# VDOO: A Short, Fast, Post-Quantum Multivariate Digital Signature Scheme

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**Abstract.** Hard lattice problems are predominant in constructing postquantum cryptosystems. However, we need to continue developing postquantum cryptosystems based on other quantum hard problems to prevent a complete collapse of post-quantum cryptography due to a sudden breakthrough in solving hard lattice problems. Solving large multivariate quadratic systems is one such quantum hard problem.

Unbalanced Oil-Vinegar is a signature scheme based on the hardness of solving multivariate equations. In this work, we present a post-quantum digital signature algorithm VDOO (Vinegar-Diagonal-Oil-Oil) based on solving multivariate equations. We introduce a new layer called the diagonal layer over the oil-vinegar-based signature scheme Rainbow. This layer helps to improve the security of our scheme without increasing the parameters considerably. Due to this modification, the complexity of the main computational bottleneck of multivariate quadratic systems i.e. the Gaussian elimination reduces significantly. Thus making our scheme one of the fastest multivariate quadratic signature schemes. Further, we show that our carefully chosen parameters can resist all existing state-of-the-art attacks. The signature sizes of our scheme for the National Institute of Standards and Technology's security level of I, III, and V are 96, 226, and 316 bytes, respectively. This is the smallest signature size among all known post-quantum signature schemes of similar security.

**Keywords:** Post-quantum · Digital signature · Multivariate Cryptography · Oil-Vinegar · Multivariate root-finding

## 1 Introduction

Cryptography is the study of different methods to safeguard our sensitive information in the ever-expanding digital world. The security assurances of cryptographic schemes especially public-key cryptographic schemes emanate from the computational intractability of some underlying hard problems. Currently, public-key cryptographic schemes such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman [51], elliptic-curve discrete logarithm [44] are predominant in our public-key infrastructure. However, in the context of the rapid development of quantum computers, these schemes exhibit a significant drawback. The underlying hard problems of these schemes *i.e.* integer factorization and discrete logarithm problem can be solved *easily* due to the polynomial time quantum algorithms developed by Shor [54] and Proos-Zalka [50] respectively. Therefore, quantumresistant hard problems have gained popularity among designers for designing publickey cryptosystems for the future. A landmark event in the development of such quantum-resistant or post-quantum cryptography (PQC) is the PQC standardization procedure [19] initiated by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) to select quantum-safe cryptographic primitives such as key encapsulation mechanisms (KEM), public-key encryption (PKE), and digital signature algorithm. In 2022, NIST standardized [3] one KEM (Crystals-Kyber [15]) and three signature schemes (SPHINCS+ [4], Crystals-Dilithium [26], and Falcon [32]) after rigorous scrutiny spanning multiple years. Among these only SPHINCS+ is based on the hardness of cryptographically secure hash functions, while Crystals-Kyber (KEM), Crystals-Dilithium, and Falcon are based on hard lattice problems. As the majority of these constructions are lattice-based, there is a lingering risk that a breakthrough in the cryptanalysis of lattice-based cryptography can reduce the security of these schemes drastically. Thus putting the whole plan to migrate to post-quantum cryptography in jeopardy. Such incidents are not uncommon. Recently, Decru et al. [18] proposed an attack to completely break the security of supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman [31] which was earlier considered quantum-safe and was also a finalist in the NIST's standardization procedure. Therefore, it is prudent to diversify the portfolio of different quantum-safe problems for seamless migration to a post-quantum world. There exist other problems that are considered quantum-safe, such as multivariate quadratic (MQ) [46,39], isogeny-based [22]. and code-based [8]. Standardizing cryptographic primitives necessitates a rigorous and comprehensive investigation. NIST reissued a call [20] for quantum-safe signature schemes to standardize some more signature schemes to diversify the portfolio of quantum-resistant schemes. Due to its small signature size, multivariate oil-vinegar construction has gained significant attention during this standardization process.

Multivariate cryptography relies on the intractability of root findings of MQ equations. The goal of the MQ problem is to find a solution to a system of multivariate quadratic polynomials in the finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . In other words, the hardness classification of this problem is NP-hard [38]. Numerous schemes, such as Matsumoto-Imai encryption scheme [43], Oil-Vinegar [46] signature, Rainbow [24] signature, Triangular [45,53,60] signature, Simple Matrix encryption [56], and Mayo [12], have been developed based on multivariate cryptography. Patarin first proposed the Oil-Vinegar signature [46]. A successful forgery attack was shown by Kipnis and Shamir [40] against this scheme. Further, Kipnis, Patarin, and Goubin upgraded the signature scheme by proposing Unbalanced Oil-Vinegar (UOV) [39].

Rainbow was a third-round NIST candidate [24], which is the first multi-layer construction based on unbalanced oil-vinegar. Therefore, the cryptanalysis of Rainbow has been a well-studied area for the last decade. This resulted in many new novel attacks such as direct attack [6,27,28], min-rank attack [14,6,7,5], band-separation attack [25,57,55], rectangular min-rank and intersection attack [10]. In 2023, Beullens proposed a cryptanalysis and reduced the security of Rainbow significantly. Rainbow team suggested using the old SL-3 (high security) parameter set as new SL-1 (low security) parameters [36] to mitigate the attack. As Beullens' attack only applies to the Rainbow structure, therefore building scheme on the top of the oil-vinegar layer is still believed to be secure.

In 2022, Cartor *et al.* internally perturbed the second layer of Rainbow by mixing oil variables quadratically [17]. However, this mixing significantly increased the sig-

nature generation time. Also, parameter sets proposed by designers are not practical in terms of efficiency. Therefore, designing a new signature scheme that can resist the simple attack while being practical, is an interesting open problem.

#### 1.1 Our Contribution and Motivation

In the context of this endeavor, we summarize our contributions below.

- We review related multivariate signature schemes and provide a comprehensive analysis of their design and performance in Section 2.
- We present Vinegar-Diagonal-Oil-Oil (VDOO), a novel multivariate signature scheme based on unbalanced oil and vinegar in Section 3. Compared to other UOV schemes VDOO boasts three primary benefits: *simplicity, efficiency*, and *security* (see Sections 4 and 5). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to introduce a diagonal layer within the UOV framework, demonstrating that it enhances efficiency without compromising security.
- We establish that VDOO effectively withstands all current attacks and outline the EUF-CMA security of our scheme. Through meticulous parameter selection, our findings reveal that it achieves a remarkably compact smallest signature size of 96 bytes (see Sections 4 and 5), contrasting favorably with NIST-standardized post-quantum signatures (Crystals-dilithium [26], Falcon [32], and SPHINCS+ [4]).

Introduction of a new simple design element. VDOO is a new layer-based construction, which has one diagonal layer and then two UOV layers. We are adding each new variable in the central polynomial one by one diagonally. This offers efficiency. This translates to a reduction of the Gaussian elimination  $(\mathsf{GE}_{(q,n)}^{1})$  which is the major computational bottleneck in the signature generation process. Suppose  $x_1, x_2, \dots, x_v, x_{v+1}, \dots, x_{v+d}, \dots, x_{v+d+o_1}, \dots, x_{v+d+o_1+o_2=:n}$  are *n* variables defined over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . In our construction, we call first *v*-variables as *vinegar variables*, next *d*-variables as *diagonal variables*, then next  $o_1$  variables are *first-layer oil variables*, and last  $o_2$  variables are *second-layer oil variables*. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the variables in each layer of the VDOO central polynomial map.

