Input Transformation Based Zero-Knowledge Argument System for Arbitrary Circuits with High Efficiency

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Abstract. We introduce a new efficient transparent interactive zero-knowledge argument system that is based on the new input transformation concept which we will introduce in this paper. The core of this concept is a mechanism that converts input parameters into a format that can be processed directly by the circuit so that the circuit output can be verified through direct computation of the circuit or business logic per se. In our protocol, we convert circuit inputs in Pedersen commitment form to linear polynomials in integer form so the verifiers can use standard integer operations to compute and verify the circuit output.

This direct computation mechanism replaces the constraint system often found in popular zero-knowledge protocols, and eliminates the need of using a front-end encoder to translate NP relation $R$ to some zero-knowledge friendly representation $\hat{R}$ (such as the R1CS constraint system) before the relation can be converted to a proof system, making our protocol easy to implement and much easier to use compared to protocols using a constraint system.

Our benchmark result shows our approach can significantly improve verifier runtime performance by more than one order of magnitude over the state of the art while keeping the prover runtime and communication cost competitive with that of the state of the art.

1 Introduction

Ever since the discoveries of interactive proofs (IPs) [28] and probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) [5] [4] [3] [2] in the late last century, there has been a tremendous amount of research in the area of proof systems. More recently, the rise of Blockchain and Web3 has finally triggered real-world deployments of zero knowledge systems.

Popular zero knowledge systems are often divided into two phases: the first part, a “front-end” encoder converting a specification of an NP-relation $R$ into a “zero-knowledge friendly” representation $\hat{R}$ (e.g. rank-1 constraint system); and then another “back-end” system converting $\hat{R}$ to a zero-knowledge proof system for $R$. The encoder based two-phased design has accelerated the development of zero knowledge system applications, but it has added cost of running the encoder to translate circuit logic to constraint system form.

Due to expensive computation during setup time of earlier SNARKs (Succinct Non-Interactive Argument of Knowledge), it has become a significant interest to have the structured reference string (SRS) be constructible in a “universal and updatable” fashion, meaning that the same SRS can be used for statements about all circuits of a certain bounded size. The first universal SNARK was in Groth et al [29], and Maller et al. improved the SRS size from quadratic to linear in Sonic [33]. More recently developed protocols such as PLONK [26], MARLIN [21] are universal fully-succinct SNARK with significantly improved prover runtime compared to the fully-succinct Sonic. However, there are still two drawbacks with these SNARKs: first, many of these universal succinct SNARKs systems require trusted setup; second, the prover run-time of these protocols are prohibitively expensive even with latest improvements such as HyperPlonk [20], usually takes over 100 seconds on a single thread CPU for a circuit with over $2^{20}$ constraints.

Protocols belong to the Goldwasser, Kalai, and Rothblum (GKR) class such as Hyrax [38], Virgo [33]: MPC-in-the-head class of Kushilevitz, Ostrovsky, and Sahai such as ZKBoo [27] and Ligero/Ligero++ [1] [9] offer efficient prover runtime that are at least one order of magnitude more efficient than pairing
based SNARKs, and many of these protocols do not require trusted setups. However, these protocols are largely ignored by the industry (e.g. blockchain community) due to expensive verifier runtime and high communication cost (hundreds of KBs) than fully succinct protocols such as STARK [7], PLONK, MARLIN, and Supersonic [19]. Furthermore, state-of-the-art GKR protocols generally has additional dependency on circuit depth where protocol complexity increases and performance significantly degrades as the circuit depth gets longer, making them less attractive to the industry where complex business logics (e.g. inputs are floating point numbers) are expected on smart contracts.

Memory efficient privacy-free garbled circuits [31] [29] [30] and Vector Oblivious Linear Evaluation (VOLE) protocols [14] [33] [16] [15] [42] [10] [6] [11] generally offer better prover performance. However, their verifier runtimes are just as expensive as their prover runtime and cannot be trivially made non-interactive, and their communication cost is easily many orders of magnitude more expensive than other approaches.

