Revisiting Pairing-friendly Curves with Embedding Degrees 10 and 14

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Abstract. Since 2015, there has been a significant decrease in the asymptotic complexity of computing discrete logarithms in finite fields. As a result, the key sizes of many mainstream pairing-friendly curves have to be updated to maintain the desired security level. In PKC'20, Guillevic conducted a comprehensive assessment of the security of a series of pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees ranging from 9 to 17. In this paper, we focus on pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees of 10 and 14. First, we extend the optimized formula of the optimal pairing on BW13-310, a 128-bit secure curve with a prime p in 310 bits and embedding degree 13, to our target curves. This generalization allows us to compute the optimal pairing in approximately $\log r/2\varphi(k)$ Miller iterations, where r and k are the order of pairing groups and the embedding degree respectively. Second, we develop optimized algorithms for cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 , as well as subgroup membership testing for \mathbb{G}_2 on these curves. Based on these theoretical results a new 128-bit secure curve emerges: BW14-351. Finally, we provide detailed performance comparisons between BW14-351 and other popular curves on a 64-bit platform in terms of pairing computation, hashing to \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 , group exponentiations and subgroup membership testings. Our results demonstrate that BW14-351 is a strong candidate for building pairing-based cryptographic protocols.

Keywords: Pairing-friendly curves $\,\cdot\,$ BW14-351 $\,\cdot\,$ the 128-bit security level

1 Introduction

The past two decades have witnessed the application of elliptic curve pairings in public-key cryptosystems, such as Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [13, 47], Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (SNARKs) [3,20,21,30], and Verifiable Delay Function(VDF) [19]. A cryptographic pairing is a nondegenerate bilinear map defined as $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$, where the three pairing groups \mathbb{G}_1 , \mathbb{G}_2 , and \mathbb{G}_T have the same large prime order r. Specifically, \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 are two independent subgroups of an elliptic curve E over a finite field \mathbb{F}_{p^k} , while \mathbb{G}_T is a subgroup of the multiplicative group $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}^*$. The value of k is the smallest positive integer such that $r \mid p^k - 1$.

The security of pairing-based cryptographic protocols relies on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the three pairing groups. The best-known attack algorithm for solving the DLP on an elliptic curve (ECDLP) in the two input pairing groups \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 is the Pollard rho algorithm [39], which requires around \sqrt{r} group operations. Thus, the size of the prime r is at least 256 bits for reaching the 128-bit security level. As for the DLP on a finite field (FFDLP) \mathbb{F}_{p^k} in \mathbb{G}_T whose characteristic p is not small, the best-known algorithm is the number field sieve (NFS) [40]. In 2013, ENISA [1] recommended that a 3072-bit finite field is 128-bit secure. Since then, a series of variants of NFS have been proposed [8, 34, 35], resulting in a drastic decrease for the security level of mainstream pairing-friendly curves. In particular, Kim and Barbulescu [35] proposed the special extended tower number field sieve (SexTNFS), which is applied to a composite extension field whose characteristic p can be parameterized by a tiny-coefficients polynomial of moderate degree. This variant is almost tailored to mainstream pairing-friendly curves, such as the Barreto-Naehrig(BN) [10] and Barreto-Lynn-Scott(BLS) [10] families. For example, the recent estimates [7, 32] suggest that the updated security level of the previous 128-bit secure BN curve has dropped down to $100 \sim 103$ bits.

In PKC'20, Guillevic [31] analyzed the consequence of the improvement of NFS in detail and recommended a list of pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees 10 to 16. In particular, Guillevic pointed out that the size of the prime pon both BN and BLS12 curves has to increase to 446 bits to match the updated 128-bit security level, and the BLS12-446 curve is the most efficient choice for pairing computation at this security level across different pairing-friendly curves. However, due to the increase of the size of p, both BLS12-446 and BN446 incur a performance penalty in terms of the operations in \mathbb{G}_1 . Therefore, two new curves derived from [24, Construction 6.6] have emerged for fast group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_1 : BW13-310 and BW19-286 [14]. Recently, Dai, Zhang and Zhao [17] proposed a new formula for computing pairing on BW13-310. More specifically, the number of iterations in Miller's algorithm on the curve is only around $\log r/(2\varphi(k))$. However, due to the lack of twists, the trick of denominator elimination is no longer applicable. In other words, even though the length of the Miller loop on BW13-310 is extremely short, the computational cost for each Miller doubling/addition step is expensive. In addition, due to the group \mathbb{G}_2 on BW13-310 is defined over the full extension field $\mathbb{F}_{p^{13}}$, the operations involved in \mathbb{G}_2 are costly, such as hashing to \mathbb{G}_2 and group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_2 . It motivates us to search for new pairing-friendly curves such that the Miller loop can be performed in $\log r/(2\varphi(k))$ iterations, and the trick of denominator elimination applies as well.

1.1 Our Contribution

In this work, we revisit the cyclotomic pairing-friendly curves presented in [24] with embedding degrees 10 and 14. A comprehensive research is presented that aims to facilitate the implementation of pairing-based cryptographic protocols using these curves. Our contributions are summarized as follows.

- We generalize the optimized formula of the optimal pairing on BW13-310 to our target curves. Specifically, the automorphism action can be extracted from the Miller function evaluation, so that the number of Miller iterations can bed reduced to approximately $\log r/(2\varphi(k))$. We also refine the best-known algorithm for the final exponentiation to save several field multiplications.
- We develop new algorithms for some key building blocks involved in implementing pairing-based protocols on our target curves, including cofactor multiplication for G₁ and G₂, and subgroup membership testings for G₂.
- Utilizing the RELIC toolkit [2], we provide high-speed software implementations of pairing computation, hashing to \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 , group exponentiations, and subgroup membership testings over a target curve named BW14-351 on a 64-bit platform. On this basis, we present detailed performance comparisons between BW14-351 and other popular curves at the updated 128-bit security level, including BNLS12-446, BN446 and BW13-310. The results of our implementation show that
 - the performance of pairing computation on BW14-351 is even slightly faster than BN-446 and BW13-310, while about 18.4% slower than BLS12-446;
 - in terms of group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_T , BW14-351 is about 49.2% and 15.1% faster than BLS12-446, 119.6% and 73.8% faster than BN-446, while 34.4% and 5.5% slower than BW13-310;
 - compared to BW13-310, BW14-351 incurs a lighter penalty in terms of hashing to \mathbb{G}_2 and group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_2 , although is still slower than BN-446 and BLS12-446.

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we recall some basic properties of ordinary elliptic curves, pairings and endomorphisms.

2.1 Ordinary elliptic curves over finite fields

Let \mathbb{F}_p be a prime field with characteristic p > 3. Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve over \mathbb{F}_p of the form $y^2 = x^3 + ax + b$, where $a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p$ such that $4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0$. The *j*-invariant of E is defined as $j(E) = -1728 \frac{4a^3}{4a^3 + 27b^2}$. We denote by $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ the group of \mathbb{F}_p rational points of E. Then the order of $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ is given by $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p+1-t$, where t is the trace of the Frobenius endomorphism

 $\pi: (x, y) \to (x^p, y^p)$. If $t \neq 0$, then the curve E is said to be *ordinary*, and *supersingular* otherwise. Let r be a large prime divisor of $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p)$. The embedding degree k with respect to r and p is the smallest integer such that $r \mid p^k - 1$. If k > 1 then $E[r] \subseteq E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k})$, where $E[r] = \{P \in E(\overline{\mathbb{F}_p}) \mid [r]P = \mathcal{O}_E\}$ and $\overline{\mathbb{F}_p}$ is the algebraic closure of \mathbb{F}_p . Let Aut(E) be the automorphism group of E, and let $d = \gcd(k, \#\operatorname{Aut}(E))$. If d > 1, then there exists a unique degree-d twist E' such that $r \mid \#E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/d}})$, with an untwisting isomorphism $\phi: E' \to E$.

An endomorphism α of E over $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ is a non-constant rational map from E to itself over $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$. The set of all endomorphisms of E over $\overline{\mathbb{F}}_p$ together with the zero map given by $0(P) = \mathcal{O}_E$ forms a ring, which is denoted as $\operatorname{End}(E)$. We denote by K the imaginary quadratic field $Q(\sqrt{-D})$, where D is the square-free part of $4p - t^2$. Let O_K be the largest subring of K. Since E is ordinary, $\operatorname{End}(E)$ is a order in O_K , i.e., $\mathbb{Z}[\pi] \subseteq \operatorname{End}(E) \subseteq O_K$. For any $\alpha \in \operatorname{End}(E)$, the characteristic equation of α can be represented as $x^2 + mx + n = 0$ for two integers m and n, where n is the degree of α , i.e., $\deg(\alpha) = n$. In particular, the characteristic equation of π is given as $\pi^2 - t\pi + p = 0$. For each endomorphism α , there is a unique endomorphism $\hat{\alpha}$ such that $\alpha \circ \hat{\alpha} = \deg(\alpha)$, which is called the dual of α .

In elliptic curve cryptography, ordinary elliptic curves with j-invariant 0 or 1728 are particularly interesting as they are equipped with an efficiently computable endomorphism. More precisely,

- if j(E) = 0, then we have a = 0 and $p \equiv 1 \mod 3$ [45, Proposition 4.33]. There exists an endomorphism $E \to E$ given as $\tau : (x, y) \to (\omega \cdot x, y)$, where ω is a primitive cube root of unity in \mathbb{F}_p^* . The characteristic equation of τ is $\tau^2 + \tau + 1 = 0$ and the dual of τ is $\hat{\tau} : (x, y) \to (\omega^2 \cdot x, y)$;
- if j(E) = 1728, then we have b = 0 and $p \equiv 1 \mod 4$ [45, Theorem 4.23]. There exists an endomorphism $E \to E$ given as $\tau : (x, y) \to (-x, i \cdot y)$, where i is a primitive fourth root of unity in \mathbb{F}_p^* . The characteristic equation of τ is $\phi^2 + 1 = 0$ and the dual of τ is $\hat{\tau} : (x, y) \to (-x, -i \cdot y)$.

The endomorphism τ is called the GLV endomorphism as it was first used by Gallant, Lambert and Vanstone [27] to accelerate elliptic curve point multiplication. In the above two cases, $\operatorname{End}(E) = \mathbb{Z}[\tau] = O_K$.

2.2 Optimal pairing

Given a random point $Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k})$ and an integer m, a Miller function $f_{m,Q}$ is a normalized rational function in $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}(E)$ with divisor

$$div(f_{m,Q}) = m(Q) - ([m]Q) - (m-1)(\mathcal{O}_E).$$
(1)

Let \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 be respectively 1- and *p*-eigenspaces of π acting on E[r], i.e., $\mathbb{G}_1 = E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r]$ and $\mathbb{G}_2 = E[r] \cap \operatorname{Ker}(\pi - [p])$. Le \mathbb{G}_T be the subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_{p^k}^*$ with order *r*. Let $\lambda = \sum_{i=0}^l c_i p^i$ be a multiple of the prime *r* with $c_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ for each *i*. Then, the general expression of the optimal pairing [44] on E is given as:

$$e: \mathbb{G}_2 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \to \mathbb{G}_T,$$

$$(Q, P) \to \left(\prod_{i=0}^l f_{c_i,Q}^{p^i}(P) \cdot \prod_{i=0}^{l-1} \frac{\ell_{[s_{i+1}]Q,[c_ip^i]Q}(P)}{\nu_{[s_i]Q}(P)}\right)^{\frac{(p^k-1)}{r}},$$

$$(2)$$

where $s_i = \sum_{j=i}^{l} c_j p^j$, $\ell_{[i]R,[j]R}$ is the straight line passing through [i]R and [j]R, and $\nu_{[i+j]R}$ is the vertical line passing through [i+j]R. The computation of the optimal pairing consists of two phases: the Miller loop and the final exponentiation. As shown in Eq. (2), the most costly part in the Miller loop is to compute $\prod_{i=0}^{l} f_{c_i,Q}^{p^i}(P)$. The Miller function $f_{c_i,Q}$ evaluated at the point P for each ican be obtained by executing the Miller's algorithm [38], which is described in **Alg.** 1. When the embedding degree k is even, the vertical line evaluations can

Algorithm 1: Miller's Algorithm

Input: $P \in \mathbb{G}_1, Q \in \mathbb{G}_2, m = \sum_{i=0}^{l} m_i 2^i$ with $m_i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ Output: $f_{m,Q}(P)$ 1: $T \leftarrow Q, f \leftarrow 1$ 2: for i = l - 1 down to 0 do 3: $f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \frac{\ell_{T,T}(P)}{\nu_{[2T]}(P)}, T \leftarrow [2]T$ 4: if $m_i = 1$ then 5: $f \leftarrow f \cdot \frac{\ell_{T,Q}(P)}{\nu_{T+Q}(P)}, T \leftarrow T + Q$ 6: elif $m_i = -1$ then 7: $f \leftarrow f \cdot \frac{\ell_{T,Q}(P)}{\nu_{T-Q}(P)}, T \leftarrow T - Q$ 8: end if 9: end for 10: return f

be ignored because these values lie in the subfield $\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}$ and can be "killed" by the final exponentiation.

