Asymmetric Group Message Franking: Definitions & Constructions

Junzuo Lai¹, Gongxian Zeng², Zhengan Huang², Siu Ming Yiu³, Xin Mu², and Jian Weng¹

¹ College of Information Science and Technology, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China
laijunzuo@gmail.com, cryptweng@gmail.com
² Peng Cheng Laboratory, Shenzhen, China
gxzeng@cs.hku.hk, zhahuang.sstu@gmail.com, mux@pcl.ac.cn
³ The University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, China
smyiu@cs.hku.hk

Abstract. As online group communication scenarios become more and more common these years, malicious or unpleasant messages are much easier to spread on the internet. Message franking is a crucial cryptographic mechanism designed for content moderation in online end-to-end messaging systems, allowing the receiver of a malicious message to report the message to the moderator. Unfortunately, the existing message franking schemes only consider 1-1 communication scenarios. In this paper, we systematically explore message franking in group communication scenarios. We introduce the notion of asymmetric group message franking (AGMF), and formalize its security requirements. Then, we provide a framework of constructing AGMF from a new primitive, called HPS-KEMΣ. We also give a construction of HPS-KEMΣ based on the DDH assumption. Plugging the concrete HPS-KEMΣ scheme into our AGMF framework, we obtain a DDH-based AGMF scheme, which supports message franking in group communication scenarios.

Keywords: Message franking; Hash proof system; Key encapsulation mechanism; Signature of knowledge

1 Introduction

In recent years, secure messaging applications have become extremely popular for conversations between individuals and groups. Billions of people communicate with each other via messaging applications like Facebook Messenger, Twitter, Signal, Google Allo, etc. every day. However, these messaging applications are abused for the spread of malicious information such as harassment messages, phishing links, fake information and so on. Facebook Messenger [20,21] introduced the concept of message franking, which was formally studied in [24] later. Generally, (symmetric or asymmetric) message franking [21,24,36] provides accountability, i.e., it allows the receiver to report the malicious messages to some
moderator (e.g., the platform or some trusted third party), and meanwhile guarantees that no fake reports can be fabricated to frame an honest sender. Deniability, as also an explicit goal of Facebook’s message franking based moderation system [21], is formalized for asymmetric message franking (AMF) in [36]. Informally, deniability ensures that when the receiver reports some malicious messages, only the moderator is able to validate the report. In other words, after a compromise, the sender can deny sending the messages technically, in order to avoid backlash or embarrassment (for more explanations, please refer to [36]). Now, message franking is a vital security feature for secure messaging applications, especially in government affairs, business and so on.

Compared with symmetric message franking, asymmetric message franking supports third-party moderation, decoupling the platform and the moderator, which enables cross-platform moderation of multiple messaging systems. As pointed out in [36], this property is necessary in decentralized or federated messaging systems like Matrix [2] or Mastodon [1], and is advantageous if the platform cannot adequately moderate messages, or if sub-communities want to enforce their own content policies.

However, the existing AMF [36] only considers the case of 1-1 communication. As for another common scenarios, group communications, no works have ever related to this topic. Group communication plays an important role in teamwork or other multi-user scenarios, and many popular instance communication tools support it, such as WhatsApp and Signal. In addition, the IETF launched the message-layer security (MLS) working group, which aims to standardize an eponymous secure group messaging protocol. At the meanwhile, the academic researchers also paid lots of attention, such as [39,23,13,3,4].

Contributions. In this paper, we systematically explore message franking in group communication scenarios. The contributions are listed as follows.

– We introduce a new primitive called asymmetric group message franking (AGMF), and formalize its security notions.
– We present a variant of key encapsulation mechanism (KEM), called HPS-KEM, and provide a construction based on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption. The construction can be extended to be built based on the $k$-Linear assumption.
– We provide a framework of constructing AGMF from HPS-KEM, and show that it achieves the required security properties. Actually, we also obtain a framework of constructing AMF from HPS-KEM (i.e., when the size of the receiver set is 1).

When plugging the concrete HPS-KEM scheme into our AGMF framework, we obtain an AGMF scheme based on the DDH assumption, which implies a DDH-based AMF scheme. Note that the only existing AMF scheme [36]†

† Very recently, Issa et al. also consider a kind of AMF, called Hecate [28], but it is somewhat different from [36]. Firstly, [36] and this paper only focus on the intrinsic/fundamental security properties of A(G)MF, while Hecate [28] also considers
is constructed based on a somewhat exotic assumption, knowledge-of-exponent assumption (KEA) [5], or the Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption [6].

**AGMF primitive.** In the context of AGMF, there are three kinds of parties involved: the sender, the multiple receivers, and the moderator (or called the judge). Syntactically, similar to AMF, an AGMF consists of nine algorithms: three algorithms for generating public parameters and key pairs, three algorithms (Frank, Verify, Judge) for creating and verifying genuine signatures, and the other three algorithms (Forge, RForge, JForge) for forging signatures. In a nutshell, the sender invokes the signing algorithm Frank to generate signatures for a receiver set. Any receiver calls Verify (with his/her secret key as input) to verify the received signatures. If some receiver reports some malicious message to the moderator, the moderator verifies the report with algorithm Judge. Algorithms Forge, RForge and JForge are not intended to be run by legitimate users. Their existence guarantee deniability in particular compromise scenarios.

We consider three kinds of security requirements for AGMF: accountability, deniability, and receiver anonymity.

- **Accountability.** Accountability is formalized with two special properties: sender binding and receiver binding. Sender binding guarantees that any sender should not be able to trick receivers into accepting unreportable messages, and receiver binding guarantees that any receivers cannot deceive the judge or other honest receivers (to frame the innocent sender).
- **Deniability.** Deniability is formalized with three special properties: universal deniability, receiver compromise deniability and judge compromise deniability. Universal deniability is formalized to guarantee deniability when no receiver secret key or judge secret key is compromised. Receiver compromise deniability is formalized to guarantee deniability when the secret keys of some receivers in the receiver set are compromised. Judge compromise deniability is formalized to guarantee deniability when the judge’s secret key is compromised.
- **Receiver anonymity.** Receiver anonymity is formalized to guarantee that any one (except for the receivers in the receiver set), including the judge, cannot tell which receiver set a signature is generated for.

When formalizing the above security requirements, the existence of multiple receivers in group communication scenarios introduces new security risks, making the security models in AGMF different from that in AMF.

First of all, due to the existence of multiple receivers, it is natural to consider that the adversary in the security models of AGMF is able to corrupt some of the receivers. These corruptions bring in the following concerns.

---

others, e.g., forward/backward secrecy. Secondly, [36] only needs one round of communication and can generate the AMF signature on the fly, but Hecate [28] introduces an AMF with preprocessing model, resulting in one more preprocessing round with the moderator to get a “token” before generating the AMF signature. Hence, we follow the definition in [36], not considering Hecate [28] when talking about AMF.
Compared with receiver binding for AMF, which requires that any single receiver cannot deceive the judge to frame the innocent sender, receiver binding for AGMF requires that any corrupted receivers cannot deceive the judge or the other honest receivers to frame the innocent sender.

Recall that receiver compromise deniability for AMF requires that a party with the receiver’s secret key is able to create a signature, such that for other parties with access to this secret key, it is indistinguishable from honestly-generated signatures. Comparatively, receiver compromise deniability for AGMF requires that any corrupted users in the receiver set are able to create a signature, such that for other parties with access to these corrupted users’ secret keys, it is indistinguishable from honestly-generated signatures.

Secondly, we also formalize a new security notion called receiver anonymity, which is not considered in AMF. Receiver anonymity requires that any one (except for the receivers in the receiver set), including the judge, cannot tell which receiver set a signature is generated for. With receiver anonymity, the receivers in group communication scenarios can report the malicious messages to the moderator with less concerns. If the AGMF scheme does not support receiver anonymity, then the judge can know some information about the identities of receivers from the report. Then the reporter may be at the risk of vengeance, especially if the judge is possible to leak the receiver’s identity information to the sender. As a result, it would silence the reporters. Actually, anonymity has already been considered in many group scenarios, such as accountable anonymous group messaging system [14,38,35], and proactively accountable anonymous messaging [15].

More importantly, in all our proposed security models, the adversary is allowed to corrupt the receivers adaptively. In other words, how many and whose secret keys are compromised is unpredictable in practical scenarios, which is greatly different from that in AMF (i.e., only one receiver’s secret key is compromised). Compared with non-adaptive corruptions (i.e., the adversary is required to announce all the corrupted users at the beginning before seeing all users’ public keys), adaptive corruptions are more natural, and cryptographic schemes supporting adaptive corruptions are much more difficult to obtain, as mentioned in [25,26,29,3].

**AGMF construction.** Following, we highlight the technical details of our AGMF construction.

\[ \text{HPS-KEM}^{\Sigma} \]. In order to provide a framework of constructing AGMF, we introduce a new primitive. This primitive is a variant of key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) satisfying that (i) it can be interpreted from the perspective of hash proof system (HPS) [17], and (ii) for some special relations (about the public/secret keys, the encapsulated keys and ciphertexts), there exist corresponding Sigma protocols [16]. We call this primitive *HPS-based KEM supporting Sigma protocols (HPS-KEM*)$^{\Sigma}$.

A HPS-KEM$^{\Sigma}$ scheme HPS-KEM$^{\Sigma}$ mainly contains six algorithms: Setup, KG, $\text{encap}_k$, $\text{encap}_c$, $\text{decap}$ and $\text{encap}_r$. In a nutshell, Setup outputs a public
parameter, and KG outputs a pair of public/secret user keys. Taking the public parameter as input, without user’s public key, \textit{encap}_c outputs a well-formed ciphertext, and \textit{encap}_c^* outputs a ciphertext which could be well-formed or ill-formed. The algorithm \textit{encap}_k, sharing the same randomness space with \textit{encap}_c, takes the public parameter and user’s public key as input, and outputs an encapsulated key. With user’s secret key, the algorithm \textit{decap} is invoked to decapsulate the ciphertexts to get the encapsulated keys. The correctness demands that given a ciphertext output by \textit{encap}_c with randomness \( r \), \textit{decap} outputs a key \( k \) equal to the one generated by \textit{encap}_k with the same randomness \( r \).

It is required that there are Sigma protocols to prove that some results are exactly output by KG, \textit{encap}_c, \textit{encap}_k or \textit{encap}_c^*. We also require the following properties informally.

1. Universality: when given a public key, it is difficult for any unbounded adversary without the corresponding secret key to generate an ill-formed ciphertext \( c \), an encapsulated key \( k \) and a witness \( w \) (indicating that \( c \) is generated via \textit{encap}_c^*), such that with the ciphertext \( c \) as input, \textit{decap} outputs a key equal to \( k \).
2. Unexplainability: it is difficult to generate a ciphertext \( c \) and a witness \( w \) (indicating that \( c \) is generated via \textit{encap}_c^*), such that \( c \) is well-formed.
3. Indistinguishability: the ciphertext output by \textit{encap}_c^* is indistinguishable from the well-formed ciphertext output by \textit{encap}_c.
4. SK-second-preimage resistance: when given a pair of public and secret keys, it is difficult to generate another valid secret key for this public key.
5. Smoothness: when given a public key, the algorithm \textit{decap}, fed with a ciphertext generated via \textit{encap}_c^* and a user’s secret key randomly sampled from the set of secret keys corresponding to the public key, will output a key uniformly distributed over the encapsulated key space.

**AGMF from HPS-KEM**. Taking HPS-KEM as a building block, we construct AGMF as follows.

The public/secret key pairs of all users (including the judge) are generated by invoking the key generation algorithm KG of the HPS-KEM.

Given a pair of sender’s public/secret keys \((pk_s, sk_s)\), a receiver set \( S = \{pk_r_i\}_{i \in [|S|]} \), the judge’s public key \( pk_J \) and a message \( m \), the sender calls Frank to generate the signature as follows:

(1) Compute \( c \leftarrow \textit{encap}_c(pp, r), k_J \leftarrow \textit{encap}_k(pp, pk_J, r) \) and \( (k_r_i \leftarrow \textit{encap}_k(pp, pk_r_i, r))_{pk_r_i \in S} \) with the same randomness \( r \).

(2) Consider the following relation

\[
\mathcal{R} = \{ (s, r, r^*), (pp, pk_s, pk_J, c, k_J) : (sk_s, pk_s) \in \mathcal{R}_s \wedge (r, (c, k_J, pk_J)) \in \mathcal{R}_{c, k} \} \cup \{ (r^*, c) \in \mathcal{R}_{c, k}^* \}
\]

where \( \mathcal{R}_s \) is a relation proving that the sender’s public/secret keys are valid, \( \mathcal{R}_{c, k} \) is a relation proving that \((c, k_J)\) are generated via \textit{encap}_c and \textit{encap}_k.
with the same randomness $r$, and $\mathcal{R}^*_s$ is a relation proving that $c$ is a ciphertext output by $\text{encap}_c^*$ with randomness $r^*$. As the HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ guarantees that there are Sigma protocols for KG, $\text{encap}_c$, $\text{encap}_c^*$ and $\text{encap}_c^\Sigma$, we can obtain a signature of knowledge (SoK) scheme for $\mathcal{R}$ by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform [22] and composition operations of Sigma protocols [7].

(3) Employ the SoK scheme for $R$ to generate a signature proof $\pi$ of statement $(pp, pk_s, pk_1, c, k_1)$ for a message $m = (m||\{k_r_i\}_{pk_i \in S})$ with a witness $(sk_s, r)$.

(4) Return the signature $\sigma = (\pi, c, k_1, \{k_r_i\}_{pk_i \in S})$.

The verification algorithm $\text{Verify}$ and the moderation algorithm $\text{Judge}$ work similarly. When some receiver receives a message and a signature or the judge receives a report with a message and a signature, the first step of these algorithms is to verify if the proof $\pi$ in the signature is valid. If not valid, $\text{Verify}$ (resp., $\text{Judge}$) returns 0; otherwise, $\text{Verify}$ (resp., $\text{Judge}$) returns 1 if and only if $\text{decap}(pp, sk_s, c) \in \{k_r_i\}$ (resp., $\text{decap}(pp, sk_s, c) = k_1$).

Now we turn to describe the forging algorithms $\text{Forge}$, $R\text{Forge}$ and $J\text{Forge}$.

Given a sender’s public keys $pk_s$, a receiver set $S = \{pk_r_i\}_{i \in |S|}$, the judge’s public key $pk_j$ and a message $m$, the universal forging algorithm $\text{Forge}$ proceeds as follows:

(1) Compute $c \leftarrow \text{encap}_c^*(pp; r^*)$ with randomness $r^*$, $k_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$, and $(k_r_i \leftarrow \mathcal{K})_{pk_i \in S}$.

(2) Employ the SoK scheme for $\mathcal{R}$ in Eq. (1) to generate a signature proof $\pi$ of statement $(pp, pk_s, pk_1, c, k_1)$ for a message $m = (m||\{k_r_i\}_{pk_i \in S})$ with a witness $r^*$.

(3) Return the signature $\sigma = (\pi, c, k_1, \{k_r_i\}_{pk_i \in S})$.

Given a sender’s public key $pk_s$, a receiver set $S = \{pk_r_i\}_{i \in |S|}$, the corrupted receivers’ secret keys $\{sk_r_i\}_{pk_i \in S_{\text{cor}}}$ (where $S_{\text{cor}} \subset S$), the judge’s public key $pk_j$ and a message $m$, the receiver compromise forging algorithm $R\text{Forge}$ proceeds similarly to $\text{Forge}$, except that $(k_r_i, pk_i \in S)$ are generated as follows: for each $pk_i \in S \setminus S_{\text{cor}}$, samples $k_r_i \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$; for each $pk_i \in S_{\text{cor}}$, computes $k_r_i \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk_r_i, c)$.

Given a sender’s public keys $pk_s$, a receiver set $S = \{pk_r_i\}_{i \in |S|}$, the judge’s secret key $sk_j$ and a message $m$, the judge compromise forging algorithm $J\text{Forge}$ proceeds similarly to $\text{Forge}$, except that $k_j$ is generated by $k_j \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk_j, c)$.

Security analysis. Now we briefly show that our AGMF framework provides accountability, deniability and receiver anonymity.

Informally, sender binding requires that any malicious sender cannot generate a signature such that an honest receiver accepts it but the judge rejects it. If there exists an adversary generating such a signature $\sigma = (\pi, c, k_1, \{k_r_i\}_{pk_i \in S})$, then we have: (i) $\pi$ is a valid proof for the relation $\mathcal{R}$; (ii) $k' = \text{decap}(pp, sk_i, c) \in \{k_r_i\}_{pk_i \in S}$; (iii) $\text{decap}(pp, sk_j, c) \neq k_1$. Observe that to generate the valid proof $\pi$ for $\mathcal{R}$, the adversary needs to know witness $(sk_s, r)$ or $r^*$. According to (i) and (iii), it implies that the adversary generates $\pi$ using the witness $r^*$, which suggests that $c$ is generated via $\text{encap}_c^*$. The unexplainability of HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ implies that $c$ is not well-formed with overwhelming probability. So according to (ii), $(c, k', r^*)$ leads to a successful attack on universality of HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$. 

6
Informally, receiver anonymity requires that any malicious receivers cannot generate a signature such that an honest receiver or the judge accepts it.

- Supposing that there exists an adversary generating a signature \( \sigma = (\pi, c, k_1, \{k_i\}_{pk_i \in S}) \) such that an honest receiver accepts it, we have: (i) \( \pi \) is a valid proof for the relation \( R \); (ii) \( k' = \text{decap}(pp, sk_i, c) \in \{k_i\}_{pk_i \in S} \). Observe that to generate the valid proof \( \pi \) for \( R \), the adversary needs to know witness \((sk_i, r)\) or \( r^*\).
  - If the adversary knows \((sk_i, r)\), it implies that \( sk_i \) is a valid secret key of the sender. Since the adversary is not allowed to corrupt the sender, it is contradictory to SK-second-preimage resistance of HPS-KEM\(^\Sigma\).
  - If the adversary knows \( r^*\), it implies that \( c \) is generated via \( \text{encap}_c^* \).

The unexplainability of HPS-KEM\(^\Sigma\) guarantees that \( c \) is not well-formed with overwhelming probability. So according to (ii), \((c, k', r^*)\) leads to a successful attack on universality of HPS-KEM\(^\Sigma\).

- Supposing that there exists an adversary generating a signature \( \sigma = (\pi, c, k_1, \{k_i\}_{pk_i \in S}) \) such that the judge accepts it, we have: (i) \( \pi \) is a valid proof for the relation \( R \); (ii) \( \text{decap}(pp, sk, c) = k_1 \). With similar analysis, this leads to a successful attack on SK-second-preimage resistance or universality of HPS-KEM\(^\Sigma\).

Next, we turn to analyze universal deniability, receiver compromise deniability, and judge compromise deniability of our AGMF framework. Due to the similarity of security analysis of these deniabilities, here we just show how universal deniability is achieved.

Universal deniability requires that the outputs of \( \text{Frank} \) and \( \text{Forge} \) are indistinguishable. For the generation of signature \( \sigma = (\pi, c, k_1, \{k_i\}_{pk_i \in S}) \), the differences between the two algorithms are as follows.

- \((c, k_1, \{k_i\}_{pk_i \in S})\): Algorithm \( \text{Frank} \) computes \( c \leftarrow \text{encap}_c(pp; r) \), \( k_1 \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, pk; r) \) and \( (k_i \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, pk; r))_{pk_i \in S} \) with the same randomness \( r \), while algorithm \( \text{Forge} \) computes \( c \leftarrow \text{encap}_c^*(pp; r^*) \) with randomness \( r^* \), and samples \( k_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{K} \) and \( (k_i \leftarrow \mathcal{K})_{pk_i \in S} \).

The indistinguishability of HPS-KEM\(^\Sigma\) guarantees that \( c \) output by \( \text{encap}_c \) is indistinguishable from that output by \( \text{encap}_c^* \). When \( c \leftarrow \text{encap}_c(pp; r) \), we have \( \text{encap}_k(pp, pk; r) = \text{decap}(pp, sk_i, c) \) and \( \text{encap}_k(pp, pk; r) = \text{decap}(pp, sk, c) \). On the other hand, when \( c \leftarrow \text{encap}_c^*(pp; r^*) \), the smoothness of HPS-KEM\(^\Sigma\) guarantees that the encapsulated keys \( k_i \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk_i, c) \) and \( k_j \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk_1, c) \) are indistinguishable from those random keys \( k_i \leftarrow \mathcal{K} \) and \( k_j \leftarrow \mathcal{K} \). Therefore, through hybrid arguments, we can show that \((c, k_1, \{k_i\}_{pk_i \in S})\) output by \( \text{Frank} \) and \( \text{Forge} \) are indistinguishable.

- \( \pi \): \( \text{Frank} \) generates a signature proof \( \pi \) for \( R \) with a witness \((sk_i, r)\), while \( \text{Forge} \) generates \( \pi \) for \( R \) with a witness \( r^* \). Because of zero knowledge property of the SoK scheme for \( R \), anyone cannot distinguish the proof output by \( \text{Frank} \) from that output by \( \text{Forge} \).

Finally, we briefly explain why our AGMF framework achieves receiver anonymity. Informally, receiver anonymity requires that given two receiver sets \( S_0 \) and \( S_1 \).
with the same size, a signature generated by Frank for $S_0$ is indistinguishable from that for $S_1$. According to the above security analysis of universal deniability, the signature output by Frank is indistinguishable from that output by Forge. Notice that, the signature generated by Forge does not contain any information about the receiver set. Thus, the signatures generated by Frank for $S_0$ and for $S_1$ are indistinguishable.

Construction of HPS-KEM$^2$. Inspired by the DDH-based HPS [17], we provide a construction of HPS-KEM$^2$, which can be extended to be built based on the $k$-Linear assumption. The main algorithms are constructed as follows.

KG outputs a pair of public/secret keys $(pk, sk) = (g_1^{x_1}g_2^{x_2}, (x_1, x_2))$, where $g_1, g_2$ are two generators of group $G$ of prime order $p$, and $x_1, x_2$ are uniformly sampled from $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

To generate a well-formed ciphertext $c$, $encap_k$ outputs $c = (u_1, u_2) = (g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2})$, where $r$ is uniformly random sampled from $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

For generating a ciphertext, $encap^*_k$ chooses randomness $r^* = (r, r') \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$ and outputs $c = (u_1, u_2) = (g_1^{x_1}, g_2^{x_2})$.