NIZKs such as SpartanNIZK [35] and later Lakonia [36] seems to offer a much more balanced approach, where it offers efficient prover runtime (6-18 seconds single thread) and competitive communication cost for large circuits (2^{20} constraints) while not being layer dependent. However, the downside of these protocols is that their verifier performance is still expensive, usually in the 400+ ms range on a single thread CPU.

Our aim is to create a new transparent zero knowledge protocol that is extremely easy to construct for developers, while able to handle complex circuits s.t. prover runtime and communication cost comparable to that of the state-of-the-art, and that shows significant improvement in verifier runtime over that of the current state-of-the-art.

1.1 Summary of Contributions

Our approach is to design a new protocol that allows verifiers to efficiently validate circuit outputs by directly examining circuit inputs and the circuit design without going through some intermediate translation phase. In addition to performance gains, we believe such approach would allow developers to code business rules exactly as they are and provide cost savings by minimizing the cost of translating business/circuit language to that of a constraint system.

In the past, Cramer and Damg˚ ard [24] first introduced a mechanism where input commitments are directly used in validating each multiplication gate. However, such an approach requires validation to be performed on each multiplication gate and therefore introduces a large communication overhead and requires both provers and verifiers to perform expensive operations in \( G \) for every multiplication gate. Although this approach, combined with some clever design, is adopted in some more recent protocols such as Hyrax [38], we still found such approach has some inherent inefficiencies and cannot be used to get the desired result we are seeking.

In our protocol, we start by transforming each committed input parameter to a circuit to some integer value in linear polynomial form, where verifiers can perform arithmetic operations (e.g., addition and multiplication) on them like they do on normal integers. Since field operations are cheap, the verifier can perform this step with high efficiency.

For a simple circuit \( a_1^d + a_2^d + a_3^d = r \), circuit inputs are \( a_1, a_2, a_3 \) and the circuit output is \( r \). In our protocol, inputs \( a_1, a_2, a_3 \) and output \( r \) are committed by the prover using Pedersen commitment. The prover then provides the transformed inputs \( a_1, a_2, a_3 \) in linear polynomial form \( a_1', a_2', a_3' \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) s.t. \( a_1' = a_1 + X a_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) (\( a_1 \) is its blinding key). Since the transformed inputs are in \( \mathbb{F} \), the verifier can plug these values directly to the circuit to compute the output e.g. \( a_1 d + a_2 d + a_3 d = o \). The circuit output \( o \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) is a polynomial evaluated at point \( x \) s.t. \( f(x) = o \). Since the degree of a polynomial will increase after it is multiplied with another polynomial, the degree of the circuit output polynomial is \( d + 1 \). The constant term of this polynomial is the circuit output \( r \) and all other coefficients are blinding values. If the prover can prove 1) it knows all coefficients of the output polynomial (e.g. using a polynomial commitment) 2) all input transformations are legit, then we say the proof is legit.

The output polynomial in the example above has degree of \( d + 1 \) because transformed inputs (linear polynomials) are of degree of 1, multiplying them \( d \) times will get a polynomial with degree of \( d + 1 \).
So if the circuit is something like \(a_1^2 + a_2^2 + a_3^2 + \ldots + a_t^2 = r\), the degree of the output polynomial is \(3 = d + 1\) (\(d = 2\)) regardless of the value of \(t\). Throughout our paper, we use symbol \(m_p\) to denote the maximum number of multiplications included in any path that leads to the circuit output.

This input transformation and direct computation approach of our protocol does not require a “front end” encoder to compile business logic relation \(R\) into some zero-knowledge friendly representation \(\hat{R}\). This construct makes our protocol relatively easy to implement and also makes it easier for end developers to apply zero knowledge design to real world applications.

For a deep circuit (\(m_p\) value is large), the prover runtime of the base version of our protocol (Protocol 1) is dominated by \(O(m_p^2 + m_p + l)\) field operations and \(O(m_p + m_p^{1/2} + l)\) group exponentiations, where \(m_p\) stands for the total number of multiplication gates included in the path that contains most multiplications and \(l\) stands for the number of inputs to a circuit; the verifier runtime is dominated by \(O(n + m_p^{1/2} + l)\) field operations and \(O(m_p^{1/2} + l)\) group exponentiations; and the communication cost is dominated by \(O(m_p^{1/2} + 1)\) group elements and \(O(m_p^{1/2} + l)\) field elements.