3 Elliptic curves with embedding degrees 10 and 14

The construction of pairing-friendly curves necessitates special methods to ensure a small embedding degree k, which is crucial for efficient pairing computation. In their 2010 work, Freeman, Scott, and Teske [24] classified pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees $1 \le k \le 50$. In particular, the authors constructed a list of cyclotomic pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees 10 and 14 that make use of the Brezing-Weng method [12]. The prime r, the charaterictic p and the trace t of these curves can be parameterized by polynomials. In practice, pairing-friendly curves with j-invariant 0 or 1728 are favored

due to they are equipped with efficiently computable endomorphisms and rapid formulas of point operation. **Tabs**. 1 and 2 summarize the important parameters of these curves and the corresponding formulas of optimal pairings, respectively. It is straightforward to see that the number of iterations in Miller's algorithm on these curves is approximately $\log r/\varphi(k)$.

 Table 1. Important parameters for cyclotomic pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees 10 and 14.

family $[24]$	k	p	r	t
Cyclo(6.3)	10	$\frac{1}{4}(z^{14} - 2z^{12} + z^{10} + z^4 + 2z^2 + 1)$	$\Phi_{20}(z)$	$z^2 + 1$
$\operatorname{Cyclo}(6.5)$	10	$\tfrac{1}{4}(z^{12}\!-\!z^{10}\!+\!z^8\!-\!5z^6\!+\!5z^4\!-\!4z^2\!+\!4)$	$\Phi_{20}(z)$	$\!-\!z^6\!+\!z^4\!-\!z^2\!+\!1$
Cyclo(6.6)	10	$\frac{1}{3}(z^3-1)^2(z^{10}-z^5+1)+z^3$	$\Phi_{30}(z)$	$z^{3} + 1$
Cyclo(6.3)	14	$\frac{1}{4}(z^{18} - 2z^{16} + z^{14} + z^4 + 2z^2 + 1)$	$\Phi_{28}(z)$	$z^2 + 1$
Cyclo(6.6)	14	$\frac{1}{3}(z-1)^2(z^{14}-z^7+1)+z^{15}$	$\Phi_{42}(z)$	$z^8 - z + 1$

3.1 New formulas of optimal pairings on target curves

Recently, Dai, Zhang and Zhao [17] proposed a faster formula for pairing computation on the BW13-310 curve such that the length of Miller loop can be reduced to around $\log r/(2\varphi(k))$. In this subsection, we show how to generalize this technique to our target curves. On this basis, we further propose an improved algorithm to reduce the performance penalty introduced by this new technique.

By the fact that the endomorphism ring of ordinary elliptic curves is commutative, we find that $\tau(Q) \in \mathbb{G}_2$ for any $Q \in \mathbb{G}_2$ as

$$\pi \circ \tau(Q) = \tau \circ \pi(Q) = \tau([p]Q) = [p]\tau(Q) \text{ and } [r]\tau(Q) = \tau([r]Q) = \mathcal{O}_E.$$

Furthermore, since \mathbb{G}_2 is cyclic with prime order, the endomorphism τ acting on \mathbb{G}_2 as a scalar, which is denoted as λ_2 . In detail, we can fix the form of τ such that

$$\lambda_{2} = \begin{cases} -z^{k/2}, & \text{in the Cyclo}(6.3)\text{-}10, 14 \text{ and Cyclo}(6.5)\text{-}10 \text{ families;} \\ z^{k}, & \text{in the Cyclo}(6.6)\text{-}10 \text{ family;} \\ -z^{k} - 1, & \text{in the Cyclo}(6.6)\text{-}14 \text{ family.} \end{cases}$$
(3)

family-k	short vector	optimal pairing
Cyclo(6.3)-10	$[z^2, -1, 0, 0]$	$(f_{z^2,Q}(P))^{(p^{10}-1)/r}$
Cyclo(6.5)-10	$[-1, z^2, 0, 0]$	$(f_{z^2,Q}(P))^{(p^{10}-1)/r}$
Cyclo(6.6)-10	$\left[z,0,-1,z^2\right]$	$ \left(f_{z,Q}(P) \cdot f_{z^{2},Q}^{p^{3}}(P) \cdot \ell_{\pi^{7}(Q),\pi^{3}([z^{2}]Q)}(P) \right)^{(p^{10}-1)/r} $
Cyclo(6.3)-14	$[z^2, -1, 0, 0, 0, 0]$	$\left(f_{z^2,Q}(P)\right)^{(p^{14}-1)/r}$
Cyclo(6.6)-14	$[z^2, z, 1, 0, 0, 0]$	$(f_{z^2,Q}(P) \cdot f_{z,Q}^p(P) \cdot \ell_{\pi^2(Q),\pi([z]Q)}(P))^{(p^{14}-1)/r}$

 Table 2. Original formulas of the optimal pairing on cyclotomic pairing-friendly curves

 with embedding degrees 10 and 14.

By combining the Frobenius endomorphism and the GLV endomorphism, we fortunately find that $\pi^m \circ \tau(Q) = [z]Q$ for any $Q \in \mathbb{G}_2$, where

$$m = \begin{cases} (k+2)/4, & \text{in the Cyclo}(6.3)-10 \text{ and Cyclo}(6.3)-14 \text{ families}; \\ 7, & \text{in the Cyclo}(6.5)-10 \text{ and Cyclo}(6.6)-10 \text{ families}; \\ 1, & \text{in the Cyclo}(6.6)-14 \text{ family}. \end{cases}$$

This observation enables us to rewrite the formulas of optimal pairings on our target curves such that the number of Miller iterations can be reduced to around $\log r/(2\varphi(k))$, which is summarized in Lemma 1 below.

Lemma 1. Let notation as above. Then $f_{z^2,Q} = f_{z,Q}^z \cdot f_{z,Q}^{p^m} \circ \hat{\tau}$, where $\hat{\tau}$ is the dual of τ .

Proof. It can obtained from [23, Lemma 3.5] that

$$f_{z^2,Q} = f_{z,Q}^z \cdot f_{z,[z]Q}.$$
 (4)

Since $\pi^m \circ \tau(Q) = [z]Q$, it follows from [49, Theorem 1] and [16, Theorem 1] that

$$f_{z,[z]Q} = f_{z,\pi^m \circ \tau(Q)} = f_{z,\tau(Q)}^{p^m} = f_{z,Q}^{p^m} \circ \hat{\tau}^{p^m} = f_{z,Q}^{p^m} \circ \hat{\tau}.$$
 (5)

Inserting Eq. (5) into Eq. (4), we have

$$f_{z^2,Q} = f_{z,Q}^z \cdot f_{z,Q}^{p^m} \circ \hat{\tau},$$

which completes the proof.

Based on Lemma 1, we can derive new formulas of optimal pairings on our target curves by executing the following two steps:

-Step 1. We first replace $f_{z^2,Q}(P)$ by $f_{z,Q}^z \cdot f_{z,Q}^{p^m} \circ \hat{\tau}(P)$ in the original formulas of optimal pairings. In particular, we can also replace the point [z]Q by $\pi^m \circ \tau(Q)$ at the final line in the Cyclo(6.6)-10 and Cyclo(6.6)-14 families.

-Step 2. Utilizing the property that a non-degenerate power of a pairing remains a pairing, we then can raise the output of the Miller loop to a p^{k-m} -power such that the exponent of the second Miller function is equal to 1.

The new formulas of optimal pairings for our selected curves are summarized in **Tab.** 3. Clearly, the most costly part of the Miller loop is to compute $f_{z,Q}^{z,p^m}(P) \cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P))$, enabling the execution of Miller's algorithm in $\log|z|$ iterations within the same loop, albeit with slightly increased computational cost per iteration. However, in comparison to the original formulas, the new ones entail an additional exponentiation by z. Fortunately, the cost of squarings for the exponentiation can be circumvented. Specifically, we first calculate $f_{z,Q}(P)$ and store all line function evaluations necessary for computing $f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P))$ at the first loop. Subsequently, given the initial value $f_{z,Q}^{p^m}(P) \cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P))$ at the second loop. The optimized procedure for computing this value is presented in **Alg.** 2.

Table 3. Optimized formulas of the optimal pairing on cyclotomic pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees 10 and 14.

family-k	optimal pairing
Cyclo(6.3)-10	$\left(f_{z,Q}^{z:p^7}(P) \cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P)) ight)^{(p^{10}-1)/r}$
Cyclo(6.5)-10	$ig(f_{z,Q}^{z\cdot p^3}(P)\cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{ au}(P))ig)^{(p^{10}-1)/r}$
Cyclo(6.6)-10	$\left(f_{z,Q}^{1+zp^3}(P) \cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P)) \cdot (y_P - y_Q)^{p^7}\right)^{(p^{10}-1)/r}$
Cyclo(6.3)-14	$\left(f_{z,Q}^{z\cdot p^{10}}(P)\cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P))\right)^{(p^{14}-1)/r}$
Cyclo(6.6)-14	$\left(f_{z,Q}^{1+z\cdot p^{13}}(P)\cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P))\cdot (y_P-y_Q)^p\right)^{(p^{14}-1)/r}$

Table 4. Parameters of the cyclotomic pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees10 and 14 at the updated 128-bit security level.

curve	family-k	seed z	$\lceil \log_2 r \rceil$	$\lceil \log_2 p \rceil$	$\lceil \log_2 p^k \rceil$
BW10-480	Cyclo(6.5)-10	$2^5 + 2^{14} + 2^{15} + 2^{18} + 2^{36} + 2^{40}$	321	480	4791
BW10-511	Cyclo(6.6)-10	$2^7 + 2^{13} + 2^{26} - 2^{32}$	256	511	5101
BW10-512	Cyclo(6.3)-10	$1 + 2^3 + 2^{17} + 2^{32} + 2^{35} + 2^{36}$	294	512	5111
BW14-351	Cyclo(6.6)-14	$2^6 - 2^{12} - 2^{14} - 2^{22}$	265	351	4908
BW14-382	Cyclo(6.3)-14	$1 + 2^{10} + 2^{13} - 2^{16} + 2^{19} + 2^{21}$	256	382	5338