Efficiency. To thwart Beullens' simple attack [11], the authors of Rainbow increased the parameter set [36], which results in increasing the Gaussian elimination cost. The complexity of Gaussian elimination becomes approximately  $o_1^3 + o_2^3$  where  $o_1$  and  $o_2$  are number of oil variables of Rainbow [24]. In our scheme, we adapt  $d \approx (o_1+o_2)/3$ ,  $o_1' \approx (o_1+o_2)/3$ , and  $o_2' \approx (o_1+o_2)/3$  as the new parameters. This adjustment results in a Gaussian elimination complexity of around  $o_1'^3 + o_2'^3$ . To illustrate, consider the signature generation process for security level one (SL-1) parameters [19]: UOV requires  $\mathsf{GE}_{(256,64)}$ , Rainbow requires  $\mathsf{GE}_{(256,32)}$  and  $\mathsf{GE}_{(256,48)}$ , while VDOO needs only  $\mathsf{GE}_{(16,34)}$  and  $\mathsf{GE}_{(16,36)}$  (for further details, refer to Table 2). Consequently, this modification notably improves our scheme's performance.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>  $\mathsf{GE}_{(q,n)}$ : Gaussian elimination on a linear system with n unknowns and n linear equation over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .




Fig. 1. Variables in each layer of the VDOO central map

**Resistance to existing attacks.** We comprehensively analyze all possible attacks on multivariate cryptographic schemes against our scheme. In an attempt to recover diagonal variables, potential attackers begin by eliminating the uppermost oil layers. Beullens proposed method [11] facilitates the removal of these layers, aiding attackers. For instance, in order to compromise our round-one parameter set, a straightforward attack necessitates  $2^{134}$ -field operations. Furthermore, Beullens combined this simple attack with the rectangular min-rank attack [10,11]. In line with previous efforts, we execute this combined attack against our scheme, determining that it requires  $2^{138}$ -field operations to break SL-1 parameter set. Additionally, we conduct the intersection attack and the direct attack on our scheme, both of which exhibit complexities exceeding  $2^{134}$ -field operations. Consequently, these references collectively imply that VDOO appears to withstand all known attacks securely. We also outline the EUF-CMA security of the VDOO scheme.

**Small signature size.** We present multiple parameters that can withstand the aforementioned attacks. Specifically, our level-one parameters that can provide 128-bit classical and 96-bit post-quantum security has a signature size of 96 bytes and public-key size of 238KB (further elaborated in Table 1). This is the smallest signature size among the majority of all multivariate signature schemes (for additional insights, refer to Tables 2 and 3).

**Roadmap.** In the upcoming Section 2 we present a generic construction of multivariate signatures, and some earlier results. Section 3 proposes a new postquantum multivariate signature scheme called VDOO. The cryptanalysis of our scheme is presented in Section 4. In Section 5, we give the parameters for different security levels and we also compare our results with the state-of-the-art. Our section 6 presents conclusions and explores potential future directions for our work.

## 2 Prior Results

In this section, we introduce some essential mathematical notations and symbols. We then provide a generic construction for multivariate signatures. Following that, we outline the central polynomial for UOV and Rainbow [39,13,24]. Additionally, we describe the subspace representation of Rainbow [10], which is particularly valuable for cryptanalysis purposes. Next, we cover recent multivariate signature schemes [12,34,29,23,33] that were submitted as part of the NIST additional round for post-quantum signature standardization [20]. Finally, we present the required hardness assumptions for these multivariate signatures to understand their cryptanalysis.

**Notations.** Let,  $\mathbb{F}_q$  be the finite field with q elements. We define two invertible affine maps  $S: \mathbb{F}_q^m \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$  and  $\mathcal{T}: \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^n$ , and one quadratic map  $\mathcal{F} = (f_1, \dots, f_m): \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ . We denote [n] for the set  $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$  and [i:j] denotes  $\{i, i+1, \dots, j\}$ . We use lowercase and bold lowercase alphabets to denote field elements and vectors respectively. The notation  $a \in US$  is used to interpret a is a random element in the set S.

#### 2.1 Generic Multivariate Signature Schemes

Here we briefly describe a generic construction for multivariate signature schemes. Due to the NP-hardness of inverting a randomly generated quadratic system [38]. However, signers can leverage a specially structured quadratic system to efficiently perform the inversion. This specialized system is commonly referred to as the *central map* and is typically denoted as  $\mathcal{F} = (f_1, \dots, f_m)$ , where each  $f_i$  represents a specifically structured multivariate quadratic polynomial. Signers must conceal this unique structure from third parties to prevent forgery attacks. To achieve this objective, signers employ one or two random invertible linear maps:  $\mathcal{S}$  and  $\mathcal{T}$ . Consequently, the public key is constructed by composing these linear maps along with the central map, denoted as  $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{S} \circ \mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{T} : \mathbb{F}_q^n \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^m$ .

as  $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{S} \circ \mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{T} : \mathbb{F}_q^n \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^m$ . The secret key comprises  $\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{T}$  and  $\mathcal{F}$ . A hash function, denoted as  $\mathcal{H}: \{0,1\}^* \longrightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^m$ , is employed to generate a vector  $\mathbf{m} \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$  from a message  $msg \in \{0,1\}^*$ . The signature generation process unfolds as follows: first, compute  $\mathbf{d} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{-1}(\mathbf{m})$ , then  $\mathbf{d}' \leftarrow \mathcal{F}^{-1}(\mathbf{d})$ , and finally  $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathcal{T}^{-1}(\mathbf{d}')$ . The signer sends the signature  $\mathbf{s}$  for the message msg to the verifier. The verifier simply evaluates the polynomial map  $\mathcal{P}$  on  $\mathbf{s}$  and checks whether it matches the hash of the message, i.e., whether  $\mathbf{m} = \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{s})$  holds or not.

## 2.2 Unbalanced Oil-Vinegar (UOV)

The Oil-Vinegar (OV) signature scheme was initially introduced by Patarin [46]. However, due to the Kipnis-Shamir's [40] *invariant subspace* attack, this scheme was modified by increasing the number of vinegar variables. This is known as the Unbalanced Oil-Vinegar (UOV) signature scheme [39].

Consider the OV central map, denoted as  $\mathcal{F}$ . Split all variables of  $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_v, \dots, x_n)$  into two buckets: the first bucket has first v variables representing vinegar, and the second bucket contains next o variables representing oil, where n = v + o and o = m. To create a multivariate quadratic homogeneous polynomial, combine variables involving vinegar  $\times$  vinegar and vinegar  $\times$  oil, while excluding all oil  $\times$  oil terms.

**Definition 1 (OV Central Polynomial Map).** A central map  $\mathcal{F} = (f_1, \dots, f_m)$ :  $\mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$  is known as OV central polynomial map when each  $f_i$  is of the form  $f_i(\mathbf{x}) = \sum_{i=1}^v \sum_{j=1}^n \alpha_{i,j}^{(k)} x_i x_j$  where  $i \leq j, k \in [v+1:n], \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ , and  $\alpha_{i,j}^{(k)} \in U \mathbb{F}_q$ .

Notably, if anyone randomly fixes vinegar variables, then the remaining part would be linear in the oil variables. Therefore, the quadratic system reduces to a linear system of o linear equations with o unknowns.

#### 2.3 Rainbow

Rainbow is a multi-layer variant of UOV [24]. For simplicity consider a two-layer Rainbow. Suppose  $n = v + o_1 + o_2$ , where the first v variables are vinegar and the next  $o_1$  and  $o_2$  variables are the first and second layer of oil variables respectively. This can be viewed as a UOV map with  $v + o_1$  variables and  $o_1$  oil variables and the next layer  $v + o_1 + o_2$  variables and  $o_2$  oil variables.

**Definition 2 (Rainbow Central Polynomial Map).** The mathematical expression for *l*-layer Rainbow central polynomial is as follows.

$$f_k(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) = \sum_{i, j \in [r]; \ i \le j} \alpha_{ij}^{(k)} x_i x_j + \sum_{i \in [r]; \ j \in [r+1:r+o_r]} \beta_{ij}^{(k)} x_i x_j$$

where for each  $k \in [r+1:r+o_r]$ , elements  $\alpha_{ij}^{(k)}$ , and  $\beta_{ij}^{(k)}$  are taken from  $\mathbb{F}_q$ ; r denotes the layer, and  $r \leq l$  where l is the total number of layers in Rainbow.