Algorithm $encap_k$ outputs an encapsulated key $k = pk^r$, where $r$ is uniformly random sampled from $\mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

When inputting a ciphertext $c = (u_1, u_2)$ and a secret key $sk = (x_1, x_2)$, the algorithm $decap$ outputs a key $k' = u_1^{x_1}u_2^{x_2}$.

Note that there are Sigma protocols for KG, $encap_k$, $encap^*_k$ or $encap^*_k$: Okamoto’s Sigma protocol [31] for KG, the Chaum-Pedersen protocol [11] for $encap_k$, and $encap^*_k$, with the same randomness, and Schnorr’s Sigma protocol [33] for $encap^*_k$.

Now we show our HPS-KEM$^2$ construction achieves the required properties. With similar analysis in [17], we can easily obtain universality, indistinguishability and smoothness of our construction.

For unexplainability, suppose that there exists an adversary breaking the unexplainability of our scheme. In other words, the adversary generates $c = (u_1, u_2)$ and $w = (r, r')$, such that (i) $(u_1 = g_1^{x_1} \land (u_2 = g_1^{x_2})$, and (ii) $c$ is well-formed. Note that $c$ is well-formed implies that $u_2 = g_2^{x_2}$. So we can compute $\log_{g_1} g_2 = \frac{x_2}{x_1}$, solving the DL problem.

For SK-second-preimage resistance (SK-2PR), suppose that there exists an adversary breaking the SK-2PR of our scheme. In other words, given a public/secret key pair $(pk, sk) = (g_1^{x_1}g_2^{x_2}, (x_1, x_2))$, the adversary outputs another secret key $sk' = (x'_1, x'_2)$ such that $pk = g_1^{x'_1}g_2^{x'_2}$. We can compute $\log_{g_1} g_2 = (x_1 - x'_1)/(x'_2 - x_2)$, solving the DL problem.

Discussion 1: Lower bound. Following we present a lower bound of the size of AGMF signature.

Theorem 1. Any AGMF with receiver binding and receiver compromise deniability must have signature size $\Omega(n)$, where $n$ is the number of the members in $S$.

Proof. Suppose that there exists a distinguisher $D$ who knows all receivers’ secret keys. Given a signature generated by RForge with a corrupted receiver set $S_{cor}$.
D can distinguish whether someone is in \( S_{\text{cor}} \) or not, by verifying validity of the signature. Note that receiver binding and receiver deniability guarantee that only the receivers in \( S_{\text{cor}} \) would accept the signature. Thus, \( D \) can determine the set \( S_{\text{cor}} \) when given a signature generated by RForge. Therefore, the signature must contain enough bits to indicate \( S_{\text{cor}} \). Since \( S_{\text{cor}} \subseteq S \) and it can be an arbitrary subset, there are \( 2^{|S|} = 2^n \) kinds of different subsets. Thus, the bit length of signature is at least \( \log_2 2^{|S|} = \log_2 2^n = n \). Considering that the signature output by Frank is indistinguishable from that output by RForge, the bit length of signature output by Frank is also \( \Omega(n) \).

When plugging the concrete HPS-KEMs scheme into our AGMF framework, we obtain an AGMF scheme based on the DDH assumption. The bit length of the signature would be \( 9 \times |\mathbb{Z}_p^*| + (n + 3) \times |G| \), where \( n \) is the number of receivers and \( p \) is the order of group \( G \).

Theorem 1 indicates that the size of signature of AGMF is linear in \( n \), and the coefficient of \( n \) in the size of signature of our AGMF scheme is \(|G|\), which is almost optimal. Note that a proof with similar idea is given by Damgård et al. in [18, Theorem 1], to show the lower bound of the size of multi-designated verifier signatures with any-subset simulation and strong unforgeablity.

**Discussion II:** AGMF when \( n = 1 \). Note that our method actually provides a framework of constructing AMF from HPS-KEMs (i.e., when the size of the receiver set is 1). The AMF scheme [36] is firstly constructed based on a somewhat exotic assumption, the KEA assumption [5]. As mentioned by Tyagi et al. [36], the KEA assumption poses a challenge for interpreting the concrete security analyses since the KEA extractor is not concretely instantiated. Then, they also show a variant scheme that can be proven secure using the GDH assumption [6], at the cost of signatures with slightly larger size. Specifically, the bit length of the AMF signature [36] based on the GDH assumption would be \( 9 \times |\mathbb{Z}_p^*| + 4 \times |G| \).

When plugging the concrete HPS-KEMs scheme into the AMF framework, we obtain a DDH-based AMF scheme. Although the size of the signature of our AMF scheme would be \( 9 \times |\mathbb{Z}_p^*| + 4 \times |G| \) as well, we stress that at the same security level, the binary representation of the group element in our scheme has smaller size than that in the GDH-based AMF scheme [36].

**Discussion III:** AGMF from AMF [36] directly. A trivial construction of AGMF is extended directly from the existing AMF [36], e.g., integrating AMF [36] with the “trivial” Signal group key mechanism (i.e., a set of individual links to each member of the group). The extension has two shortcomings: i) the signature contains \( n \) NIZK proofs, and ii) it needs a non-standard assumption, which is inherited from AMF [36]. Our scheme does not have these shortcomings. We also consider another extension in Appendix B. The key point is that we extend the relation used in AMF [36] for one receiver to a relation for multiple receivers. However, this extension also has similar shortcomings mentioned above. Due to space limitations, more details of the extension are placed in Appendix B.

**Discussion IV:** Integrating AGMF with group messaging protocols. For end-to-end encryption systems, there are kinds of requirements, including
message franking, privacy, forward/backward security, etc.. Our paper focuses
on asymmetric message franking in group communication scenarios, not caring
about the other intrinsic security of group messaging protocols (e.g., privacy
and authenticity in the form of post-compromise forward secrecy). Discussing a
unified security model capturing other security properties is out of the scope of
this paper and we remain it as a future work.

A potential method to integrate AGMF with group messaging protocols (e.g.,
[23,14,13,3]) is similar to AMF. In other words, we treat the output of AGMF
as a signature and then encrypt the message and the signature following these
protocols.

Related work. The technique of symmetric message franking (SMF) was firstly
introduced by Facebook [20,21]. Grubbs et al. [24] initiated a formal study of
SMF, formalizing a cryptographic primitive called compactly committing authen-
ticated encryption with associated data (AEAD), and then showing that
many in-use AEAD schemes can be used for SMF. Dodis et al. [19] pointed out
that the Facebook SMF scheme is actually insecure, and proposed an efficient
single-pass construction of compactly committing AEAD. Observing that in all
previous SMF schemes, to make a report the receiver has to reveal the whole
communication for a session, Leontiadis et al. [30] and Chen et al. [12] indepen-
dently presented SMF constructions to tackle this problem. In CRYPTO 2019,
Tyagi et al. [36] initiated a formal study of AMF, formalizing security notions
of accountability and deniability for AMF, and showing an AMF construction
via signature of knowledge [8].

Recently, some works [37,32,28] explore source-tracking, which allows the
moderator to pinpoint the original source of a viral message rather than the
immediate sender of the message (in the setting of message franking [24,36]).
These works mainly focus on end-to-end encrypted messaging. It is an interesting
direction to consider source-tracking in group settings.

Group messaging and its variants have been studied in many works [39,23,14,13,3,4],
 focusing on different properties or security requirements. To the best of our
knowledge, currently there are no variants of group messaging which can provide
the aforementioned accountability, deniability and anonymity simultaneously.

In 2020, Damgård et al. [18] proposed the notion of off-the-record for any
subset in the constructions of multi-designated verifier signature (MDVS) for the
group Off-the-Record messaging. The notion is somewhat similar to the receiver
compromise deniability defined in this paper. As designated verifier signature
does not have all desired properties in the setting of AMF [36], the MDVS
construction [18] does not provide all required properties (e.g., accountability)
in our AGMF scenarios either.

Roadmap. We recall some preliminaries in Section 2. Then in Section 3, we
present the primitive of AGMF and formalize its security notions of accountabil-
ity, deniability and receiver anonymity. Next, in Section 4, we introduce a primi-
tive called HPS-KEMΣ and present a concrete construction. Taking HPS-KEMΣ
as a building block, we provide a framework of constructing AGMF, and show
that it achieves accountability, deniability and receiver anonymity in Section 5.
2 Preliminaries

Notations. Throughout this paper, let $\lambda$ denote the security parameter. For any $k \in \mathbb{N}$, let $[k] := \{1, 2, \cdots, k\}$. For a finite set $S$, we denote by $|S|$ the number of elements in $S$, and denote by $a \leftarrow S$ the process of uniformly sampling $a$ from $S$. For a distribution $X$, we denote by $a \leftarrow X$ the process of sampling $a$ from $X$. For any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm $\text{Alg}$, we write $\text{Alg}(x; r)$ for the process of running $\text{Alg}$ on input $x$ with inner randomness $r$, and use $y \leftarrow \text{Alg}(x)$ to denote the process of running $\text{Alg}$ on input $x$ with uniformly sampled inner randomness $r$, and assigning $y$ the result.

Now we recall the definitions of non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proof system in the random oracle model, Sigma protocol, and the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [22] as follows. For convenience, the recalled NIZK is a variant integrating the notion of signature of knowledge in [9, 10, 36] and the notion of NIZK in [7].

NIZK proof system. Let $M$ be a message space. For a witness space $X$ and a statement space $Y$, let $R \subseteq X \times Y$ be a relation. A NIZK proof scheme $\text{NIZK}^R = (\text{prove}, \text{verify})$ for witness-statement relation $R \subseteq X \times Y$ is a pair of PPT algorithms associated with a message space $M$ and a proof space $\Pi$.

- $\pi \leftarrow \text{NIZK}^R.\text{prove}(m, x, y)$: The prove algorithm takes $(m, x, y) \in M \times X \times Y$ as input, and outputs a proof $\pi \in \Pi$.
- $b \leftarrow \text{NIZK}^R.\text{verify}(m, \pi, y)$: The verification algorithm takes $(m, \pi, y) \in M \times \Pi \times Y$ as input, and outputs a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

It is required to satisfies completeness, existential soundness, and zero-knowledge in the random oracle model. The formal definitions are recalled as follows.

- Completeness. For all $m \in M$ and all $(x, y) \in R$, we always have $\text{NIZK}^R.\text{verify}(m, \text{NIZK}^R.\text{prove}(m, x, y), y) = 1$.
- Existential soundness. For any PPT adversary $A$, $\text{Adv}_{\text{NIZK}, A}^{\text{sound}}(\lambda)$ is negligible, where $\text{Adv}_{\text{NIZK}, A}^{\text{sound}}(\lambda)$ is the probability that $A$ outputs $(m, y) \in M \times Y$ and $\pi \in \Pi$, such that $\text{NIZK}^R.\text{verify}(m, \pi, y) = 1$ and $(x', y) \not\in R$ for all $x' \in X$.
- Zero-knowledge. There is a PPT simulator $S = (S_{\text{prove}}, S_{\text{ro}})$, such that for any PPT adversary $A$, the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{NIZK}, A}^{\text{zk}}(\lambda) := \left| \Pr[G_{\text{real}}^{\text{NIZK}, A}(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[G_{\text{ideal}}^{\text{NIZK}, A, S}(\lambda) = 1] \right|$$

is negligible, where $G_{\text{real}}^{\text{NIZK}, A}$ and $G_{\text{ideal}}^{\text{NIZK}, A, S}$ are both in Fig. 1. Suppose that $\text{NIZK}^R$ makes use of a hash function $\text{Hash}$, and the hash function $\text{Hash}$ with output length $\text{len}$ in Fig. 1 is modeled as a random oracle (a local array $H$ is employed).

Sigma protocol. A Sigma protocol for $R \subseteq X \times Y$ consists of two efficient interactive protocol algorithms $(P, V)$, where $P = (P_1, P_2)$ is the prover and $V = (V_1, V_2)$ is the verifier, associated with a challenge space $CL$. Specifically,
Fig. 1 Games for defining zero knowledge of $\text{NiZK}^N$

for any $(x, y) \in \mathcal{R}$, the input of the prover (resp., verifier) is $(x, y)$ (resp., $y$). The prover first computes $(cm, aux) \leftarrow P_1(x, y)$ and sends the commitment $cm$ to the verifier. The verifier (i.e., $V_1$) returns a challenge $cl \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$. Then the prover replies with $z \leftarrow P_2(cm, cl, x, y, aux)$. Receiving $z$, the verifier (i.e., $V_2$) outputs $b \in \{0, 1\}$. The tuple $(cm, cl, z)$ is called a conversation. We require that $V$ does not make any random choices other than the selection of $cl$. For any fixed $(cm, cl, z)$, if the final output of $V(y)$ is $1$, $(cm, cl, z)$ is called an accepting conversation for $y$. Correctness requires for all $(x, y) \in \mathcal{R}$, when $P(x, y)$ and $V(y)$ interact with each other, the final output of $V(y)$ is always $1$.

The corresponding security notions are as follows.

Definition 1. (Knowledge soundness). We say that a Sigma protocol $(P, V)$ for $R \subseteq X \times Y$ provides knowledge soundness, if there is an efficient deterministic algorithm $\text{Ext}$ such that on input $y \in Y$ and two accepting conversations $(cm, cl, z), (cm, cl', z')$ where $cl \neq cl'$, $\text{Ext}$ always outputs an $x \in X$ satisfying $(x, y) \in \mathcal{R}$.

Definition 2. (Special HVZK). We say that a Sigma protocol $(P, V)$ for $R \subseteq X \times Y$ with challenge space $\mathcal{C}$ is special honest verifier zero knowledge (special HVZK), if there is a PPT simulator $\mathcal{S}$ which takes $(y, cl) \in Y \times \mathcal{C}$ as input and satisfies the following properties:

(i) for all $(y, cl) \in Y \times \mathcal{C}$, $\mathcal{S}$ always outputs a pair $(cm, z)$ such that $(cm, cl, z)$ is an accepting conversation for $y$;

(ii) for all $(x, y) \in \mathcal{R}$, the tuple $(cm, cl, z)$, generated via $cl \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$ and $(cm, z) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(y, cl)$, has the same distribution as that of a transcript of a conversation between $P(x, y)$ and $V(y)$.

The Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Let $\mathcal{M}$ be a message space, and $(P, V) = ((P_1, P_2), (V_1, V_2))$ be a Sigma protocol for a relation $\mathcal{R} \subseteq X \times Y$, where its conversations $(cm, cl, z)$ belong to some space $CM \times CL \times Z$. Let $\text{Hash} : \mathcal{M} \times CM \rightarrow CL$
be a hash function. The Fiat-Shamir non-interactive proof system \( \text{NIZK}_{\text{FS}} = (\text{prove}_{\text{FS}}, \text{verify}_{\text{FS}}) \), with proof space \( \Pi = \mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{Z} \), is as follows:

- \( \text{prove}_{\text{FS}}(m, x, y) \): On input \((m, x, y) \in \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}\), this algorithm firstly generates \((cm, aux) \leftarrow P_1(x, y)\) and \(cl = \text{Hash}(m, cm, y)\), and then computes \(z \leftarrow P_2(cm, cl, x, y, aux)\). Finally, it outputs \(\pi = (cm, z)\).

- \( \text{verify}_{\text{FS}}(m, (cm, z), y) \): On input \((m, (cm, z), y) \in \mathcal{M} \times (\mathcal{C} \times \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{Z}) \times \mathcal{Y}\), this algorithm firstly computes \(cl = \text{Hash}(m, cm, y)\), and then runs \(V_2(y)\) to check whether \((cm, cl, z)\) is a valid conversation for \(y\). If so, \(\text{verify}_{\text{FS}}\) returns \(1\); otherwise, it returns \(0\).

According to \([22,7]\), \(\text{NIZK}_{\text{FS}}\) is an NIZK proof system if \(\text{Hash}\) is modeled as a random oracle. To be noted, in order to reduce the size of \(\pi\), we replace \(cm\) with \(cl\) (i.e., we have \(\pi = (z, cl)\)), following \([7]\).

**Cryptographic assumptions.** Let \(G\) be a cyclic group of prime order \(p\) and \(g\) be the generator of \(G\).

**Definition 3. (The DL assumption).** We say that the discrete logarithm (DL) assumption holds for \(G\), if for any PPT adversary \(A\), \(\text{Adv}_{G, A}^{\text{dl}}(\lambda) := \Pr[G_{G, A}^{\text{dl}}(\lambda) = 1] \) is negligible, where \(G_{G, A}^{\text{dl}}(\lambda)\) is shown in Fig. 2.

**Definition 4. (The DDH assumption).** We say that the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption holds for \(G\), if for any PPT adversary \(D\), \(\text{Adv}_{G, D}^{\text{ddh}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[G_{G, D}^{\text{ddh}}(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \) is negligible, where \(G_{G, D}^{\text{ddh}}(\lambda)\) is in Fig. 2.

![Fig. 2 Games for the DL and DDH assumptions](image)

### 3 Asymmetric group message franking

In this section, we introduce a primitive called *asymmetric group message franking (AGMF)* and formalize its security notions. Generally, AGMF is a cryptographic primitive providing accountability, deniability and receiver anonymity in group communication scenarios simultaneously.

13
3.1 AGMF algorithms

We will firstly present the detailed notations of AGMF, and then explain the syntax of the algorithms.

Formally, an asymmetric group message franking (AGMF) scheme \( \text{AGMF} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KG}_J, \text{KG}_u, \text{Frank}, \text{Verify}, \text{Judge}, \text{Forge}, \text{RForge}, \text{JForge}) \) is a tuple of algorithms associated with a public key space \( \mathcal{PK} \), a secret key space \( \mathcal{SK} \), a message space \( \mathcal{M} \) and a signature space \( \mathcal{SG} \). Without loss of generality, we assume that all \( pk \) inputs are in \( \mathcal{PK} \), all \( sk \) inputs are in \( \mathcal{SK} \), all \( m \) inputs are in \( \mathcal{M} \), and all \( \sigma \) inputs are in \( \mathcal{SG} \).

The detailed descriptions of the nine algorithms are as follows.

- \( pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda) \): The setup algorithm takes the security parameter as input, and outputs a global public parameters \( pp \).
- \( (pk_J, sk_J) \leftarrow \text{KG}_J(pp) \): The randomized key generation algorithm \( \text{KG}_J \) takes \( pp \) as input, and outputs a key pair \( (pk_J, sk_J) \) for the judge.
- \( (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}_u(pp) \): The randomized key generation algorithm \( \text{KG}_u \) takes \( pp \) as input, and outputs a key pair \( (pk_u, sk_u) \) for users. Below we usually use \( (pk_s, sk_s) \) (resp., \( (pk_r, sk_r) \)) to denote sender (resp., receiver) public/secret key pair.
- \( \sigma \leftarrow \text{Frank}(pp, sk_u, S, pk_J, m) \): The franking algorithm takes the public parameter \( pp \), a sender’s secret key \( sk_u \), a polynomial-size receiver’s public key set \( S = \{pk_i\}_{i \in [|S|]} \subset \mathcal{PK} \), the judge’s public key \( pk_J \) and a message \( m \) as input, and outputs a signature \( \sigma \).
- \( b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(pp, pk_u, sk_r, pk_J, m, \sigma) \): The deterministic receiver verification algorithm takes \( (pp, pk_u, sk_r, pk_J) \), a message \( m \) and a signature \( \sigma \) as input, and outputs a bit \( b \), which indicates that the signature is valid or not.
- \( b \leftarrow \text{Judge}(pp, pk_u, sk_J, m, \sigma) \): The deterministic judge authentication algorithm takes \( (pp, pk_u, sk_J) \), a message \( m \) and a signature \( \sigma \) as input, and returns \( b \in \{0, 1\} \).
- \( \sigma \leftarrow \text{Forge}(pp, pk_u, S, pk_J, m) \): The universal forging algorithm, on input \( (pp, pk_u, S, pk_J) \) and a message \( m \), returns a “forged” signature \( \sigma \), where \( S \subset \mathcal{PK} \).
- \( \sigma \leftarrow \text{RForge}(pp, pk_u, (pk_r, sk_r)_{pk_i \in S_{cor}}, S, pk_J, m) \): The receiver compromise forging algorithm takes \( (pp, pk_u, (pk_r, sk_r)_{pk_i \in S_{cor}}, S, pk_J) \) and a message \( m \) as input, and returns a “forged” signature \( \sigma \), where \( S_{cor} \subset S \subset \mathcal{PK} \).
- \( \sigma \leftarrow \text{JForge}(pp, pk_u, S, sk_J, m) \): The judge compromise forging algorithm takes \( (pp, pk_u, S, sk_J) \) and a message \( m \) as input, and outputs a “forged” signature \( \sigma \), where \( S \subset \mathcal{PK} \).

**Correctness.** For any normal signature generated by \( \text{Frank} \), the correctness requires that (i) each receiver in the receiver set can call \( \text{Verify} \) to verify the signature successfully, and (ii) the moderator can invoke \( \text{Judge} \) to validate a report successfully once he receives a valid report. The formal requirements are shown as follows.

Given any \( pp \) generated by \( \text{Setup} \), any key pairs \( (pk_s, sk_s) \) and \( (pk_r, sk_r) \) output by \( \text{KG}_u \), and any key pair \( (pk_J, sk_J) \) output by \( \text{KG}_J \), we require that
for any $S \subset \mathcal{P}$ satisfying $pk_s \in S$, any message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and any $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Frank}(pp, sk_s, S, pk_j, m)$, it holds that:

1. Verify$(pp, pk_s, sk_r, pk_j, m, \sigma) = 1$;
2. Judge$(pp, pk_s, sk_j, m, \sigma) = 1$.

### 3.2 Security notions for AGMF

Now we formalize some security notions for AGMF, including the security notions for accountability, deniability and receiver anonymity of AGMF. Note that we consider the adaptive security in the following games. It means that the adversary $A$ is allowed to query the corruption oracle on different public keys adaptively, obtaining corresponding secret keys.

**Accountability.** Analogous to the setting of end-to-end communication, one of the most important security requirements in group scenarios is to prevent malicious impersonation. In other words, AGMF needs to ensure that no one will be impersonated successfully as long as her/his secret key is not compromised. Specifically, AGMF needs to guarantee that (i) no receivers can trick the judge or any receiver in the receiver set (except the adversarial receiver herself if she is also in this set) into accepting a message that is not actually sent by the sender, and (ii) no sender can create a signature such that it is accepted by some receiver but meanwhile rejected by the judge. Following the terminology in AMF [36], we also refer to these security requirements as **receiver binding** and **sender binding**, respectively.