Algorithm 2: Computing $f_{z,Q}^{z \cdot p^m}(P) \cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P))$ Input: $P \in \mathbb{G}_1, Q \in \mathbb{G}_2, z = \sum_{i=0}^l z_i 2^i$ with $z_i \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$ **Output:** $f_{z,Q}^{z \cdot p^m}(P) \cdot f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P))$ 1: $T \leftarrow Q, f \leftarrow 1, tab \leftarrow [], j \leftarrow 0$ 2: for i = l - 1 down to 0 do $f \leftarrow f^2 \cdot \ell_{T,T}(P), tab[j] \leftarrow \ell_{T,T}(\hat{\tau}(P)), T \longleftarrow 2T, j \leftarrow j+1$ 3: // SDBL if $z_i = 1$ then 4: $f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell_{T,Q}(P), tab[j] \leftarrow \ell_{T,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P)), T \leftarrow T + Q, j \leftarrow j + 1$ 5: // SADD 6: elif $z_i = -1$ then $f \leftarrow f \cdot \ell_{T,-Q}(P), tab[j] \leftarrow \ell_{T,-Q}(\hat{\tau}(P)), T \leftarrow T - Q, j \leftarrow j + 1$ 7: // SADD end if 8: 9: end for 10: $g \leftarrow f^{p^m}$, $h \leftarrow g$, $j \leftarrow 0$ 11: for i = l - 1 down to 0 do $h \leftarrow h^2 \cdot tab[j], \, j \leftarrow j+1$ 12:if $z_i = 1$ then 13: $h \leftarrow h \cdot g \cdot tab[j], \ j \leftarrow j+1$ 14: elif $z_i = -1$ then 15:16: $h \leftarrow h \cdot \bar{q} \cdot tab[j], j \leftarrow j+1$ 17:end if 18: end for 19: return h

3.2Choice of parameters at the 128-bit security level

The choice of parameters of pairing-friendly curves should be careful for achieving high performance implementation at the desired security level. In this paper, we focus on the performance of pairing computation at the 128-bit security level. To this end, the size of the prime p should not be smaller than that recommended by Guillevic 6 [31, Table 5] to ensure that the field side can withstand attacks from the variants of NFS. On this basis, to maximize the efficiency of pairing computation, we also expect

- (a) the selected prime p should satisfy that $p \equiv 1 \mod k$;
- (b) the sum of bit length and hamming weight (in non-adjacent form) of the selected seed z is as small as possible.

In more detail, the condition (a) ensures that the full extension field \mathbb{F}_{p^k} can be represented as $\mathbb{F}_p[v]/(v^k - \alpha)$ for some $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ [36, Theorem 3.75], which induces fast multiplication and squaring arithmetic operations in \mathbb{F}_{p^k} ; the condition (b) amis to minimize the number of Miller iterations in Alg. 2. In fact, the computation of the final exponentiation also benefits from condition (b) since this step consists of a large number of exponentiations by z (see Section 4.3). Tab. 4 summarizes our chosen seeds z under the above conditions, together with the corresponding sizes of the curve parameters. Notably, while Guillevic [31, Table

6] selected the seed for the Cyclo(6.6)-14 family, this seed fails to meet condition (a). Instead, we select a new seed meeting this condition. For our selected parameters, the full extension field \mathbb{F}_{p^k} can be constructed as a tower of quadratic and k/2-th extensions:

$$\mathbb{F}_p \xrightarrow{\xi^{k/2} - \alpha} \mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}} \xrightarrow{v^2 - \xi} \mathbb{F}_{p^k}.$$

Curve name: For convenience, all the candidate curves listed in **Tab.** 4 are collectively called as BW curves since they are essentially generated using the Brezing-Weng method. Moreover, we distinguish each curve by its embedding degree and the size of the characteristic p. For instance, the BW14-351 curve is referred to as the curve constructed from the Cyclo(6.6)-14 family defined over a 351-bit prime field.

4 Pairing Computation

In this section, we first describe explicit formulas for Miller doubling and addition steps. In particular, the technique of lazy reduction [5] has been fully exploited to reduce the number of modular reductions required in Miller's algorithm. Then, we show how to perform the final exponentiation efficiently. Finally, we present detailed operation counts for pairing computation on different curves.

Notations. The cyclotomic group $\mathbb{G}_{\Phi_k(p)}$ is defined by $\mathbb{G}_{\Phi_k(p)} = \{a \in \mathbb{F}_{p^k} \mid a^{\Phi_k(p)} = 1\}$. The notation \times is used to denote field multiplication without reduction. We use the following notation to denote the cost of operations:(i) **a**, **m**, **m**_u, **s**, **s**_u, **i** and **r** denote the cost of addition, multiplication, multiplication without reduction, squaring, squaring without reduction, inversion and modular reduction in \mathbb{F}_p , respectively; (ii) $\tilde{\mathbf{a}}$, $\tilde{\mathbf{m}}$, $\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u$, $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}$, $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_u$, $\tilde{\mathbf{i}}$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{r}}$ represent the cost of addition, multiplication, squaring, squaring without reduction, squaring, squaring without reduction, squaring, squaring without reduction, squaring, squaring without reduction, inversion and modular reduction in $\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}$, respectively; (iii) **M**, **S**, **S**_c, **f** and **I** represent the cost of multiplication, squaring, cyclotomic squaring, Frobenius map and inversion in \mathbb{F}_{p^k} , respectively.

4.1 Miller loop on curves of form $y^2 = x^3 + b$

Let $E: y^2 = x^3 + b$ be a curve over \mathbb{F}_p with embedding degree 10 or 14. Then E admits a quadratic twist $E': y^2 = x^3 + b/\xi^3$ over $\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}$. The associated untwisting isomorphism from E' to E is given by

$$\phi: (x, y) \to (x\xi, y\xi v).$$

To avoid field inversions when performing point operations, points can be represented in projective coordinates. For this curve shape, it is convenient to use Jacobian coordinates, that is, an affine point (x, y) corresponds to a triplet (X, Y, Z)with $x = X/Z^2$ and $y = Y/Z^3$. Shared doubling step (SDBL) Let $T = (X, Y, Z) \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})[r]$ be in Jacobian coordinates. The fastest formulas for computing the doubling point $[2]T = (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$ are derived from [6, Section 4.3], where

$$X_3 = X(\frac{9}{4}X^3 - 2Y^2), Y_3 = \frac{9}{4}X^3(2Y^2 - \frac{3}{2}X^3) - Y^4, Z_3 = YZ.$$

By the form of the untwisting map ϕ , the image point $\phi(T) \in \mathbb{G}_2$ can be represented as $(X\xi, Y\xi v, Z)$. Thanks to the technique of denominator elimination, the line function $l_{\phi(T),\phi(T)}$ evaluated at $P = (x_P, y_P)$ and $\hat{\tau}(P) = (\tilde{x}_P, y_P)$ can be simplified as

$$l_{\phi(T),\phi(T)}(P) = 2Z_3 Z^2 y_P + \left((3X^3 - 2Y^2) \cdot \xi - 3X^2 Z^2 x_P \right) v, l_{\phi(T),\phi(T)}(\hat{\tau}(P)) = 2Z_3 Z^2 y_P + \left((3X^3 - 2Y^2) \cdot \xi - 3X^2 Z^2 \tilde{x}_P \right) v.$$

It is evident that the two line evaluations share a large amount of variables. In addition, the technique of lazy reduction can be employed when computing Y_3 . Thus, we can obtain the above two line evaluations using the following sequence of operations:

$$\begin{aligned} A &= 3X^2, B = A \cdot X, C = \frac{B}{2}, D = C + \frac{C}{2}, E = Y^2, F = 2E, U_0 = D \times (F - C), \\ U_1 &= E \times E, \quad Y_3 = (U_0 - U_1) \bmod p, X_3 = X \cdot (D - F), Z_3 = Y \cdot Z, G = Z^2, \\ I &= G \cdot Z_3 \cdot (2y_P), J = A \cdot G, K = (B - F) \cdot \xi, L = J \cdot x_P, M = J \cdot \tilde{x}_P, \\ l_{\phi(T),\phi(T)}(P) &= I + (K - L)v, l_{\phi(T),\phi(T)}(\hat{\tau}(P)) = I + (K - M)v. \end{aligned}$$

The total operation count for point doubling together with two line evaluations is $5\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + \tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + \tilde{\mathbf{s}}_u + \tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + 3\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + \frac{3k}{2}\mathbf{m} + \tilde{\mathbf{r}} + 13\tilde{\mathbf{a}} + \mathbf{a}$, assuming that the computation of division by 2 and $U_0 - U_1$ requires one and two additions, respectively.

Shared addition step (SADD) Let $T = (X, Y, Z), Q = (X_2, Y_2, Z_2) \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})[r]$ be in Jacobian coordinates with $Z \neq 0, Z_2 = 1$ and $T \neq Q$. Then one can compute the point $T + Q = (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$ using the mixed addition formulas [6, Section 4.3], which is given as

 $\alpha = Y_2 Z^3 - Y, \beta = X_2 Z^2 - X, X_3 = \alpha^2 - 2X\beta^2 - \beta^3, Y_3 = \alpha(X\beta^2 - X_3) - Y\beta^3, Z_3 = Z\beta.$

Subsequently, the line function $l_{\phi(T),\phi(Q)}$ evaluated at P and $\hat{\tau}(P)$ can be expressed as

$$l_{\phi(T),\phi(Q)}(P) = Z_3 y_p + ((\alpha X_2 - Y_2 Z_3) \cdot \xi - \alpha x_P) v, l_{\phi(T),\phi(Q)}(\hat{\tau}(P)) = Z_3 y_p + ((\alpha X_2 - Y_2 Z_3) \cdot \xi - \alpha \tilde{x}_P) v.$$

Again, by taking advantage of the technique of lazy reduction, we perform the following sequence of operations to compute the above two line evaluations,

which costs $6\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + 4\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + \tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + 3\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + \frac{3k}{2}\mathbf{m} + 2\tilde{\mathbf{r}} + 12\tilde{\mathbf{a}}$:

$$\begin{split} A &= Z^2, B = Y_2 \cdot A \cdot Z - Y, C = X_2 \cdot A - X, D = C^2, E = C \cdot D, F = X \cdot D, \\ X_3 &= B^2 - 2F - E, U_0 = B \times (F - X_3), U_1 = Y \times E, Y_3 = (U_0 - U_1) \bmod p, \\ Z_3 &= Z \cdot C, G = Z_3 \cdot y_P, H = B \cdot x_P, I = B \cdot \tilde{x}_P, U_2 = B \times X_2, U_3 = Y_2 \times Z_3, \\ J &= (U_2 - U_3) \bmod p, K = J \cdot \xi, l_{\phi(T),\phi(Q)}(P) = G - (K - H)v, \\ l_{\phi(T),\phi(Q)}(\hat{\tau}(P)) = G + (K - I)v. \end{split}$$

4.2 Miller loop on curves of form $y^2 = x^3 + ax$

Let $E: y^2 = x^3 + ax$ be a curve over \mathbb{F}_p with embedding degree 10 or 14. Then E admits a quadratic twist $E': y^2 = x^3 + a'$ over $\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}$, where $a' = a \cdot \xi^2$. As a consequence, the associated untwisting isomorphism from E' to E can be expressed as

$$\phi: (x, y) \to (x, y) \to (x/\xi, y/(\xi v)).$$

For this curve shape, we represent an affine point (x, y) in the weight-(1, 2) coordinates (X, Y, Z) satisfying that x = X/Z and $y = Y/Z^2$. This type of projective coordinates was first proposed in [15, Section 4] and provides fastest formulas for point operations in this case.

