# Rectangular Attack on VOX 

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#### Abstract

VOX $\left[\mathrm{PCF}^{+} 23\right]$ has been submitted to the NIST Round 1 Additional Signature of the Post-Quantum Signature Competition in June 2023. VOX is a strengthened variant of UOV which uses the Quotient-Ring (QR) setting to reduce the public-key size. At the end of August 2023, Furue and Ikamatsu posted on the NIST mailing-list a post, indicating that the parameters of VOX can be attacked efficiently using the rectangular attack in the QR setting. In this note, we explain the attack in the specific case of VOX, we detail the complexity, and show that as Furue and Ikematsu indicated, the attack can be completely avoided by adding one more constraint on the parameter selection. Finally, we show that this constraint does not increase the sizes of the public keys or signature.


Keywords: Multivariate Cryptography, UOV, VOX, QR, Rectangular Attack

## 1 The Rectangular MinRank Attack on VOX

This attack has been discovered by Ward Beullens on the UOV scheme [Beu21], and has been recently generalized to the Quotient Ring (QR) setting by Furue and Ikematsu at IWSEC 2023 in [FI23]. The QR setting consists in reducing the public key by replacing $c \times c$ coefficients in $\mathbb{F}_{q}$ of the public-key matrix by one coefficient in $\mathbb{F}_{q^{c}}$ as in [FIKT21]. This allows to reduce by a factor $c$ the matrices and the public key. The attack applies to VOX, which uses the QR-setting, but not to FOX, which does not use that setting.

### 1.1 Notation

Let $o$ and $v$ denote the number of Oil and Vinegar variables, and let $n=o+v$. All these quantities have a common divisor $c$, and we write $O=o / c, V=v / c, N=n / c$. We denote by $t$ the number of totally random secret polynomials in $N$ variables over $\mathbb{F}_{q^{c}}$. Let $\left\{e_{i}, i=1, \ldots, N\right\}$ be a canonical vector base of $\mathbb{F}_{q^{c}}^{N}$.

### 1.2 Description of the attack

The original attack exploits the fact that a specific (rectangular) matrix built up by composing the polar forms of the public polynomials by a random vector may have a low rank if the vector happens to belong to the secret Oil space. Therefore, solving a MinRank problem enables to find the secret Oil space. Using the notations of [Beu21],

[^0]the rectangular matrix can be expressed as the representation of the linear mapping $L_{x}$ defined by:
$$
L_{x}(y)=(\Delta \mathbf{P} \mathbf{u b}(x, y))
$$
where $\Delta \mathbf{P u b}(x, y)=\mathbf{P u b}(x+y)-\mathbf{P u b}(x)-\mathbf{P u b}(y)$ is the polar form of the public key. Indeed, for a random vector $x$, the expected rank of the rectangular matrix is $\min (o, N)$. For a vector $x$ in the secret oil space, this rank is bounded by $\min (o, N, V+t)$. In the case $o>N$, the MinRank attack is applicable whenever $t<O$. Indeed, in that parameter regime, $\min (o, N, V+t)=V+t<N=\min (o, N)$, so the behavior of the rank differs between the two cases.