#### 2.4 Beullens Subspace Description

For a better view of cryptanalysis on Rainbow, Beullens explained the construction of Rainbow via subspaces [10]. Using this description, he derived the simple attack [11]. To elaborate this idea, initially, we define a differential polar form of a polynomial map.

The differential polar map of a polynomial map  $\mathcal{P}$  is denoted by  $\mathcal{DP}$ :  $\mathbb{F}_q^n \times \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$  and defined as  $\mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{w}) = \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x}+\mathbf{w}) - \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x}) - \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{w})$ . Note that, we only consider homogeneous quadratic polynomials, so throughout this paper,  $\mathcal{P}(0)=0$ .




Fig. 2. *l* layer Rainbow

**Trapdoor information.** This part describes the trapdoor information of *l*-layer Rainbow. At first, signer chooses a secret chain of nested subspaces: input subspaces  $O_1 \supset O_2 \supset \cdots \supset O_l$  and output subspaces  $Q_1 \supset Q_2 \supset \cdots \supset Q_l = \{0\}$ . Using this secret, one can construct a public polynomial map as follows.

- $-\mathcal{P}$  maps each  $O_i$  to  $Q_i$  and
- for any  $\mathbf{x} \in_U \mathbb{F}_q^n$ ,  $\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{x}}: O_i \to Q_{i-1}$  is a linear map (see Figure 2)

**Inversion**. In this methodology, the goal is to compute  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  from given  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$  such that  $\mathbf{y} = \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{x})$ . The knowledge of nested sequences of input and output subspaces is used in this computation. At first glance, for *l*-layer Rainbow, the value of the unknown  $\mathbf{x}$  can be represented as  $\mathbf{v} + \mathbf{o}_1 + \cdots + \mathbf{o}_l$  where all of the  $\mathbf{o}_i \in O_i$ . Fix  $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{U} \mathbb{F}_q^n$  Then  $\mathcal{P}$  is used in conjunction with the *i*th-layer's output subspace  $Q_i$  to calculate  $\mathbf{o}_i$ . For the sake of clarity, let's define the *quotient space*  $\overline{O_i} := O_i/O_{i+1}$ .

Using the knowledge of sequences of subspaces, the goal is to find  $\mathbf{o}_i$  for all *i*. This will lead to computing the preimage of any element from  $\mathbb{F}_q^n$ . For computing  $\overline{\mathbf{o}}_i \in \overline{O}_i$ , use the following relation (note that, from definition,  $\mathcal{P}(\overline{\mathbf{o}}_i)=0$ ),

$$\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{v} + \overline{\mathbf{o}}_i) + Q_i = \mathbf{y} + Q_i$$
$$\Longrightarrow \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{v}) + \mathcal{P}(\overline{\mathbf{o}}_i) + \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{v}, \overline{\mathbf{o}}_i) + Q_i = \mathbf{y} + Q_i$$

Earlier **v** is fixed, so the quadratic system reduces to a linear system. The number of constraints and variables are the same for the linear system. This implies that a unique solution can be obtained with probability  $(1-\frac{1}{q})$ . Repeatedly running this procedure, one can compute all **o**<sub>i</sub>, which implies that preimage **x** will be computed.

In 2022, Beullens [11] reduced the security level of Rainbow. He showed for small n-m, recovering all subspaces is significantly efficient. Also, the small finite field size accelerates the attack.

#### 2.5 Concurrent Proposals

The NIST additional signature submission call [20] received a total of eleven multivariate signature schemes e.g. Mayo [12], QR-UOV [34], TUOV [23], etc. Most of them are based on the old *unbalanced Oil-Vinegar* structure. For example, Mayo [12] employed a UOV structure along with a new *whipped-up MQ* (WMQ) approach. QR-UOV is another variant of UOV where the public key is represented by block matrices, with each element corresponding to an element in a quotient ring [34]. Also, in 2022, a new proposal, called IPRainbow [17] was made by perturbing the central polynomials of the second layer by *s* variables. This change although decreases the attack probability by  $1/q^s$ , the running time significantly increases due to the usage of Gröbner basis technique for inversion.

#### 2.6 Hardness of Multivariate Cryptography

Here, we describe other approaches used in the cryptanalysis of multivariate signatures apart from the direct solution of MQ equations.

- 1. Min-rank. Let  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_k \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times m}$  be the given matrices and  $r \in \mathbb{N}$ , find a non-trivial linear combination (with  $m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k \in \mathbb{F}_q$ ) so that rank  $(\sum_{i=1}^k m_i M_i) \leq r$ . This problem is called the *min-rank* problem and has been shown to be NP-hard [16]. The min-rank problem appeared as a cryptanalytic tool in multivariate cryptography [41,30,6,10]. This attack helps to find a linear combination of public matrices which sums up to a low-rank matrix.
- 2. **EIP.** Find an equivalent composition of  $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{S}' \circ \mathcal{F}' \circ \mathcal{T}'$ , where  $\mathcal{S}'$  and  $\mathcal{T}'$  are equivalent affine maps, and  $\mathcal{F}'$  is an equivalent central map. The above problem is the *Extended Isomorphism of Polynomials (EIP)* problem. No such hardness classification is known (though it subsumes graph isomorphism problem [1,2]), but for some instances, polynomial time algorithms exist [40].

## 3 Our Proposal: VDOO Signature Scheme

In our scheme, we introduce a new design element called *diagonals* into the Oil-Vinegar scheme. Let,  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ , we pick the first v variables as vinegar variables. We denote the next d variables as diagonal variables. In this layer, we introduce d quadratic equations. In any *i*-th  $(1 \le i \le d)$  equation, only v+i-th variable is unknown among v+i variables. In the following layers, we apply the Oil-Vinegar technique. This means we can generate  $o_1$  OV polynomials using v+d-vinegar variables and newly added  $o_1$ -oil variables. Further, we construct  $o_2$  OV polynomials using  $v+d+o_1$ -vinegar variables and newly added  $o_2$ -oil variables. Finally, we have a quadratic system with  $n=v+d+o_1+o_2$  variables and  $m=d+o_1+o_2$  homogeneous quadratic equations.

## 3.1 VDOOSetUp: Generate Parameters

To construct polynomial maps we need to define parameters associated with this. In this phase algorithm takes input the security parameter  $\lambda$  and output the parameter tuple, that is  $params = (q, v, d, o_1, o_2) \leftarrow VDOOSetUp(1^{\lambda})$ . Here,

- Finite field  $\mathbb{F}_q$  which has q elements.
- Positive integers v, d,  $o_1$ , and  $o_2$ , where v denotes the number of vinegar variables, d is the number of diagonal variables,  $o_1$  and  $o_2$  stands for the number of first and second layer oil variables respectively. Therefore, total number of variables is  $n=v+d+o_1+o_2$ , and number of equations is  $m=d+o_1+o_2$ .

#### 3.2 VDOO Central Polynomial Map and Inversion.

Construction of central polynomial map  $\mathcal{F}:\mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$  plays an important role in the multivariate signature schemes. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a central polynomial map that involves vinegar, diagonal, and oil variables in a three-layer construction.

- **Diagonal Layer.** Here, we explain the structure of any central polynomial  $f_k$  for the diagonal layer  $k \in [v+1:v+d]$ . Each  $f_k$  is defined as follows.

$$f_{k-\nu}(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = \sum_{i=1}^{k-1} \alpha_{i,k}^{(k)} x_i x_k + \sum_{i,j=1, i \le j}^{k-1} \beta_{i,j}^{(k)} x_i x_j$$

Each coefficient  $\alpha_{ij}^{(k)}$ , and  $\beta_{ij}^{(k)} \in_U \mathbb{F}_q$ . The subroutine  $\mathsf{DiagPoly}(q,k)$  is used to generate such central polynomial  $f_k$  in the diagonal layer.