Shared doubling step (SDBL) Let $T = (X, Y, Z) \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})[r]$ be in weight-(1, 2) coordinates. For this curve shape, the point doubling formulas for computing $[2]T = (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$ are derived from [15, section 4], which are expressed as

$$X_3 = (X^2 - a'Z^2)^2, Y_3 = 2Y(X^2 - a'Z^2)(2(X^2 + a'Z^2)^2 - X_3), Z_3 = 4Y^2.$$

In this case, it is more convenient to perform line evaluations on the twisted curve. In other words, we compute the line function $l_{T,T}$ evaluated at $\phi^{-1}(P) = (x_P\xi, y_P\xi v)$ and $\phi^{-1} \circ \hat{\tau}(P) = (-x_P\xi, \tilde{y}_P\xi v)$. The explicit formulas are given by

$$l_{T,T}(\phi^{-1}(P)) = (X^3 - a'XZ^2) - (3X^2Z + a'Z^3)x_P\xi + 2YZy_P\xi v,$$

$$l_{T,T}(\phi^{-1} \circ \hat{\tau}(P)) = (X^3 - a'XZ^2) + (3X^2Z + a'Z^3)x_P\xi + 2YZ\tilde{y}_P\xi v.$$

Accordingly, point doubling and two line evaluations can be accomplished by performing the following sequences of operations at a cost of $5\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + 5\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + \frac{3k}{2}\mathbf{m} + 2\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + \tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{a'} + 9\tilde{\mathbf{a}}$:

$$A = X^{2}, B = 2Y, C = a' \cdot Z^{2}, D = A - C, E = A + C, X_{3} = D^{2}, Z_{3} = B^{2}, F = B \cdot Z,$$

$$Y_{3} = B \cdot D \cdot (2E^{2} - X_{3}), G = F \cdot \xi, I = X \cdot D, H = (2A + E) \cdot Z \cdot x_{P}, J = y_{P} \cdot G,$$

$$\tilde{J} = \tilde{y}_{P} \cdot G, K = H \cdot \xi, l_{T,T}(\phi^{-1}(P)) = I - K + Jv, l_{T,T}(\phi^{-1} \circ \hat{\tau}(P)) = I + K + \tilde{J}v.$$

Shared addition step (SADD) Let $T = (X, Y, Z), Q = (X_2, Y_2, Z_2) \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})[r]$ be in weight-(1, 2) coordinates with $Z \neq 0, Z_2 = 1$ and $T \neq Q$. We adopt the mixed addition formulas [15, section 4] for computing the point $T + Q = (X_3, Y_3, Z_3)$, which are given by

$$U = X - X_2 Z, S = U^2 Z, X_3 = (Y - Y_2 Z^2)^2 - (X + X_2 Z)S,$$

$$Y_3 = ((Y - Y_2 Z^2)(XS - X_3) - YSU)UZ, Z_3 = (UZ)^2.$$

Subsequently, the line function $l_{T,Q}$ evaluated at $\phi^{-1}(P)$ and $\phi^{-1} \circ \hat{\tau}(P)$ are given by

$$l_{T,Q}(\phi^{-1}(P)) = \left((Y - Y_2 Z^2) X_2 - U Z Y_2 \right) - (Y - Y_2 Z^2) \xi x_P + y_P U Z \xi v, l_{T,Q}(\phi^{-1} \circ \hat{\tau}(P)) = \left((Y - Y_2 Z^2) X_2 - U Z Y_2 \right) + (Y - Y_2 Z^2) \xi x_P + \tilde{y}_P U Z \xi v.$$

The following sequence of operations can be used for computing mixed point addition and two line evaluations at a cost of $6\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + 6\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + 2\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + 3\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + \frac{3k}{2}\mathbf{m} + 3\tilde{\mathbf{r}} + 10\tilde{\mathbf{a}}$:

$$\begin{split} A &= Z^2, B = X_2 \cdot Z, C = Y_2 \cdot A, D = X - B, E = Y - C, F = Z \cdot D, G = F \cdot D, \\ X_3 &= (E \times E - (X + B) \times G) \mod p, H = X \cdot G - X_3, I = E \cdot F, J = G^2, \\ Y_3 &= (I \times H - Y \times J) \mod p, Z_3 = F^2, K = (E \times X_2 - F \times Y_2) \mod p, L = E \cdot x_P \cdot \xi, \\ M &= F \cdot \xi, N = M \cdot y_P, \tilde{N} = M \cdot \tilde{y}_P, l_{T,Q}(\phi^{-1}(P)) = (K - L) + Nv, \\ l_{T,Q}(\phi^{-1} \circ \hat{\tau}(P)) &= (K + L) + \tilde{N}v. \end{split}$$

4.3 The final exponentiation

The final exponentiation is the other time-consuming stage of the pairing computation. The goal of this step is to raise the output of the Miller loop to the power of $(p^{k-1})/r$. Generally speaking, the large exponent on our target curves can be split into two parts:

$$(p^{k-1})/r = \underbrace{(p+1)(p^{k/2}-1)}_{\text{easy part}} \cdot \underbrace{\varPhi_k(p)/r}_{\text{hard part}} \cdot$$

The exponentiation to the power of the easy part yields an element $f \in \mathbb{G}_{\Phi_k(p)}$, requiring only $\mathbf{I} + 3\mathbf{M} + 2\mathbf{f}$. The major bottleneck during the final exponentiation arises from the exponentiation to the power of the hard part. Observing that a non-degenerate power of a pairing remains a pairing, Fuentes-Castañeda *et al.* [25] proved that it suffices to raise f to the power of a multiple h of $\Phi_k(p)/r$, where h can be written in the base p as

$$h = h_0 + h_1 \cdot p + \dots + h_{\varphi(k)-1} \cdot p^{\varphi(k)-1}.$$

As a consecuence, the LLL algorithm is applied to obtain small coefficients h_i . In essence, this method aims to minimize the number of iterations required for the final exponentiation. Nevertheless, it may still be challenging to devise an optimized routine of the $\varphi(k)$ small exponentiations f^{h_i} . For example, when applying this method to the BW14-351 curve, the six coefficients h_i are given as follows:

$$\begin{split} h_0 &= z^{13} + z^{12} + z^{11} - z^6 + 3z^5 + z^3, \\ h_1 &= -z^{13} - z^{12} - 2z^{11} - z^{10} - z^9 + z^6 - 2z^5 + z^4 - 3z^3, \\ h_2 &= (1+z^3)(z^{10} + z^9 + z^8) - z^6 + 2z^5 - z^4 - z^3 + 2z^2 - z, \\ h_3 &= -z^{13} - z^{12} - z^{11} + z^6 - 2z^5 + z^4 + z^2 + z + 1, \\ h_4 &= z^{13} + z^{12} + z^{11} - z^8 - z^7 - 2z^6 + 2z^5 - z^4 - 3, \\ h_5 &= z^{14} - z^{11} + 4z^6 - 2z^5 + z^4. \end{split}$$

Thus, the cost of computing f^{h_i} consists of 14 exponentiations by z and a large amount of full extension field multiplications.

Based on the fact that $f^{\Phi_k(p)} = 1$, we can further substitute the exponent h with $\lambda = h + \delta \Phi_k(p)$ for some integer δ . In particular, since $\Phi_k(p) = \sum_{i=0}^{\varphi(k)} (-1)^i p^i$ in our case, the new exponent λ can be written in base of p as

$$\lambda = \lambda_0 + \lambda_1 \cdot p + \dots + \lambda_{\varphi(k)} \cdot p^{\varphi(k)},$$

where $\lambda_i = h_i + (-1)^i \delta$ for $i \in \{0, 1, \dots, \varphi(k) - 1\}$ and $\lambda_{\varphi(k)} = \delta$. Therefore, the careful selection of the parameter δ may facilitate faster final exponentiation. We now go back to the BW14-351 curve to illustrate this method in detail. By setting $\lambda_6 = -(z^{13} + z^{12} + z^{11} + 3z^5) + (z^6 + z^5 + z^4)$, we now have

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_0 &= h_0 + \lambda_6 = z^5 + z^4 + z^3, & \lambda_1 = h_1 - \lambda_6 = -z^{11} - z^{10} - z^9 - 3z^3, \\ \lambda_2 &= h_2 + \lambda_6 = z^{10} + z^9 + z^8 - z^3 + 2z^2 - z, & \lambda_3 = h_3 - \lambda_6 = z^2 + z + 1, \\ \lambda_4 &= h_4 + \lambda_6 = -z^8 - z^7 - z^6 - 3, & \lambda_5 = h_5 - \lambda_6 = z^{14} + z^{13} + z^{12} + 3z^6. \end{aligned}$$

It is straightforward to see that the six coefficients λ_i satisfy the following relations:

$$\begin{split} \lambda_3 &= z^2 + z + 1, \quad \lambda_0 &= z^3 \lambda_3, \qquad \lambda_4 &= -(z^3 \lambda_0 + 3), \\ \lambda_1 &= z^3 \lambda_4, \qquad \lambda_6 &= z^2 \lambda_1 + z \lambda_0, \quad \lambda_5 &= -z^3 \lambda_1. \end{split}$$

In conclusion, the hard part exponentiation on the BW14-351 curve benefits from the easy relation between λ_i . In **Tab**. 5, we list our selected coefficients $\lambda_0, \lambda_1, \dots, \lambda_{\varphi(k)}$ and the corresponding sequence of operations on the five candidate curves.

4.4 Computational Cost

The construction of tower fields and the curve equations for the five candidate pairing-friendly curves are presented in **Tab**. 6. We now discuss the operation

Table 5. The exponentiation of the hard part on cyclotomic pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees 10 and 14. We assume the computation of f^3 costs one multiplication, and the computation of f^4 is free.