On the other hand, if the circuit is shallow (e.g. for a circuit with \(n\) addition operations and \(n\) multiplication operations: \(r = \sum_{i=1}^{n} a_i b\) where \(r\) is the circuit output and \(a, b\) are circuit inputs, we have \(m_p = 1\) ), the prover work would be dominated by \(O(n)\) field addition operations which is very cheap.

Our protocol is specifically efficient for proving complex business logics where circuit depth is high. For example, inputs are floating point numbers and the business logic requires the circuit to perform a lot of floating point multiplications/divisions operations, a very likely scenario in the real world.

Specifically, when processing a circuit of \(2^{20}\) sequential multiplication gates with 960 input bits representing 30 input integers on a single CPU thread, the prover runtime of our protocol is 5.5 seconds, the verifier runtime is 26 milliseconds, and the communication cost is approximately 64 kilobytes. This result shows a significant improvement in verifier runtime by more than one order of magnitude over the state of the art while keeping the prover runtime and communication cost competitive with the state of the art.

We introduce our protocol in an interactive setting where all verifier challenges are random field elements. In practice, we assume the Fiat-Shamir heuristic is applied to our protocol to obtain a non-interactive zero-knowledge argument in the random oracle model.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Assumption

**Definition 1. (Discrete Logarithmic Relation)** For all PPT adversaries \(A\) and for all \(n \geq 2\) there exists a negligible function \(\text{negl}(\lambda)\) s.t.

\[
Pr\left[ G = \text{Setup}(\lambda), \ g_0, \ldots, g_{n-1} \xleftarrow{\$} G, \ a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p \leftarrow A(g_0, \ldots, g_{n-1}) \mid \exists a_i \neq 0 \land \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} g_i^{a_i} = 1 \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

The Discrete Logarithmic Relation assumption states that an adversary can’t find a non-trivial relation between the randomly chosen group elements \(g_0, \ldots, g_{n-1} \in G^n\), and that \(\prod_{i=0}^{n-1} g_i^{a_i} = 1\) is a non-trivial discrete log relation among \(g_0, \ldots, g_{n-1}\).

### 2.2 Zero-Knowledge Argument of Knowledge

Interactive arguments are interactive proofs in which security holds only against computationally bounded provers. In an interactive argument of knowledge for a relation \(R\), a prover convinces a verifier that it knows a witness \(w\) for a statement \(x\) s.t. \((x, w) \in R\) without revealing the witness itself to the verifier. When we say knowledge of an argument, we imply that the argument has witness-extended emulation.
Definition 2. (Interactive Argument) Let’s say \((P, V)\) denotes a pair of PPT interactive algorithms and \(\text{Setup}\) denotes a non-interactive setup algorithm that outputs public parameters \(pp\) given a security parameter \(\lambda\) that both \(P\) and \(V\) have access to. Let \((P(pp, x, w), V(pp, x))\) denote the output of \(V\) on input \(x\) after its interaction with \(P\), who has knowledge of witness \(w\). The triple \((\text{Setup}, P, V)\) is called an argument for relation \(R\) if for all non-uniform PPT adversaries \(A\), the following properties hold:

- **Perfect Completeness**
  \[
  Pr\left[\frac{pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)}{(pp, x, w) \notin R \text{ or } (P(pp, x, w), V(pp, x)) = 1} \right] = 1
  \]

- **Computational Soundness**
  \[
  Pr\left[\forall w(pp, x, w) \notin R \land (A(pp, s), V(pp, x)) = 1 \mid (x, s) \leftarrow A(pp)\right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
  \]

- **Public Coin** All messages sent from \(V\) to \(P\) are chosen uniformly at random and independently of \(P\)’s messages.