- First Oil Layer. In this oil layer, we use v+d variables as vinegar variables and next  $o_1$  variables as oil variables. All these variables help us to construct  $o_1$ homogeneous quadratic polynomials of the following form.

$$f_{k-v}(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) = \sum_{i=1}^{v+d} \sum_{j=1}^{v+d} \alpha_{ij}^{(k)} x_i x_j + \sum_{i=1}^{v+d} \sum_{j=v+d+1}^{v+d+o_1} \beta_{ij}^{(k)} x_i x_j$$

where  $k \in [v+d+1:v+d+o_1]$ ,  $\alpha_{ij}^{(k)}$ , and  $\beta_{ij}^{(k)} \in U \mathbb{F}_q$ .

- Second Oil Layer. The topmost oil layer has  $v+d+o_1$  vinegar and  $o_2$  oil variables. That means, it has  $o_2$  quadratic equations. Those equations are of the form

$$f_{k-v}(x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_n) = \sum_{i=1}^{v+d+o_1} \sum_{j=1}^{v+d+o_1} \alpha_{ij}^{(k)} x_i x_j + \sum_{i=1}^{v+d+o_1} \sum_{j=v+d+o_1+1}^{v+d+o_1+o_2} \beta_{ij}^{(k)} x_i x_j,$$

where  $k \in [v+d+o_1+1:v+d+o_1+o_2=n]$  and  $\alpha_{ij}^{(k)}$ , and  $\beta_{ij}^{(k)} \in U \mathbb{F}_q$ . We denote this as  $\mathsf{OVPoly}(q, v, o)$  to generate a oil-vinegar central polynomial (according to 2.2) which has v vinegar variables and o oil variables.

Here, Algorithm 1, uses OVPoly and DiagPoly to generate a VDOO central map  $\mathcal{F}$ .

Algorithm 1 VDOOCentPoly

**Require:** Parameter tuple  $params = (q, v, d, o_1, o_2)$  **Ensure:** Central map  $\mathcal{F} = (f_1, \dots, f_m) : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ 1: Compute  $m = d + o_1 + o_2$  and n = v + m. 2: for  $1 \le i \le d$ 3:  $f_i \leftarrow$  DiagPoly (q, i)4: for  $d + 1 \le i \le d + o_1$ 5:  $f_i \leftarrow$  OVPoly  $(q, v + d, o_1)$ 6: for  $d + o_1 + 1 \le i \le m$ 7:  $f_i \leftarrow$  OVPoly  $(q, v + d + o_1, o_2)$ 8: **Return** VDOO central polynomial  $\mathcal{F}$ 

**Inversion**. The main computational bottleneck of UOV-based constructions is the inversion of the central polynomial. It requires Gaussian elimination which runs in  $O(N^3)$ . However, in our scenario inversion of the diagonal polynomials is straightforward as there is only one unknown variable. Nevertheless, the inversion of OV polynomials in the remaining two layers each needs a Gaussian elimination. Therefore, inverting VDOO central polynomial map needs two Gaussian elimination only. This is shown in Algorithm 2. Following two algorithms help to compute the inverse of the VDOO central polynomial.

- ST The subroutine Substitution or ST converts a bunch of oil-vinegar polynomials to a bunch of linear polynomials consists of oil variables by fixing the vinegar variables. That means, ST substitutes vinegar variables  $x_1, \dots, x_v$  by random values (in  $\mathbb{F}_q$ ) in the bunch of o oil-vinegar polynomials  $(f_i)_{i=1}^o$  and converts it to a bunch of linear polynomials of o oil variables  $(\tilde{f}_i)_{i=1}^o$ .
- GE The  $\mathsf{GE}_{(q,l)}$  denotes Gaussian elimination for l unknowns over the linear system of equations ( $\tilde{f}_i = y_i$ ) $_{i=1}^l$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . It returns a failure when the rank of the matrix representing the linear system is less than l.

#### Algorithm 2 VDOOCentPoly Inversion

**Require:** Central map:  $\mathcal{F} = (f_1, \dots, f_m) : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$  and  $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$ , and params. **Ensure:** A vector  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$  such that  $\mathcal{F}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{y}$ . 1:  $m \leftarrow d + o_1 + o_2$  and  $n \leftarrow v + m$ 2: Randomly fix first v-vinegar variables  $x_1, \dots, x_v \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{F}_q$ 3: for  $1 \le i \le d$ 4: compute  $x_{v+i}$  using  $y_i, x_1, \dots, x_{v+i-1}$  and  $f_i$ . 5:  $(\tilde{f}_{d+1}, \dots, \tilde{f}_{v+d}) \leftarrow \mathsf{ST}(f_{d+1}(x_1, \dots, x_{v+d}), \dots, f_{d+o_1}(x_1, \dots, x_{v+d})))$ 6:  $(x_{v+d+1}, \dots, x_{v+d+o_1}) \leftarrow \mathsf{GE}_{(q,o_1)}(\tilde{f}_{d+1} = y_{d+1}, \dots, \tilde{f}_{d+o_1} = y_{d+o_1}).$ 7:  $(\tilde{f}_{d+o_1+1}, \dots, \tilde{f}_m) \leftarrow \mathsf{ST}(f_{d+o_1+1}(x_1, \dots, x_{n-o_2}), \dots, f_m(x_1, \dots, x_{n-o_2})))$ 8:  $(x_{v+d+o_1+1}, \dots, x_n) \leftarrow \mathsf{GE}_{(q,o_2)}(\tilde{f}_{d+o_1+1} = y_{d+o_1+1}, \dots, \tilde{f}_m = y_m)$ 9: **Return**  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ 

## 3.3 VDOOKeyGen: VDOO Key Generation

The VDOOKeyGen in Algorithm 3 generates two random invertible affine maps  $S: \mathbb{F}_q^m \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$  and  $\mathcal{T}: \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^n$  along with the VDOO-central map  $\mathcal{F}: \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ . Here, secret/signing key is  $S, \mathcal{F}$ , and  $\mathcal{T}$  and public/verification key is the composition map  $\mathcal{P}$ , where  $\mathcal{P} = S \circ \mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{T}: \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ . Note that, the individual information of secret maps allows user to compute the inverse of  $\mathcal{P}$  efficiently. We denote  $S \leftarrow$  randomMatrix (q, m, seed) to generate a random  $m \times m$  matrix over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  from a seed, invMat(q, m, S) helps to compute the inverse of a  $m \times m$  matrix S over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ , and Affine $(S, \mathbf{a})$  computes  $S \leftarrow S \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{a}$ .

## Algorithm 3 VDOOKeyGen

**Require:** Parameter tuple params. **Ensure:** Generate public and private key pair. - Public key:  $pk = \mathcal{P}$ . - Secret key:  $\mathsf{sk} = \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{T}, \text{ and } \mathcal{F}.$ 1:  $m \leftarrow d + o_1 + o_2$  and  $n \leftarrow m + v$ 2: seed  $\leftarrow PRNG(1^{\lambda})$  $\triangleright \lambda$  is the security parameter 3: while  $(\det(S) \neq 0 \&\& \det(T) \neq 0)$  do  $\triangleright S \in_U \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times m} \\ \triangleright T \in_U \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times n}$  $S \leftarrow \mathsf{randomMatrix}(q, m, seed)$ 4:  $T \leftarrow \mathsf{randomMatrix}(q, n, seed)$ 5:6: end while 7:  $\mathbf{a} \in_U \mathbb{F}_q^m$  and  $\mathbf{b} \in_U \mathbb{F}_q^n$  $\triangleright$  generate two random vector 8:  $invS \leftarrow invMat(q,m,\hat{S})$  and  $invT \leftarrow invMat(q,n,T) \triangleright$  compute inverse of matrices 9:  $\mathcal{S} \leftarrow \mathsf{Affine}(S,\mathbf{a})$  and  $\mathcal{T} \leftarrow \mathsf{Affine}(T,\mathbf{b})$  $\triangleright$  Constructing invertible affine maps 10:  $\mathcal{F} \leftarrow \mathsf{VDOOCentPoly}(\mathsf{params})$ ▷ generate VDOO central map 11: Compute  $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{S} \circ \mathcal{F} \circ \mathcal{T}$ 12: **Return**  $\mathsf{pk} = \mathcal{P}$  and  $\mathsf{sk} = (invS, \mathbf{a}, invT, \mathbf{b})$  (equivalently sending  $\mathcal{S}$ , and  $\mathcal{T}$ ).