DUVIO 400	$\lambda_0 = z^8 - 4z^2, \lambda_1 = z^{10} - z^8 - 4z^4 + 4z^2, \lambda_2 = z^6 - z^4 - 4, \lambda_3 = -z^6 + 4.$
BW10-480	Input: $f \in \mathbb{G}_{\Phi_{14}(p)}$, Output: $h \in \mathbb{G}_T$, Cost: $10\mathbf{e} + 6\mathbf{M} + 3\mathbf{f}$
	$f_1 \leftarrow f^{z^4}, f_2 \leftarrow f_1^{z^2} \cdot \bar{f}^4, f_3 \leftarrow f_2^{z^2}, f_4 \leftarrow f_3^{z^2}, f_5 \leftarrow f_2 \cdot \bar{f}_1, f_6 \leftarrow f_4 \cdot \bar{f}_3,$
	$h \leftarrow f_3 \cdot f_6^p \cdot f_5^{p^2} \cdot \bar{f}_2^p.$
	$\lambda_0 = -z^{13} + 2z^{10} - z^7 - 3, \lambda_1 = -z^{10} + 2z^7 - z^4, \lambda_2 = -z^7 + 2z^4 - z,$
BW10-511	$ \lambda_3 = (z^{14} - 2z^{11} + z^8 + 3z) - (z^9 - 2z^6 + z^3), \ \lambda_4 = (z^{11} - 2z^8 + z^5) - (z^6 - 2z^3 + 1) $
	Input: $f \in \mathbb{G}_{\Phi_{10}(p)}$, Output: $h \in \mathbb{G}_T$, Cost: 14e + 9M + S _c + 4f
	$f_1 \leftarrow f^{z^6 - 2z^3 + 1}, f_2 \leftarrow f_1^z, f_3 \leftarrow f_2^{z^2}, f_4 \leftarrow f_3^z, f_5 \leftarrow f_4^z, f_6 \leftarrow f_5^{z^2} \cdot f^3,$
	$f_7 \leftarrow f_6^z \cdot \bar{f}_3, f_8 \leftarrow f_5 \cdot \bar{f}_1, h \leftarrow \bar{f}_6 \cdot \bar{f}_4^{\ p} \cdot \bar{f}_2^{\ p^2} \cdot f_7^{\ p^3} \cdot f_8^{\ p^4}$
	$\lambda_0 = z^6 - 2z^4 + z^2, \lambda_1 = z^4 - 2z^2 + 1, \lambda_2 = -z^{12} + 2z^{10} - z^8 - 4,$
BW10-512	$\lambda_3 = -z^{10} + 2z^8 - z^6, \lambda_4 = -z^8 + 2z^6 - z^4.$
	Input: $f \in \mathbb{G}_{\Phi_{10}(p)}$, Output: $h \in \mathbb{G}_T$, Cost: $12\mathbf{e} + 7\mathbf{M} + \mathbf{S}_c + 4\mathbf{f}$
	$f_1 \leftarrow f^{z^4 - 2z^2 + 1}, f_2 \leftarrow f_1^{z^2}, f_3 \leftarrow f_2^{z^2}, f_4 \leftarrow f_3^{z^2}, f_5 \leftarrow f_4^{z^2} \cdot f^4,$
	$h \leftarrow f_2 \cdot f_1^p \cdot \bar{f_5}^{p^2} \cdot \bar{f_4}^{p^3} \cdot \bar{f_3}^{p^4}$
	Input: $f \in \mathbb{G}_{\Phi_{14}(p)}$, Output: $h \in \mathbb{G}_T$, Cost: $14\mathbf{e} + 12\mathbf{M} + 6\mathbf{f}$
DW14 951	$f_1 \leftarrow f^{z^2 + z + 1}, f_2 \leftarrow f_1^z, f_3 \leftarrow f_2^{z^2}, f_4 \leftarrow f_3^z, f_5 \leftarrow f_4^{z^2} \cdot f^3 f_5 \leftarrow \bar{f}_5, f_6 \leftarrow f_5^{z^2}, f_6 \leftarrow f_6^{z^2}, f_6 \leftarrow f_6 \leftarrow f_6^{z^2}$
D W 14-551	$f_7 \leftarrow f_2 \cdot f_6, f_8 \leftarrow f_6^z, f_9 \leftarrow f_8^{z^2}, f_{10} \leftarrow f_4 \cdot f_9, f_{11} \leftarrow f_9^z,$
	$h \leftarrow f_3 \cdot \bar{f_8}^p \cdot \bar{f_7}^{p^2} \cdot {f_1}^{p^3} \cdot {f_5}^{p^4} \cdot \bar{f_{11}}^{p^5} \cdot {f_{10}}^{p^6}$
	$ \begin{vmatrix} \lambda_0 = z^{10} - 2z^8 + z^6, \lambda_1 = z^8 - 2z^6 + z^4, \lambda_2 = z^6 - 2z^4 + z^2, \lambda_3 = z^4 - 2z^2 + 1, \end{vmatrix} $
BW14-382	$\lambda_4 = -z^{16} + 2z^{14} - z^{12} - 4, \lambda_5 = -z^{14} + 2z^{12} - z^{10}, \lambda_6 = -z^{12} + 2z^{10} - z^8.$
	Input: $f \in \mathbb{G}_{\Phi_{14}(p)}$, Output: $h \in \mathbb{G}_T$, Cost: 16e + 7M + S _c + 4f
	$\int f_1 \leftarrow f^{z^4 - 2z^2 + 1}, f_2 \leftarrow f^{z^2}_1, f_3 \leftarrow f^{z^2}_2, f_4 \leftarrow f^{z^2}_3, f_5 \leftarrow f_4 \cdot f^p_3 \cdot f^{p^2}_2,$
	$f_6 \leftarrow (f_5^{z^{\circ}} \cdot f^4)^{p^4}, h \leftarrow f_1^{p^3} \cdot f_5 \cdot \bar{f}_6.$

counts of pairing computation on these curves. To this aim, we first count the number of finite field arithmetic operations. For the Frobenius map and inversion arithmetic, we adopt the formulas described in [32, Section.5]. For multiplication and squaring arithmetic, we combine the lazy reduction technique [5] and the Karatsuba algorithm [46]. In particular, cyclotomic squaring arithmetic can be accelerated using the formula described in [29, Section 3]. The exact operation counts for finite field arithmetic across different pairing-friendly curves are presented in **Tabs**. 7.

Recall from Section 3.1 that the optimized formulas of Miller function on our target curves can be expressed as

$$\begin{cases} f_{z,Q}^{z \cdot p^m}(P) f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P)) \cdot f_{z,Q}(P) \cdot (y_P - y_Q)^{p^n}, & \text{if } j(E) = 1728; \\ f_{z,Q}^{z \cdot p^m}(P) f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P)), & \text{if } j(E) = 0. \end{cases}$$

The computation of $f_{z,Q}^{z\cdot p^m}(P)f_{z,Q}(\hat{\tau}(P))$ can be performed using **Alg.2**, and it requires additional $2\mathbf{M} + \mathbf{f} + \tilde{\mathbf{a}}$ to complete the final step of the Miller iteration on

curves with j-invariant 1728. In conclusion, the total operation count of Miller Loop is

$$ML = \underbrace{2\mathbf{M} + \mathbf{f} + \tilde{\mathbf{a}}}_{\text{if } j(E) = 1728} + \underbrace{(nbits(z) - 1) \cdot \text{SDBL} + ((hw(z) - 1) \cdot \text{SADD})}_{\text{Lines 1-9 in Alg.2}} + \underbrace{((nbits(z) - 1) + 2hw(z) - 2) \cdot \mathbf{M} + (nbits(z) - 1) \cdot \mathbf{S} + \mathbf{f}}_{\text{Lines 10-16 in Alg.2}}$$
(6)

where nbits(z) and hw(z) represent the bit length and the hamming weight in 2-non-adjacent form of the seed z, respectively. We use n_1 , n_2 , n_3 and n_4 to denote the number of **e**, **M**, **S**_c and **f** required for the exponentiation to the power of the hard part, respectively. Then the total operation counts of the final exponentiation is

$$FE = \underbrace{\mathbf{I} + 3\mathbf{M} + 2\mathbf{f}}_{\text{easy part}} + \underbrace{n_1 \cdot \left((nbits(z) - 1)\mathbf{S}_c + (hw(z) - 1)\mathbf{M} \right) + n_2\mathbf{M} + n_3\mathbf{S}_c + n_4\mathbf{f}}_{\text{hard part}}$$
$$= \mathbf{I} + \left(n_1 \cdot (hw(z) - 1) + n_2 + 3 \right)\mathbf{M} + \left(n_1 \cdot (nbits(z) - 1) + n_3 \right)\mathbf{S}_c + (n_4 + 2)\mathbf{f}.$$
(7)

In the example below, we analysis the detailed operation counts of pairing computation on BW14-351.

Table 6. Parameters of full extension fields and curve equations for the five candidate pairing-friendly curves.

curve	full extension field	original curve E	twisted curve E'
BW10-480	$\mathbb{F}_p \xrightarrow{\xi^5 + 11} \mathbb{F}_{p^5} \xrightarrow{v^2 - \xi} \mathbb{F}_{p^{10}}$	$y^2 = x^3 + x$	$y^2 = x^3 + \xi^2 x$
BW10-511	$\mathbb{F}_p \xrightarrow{\xi^5+4} \mathbb{F}_{p^5} \xrightarrow{v^2-\xi} \mathbb{F}_{p^{10}}$	$y^2 = x^3 - 2$	$y^2 = x^3 - 2/\xi^3$
BW10-512	$\mathbb{F}_p \xrightarrow{\xi^5 + 17} \mathbb{F}_{p^5} \xrightarrow{v^2 - \xi} \mathbb{F}_{p^{10}}$	$y^2 = x^3 + x$	$y^2 = x^3 + \xi^2 x$
BW14-351	$\mathbb{F}_p \xrightarrow{\xi^7 - 2} \mathbb{F}_{p^7} \xrightarrow{v^2 - \xi} \mathbb{F}_{p^{14}}$	$y^2 = x^3 + 3$	$y^2 = x^3 + 3/\xi^3$
BW14-382	$\mathbb{F}_p \xrightarrow{\xi^7 - 17} \mathbb{F}_p 7 \xrightarrow{v^2 - \xi} \mathbb{F}_{p^{14}}$	$y^2 = x^3 + x$	$y^2 = x^3 + \xi^2 x$

Example 1. By the form of the selected seed z on BW14-351, we have nbits(z) = 23 and hw(z) = 4. Then it follows from Eq. (6) that the cost of the Miller

curve	$ ilde{\mathbf{m}} = ilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + ilde{\mathbf{r}}$	$ ilde{\mathbf{s}} = ilde{\mathbf{s}}_u + ilde{\mathbf{r}}$	ĩ	$ ilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi}, ilde{\mathbf{m}}_{a'}$
BW10-480	$15m_u + 122a + 5r$	$7\mathbf{m}_u + 8\mathbf{s}_u + 83\mathbf{a} + 5\mathbf{r}$	$\approx i + 2\tilde{m} + 22m$	5 a , 10 a
BW10-511	$15\mathbf{m}_u + 98\mathbf{a} + 5\mathbf{r}$	$7\mathbf{m}_u + 8\mathbf{s}_u + 59\mathbf{a} + 5\mathbf{r}$	$\approx i + 2\tilde{m} + 22m$	2 a , -
BW10-512	$15\mathbf{m}_u + 122\mathbf{a} + 5\mathbf{r}$	$7\mathbf{m}_u + 8\mathbf{s}_u + 83\mathbf{a} + 5\mathbf{r}$	$\approx i + 2\tilde{m} + 22m$	5a, 10a
BW14-351	$24\mathbf{m}_u + 162\mathbf{a} + 7\mathbf{r}$	$9\mathbf{m}_u + 15\mathbf{s}_u + 109\mathbf{a} + 7\mathbf{r}$	$\approx i + 3\tilde{m} + 38m$	a , -
BW14-382	$24\mathbf{m}_u + 210\mathbf{a} + 7\mathbf{r}$	$9\mathbf{m}_u + 15\mathbf{s}_u + 157\mathbf{a} + 7\mathbf{r}$	$\approx i + 3\tilde{m} + 38m$	5a , 10 a
\mathbf{S}_{c}	S	М	Ι	f
$\mathbf{\tilde{m}} + \mathbf{\tilde{s}} + 2\mathbf{\tilde{a}}$	$2\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + 5\tilde{\mathbf{a}} + 2\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi}$	$3\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + 8\tilde{\mathbf{a}} + 2\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + 2\tilde{\mathbf{r}}$	$\tilde{\mathbf{i}}$ +2 $\tilde{\mathbf{m}}$ + $\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi}$ +2 $\tilde{\mathbf{s}}$ + $\tilde{\mathbf{a}}$	$(k-2)\mathbf{m}$

Table 7. Costs of arithmetic operations in a tower extension field \mathbb{F}_{p^k} on the five candidate curves.

Loop (ML) is:

$$\begin{split} ML =& 22(\mathbf{M} + \mathbf{S} + 5\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + \tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + \tilde{\mathbf{s}}_u + \tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + 3\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + 21\mathbf{m} + \tilde{\mathbf{r}} + 13\tilde{\mathbf{a}} + \mathbf{a}) + \\ & 3(\mathbf{M} + 6\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + 4\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + \tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + 3\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + 21\mathbf{m} + 2\tilde{\mathbf{r}} + 12\tilde{\mathbf{a}}) + (28\mathbf{M} + 22\mathbf{S} + \mathbf{f}) \\ =& 53\mathbf{M} + 44\mathbf{S} + 128\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + 34\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + 75\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + 22\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_u + 25\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + 525\mathbf{m} + 28\tilde{\mathbf{r}} + \mathbf{f} + 322\tilde{\mathbf{a}} + 22\mathbf{a} \\ =& 216\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + 193\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + 219\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + 75\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + 22\tilde{\mathbf{s}}_u + 134\tilde{\mathbf{r}} + \mathbf{f} + 525\mathbf{m} + 966\tilde{\mathbf{a}} + 22\mathbf{a} \\ =& 537\mathbf{m} + 10689\mathbf{m}_u + 1455\mathbf{s}_u + 83834\mathbf{a} + 2975\mathbf{r} \\ =& 11226\mathbf{m}_u + 1445\mathbf{s}_u + 83834\mathbf{a} + 3512\mathbf{r}. \end{split}$$

Furthermore, it can be obtained from Tab. 5 that the parameters n_1 , n_2 , n_3 and n_4 are equal to 14, 12, 0 and 6, respectively. By Eq. (7), the cost of the final exponentiation is:

 $FE = (\mathbf{I} + 3\mathbf{M} + 2\mathbf{f}) + (14\mathbf{e} + 12\mathbf{M} + 6\mathbf{f}) = \mathbf{I} + 57\mathbf{M} + 308\mathbf{S}_c + 8\mathbf{f}$ = $\tilde{\mathbf{i}} + 310\tilde{\mathbf{m}} + 171\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_u + 115\tilde{\mathbf{m}}_{\xi} + 310\tilde{\mathbf{s}} + 114\tilde{\mathbf{r}} + 96\mathbf{m} + 1073\tilde{\mathbf{a}}$ = $\mathbf{i} + 14406\mathbf{m}_u + 134\mathbf{m} + 4650\mathbf{s}_u + 5159\mathbf{r} + 131294\mathbf{a}$ = $\mathbf{i} + 14540\mathbf{m}_u + 4650\mathbf{s}_u + 119824\mathbf{a} + 5293\mathbf{r}$.