**Games for defining receiver-binding and sender-binding of AGMF**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game Name</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{G}<em>\text{r-bind}</em>{\text{AGMF}}(\lambda)$</td>
<td>Setup$(\lambda)$: $(pk_j, sk_j) \leftarrow \text{KG}(pp)$; $U := \emptyset$; $U_{\text{key}} := \emptyset$; $U_{\text{cor}} := \emptyset$; for $i = 1, \ldots, n$: $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{KG}(pp)$; $U \leftarrow U \cup {pk_i}$ $\Rightarrow U_{\text{key}} \leftarrow U_{\text{key}} \cup {(pk_i, sk_i)}$ $(pk_s^<em>, pk_j^</em>, m^<em>, \sigma^</em>) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^\mathcal{C}(pp, U, pk_j)$ If Verify$(pp, pk_s^<em>, sk_j^</em>, pk_j, m^<em>, \sigma^</em>) = 1$: Return 1 If $pk_s^<em>, pk_j^</em> \notin U_{\text{cor}}$: If $(pk_s^<em>, S^</em>, m^<em>) \in Q_{\text{sig}}$ s.t. $pk_s^</em> \in S^<em>$: Return 1 If Judge$(pp, pk_s^</em>, sk_j^<em>, m^</em>, \sigma^<em>) = 1$: If $(pk_s^</em> \notin U_{\text{cor}}) \land ((pk_s^<em>, S^</em>, m^*) \in Q_{\text{sig}})$: Return 1 Return 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{G}<em>\text{s-bind}</em>{\text{AGMF}}(\lambda)$</td>
<td>Setup$(\lambda)$: $(pk_j, sk_j) \leftarrow \text{KG}(pp)$; $U := \emptyset$; $U_{\text{key}} := \emptyset$; $U_{\text{cor}} := \emptyset$; for $i = 1, \ldots, n$: $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{KG}(pp)$; $U \leftarrow U \cup {pk_i}$ $\Rightarrow U_{\text{key}} \leftarrow U_{\text{key}} \cup {(pk_i, sk_i)}$ $(pk_s^<em>, pk_j^</em>, m^<em>, \sigma^</em>) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^\mathcal{C}(pp, U, pk_j)$ If $pk_s^* \in U_{\text{cor}}$: Return 0 $b_1 \leftarrow \text{Verify}(pp, pk_s^<em>, sk_j^</em>, pk_j, m^<em>, \sigma^</em>)$ $b_2 \leftarrow \text{Judge}(pp, pk_s^<em>, sk_j^</em>, m^<em>, \sigma^</em>)$ Return $b_1 \land \neg b_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{G}_\text{cor}(pk')$</td>
<td>$U_{\text{cor}} \leftarrow U_{\text{cor}} \cup {pk'}$ Return sk$'$ s.t. $(pk', sk') \in U_{\text{key}}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{G}_\text{frank}(pk', S', m')$</td>
<td>$Q_{\text{sig}} \leftarrow Q_{\text{sig}} \cup {(pk_s', S', m')}$ Return Frank$(pp, sk_s', S', pk_j, m')$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{G}_\text{verify}(pk_s', pk_j', m', \sigma')$</td>
<td>Return Verify$(pp, pk_s', pk_j', m', \sigma')$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\mathcal{G}_\text{judge}(pk_s', m', \sigma')$</td>
<td>Return Judge$(pp, pk_s', sk_j', m', \sigma')$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 3** Games for defining receiver-binding and sender-binding of AGMF
Now, we present the formal definitions as below.

**Definition 5. (r-BIND).** An AGMF scheme \(\text{AGMF}\) is receiver-binding, if for any PPT adversary \(A\), its advantage

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{r-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda) := \Pr[\text{G}^{\text{r-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda) = 1]
\]

is negligible, where \(\text{G}^{\text{r-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda)\) is defined in Fig. 3.

**Definition 6. (s-BIND).** An AGMF scheme \(\text{AGMF}\) is sender-binding, if for any PPT adversary \(A\), its advantage

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{s-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda) := \Pr[\text{G}^{\text{s-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda) = 1]
\]

is negligible, where \(\text{G}^{\text{s-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda)\) is defined in Fig. 3.

**Remark 1.** The receiver binding game \(\text{G}^{\text{r-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda)\) is much more complicated than that in AMF [36], essentially because in the setting of group scenarios, there are multiple receivers. For example, compared with the receiver binding game in AMF, here we additionally need to consider the probability that \(A\) tricks the other honest receivers in the same receiver set. We want to stress that this security model implies unforgeability.

**Remark 2.** In \(\text{G}^{\text{r-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda)\), if \(A\) outputs \((pk_s^*, pk_r^*, \sigma^*, m^*)\) such that \(\text{Verify}(pp, pk_s^*, sk_r^*, pk_J^*, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1\), then \(A\) wins only if

\[
(pk_s^* \notin U_{\text{cor}}) \land (pk_r^* \notin U_{\text{cor}}) \land \left(\exists (pk_s^*, S', m^*) \in Q_{\text{sig}} \text{ s.t. } pk_r^* \in S'\right).
\]

That’s because (i) if \(pk_s^* \in U_{\text{cor}}\) or there is some \((pk_s^*, S', m^*) \in Q_{\text{sig}}\) such that \(pk_r^* \in S'\), \(A\) can trivially win; (ii) if \(pk_r^* \in U_{\text{cor}}\), \(A\) can still generate such a tuple to win this game by running algorithm \(\text{RForge}\).

**Remark 3.** Compared with the security models of receiver-binding and sender-binding in AMF [36], here we provide the adversary \(A\) with more abilities. For example, in \(\text{G}^{\text{r-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda)\) and \(\text{G}^{\text{s-bind}}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda)\), \(A\) is allowed to query \(O^{\text{Frank}}\) on \((pk_s^*, S', m')\) and query \(O^{\text{Verify}}\) on \((pk_s^*, pk'_r, m', \sigma')\), where \(pk'_r\) can be any users’ public keys (including \(pk_s^*\) and \(pk_r^*\)), and so can \(pk_s^*\). The ability is not provided in the receiver/sender binding game of AMF in [36].

**Deniability.** To support deniability, we need to consider universal deniability, receiver compromise deniability, and judge compromise deniability for AGMF. Generally speaking, universal deniability requires that any non-participating party (i.e., no access to the secret key of the sender, the secret key of any user in the receiver set, or the secret key of the judge) can create a signature, such that for other non-participating parties, it is indistinguishable from honestly-generated signatures. Receiver compromise deniability requires that any corrupted users in the receiver set are able to create a signature, such that for other parties with access to these corrupted users’ secret keys, it is indistinguishable from honestly-generated signatures. Judge compromise deniability requires that a party with the judge’s secret key is able to create a signature, such that for other parties with access to the judge’s secret key, it is indistinguishable from honestly-generated signatures.

The formal definitions are presented as follows.
is negligible, where \( G \) is defined in Fig. 4.

### Definition 7. (UnivDen). An AGMF scheme AGMF is universally deniable, if for any PPT adversary \( A \), its advantage

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}^{\text{UnivDen}}(\lambda) := |\text{Pr}[G_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| 
\]

is negligible, where \( G_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}(\lambda) \) is defined in Fig. 4.

### Definition 8. (ReComDen). An AGMF scheme AGMF is receiver-compromise deniable, if for any PPT adversary \( A \), its advantage

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}^{\text{ReComDen}}(\lambda) := |\text{Pr}[G_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| 
\]

is negligible, where \( G_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}(\lambda) \) is defined in Fig. 4.

### Definition 9. (JuComDen). An AGMF scheme AGMF is judge-compromise deniable, if for any PPT adversary \( A \), its advantage

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}^{\text{JuComDen}}(\lambda) := |\text{Pr}[G_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| 
\]

is negligible, where \( G_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}(\lambda) \) is defined in Fig. 4.

### Remark 4. In universal deniability game (resp., judge compromise deniability game), for \( A \)'s each \( O_F^{\text{F-oracle}} \) (resp., \( O_F^{\text{F-oracle}} \)) query \( (pk', S', m') \), \( A \) is
not allowed to see the secret keys of the receivers in $S'$. In receiver compromise deniability game, for $A$’s each $\mathcal{O}_{\mathbf{RF}}$-oracle query $(pk'_i, S', S'_\text{cor}, m')$, $A$ is not allowed to see the secret keys of the receivers in $S'\setminus S'_\text{cor}$. We use $Q^*$ to specify the receivers whose secret keys are not provided to $A$.

**Remark 5.** Note that in these games, the adversary is allowed to access the sender’s secret key, as long as the sender is not in the receiver set. Compared with the judge compromise deniability formally defined in AMF [36], where the adversary $A$ is offered both the receiver’s and the judge’s keys, our judge compromise deniability only provides the judge’s key to $A$. We stress that the judge compromise deniability formally defined in [36] conflicts with strong authentication (i.e., as pointed out in [36], “forgeries by the moderator cannot be detected by the receiver”). Our judge compromise deniability follows one of the ideas of the judge compromise deniability formalization when considering strong authentication, which is also introduced in [36, Appendix B]. Some more discussions on definitions of deniability is presented in Appendix C.

**Receiver Anonymity.** Generally speaking, receiver anonymity requires that any one (except for the receivers in the receiver set), including the judge, cannot tell which receiver set a signature is generated for. With receiver anonymity, the receivers in group communication scenarios can report the malicious messages to the moderator with less concerns.

The formal definition is presented as follows.

**Definition 10.** (RecAnony). An AGMF scheme AGMF is receiver anonymous, if for any PPT adversary $A$, its advantage

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{RecAnony}}_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}(\lambda) := | Pr[G_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}^{\text{RecAnony}}(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$$

is negligible, where $G_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}^{\text{RecAnony}}(\lambda)$ is defined in Fig. 5.

![Fig. 5 Game for defining receiver anonymity of AGMF](image)

**Discussion.** In the following sections, we will present an AGMF scheme achieving the above security features. In fact, our scheme can be proved secure under stronger security models. For example, the receiver anonymity game $G_{\text{AGMF}, A, n}^{\text{RecAnony}}(\lambda)$
in Fig. 5 can be strengthened by allowing the adversary to know the secret keys of the users belonging to $S_0 \cap S_1$. Our scheme also achieves the strengthened receiver anonymity. It is an interesting direction to further strengthen these security models.

### 4 HPS-based KEM supporting Sigma protocols

In this section, we introduce a new primitive, which we will take as a building block to construct AGMF in Section 5. This primitive is a variant of key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) satisfying that (i) it can be interpreted from the perspective of hash proof system (HPS) [17], and (ii) for some special relations (about the public/secret keys, the encapsulated keys and ciphertexts), there exist corresponding Sigma protocols. We call this primitive **HPS-based KEM supporting Sigma protocols** (HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$). We also provide a concrete construction based on the DDH assumption. Note that our construction can be easily extended to be built based on the $k$-Linear assumption [27,34].

#### 4.1 Definition

A HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ scheme HPS-KEM$^\Sigma = (\text{KEMSetup}, \text{KG}, \text{CheckKey}, \text{encap}_c, \text{encap}_k, \text{encap}^\ast, \text{decap}, \text{CheckCwel})$ is a tuple of algorithms associated with a secret key space $SK$, an encapsulated key space $K$, where $\text{encap}_c$ and $\text{encap}_k$ have the same randomness space $RS$, and we denote by $RS^\ast$ the randomness space of $\text{encap}^\ast$.

- $pp \leftarrow \text{KEMSetup}(1^\lambda)$: On input a security parameter $\lambda$, it outputs a public parameter $pp$.
- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(pp)$: On input the public parameter $pp$, it outputs a pair of public/secret keys $(pk, sk)$.
- $b \leftarrow \text{CheckKey}(pp, sk, pk)$: On input the public parameter $pp$, a secret key $sk$ and a public key $pk$, it outputs a bit $b$. Let $SK_{pp,sk} := \{ sk \in SK \mid \text{CheckKey}(pp, sk, pk) = 1 \}$.
- $c \leftarrow \text{encap}_c(pp; r)$: On input the public parameter $pp$ with inner randomness $r \in RS$, it outputs a well-formed ciphertext $c$. Let $C_{pp}^{\text{well-f}} := \{ c = \text{encap}_c(pp; r) \mid r \in RS \}$.
- $k \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, pk; r)$: On input the public parameter $pp$ and a public key $pk$ with inner randomness $r \in RS$, it outputs an encapsulated key $k \in K$.
- $c \leftarrow \text{encap}^\ast_c(pp; r^\ast)$: On input the public parameter $pp$ with inner randomness $r^\ast \in RS^\ast$, it outputs a ciphertext $c$. Let $C_{pp}^{\ast} := \{ \text{encap}^\ast_c(pp; r^\ast) \mid r^\ast \in RS^\ast \}$.

We require that $C_{pp}^{\text{well-f}} \subseteq C_{pp}^{\ast}$.

- $k' \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk, c)$: On input the public parameter $pp$, the ciphertext $c$ and a secret key $sk$, it outputs an encapsulated key $k' \in K$.
- $b \leftarrow \text{CheckCwel}(pp, c, r^\ast)$: On input the public parameter $pp$, a ciphertext $c$ and a random number $r^\ast \in RS^\ast$, it outputs a bit $b$.

To generate a well-formed ciphertext and its corresponding encapsulated key, one can invoke $\text{encap}_c$ and $\text{encap}_k$ at the same time with the same randomness $r$. For simplicity, we introduce another algorithm $\text{encap}$, and use "$(c, k) \leftarrow"
encap(pp, pk; r)" to denote the procedures “c ← encap_p(pp; r), k ← encap_k(pp, pk; r)”. Note that only k contains the information about the public key pk.

Correctness is as follows.

1. For any pp generated by KEMSetup(1^λ), and any (pk, sk) output by KG(pp), CheckKey(pp, sk, pk) = 1.
2. For any pp generated by KEMSetup(1^λ), any (pk, sk) satisfying CheckKey(pp, sk, pk) = 1, and any (c, k) ← encap_c(pp, pk; r) = k.
3. For any pp generated by KEMSetup(1^λ), and any c generated with encap^*_c(pp; r^*), CheckCwel(pp, c, r^*) = 1 if and only if c ∈ C^well-f^pp.

For any pp generated by KEMSetup(1^λ), we define some relations as follows:

\[ R_s = \{(sk, pk) : \text{CheckKey}(pp, sk, pk) = 1\} \]
\[ R_{c,k} = \{(r, (c, k, pk)) : (c, k) = \text{encap}(pp, pk; r)\} \]
\[ R^*_c = \{(r^*, c) : c = \text{encap}^*_c(pp, r^*)\} \]

We require that for each relation in Eq. (2), there is a Sigma protocol.

We also require the properties: universality, unexplainability, indistinguishability, SK-2PR and smoothness, the definitions of which are as follows.

**Definition 11. (Universality).** We say that a HPS-KEM scheme HPS-KEM^Σ is universal, if for any computationally unbounded adversary A, the advantage

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{univ}}^{\text{HPS-KEM^Σ, A}}(\lambda) := \Pr[G^{\text{univ}}_{\text{HPS-KEM^Σ, A}}(\lambda) = 1] \]

is negligible, where \( G^{\text{univ}}_{\text{HPS-KEM^Σ, A}}(\lambda) \) is defined in Fig. 6.

**Fig. 6** Game for defining universality of HPS-KEM^Σ

**Definition 12. (Unexplainability).** We say that a HPS-KEM scheme HPS-KEM^Σ is unexplainable, if for any PPT adversary A, the advantage

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{unexpl}}^{\text{HPS-KEM^Σ, A}}(\lambda) := \Pr[G^{\text{unexpl}}_{\text{HPS-KEM^Σ, A}}(\lambda) = 1] \]

is negligible, where \( G^{\text{unexpl}}_{\text{HPS-KEM^Σ, A}}(\lambda) \) is defined in Fig. 7.

**Fig. 7** Game for defining unexplainability of HPS-KEM^Σ
Remark 6. Generally, unexplainability requires that for any PPT adversary, it is difficult to explain a well-formed ciphertext as a result generated with $\text{encap}^*_c$.

Definition 13. (Indistinguishability). We say that a HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ scheme HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ is indistinguishable, if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) := |\text{Pr}[\mathcal{G}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}|$$

is negligible, where $\mathcal{G}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ is defined in Fig. 8.

Definition 14. (SK-2PR). We say that a HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ scheme HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ is SK-second-preimage resistant, if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{SK-2pr}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}} (\lambda) := \text{Pr}[\mathcal{G}_{\text{SK-2pr}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}} (\lambda) = 1]$$

is negligible, where $\mathcal{G}_{\text{SK-2pr}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}} (\lambda)$ is defined in Fig. 8.

\[ \begin{array}{|c|c|}
\hline
\text{G}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda): & \text{G}^{\text{sk-2pr}}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda): \\
\hline
pp \leftarrow \text{KEMSetup}(1^\lambda) & pp \leftarrow \text{KEMSetup}(1^\lambda) \\
b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} & (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(pp) \\
c_0 \leftarrow \text{encap}_c(pp) & sk' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp, pk, sk) \\
c_1 \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_c(pp) & \text{If } (sk' \neq sk) \wedge (\text{CheckKey}(pp, sk', pk) = 1): \\
b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp, c_0) & \text{Return 1} \\
\text{Return } (b' = b) & \text{Return 0} \\
\hline
\end{array} \]

Fig. 8 Games for defining indistinguishability and SK-second-preimage resistance of HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$

Definition 15. (Smoothness). We say that a HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ scheme HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ is smooth, if for any fixed $pp$ generated by KEMSetup and any fixed $pk$ generated by KG,

$$\Delta((c, k), (c', k')) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $c \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_c(pp)$, $k \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$, $sk \leftarrow \text{SK}_{pp, pk}$ and $k' = \text{decap}(pp, sk, c)$.

Remark 7. Smoothness guarantees that $\frac{1}{|\text{SK}_{pp, pk}|}$ is a negligible function of $\lambda$.

4.2 Construction

Here, we present a concrete construction of HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$, which satisfies all the aforementioned security properties. The algorithms are described as follows.

- KEMSetup$(1^\lambda)$: Given a security parameter $\lambda$, choose a prime-order group $G$ such that the order of $G$ is $p$ and the bit-length of $p$ is $\lambda$. Then, choose the generators $g_1, g_2$ of $G$ uniformly at random. The public parameter is $pp = (G, p, g_1, g_2)$. 

• KG(pp): Given the public parameter \( pp = (\mathbb{G}, p, g_1, g_2) \), choose two randomnesses \((x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2\), set \( h = g_1^{x_1}g_2^{x_2} \) and the pair of public/secret keys is set as

\[
(pk = h, \ sk = (x_1, x_2)).
\]

• CheckKey(pp, sk, pk): Given the public parameter \( pp = (\mathbb{G}, p, g_1, g_2) \) and a pair of public/secret keys \( (pk = h, \ sk = (x_1, x_2)) \), check whether \( g_1^{x_1}g_2^{x_2} = h \) holds. If not, output 0; otherwise output 1.

• encap(pp, r): Given the public parameter \( pp = (\mathbb{G}, p, g_1, g_2) \) and a randomness \( r \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \), output a well-formed encapsulated ciphertext

\[
c = (u_1 = g_1^r, \ u_2 = g_2^r).
\]

• decap(pp, sk, c): Given the public parameter \( pp = (\mathbb{G}, p, g_1, g_2) \), an encapsulated ciphertext \( c = (u_1, u_2) \) and a secret key \( sk = (x_1, x_2) \), output an encapsulated key \( k' = u_1^{x_1}u_2^{x_2} \).

• CheckKey(pp, c, r\(^*\)): Given the public parameter \( pp = (\mathbb{G}, p, g_1, g_2) \), a ciphertext \( c = (u_1, u_2) \) and a random number \( r^* = (r, r') \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2 \), it outputs 1 if \( g_2^r = u_2 \); otherwise, it outputs 0.

It is clear that the above construction satisfies correctness. Then the relations \( \mathcal{R}_s \), \( \mathcal{R}_{c,k} \) and \( \mathcal{R}_c^* \) are constructed as follows.

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{R}_s & = \{(x_1, x_2, pk) : pk = g_1^{x_1}g_2^{x_2}\} \\
\mathcal{R}_{c,k} & = \{(r, ((u_1, u_2), k, pk)) : u_1 = g_1^r \land u_2 = g_2^r \land k = pk^r\} \\
\mathcal{R}_c^* & = \{(r, r'), ((u_1, u_2)) : u_1 = g_1^r \land u_2 = g_1^{r'}\}
\end{align*}
\]

We show that there are Sigma protocols for relations \( \mathcal{R}_s \), \( \mathcal{R}_{c,k} \) and \( \mathcal{R}_c^* \): Okamoto’s Sigma protocol [31] for \( \mathcal{R}_s \), the Chaum-Pedersen protocol [11] for \( \mathcal{R}_{c,k} \) and Schnorr’s Sigma protocol [33] for \( \mathcal{R}_c^* \).

We now prove that the above construction satisfies universality, unexplainability, indistinguishability, SK-second-preimage resistance, and smoothness. Formally, we have the following theorems.

**Theorem 2.** The above HPS-KEM scheme is universal.

**Theorem 3.** If the DL assumption holds in \( \mathbb{G} \), the above HPS-KEM scheme is unexplainable.

**Theorem 4.** If the DDH assumption holds in \( \mathbb{G} \), the above HPS-KEM scheme is indistinguishable.

**Theorem 5.** If the DL assumption holds in \( \mathbb{G} \), the above HPS-KEM scheme is SK-second-preimage resistant.
Theorem 6. The above HPS-KEM scheme is smooth.

Proof (of Theorem 2). For any computationally unbounded adversary \( A \) attacking universality of HPS-KEM, let \( (pp, g_1, g_2) \) be \( A \)'s input, where \( (pk, sk = (x_1, x_2)) \) are generated by KG\((pp)\). Denote by \( a := log_{g_2} g_1 \). Let \( (c = (u_1, u_2), k, w = (r, r')) \) be \( A \)'s final output satisfying \( ((w, c) \in \mathcal{R}^*_p) \& (c \notin \mathcal{C}_{pp^{-f}}) \).

Observe that, if \( u = g_1^r \) and \( u_2 = g_1^{r'} \), the probability of the adversary is negligible. Thus, \( A \) wins the game with non-negligible probability. It is easy to construct an algorithm \( B \) that makes use of \( A \) to solve the DL problem with non-negligible probability. Algorithm \( B \) is given a random tuple \((G, p, g, g^a)\), and runs \( A \) as follows.