## 3.4 VDOOSign: VDOO Signature Generation

Similar to the other OV based constructions [12,23,39,24], we use the hash-and-sign paradigm for our signature algorithm as shown in Algorithm 4. We use a hash function  $\mathcal{H}: \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ . Signer knows each polynomial map, so it can compute the inverse of each map *i.e.*  $S^{-1}$ ,  $\mathcal{F}^{-1}$ , and  $\mathcal{T}^{-1}$ . If GE reports a failure during the computation of  $\mathcal{F}^{-1}$ , we restart the process by regenerating the salt and repeating the entire procedure. Finally, the signature is computed as  $\mathcal{P}^{-1}(\mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}(msg)||salt))$ .

Algorithm 4 VDOOSign	
<b>Require:</b> $sk = (invS, \mathbf{a}, invT, \mathbf{b})$ , message $msg$ , and $\mathcal{H}: \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$	
<b>Ensure:</b> a signature $\sigma = (\mathbf{s}, salt)$	
1: $salt \leftarrow PRNG$	
2: Use hash function $\mathbf{d} \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}(msg)  salt)$	
3: Compute $\mathbf{t} = invS \times (\mathbf{d} - \mathbf{a})$	$\triangleright \mathbf{t} = S^{-1}(\mathbf{d})$
4: Compute $\mathbf{y} = \mathcal{F}^{-1}(\mathbf{t})$ using VDOOCentPoly_Inversion 2.	
5: Compute $\mathbf{s} = invT \times (\mathbf{y} - \mathbf{b})$	$\triangleright \mathbf{s} = \mathcal{T}^{-1}(\mathbf{y})$
6: <b>Return</b> signature $\sigma = (\mathbf{s}, salt)$	

Efficiency analysis. As mentioned earlier, the major computational overhead of OV-based schemes is the Gaussian elimination procedure. In VDOO, during signing, we have to compute only one Gaussian elimination *i.e.* computation of  $\mathcal{F}^{-1}$ . The computation of  $\mathcal{S}^{-1}$  and  $\mathcal{T}^{-1}$  can be done during the key-generation procedure. In VDOO the computation of  $\mathcal{F}^{-1}$  is also very efficient compared to other OV-based schemes as the number of unknowns is smaller in VDOO as shown in Table 2.

#### 3.5 VDOOVerif: VDOO Verification

Our verification procedure is simple. It needs a polynomial evaluation of  $\mathcal{P}$ , requiring just  $O(N^3)$  field operations. Compute  $\mathbf{d}' = \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{s})$  from public key  $\mathcal{P}$  and signature  $\sigma = (\mathbf{s}, salt)$  The signatures is accepted if  $\mathbf{d}' = \mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}(msg) || salt)$  holds, else rejected.

#### Algorithm 5 VDOOVerif

**Require:**  $\mathbf{pk} = \mathcal{P}$ ; message msg; signature  $\sigma = (\mathbf{s}, salt)$  and  $\mathcal{H}: \{0,1\}^* \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$ . **Ensure:** accept or reject 1: Use hash function to compute  $\mathbf{d} \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\mathcal{H}(msg) || salt)$ 2: Compute  $\mathbf{d}' = \mathcal{P}(\mathbf{s})$ 3: **if**  $\mathbf{d} = \mathbf{d}'$  **then** output accept 4: **else** reject 5: **end if** 6: **Return** accept or reject

#### 3.6 Key Size Computation

Our VDOO contains one diagonal layer and two UOV layers. The size of the private key is determined first, followed by the size of the public key.

- Size of the central map  $\mathcal{F}$  for a diagonal layer having *d*-diagonal polynomials is  $\sum_{i=1}^{d} \left( \frac{v_i(v_i+1)}{2} + v_i \right)$  field elements. The first diagonal layer has  $v_1 = n - m$ vinegar variables. In any diagonal layer, a central polynomial  $f_i$  has  $v_i$  vinegar variables and  $f_{i+1}$ -th polynomial has  $v_{i+1} = v_i + 1$  vinegar variables.
- Size of the central map  $\mathcal{F}$  for a UOV layer is around  $o \times \left(\frac{v(v+1)}{2} + ov\right)$  field elements. Such UOV layer has v vinegar variables and o oil variables.

The sizes of the two affine transformations are as follows: for S we need m(m+1), while for T we need n(n+1), field elements. These maps can be generated using a random seed.

Now we are interested in computing the size of the public key of standard VDOO. Each *n*-variate quadratic polynomial requires  $\frac{(n+1)(n+2)}{2}$  field elements. Therefore, the size of the public key is  $m\frac{(n+1)(n+2)}{2}$ . Further optimization of public key is possible [48,49]. It optimized the public key size from  $O(mn^2\log q)$  to  $O(m^3\log q)$ .

## 3.7 Subspace Description of VDOO Central Polynomial

Our scheme can be explained through Beullens's subspace descriptions [10]. This description is useful to understand the cryptanalysis of VDOO. In this case, we have d+2 input and output subspaces. These sequences of nested subspaces are as follows.

- Input subspaces  $\mathbb{F}_q^n \supset D_1 \supset D_2 \supset \cdots \supset D_d \supset O_1 \supset O_2.$  Output subspaces  $\mathbb{F}_q^m \supset Q_{1,1} \supset Q_{1,2} \supset \cdots \supset Q_{1,d} \supset Q_2 \supset Q_3 = \{0\}.$

In the Figure 3 (single arrow denotes  $\mathcal{P}$  and bold arrow denotes  $\mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{x}, \cdot)$ ), these following relations will hold:  $\dim(D_i) = \dim(D_{i+1}) + 1$  and  $\dim(Q_{1,i}) = \dim(Q_{1,i+1}) + 1$ for  $1 \leq i < d$ . Also,  $\dim(D_1) = m$ ,  $\dim(D_i) = \dim(Q_{1,i-1})$  for  $1 < i \leq d$ . In addition,  $\dim(O_1) = \dim(Q_{1,d}) = o_1 + o_2, \dim(O_2) = \dim(Q_2) = o_2.$ 




Fig. 3. Central polynomial of VDOO

The signer first fixes  $\mathbf{v} \in_U \mathbb{F}_q^n$ . Since  $\dim(\tilde{D}_i) = \dim(D_i) - \dim(D_{i+1}) = 1$ , so for diagonal layer computing  $\mathbf{d}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{d}_d$  is very easy. Once these vectors are found, then update  $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{d}_1 + \dots + \mathbf{d}_d$ . Now, signer needs to solve for  $\tilde{\mathbf{o}}_1 \in O_1(=O_1/O_2)$ , so that the following relation holds. Note that,  $\dim(O_1) = o_1$ .

$$\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{v}) + \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{v}, \tilde{\mathbf{o}_1}) = \mathbf{t} \mod Q_2.$$

We know that the above equation is a linear system of  $o_1$  variables and  $o_1$  equations. With the probability (1-1/q), the signer will able to compute  $o_1$ . Then signer again updates  $\mathbf{v} \leftarrow \mathbf{v} + \mathbf{o}_1$  and follow a similar strategy to find  $\mathbf{o}_2 \in O_2$ . Thus the signer can finally compute the pre-image of  $\mathbf{t}$ .

#### 4 Security Analysis of VDOO

Cryptanalysis that targets solving the MQ problem directly, is known as the direct attack in multivariate cryptography [6,27,28,9]. Later researchers have used the special structure of the quadratic system and improved the state-of-the-art, like, band-separation attack [25,57,55], intersection attack [10], and simple attack [11].