### 1.3 Complexity of the attack

The underlying MinRank problem: Let $x=\sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{i} e_{i}$ be an unknown vector. So $L_{x}=$ $\sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{i} L_{e_{i}}$ has rank at most $V+t$ when $x$ is in the secret oil space, and has a greater rank with overwhelming probability otherwise. Since the secret oil space has dimension $O$, with high probability, there is still a solution to the MinRank problem for $x$ such that $O-1$ of its coordinates are set to 0 . So we have to solve $\operatorname{Rank}\left(\sum_{i=1}^{k} x_{i} L_{e_{i}}\right) \leq r$ where we note $r=V+t$ and $k=V+1$. Furthermore, we can consider the MinRank problem with $N \times o$ or $o \times N$ matrices, whichever choice leads to a better efficiency for the attack. It appears that for the set of VOX parameters, the second choice is better. We use the Support Minors Modeling to solve the MinRank problem [ $\left.\mathrm{BBC}^{+} 20\right]$. For a better efficiency, we can also choose to select only $m$ columns from the MinRank problem, with $r+1 \leq m \leq N$. Using the notation of [Beu21] section 7, let $n_{x}=k$ be the number of $x_{i}$ variables, and $n_{y}=\binom{m}{r}$ the number of Minors variables. The MinRank problem can be expressed as a bilinear system of equations in two groups of $n_{x}$ and $n_{y}$ variables. This problem is solved by the XL algorithm on the first group of variables, that is we look for the minimum degree $b$, such that multiplying all the equations by all the monomials of the first group of variables, of degree $b-1$, then the resulting system has more free equations than the resulting number of monomials, which therefore have bi-degree ( $b, 1$ ). And then replacing all monomial by new variables (linearization), a solution can be found by the block-Wiedemann algorithm, since all equations are sparse and contains the same number of terms, given by $w=n_{x}(r+1)$. The number of monomials of bi-degree $(b, 1)$ in $\left(n_{x}, n_{y}\right)$ variables is $M(b)=\binom{n_{x}+b-1}{b} n_{y}$. From [Beu21] Section 2, the number of free equations can be expressed as $R(k, o, m, r, b)=\sum_{i=1}^{b}(-1)^{i+1}\binom{m}{i+r}\binom{o+i-1}{i}\binom{k+b-i-1}{b-i}$, whenever this quantity does not exceed the number of monomials $M(b)-1$, and is $M(b)-1$ otherwise. Finally, the complexity of the attack is $3 M\left(b_{\text {min }}\right)^{2} w$, expressed in field multiplications, where $b_{\text {min }}$ is the minimum value of $b$ satisfying $R(k, o, m, r, b) \geq M(b)-1$. We use the following formula $\mu=2 \log _{2}^{2} q^{c}+\log _{2} q^{c}$ to estimate the cost of a field multiplication. We give the results in table 1.

Table 1: Complexity of the Rectangular MinRank attack on VOX parameters

| $\lambda$ | $q$ | $O$ | $V$ | $c$ | $t$ | $m$ | $b$ | $\log _{2} C$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 128 | 251 | 8 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 17 | 3 | 50.8 |
| 192 | 1021 | 10 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 20 | 3 | 54.8 |
| 256 | 4093 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 8 | 22 | 4 | 55.3 |

## 2 New parameters for VOX

In the choice of our parameters, we now add the condition $O \leq t$. With this additional constraint, the Rectangular MinRank attack is no longer possible. Indeed, in that parameter
regime, $V+t \geq N$, hence $\min (o, N, V+t)=\min (o, N)$ : the rank difference exploited by the attack no longer exists.

If we add this constraint in the parameter selection estimation, we can propose many other parameter choices. The security in the last column has been evaluated using the MQEstimator tool [BMSV22], and considering the security for quantum estimation given by NIST ${ }^{1}: 2^{143}$ for Level-I, $2^{207}$ for Level-III, and $2^{274}$ for Level-V.

The compressed public key size (in bytes) is given by the following formula:

$$
32+\left\lceil\left((o-t) * o *(o / c+1) / 2 *\left\lceil\log _{2}(q)\right\rceil\right) / 8\right\rceil
$$

The signature size (in bytes) is given by the following formula:

$$
\left\lceil\left((o+v) / c *\left\lceil\log _{2}(q)\right\rceil\right) / 8\right\rceil .
$$