\( B \) first sets \( g_1 = g \) and \( g_2 = g^a \), and sends the public parameter \( pp = (G, p, g_1, g_2) \). Then, the adversary \( A \) outputs \((w, c) \in \mathcal{R}^*_p\). Parse \( c = (u_1, u_2) \) and \( w = (r, r') \). Note that \((w, c) \in \mathcal{R}^*_p\) guarantees that \( u_1 = g_1^r \) and \( u_2 = g_1^{r'} \). If \( A \) wins the game of unexplainability, then \( c \in C_{pp^{-f}} \), which means that \( u_1 = g_1^r \) and \( u_2 = g_1^{r'} \). In this case, we have \( u_2 = g_1^{r'} = g_1^t \). Therefore, \( B \) can output \( a = \frac{r}{t} \) as the solution of the DL problem.

Proof (of Theorem 3). Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary \( A \) winning the game of unexplainability with non-negligible probability. It is easy to construct a PPT algorithm \( B \) that makes use of \( A \) to solve the DDH problem with non-negligible probability. Algorithm \( B \) is given a random tuple \((G, p, g, g^a, g^b, Z)\), where \( Z = g^{ob} \) or \( Z \) is uniformly and independently sampled in \( G \). \( B \) runs \( A \) as follows.

\( B \) first sets \( g_1 = g \), \( g_2 = g^a \), \( u_1 = g^b \), \( u_2 = Z \). Then, it sends the public parameter \( pp = (G, p, g_1, g_2) \) and the encapsulated ciphertext \( c = (u_1, u_2) \) to the adversary \( A \). Finally, \( A \) outputs a bit and \( B \) also outputs the bit.

Observe that, if \( Z = g^{ob} \), then \( u_1 = g_1^b \) and \( u_2 = g_2^b \), and from the perspective of the adversary the distribution of the ciphertext \( c = (u_1, u_2) \) is identical to the
distribution of the well-formed encapsulated ciphertext generated by $\text{encap}$. If $Z$ is a random element in $\mathbb{G}$, then $u_1$, $u_2$ are random elements in $\mathbb{G}$, and from the perspective of the adversary the distribution of the ciphertext $c = (u_1, u_2)$ is identical to the distribution of the ciphertext generated by $\text{encap}$. Therefore, if $A$ can win the game of indistinguishability with non-negligible probability, $B$ can make use of $A$ to solve the DDH problem with non-negligible probability.

Proof (of Theorem 5). Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary $A$ winning the game of SK-second-preimage resistance with non-negligible probability. It is easy to construct a PPT algorithm $B$ that makes use of $A$ to solve the DL problem with non-negligible probability. Algorithm $B$ is given a random tuple $(\mathbb{G}, p, g, g')$, and runs $A$ as follows.

$B$ first sets $g_1 = g$ and $g_2 = g^a$. Next, it chooses $x_1, x_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ uniformly at random, and generates a pair of public/secret keys $(pk = g_1^{x_1}g_2^{x_2}, sk = (x_1, x_2))$. Then, $B$ sends the public parameter $pp = (\mathbb{G}, p, g_1, g_2)$ and the pair of public/secret keys $(pk, sk)$ to $A$. The adversary $A$ outputs a secret key $sk' \neq sk$ and CheckKey$(pp, sk', pk) = 1$. That is to say, $g_1^{x_1'}g_2^{x_2'} = g_1^{x_1}g_2^{x_2}$ and $x_1' \neq x_1, x_2' \neq x_2$. Therefore, $B$ can output $a = (x_1 - x_1')/(x_2' - x_2)$ as the solution of the DL problem.

Proof (of Theorem 6). For any fixed $pp = (\mathbb{G}, p, g_1, g_2)$ and any fixed $pk = h$ generated by KG, let $a := \log_{g_1} g_2$, $b := \log_{g_1} h$. Then, $SK_{pp, pk} = \{(x_1, x_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \mid x_1 + ax_2 = b\}$. Note that the ciphertext space of $\text{encap}$ is $\mathcal{C}^* = (\mathbb{G} \setminus \{1_{\mathcal{G}}\})^2$, where $1_{\mathcal{G}}$ is the identity element of $\mathbb{G}$, and the encapsulated key space $\mathcal{K}$ is $\mathbb{G}$. For all $\hat{c} \in (\mathbb{G} \setminus \{1_{\mathcal{G}}\})^2$, we parse $\hat{c} = (\hat{u}_1, \hat{u}_2)$, and write $S_1 := \{(\hat{u}_1, \hat{u}_2) \in (\mathbb{G} \setminus \{1_{\mathcal{G}}\})^2 \mid \log_{g_1} \hat{u}_2 \neq a \log_{g_1} \hat{u}_1\}$ and $S_2 := \{(\hat{u}_1, \hat{u}_2) \in (\mathbb{G} \setminus \{1_{\mathcal{G}}\})^2 \mid \log_{g_1} \hat{u}_2 = a \log_{g_1} \hat{u}_1\}$.

So, $\Delta((c, k), (c, k')) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{(\hat{c}, \hat{k}) \in \mathcal{C}^* \times \mathcal{K}} |\text{Pr}[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] - \text{Pr}[(c, k') = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})]|$

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\hat{c} \in S_1} \sum_{\hat{k} \in \mathcal{K}} |\text{Pr}[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] - \text{Pr}[(c, k') = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})]| + \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\hat{c} \in S_2} \sum_{\hat{k} \in \mathcal{K}} |\text{Pr}[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] - \text{Pr}[(c, k') = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})]|. \tag{4}
\]

We present the following two lemmas with postponed proofs.

**Lemma 1.** $\sum_{\hat{c} \in S_1} \sum_{\hat{k} \in \mathcal{K}} |\text{Pr}[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] - \text{Pr}[(c, k') = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})]| = 0.$

**Lemma 2.** $\sum_{\hat{c} \in S_2} \sum_{\hat{k} \in \mathcal{K}} |\text{Pr}[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] - \text{Pr}[(c, k') = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})]| = \frac{2}{p}.$

Combining Eq. (4), Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, we obtain $\Delta((c, k), (c, k')) = \frac{1}{p}$, concluding the proof of this theorem.

So what remains is to prove the above two lemmas.
Proof (of Lemma 1). For any \( \hat{c} = (\hat{u}_1, \hat{u}_2) \in S_1 \) and any \( \hat{k} \in K = \mathbb{G} \), we have
\[
\Pr[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] = \frac{1}{(p-1)^2p} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[(c, k') = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] = \frac{1}{(p-1)^2p} \Pr[k' = \hat{k} \mid c = \hat{c}].
\]

Note that \( c = (g_1^x, g_2^y) = \hat{c} \) implies \( r = \log_{g_1} \hat{u}_1 \) and \( r' = \log_{g_2} \hat{u}_2 \). Since \( \hat{c} \in S_1 \), we obtain \( r' \neq ar \). We also notice that \( sk = (x_1, x_2) \) is uniformly sampled from \( SK \), so the distribution of \( sk \) can be seen as “uniformly sampling \( x_2 \) from \( \mathbb{Z}_p^* \), and letting \( x_1 = b - ax_2 \)”. As a result, given a fixed \( c = \hat{c} \) (i.e., given fixed \( r = \log_{g_1} \hat{u}_1 \) and \( r' = \log_{g_2} \hat{u}_2 \)), when \( sk \leftarrow SK \), \( k' = \text{decap}(pp, sk, c) = g_1^{rx_1}g_1^{y2} = g_1^{r(b - ax_2) + r'x_2} = h^r g_1^{r'(r - ar)x_2} \) is uniformly distributed over \( K \). Hence, \( \Pr[k' = \hat{k} \mid c = \hat{c}] = \frac{1}{p} \).

So we conclude that for any \( \hat{c} \in S_1 \) and any \( \hat{k} \in K \), \( \Pr[(c, k') = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] = \Pr[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] = \frac{1}{(p-1)^2p} \Pr[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})]. \)

Proof (of Lemma 2). For any \( \hat{c} = (\hat{u}_1, \hat{u}_2) \in S_2 \) and any \( \hat{k} \in K = \mathbb{G} \), we have
\[
\Pr[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] = \frac{1}{(p-1)^2p} \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[(c, k') = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] = \frac{1}{(p-1)^2p} \Pr[k' = \hat{k} \mid c = \hat{c}].
\]

Note that \( c = (g_1^x, g_2^y) = \hat{c} \) implies \( r = \log_{g_1} \hat{u}_1 \) and \( r' = \log_{g_2} \hat{u}_2 \). Since \( \hat{c} \in S_2 \), we obtain \( r' = ar \). Thus, given a fixed \( c = \hat{c} \) (i.e., given fixed \( r = \log_{g_1} \hat{u}_1 \) and \( r' = \log_{g_2} \hat{u}_2 \)), we derive that \( k' = \text{decap}(pp, sk, c) = g_1^{rx_1}g_1^{y2} = g_1^{r(b - ax_2) + r'x_2} = h^r g_1^{r'(r - ar)x_2} = h^r = h^\log_{g_1} \hat{u}_1 \), which is also fixed (since \( pk = h \) and \( \hat{u}_1 \) are both fixed values).

Hence,
\[
\sum_{\hat{c} \in S_2} \sum_{\hat{k} \in K} \left| \Pr[(c, k) = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] - \Pr[(c, k') = (\hat{c}, \hat{k})] \right| = \sum_{\hat{c} \in S_2} \sum_{\hat{k} \in K} \left| \frac{1}{(p-1)^2p} - \frac{1}{(p-1)^2p} \Pr[k' = \hat{k} \mid c = \hat{c}] \right|
\]
\[
= \sum_{\hat{c} \in S_2} \sum_{\hat{k} \in K} \left( \frac{1}{(p-1)^2p} - \frac{1}{(p-1)^2p} \right) = \frac{2}{(p-1)p}.
\]

Thus, we complete the proof.

5 Generic construction of AGMF from HPS-KEM\( ^{\Sigma} \)

In this section, we provide a framework of constructing AGMF from HPS-KEM\( ^{\Sigma} \), and show that it achieves the required securities.

Let HPS-KEM\( ^{\Sigma} = (\text{KEMSetup}, \text{KG}, \text{CheckKey}, \text{encap}_c, \text{encap}_k, \text{decap}, \text{CheckCwel}) \) be a HPS-KEM\( ^{\Sigma} \) scheme supporting universality, unexplainability, indistinguishability, SK-second-preimage resistance and smoothness, where \( R.S \)
denotes the randomness space of \( \text{encap}_c \) and \( \text{encap}_k \), \( \mathcal{RS}^* \) denotes the randomness space of \( \text{encap}^*_c \), and \( \mathcal{K} \) denotes the encapsulated key space.

Our generic AGMF scheme \( \text{AGMF} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KG}_J, \text{KG}_u, \text{Frank}, \text{Verify}, \text{Judge}, \text{Forge}, \text{RForge}, \text{JForge}) \) is described as follows.

\[
\text{Setup}(\lambda): \ pp \leftarrow \text{KEMSetup}(1^\lambda); \ Return \ pp
\]

\[
\text{KG}_J(pp): (pk_J, sk_J) \leftarrow \text{KG}(pp); \ Return (pk_J, sk_J)
\]

\[
\text{KG}_u(pp): (pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{KG}(pp); \ Return (pk, sk)
\]

**Fig. 9** Algorithm descriptions of \( \text{Setup}, \text{KG}_J \) and \( \text{KG}_u \)

The main body of AGMF (i.e., \( \text{Frank}, \text{Verify} \) and \( \text{Judge} \)) is shown in Fig. 10. Specifically, algorithm \( \text{Frank} \) calls \( \text{encap}_c \) and \( \text{encap}_k \) of \( \text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma \) to generate a well-formed ciphertext and encapsulated keys respectively. Besides, it calls a NIZK proof algorithm \( \text{NIZK}^{R^{\star}.\text{PoK}} \) to generate a NIZK proof, where the relation \( R \) is defined in Eq. (5) and \( \text{NIZK}^R = (\text{PoK}, \text{PoKVer}) \) is a NIZK proof using the Fiat-Shamir transform from the Sigma protocols induced by \( \text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma \). The verification algorithm \( \text{Verify} \) and the moderation algorithm \( \text{Judge} \) are similar. They first call \( \text{NIZK}^{R^{\star}.\text{PoKVer}} \) to check if the NIZK proof is valid, and then call \( \text{decap} \) with the receiver's/judge's secret key to check whether the encapsulated key and the corresponding decapsulated key are identical or not.

The three forging algorithms (i.e., \( \text{Forge}, \text{RForge}, \text{JForge} \)), focusing on different compromise scenarios, are described in Fig. 11. They firstly call \( \text{encap}^*_c \) of \( \text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma \) to generate an ill-formed ciphertext. Then, for each one of the receivers (and for the judge) whose secret key is not compromised, randomly sample an encapsulated key from \( \mathcal{K} \); for each one of the receivers (and for the judge) whose secret key is compromised, employ \( \text{decap} \) to generate an encapsulated key. Finally, they call \( \text{NIZK}^{R^{\star}.\text{PoK}} \) to generate a NIZK proof.

For the NIZK proof system \( \text{NIZK}^R = (\text{PoK}, \text{PoKVer}) \) used in Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, we obtain it as follows. The relation \( R \) is defined in Eq. (5).

\[
R = \{ \ (sk_s, r, r^{\star}), (pp, pk_s, pk_J, c, k_J) \ : \\
( (sk_s, pk_s) \in \mathcal{R}_s \land (r, (c, k_J, pk_J)) \in \mathcal{R}_{c,k} ) \\
\lor \ ( (r^{\star}, c) \in \mathcal{R}_c^* ) \} \\
\]

where \( \mathcal{R}_s, \mathcal{R}_{c,k} \) and \( \mathcal{R}_c^* \) are defined in Eq. (2). Note that for every sub-relation (i.e., \( \mathcal{R}_s, \mathcal{R}_{c,k}, \mathcal{R}_c^* \)), the \( \text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma \) scheme guarantees that there is a Sigma protocol. So, with the technique of trivially combining Sigma protocols for AND/OR proofs [7, Sec. 19.7], we obtain a new Sigma protocol for relation \( R \). Then, using the Fiat-Shamir transform, we derive a NIZK proof system \( \text{NIZK}^R = (\text{PoK}, \text{PoKVer}) \) for \( R \) in the random oracle model.

Now, we provide some explanations about relation \( R \).
AGMF can support third-party moderation better. HPS-KEM based on an independent HPS-KEM can be encapsulated in another ciphertext, which can be generated with an independent HPS-KEM. Hence, the judge can run KGJ based on an independent HPS-KEM, to generate the public/secret key pair. In this case, the obtained AGMF can support third-party moderation better.

Remark 8. In our framework AGMF, in order to reduce the size of signature, kJ and kJ are all encapsulated in the same ciphertext c. This suggests that KGJ and KGJ are built based on the identical HPS-KEM. Actually, kJ1 can be encapsulated in another ciphertext, which can be generated with an independent HPS-KEM. Hence, the judge can run KGJ based on an independent HPS-KEM, to generate the public/secret key pair. In this case, the obtained AGMF can support third-party moderation better.
For any signature $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Frank}(pp, sk; S, pk, m)$ and any $pk_i \in S$, we parse $\sigma = (\pi, c, k_1, \{k_i\}_{pk_i}, s)$, and let $y := (pp, pk_x, pk_j, c, k_1)$ and $m := (m||\{k_i\}_{pk_i}, s)$.

We first analyze the output of Verify as follows: (i) the correctness of NIZK$_K^R$ guarantees that NIZK$_K^R$.PokVer$(\pi, \pi, y) = 1$; (ii) the correctness of HPS-KEM$_C$ guarantees that decap$(pp, sk, c) \in \{k_i\}_{pk_i}$ since $pk_i \in S$. So, Verify will return 1.

Next, we analyze the output of Judge as follows: (i) the correctness of NIZK$_K^R$ guarantees that NIZK$_K^R$.PokVer$(\pi, \pi, y) = 1$; (ii) the correctness of HPS-KEM$_C$ guarantees that decap$(pp, sk, c) = k_1$. Therefore, Judge will also return 1.

Security. For security, we have the following theorem.

**Theorem 7.** If a HPS-KEM$_C$ scheme HPS-KEM$_C$ is universal, unexplainable, indistinguishable, SK-second-preimage resistant and smooth, and NIZK$_K^R$ = (PokK, PoKVer) is a Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system for $\mathcal{R}$, then our scheme AGMF achieves the accountability (receiver binding and sender binding), deniability (universal deniability, receiver compromise deniability, and judge compromise deniability) and receiver anonymity simultaneously.

We put the proof of Theorem 7 in Appendix A. Specifically, the proofs of receiver binding and sender binding are presented in Appendix A.1 and Appendix A.2, respectively. For deniability, the proofs are in Appendix A.3. The proof of receiver anonymity is given in Appendix A.4.
Acknowledgements

We would like to express our sincere appreciation to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions!

References

Appendix

A Proof of Theorem 7

A.1 Proof of receiver binding

Proof. For any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ attacking the receiver-binding property of AGMF, we denote $\mathcal{A}$’s input as $(pp, \{pk_i| i \in [n]\}, pk_j)$, and $\mathcal{A}$’s final output as $(pk^*_a, pk^*_b, m^*, \sigma^*)$. Then, we parse $\sigma^* = (\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{c}, \tilde{k}_1, \{\tilde{k}_i\}_{pk_i \in S})$. Let $m^* = m^* || \{\tilde{k}_i\}_{pk_i \in S}$, and $\tilde{y} = (pp, pk^*_a, pk^*_b, \tilde{c}, \tilde{k}_1)$. Let $U_{cor}$ (resp., $Q_{sig}$) denote the set of public keys (resp., tuples) that $\mathcal{A}$ has submitted to $\mathcal{O}_{cor}$ (resp., $\mathcal{O}_{Frank}$). Since $\text{NiZK}^R = (\text{PoK}, \text{PoKVer})$ is a NIZK proof obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform, we can further parse $\tilde{\pi} = (\tilde{c}\tilde{m}, \tilde{z})$.

Without loss of generality, we assume that $\mathcal{A}$ has queried the random oracle on $(\tilde{m}^*, \tilde{c}\tilde{m}, \tilde{y})$ before returning its final output $(pk^*_a, pk^*_b, m^*, \sigma^*)$.

Let $\text{evt}_1$ denote the event that $\text{Verify}(pp, pk^*_a, sk^*_a, pk_j, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1$ where $(pk^*_a, pk^*_b \notin U_{cor}) \land (\text{\#}(pk^*_a, S', m^*) \in Q_{sig}$ s.t. $pk^*_b \in S')$, and $\text{evt}_2$ denote the event that $\text{Judge}(pp, pk^*_a, sk^*_a, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1$ where $(pk^*_a \notin U_{cor}) \land (\text{\#}(pk^*_a, S', m^*) \in Q_{sig})$.

Obviously, we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}^{r\text{-bind}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{Cor}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}(\lambda) = 1] \leq \Pr[\text{evt}_1] + \Pr[\text{evt}_2]. \quad (6)$$

We present the following two lemmas with postponed proofs.

Lemma 3. $\Pr[\text{evt}_1] \leq \negl(\lambda)$.

Lemma 4. $\Pr[\text{evt}_2] \leq \negl(\lambda)$.

Combining Eq. (6), Lemma 3 and Lemma 4, we obtain that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{AGMF},A,n}^{r\text{-bind}}(\lambda) \leq \negl(\lambda).$$

So what remains is to prove the above two lemmas.

Proof (of Lemma 3). Assume that $\Pr[\text{evt}_1]$ is non-negligible.

Event $\text{evt}_1$ occurs if and only if $\text{Verify}(pp, pk^*_a, sk^*_a, pk_j, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1$ where $(pk^*_a, pk^*_b \notin U_{cor}) \land (\text{\#}(pk^*_a, S', m^*) \in Q_{sig}$ s.t. $pk^*_b \in S')$. Note that $\text{Verify}(pp, pk^*_a, sk^*_a, pk_j, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1$ implies that $\text{NiZK}^R\cdot \text{PoKVer}(m^*, \tilde{\pi}, \tilde{y}) = 1$. Since $\text{NiZK}^R$ is a NIZK proof system obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform from a Sigma protocol, according to a rewinding lemma [7, Lemma 19.2] and knowledge soundness of the Sigma protocol, a witness $\tilde{x}$ for $\tilde{y}$ (satisfying $\tilde{x} = (sk^*_a, \tilde{r}, \bot)$ or $\tilde{x} = (\bot, \bot, \tilde{r}^*)$) can be extracted with non-negligible probability. The reason is as follows.

Let $q_{ro}$ denote the total number of random oracle queries made by $\mathcal{A}$. Since we assume that $\mathcal{A}$ has queried the random oracle on $(\tilde{m}^*, \tilde{c}\tilde{m}, \tilde{y})$ before returning its final output $(pk^*_a, pk^*_b, m^*, \sigma^*)$, for $j \in [q_{ro}]$, let $\text{evt}_1^{(j)}$ denote the event that $\text{evt}_1$ occurs and $(\tilde{m}^*, \tilde{c}\tilde{m}, \tilde{y})$ is $\mathcal{A}$’s $j$-th random oracle query. Obviously, $\Pr[\text{evt}_1] = \sum_{j=1}^{q_{ro}} \Pr[\text{evt}_1^{(j)}]$. So the fact that $\Pr[\text{evt}_1]$ is non-negligible implies that there
must be some \( j^* \in [q_0] \), such that \( \Pr[\text{evt}_{1}(j^*)] \) is non-negligible. On the other hand, when \( \text{evt}_{1}(j^*) \) occurs, we can rewind back to the moment when \( \mathcal{A} \) made its \( j^* \)-th random oracle query, and respond with a fresh and uniformly sampled value for this query. If \( \text{evt}_{1}(j^*) \) occurs again, we can use the knowledge soundness of the Sigma protocol to extract a valid witness \( \hat{x} \) for \( \hat{y} \). Since \( \Pr[\text{evt}_{1}(j^*)] \) is non-negligible, the rewinding lemma [7, Lemma 19.2] guarantees that the witness can be extracted successfully with non-negligible probability.

Hence, let \( \text{evt}_{(sk, \perp)} \) (resp., \( \text{evt}_{(\perp, \perp)} \)) denote the event that \( \text{evt}_{1} \) occurs and a witness \( \hat{x} = (\hat{sk}_a, \hat{r}, \perp) \) (resp., \( \hat{x} = (\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^*) \)) for \( \hat{y} \) is successfully extracted. Since \( \Pr[\text{evt}_{1}] \) is non-negligible, we derive that at least one of \( \Pr[\text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)}] \) and \( \Pr[\text{evt}_{(\perp, \perp)}] \) is non-negligible.

**Case 1:** \( \Pr[\text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)}] \) is non-negligible:

We show a PPT adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) attacking SK-second-preimage resistance of HPS-KEM as follows.