In total, the cost of pairing computation on BW14-351 is

$$ML + FE = \mathbf{i} + 25766\mathbf{m}_u + 6105\mathbf{s}_u + 203658\mathbf{a} + 8805\mathbf{r}.$$

In **Tab.** 8, we summarize the cost of pairing computation for the five candidate curves. It should be noted that all the selected primes p for BW10-480, BW10-511 and BW10-512 can be represented by 8 computer words in a 64-bit processor, while for BW14-351 and BW14-382 only requires 6 computer words. As illustrated in [4, Section 8], it is reasonable to estimate that $\mathbf{m}_8 \approx (136/78)\mathbf{m}_6 \approx 1.74\mathbf{m}_6$ and $\mathbf{a}_8 \approx (8/6)\mathbf{a}_6 \approx 1.33\mathbf{a}_6$, where \mathbf{m}_i and \mathbf{a}_i

curve	ML	FE	ML + FE
BW10-480	$ \begin{array}{r} 12861\mathbf{m}_{u} + 1720\mathbf{s}_{u} + \\ 115142\mathbf{a} + 4761\mathbf{r} \end{array} $	$i + 11591m_u + 3216s_u + 111208a + 4682r$	$i + 24452m_u + 4936s_u + 226350a + 9443r$
BW10-511	$ \frac{10027m_u + 1096s_u +}{71275a + 3508r} $	$i + 12452m_u + 3608s_u + 93752a + 5130r$	$i + 22479m_u + 4704s_u + 165027a + 8638r$
BW10-512	$ \frac{11761\mathbf{m}_u + 1560\mathbf{s}_u + 104010\mathbf{a} + 4341\mathbf{r}}{104010\mathbf{a} + 4341\mathbf{r}} $	$i + 12820m_u + 3480s_u + 122456a + 5130r$	$i + 24581m_u + 5040s_u + 226466a + 9471r$
BW14-351	$ \begin{array}{r} 11226\mathbf{m}_u + 1455\mathbf{s}_u + \\ 83834\mathbf{a} + 3512\mathbf{r} \end{array} $	$i + 14540m_u + 4650s_u + 119824a + 5293r$	$i + 25766m_u + 6105s_u + 203658a + 8805r$
BW14-382	$ \begin{array}{r} 11874\mathbf{m}_u + 1800\mathbf{s}_u + \\ 116234\mathbf{a} + 3874\mathbf{r} \end{array} $	$i + 17849m_u + 5085s_u + 192413a + 6137r$	$i + 29723m_u + 6885s_u + 308647a + 10011r$

 Table 8. Comparison of operations of pairing computation for the five candidate pairing-friendly curves.

denote the cost of multiplication and addition in \mathbb{F}_p , with p a i computer word size prime in a 64-bit processor. Following the estimates, together with **Tab**. 8, we predict that BW14-351 is the most efficient choice among the five candidate curves in terms of pairing computation.

5 Subgroup membership testings

In pairing-based cryptographic protocols, subgroup membership testings play a critical role in defending against small subgroup attacks [9, 37]. Recent research [16,43] has demonstrated that efficiently computable endomorphisms are powerful tools for accelerating these testings in various pairing groups. In this section, we describe the application of the the state-of-the-art technique [16] to our specific pairing-friendly curves. Furthermore, we also introduce a faster method for \mathbb{G}_2 membership testing.

Notations. We denote by η , ψ and Ψ the enodmorphisms $\phi^{-1} \circ \tau \circ \phi$, $\phi^{-1} \circ \pi \circ \phi$ and $\phi^{-1} \circ \pi \circ \tau \circ \phi$, respectively. We write $\operatorname{\mathbf{Res}}(f,g)$ for the resultant of two polynomials f and g.

5.1 \mathbb{G}_1 membership testing

Given a candidate point P, the process of verifying whether $P \in \mathbb{G}_1$ can be divided into two phases. Concretely, one can first check whether $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$, followed by verifying that the order of P is exactly r. It is clear that the computational cost largely comes from the second phase. Let the GLV endomorphism τ on \mathbb{G}_1 act as scalar multiplication by λ_1 , and \mathcal{L}_{τ} be a two dimensional lattice as

$$\mathcal{L}_{\tau} = \{(a_0, a_1) \in \mathbb{Z}^2 | a_0 + a_1 \cdot \lambda_1 \equiv 0 \bmod r\}.$$

By [44, Theorem 2], the norm of the shortest vector in \mathcal{L}_{τ} is about $\log r/2$. Let (a_0, a_1) be a vector in \mathcal{L}_{τ} with $gcd(h_1, h'_1) = 1$, where

$$h_1' = \begin{cases} \left(a_0^2 - a_0 \cdot a_1 + a_1^2\right)/r, & \text{if } j(E) = 0; \\ \left(a_0^2 + a_1^2\right)/r, & \text{if } j(E) = 1728. \end{cases}$$
(8)

Dai et al. [16] prove that the short vector (a_0, a_1) can be used to accelerate \mathbb{G}_1 membership testing, i.e.,

$$P \in \mathbb{G}_1 \Leftrightarrow P \in E(\mathbb{F}_p) \text{ and } [a_0]P + [a_1]\tau(P) = \mathcal{O}_E.$$

In general, the constraint $gcd(h_1, h'_1) = 1$ is mild and thus one can find a valid short vector "closed" to the shortest one on many pairing-friendly curves. It means that the process of \mathbb{G}_1 membership testing requires about $\log r/2$ iterations.

5.2 \mathbb{G}_T membership testing

In the case of \mathbb{G}_T membership testing, the Forbenius endomorphism is critical in finding valid short vectors. To illustrate it, we first use \mathcal{L}_{π} to denote the following $\varphi(k)$ dimensional lattice:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\pi} = \{(a_0, \cdots, a_{\varphi(k)-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{\varphi(k)} | a_0 + a_1 \cdot p + \cdots + a_{\varphi(k)-1} \cdot p^{\varphi(k)-1} \equiv 0 \mod r\}.$$

The norm of the shortest vector in \mathcal{L}_{π} is about $\log r/\varphi(k)$. For a given short vector $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1, \cdots, c_{\varphi(k)-1}) \in \mathcal{L}_{\pi}$ with $\gcd(h_T, h'_T) = 1$ where $h_T = \Phi_k(p)/r$ and $h'_T = \sum_{i=0}^{\varphi(k)-1} c_i \cdot p^i$, Dai et al. found that:

$$\alpha \in \mathbb{G}_T \Leftrightarrow \alpha^{\Phi_k(p)} = 1 \text{ and } \prod_{i=0}^{\varphi(k)-1} \alpha^{c_i \cdot p^i} = 1.$$

Likewise, the condition $gcd(h_T, h'_T) = 1$ is mild, and thus the process of \mathbb{G}_T membership testing requires about $\log r/\varphi(k)$ iterations.

Modified short vector: The previous idea for optimizing the final exponentiation still applies to \mathbb{G}_T membership testing such that several full extension field multiplications can be saved. Specifically, once the candidate element α proved to be a member of $\mathbb{G}_{\Phi_k(p)}$, one can replace the original valid vector **c** by $\mathbf{c}' = (c_0 + \delta, c_1 - \delta, \cdots, c_{\varphi(k)-1} - \delta, \delta)$ for some integer δ on our target curves as

$$\prod_{i=0}^{\varphi(k)-1} \alpha^{c_i \cdot p^i} = 1 \Leftrightarrow \alpha^{\delta \cdot \Phi_k(p)} \cdot \prod_{i=0}^{\varphi(k)-1} \alpha^{c_i \cdot p^i} = 1.$$

In particular, if the first *i* tuples of \mathbf{c}' are 0, we then can obtain a new vector as $(c_{i+1} + (-1)^{i+1}\delta, \cdots, c_{\varphi(k)-1} - \delta, \delta, 0, \cdots, 0)$. For instance, using the Magma code provided in [16, Section 5], a valid vector for \mathbb{G}_T membership testing on BW14-351 is given by $\mathbf{c}=(1,-1,1,z^2-1,-z^2+z+1,-z).$ Taking $\delta=-1,$ we have

$$(c_0 - 1, c_1 + 1, \cdots, c_6 - 1, 1) = (0, 0, 0, z^2, -z^2 + z, -z + 1, -1).$$

Left-shifting the above vector, one can obtain a modified short vector as $(z^2, -z^2 + z, -z + 1, -1, 0, 0, 0)$. In conclusion, it is equivalent to checking that

$$\alpha \cdot \alpha^{(p+p^3+p^5) \cdot p} = \alpha^{p+p^3+p^5}, \alpha^{p^3} = \alpha^{z^2} \cdot \alpha^{(z-z^2) \cdot p} \cdot \alpha^{(1-z) \cdot p^2}.$$

5.3 \mathbb{G}_2 membership testing

Let $(c_0, c_1, \dots, c_{\varphi(k)-1})$ be a short vector in \mathcal{L}_{π} with $gcd(h_2, h'_2) = 1$, where $h_2 = \#E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})/r$ and $h'_2 = \sum_{i=0}^{\varphi(k)-1} c_i \cdot p^i$. Dati et al. method for \mathbb{G}_2 membership testing is summarized as follows:

$$Q \in \mathbb{G}_2 \Leftrightarrow Q \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}) \text{ and } \sum_{i=0}^{\varphi(k)-1} [c_i]\psi^i(Q) = \mathcal{O}_{E'}.$$

Again, the above computation requires about $\log r/\varphi(k)$ iterations. In the following, we develop a faster method for \mathbb{G}_2 membership testing, which is tailored to our target curves. To this aim, we first determine the characteristic equation of the endomorphism Ψ .

Lemma 2. Let *E* be an ordinary curve over \mathbb{F}_p with $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p + 1 - t$, admitting a twist *E'*. If j(E') = 0 or 1728, then the characteristic equation of Ψ is given as follows:

(1) $j(E') = 0: \quad \Psi^2 + \frac{t \pm 3f}{2}\Psi + p = 0 \text{ with } t^2 - 4p = -3f^2;$ (2) $j(E') = 1728: \quad \Psi^2 \pm f\Psi + p = 0 \text{ with } t^2 - 4p = -f^2.$

Proof. We only give the proof for the case j(E') = 0 (The proof of the remaining case is similar). As mentioned in Section 2.1, the characteristic equation of Ψ can be expressed as

$$\Psi^2 + m\Psi + n = 0 \tag{9}$$

for some integers m and n. Since $\deg(\psi) = p$ and $\deg(\eta) = 1$, we have

$$n = \deg(\Psi) = \deg(\psi) \cdot \deg(\eta) = p$$

Furthermore, since the characteristic equation of π and η are given as follows

$$\psi^2 - t \psi + p = 0, \quad \eta^2 + \eta + 1 = 0,$$

it is easy to deduce that

$$\psi = \frac{t \pm \sqrt{-3} \cdot f}{2}$$
 and $\eta = \frac{-1 \pm \sqrt{-3}}{2}$.