Definition 3. (Computational Witness-Extended Emulation) Given a public-coin interactive argument tuple \((\text{Setup}, P, V)\) and arbitrary prover algorithm \(P^*\), let \(\text{Recorder}\) \((P^*, pp, x, s)\) denote the message transcript between \(P^*\) and \(V\) on shared input \(x\), initial prover state \(s\), and \(pp\) generated by \(\text{Setup}\). Furthermore, let \(E\) \(\text{Recorder}\) \((P, pp, x, s)\) denote a machine \(E\) with a transcript oracle for this interaction that can rewind to any round and run again with fresh verifier randomness. The tuple \((\text{Setup}, P, V)\) has computational witness-extended emulation if for every deterministic polynomial time \(P\) there exists an expected polynomial time emulator \(E\) such that for all non-uniform polynomial time adversaries \(A\) the following condition holds:

\[
\left| Pr\left[A(tr) = 1 \mid pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), (x, s) \leftarrow A(pp), tr \leftarrow \text{Recorder}(P^*, pp, x, s)\right]\right| - Pr\left[A(tr) = 1 \land (x, s) \leftarrow A(pp), tr accepting \Rightarrow (x, w) \in R, (x, s) \leftarrow A(pp), (tr, w) \leftarrow E\text{Recorder}(P^*, pp, x, s)(pp, x)\right]\right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

Definition 4. (Perfect Special Honest Verifier Zero Knowledge for Interactive Arguments) An interactive proof is \((\text{Setup}, P, V)\) is a perfect special honest verifier zero knowledge (PSHVZK) argument of knowledge for \(R\) if there exists a probabilistic polynomial time simulator \(S\) such that all pairs of interactive adversaries \(A_1, A_2\) have the following property for every \((x, w, \sigma) \leftarrow A_2(pp) \land (pp, x, w) \in R\), where \(\sigma\) stands for verifier’s public coin randomness for challenges:

\[
Pr\left[A_1(tr) = 1 \mid pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), tr \leftarrow (P(pp, x, w), V(pp, x))\right] = Pr\left[A_1(tr) = 1 \mid pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), tr \leftarrow S(pp, x, \sigma)\right]
\]

Above property states that adversary chooses a distribution over statements \(x\) and witnesses \(w\) but is not able to distinguish between the simulated transcripts and the honestly generated transcripts for a valid statement/witnesses pair.
2.3 Polynomial Commitment Function

As in the case of other popular zero knowledge protocols that offer succinct proof size, our protocol uses a polynomial commitment evaluation protocol to construct most of our proof transcript. Our protocol uses a version of the polynomial commitment scheme defined by Bootle et al. [12]. Others have improved the square-root-based polynomial commitments by applying the inner product approach defined by Bunez et al. and adding support for multilinear polynomials such as Hyrax [39] and Spartan [35]. Similar techniques may be used to improve our implementation in the future to reduce proof size in the expense of longer verifier runtime. The polynomial commitment function PolyCommitEval is defined as:

- \( \text{PolyCommitEval}(C, y, x; \vec{\tau}, \phi) \rightarrow \text{boolean} \)
  - \( C \) is the committed polynomial in \( G \) where \( \vec{\tau} \) are its coefficients and \( \phi \) is its blinding key. The function returns a boolean value “true” if the polynomial can be correctly evaluated at point \( x \) s.t. \( y = f(x) \).

Assume the polynomial commitment scheme we use in this paper is the one defined by Bootle et al. [12]. In section 5, we will introduced a modified version of the polynomial commitment evaluation scheme defined by Bootle et al. that tailors to our need.

2.4 Zero Knowledge Proof of Discrete Logarithm

For a prover to prove it has the knowledge of a discrete logarithmic \( \kappa \) of some group element \( s = h^\kappa \in G \). We define the relation for this protocol as \( R_{\text{PoD}} = \{(h, s; \kappa) : s = g^\kappa \} \). We also define two functions (ProveDL, VerifyDL) for provers and verifiers to create and verify proof transcripts:

- \( \text{ProveDL}(g, \kappa) \rightarrow tr_\kappa \)
  - generates proof transcript \( tr_\kappa \), where \( \kappa \) is the witness.
- \( \text{VerifyDL}(g, s, tr_\kappa) \rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\} \)
  - takes a proof transcript \( tr_\kappa \) and a pair of group elements with discrete log relation \( (g, s \in G \land s = h^\kappa) \), and outputs true if the knowledge of the relation is verified, false otherwise.