Upon receiving \((\hat{pp}, \hat{pk}, \hat{sk})\), \( \mathcal{B} \) samples \( \tilde{i} \leftarrow [n] \), sets \( pp := \hat{pp} \) and \( (pk_i, sk_i) := (pk, sk) \), and generates \((pk_1, sk_1)\) and \((pk_i, sk_i)\) \( \in [n]\setminus\{\tilde{i}\} \) by himself. Then, with these parameters, \( \mathcal{B} \) simulates \( G_{\text{AGMF}, n}^\lambda(\lambda) \) for \( \mathcal{A} \). Note that \( \mathcal{B} \) can answer \( \mathcal{A} \)'s oracle queries by himself. Receiving \( \mathcal{A} \)'s final output \((pk^*_r, pk^*_m, m^*, \sigma^*)\), if \( pk^*_r = pk_i \) and \( \text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)} \) occurs, \( \mathcal{B} \) returns \( \hat{sk}_a \); otherwise, \( \mathcal{B} \) returns a random secret key.

Now we analyze \( \mathcal{B} \)'s advantage.

Note that \( \mathcal{B} \) wins if and only if \( pk^*_r = pk_i \), \( \text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)} \) occurs and \( \hat{sk}_a \neq sk_a^* \), i.e.,

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^{sk_{2pr}}_{\mathcal{B}}}^{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \frac{1}{n} \Pr[\text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)} \land (\hat{sk}_a \neq sk_a^*)] = \frac{1}{n} \left( \Pr[\text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)}] - \Pr[\text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)} \land (\hat{sk}_a = sk_a^*)] \right) \\
> \frac{1}{n} \left( \Pr[\text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)}] - \Pr[\hat{sk}_a = sk_a^* \mid \text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)}] \right).
\]

Next, we turn to \( \Pr[\hat{sk}_a = sk_a^* \mid \text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)}] \). From \( \mathcal{A} \)'s point of view, the information on \( sk_a^* \) beyond \( pk_a^* \) is released only in the responses returned by \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{Cor}}^{\mathcal{A}} \), \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{Frank}}^{\mathcal{A}} \) and \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{Verify}}^{\mathcal{A}} \). Note that \( \text{evt}_{1} \) guarantees \( pk_a^* \notin U_{\text{cor}} \), so \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{Cor}}^{\mathcal{A}} \) will not provide any information about \( sk_a^* \). \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{Frank}}^{\mathcal{A}} \) will not provide any information on \( sk_a^* \) beyond \( pk_a^* \) either except with negligible probability, because of the zero-knowledge property of NIZK\(^K\) (note that during the execution of Frank, the secret key is only used as a component of the witness to generate the NIZK proof).

On the other hand, at best, each query to \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{Verify}}^{\mathcal{A}} \) will help \( \mathcal{A} \) to eliminate one possible value of \( sk_a^* \), and the total number of verification queries is polynomial in \( \lambda \) (which we denote as \( q_{\text{verf}} \)). Therefore,

\[
\Pr[\hat{sk}_a = sk_a^* \mid \text{evt}_{(sk_a, \perp)}] \leq \frac{1}{|\text{SK}_{pp,pk^*}| - q_{\text{verf}}} + \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

which is also negligible.

32
So we derive that $\text{Adv}^{sk-2pr}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma}(\lambda)$ is non-negligible, contradicting SK-second-preimage resistance of HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$.

**Case 2:** If $\Pr[\text{evt}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}]$ is non-negligible:

For all $i \in [n]$, let $\text{evt}^{(i)}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}$ denote the event that $\text{evt}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}$ occurs and $pk^*_i = pk_i$. Obviously, $\Pr[\text{evt}^{(i)}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}] = \sum_{i=1}^n \Pr[\text{evt}^{(i)}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}]$. So there must be some $i^* \in [n]$, such that $\Pr[\text{evt}^{(i^*)}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}]$ is non-negligible.

Now we use a sequence of games to show the proof.

**Game $G_0$:** This is the original game $G_{\text{AGMF-}A,n}^{\text{bind}}(\lambda)$. Specifically, the challenger generates $pp, (pk_i, sk_i)_{i \in [n]}$ and $(pk_3, sk_3)$, and initiates a set $Q_{m-sig} := \emptyset$. The challenger maintains a local array $L_{\text{ro}}$ to keep track of $A$’s random oracle queries (here we use $\mathcal{CL}$ to denote the range of the hash function modelled as a random oracle). Then, the challenger sends $(pp, (pk_i)_{i \in [n]}, pk_3)$ to $A$, and answers $A$’s oracle queries as follows:

- $O^{RO}(\text{str})$: If there is some $(\text{str}, cl) \in L_{\text{ro}}$, the challenger returns $cl$; otherwise, the challenger samples $cl \leftarrow \mathcal{CL}$, adds $(\text{str}, cl)$ to $L_{\text{ro}}$, and returns $cl$.
- $O^{Cor}(pk')$: The challenger returns the corresponding secret key $sk'$.
- $O^{\text{Frank}}(pk'^*, S', m')$: The challenger generates $\sigma' \leftarrow \text{Frank}(pp, pk'^*, S', pk_1, m')$, sets $Q_{m-sig} := Q_{m-sig} \cup \{(pk'_i, S', m', \sigma')\}$, and returns $\sigma'$ to $A$.
- $O^{\text{Verify}}(pk'^*, pk'^i, sk'^i, pk_3, m', \sigma')$: The challenger returns $\text{Verify}(pp, pk'^*, sk'^i, pk_3, m', \sigma')$ to $A$.

Receiving $A$’s final output $(pk'^*, pk'^i, m', \sigma^*)$, the challenger checks whether $\text{evt}^{(i^*)}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}$ occurs. If so, the challenger outputs $1$; otherwise, it outputs $0$. In the following, we use $G_i \Rightarrow 1$ to denote that the challenger finally outputs $1$ in game $G_i$ ($i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, 4\}$).

We note that $\sigma^*$ can be parsed as $(\pi, \hat{c}, k_j, \{k_i\}_{k_i \in S})$. When $\text{evt}^{(i^*)}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}$ occurs, we have $(\tau^*, \hat{c}) \in R^*_c$.

Since $G_0 = G_{\text{AGMF-}A,n}^{\text{bind}}(\lambda)$, we derive that

$$\Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[\text{evt}^{(i^*)}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}].$$

(7)

**Game $G_1$:** This game is the same as $G_0$, except that when $\text{evt}^{(i^*)}_{(\perp,\perp,\tau^*)}$ occurs, the challenger returns $0$ if $\hat{c} \in C_{pp}^{\text{well}}$. Note that the challenger can employ algorithm $\text{CheckWell}$ to check whether $\hat{c} \in C_{pp}^{\text{well}}$ (with the help of $\tau^*$) efficiently. The unexplainability of HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ guarantees that

$$|\Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda).$$

(8)

**Game $G_2$:** This game is the same as $G_1$, except that when $A$ submits $pk_{i^*}$ to $O^{\text{Cor}}$, the challenger aborts the game (with a random bit as its final output)
(iii) Set $y = \sigma_{pk}$. (ii) Check whether $pk_i \in S'$, the challenger generates the response as follows:

(i) Sample $r' \leftarrow RS$, and compute $c' = \text{encap}(pp, r')$ and $k'_j \leftarrow \text{encap}(pp, pk_j; r')$.

(ii) For each $pk_i \in S'$, compute $k'_i \leftarrow \text{encap}(pp, pk_i; r')$.

(iii) Set $y := (pp, pk'_i, pk_j, c', k'_j)$ and $m := (m' || \{ k'_i \})_{pk_i \in S'}$, and then generate a proof $\pi'$ with the simulator (taking $(m', y')$ as input) of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system $\text{NIZK}^R$.

(iv) Set $\sigma := (\pi', c, k'_j, \{ k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S'})$ and $Q_{m-sig} := Q_{m-sig} \cup \{ (pk'_i, S', m', \sigma') \}$, and return $\sigma'$ to $A$.

The zero-knowledge property of $\text{NIZK}^R$ guarantees that

$$| \Pr[\mathbf{G}_3 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_2 \Rightarrow 1] | \leq \text{negl}(\lambda). \quad (10)$$

**Game $\mathbf{G}_4$:** This game is the same as $\mathbf{G}_3$, except that when $A$ queries $\text{O}^{\text{Frank}}$ on $(pk'_i, pk'_j = pk_i; S', m', \sigma')$ satisfying that $\exists (pk'_i, S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{m-sig}$ s.t. $pk_i \in S'$, the challenger generates the response as follows:

(i) Parse $\sigma' = (\pi', c', k'_i, \{ k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S'})$. Let $m' = m' || \{ k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S'}$, $y' = (pp, pk'_i, pk_j, c', k'_j)$.

(ii) Check whether $c' \in \mathcal{C}_{pp}^\text{well-t}$ or not (with the help of some unbounded algorithm):

- If $c' \notin \mathcal{C}_{pp}^\text{well-t}$, return 0 to $A$ directly.

- If $c' \in \mathcal{C}_{pp}^\text{well-t}$, find $r' \in RS$ satisfying $\text{encap}(pp, r') = c'$ (with the help of some unbounded algorithm). Then, the challenger checks whether $\text{encap}(pp, pk_i; r') \in \{ k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S}$ or not. If so, it returns 1 to $A$; otherwise, it returns 0 to $A$.

We stress that $\mathbf{G}_4$ is an inefficient game.

Let $\text{bad}$ denote the event that “$A$ submits a verification query $(pk'_i, pk'_j = pk_i; S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{m-sig}$ such that $pk_i \in S'$, (ii) $c' \in \mathcal{C}_{pp}^* \setminus \mathcal{C}_{pp}^\text{well-t}$, and (iii) $\text{decap}(pp, sk_i, c') \in \{ k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S}$”. Note that from $A$’s point of view, $\mathbf{G}_4$ and $\mathbf{G}_3$ are identical except that $\text{bad}$ occurs. The universality of $\text{HPS-KEM}^R$ guarantees that the probability that $\text{bad}$ occurs is negligible (note that when $c' \in \mathcal{C}_{pp}^* \setminus \mathcal{C}_{pp}^\text{well-t}$, an unbounded algorithm can trivially find $r'$ satisfying $(r', c') \in R_i^*$. So we derive that

$$| \Pr[\mathbf{G}_4 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_3 \Rightarrow 1] | \leq \Pr[\text{bad}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda). \quad (11)$$

Next, we show an unbounded adversary $\mathcal{S}'$, which simulates $\mathbf{G}_4$ for $A$, attacking the universality of $\text{HPS-KEM}^R$ as follows.
Upon receiving \((\hat{p}p, \hat{p}k)\), \(B'\) initiates a set \(Q_{m-sig} := \emptyset\), samples \(\hat{i} \leftarrow [n]\), sets \(pp := \hat{p}p\) and \(pk := \hat{p}k\), and generates \((pk_1, sk_1)\) and \((pk_i, sk_i)_{i \in [n]\setminus \{\hat{i}\}}\) by herself. \(B'\) maintains a local array \(L_{ro}\) to keep track of \(A\)'s random oracle queries (here we use \(CL\) to denote the range of the hash function modelled as a random oracle). Then, \(B'\) sends \((pp, (pk_i)_{i \in [n]}, pk_3)\) to \(A\) and answers \(A\)'s oracle queries as follows:

- \(O^{RO}(str)\): If there is some \((str, cl) \in L_{ro}\), \(B'\) returns \(cl\); otherwise, \(B'\) samples \(cl \leftarrow CL\), adds \((str, cl)\) to \(L_{ro}\), and returns \(cl\).
- \(O^{Cor}(pk')\): If \(pk' \neq pk_i\), \(B'\) returns the corresponding secret key; if \(pk' = pk_i\), \(B'\) aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple \((c_{ran}, k_{ran}, w_{ran})\) as her final output.
- \(O^{Frank}(pk'_3, S', m';)\): If \(pk'_3 \neq pk_i\), \(B'\) uses the corresponding secret key \(sk'_3\) to run \(Frank(pp, sk'_3, S', pk_3, m')\) and returns the results to \(A\); otherwise, \(B'\) proceeds as follows.
  (i) Sample \(r' \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_S\), and compute \(c' \leftarrow \text{encap}_s(pp, r')\) and \(k'_3 \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, pk_3; r')\).
  (ii) For each \(pk_i \in S'\), compute \(k'_i \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, pk_i; r')\).
  (iii) Set \(y' := (pp, pk'_3, pk_3, c', k'_3)\) and \(m' := (m'||k'_i, i \in S')\), then generate a proof \(\pi'\) with the simulator (taking \((m', y')\) as input) of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system \(\Pi^{NIZK}\).
  (iv) Set \(\sigma' := (\pi', c, k'_i, (k'_i, i \in S')\) and \(Q_{m-sig} := Q_{m-sig} \cup \{(pk'_3, S', m', \sigma')\}\), and return \(\sigma'\) to \(A\).
- \(O^{Verify}(pk'_3, pk'_3, m', \sigma')\): If \(pk'_3 \neq pk_i\), \(B'\) uses the corresponding secret key \(sk'_3\) to run \(Verify(pp, pk'_3, sk'_3, pk_3, m', \sigma')\) and returns the result to \(A\); if \(pk'_3 = pk_i\) and there is some \(S'\) satisfying that \((pk'_3 \in S') \land ((pk'_3, S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{m-sig})\), then \(B'\) returns 1 to \(A\) directly; otherwise, \(B'\) proceeds as follows.
  (i) Parse \(\sigma' = (\pi', c, k'_i, (k'_i, i \in S')\). Let \(\tilde{m} = m'||(k'_i, i \in S), y' = (pp, pk'_3, pk_3, c, k'_i)\).
  (ii) If \(\Pi^{NIZK}.\text{PoKVer}(\tilde{m}', \pi', y') = 0\), return 0 to \(A\).
  (iii) \(B'\) checks whether \(c' \in C_{well-f}\) or not:
    - If \(c' \notin C_{well-f}\), \(B'\) returns 0 to \(A\) directly.
    - If \(c' \in C_{well-f}\), \(B'\) finds \(r' \in \mathcal{R}_S\) satisfying \(\text{encap}_s(pp, r') = c'\). Then, \(B'\) checks whether \(\text{encap}_k(pp, pk'_3; r') \in \{k'_i, i \in S\}\) or not. If so, \(B'\) returns 1 to \(A\); otherwise, she returns 0 to \(A\).
- \(O^{Judge}(pk'_3, m', \sigma';)\): \(B'\) returns \(Judge(pp, pk'_3, sk_3, m', \sigma')\) to \(A\).

Receivng \(A\)'s final output \((pk'_* , pk'_*, m^*, \sigma^*)\), if \(pk'_* \neq pk_i\), \(B'\) returns a random tuple \((c_{ran}, k_{ran}, w_{ran})\) as her final output. Otherwise, since \(B'\) cannot check whether \(ev_{t1}\) occurs by herself (because she does not have \(sk_i\)), she proceeds as follows.

1. If \((pk'_* \in U_{cor}) \lor (pk'_* \in U_{cor}) \lor (\exists (pk'_*, S', m^*) \in Q_{m-sig} \text{ s.t. } pk'_* \in S')\), then \(B'\) aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple \((c_{ran}, k_{ran}, w_{ran})\) as her final output.
(2) Parse σ* = (˜c, ⃗i, ⃗1i, {˜ki}), pk,i ∈ S). Let ˜m* = m* || {˜ki}, pk,i ∈ S, and ˜y = (pp, pk*, pkJ, ˜c, ⃗1).

(3) If NIZK$^R$.PoKVer(˜m*, ˜y, ˜y) = 0, then B' aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple (c$_{ran}$, k$_{ran}$, w$_{ran}$) as her final output.

(4) If NIZK$^R$.PoKVer(˜m*, ˜y, ˜y) = 1, extract a witness ˜x for ˜y (via the rewinding technique) such that ˜x = (sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥) or ˜x = (⊥, ⊥, ˜f*):
- If ˜x = (sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥), B' aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple (c$_{ran}$, k$_{ran}$, w$_{ran}$) as her final output.
- If ˜x = (⊥, ⊥, ˜f*), B' firstly checks whether ˜c ∈ C$_{pp}$:$^f$. If so, B' aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple (c$_{ran}$, k$_{ran}$, w$_{ran}$) as her final output.
Otherwise, B' samples a key ˜k uniformly random from {˜ki}, pk,i ∈ S, and returns (˜c, ˜k, ˜f*) as her final output.

That’s the construction of B'.

Obviously, when ˜i = i*, B' perfectly simulates G$_4$ for A. On the other hand, since ˜k is uniformly sampled from {˜ki}, pk,i ∈ S. So when G$_4$ = 1, the probability that ˜k is the encapsulated key for pk*$_{k}$ is at least $\frac{1}{n}$. Therefore, we obtain that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{HPS-KEM:$^R$.B}}(\lambda) \geq \frac{1}{n^2}\text{Pr}[G_4 = 1].$$

(12)

Combining equations (7)-(12), we obtain that

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{HPS-KEM:$^R$.B'}}(\lambda) \geq \frac{1}{n^2}(\text{Pr}[\text{evt}(i^*) - \text{negl}(\lambda)),
$$

which is also non-negligible, contradicting universality of HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$. $\square$

**Proof (of Lemma 1).** Assume that Pr[evt$_2$] is non-negligible.

Event evt$_2$ occurs if and only if Judge(pp, pk*$_{k}$, sk$_{k}$, m*, σ*) = 1 where (pk*$_{k}$ ∉ U$_{cor}$) ∧ (k* ∈ Q$_{sig}$). Note that Judge(pp, pk*$_{k}$, sk$_{k}$, m*, σ*) = 1 implies that NIZK$^R$.PoKVer(˜m*, ˜y, ˜y) = 1. Since NIZK$^R$ is a NIZK proof system obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform from a Sigma protocol, a witness ˜x for ˜y can be extracted such that ˜x = (sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥) or ˜x = (⊥, ⊥, ˜f*).

Hence, let evt$_{(sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥)}$ (resp., evt$_{(⊥, ⊥, ˜f*)}$) denote the event that evt$_2$ occurs and a witness ˜x = (sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥) (resp., ˜x = (⊥, ⊥, ˜f*)) for ˜y is successfully extracted. Since Pr[evt$_2$] is non-negligible, we derive that at least one of Pr[evt$_{(sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥)}$] and Pr[evt$_{(⊥, ⊥, ˜f*)}$] is non-negligible.

**Case 1:** If Pr[evt$_{(sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥)}$] is non-negligible:

A PPT adversary B attacking SK-one-wayness of HPS-KEM$^\Sigma$ with non-negligible advantage can be shown. The construction and analysis of B are totally

---

1 For simplicity, we abuse the notations here. The events evt$_{(sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥)}$ and evt$_{(⊥, ⊥, ˜f*)}$ here are different from that in the proof of Lemma 3. For example, the “evt$_{(sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥)}$” in the proof of Lemma 3 denotes that “evt$_4$” occurs and a witness ˜x = (sk*$_{k}$, ˜f, ⊥) is successfully extracted.
identical with the “adversary $B$” in the proof of Lemma 3. So we do not repeat the
details here.

**Case 2:** If $\Pr[\text{evt}_{\{(\perp, \perp), \tau^*\}}]$ is non-negligible:

Now we use a sequence of games to show the proof.

**Game $G_0$:** This is the original game $G_{\text{AGMF}, \text{A}, n}^\text{bind}(\lambda)$. Specifically, the challenger
 generates $(pp, (pk_i, sk_i))_{i \in [n]}$ and $(pk_j, sk_j)$, and initiates a set $Q_{\text{m-sig}} := \emptyset$. The
 challenger maintains a local array $L_{\text{ro}}$ to keep track of $A$’s random oracle queries
 (here we use $\mathcal{CL}$ to denote the range of the hash function modelled as a random
 oracle). Then, the challenger sends $(pp, (pk_i))_{i \in [n]}$, $pk_j$ to $A$, and answers $A$’s
 oracle queries as follows:

- $\mathcal{O}^{\text{RO}}(str)$: If there is some $(str, cl) \in L_{\text{ro}},$ the challenger returns $cl$; otherwise,
 the challenger samples $cl \leftarrow \mathcal{CL}$, adds $(str, cl)$ to $L_{\text{ro}},$ and returns $cl$.

- $\mathcal{O}^{\text{Cor}}(pk')$: The challenger returns the corresponding secret key $sk'$.

- $\mathcal{O}^{\text{Frank}}(pk'_s, S', m')$: The challenger generates $\sigma' \leftarrow \text{Frank}(pp, sk'_s, S', pk_1, m')$
 sets $Q_{\text{m-sig}} := Q_{\text{m-sig}} \cup \{(pk'_s, S', m', \sigma')\}$, and returns $\sigma'$ to $A$.

- $\mathcal{O}^{\text{Verify}}(pk'_s, pk'_i, m', \sigma')$: The challenger returns $\text{Verify}(pp, pk'_s, sk'_i, pk_1, m', \sigma')$
 to $A$.

- $\mathcal{O}^{\text{Judge}}(pk'_s, m', \sigma')$: The challenger returns $\text{Judge}(pp, pk'_s, sk_1, m', \sigma')$ to $A$.

Receiving $A$’s final output $(pk'_s, pk'_i, m', \sigma')$, the challenger checks whether
 $\text{evt}_{\{(\perp, \perp), \tau^*\}}$ occurs. If so, the challenger outputs 1; otherwise, it outputs 0. In the
 following, we use $G_i \Rightarrow 1$ to denote that the challenger finally outputs 1 in game
 $G_i$ ($i \in \{0, 1, 2\}$).

We note that $\sigma^*$ can be parsed as $(\pi, \widehat{c}, \widehat{k}_3, \{\widehat{k}_i\}_{pk_i \in S})$. When $\text{evt}_{\{(\perp, \perp), \tau^*\}}$
 occurs, we have $(\widehat{r}^*, \widehat{c}) \in \mathcal{R}^*_c$.

Since $G_0 = G_{\text{AGMF}, \text{A}, n}^\text{bind}(\lambda)$, we derive that

$$\Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[\text{evt}_{\{(\perp, \perp), \tau^*\}}].$$

(13)

**Game $G_1$:** This game is the same as $G_0$, except that when $\text{evt}_{\{(\perp, \perp), \tau^*\}}$ occurs, the
 challenger returns 0 if $\widehat{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{\text{pp}}^\text{well-i}$. Note that the challenger can employ algorithm
 $\text{CheckCwel}$ to check whether $\widehat{c} \in \mathcal{C}_{\text{pp}}^\text{well-i}$ (with the help of $\widehat{r}^*$) efficiently. The
 unexplainability of $\text{HPS-KEM}^\Sigma$ guarantees that

$$|\Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

(14)

**Game $G_2$:** This game is the same as $G_1$, except that when $A$ queries $\mathcal{O}^{\text{Judge}}$
 on $(pk'_s, m', \sigma')$ satisfying that “$\emptyset(pk'_s, S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{\text{m-sig}}$”, the challenger generates
 the response as follows:

(i) Parse $\sigma' = (\pi', c', k'_1, \{k'_i\}_{pk_i \in S})$. Let $\mathcal{m}' = m'||\{k'_i\}_{pk_i \in S}$, $y' = (pp, pk'_s, pk_j, c', k'_1)$.