To determine the complexity of the attacks described below by the number of field multiplications required to perform the attack. One  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -field multiplication needs  $(2(\log_2 q)^2 + \log_2 q)$  gates. Here, each  $2(\log_2 q)^2$ -bit stands for one  $(\log_2 q)^2$ -bit multiplication (represented as AND gates) and the same number of additions (represented as XOR gates) during one  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -multiplication. Additionally,  $\log_2 q$  bits are needed for  $\log_2 q$ -bit additions involved in one  $\mathbb{F}_q$ -addition, which is required for each field multiplication that occurs during an attack. For example, the cost one  $\mathbb{F}_{16}$ -multiplication requires 36 gates. Such a strategy to determine the complexity is standard and has been also followed in other MQ-based signature schemes [34,12,29].

Henceforth, in this document, we use the parameter set  $(q, v, d, o_1, o_2) = (16, 60, 30, 0, 0)$ 34,36) as an example to demonstrate the complexity of the following attacks. Incidentally, this is also our SL-1 parameter. Our full parameter set is given in Table. 1.

#### 4.1Direct Attack on VDOO

The direct attack is the fundamental methodology for forging any multivariate signature scheme. To counterfeit a VDOO signature, an attacker aims to solve an underdetermined system with n variables and m homogeneous equations (n > m), to find s such that  $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{t}$ . The basic approach involves converting this underdetermined system into a determined one by fixing n-m variables. Subsequently, quadratic system-solving techniques like the Wiedemann XL algorithm [58,21] or Gröbner basis methods such as F4 or F5 [27,28] are applied. Another approach named hybrid approach [9] involves guessing k variables prior to solving the system. The time complexity of this attack, using the approach outlined in [9], is expressed in terms of field multiplications as:

$$\min_{0 \le k \le m} q^k \cdot 3 \cdot \binom{m-k+d}{d}^2 \binom{m-k}{2}$$

Here, k denotes the number of variables fixed during the algorithm, and d represents the smallest integer for which the coefficient of  $t^d$  in the series  $\frac{(1-t^2)^m}{(1-t)^{m-k}}$  is non-positive. *Example for SL-1 parameters.* Our level one parameter set has 160 variables and

100 constraints. According to [9], we fix 60 variables. Now in the algorithm, if we fix twelve variables, then the value of d is 28. The total complexity is around  $2^{280}$ .

#### Simple Attack on VDOO 4.2

In 2022, Beullens proposed the *simple attack* against Rainbow [24]. For Rainbow, this highly effective attack reduces *n*-unknown and *m*-constraints in the quadratic system to n-m-unknown and m-constraints. Now an attacker can apply the same methodology on VDOO to recover the secret key. Recall from Figure. 3,  $\mathcal{P}$  is the public polynomial map, and sequences of nested input and output subspaces are,

- $\begin{array}{l} \hspace{.5cm} \textit{Input subspaces } \mathbb{F}_q^n \supset D_1 \supset D_2 \supset \cdots \supset D_d \supset O_1 \supset O_2. \\ \hspace{.5cm} \textit{Output subspaces } \mathbb{F}_q^m \supset Q_{1,1} \supset Q_{1,2} \supset \cdots \supset Q_{1,d} \supset Q_2 \supset Q_3 = \{0\}. \end{array}$

The main crux of the simple attack lies in finding a vector within  $O_2$  (as depicted in Figure. 3). To achieve this, the attacker must solve a quadratic system with n-m unknowns and m constraints using the XL algorithm. This computational step constitutes the most significant component of the entire attack. Here is a step-by-step outline detailing the cryptanalysis of our scheme using the simple attack.

**Input:** Public polynomial map  $\mathcal{P}$ . **Output:** Recover sequences of subspaces. **Find a vector**  $\mathbf{o} \in O_2$ : Choose  $\mathbf{v} \in U \mathbb{F}_q^n$ . Then from Figure. 3,  $\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{v}} : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \mathbb{F}_q^m$  is a linear map, in particular it maps  $O_2$  to  $Q_2$ . The attacker uses this linear relation to reduce the number of unknowns present in the quadratic system. Therefore, to find a vector, an attacker should solve the following system.

$$\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{o}) = 0$$
$$\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{o}) = 0$$

With probability  $\approx 1/q$ , the attacker successfully guesses a vector in  $O_2$ . Later, the attacker deploys the XL algorithm to solve the quadratic system of n-m-unknowns and m-constraints. Thus attacker recovers **o**.

**Recover**  $Q_2$ : Attacker will retrieve  $Q_2$  using the information  $\mathbf{o} \in O_2$ . Note that,  $\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{o}}: O_2 \to Q_2$  is a linear map. Therefore,

Span{ 
$$\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{o}}(\mathbf{e}_1), \cdots, \mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{o}}(\mathbf{e}_n)$$
 }  $\subseteq Q_1$ 

for some linearly independent vectors  $\mathbf{e}_i$ . For enough such  $\mathbf{e}_i$ 's equality will hold. **Recover**  $O_2$ : To recover  $O_2$ , solve the following system of linear equations. Because with high probability kernel of  $\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{o}}$  matches with  $O_2$ .

$$\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{o}}(\mathbf{e}_1) \equiv 0 \mod Q_2$$
$$\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{o}}(\mathbf{e}_2) \equiv 0 \mod Q_2$$
$$\vdots$$
$$\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{o}}(\mathbf{e}_n) \equiv 0 \mod Q_2$$

**Recover a vector o'** $\in O_1$ : Now the quadratic system  $\mathcal{P}$  reduces to  $m' = m - o_2$  equations and  $n' = n - o_2$  variables. To recover  $O_1$ , the goal of the attacker is to find a vector in  $\mathbf{o} \in O_1$ . Again attacker will guess a vector  $\mathbf{v'} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n'}$ . Like above, a similar argument shows that  $\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{v'}}: O_1 \to Q_{1,1}$  is a linear map and the attacker tries to solve the following systems mod  $Q_2$ .

$$\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{v}'}(\mathbf{o}') = 0 \mod Q_2$$
$$\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{o}') = 0 \mod Q_2$$

The attacker runs the XL algorithm to solve the quadratic system of n'-m'-unknowns and m'-constraints.

- **Recover**  $O_1$ : Attacks follows same approach as recovering  $O_2$  to recover  $O_1$ . Here, an attacker solves a system  $\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{o}'}(\mathbf{e}'_i) \equiv 0 \mod Q_1$  for  $i \leq n'$ .
- **Recovering vectors from diagonal layer:** The only task that remains is to find all the diagonal vectors. The attacker can apply Wolf et al.'s [59] trick to find all the diagonal vectors in the layer. Here observe that the computation of finding a vector in  $O_2$ , dominates the computation of finding a vector in  $O_1$ .

Attack Complexity. The complexity of the first steps dominates the complexity of other steps involved in this algorithm. Basically, a system of n variables and m

non-linear equations reduces to a system of m homogeneous equations with n-m variables. This computation can be performed via XL algorithm and it requires

$$3 \cdot q \binom{n-m-1+d}{d}^2 \binom{n-m-1}{2}$$

field operations, where d is the operating degree of the algorithm. It means, dis the smallest positive integer so that the coefficient of  $t^d$  in the power series  $(1-t^2)^m/(1-t)^{n-m}$  is non-positive.

**Example for SL-1 parameters.** Apply Beullens' trick to guess a vector in  $O_2$ , which happens with probability 1/q. Finding one vector on  $O_2$  asks to solve a quadratic system of 100-variables 60-unknowns. This computation is the most costly in the entire algorithm. Solving this quadratic system needs  $2^{134}$  field operations. The guessing needs 1/q search and cost of one  $\mathbb{F}_{16}$ - multiplication needs 36 gates. Therefore, this parameter set provides approximately at-least 128-bit security.