In this paper, we assume the underlying implementation of the proof of discrete logarithm protocol is Schnorr’s protocol. We know for a fact that Schnorr’s protocol has perfect completeness, special honest verifier zero knowledge, and computational witness-extended emulation.

2.5 Notations

Let \( G \) denote any type of secure cyclic group of prime order \( p \), and let \( \mathbb{Z}_p \) denote an integer field modulo \( p \). Group elements other than generators are denoted by capital letters, e.g., \( C = u_1^a_1 u_2^a_2 ... u_n^a_n \in G \) is a commitment commits to a vector \( \vec{a} \) denoted by a capital letter, and \( B \in G \) is a random group element also denoted by a capital letter. For generators used as base points to compute other group elements in our protocol, such as \( \vec{g}, \vec{h} \in G \), we use lower case letters to denote them. Greek letters are used to label hidden key values. e.g. \( \upsilon \) is the blinding key for Pedersen commitment \( P \) on generator \( h \in G \) s.t. \( P = g^a h^\upsilon \). Finally, we use standard vector notation \( \vec{v} \) to denote vectors, i.e. \( \vec{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n \) is a list of \( n \) integers \( a_i \) for \( i = \{1, 2, ..., n\} \).

We write \( \mathcal{R} = \{(\text{Public Inputs} ; \text{Witnesses}) : \text{Relation}\} \) to denote the relation \( \mathcal{R} \) using the specified public inputs and witnesses.

2.6 The Input Transformation Concept

We first define the relation for the base version of our protocol. For \( l \) input parameters, let \( C_F \) represent the set of arbitrary arithmetic circuits in \( F \), there exists a zero knowledge argument for the relation:

\[
\{(g, h, R \in G, \vec{P} \in G^l, E_c \in C_F ; \vec{a}, \vec{\upsilon} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^l, r, \epsilon \in \mathbb{Z}_p) : P_i = g^{a_i} h^{\upsilon_i} \forall i \in [1, l] \land R = g^r h^\epsilon \land E_c(\vec{a}, \upsilon) = r, \epsilon\}
\] (1)
The above relation states that each input parameter to a circuit is represented by a commitment $P_i$ in $\mathbb{G}$, which hides input value $a_i$ with blinding key $\nu_i$. The circuit output $r$ is computed from processing circuit $E_c$ with inputs $\tilde{P}$. The circuit output value is also represented by a commitment $R \in \mathbb{G}$ with blinding key $\epsilon$.

Despite being additively homomorphic, we cannot take Pedersen commitments as inputs to a circuit because we cannot perform multiplications on them. We introduce a new concept called input transformation. The main idea is to transform committed inputs in Perdersen commitment form in $\mathbb{G}$ to linear polynomials in $\mathbb{F}$ where both the prover and the verifier can perform addition and multiplication operations just as they do on integers. The output value of a circuit evaluation is now $a_i'$, which hides input value $a_i$, is represented by a commitment $P'_i$ in $\mathbb{G}$ with blinding key $\nu_i$.

In our protocol, we can break the evaluation process into two sub-statements: in proving the first sub-statement, the prover proves each input transformation from committed circuit output value. To prove the first sub-statement, the prover proves the circuit output is correctly computed from transformed inputs by showing the constant term of the output polynomial maps to the committed circuit output value. To prove the first sub-statement we show how to prove each input transformation from $P_i$ to $a_i'$ is legit. Unlike commitments, the linear polynomial $a_i' \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ is not binding to $a_i$ as we can easily manipulate the value of $a_i$ by altering its blinding key if the value of challenge $X$ is known. e.g. $a_i' = (a_i + \delta) + x(\nu_i - \delta/x)$ (the “committed” value $a_i$ is altered to $a_i + \delta$). This is ok because the prover must commits to circuit output $r'$ and its blinding key $\epsilon$ before the evaluation point $X$ is known.