By the fact that $\Psi = \psi \circ \eta$, we have

$$\Psi = \frac{t \pm \sqrt{-3} \cdot f}{2} \cdot \frac{-1 \pm \sqrt{-3}}{2} = \frac{-(t \pm 3f) \pm \sqrt{-3} \cdot (t - f)}{4}$$
(10)

On the other hand, it can be obtained from Eq. (9) that

$$\Psi = \frac{-m + \sqrt{m^2 - 4n}}{2}.$$
 (11)

By comparing Eqs.(10) and (11), we conclude that $m = (t \pm 3f)/2$, which completes the proof.

Recall that the endomorphism η acts on \mathbb{G}_2 (the group is on E') as scalar multiplication by λ_2 that is defined in Eq. (3). By combining the actions of ψ and η on \mathbb{G}_2 together, we have $\Psi(Q) = [\ell]Q$ for any $Q \in \mathbb{G}_2$, where $\ell = p \cdot \lambda_2 \mod r$. Since the order of Ψ restricting on the $\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}$ rational endomorphism ring is equal to 2k or 3k on our target curves, we have $r \mid \Phi_{2k}(\ell)$ or $r \mid \Phi_{3k}(\ell)$. The degree of each of the two cyclotomic polynomials is equal to $2\varphi(k)$. For this reason, we can construct the following $2\varphi(k)$ dimensional lattice:

$$\mathcal{L}_{\Psi} = \{ (a_0, \cdots, a_{2\varphi(k)-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2\varphi(k)} | a_0 + a_1 \cdot \ell + \dots + a_{2\varphi(k)-1} \cdot \ell^{2\varphi(k)-1} \equiv 0 \mod r \}.$$

By taking full advantage of the endomorphism Ψ , a new method for \mathbb{G}_2 membership testing is proposed, which is tailored to our target curves.

Theorem 1. Let E be an ordinary curve over \mathbb{F}_p with j-invariant 0 or 1728. Let r be a large prime such that $r \mid \#E(\mathbb{F}_p)$. Let E admit a twist E' of degree 2 such that $r \mid \#E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})$, where k is the embedding degree of E with respect to rand p. Assume $\mathbf{c} = (c_0, c_1, \cdots, c_{2\varphi(k)-1}) \in \mathcal{L}_{\Psi}$ such that

$$\gcd(\operatorname{Res}(h(\Psi), g(\Psi)), h_2 \cdot r) = r, \tag{12}$$

where $h(\Psi) = \sum_{i=0}^{2\varphi(k)-1} c_i \Psi^i$ and $g(\Psi)$ is the characteristic polynomial of Ψ . Then for any non-identity point Q of $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})$, the point $Q \in \mathbb{G}_2 = E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})[r]$ if and only if

$$\sum_{i=0}^{2\varphi(k)-1} [c_i] \Psi^i(Q) = \mathcal{O}_{E'}.$$
(13)

Proof. If $Q \in \mathbb{G}_2$, then we have $\Psi(Q) = [\ell]Q$. As a result, we can easily check that

$$\sum\nolimits_{i=0}^{2\varphi(k)-1} {[c_i]} {\varPsi^i(Q)} = \sum\nolimits_{i=0}^{2\varphi(k)-1} {[c_i\ell^i]} Q = \mathcal{O}_{E'}.$$

Conversely, we let b_0 and b_1 be two integers satisfying that $b_0 + b_1 \Psi = h(\Psi) \mod g(\Psi)$. By the property of resultant, we have

$$\mathbf{Res}(f(\Psi), g(\Psi)) = \mathbf{Res}(b_0 + b_1 \Psi, g(\Psi)) = b_0^2 + b_0 b_1 t_{\Psi} + b_1^2 p,$$

where t_{Ψ} is the trace of Ψ that is given in Lemma 2. Furthermore, by the fact that $h(\Psi)(Q) = g(\Psi)(Q) = \mathcal{O}_{E'}$, we have

$$[b_0^2 + b_0 b_1 t_{\Psi} + b_1^2 p]Q = (b_0 + b_1 \hat{\Psi})(b_0 + b_1 \Psi)(Q) = \mathcal{O}_{E'},$$

Therefore, the order of Q divides $gcd(\mathbf{Res}(h(\Psi), g(\Psi)), h_2 \cdot r)$. Since the selected vector **c** is restricted by Eq. (12), we conclude that $Q \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})[r] = \mathbb{G}_2$, which completes the proof.

Likewise, the new approach requires about $\log r/(2\varphi(k))$ bits operations, which is about $2\times$ as fast as the previous leading work [16]. In **Tab**. 9, we list the short vectors that can be used for \mathbb{G}_1 , \mathbb{G}_2 and \mathbb{G}_T membership membership testings on the five candidate pairing-friendly curves. It is straightforward to see that the computational cost of \mathbb{G}_2 membership testing on the five candiate curves comes largely from a scalar multiplication by z.

 Table 9. Short vectors for subgroup membership testings on five candidate pairing-friendly curves.

curve	$\mathbb{G}_1 \left(a_0, a_1 \right)$	\mathbb{G}_2	\mathbb{G}_T
BW10-480	$(z^3 - z, -1 - a_0 \cdot z)$	(1, 0, 0, -z, 0, 0, 0, 0)	$(z^2, 0, 0, 0, 1)$
BW10-511	$(a_1 \cdot z - 1, z^3 + z^2 - 1)$	(1, 0, -z - 1, -1, 0, 0, 1, 1)	$(1, -z^2, 0, z, 0)$
BW10-512	$(z^3 - z, -a_0 \cdot z - 1)$	(0, 1, 0, z - 1, 0, 1, -z + 1, -1)	$(1, z^2 - 1, 0, z^2 - 1)$
BW14-351	$(z^5 + z^4 - z^2 - z, (1 - z) \cdot a_0 - 1)$	(1, 1, 0, -1, -1, 0, 1, 0, -1, -1, 0, z+1)	$(z^2, z-z^2, 1-z, -1)$
BW14-382	$(z^5 - z^3 + z, -1 + a_0 \cdot z)$	(0, 1, z, -1, 0, 1, 0, -1, 1, 1, 0, z - 1)	$(z^2, -1, z^2, -1)$

6 Cofactor Multiplication

Hashing a string into \mathbb{G}_1 or \mathbb{G}_2 is an important building block in pairing-based cryptographic protocols. This operation consists of two phases: first mapping a string into a curve point, followed by a cofactor multiplication so that the resulting point falls into the target subgroup. In this section, we present efficient algorithms for cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 on our chosen target curves.

6.1 Cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_1

Given a random point $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$, cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_1 is to map the point P into \mathbb{G}_1 . The naive way is to perform the scalar multiplication $[h_1]P$, where the cofactor $h_1 = \#E(\mathbb{F}_p)/r$. Housni, Guillevic and Piellard [22] observe that the cofactor h_1 can be replaced by a smaller cofactor \tilde{h}_1 on a large class of cyclotomic pairing-friendly curves, where \tilde{h}_1 is determined by the group structure of $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$:

$$E(\mathbb{F}_p) \cong \mathbb{Z}_{m_1} \oplus \mathbb{Z}_{\tilde{h}_1 \cdot r}$$
 with $m_1 \mid \tilde{h}_1$ and $m_1 \cdot \tilde{h}_1 = h_1$.

It can be deduced from [41, Proposition 3.7] that m_1 is the largest integer such that $m_1^2 \mid \#E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ and $m_1 \mid (p-1)$ on curves with j-invariant 0 or 1728. Thus, it is not difficult to determine the value m_1 on the five candidate curves. In the optimal case, we have $m_1 \approx \tilde{h}_1$ and thus the new method would be twice as fast as the naive one, such as on the BW10-480 and BW10-511 curves.

Faster cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_1 : The algorithm of Housni-Guillevic-Piellard can be further optimized in the case that $m_1 \ll \tilde{h}_1$, such as on the BW10-512, BW14-351 and BW14-382 curves. In fact, a random point $P \in E(\mathbb{F}_p)$ can be mapped into \mathbb{G}_1 as follows:

$$E(\mathbb{F}_p) \xrightarrow{m_1} E(\mathbb{F}_p)[n_1 \cdot r] \xrightarrow{a_0 + a_1 \tau} E(\mathbb{F}_p)[r] = \mathbb{G}_1.$$

In detail, the first step is to map the point P into the cyclic group $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[n_1 \cdot r]$ by performing a scalar multiplication by m_1 where, $n_1 = \tilde{h}_1/m_1$; the next step is to clear the cofactor n_1 using the endomorphism $a_0 + a_1 \cdot \tau$, where a_0 and a_1 are integers satisfying $a_0 + a_1 \cdot s_1 \equiv 0 \mod n_1$ and s_1 denotes the scalar of the GLV endomorphism τ acting on $E(\mathbb{F}_p)[n_1 \cdot r]$. More specifically, the LLL algorithm can be exploited to look for two integers a_0 and a_1 such that $\max\{\log|a_0|, \log|a_1|\} \approx \log n_1/2$. In conclusion, cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_1 can always be performed in around $\log m_1 + \log n_1/2 \approx \log h_1/2$ iterations, which does not depend on the group structure of $E(\mathbb{F}_p)$. In **Tab.**10, we summarize the parameters h_1 , m_1 and \tilde{h}_1 , and short vectors (a_0, a_1) across different pairing-friendly curves.

Table 10. Important parameters for cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_1 on the five candidate pairing-friendly curves.

	curve	h_1	m_1	$ ilde{h}_1$	n_1	(a_0,a_1)
в₩	/10-480	$\frac{z^4}{4}$	$\frac{z^2}{2}$	$\frac{z^2}{2}$	1	_
вм	/10-511	$\frac{(z^3-1)^2}{3}$	$\tfrac{(z^3-1)}{3}$	$z^{3} - 1$	3	_
вм	/10-512	$\frac{(z^2-1)^2(z^2+1)}{4}$	$\frac{(z^2-1)}{2}$	$\frac{(z^2-1)(z^2+1)}{2}$	$z^{2} + 1$	(z, -1)
вv	V14-351	$\frac{(z^2-z+1)(z^2+z+1)}{3}$	1	$\frac{(z^2-z+1)(z^2+z+1)}{3}$	$\frac{(z^2-z+1)(z^2+z+1)}{3}$	$(2z, z^2 + z - 1)$
вw	/14-382	$\frac{(z^2-1)^2(z^2+1)}{4}$	$\frac{(z^2-1)}{2}$	$\frac{(z^2-1)(z^2+1)}{2}$	$z^{2} + 1$	(z,1)

6.2 Cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_2

Cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_2 aims to map a random point Q of $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})$ into \mathbb{G}_2 . The naive way is to compute $[h_2]Q$ directely, where $h_2 = \#E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})/r$. Since the cofactor h_2 is much larger than the cofactor h_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 is defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}$, the computational cost of the cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_2 is more expensive than that for \mathbb{G}_1 . To date, the fastest known algorithm [25] requires $\log h_2/\varphi(k)$

iterations to clear the cofactor. Recently, Dai et al. [18] proposed a fast method for this operation on curves with the lack of twists. In this subsection, we show that Dai et al. method can be generalized to our target curves such that the number of iterations can be further reduced to $\log h_2/(2\varphi(k))$.

Lemma 3. Let $G'_0 = \{Q \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}) | \Phi_k(\psi)(Q) = \mathcal{O}_{E'}\}$. Then the order of G'_0 is precisely equal to $\frac{\#E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}) \cdot \#E(\mathbb{F}_p)}{\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})}$.