#### 4.3 Rectangular Min-rank Attack on VDOO

Rectangular min-rank attack is proposed by Beullens [10]. We first describe the attack against VDOO and then compute the required attack complexity to perform this attack against VDOO. Attacker starts with  $n \times m$ -rectangular matrices  $M_1, M_2, \dots, M_n$  over  $\mathbb{F}_q$  where each  $M_i$  is defined as

$$M_{i} = \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{s}_{1}, \mathbf{s}_{i}) \\ \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{s}_{2}, \mathbf{s}_{i}) \\ \vdots \\ \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{s}_{n}, \mathbf{s}_{i}) \end{bmatrix}$$

where  $(\mathbf{s}_i)_{i=1}^n$  is a basis of  $\mathbb{F}_q^n$ .

Let  $\mathbf{o}_2 \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$ . The bi-linearity of  $\mathcal{DP}$  implies

$$M := \sum_{i=1}^{n} o_{2i} M_i := \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{o}_2) \\ \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{s}_2, \mathbf{o}_2) \\ \vdots \\ \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{s}_n, \mathbf{o}_2) \end{bmatrix}$$

Hence, the maximum rank of M is  $o_2$ , since  $\mathbf{o}_2 \in O_2$ . This observation provides attacker a min-rank instance to find  $o_{2i}$ 's in  $\mathbb{F}_q$ .

To enhance the performance of the simple attack, Beullens combined the rectangular min-rank attack with the simple attack [11]. Like earlier, the attacker fixes **v** to get a linear map  $\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{v}}$ . This helps to find  $\mathbf{o}_2 \in O_2$  using  $\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{o}_2) = 0$ .

This system of linear equations reduces the number of matrices by m in the rectangular min-rank instance. Thus, the basis of  $\text{Ker}(\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{v}})$  is  $\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_{n-m}$ . Hence,

the new min-rank instance has n-m matrices  $\widetilde{M}_i$ , where

$$\widetilde{M}_{i} := \sum_{j=1}^{n} b_{ij} M_{j} := \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{s}_{1}, \mathbf{b}_{i}) \\ \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{s}_{2}, \mathbf{b}_{i}) \\ \vdots \\ \mathcal{DP}(\mathbf{s}_{n}, \mathbf{b}_{i}) \end{bmatrix}, \text{ for } i = 1 \text{ to } n - m.$$

If **y** is a solution of the new min-rank problem having n - m matrices then  $\mathbf{o}_2 = \sum_{i=1}^{n-m} y_i \mathbf{b}_i$  is a solution of the old min-rank problem. Hence, the attack needs to be repeated approximately q times, until it finds  $\mathbf{o}_2 \in \operatorname{Ker}(\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{x}}) \cap O_2 \neq \{0\}$ .

Attack Complexity. The number of field multiplications required to perform this attack is

$$3 \cdot q \cdot (n-m-1)(o_2+1) \binom{n}{r}^2 \cdot \binom{n-m+b-3}{b}^3$$

where b is the operating degree for the algorithm [7].

**Example for SL-1 parameters.** The attacker needs to guess a good  $\mathcal{DP}_{\mathbf{x}}$ . After then the attacker gets a min-rank instance of 60 matrices which has 159 rows and 100 columns and the span of these matrices has a matrix of rank 36. Bardet et al.'s [7] algorithm provides an efficient way to solve this min-rank instance. This computation needs  $2^{133}$ -field operations.

#### 4.4 Kipnis-Shamir Attack on VDOO

The attacker targeting VDOO can employ a technique similar to the one devised by Kipnis and Shamir [40] to retrieve the subspace  $O_2$ . This approach effectively aids in the separation of oil and vinegar variables, ultimately leading to the recovery of the private key. The complexity of this attack can be roughly estimated as  $O(o_2^4 \cdot q^{n-o_2-1})$  field multiplications. To expedite this assault, the attacker leverages Grover's algorithm, which serves to reduce the complexity to  $O(o_2^4 \cdot q^{(n-o_2-1)/2})$ .

*Example for SL-1 parameters.* Attacker needs to perform approximately  $2^{348}$ -field operations in classical settings and  $2^{174}$ -field operations in quantum computer.

#### 4.5 Intersection Attack on VDOO

Beullens introduced the intersection attack [10], which effectively reduced the claimed security level of the Rainbow signature scheme by approximately 20 bits compared to the original design. In this attack, Beullens improved upon the Rainbow band separation attack [25] using the analysis proposed by Perlner [47]. The intersection attack helps to identify k-vectors simultaneously within the oil-space  $O_2$  by solving a system of quadratic equations for a vector within the intersection  $\bigcap_{i=1}^{k} L_i O_2$ , where  $L_i$ 's are invertible matrices. This attack performs well when the intersection is non-empty, which occurs when  $n < \frac{2k-1}{k-1}o_2$ . The computational cost of this attack involves solving a quadratic system with  $\binom{k+1}{2}^2 o_2 - 2\binom{k}{2}$  equations in  $k(no_2) - (2k-1)o_2$  variables.

However, in the case of VDOO where  $n \ge 3o_2$ , there is no guarantee that the subspace (for more details, see [10]) namely  $L_iO_2 \cap L_jO_2$  will exist. Consequently, the attack becomes probabilistic for VDOO and will succeed with a probability of  $\frac{1}{a^{(n-3o_2+1)}}$ .

**Example for SL-1 parameters.** The complexity to break SL-1 parameters, attacker needs  $2^{131}$ -field multiplications.

### 4.6 Quantum Attacks

The attacker can accelerate certain aspects of the classical attacks using a quantum computer. For MQ- or OV-based schemes the only quantum algorithm that can help in cryptanalysis is Grover's search [37]. This algorithm reduces the search space, thereby reducing the number of field multiplications by a factor of  $q^{k/2}$ . This specifically does not threaten the post-quantum security of our scheme [19].

#### 4.7 Provable security: EUF-CMA Security

Our VDOO scheme, similar to UOV, Rainbow, and other UOV-based signature schemes, offers universal unforgeability [24]. Like these other schemes, we incorporate a salt in the signature generation process to demonstrate the EUF-CMA security of our scheme. We have followed the established methodology for this purpose, as seen in prior work such as [52,12]. Here, we have only provided an outline of the proof. The full proof can be done using similar strategies as Mayo [12], QR-UOV [34], PROV [29], etc. Our security proof relies on the well-understood hardness of the UOV problem. We begin by defining the UOV problem and then introduce the VDOO problem.

For security reasons, we recommend that each salt value should be used for no more than one signature. Consequently, we fix the salt length at 16 bytes, assuming up to  $2^{64}$  signature generations within the system [19].

**Definition 3 (UOV Problem).** Suppose  $UOV_{(n,v,o,q)}$  denotes a family of UOV public polynomial maps where n is the number variables, v+o is number of equations and q is the size of the finite field, and  $MQ_{(q,n,m)}$  denotes a family of random quadratic systems with n unknowns and m constraints over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . The UOV problem asks to distinguish  $\mathcal{P}$  from  $UOV_{(q,n,v,o)}$  and  $MQ_{(q,n,m)}$ . Suppose  $\mathcal{A}_{UOV}$  be the adversary solves the distinguishing problem and it has a distinguishing advantage as:

 $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{UOV}}(\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{UOV}}) = \left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{UOV}}(\mathcal{P}) = 1 \mid \mathcal{P} \in \mathsf{MQ}] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{UOV}}(\mathcal{P}) = 1 \mid \mathcal{P} \in \mathsf{UOV}] \right|$ 

It is widely believed that there is no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary, including quantum adversaries, denoted as  $\mathcal{A}$ , that can efficiently solve the UOV problem.

**Definition 4 (VDOO Problem).** Suppose VDOO be a family of VDOO public polynomial map. Now given a random  $\mathcal{P} \in \mathsf{VDOO}$  and  $\mathbf{t} \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$  VDOO problem asks to find  $\mathbf{s}$  such that  $\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{t}$ . If  $\mathcal{A}$  is such an adversary to compute the inverse of the VDOO public map then the advantage of this computation is

$$\operatorname{Adv}_{VDOO}(\mathcal{A}_{VDOO}) = Pr[\mathcal{P}(\mathbf{s}) = \mathbf{t} \mid \mathcal{P} \in VDOO, \mathcal{A}_{VDOO}(\mathcal{P}, \mathbf{t}) = \mathbf{s}]$$

Now we are going to state our main theorem which establishes the EUF-CMA security of the VDOO. To understand the security notion, we refer to [12,52,42].