The prover commits to the differences between blinding key pairs $(a_i - \nu_i)$ using blinding key $\mu$. The verifier uses a random challenge $k$ to generate $\bar{k} = k^1, ..., k^l$ so that verifiers can verify all transformed inputs in batch s.t.:

$$\kappa = \sum_{i=1}^{l} (a_i - \nu_i)k^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$$
If the prover can prove the knowledge of $\kappa, \mu$ on generator $h, u \in \mathbb{G}$ using any proof of knowledge (proof of discrete logarithm) protocol, we can confirm that only the sum of products of blinding keys (exponent of $h$) are being updated except for a negligible probability. To prove and verify the knowledge of two exponents on two generators of a committed value, we extend the functionality of proveDL and verifyDL defined earlier:

- **ProveEDL**($h, u, \kappa, \mu$) → $tr_{\kappa\mu}$ generates proof transcript $tr_{\kappa\mu}$, where $\kappa, \mu$ are witnesses.
- **VerifyEDL**($h, u, PK_{\kappa\mu}, tr_{\kappa\mu}$) → $b \in \{0, 1\}$ takes a proof transcript $tr_{\kappa\mu}$ and verify a pair of discrete log relation ($PK_{\kappa\mu} = h^{\kappa}u^{\mu}$), and outputs true if the knowledge of these relation is verified, false otherwise.

Neither of these two functions above will be used in the final version of our protocol, we use them to get a secure version of our base protocol (Protocol 1). The implementation of the two functions above is trivial, one such example is the extended Shnorr protocol find in halo [13]. The key is to not allow attackers to retrieve $h^\kappa$ and $u^\mu$ from proof transcripts. In protocol 1, the prover creates the proof transcript for the knowledge of $\kappa, \mu$ on generators $h, u \in \mathbb{G}$ as follows:

$$PK_{\kappa\mu} = h^{\kappa}u^{\mu} \in \mathbb{G}$$

To verify all input mappings in one batch, the verifier adds the commitment to blinding key differences $PK_{\kappa\mu}$ back to the sum of products of all input commitments:

$$P_t = \prod_{i=1}^{l} P_k^i \cdot PK_{\kappa\mu} \in \mathbb{G}$$

The prover use the new blinding keys $\vec{\alpha}$ to create linear polynomials $\vec{a}$ such that $a_i' = a_i + x\alpha_i$ for all $i$. After challenge $k$ is available, the prover can batch prove the mapping between committed values and their linear polynomial values by providing transcripts for $tr_{\alpha_t}$.

$$\alpha_t = \sum_{i=1}^{l} (a_i)k_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$tr_{\alpha_t\mu} = ProveEDL((h/g^x), u, \alpha_t, \mu)$$

The verifier computes the sum of products of $\vec{a}$ and powers of $k$. With sum of products of both $\vec{P}, \vec{a}'$ ($P_t, t$) available, the verifier can trivially compute $PK_{\alpha_t}$ s.t.:

$$t = \sum_{i=1}^{l} a_i'k_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$$

$$PK_{\alpha_t\mu} = P_t/g^t = (h/g^x)^{\alpha_t}u^\mu$$

If the prover can prove the knowledge of $\alpha_t$ on generator $(h/g^x) \in \mathbb{G}$ using any proof of knowledge protocol, we know that the mapping between $\vec{P}$ and $\vec{a}'$ is correct except for a negligible probability.

**To prove the second sub-statement** To prove the circuit output is correctly computed from transformed inputs $\vec{a}'$, the prover needs to show it knows the coefficient of all terms of the output polynomial. For example, for a simple circuit that just outputs the sum of two inputs, the prover needs to show it knows the constant term $r$ and the coefficient of the degree 1 term $\epsilon$ of the output polynomial:

$$o = a_1' + a_2' = r + X \cdot \epsilon$$
Computing the output polynomial is the same as adding two polynomials, where \( r = (a_1 + a_2) \) and the blinding key is \( \epsilon = (\alpha_1 + \alpha_2) \). Likewise, multiplying two inputs \( a_1', a_2' \) is the same as multiplying two polynomials:

\[
o = a_1 \cdot a_2 = r + X \cdot \epsilon + X^2 \cdot \tau
\] (14)

Where \( r = a_1 \cdot a_2, \epsilon = a_2 \alpha_1 + a_1 \alpha_2, \) and \( \tau = \alpha_1 \cdot \alpha_2 \). We use the label “\( o \)” to represent the circuit output, which is equivalent to the output polynomial evaluated at a point \( X \). The degree of the polynomial will increase after each multiplication operation, so the efficiency will drop as the maximum number of multiplications included in any path that leads to the circuit output \( (m_p) \) increases.