(ii) If $\text{NIZK}^\mathcal{R}.\text{PoKVer}(\mathcal{m}', \pi', y') = 0$, return 0 to $A$.

(iii) Check whether $c' \in \mathcal{C}_{\text{pp}}^\text{well-i}$ or not (with the help of some unbounded algo-
 rithm):
- If \( c' \notin C_{pp}^{\text{well-f}} \), return 0 to \( A \) directly.
- If \( c' \in C_{pp}^{\text{well-f}} \), find \( r' \in RS \) satisfying \( \text{encap}(pp, r') = c' \) (with the help of some unbounded algorithm). Then, the challenger checks whether \( \text{encap}(pp, pk_1; r') = k'_j \) or not. If so, it returns 1 to \( A \); otherwise, it returns 0 to \( A \).

We stress that \( G_2 \) is an inefficient game.

Let \( \text{bad} \) denote the event that “\( A \) submits a judge query \((pk'_s, m', \sigma' = (\pi', c', k'_j, \{k'_{i,}\}_{pk_i \in S}))\)” satisfying that (i) there is no \((pk'_s, S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{m-sig} \), (ii) \( c' \in C_{pp}^{\text{well-f}} \), and (iii) \( \text{decap}(pp, sk_1, c') = k'_j \). Note that from \( A \)'s point of view, \( G_2 \) and \( G_1 \) are identical except that \( \text{bad} \) occurs. The universality of \( \text{HPS-KEM}^{\text{SG}} \) guarantees that the probability that \( \text{bad} \) occurs is negligible (note that when \( c' \in C_{pp}^{\text{well-f}} \), an unbounded algorithm can trivially find \( r' \) satisfying \((r', c') \in R_S^\ast \)). So we derive that

\[
|\Pr[G_2 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq \Pr[\text{bad}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda). \tag{15}
\]

Next, we show an unbounded adversary \( B' \), which simulates \( G_2 \) for \( A \), attacking the universality of \( \text{HPS-KEM}^{\text{SG}} \) as follows.

Upon receiving \((pp, pk)\), \( B' \) initiates a set \( Q_{m-sig} := \emptyset \), sets \( pp := \tilde{pp} \) and \( pk_1 := \tilde{pk} \), and generates \((pk'_i, sk_i)_{i \in [n]}\) by herself. \( B' \) maintains a local array \( L_{ro} \) to keep track of \( A \)'s random oracle queries (here we use \( CL \) to denote the range of the hash function modelled as a random oracle). Then, with these parameters, \( B' \) simulates \( G_{\text{emo}, A, n}^{\text{find}}(\lambda) \) for \( A \), answering \( A \)'s oracle queries as follows:

- \( O_{QR}(str) \): If there is some \((str, cl) \in L_{ro} \), \( B' \) returns \( cl \); otherwise, \( B' \) samples \( cl \leftarrow CL \), adds \((str, cl) \) to \( L_{ro} \), and returns \( cl \).
- \( O_{\text{Cor}}(pk') \): \( B' \) returns the corresponding secret key.
- \( O_{\text{Rank}}(pk'_s, S', m') \): \( B' \) generates \( \sigma' \leftarrow \text{Frank}(pp, sk'_s, S', pk_1, m') \), sets \( Q_{m-sig} := Q_{m-sig} \cup \{(pk'_s, S', m', \sigma')\} \), and returns \( \sigma' \) to \( A \).
- \( O_{\text{Verify}}(pk'_s, pk'_i, m', \sigma') \): \( B' \) returns \( \text{Verify}(pp, pk'_s, sk'_i, pk_1, m', \sigma') \) to \( A \).
- \( O_{\text{Judge}}(pk'_s, m', \sigma') \): If there is \((pk'_s, S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{m-sig} \), then \( B' \) returns 1 to \( A \) directly; otherwise, \( B' \) proceeds as follows.
  (i) Parse \( \sigma' = (\pi', c', k'_j, \{k'_{i,}\}_{pk_i \in S}) \). Let \( m' = m' || \{k'_{i,}\}_{pk_i \in S} \), \( y' = (pp, pk'_s, pk_1, c', k'_j) \).
  (ii) If \( \text{NIZK}^{\text{SG}}.\text{PoKVer}(\overline{m'}, \pi', y') = 0 \), return 0 to \( A \).
  (iii) \( B' \) checks whether \( c' \notin C_{pp}^{\text{well-f}} \) or not:
    - If \( c' \notin C_{pp}^{\text{well-f}} \), \( B' \) returns 0 to \( A \) directly.
    - If \( c' \in C_{pp}^{\text{well-f}} \), \( B' \) finds \( r' \in RS \) satisfying \( \text{encap}(pp, r') = c' \). Then, \( B' \) checks whether \( \text{encap}(pp, pk_1; r') = k'_j \) or not. If so, \( B' \) returns 1 to \( A \); otherwise, she returns 0 to \( A \).

Receiving \( A \)'s final output \((pk'_s, pk'_i, m', \sigma') \), since \( B' \) cannot check whether \( ev_{t_2} \) occurs by herself (because she does not have \( sk_1 \)), she proceeds as follows.

1. If \((pk'_s \in U_{cor}) \lor (\exists (pk'_s, S', m') \in Q_{sig}) \), then \( B' \) aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple \((c_{ran}, k_{ran}, u_{ran}) \) as her final output.
(2) Parse \(\sigma^* = (\tilde{\sigma}, c, \tilde{k}_J, \{\tilde{k}_r, \})_{pk_r \in S}\). Let \(m^* = m^* \parallel \{\tilde{k}_r, \}_{pk_r \in S}\), and \(\tilde{y} = (pp, pk^*_s, pk_j, \tilde{k}_J)\).

(3) If \(NIZK^R.\) PoKVer\((m^*, \tilde{\sigma}, \tilde{y}) = 0\), then \(B'\) aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple \((c_{ran}^{\prime}, k_{ran}^{\prime}, w_{ran})\) as her final output.

(4) If \(NIZK^R.\) PoKVer\((m^*, \tilde{\sigma}, \tilde{y}) = 1\), extract a witness \(\tilde{x}\) for \(\tilde{y}\) (via the rewinding technique) such that \(\tilde{x} = (sk^*_s, \tilde{r}, \perp)\) or \(\tilde{x} = (\perp, \perp, \tilde{r}^*)\):

- If \(\tilde{x} = (sk^*_s, \tilde{r}, \perp)\), \(B'\) aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple \((c_{ran}, k_{ran}, w_{ran})\) as her final output.
- If \(\tilde{x} = (\perp, \perp, \tilde{r}^*)\), \(B'\) firstly checks whether \(\tilde{c} \in C_{\text{well-f}}^{pp}\), If so, \(B'\) aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple \((c_{ran}, k_{ran}, w_{ran})\) as her final output. Otherwise, \(B'\) returns \((\tilde{e}, \tilde{k}_J, \tilde{r}^*)\) as her final output.

That’s the construction of \(B'\).

Obviously, \(B'\) perfectly simulates \(G_2\) for \(A\). So we obtain that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{HPS-KEM}}^\text{univ}^\text{B'}(\lambda) \geq \Pr[G_2 \Rightarrow 1].
\]

Combining equations (13)-(16), we obtain that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{HPS-KEM}}^\text{univ}^\text{B'}(\lambda) \geq \Pr[\text{evt} \{\perp, \perp, \tilde{r}^*\}] - \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

which is also non-negligible, contradicting universality of HPS-KEM\(^R\).

\[\square\]

A.2 Proof of sender binding

Proof. For any PPT adversary \(A\) attacking the sender-binding property of AGMF, we denote \(A\)'s input as \((pp, \{(pk)_i \in [n]\}, pk_J)\), and \(A\)'s final output as \((pk^*_s, pk^*_r, m^*, \sigma^*)\). Then, we parse \(\sigma^* = (\tilde{\sigma}, c, \tilde{k}_J, \{\tilde{k}_r, \})_{pk_r \in S}\). Let \(m^* = m^* \parallel \{\tilde{k}_r, \}_{pk_r \in S}\), and \(\tilde{y} = (pp, pk^*_s, pk_J, \tilde{k}_J)\). Let \(U_{\text{cor}}\) (resp., \(Q_{\text{sig}}\)) denote the set of public keys (resp., tuples) that \(A\) has submitted to \(O^{\text{cor}}\) (resp., \(O^{\text{Frank}}\)). Since \(NIZK^R = (\text{PoK, PoKVer})\) is a NIZK proof obtained via the Fiat-Shamir transform, we can further parse \(\tilde{\sigma} = (c_{\text{cor}}, \tilde{z})\).

Without loss of generality, we assume that \(A\) has queried the random oracle on \((m^*, c_{\text{cor}}, \tilde{y})\) before returning its final output \((pk^*_s, pk^*_r, m^*, \sigma^*)\).

Let \(\text{evt}\) denote the event that \(\{\text{Verify}(pp, pk^*_s, sk^*_r, pk_J, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1\} \land \{\text{Judge}(pp, pk^*_s, sk_J, m^*, \sigma^*) = 0\} \land \{pk^*_r \notin U_{\text{cor}}\}\).

Obviously, we have

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{AGMF}}^\text{bind, A, n}^\text{bind}(\lambda) = \Pr[G_{\text{AGMF}}^\text{bind, A, n}(\lambda) = 1] = \Pr[\text{evt}].
\]

So what remains is to prove that \(\Pr[\text{evt}]\) is negligible.

Assume that \(\Pr[\text{evt}]\) is non-negligible.

Note that when \(\text{evt}\) occurs, we have \(\text{Verify}(pp, pk^*_s, sk^*_r, pk_J, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1\) and \(\text{Judge}(pp, pk^*_s, sk_J, m^*, \sigma^*) = 0\). \(\text{Verify}(pp, pk^*_s, sk^*_r, pk_J, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1\) implies that \(NIZK^R.\) PoKVer\((m^*, \tilde{\sigma}, \tilde{y}) = 1\). Since \(NIZK^R\) is a NIZK proof system obtained
via the Fiat-Shamir transform from a Sigma protocol, according to a rewinding
lemma [7, Lemma 19.2] and knowledge soundness of the Sigma protocol, a wit-
tness \( \hat{x} \) for \( \hat{y} \) (satisfying \( \hat{x} = (s\hat{k}_s, \hat{r}, \perp) \) or \( \hat{x} = (\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast) \)) can be extracted with
non-negligible probability. The reason is as follows.

Let \( q_{ro} \) denote the total number of random oracle queries made by \( A \). Since
we assume that \( A \) has queried the random oracle on \((\pi^r, c\tilde{m}, \tilde{y})\) before returning
its final output \((pk_s^*, pk_i^*, m^*, \sigma^*)\), for \( j \in [q_{ro}] \), let \( \text{evt}^{(j)} \) denote the event that \( \text{evt} \)
occurs and \((\pi^r, c\tilde{m}, \tilde{y})\) is \( A \)'s \( j \)-th random oracle query. Obviously, \( \Pr[\text{evt}] = \sum_{j=1}^{q_{ro}} \Pr[\text{evt}^{(j)}] \). So the fact that \( \Pr[\text{evt}] \) is non-negligible implies that there
must be some \( j^* \in [q_{ro}] \), such that \( \Pr[\text{evt}^{(j^*)}] \) is non-negligible. On the other
hand, when \( \text{evt}^{(j^*)} \) occurs, we can rewind back to the moment when \( A \) made
its \( j^* \)-th random oracle query, and respond with a fresh and uniformly sampled
value for this query. If \( \text{evt}^{(j^*)} \) occurs again, we can use the knowledge soundness
of the Sigma protocol to extract a valid witness \( \hat{x} \) for \( \hat{y} \). Since \( \Pr[\text{evt}^{(j^*)}] \) is non-
negligible, the rewinding lemma [7, Lemma 19.2] guarantees that the witness
can be extracted successfully with non-negligible probability.

Note that when \( \text{Verify}(pp, pk_s^*, sk_i^*, pk_3, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1 \), if the extracted witness
\( \hat{x} \) for \( \hat{y} \) is \((s\hat{k}_s, \hat{r}, \perp) \), then \( \text{Judge}(pp, pk_s^*, sk_3, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1 \), which implies that \( \text{evt} \)
does not occur. So we derive that when \( \text{evt} \) occurs, the extracted witness for
\( \hat{y} \) is \( \hat{x} = (\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast) \).

Hence, let \( \text{evt}^{(1)}_{(\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast)} \) denote the event that \( \text{evt} \) occurs and a witness \( \hat{x} =
(\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast) \) is successfully extracted. Since \( \Pr[\text{evt}] \) is non-negligible, we derive
that \( \Pr[\text{evt}^{(1)}_{(\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast)}] \) is also non-negligible.

For all \( i \in [n] \), let \( \text{evt}^{(i)}_{(\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast)} \) denote the event that \( \text{evt}^{(i)}_{(\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast)} \) occurs and
\( pk_i^* = pk_i \). Obviously, \( \Pr[\text{evt}^{(i)}_{(\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast)}] = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \Pr[\text{evt}^{(i)}_{(\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast)}] \). So there must be
some \( i^* \in [n] \), such that \( \Pr[\text{evt}^{(i^*)}_{(\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast)}] \) is non-negligible.

Next, we utilize a sequence of games to show the proof.

**Game \( G_0 \):** This is the original game \( G_{AGMF,A,t}(\lambda) \). Specifically, the challenger
generates \( pp, (pk_i, sk_i)_{i \in [n]} \) and \((pk_3, sk_3)\), and initiates a set \( Q_{m-sig} := \emptyset \). The
challenger maintains a local array \( L_{ro} \) to keep track of \( A \)'s random oracle queries
(here we use \( CL \) to denote the range of the hash function modelled as a random
oracle). Then, the challenger sends \((pp, (pk_i)_{i \in [n]}, pk_3)\) to \( A \), and answers \( A \)'s
oracle queries as follows:

- \( O^{\text{RO}}(str) \): If there is some \((str, cl) \in L_{ro} \), the challenger returns \( cl \); otherwise,
  the challenger samples \( cl \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \), adds \((str, cl) \) to \( L_{ro} \), and returns \( cl \).
- \( O^{\text{Cor}}(pk'_i) \): The challenger returns the corresponding secret key \( sk'_i \).
- \( O^{\text{rank}}(pk'_i, S', m') \): The challenger generates \( \sigma' \leftarrow \text{Frank}(pp, sk'_i, S', pk_3, m') \),
  sets \( Q_{m-sig} := Q_{m-sig} \cup \{(pk'_i, S', m', \sigma')\} \), and returns \( \sigma' \) to \( A \).
- \( O^{\text{Verify}}(pk'_i, pk'_i, m', \sigma') \): The challenger returns \( \text{Verify}(pp, pk'_i, sk'_i, pk_3, m', \sigma') \)
to \( A \).
- \( O^{\text{Judge}}(pk'_i, m', \sigma') \): The challenger returns \( \text{Judge}(pp, pk'_i, sk_3, m', \sigma') \) to \( A \).

Receiving \( A \)'s final output \((pk_s^*, pk_i^*, m^*, \sigma^*)\), the challenger checks whether
\( \text{evt}^{(i^*)}_{(\perp, \perp, \hat{r}^\ast)} \) occurs. If so, the challenger outputs \( 1 \); otherwise, it outputs \( 0 \).
In the following, we use $G_i \Rightarrow 1$ to denote that the challenger finally outputs 1 in game $G_i$ ($i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, 4\}$).

We note that $\sigma^*$ can be parsed as $(\tilde{\pi}, \tilde{c}, \tilde{k}_1, \{\tilde{k}_i\}_{i \in S})$. When $\text{evt}_{\{\#, \perp, \tilde{r}\}}(\sigma^*)$ occurs, we have $\tilde{r}^* \in \mathcal{R}_c^*$.

Since $G_0 = \mathcal{G}_\text{AGMF},A_n^\text{bind}(\lambda)$, we derive that

$$\Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[\text{evt}_{\{\#, \perp, \tilde{r}\}}(\sigma^*)].$$

**Game $G_1$:** This game is the same as $G_0$, except that when $\text{evt}_{\{\#, \perp, \tilde{r}\}}(\sigma^*)$ occurs, the challenger returns 0 if $\tilde{c} \in \mathcal{C}_\text{pol}$. Note that the challenger can employ algorithm CheckCWel to check whether $\tilde{c} \in \mathcal{C}_\text{pol}$ (with the help of $\tilde{r}^*$) efficiently. The unexplainability of HPS-KEM guarantees that

$$|\Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_0 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda).$$

**Game $G_2$:** This game is the same as $G_1$, except that when $A$ submits $p_{k_i}$ to $\mathcal{O}_\text{Cor}$, the challenger aborts the game (with a random bit as its final output) immediately. Note that when $A$ has queried $\mathcal{O}_\text{Cor}$ on $p_{k_i}$, $p_{k_i}$ will be added to $U_{cor}$. In this case, $\text{evt}_{\{\#, \perp, \tilde{r}\}}(\sigma^*)$ will not occur. So we obtain that

$$\Pr[G_2 \Rightarrow 1] = \Pr[G_1 \Rightarrow 1].$$

**Game $G_3$:** This game is the same as $G_2$, except that when $A$ queries $\mathcal{O}_\text{Frank}$ on $(p_{k_i}^r = p_{k_i}, S', m')$, the challenger generates the response as follows:

(i) Sample $r' \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_S$, and compute $c' \leftarrow \text{encap}_x(pp; r')$ and $k_i' \leftarrow \text{encap}_x(pp, pk_i; r')$.

(ii) For each $p_{k_i} \in S'$, compute $k_i' \leftarrow \text{encap}_x(pp, p_{k_i}; r')$.

(iii) Set $y' := (pp, p_{k_i}, c', k_i')$ and $\overline{m'} := (m' || \{k_i'\}_{i \in S'})$, and then generate a proof $\pi'$ with the simulator (taking $(\overline{m'}, y')$ as input) of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system $\text{NIZK}^\mathcal{R}$.

(iv) Set $\sigma' := (\pi', c, k_i', \{k_i'\}_{i \in S'})$ and $Q_{\text{m-sig}} := Q_{\text{m-sig}} \cup \{(p_{k_i}^r, S', m', \sigma')\}$, and return $\sigma'$ to $A$.

The zero-knowledge property of $\text{NIZK}^\mathcal{R}$ guarantees that

$$|\Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_2 \Rightarrow 1]| \leq \text{neg}(\lambda).$$

**Game $G_4$:** This game is the same as $G_3$, except that when $A$ queries $\mathcal{O}_\text{Verify}$ on $(p_{k_i}^r, p_{k_i}^t = p_{k_i}, m', \sigma')$ satisfying that $^*?^*(p_{k_i}^r, S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{\text{m-sig}}$ s.t. $p_{k_i} \in S^{\text{pol}}$, the challenger generates the response as follows:

(i) Parse $\sigma' = (\pi', c, k_i', \{k_i'\}_{i \in S})$. Let $\overline{m'} = m' || \{k_i'\}_{p_{k_i} \in S}$, $y' = (pp, p_{k_i}, p_{k_i}^t, c', k_i')$.

(ii) Check whether $c' \in \mathcal{C}_\text{pol}$ or not (with the help of some unbounded algorithm):

- If $c' \notin \mathcal{C}_\text{pol}$, return 0 to $A$ directly.
If $c' \in \mathcal{C}_{well}^4$, find $r' \in \mathcal{R}_S$ satisfying $\text{encap}_1(pp; r') = c'$ (with the help of some unbounded algorithm). Then, the challenger checks whether $\text{encap}_1(pp, pk_i' ; r') \in \{k_i' \}_{pk_i \in S}$ or not. If so, it returns $1$ to $A$; otherwise, it returns $0$ to $A$.

We stress that $G_4$ is an inefficient game.

Let $\text{bad}$ denote the event that “$A$ submits a verification query $(pk'_i, pk'_j = pk_{i'}$, $m', \sigma' = (\pi', c', k'_i, \{k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S})$) satisfying (i) there is no $(pk'_i, S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{m-sig}$ such that $pk_{i'} \in S'$, (ii) $c' \in \mathcal{C}_{pp}^* \setminus \mathcal{C}_{well}^4$, and (iii) $\text{decap}(pp, sk_i', c') \in \{k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S}$”. Note that from $A$’s point of view, $G_4$ and $G_3$ are identical except that $\text{bad}$ occurs. The universality of HPS-KEM guarantees that the probability that $\text{bad}$ occurs is negligible (note that when $c' \in \mathcal{C}_{pp}^* \setminus \mathcal{C}_{well}^4$, an unbounded algorithm can trivially find $r'$ satisfying $(r', c') \in \mathcal{R}_S^*$. So we derive that

$$\left| \Pr[G_4 \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[G_3 \Rightarrow 1] \right| \leq \Pr[\text{bad}] \leq \text{neg}(\lambda).$$

Now, we show an unbounded adversary $B'$, which simulates $G_4$ for $A$, attacking the universality of HPS-KEM as follows.