Table 2: Impact of the new constraint on VOX parameters

|  | $\lambda$ | $q$ | $O=o / c$ | $V=v / c$ | $c$ | $t$ | $\mid$ Sig $\mid$ | $\|c p k\|$ | Sec. |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| VOX-I | 128 | 251 | 8 | 9 | 6 | 6 | 102 B | 9104 B |  |
| VOX-III | 192 | 1021 | 10 | 11 | 7 | 7 | 184 B | 30351 B |  |
| VOX-V | 256 | 4093 | 12 | 13 | 8 | 8 | 300 B | 82400 B |  |
|  | 128 | 251 | 4 | 5 | 13 | 6 | 117 B | 5980 B | 145 |
|  |  | 251 | 5 | 6 | 11 | 6 | 121 B | 8117 B | 151 |
|  |  | 251 | 6 | 7 | 9 | 6 | 117 B | 9104 B | 150 |
|  | 192 | 1021 | 5 | 6 | 15 | 7 | 207 B | 19157 B | 209 |
|  |  | 1021 | 6 | 7 | 13 | 7 | 212 B | 24261 B | 219 |
|  |  | 1021 | 7 | 8 | 11 | 7 | 207 B | 26982 B | 215 |
|  | 256 | 4093 | 6 | 7 | 17 | 8 | 332 B | 50337 B | 287 |
|  |  | 4093 | 7 | 8 | 14 | 8 | 315 B | 52920 B | 276 |
|  |  | 4093 | 8 | 9 | 13 | 8 | 332 B | 67392 B | 293 |

## 3 Conclusion

In this note, we explain how the rectangular attack can be adapted to VOX and why by adding an extra constraint, this attack completely disappears. Moreover, we also show that this constraint has practically no impact on the public-key and signature sizes.

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## A Security Analysis

In this section we now consider, three kinds of attacks :

- the direct attacks do not take into account the inner structure of the public key,
- the Kipnis-Shamir attack that tries to guess the secret oil space as the eigenvector space of some matrix $M^{-1} M^{\prime}$ where $M$ and $M^{\prime}$ are the polar forms of two public equations, provided that the contribution of the $t$ secret completely random equations is cancelled,
- other UOV related attacks such as Intersection attack, for which many (at least 3) "pure" UOV public equations are required.

Table 3: Security Analysis of new VOX parameters against direct attacks. $T$ and $M$ denote the time and memory complexities. The value $k$ denotes the number of variables we have to guess in the F4/F5 or XLWiedemann algorithms. These attacks are direct attacks and so are estimated on the parameters related to the ground field, and do not consider the QR technique using the estimator [BMSV22]. Experiments on small parameters tend to show that systems issued from a VOX system behave like random systems.

| Security <br> Level | Parameters set <br> $(n, m, c, t, q)$ | Hybrid |  |  | Hybrid <br> XLWiedemann |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $T$ | $M$ | $k$ | $T$ | $M$ | $k$ |
| 128 | $(110,50,10,6,251)$ | 139.6 | 116.9 | 2 | 145.7 | 69.2 | 2 |
| $(143)$ | $(121,52,13,6,251)$ | 145.1 | 122.4 | 6 | 151.3 | 72.0 | 2 |
|  | $(121,55,11,6,251)$ | 151.9 | 121.2 | 3 | 158.2 | 71.5 | 3 |
|  | $(117,54,9,6,251)$ | 150.6 | 127.8 | 2 | 156.9 | 74.9 | 2 |
| 192 | $(165,75,15,7,1021)$ | 209.8 | 172.6 | 3 | 216.5 | 98.1 | 3 |
| $(207)$ | $(169,78,13,7,1021)$ | 219.8 | 182.5 | 3 | 226.6 | 103.2 | 3 |
|  | $(165,77,11,7,1021)$ | 215.3 | 178 | 3 | 222.1 | 101 | 3 |
| 256 | $(201,98,14,8,4093)$ | 276.6 | 244.9 | 2 | 283.8 | 135.2 | 2 |
| $(274)$ | $(221,102,17,8,4093)$ | 287.6 | 255.9 | 2 | 294.9 | 140.8 | 2 |
|  | $(221,104,13,8,4093)$ | 293.2 | 261.3 | 2 | 300.4 | 143.6 | 2 |