We also need the reduce the circuit output from a degree \( m_p + 1 \) polynomial to a linear polynomial \( r' = r + X \epsilon \) maps to the commitment \( R = g^r h^\epsilon \). To get the linear polynomial we need from the raw output \( o \), the verifier needs to subtract out all terms with degree higher than one. In the multiplication circuit above, the verifier needs to eliminate the term of degree 2 to get the linear polynomial. To do so, the prover commits to \( \tau \) before the challenge \( x \) is known. When the challenge \( x \) is available, the prover sends the evaluation of terms with degree higher than one \( y \) to the verifier and engage with the verifier to prove \( f(x) = X^2 \tau = y \). With \( y = X^2 \tau \) validated, the verifier can subtract \( y \) from \( o \) to get the output in linear polynomial form:

\[
r' = o - y
\] (15)

We call \( y \) the “breaker” of our protocol, because it subtracts all noises (polynomial terms of degree higher than one) from the raw circuit output \( o \). In practice, the prover and the verifier engages in a polynomial commitment protocol to confirm \( f(x) = y \).

\[
C = \prod_{i=1}^{m_p} u_i^\tau \in \mathbb{G}
\] (16)

In the final version of our protocol, the polynomial commitment evaluation logic is broken apart and integrated with our protocol (protocol 3), so that we no longer need to call a polynomial commitment evaluation function as we do in Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 (see section 5).

We define two more functions for our protocol. Function \texttt{computeKeys} is used by the prover to compute keys of a polynomial, and function \texttt{computeCircuit} is used by verifiers to compute the value of the result polynomial at evaluation point \( X \):

1. function \texttt{computeKeys}(circuit,"input values", "input keys") take input values \( \vec{a} \) and keys \( \vec{\upsilon} \) to compute \( r, \epsilon, \vec{\tau} \) (coefficients of \( o \)) using the circuit provided to the protocol. function \texttt{computeKeys} uses function Multiply and function Add defined above to compute coefficients of \( o \).
2. function \texttt{computeCircuit}(circuit,"input values in linear polynomial form") trivially compute the result \( o \) from the inputs provided as they are integer values.

We don’t waste space describing them in detail here since they are trivial to implement. With all the information available, we now formally introduce Protocol 1:

\[
Input : (\vec{P} \in \mathbb{G}^l, \vec{a} \in \mathbb{G}^{m_p}, g, h \in \mathbb{G}, \vec{a}, \vec{\upsilon} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^l)
\] (17)

\[
\mathcal{P}'s\ input : (\vec{P}, \vec{a}, g, h; \vec{a}, \vec{\upsilon})
\] (18)

\[
\mathcal{V}'s\ input : (\vec{P}, \vec{a}, g, h)
\] (19)

\[
\mathcal{P}\ compute :
\] (20)

\[
\alpha_i \xleftarrow{} \mathbb{Z}_p, \quad i = \{1, \ldots, l\}
\] (21)

\[
r, \epsilon, \vec{\tau} = \text{computeKeys} (\text{equation,} \vec{a}, \vec{\upsilon})
\] (22)

\[
R = g^r h^\epsilon \in \mathbb{G}
\] (23)

\[
tr_c = ((h/g^\tau), \epsilon)
\] (24)
\[ C = \prod_{i=1}^{m_p} u_i^{\tau_i} \in G \]  

(25)

\[ \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} : C, R, tr \epsilon \]  

(26)

\[ \mathcal{V} \text{ compute} : \]  

\[ x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \]  

(28)

\[ \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P} : x \]  

(29)

\[ \mathcal{P} \text{ compute} : \]  

\[ a'_i = a_i + x\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \quad i = \{1, ..., l\} \]  

(31)

\[ y = \sum_{i} \tau_i \cdot x^{i+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p \]  

(32)

\[ \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} : a', y \]  

(33)

\[ \mathcal{V} \text{ verify final output } R : \]  

\[ o = \text{computeCircuit}(\text{circuit, } a') \]  