Upon receiving $(pp, pk)$, $B'$ initiates a set $Q_{m-sig} := \emptyset$, samples $i \leftarrow [n]$, sets $pp := \tilde{pp}$ and $pk_i := pk$, and generates $(pk_i, sk_i)$ and $(pk_i, sk_i)_{i \in [n]} \setminus \{i\}$ by herself. $B'$ maintains a local array $L_{ro}$ to keep track of $A$’s random oracle queries (here we use $CL$ to denote the range of the hash function modelled as a random oracle). Then, $B'$ sends $(pp, (pk_i)_{i \in [n]}, pk_1)$ to $A$ and answers $A$’s oracle queries as follows:

- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{RO}}(str)$: If there is some $(str, cl) \in L_{ro}, B'$ returns $cl$; otherwise, $B'$ samples $\tilde{cl} \leftarrow CL$, adds $(str, cl)$ to $L_{ro}$, and returns $\tilde{cl}$.
- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Gar}}(pk')$: If $pk' \neq pk_i$, $B'$ returns the corresponding secret key; if $pk' = pk_i$, $B'$ aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple $(c_{ran}, k_{ran}, w_{ran})$ as her final output.
- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Frank}}(pk'_i, S', m')$: If $pk'_i \neq pk_i$, $B'$ uses the corresponding secret key $sk'_i$ to run $\text{Frank}(pp, sk'_i, S', pk_j, m')$ and returns the results to $A$; otherwise, $B'$ proceeds as follows.
  (i) Sample $r' \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_S$, and compute $c' \leftarrow \text{encap}_1(pp; r')$ and $k'_j \leftarrow \text{encap}_1(pp, pk_{j}; r')$.
  (ii) For each $pk_i \in S'$, compute $k'_i \leftarrow \text{encap}_1(pp, pk_i; r')$.
  (iii) Set $y' := (pp, pk'_i, pk_j, c', k'_i)$ and $\bar{m}' := (m'||\{k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S'})$, and then generate a proof $\pi'$ with the simulator (taking $(\bar{m}', y')$ as input) of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system NIZK$^R$.
  (iv) Set $\sigma' := (\pi', c, k'_j, \{k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S'})$ and $Q_{m-sig} := Q_{m-sig} \cup \{(pk'_i, S', m', \sigma')\}$, and return $\sigma'$ to $A$.
- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{Verify}}(pk'_i, pk_j, m', \sigma')$: If $pk'_i \neq pk_i$, $B'$ uses the corresponding secret key $sk'_i$ to run $\text{Verify}(pp, pk'_i, sk'_i, pk_j, m', \sigma')$ and returns the result to $A$; if $pk'_i = pk_i$ and there is some $S'$ satisfying that $(pk'_i \in S') \land (pk'_i, S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{m-sig}$, then $B'$ returns $1$ to $A$ directly; otherwise, $B'$ proceeds as follows.
  (i) Parse $\sigma' = (\pi', c', k'_j \{k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S})$. Let $m'' = m'||\{k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S}, y' = (pp, pk'_i, pk_j, c', k'_j)$.
(ii) If \( NIZK^R \cdot \text{PoKVer}(\pi', \pi'', y') = 0 \), return 0 to \( A \).

(iii) \( B' \) checks whether \( c' \in C^\text{well-f} \) or not:
- If \( c' \notin C^\text{well-f} \), \( B' \) returns 0 to \( A \) directly.
- If \( c' \in C^\text{well-f} \), \( B' \) finds \( r' \in R \) satisfying \( \text{encap}_b(pp; r') = c' \). Then, \( B' \) checks whether \( \text{encap}_b(pp, pk'_i; r') \in \{ k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S} \) or not. If so, \( B' \) returns 1 to \( A \); otherwise, she returns 0 to \( A \).

\[ O_{\text{Judge}}(pk'_i, m', c', \sigma') \rightarrow \text{Judge}(pp, pk'_i, sk_j, m', s, \sigma') \rightarrow A. \]

Receiving \( A \)'s final output \((pk'_i, pk'_i, m^*, \sigma^*)\), if \( pk'_i \neq pk'_j \), \( B' \) returns a random tuple \((\text{run}, h, w)\) as her final output. Otherwise, since \( B' \) cannot check whether \text{evt} occurs by herself (because she does not have \( sk'_i \)), she proceeds as follows.

\[ \text{(1)} \quad \text{If } pk'_i \in U_{\text{cor}}, \text{ then } B' \text{ aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple } (\text{run}, h, w) \text{ as her final output.} \]

\[ \text{(2)} \quad \text{Parse } \sigma^* = (\pi, c, k_i, \{ k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S}). \text{ Let } m^* = m^* \| \{k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S}, \text{ and } \hat{y} = (pp, pk'_i, pk'_j, \pi, c, \hat{k}). \]

\[ \text{(3)} \quad \text{If } NIZK^R \cdot \text{PoKVer}(\pi^*, \pi, \hat{y}) = 0, \text{ then } B' \text{ aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple } (\text{run}, h, w) \text{ as her final output.} \]

\[ \text{(4)} \quad \text{If } NIZK^R \cdot \text{PoKVer}(\pi^*, \pi, \hat{y}) = 1, \text{ extract a witness } \hat{x} \text{ for } \hat{y} \text{ (via the rewinding technique) such that } \hat{x} = (sk'_i, \pi, \perp) \text{ or } \hat{x} = (\perp, \perp, \sigma^*). \]

- If \( \hat{x} = (sk'_i, \pi, \perp) \), \( B' \) aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple \((\text{run}, h, w)\) as her final output.
- If \( \hat{x} = (\perp, \perp, \sigma^*) \), \( B' \) first checks whether \( \hat{c} \in C^\text{well-f} \). If so, \( B' \) aborts the simulation and returns a random tuple \((\text{run}, h, w)\) as her final output.

Otherwise, \( B' \) samples a key \( \hat{k} \) uniformly random from \( \{ k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S} \), and returns \((\hat{c}, \hat{k}, \sigma^*)\) as her final output.

That’s the construction of \( B' \).

Obviously, when \( i = i^* \), \( B' \) perfectly simulates \( G_4 \) for \( A \). On the other hand, since \( \hat{k} \) is uniformly sampled from \( \{ k'_i \}_{pk_i \in S} \), when \( G_4 \Rightarrow 1 \), the probability that \( \hat{k} \) is the encapsulated key for \( pk'_i \) is at least \( \frac{1}{\pi} \). Therefore, we obtain that

\[ \text{Adv}^\text{univ}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^E, B'}(\lambda) \geq \frac{1}{\pi^2} \Pr[G_4 \Rightarrow 1]. \]  

(23)

Combining equations (18)-(23), we obtain that

\[ \text{Adv}^\text{univ}_{\text{HPS-KEM}^E, B'}(\lambda) \geq \frac{1}{\pi^2} (\Pr[\text{evt}(\tau^*)] - \text{neg}!(\lambda)), \]

which is also non-negligible, contradicting universality of HPS-KEM\(^E\).

\[ \square \]

### A.3 Proof of deniability

**Proof (of universal deniability).** We prove the universal deniability using a game hopping. The games are defined as follows (also see in Fig. 12).

\[ 43 \]
Fig. 12 Games for the proof of universal deniability (codes in the boxes are only executed in the corresponding games)
Game\(_0\) : corresponds to the universal deniability game \(G_{\text{AGMF},A,n}^{\text{UnivDen}}\) when \(b = 0\).

When the adversary \(A\) issues \(O^{F,F}(pk'_s, S', m')\) queries, the challenger proceeds as follows.

1. If the secret keys of some receivers in \(S'\) have been queried to the oracle \(\mathcal{O}^{\text{Cor}}\) by the adversary, return \(\bot\).
2. Sample \(r' \leftarrow RS\), and compute \(c' \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, r')\) and \(k'_j \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, pk_j; r')\).
3. For each \(pk'_i \in S'\), compute \(k'_i \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, pk'_i; r')\).
4. Set \(x' := (sk'_i, r', \bot), y' := (pp, pk'_i, pk_3, c', k'_j)\) and \(m' := (m' || \{k'_i\}_{pk'_i \in S'})\), and then compute the proof \(\pi' \leftarrow \text{NIZK}^R.PoK(m', x', y')\).
5. Return \(\sigma' = (n', c', k'_i, \{k'_i\}_{pk'_i \in S'})\) to the adversary.

The adversary \(A\) can also know some secret keys by querying the corresponding public keys to \(\mathcal{O}^{\text{Cor}}\). We require that the secret keys of these receivers in \(S'\) are not allowed to be queried to the oracle \(\mathcal{O}^{\text{Cor}}\). Therefore, the game will not give the corresponding secret keys of the receivers in \(S'\) to \(A\). Finally, \(A\) guesses a bit \(b'\).

Game\(_1\) : is the same as Game\(_0\), except that when generating the NIZK proof in the \(O^{F,F}\), the challenger calls the simulator \(S\) of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system for \(\mathcal{R}\) and the witness \(x'\) are set empty.

Game\(_2\) : is same as Game\(_1\) except that in the response of the adversary’s \(O^{F,F}(pk'_s, S', m')\) queries, \(k'_j, k'_i\) are generated by \(\text{decap}\). That is to say, the challenger computes \(k'_j \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk_3, c')\), and for each \(pk'_i \in S'\), computes \(k'_i \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk'_i, c')\).

Game\(_3\) : is same as Game\(_2\) except that in the response of the adversary’s \(O^{F,F}(pk'_s, S', m')\) queries, \(c'\) is generated by \(\text{encap}^*_c\). That is to say, the challenger chooses \(r' \leftarrow RS\), and computes \(c' \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_c(pp, r'^*\).

Game\(_4\) : is same as Game\(_3\) except that in the response of the adversary’s \(O^{F,F}(pk'_s, S', m')\) queries, \(k'_j \leftarrow \mathcal{K}\), and for each \(pk'_i \in S'\), \(k'_i \leftarrow \mathcal{K}\).

Game\(_5\) : is the same as Game\(_4\), except that when generating the NIZK proof, the challenger calls the NIZK generation algorithm \(\text{NIZK}^R.PoK\). In fact, Game\(_5\) corresponds to the universal deniability game \(G_{\text{AGMF},A,n}^{\text{UnivDen}}\) when \(b = 1\).

In other words, when the adversary \(A\) issues \(O^{F,F}(pk'_s, S', m')\) queries, the challenger proceeds as follows.

1. If the secret keys of some receivers in \(S'\) have been queried to the oracle \(\mathcal{O}^{\text{Cor}}\) by the adversary, return \(\bot\).
2. Sample \(r'^* \leftarrow RS^*\), and compute \(c' \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_c(pp, r'^*)\) and choose \(k'_j \leftarrow \mathcal{K}\).
3. For each \(pk'_i \in S'\), choose \(k'_i \leftarrow \mathcal{K}\).
4. Set \(x' := (\bot, \bot, r'^*), y' := (pp, pk'_i, pk_3, c', k'_j)\) and \(m' := (m' || \{k'_i\}_{pk'_i \in S'})\), and then compute the proof \(\pi' \leftarrow \text{NIZK}^R.PoK(m', x', y')\).
5. Return \(\sigma' = (n', c', k'_i, \{k'_i\}_{pk'_i \in S'})\) to the adversary.

We will show that these games are indistinguishable. Therefore, we conclude that any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game\(_0\) (i.e., the universal deniability game when \(b = 1\)) and Game\(_5\) (i.e., the universal deniability game when \(b = 1\)) with non-negligible probability. That is to say, the advantage of the adversary in the receiver compromise deniability game is negligible.

45
So what remains is to prove that Game$_0$ and Game$_3$ are indistinguishable.

**Game$_0$ → Game$_1$.** If Pr[Game$_0(\lambda) = 1$] and Pr[Game$_1(\lambda) = 1$] are distinguishable with non-negligible probability, then we construct an adversary $B$ to win the game of zero-knowledge of NIZK in the random oracle model. The adversary $B$ plays the role of challenger in both Game$_0$ and Game$_1$. The adversary $B$ initializes $n$ secret-public keys pairs and the judge’s key pair first, as the challenger does, then proceeds as follows

1. When $A$ queries to $O^{\text{Cor}}$, $B$ returns the result as the challenger does.
2. When $A$ queries to $O^{\text{F-F}}$, $B$ generates the ciphertext and encapsulated keys as they are generated in Frank algorithm. When generating the NIZK proof, $B$ embeds a proof which is generated either by the real word or by the ideal word.

After that, $B$ outputs the returned value from $A$. If the proof is generated by the real word, $B$ communicates with $A$ in Game$_0$. If the proof is generated by the ideal word, $B$ communicates with $A$ in Game$_1$. Thus, we have

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{NIZK},B}_{\text{NIZK}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{NIZK},B}(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{NIZK},B}(\lambda) = 1]|.$$

Note that the zero proof of NIZK requires that $\text{Adv}^{\text{NIZK},B}_{\text{NIZK}}(\lambda)$ is negligible. Therefore, we have $|\Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{NIZK}}(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{1}}(\lambda) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

**Game$_1$ → Game$_2$.** Due to the correctness property of the HPS-KEM$^2$ scheme, when $c' \leftarrow \text{encap}_s(pp, r')$, we have $\text{encap}_s(pp, pk_3, r') = \text{decap}(pp, sk_1, c')$ and $\text{encap}_s(pp, pk'_3, r') = \text{decap}(pp, sk'_1, c')$ for each $pk'_1 \in S'$. Therefore, Game$_2$ is identical to Game$_1$.

**Game$_2$ → Game$_3$.** The difference between Game$_2$ and Game$_3$ lies in the way to generate $c'$ in the response of the adversary’s $O^{\text{F-F}}$ queries. In Game$_2$, $c'$ is generated by encap$_s$, and in Game$_3$, $c'$ is generated by encap$_s^*$. Due to the indistinguishability property of the HPS-KEM$^2$ scheme, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game$_2$ and Game$_3$ with non-negligible probability.

**Game$_3$ → Game$_4$.** By smoothness of the HPS-KEM$^2$, we have $\Delta((c, k), (c, k')) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$, where $c \leftarrow \text{encap}_s^*(pp)$, $k \leftarrow k$, $sk \leftarrow \text{SK}_{pp, pk}$ and $k' = \text{decap}(pp, sk, c)$. Thus, we have $|\Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{3}}(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{4}}(\lambda) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

**Game$_4$ → Game$_5$.** The case is similar to that in Game$_0$ → Game$_1$. If Pr[Game$_4(\lambda) = 1$] and Pr[Game$_5(\lambda) = 1$] are distinguishable with non-negligible probability, then we construct an adversary $B$ to win the game of zero-knowledge of NIZK in the random oracle model. For simplicity, we omit the details and directly draw the conclusion here, $|\Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{4}}(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{5}}(\lambda) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Finally, we have $\text{Adv}_{\text{AGMF,UnivDen}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{0}}(\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_{\text{5}}(\lambda) = 1]| = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Thus, it holds that $\text{Adv}_{\text{AGMF,UnivDen}}(\lambda)$ is negligible.

\[\square\]

**Proof (of receiver compromise deniability).** We will prove receiver compromise deniability using a hybrid argument over a sequence of games (also see in Fig. 13).

46
\[ b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; \quad \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda); \quad (pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{KG}_1(\text{pp}) \]

\[ U := \emptyset; \quad U_{\text{key}} := \emptyset; \quad U_{\text{cor}} := \emptyset; \quad Q^* := \emptyset \]

For \( i = 1 \ldots n \):

\[ (pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{KG}_i(\text{pp}); \]

\[ U \leftarrow U \cup \{pk_i\}; \quad U_{\text{key}} \leftarrow U_{\text{key}} \cup \{pk_i, sk_i\} \]

\[ b' \leftarrow A^0(\text{pp}, U, pk_J) \]

Return \((b = b')\)

\[ \text{O}^\text{C} \quad \text{Cor}(pk') \quad \text{If } pk' \in Q': \quad \text{Return } \bot \]

\[ U_{\text{cor}} \leftarrow U_{\text{cor}} \cup \{pk'\} \]

Return \(sk'\) s.t. \(\{pk', sk'\} \in U_{\text{key}}\)

\[ \text{O}^\text{RF} \quad \text{For } pk_i \in S_{\text{cor}}: \quad k_i \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk_i, c) \]

\[ \text{For } pk_i \in S_{\text{cor}}: \quad k_i \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, pk_i, r) \]

\[ m \leftarrow (m' || \{k_i\})_{pk_i \in S'} \]

\[ x \leftarrow (sk_i, r, \bot); \quad y \leftarrow (pp, pk_i', pk_1, c, k_1); \quad \pi \leftarrow \text{NIKE}^X.\text{PoK}(\pi, x, y) \]

\[ x' \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, n\}; \quad y' \leftarrow (pp, pk_i', pk_1, c, k_1); \quad \pi \leftarrow \text{NIKE}^X.\text{PoK}(\pi, x, y) \]

\[ x' \leftarrow \{1, \ldots, n\}; \quad y' \leftarrow (pp, pk_i', pk_1, c, k_1); \quad \pi \leftarrow \text{NIKE}^X.\text{PoK}(\pi, x, y) \]

Return \(\sigma = (\pi, c, k_1, \{k_i\})_{pk_i \in S'}\)

---

**Fig. 13** Games for the proof of receiver compromise deniability (codes in the boxes are only executed in the corresponding games)
The difference between Game\(_0\) is negligible. say, the advantage of the adversary in the receiver compromise deniability game when any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game\(_0\) or the secret keys of some receivers in \(S' \setminus S'_\text{cor}\) have been queried to the oracle \(O_{\text{cor}}\) by the adversary, return \(\perp\).

1. If \(S'_\text{cor} \subseteq S'\) or the secret keys of some receivers in \(S' \setminus S'_\text{cor}\) have been queried to the oracle \(O_{\text{cor}}\) by the adversary, return \(\perp\).

1. If \(S'_\text{cor} \subseteq S'\) or the secret keys of some receivers in \(S' \setminus S'_\text{cor}\) have been queried to the oracle \(O_{\text{cor}}\) by the adversary, return \(\perp\).

2. Sample \(r' \leftarrow \mathcal{RS}\), and compute \(c' \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_\text{F-RF}(pp, r')\) and \(k'_j \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_\text{F-RF}(pp, pk_j; r')\).

2. Sample \(r' \leftarrow \mathcal{RS}\), and compute \(c' \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_\text{F-RF}(pp, r')\) and \(k'_j \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_\text{F-RF}(pp, pk_j; r')\).

3. For each \(pk'_t \in S'\), compute \(k'_t \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_\text{F-RF}(pp, pk'_t; r')\).

3. For each \(pk'_t \in S'\), compute \(k'_t \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_\text{F-RF}(pp, pk'_t; r')\).

4. For each \(pk'_t \in S'\), compute \(k'_t \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_\text{F-RF}(pp, pk'_t; r')\).

4. For each \(pk'_t \in S'\), compute \(k'_t \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_\text{F-RF}(pp, pk'_t; r')\).

5. Set \(x' := (sk'_t, r', \perp), y' := (pp, pk'_s, pk'_3, c', k'_j)\) and \(m' := (m' || \{k'_t\}_{pk'_t \in S'})\), and then compute the proof \(\pi' \leftarrow \text{NIZK}^\mathcal{R}\text{.PoK}(m', x', y')\).

5. Set \(x' := (sk'_t, r', \perp), y' := (pp, pk'_s, pk'_3, c', k'_j)\) and \(m' := (m' || \{k'_t\}_{pk'_t \in S'})\), and then compute the proof \(\pi' \leftarrow \text{NIZK}^\mathcal{R}\text{.PoK}(m', x', y')\).

5. Return \(\sigma' = (\pi', c', k'_j, \{k'_t\}_{pk'_t \in S'})\) to the adversary.

6. Return \(\sigma' = (\pi', c', k'_j, \{k'_t\}_{pk'_t \in S'})\) to the adversary.

We will show that these games are indistinguishable. Therefore, we conclude that any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game\(_0\) (i.e., the receiver compromise deniability game when \(b = 1\)) and Game\(_5\) (i.e., the receiver compromise deniability game when \(b = 1\)) with non-negligible probability. That is to say, the advantage of the adversary in the receiver compromise deniability game is negligible.

So what remains is to prove that Game\(_0\) and Game\(_5\) are indistinguishable.

Game\(_0\) \rightarrow Game\(_1\). The difference between Game\(_0\) and Game\(_1\) lies in the way to generate the proofs \(\pi'\) in the response of the adversary’s \(O^{\text{F-RF}}\) queries. In Game\(_0\), the proofs are generated by \(\text{NIZK}^\mathcal{R}\text{.PoK}\), and in Game\(_1\), the proofs are
generated by the simulator of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system NIZK\textsuperscript{R}. Due to the zero-knowledge property of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system NIZK\textsuperscript{R}, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game\textsubscript{0} and Game\textsubscript{1} with non-negligible probability.

Game\textsubscript{1} \rightarrow Game\textsubscript{2}. Due to the correctness property of the HPS-KEM\textsuperscript{Σ} scheme, when \( c' \leftarrow \text{encap}_\Sigma(pp; r') \), we have \( \text{encap}_\Sigma(pp, pk_3; r') = \text{decap}(pp, sk_3, c') \) and \( \text{encap}_\Sigma(pp, pk'_3; r') = \text{decap}(pp, sk'_3, c') \) for each \( pk'_3 \in S' \). Therefore, Game\textsubscript{2} is identical to Game\textsubscript{1}.

Game\textsubscript{2} \rightarrow Game\textsubscript{3}. The difference between Game\textsubscript{2} and Game\textsubscript{3} lies in the way to generate \( c' \) in the response of the adversary’s \( \mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{F}-\mathcal{RF}} \) queries. In Game\textsubscript{2}, \( c' \) is generated by \( \text{encap}_\Sigma \), and in Game\textsubscript{3}, \( c' \) is generated by \( \text{encap}^* \). Due to the indistinguishability property of the HPS-KEM\textsuperscript{Σ} scheme, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game\textsubscript{2} and Game\textsubscript{3} with non-negligible probability.

Game\textsubscript{3} \rightarrow Game\textsubscript{4}. The difference between Game\textsubscript{3} and Game\textsubscript{4} lies in the way to generate \( k'_1 \) and \( k'_4 \) for \( pk'_3 \in S' \setminus S'_{\text{corr}} \) in the response of the adversary’s \( \mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{F}-\mathcal{RF}} \) queries. In Game\textsubscript{3}, \( k'_1 \) is generated by running \( \text{decap}(pp, sk_3, c') \), and for each \( pk'_3 \in S' \setminus S'_{\text{corr}} \), \( k'_4 \) is generated by running \( \text{decap}(pp, sk'_3, c') \), and in Game\textsubscript{4}, these values are chosen in \( \mathcal{K} \) uniformly at random. Note that, in Game\textsubscript{4} and Game\textsubscript{1}, \( c' \) is generated by \( \text{encap}^* \). Hence, due to the smoothness property of the HPS-KEM\textsuperscript{Σ} scheme, Game\textsubscript{3} and Game\textsubscript{4} are indistinguishable.

Game\textsubscript{4} \rightarrow Game\textsubscript{5}. Observe that, the difference between Game\textsubscript{4} and Game\textsubscript{5} lies in the way to generate the proof \( \pi' \) in the response of the adversary’s \( \mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{F}-\mathcal{RF}} \) queries. In Game\textsubscript{5}, the proofs are generated by the simulator of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system NIZK\textsuperscript{R}, and in Game\textsubscript{5}, the proofs are generated by NIZK\textsuperscript{R}. PoK. Due to the zero-knowledge property of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system NIZK\textsuperscript{R}, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game\textsubscript{4} and Game\textsubscript{5} with non-negligible probability.