Table 4: Security Analysis of new VOX parameters against Kipnis-Shamir. $T$ and $M$ denote the time and memory complexities. This attack requires to guess at least 2 public equations for which the $t$ secret random equations are cancelled. This extra cost is $q^{2 t}$, which is a safe margin against this attack. Once the secret equations are cancelled, we have to solve an instance of UOV and we used the estimator [BMSV22].

| Security <br> Level | Parameters set <br> $(n, m, c, t, q)$ | Kipnis <br> Shamir |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $T$ | $M$ |
| 128 | $(110,50,10,6,251)$ | $93.2+95=188.2$ | 20.3 |
| $(143)$ | $(121,52,13,6,251)$ | $149.3+95=244.3$ | 20.7 |
|  | $(121,55,11,6,251)$ | $101.5+95=196.5$ | 20.7 |
|  | $(117,54,9,6,251)$ | $85.4+95=180.4$ | 20.6 |
| 192 | $(165,75,15,7,1021)$ | $164.6+139=303.6$ | 22.0 |
| $(207)$ | $(169,78,13,7,1021)$ | $144.7+139=283.7$ | 22.2 |
|  | $(165,77,11,7,1021)$ | $124.6+139=263.6$ | 22 |
| 256 | $(201,98,14,8,4093)$ | $183.4+191=374.4$ | 23.1 |
| $(274)$ | $(221,102,17,8,4093)$ | $219.5+191=410.5$ | 23.3 |
|  | $(221,104,13,8,4093)$ | $171.5+191=362.5$ | 23.3 |

Table 5: Security Analysis of new VOX parameters against Intersection attack and others UOV related attacks that would require to guess by brute force at least 2 public equations for which the $t$ secret random equations are cancelled. The complexity of the best intersection attack uses the value for $k$. The complexity would be $q^{k t}$ times the intersection attack. We can see here that $k>2$.

| Security <br> Level | Parameters set <br> $(n, m, c, t, q)$ | Intersection <br> Attack |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  | $T$ | $M$ | $k$ |
| 128 | $(110,50,10,6,251)$ | $62.5+95=157.5$ | 52.9 | 5 |
| $(143)$ | $(121,52,13,6,251)$ | $89.7+95=184.7$ | 80.5 | 4 |
|  | $(121,55,11,6,251)$ | $64.0+95=159.0$ | 54.2 | 5 |
|  | $(117,54,9,6,251)$ | $62.5+95=157.5$ | 52.7 | 5 |
| 192 | $(165,75,15,7,1021)$ | $78.2+139=217.2$ | 68.0 | 5 |
| $(207)$ | $(169,78,13,7,1021)$ | $69.9+139=208.9$ | 59.2 | 6 |
|  | $(165,77,11,7,1021)$ | $67.1+139=206.1$ | 56.8 | 5 |
| 256 | $(201,98,14,8,4093)$ | $73.9+191=264.9$ | 62.4 | 7 |
| $(274)$ | $(221,102,17,8,4093)$ | $84.4+191=275.4$ | 73.2 | 6 |
|  | $(221,104,13,8,4093)$ | $72.5+191=263.5$ | 61.4 | 6 |

Table 6: The security parameters $q$ and $t$ have been chosen so that $q^{3 t}$ satisfies the NIST security levels. This is the cost to recover 3 UOV polynomials without the randomized secret random quadratic forms.

| Security <br> Level | Parameters set <br> $(t, q)$ | $q^{3 t}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 128 | $(6,251)$ | 143 |
| $(143)$ |  |  |
| 192 | $(7,1021)$ | 209 |
| $(207)$ |  |  |
| 256 | $(8,4093)$ | 287 |
| $(274)$ |  |  |


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[^1]:    ${ }^{1}$ https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography/post-quantum-cryptography-standardization/ evaluation-criteria/security-(evaluation-criteria)