**Theorem 1.** Suppose the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  runs in time T to solve the EUF-CMA game of VDOO in the random oracle model. This adversary makes  $q_s$  signing queries and  $q_h$  random oracle queries. Then there exists  $\mathcal{A}_{UOV}$  and  $\mathcal{A}_{VDOO}$  running in time  $T+O((q_s+q_t) \cdot poly(q,v,d,o_1,o_2))$  with

$$\operatorname{Adv}_{\mathsf{VDOO}}^{\mathsf{EUF-CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \operatorname{Adv}_{\mathsf{UOV}_{(q,v',o')}}(\mathcal{A}_{UOV}) + q_h \cdot \operatorname{Adv}_{\mathsf{VDOO}_{(q,v,d,o_1,o_2)}}(\mathcal{A}_{VDOO}) + (q_s + q_h)q_s \cdot 2^{-|salt|} + q^{-m}.$$

*Proof idea.* Here, we informally sketch the proof. We can adopt the proof methodology used in Mayo (see theorem 6 from [12]). In the first step, we can establish a reduction from the EUF-CMA security of the VDOO signature scheme to EUF-KOA (Existential unforgeability against key-only attack) security by simulating the signing oracle. Note that, the adversary does not have access to the signing oracle in the EUF-KOA game. Once this reduction is established, we can easily show a reduction from the UOV problem and VDOO problem to the EUF-KOA security game in the second step. Like the security proof of Mayo [12], we can use the hybrid proof system to establish both reductions. This proof style has also been adopted by many state-of-the-art OV-based constructions [34,35,29,23]. Finally, we can combine both of these two steps to establish the above theorem.

### 5 Parameters and Performance

This section describes our chosen parameters based on the security analysis described in Section. 4. We assess the *practicality* of the VDOO signature scheme, which involves a finely tuned trade-off among computation time, security, and communication costs. For most multivariate schemes, computation time is dominated by either the Gaussian elimination (solving linear system <sup>2</sup>) or the Gröbner basis method (solving quadratic system <sup>3</sup>). Communication cost is proportional to signature size + public key size.

#### 5.1 Parameter Selection

Table. 1, shows the signature, public-key, and private-key sizes of VDOO for different security levels as determined by the parameter tuple  $(q, v, d, o_1, o_2)$ . We follow the NIST classification [19] to categorize the parameters. We consider the complexity of two primary attacks: the simple attack [11] (SA) and the rectangular min-rank attack [10] (RA). From the attacker's point of view, these two attacks exhibit the most optimistic complexity among all other known attacks. Here, the complexity represents the number of field multiplications required for their execution.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>  $\mathsf{GE}_{(q,n)}$ : Gaussian elimination on a linear system with *n* unknowns and *n* linear equation over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . This computation needs  $O(n^3)$ -field operations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>  $\mathsf{XL}_{(q,n)}$ : eXtended Linearization or Gröbner basis method to solve a quadratic system of *n* variables and *n* constraints over  $\mathbb{F}_q$ . This computation needs  $2^{2^n}$ -field operations.

Security level (B)	params $(q, v, d, o_1, o_2)$	Signature size (B)	Private key size (KB)		
SL-I	(16, 60, 3034, 36)	96	243	236	(134, 138)
SL-III	(256, 100, 30, 40, 40)	226	1056	2437	(207, 191)
SL-V	(256, 120, 50, 60, 70)	316	3524	8127	(270, 264)

Table 1. VDOO parameter set for different NIST prescribed security level

#### 5.2 Comparison with other post-quantum schemes

In response to the NIST's last [19] and the latest [20] standardization call multiple post-quantum signatures schemes have been proposed based on MQ problem or its derivatives. For our comparative analysis, we focus on schemes with small signature sizes and well-established hardness assumptions only in Table. 2. For fairness, we compare with the parameters which provide at least 128-bit of classical security [19]. For details about the parameters of a scheme and their role in security and key sizes we kindly request interested readers to the original publications.

Signature	Computational	Signature	Public key	
schemes	bottleneck	size (B)	size (KB)	
VDOO	$GE_{(16,34)}, GE_{(16,36)}$	96	238	
(16,40,30,34,36)	GL(16,34), GL(16,36)	50	200	
Rainbow [24,36]	$GE_{(256,32)}, GE_{(256,48)}$	164	258	
(256, 148, 80, 48)	GL(256,32), GL(256,48)	104	200	
IPRainbow [17]	$GE_{(257,32)},GE_{(257,38)},$	120	342.784	
(257, 32, 32, 38, 7)	XL <sub>(257,7)</sub>	120	012.101	
Mayo [12]	$GE_{(16,65)}$	387	1	
(16, 66, 65, 7, 11)	,	001	1	
QR-UOV [34,35]	GE <sub>(7,100)</sub>	331	20.657	
(7,740,100,10)	GE(7,100)	001	20.001	
PROV[29]	$GE_{(8,46)}$	160	68.326	
(136, 46, 8)	GE(8,46)	100	00.020	
TUOV [23]	$GE_{(16,64)} + GE_{(16,32)}$	80	65.552	
(16, 160, 64, 32)	GL(16,64) + GL(16,32)	00	00.002	
VOX [33]	XL <sub>(251,6)</sub>	102	9.1	
(251, 8, 9, 6, 6)	<b>~~</b> (251,6)	102	5.1	
UOV [13]	GE(ara au)	96	66.576	
(256, 160, 64, 16)	$GE_{(256,64)}$	50	00.010	

Table 2: Compare with other multivariate signature for security level one (at least 128-bit) [19]

Comparisons/ Algorithms	VDOO	Crystals Dilithium	Falcon	Sphincs+	FuLeeca	LESS
Signature size (B)	96	2420	666	7856	1100	8400
Public key size (B)	23813	1312	897	32	1318	13700
Comparisons/ Algorithms	SQISign	Hawk	ASCON-Sign	MIRA	MiRitH	RYDE
Signature size (B)	177	555	7856	7376	7661	7446
Public key size (B)	64	1024	32	84	129	86

In Table. 3, we compare VDOO with recently standardized Crystals Dilithium [26], Falcon [32], SPHINICS+ [4] and recently submitted some signature schemes (see [20]) which are not based on MQ problem.

Table 3: Comparisons with other signatures for NIST security level 1

From the above tables, it is evident that VDOO outperforms the majority of existing multivariate signature schemes. This superiority stems from the smaller number of variables involved in Gaussian eliminations in VDOO. Furthermore, the signature generation process in VDOO does not rely on the Gröbner basis technique, which further confirms its practicality. Further Table. 3 illustrates that VDOO has one of the smallest signature sizes with respect to other quantum-safe signature schemes.

## 6 Conclusion

We have introduced a post-quantum signature algorithm, leveraging well established cryptanalysis techniques to devise a parameter set for VDOO. In order to ensure a minimum of 128-bit security, our scheme achieves a compact 96-byte signature size, which outperforms numerous existing signature schemes. Nonetheless, it does grapple with a sizable public key size, a challenge that is prevalent in a significant number of multivariate signature schemes.

Our immediate future endeavors will be centered around further compressing the public key size within the VDOO scheme. Additionally, we intend to delve into the exploration of VDOO's security within the quantum random oracle model (QROM). Subsequently, our focus will shift towards realizing hardware implementations and assessing potential physical attacks against our scheme.

## 7 Acknowledgements

Authors thanks to anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. AG wish thanks the Tata Consultancy Service for funding. N.S. thanks the funding support from DST-SERB (CRG/2020/000045) and N.Rama Rao Chair (CSE-IITK).

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