\( \square \)

Proof (of judge compromise deniability). We will prove judge compromise deniability using a hybrid argument over a sequence of games (also see in Fig. 14).

Game\textsubscript{0} : corresponds to judge compromise deniability game when \( b = 0 \). Note that, in this game, when the adversary issues \( \mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{F}-\mathcal{JF}}(pk'_3, S', m') \) queries, the challenger proceeds as follows.

1. If the secret keys of some receivers in \( S' \) have been queried to the oracle \( \mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{Cor}} \) by the adversary, return \( \bot \).
2. Sample \( r' \leftarrow \mathcal{RS} \), and compute \( c' \leftarrow \text{encap}_\Sigma(pp; r') \) and \( k'_j \leftarrow \text{encap}_\Sigma(pp, pk_3; r') \).
3. For each \( pk'_3 \in S' \), compute \( k'_j \leftarrow \text{encap}_\Sigma(pp, pk'_3; r') \).
4. Set \( x' := (sk'_3, r', \bot) \), \( y' := (pp, pk'_3, pk_3; c', k'_j) \) and \( \pi' := (m' || \{k'_j\}_{pk'_3 \in S'}) \), then compute the proof \( \pi' \leftarrow \text{NIZK}^\mathcal{R}.\text{PoK}(\pi', x', y') \).
5. Return \( \sigma' = (x', c', k'_j, \{k'_j\}_{pk'_3 \in S'}) \) to the adversary.

Game\textsubscript{1} : is same as Game\textsubscript{0} except that, in the response of the adversary’s \( \mathcal{O}^{\mathcal{F}-\mathcal{JF}}(pk'_3, S', m') \) queries, the proof \( \pi' \) is generated by the simulator of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system for \( \mathcal{R} \), without using the witness \( x' \).
\( b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; \ pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda); \ (pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{KG}_1(pp) \)

\( U := \emptyset; \ U_{\text{key}} := \emptyset; \ U_{\text{cor}} := \emptyset; \ Q^* := \emptyset \)

For \( i = 1 \ldots n \):

\( (pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{KG}_i(pp); \ U \leftarrow U \cup \{pk_i\}; \ U_{\text{key}} \leftarrow U_{\text{key}} \cup \{pk_i, sk_i\} \)

\( b' \leftarrow A^G(pp, U, pk_J, sk_J) \)

Return \( (b = b') \)

\( O^\text{Cor}(pk') \):

If \( pk' \in Q^* \): Return \( \perp \)

\( U_{\text{cor}} \leftarrow U_{\text{cor}} \cup \{pk'\} \)

Return \( sk' \) s.t. \( (pk', sk') \in U_{\text{key}} \)

\( O^\text{F-JF}(pk', S', m') \):

If \( S' \cap U_{\text{cor}} \neq \emptyset \): Return \( \perp \)

\( Q^* \leftarrow Q^* \cup S' \)

\( r \leftarrow \text{RS}; \ c \leftarrow \text{encap}_c(pp, r); \ k_J \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, pk_J, r) \)

\( r' \leftarrow \text{RS}; \ c' \leftarrow \text{encap}_c(pp, r); \ k_J' \leftarrow \text{decap}_k(pp, sk_J, c) \)

For \( pk_{i_1}, \in S' \):

\( k_{i_1} \leftarrow \text{encap}_k(pp, pk_{i_1}, r); \ k_{i_1} \leftarrow \text{decap}_k(pp, sk_{i_1}, c); \ k_{i_1} \leftarrow k \)

\( m \leftarrow (m' || \{k_{i_1}\}_{pk_{i_1} \in S'}) \)

\( \pi \leftarrow \text{NIZK}_R.\text{PoK}(m, x, y) \)

\( x \leftarrow (sk_{i_1}, r, \perp); \ y \leftarrow (pp, pk_{i_1}, pk_{i_1}, c, k_{i_1}); \ pi \leftarrow \text{NIZK}_R.\text{PoK}(m, x, y) \)

\( x \leftarrow (\perp, \perp, r); \ y \leftarrow (pp, pk_{i_1}, pk_{i_1}, c, k_{i_1}); \ pi \leftarrow \text{NIZK}_R.\text{PoK}(m, x, y) \)

Return \( \sigma \leftarrow (\pi, c, k_1, \{k_{i_1}\}_{pk_{i_1} \in S'}) \)

**Fig. 14** Games for the proof of judge compromise deniability (codes in the boxes are only executed in the corresponding games)
\textbf{Game}_2: is same as \textbf{Game}_1 except that in the response of the adversary’s $O^{F-JF}(pk'_i, S', m')$ queries, $k'_i, k'_1$ are generated by $\text{decap}$. That is to say, the challenger computes $k'_j \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk, c')$, and for each $pk'_i \in S'$, computes $k''_i \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk'_i, c')$.

\textbf{Game}_3: is same as \textbf{Game}_2 except that in the response of the adversary’s $O^{F-JF}(pk'_i, S', m')$ queries, $c'$ is generated by $\text{encap}^*_c$. That is to say, the challenger chooses $r^* \leftarrow R \mathcal{S}^*$, and computes $c' \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_c(pp; r^*)$.

\textbf{Game}_4: is same as \textbf{Game}_3 except that in the response of the adversary’s $O^{F-JF}(pk'_i, S', m')$ queries, for each $pk'_i \in S'$, $k'_i \leftarrow K$.

\textbf{Game}_5: corresponds to judge compromise deniability game when $b = 1$. Note that, in this game, when the adversary issues $O^{F-JF}(pk'_i, S', m')$ queries, the challenger proceeds as follows.

1. If the secret keys of some receivers in $S'$ have been queried to the oracle $O^{C_{or}}$ by the adversary, return $\perp$.
2. Sample $r^* \leftarrow R \mathcal{S}^*$, and compute $c' \leftarrow \text{encap}^*_c(pp; r^*)$ and $k'_j \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk, c')$.
3. For each $pk'_i \in S'$, choose $k'_i \leftarrow K$.
4. Set $x' := (\perp, \perp, r^*), y' := (pp, pk'_i, pk, c')$, and $m' := (m' || \{k'_i\}_{pk'_i \in S'})$, and then compute the proof $\pi' \leftarrow \text{NIZK}^R\cdot \text{PoK}(m', x', y')$.
5. Return $\sigma' = (\pi', c', k'_j, \{k'_i\}_{pk'_i \in S'})$ to the adversary.

We will show that these games are indistinguishable. Therefore, we conclude that any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between \textbf{Game}_0 (i.e., the judge compromise deniability game when $b = 1$) and \textbf{Game}_5 (i.e., the judge compromise deniability game when $b = 1$) with non-negligible probability. That is to say, the advantage of the adversary in the judge compromise deniability game is negligible.

So what remains is to prove that \textbf{Game}_0 and \textbf{Game}_5 are indistinguishable.

\textbf{Game}_0 $\rightarrow$ \textbf{Game}_1. The difference between \textbf{Game}_0 and \textbf{Game}_1 lies in the way to generate the proofs $\pi'$ in the response of the adversary’s $O^{F-JF}$ queries. In \textbf{Game}_0, the proofs are generated by $\text{NIZK}^R\cdot \text{PoK}$, and in \textbf{Game}_1, the proofs are generated by the simulator of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system $\text{NIZK}^R$. Due to the zero-knowledge property of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system $\text{NIZK}^R$, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between \textbf{Game}_0 and \textbf{Game}_1 with non-negligible probability.

\textbf{Game}_1 $\rightarrow$ \textbf{Game}_2. Due to the correctness property of the HPS-KEM$^S$ scheme, when $c' \leftarrow \text{encap}(pp; r^*)$, we have $\text{encap}_c(pp, pk'_i; r^*) = \text{decap}(pp, sk, c')$ and $\text{encap}_c(pp, pk'_i; r') = \text{decap}(pp, sk'_i, c')$ for each $pk'_i \in S'$. Therefore, \textbf{Game}_2 is identical to \textbf{Game}_1.

\textbf{Game}_2 $\rightarrow$ \textbf{Game}_3. The difference between \textbf{Game}_2 and \textbf{Game}_3 lies in the way to generate $c'$ in the response of the adversary’s $O^{F-JF}$ queries. In \textbf{Game}_2, $c'$ is generated by $\text{encap}$, and in \textbf{Game}_3, $c'$ is generated by $\text{encap}^*_c$. Due to the indistinguishability property of the HPS-KEM$^S$ scheme, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between \textbf{Game}_2 and \textbf{Game}_3 with non-negligible probability.

\textbf{Game}_3 $\rightarrow$ \textbf{Game}_4. The difference between \textbf{Game}_3 and \textbf{Game}_4 lies in the way to generate $k'_j$ for $pk'_i \in S'$ in the response of the adversary’s $O^{F-JF}$ queries. In
A.4 Proof of receiver anonymity

Proof. We will prove receiver anonymity using a hybrid argument over a sequence of games.

\textbf{Game}_{-5} : corresponds to the real receiver anonymity game. Without loss of generality, we assume that the challenger initiates a set $Q_{m\text{-sig}} := \emptyset$ at the beginning, and then when answering the adversary’s $\text{OF}_{\text{Frank}} \text{-oracle query (pk}_{J}^{*}, S', m')$ (with response $\sigma'$), the challenge sets that $Q_{m\text{-sig}} := Q_{m\text{-sig}} \cup \{(pk}_{J}^{*}, S', m', \sigma')$. Note that, in the challenge phase, the adversary comes up with a sender’s public key $pk}_{J}^{*}$, a message $m^*$ and two receiver’s public key sets $S_0, S_1$ of equal size $|S_0| = |S_1| = l$. The challenger proceeds as follows.
1. Sample $r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}\mathcal{S}$, and compute $c \leftarrow \text{encap}_{pp}(pp; r)$ and $k_\mathcal{J} \leftarrow \text{encap}_{pp}(pp, pk_\mathcal{J}; r)$.
2. Choose a random bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Let $S_b = \{pk_{i_1}, pk_{i_2}, \ldots, pk_{i_l}\}$. For each $i \in [l]$, compute $k_i \leftarrow \text{encap}_{pp}(pp, pk_{i}; r)$.
3. Set $x^* := (sk^*_J, r, \bot), y^* := (pp, pk^*_J, pk_1, c, k_1)$ and $\overline{m}^* := (m^* || \{k_i\}_{pk_i \in S_b})$,
   and then compute the proof $\pi^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}\text{-PoK}(\overline{m}^*, x^*, y^*)$.
4. Return $\sigma^* = (\pi^*, c, k_1, \{k_i\}_{pk_i \in S_b})$ to the adversary.

\textbf{Game}_{-4} : is the same as Game}_{-5} except that when the adversary issues $\text{OF}_{\text{Frank}} (pk}_{J}^{*}, S', m')$ queries, if $pk_{J}^{*}$ has never been queried to the oracle $\text{OF}_{\text{Cor}}$ by the adversary, the challenger proceeds as follows.
1. Sample $r' \leftarrow \mathcal{R}\mathcal{S}$, and compute $c' \leftarrow \text{encap}_{pp}(pp; r')$ and $k_\mathcal{J}' \leftarrow \text{encap}_{pp}(pp, pk_\mathcal{J}; r')$.
2. For each $pk_{J_i} \in S'$, compute $k_{J_i} \leftarrow \text{encap}_{pp}(pp, pk_{J_i}; r')$.
3. Set $y' := (pp, pk^*_J, pk_3, c', k_3')$ and $\overline{m}' := (m' || \{k_i\}_{pk_i \in S'})$, and then generate a proof $\pi'$ with the simulator (taking ($\overline{m}', y'$) as input) of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system $\text{NIZK}_{\mathcal{R}}$.
4. Return $\sigma' = (\pi', c', k_3', \{k_{J_i}\}_{pk_{J_i} \in S'})$ to the adversary.

\textbf{Game}_{-3} : is the same as Game}_{-4} except that when the adversary issues $\text{OF}_{\text{Verify}}(pk}_{J}^{*}, S', m', \sigma')$ queries, if (1) neither $pk_{J}^{*}$ nor $pk_\mathcal{J}$ has been queried to the oracle $\text{OF}_{\text{Cor}}$ by the adversary, and (2) there is no $S'$ such that $(pk_{J}^{*} \in S') \land ((pk_{J}^{*}, S', m', \sigma') \in Q_{m\text{-sig}})$, then the challenger returns 0 to the adversary directly.

\footnotesize

\footnotesize
Game\textsubscript{−2} : is the same as Game\textsubscript{−3} except that in the challenge phase, \( k_3, k_r \) are generated by \text{decap}. That is to say, the challenger computes \( k_3 \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk_3, c) \), and for \( i \in [l] \), computes \( k_r \leftarrow \text{decap}(pp, sk_r, c) \).

Game\textsubscript{−1} : is same as Game\textsubscript{−2} except that in the challenge phase, the proof \( \pi^* \) is generated by the simulator of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system for \( R \), without using the witness \( x^* \).

Game\textsubscript{1} : is the same as Game\textsubscript{−1} except that in the challenge phase, \( c \) is generated by \text{encap}\textsubscript{π}. That is to say, the challenger chooses \( r^* \leftarrow RS^\ast \), and computes \( c \leftarrow \text{encap}_\pi(pp; r^*) \).

Game\textsubscript{0}(1 \leq \nu \leq l) : is the same as Game\textsubscript{0} except that in the challenge phase, for each \( 1 \leq i \leq \nu, k_r \leftarrow \mathcal{K} \).

We will show that these games are indistinguishable. Note that in Game\textsubscript{1}, the value of \( b \) (i.e., the receiver’s public key set \( S_b \)) is information-theoretically hidden from the adversary. Hence the adversary has no advantage in the value of \( \nu \). Therefore, we conclude that the advantage of the adversary in Game\textsubscript{−5} (i.e., the original receiver anonymity game) is negligible.

So what remains is to prove that Game\textsubscript{−5} and Game\textsubscript{1} are indistinguishable.

Game\textsubscript{−5} \rightarrow Game\textsubscript{−4}. The difference between Game\textsubscript{−5} and Game\textsubscript{−4} lies in the way to generate the proofs \( \pi' \) in the response of the adversary’s \( O^{Frank} \) queries. In Game\textsubscript{−5}, the proofs are generated by NIZK\textsuperscript{R}.PoK, and in Game\textsubscript{−4}, the proofs are generated by the simulator of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system NIZK\textsuperscript{R}. Due to the zero-knowledge property of NIZK\textsuperscript{R}, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game\textsubscript{−5} and Game\textsubscript{−4} with non-negligible probability.

Game\textsubscript{−4} \rightarrow Game\textsubscript{−3}. Observe that, Game\textsubscript{−3} and Game\textsubscript{−4} are the same except that the event that \( \mathcal{A} \) submits a verification query \((pk'_i, pk'_i, m', \sigma')\) such that

1. neither \( pk'_i \) nor \( pk'_i \) has been queried to the oracle \( O^{Cor} \) by the adversary,
2. there is no \( S' \) such that \((pk'_i, pk'_i, m', \sigma') \in Q_{m-sig} \), and
3. \( \text{Verify}(pp, pk'_i, sk'_i, pk_j, m', \sigma') = 1^* \) occurs (note that if \( pk'_i \) has been queried to \( O^{Cor} \), the challenger will return \( \bot \)).

Due to the receiver-binding property of AGMF, the above event happens with negligible probability. Hence, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game\textsubscript{−4} and Game\textsubscript{−3} with non-negligible probability.

Game\textsubscript{−3} \rightarrow Game\textsubscript{−2}. Due to the correctness property of the HPS-KEM\textsuperscript{F} scheme, when \( c \leftarrow \text{encap}_\pi(pp; r) \), we have \( \text{encap}_\pi(pp, pk_r; r) = \text{decap}(pp, sk_r, c) \) and \( \text{encap}_\pi(pp, pk_i; r) = \text{decap}(pp, sk_i, c) \) for \( i \in [l] \). Therefore, Game\textsubscript{−2} is identical to Game\textsubscript{−3}.

Game\textsubscript{−2} \rightarrow Game\textsubscript{−1}. The difference between Game\textsubscript{−2} and Game\textsubscript{−1} lies in the way to generate the proof \( \pi^* \) in the challenge phase. In Game\textsubscript{−2}, \( \pi^* \) is generated by NIZK\textsuperscript{R}.PoK, and in Game\textsubscript{−1}, the proof is generated by the simulator of the Fiat-Shamir NIZK proof system NIZK\textsuperscript{R}. Due to the zero-knowledge property NIZK\textsuperscript{R}, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between Game\textsubscript{−2} and Game\textsubscript{−1} with non-negligible probability.

Game\textsubscript{−1} \rightarrow Game\textsubscript{0}. The difference between Game\textsubscript{−1} and Game\textsubscript{0} lies in the way to generate \( c \) in the challenge phase. In Game\textsubscript{−1}, \( c \) is generated by \text{encap}_\pi, and in Game\textsubscript{0}, \( c \) is generated by \text{encap}_\pi. Due to the indistinguishability property of
the HPS-KEM scheme, any PPT adversary cannot distinguish between \( \text{Game}_{-1} \) and \( \text{Game}_0 \) with non-negligible probability.

\( \text{Game}_{\nu-1} \rightarrow \text{Game}_{\nu}(1 \leq \nu \leq l) \). The difference between \( \text{Game}_{\nu-1} \) and \( \text{Game}_\nu \) lies in the way to generate \( k_{r_{\nu}} \) in the challenge phase. In \( \text{Game}_{\nu-1} \), \( k_{r_{\nu}} \) is generated by running \( \text{decap} (pp, sk_{r_{\nu}}, c) \), and in \( \text{Game}_\nu \), \( k_{r_{\nu}} \) is chosen in \( \mathcal{K} \) uniformly at random. Note that, in \( \text{Game}_{\nu-1} \) and \( \text{Game}_\nu \), \( c \) is generated by \( \text{encap}^* \). Hence, due to the smoothness property of the HPS-KEM scheme, \( \text{Game}_{\nu-1} \) and \( \text{Game}_\nu \) are indistinguishable. 

\[ \square \]

### B Extension from AMF [36]

We first recall the relation of Tygai et al.’s AMF [36] here. In their AMF scheme, an honest sender constructs

\[ \begin{align*}
(a_J = \langle pk_J \rangle^\alpha, e_J = g^\alpha) \quad \text{and} \quad (a_r = \langle pk_r \rangle^\beta, e_r = g^\beta)
\end{align*} \]

where \((\alpha, \beta) \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p)^2\), and then sends these values to the receiver, where \( pk_J \) is the judge’s public key and \( pk_r \) is the receiver’s public key, along with the signature of knowledge derived from the following relation:

\[ \mathcal{R}_{AMF} = \{ ((t, u, v, w), (pk_s, pk_J, a_J, e_J, a_r)) : \\
(pk_s = g^t \land a_j = g^u) \\
\land ((a_J = \langle pk_J \rangle^u \land a_J = g^u) \lor a_r = g^w) \}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (25)

However, the above scheme conflicts with strong authentication (i.e., as pointed out in [36], “forgeries by the moderator cannot be detected by the receiver”).

Now, we adjust the above relation to be compatible with strong authentication, as shown in Eq. (26).

\[ \mathcal{R}_{AMF} = \{ ((t, u, v, w), (pk_s, pk_J, a_J, e_J, a_r)) : \\
(pk_s = g^t \land (a_J = \langle pk_J \rangle^u \land e_J = g^u)) \\
\lor (a_J = g^u \land a_r = g^w) \}. \]  \hspace{1cm} (26)

Observe that anyone without the receiver’s secret key \( sk_r \) cannot generate a valid DDH tuple \((pk_r, e_r, a_r)\) and know the discrete logarithm of \( a_r \) at the same time. Therefore, the forger without the receiver’s secret key cannot deceive the receiver. Hence, it is compatible with strong authentication.

Following the idea, we can construct AGMF as follows. An honest sender constructs \((a_1 = \langle pk_1 \rangle^a, e_J = g^a)\) (for the judge) and \((a_r = \langle pk_r \rangle^b, e_r = g^b)\) (for each receiver with public key \( pk_r \)). Then he/she sends these values along with the signature of knowledge derived from the following relation:

\[ \tilde{\mathcal{R}} = \{ ((t, u, v, \{ w_i \}_{i \in [\Delta]}), (pk_s, pk_J, a_J, e_J, \{ a_r \}_{i \in [\Delta]})) : \\
(pk_s = g^t \land (a_j = \langle pk_J \rangle^u \land e_J = g^u)) \} \]
\[ \forall (a_1 = g^v \land (a_{ri} = g^{w_i})_{i \in |S|}) \], \quad (27) \]

where \( S \) is the receiver set. However, it has two shortcomings: 1) it needs a non-standard assumption (KEA assumption), which inherits from AMF[36]; 2) the size of the NIZK proof is still \( O(n) \).

C More discussions on deniability

In AMF [36, page 9], when the authors define the judge compromise deniability, they explain the meaning behind it in this way: “Judge compromise deniability requires that a party with access to the judge’s secret key can forge a signature that is indistinguishable from honestly-generated signatures to other parties with access to the judge’s secret key.”

However, the definition of judge compromise deniability in AMF [36] does not match the above informal statement, as the adversary in [36] has access to both the judge’s secret key and the receiver’s secret key. The way we define judge compromise deniability here is more natural to interpret the meaning, following the same style of universal deniability and receiver compromise deniability. In addition, it is compatible with strong authentication.

If considering the corruption of the judge and receivers in the deniability game, then it is more natural to consider judge-receiver compromise deniability. Following the style of the existing deniability definitions, judge-receiver compromise deniability means that a party with access to the judge’s secret key and some corrupted receivers’ keys can forge a signature that is indistinguishable from honestly-generated signatures to other parties with access to the judge’s secret key and these corrupted receivers’ secret keys. Then, a corresponding forging algorithm should be added in the primitive, that is JRForge. It takes as input the public parameter, the sender’s public key, the key pairs of the corrupted receivers, the receiver set, the key pair of the judge and a message. Then, it outputs a “forged” signature.

We stress that our AGMF construction can fulfill the above requirements and it supports strong authentication.

The intuition is as follows. We can easily construct JRForge algorithm by combining RForge and JForge. The judge can be seen as a special receiver in our construction, since the computation with respect to the judge is analogous to that with respect to the receivers. Then, the proofs of judge-receiver compromise deniability and strong authentication can be obtained from the proofs of receiver compromise deniability and receiver binding with minor modifications, respectively.

In fact, our security models can be strengthened from many aspects. This paper mainly focuses on introducing the primitive of AGMF and presenting the framework of its construction, so we only provide the basic security notions, mainly extended from the definitions of AMF [36].