Proof. Let $G_0 = \{Q \in E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k}) | \Phi_k(\pi)(Q) = \mathcal{O}_E\}$. It is easy to see that $G_0 \cong G'_0$ and thus $\#G_0 = \#G'_0$. By [18, Proposition 2], we have

$$#G_0 = \frac{\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k}) \cdot \#E(\mathbb{F}_p)}{\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}) \cdot \#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})}.$$
(14)

On the other hand, it can be obtained from [33, Theorem 3] that

$$#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^k}) = #E(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}) \cdot #E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}).$$
(15)

Inserting Eq.(14) into Eq.(15), it yields that

$$#G'_0 = #G_0 = \frac{#E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}) \cdot #E(\mathbb{F}_p)}{#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})},$$
(16)

which completes the proof of this lemma.

Since \mathbb{G}_2 is a subgroup of G'_0 , we define that $G'_0 \cong \mathbb{Z}_{m_2} \oplus \mathbb{Z}_{m_2 \cdot n_2 \cdot r}$ for some integers m_2 and n_2 . As a consequence, the process of mapping a random point of $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})$ into \mathbb{G}_2 can be divided into three steps as follows:

$$E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}) \to G'_0 \to E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})[n_2 \cdot r] \to \mathbb{G}_2.$$

Given a random point $Q \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})$, it can be mapped into the group G'_0 under the endomorphism $\psi + 1$. It is clear that the computational cost of operations largely comes from the last step. In the following, we show how to map a random point of $E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}})[n_2 \cdot r]$ into \mathbb{G}_2 . To illustrate it, we first introduce the two lemmas.

Lemma 4. Let t' be the trace of the $p^{k/2}$ power Frobenius endomorphism of E'. Let $f, f' \in \mathbb{Z}$ be such that $t^2 - 4p = -Df^2$ and $t'^2 - 4p^{k/2} = -Df'^2$, where -D is the square-free part of $t^2 - 4p$. Let H be a cyclic subgroup of G'_0 with order $n_2 \cdot r$. Then $\psi(P) = [a]Q$ for any $Q \in H$, where $a = \frac{t \pm f(t'-2)}{2f'} \mod n_2 \cdot r$.

Proof. The proof is given in [25, Lemma 2].

As illustrated in [25], Lemma 4 induces a fast approach for cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_2 in $\log n_2/\varphi(k)$ iterations on a large class of pairing-friendly curves. **Lemma 5.** Let H be a cyclic subgroup of G'_0 with order $n_2 \cdot r$. Then $\eta(Q) = [b]Q$ for any $Q \in H$, where

$$b = \begin{cases} \frac{-f \pm (2a - t)}{2f} \mod n_2 \cdot r, & \text{if } j(E) = 0, \\ \frac{\pm (2a - t)}{f} \mod n_2 \cdot r, & \text{if } j(E) = 1728. \end{cases}$$

Proof. The proof is derived from [18, Lemma 2].

In the following, we propose a more efficient approach for cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_2 suitable for curves listed in **Tab**. 1. Our main idea is summarized in the theorem below.

Theorem 2. Let E be an ordinary elliptic curve admitting a degree-2 twist E' over an extension field $\mathbb{F}_{p^{k/2}}$, where k is the even embedding degree. Let H be a cyclic subgroup of G'_0 . If the curve E satisfies the following two conditions: $(i)j(E) \in \{0, 1728\}, (ii)3 \nmid k \text{ and } 4 \nmid k, \text{ then there exists a polynomial}$

$$h(x) = h_0 + h_1 x + \dots + h_{s-1} x^{s-1} \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$$

such that $h(\Psi)(Q) \in \mathbb{G}_2$ for any $Q \in H$, where $s = 2\varphi(k)$ and $|h_i| < |n_2|^{1/s}$ for $i = 0, \dots, s - 1$.

Proof. Since $\Psi = \psi \circ \eta$, it can be deduced from Lemmas 4 and 5 that $\Psi(Q) = [\lambda_2]Q$, where $\lambda_2 = a \cdot b \mod n_2 \cdot r$. Under the condition that $3 \nmid k$ and $4 \nmid k$, we can deduce that the order of Ψ acting on the group G'_0 is 2k or 3k, which means that

$$\begin{cases} \Phi_{3k}(\lambda_2) \equiv 0 \mod n_2 \cdot r, & \text{if } j(E) = 0; \\ \Phi_{2k}(\lambda_2) \equiv 0 \mod n_2 \cdot r, & \text{if } j(E) = 1728. \end{cases}$$

In both cases, the degree of the cyclotomic polynomial is $2\varphi(k)$. Analogous to [25, Theorem 1], there exists a polynomial

$$h(x) = h_0 + h_1 x + \dots + h_{\varphi(k)-1} x^{2\varphi(k)-1} \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$$

such that $h(\lambda_2)$ is a multiple of n_2 , where $|h_i| < |n|^{1/2\varphi(k)}$. Therefore, we have $h(\Psi)Q \in \mathbb{G}_2$ for any $Q \in H$, which completes the proof of this theorem.

By Theorem 2, the number of iterations for \mathbb{G}_2 cofactor multiplication can be reduced to $\frac{\log n_2}{2\varphi(k)} \approx \frac{\log h_2}{2\varphi(k)}$ on the curves listed in **Tab**. 1, which is approximately $2\times$ as fast as the previous leading work [25]. In **Alg**. 3, we present Magma [11] code for searching for the target short vector $h = (h_0, h_1, \dots, h_{2\varphi(k)-1})$. In the following, we take the BW14-351 curve as an example to describe the main mechanics of the new algorithm.

Example 2 (Cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_2 on BW14-315). We first can check that $gcd(\#G'_0, p^7 - 1) = 1$ on BW14-351, where $\#G'_0$ can be obtained from

Algorithm 3: Computing the vector h used for cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_2 on pairing-friendly curves listed in **Tab**. 1

Input: the prime p, the scalars a and b, the order r, the embedding degree k, and the large cofactor n**Output:** the coefficient vector hs:=2*EulerPhi(k); 1 lambda:=a*b bmod nr; 2 B:=RMatrixSpace(Integers(),s-1,s-1)!0; 3 B[1][1]:=n; 4 for i:= 2 to s-1 do 5B[i][1]:=-lambda^(i-1);B[i][i]:=1; 6 end for 7 L:= LatticeWithBasis(B); 8

9 h:=ShortestVector(L); 10 return h

Lemma 3. It follows from [18, Proposition 1] that G'_0 is cyclic. Applying Alg. 3, we can obtain a vector $(h_0, h_1, \dots, h_{11})$, where

$$h_{i} = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } 9 \leq i \leq 11; \\ 2, & \text{if } i = 8; \\ z^{2} + z + 1, & \text{if } i = 6; \\ zh_{i+1}, & \text{if } 2 \leq i \leq 5; \\ zh_{2} - 1, & \text{if } i = 1; \\ h_{1} + h_{4} - h_{3} - h_{6} + z + 2, & \text{if } i = 0; \\ -h_{1} - h_{4} + h_{2} + h_{5} + 1. & \text{if } i = 7. \end{cases}$$

Given a random point $Q \in E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^7})$, we fist obtain the point $P = (\psi + 1)(Q)$. Then, we have $h(\Psi)P = \sum_{i=0}^{8} \Psi^i(R_i) \in \mathbb{G}_2$, where R_i is given as follows:

$$\begin{split} R_8 &= [2]P, \\ R_6 &= [z^2 + z + 1]P, \\ R_i &= [z]R_{i+1}, \ 2 \leq i \leq 5, \\ R_1 &= [z]R_2 - P, \\ R_7 &= -(R_1 + R_4) + (R_2 + R_5) - P, \\ R_0 &= (R_1 + R_4) - (R_3 + R_6) + [z]P + R_8. \end{split}$$

In total, cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_2 on BW14-351 costs seven scalar multiplications by z, nineteen point additions, one ψ map, and eight Ψ maps.

7 Implementation Results

We first present Magma scripts to validate the correctness of our proposed algorithms and formulas. Moreover, we also provide high-speed software implementation for several important pairing group operations on BW14-351, which has been identified as the winner for pairing computation among the five candidate curves. Our implementation is based on RELIC, which a well-known cryptographic library for building pairing-based cryptographic protocols on popular curves at the updated 128 security level, such as BN-446 and BLS12-446. In addition, we have observed that the implementation of pairing group operations on BW13-310 presented in [17] also relies on this library. Therefore, we have integrated our code into RELIC to enable fair performance comparisons between BW14-351 and these popular curves. Besides our proposed algorithms, we exploit state-of-the-art techniques to implement the following operations.

- We employ the GLV method [27] and GLS method [26] to perform group exponentiations in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_T on BW14-351, respectively.
- For group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_2 on BW14-351, we fortunately find that Dai et al. method [17, Section 5] can be exploited to achieve a $2\varphi(k)$ -dimensional decomposition.
- In terms of the computation of pairings products, we adopt the strategies proposed [28,42,48] such that the final exponentiation step and the squaring computations at the Lines 3 and 12 of Alg. 2 can be shared.

Operation\Curve	BLS12-446	BN-446	BW13-310	BW14-351
hashing to \mathbb{G}_1	697	427	274	422
hashing to \mathbb{G}_2	1630	1361	16699	7402
exp in \mathbb{G}_1	541	791	268	362
exp in \mathbb{G}_2	918	1394	7247	3548
exp in \mathbb{G}_T	1322	2243	1062	1122
test in \mathbb{G}_1	389	8	269	345
test in \mathbb{G}_2	333	487	1176	938
test in \mathbb{G}_T	372	540	223	391
ML	1554	2480	1719	1621
FE	1835	1589	2579	2390
Single pairing	3389	4069	4298	4011
2-pairings	4439	5717	5640	5294
5-pairings	7614	1053	9621	9476
8-pairings	10790	15349	13603	13035

Table 11. Benchmarking results of pairing group operations across different pairing-friendly curves reported in 10^3 cycles in a 64-bit processor averaged over 10^4 executions.

It should be noted that RELIC supports the GLV decomposition once the associated curve parameters are given.

Our code is available at https://github.com/eccdaiy39/BW10-14. The implementations are compiled with GCC 11.4.0 and flags -03 -funroll-loops -march=native -mtune=native. The benchmarks are executed an Intel Core i9-12900K processor running at @3.2GHz with TurboBoost and hyper-threading features disabled. Tab. 11 reports detailed performance comparisons for each building block across different curves. The results reveal that the performance of single pairing computation on BW14-351 is even slightly faster than BN-446 and BW13-310, while about 18.4% slower than BLS12-446. In terms of group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_T , BW14-351 is about 49.2% and 15.1% faster than BLS12-446, 119.6% and 73.8% faster than BN-446, while 34.4% and 5.5% slower than BW13-310. Moreover, compared to BW13-310, BW14-351 benefits from a lighter performance penalty for hashing to \mathbb{G}_2 and group exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_2 , even though is still slower than BN-446 and BLS12-446.

These results show that each curve has its own strengths and no one can be said to be perfect. The selection of a curve should be based on a careful analysis of the protocol requirements and a thorough evaluation of the performance tradeoffs. For instance, BW14-351 may be an appropriate choice in the case that a protocol aims to pursue fast group exponentiations in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_T , while minimizing the performance penalty for group exponentiations in \mathbb{G}_2 .

8 Conclusion

In this paper, we provided a comprehensive research for a list of pairing-friendly curves with embedding degrees 10 and 14. We generalized Dai-Zhang-Zhao algorithm for pairing computation on BW13-310 to our target curves, so that the number of Miller iterations can be reduced to approximately $\log r/(2\varphi(k))$, while the denominator elimination trick still can be applied. We also proposed optimized algorithms for cofactor multiplication for \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 , and subgroup membership testing for \mathbb{G}_2 on these curves. After the correctness of our proposed algorithms via Magma scripts, we presented high-speed software implementations on the BW14-351 curve inside the RELIC library, and compared performance tradeoffs with other popular curves at the same security level, including BN-446, BLS12-446 and BW13-310. Our results showed that the BW14-351 curve is competitive for building pairing-based cryptographic protocols at the updated 128-bit security level.

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