(35)

\[ r' = o - y \in G \]  

(36)

\[ PK_{\epsilon} = R/g^{r'} \in G \]  

(37)

if PolyCommitEval(C, y, x; \overline{r})  

then continue  

else reject  

if VerifyDL((h/g^x), PK_{\epsilon}, tr)  

then continue  

else reject  

\[ \mathcal{V} \text{ compute} : \]  

\[ k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \]  

(44)

\[ \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P} : k \]  

(46)

\[ \mathcal{P} \text{ compute} : \]  

\[ \alpha_{t} = \sum_{i=1}^{l} \alpha_i k^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \]  

(48)

\[ tr_{\alpha_{t} \mu} = \text{ProveEDL}(h, g, u, \alpha_t, \mu) \]  

(49)

\[ \kappa = \sum_{i=1}^{l} (\alpha_i - \nu_i) k^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \]  

(50)

\[ PK_{\kappa \mu} = h^\kappa u^\mu \in G \]  

(51)

\[ tr_{\kappa \mu} = \text{ProveEDL}(h, u, \kappa, \mu) \]  

(52)

\[ \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} : PK_{\kappa \mu}, tr_{\kappa \mu}, tr_{\alpha_{t} \mu} \]  

(53)

\[ \mathcal{V} \text{ verify inputs} : \]  

\[ P_t = (\prod_{i=1}^{l} P_i^k) \cdot PK_{\kappa \mu} \in G \]  

(54)

\[ t = \sum_{i=1}^{l} a'_i k^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \]  

(56)
\[ PK_{\alpha t} = P_t / g^t \]  
\[ \text{if } \text{VerifyEDL}(h, u, PK_{\kappa \mu}, tr_{\kappa \mu}), \]  
\[ \text{and } \text{VerifyEDL}((h / g^x), u, PK_{\alpha t \mu}, tr_{\alpha t \mu}) \]  
\[ \text{then accept} \]  
\[ \text{else reject} \]  

Protocol 1

Theorem 1. (Zero Knowledge Argument with Practical Efficiency). The proof system presented in this section has perfect completeness, perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge, and computational witness extended emulation.

The proof for Theorem 1 is presented in Appendix A.

The main idea of Protocol 1 is to convert commitments \( P_i \) to its linear polynomial form \( a'_i \) so that the verifier can just take linear polynomials as input values to the circuit and use standard integer operations to compute the circuit. The circuit output \( o \) is a polynomial with \( mp + 1 \) degree. By subtracting out all term with degree greater than one as in equation 15 explained, the verifier gets the circuit output in linear polynomial form that maps to the commitment \( R \).

3 Making Input Transformation Based Zero Knowledge Protocol Efficient with NTT

Protocol 1’s prover isn’t efficient because \( O(mp^2) \) field operations in prover work can become expensive as \( m_p \) gets big. In this section, we introduce a mechanism that allows us to use the number theoretic transform (NTT) to cut prover’s field operation work to \( mp \log mp \).

3.1 Using Number Theoretic Transform to Improve Prover Performance in Field Operations

The objective of NTT is to multiply two polynomials such that the coefficients of the resultant polynomials are calculated under a particular modulo in \( mp \log mp \), a major improvement over \( mp^2 \) runtime of the trivial approach. However, a major drawback of NTT is that it requires a prime modulo \( q \) of the form \( q = r \cdot 2^k + 1 \) to be the prime order of the group, where \( k \) and \( c \) are arbitrary constants. Since the prime order of widely used \( G \) in cryptography is usually not a prime with the aforementioned form, we need a mechanism to map linear polynomials with a prime modulo \( q \) that satisfies the aforementioned form to a group \( G \) with prime order \( p \). \( q \) is expected to be smaller than \( p \) because: 1) computation in \( p \) (e.g. polynomial commitment evaluation) won’t overflow 2) the smaller the \( q \) value in bits, the lower the communication cost. In our benchmark testing, we set \( q \) to a 61-bit prime number.

We redefine equation 2 s.t. \( a'_i \) and its blinding key \( \alpha_i \) are now in prime field \( q \) instead of the larger prime field \( p \).

\[ a'_i = a_i + x\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q \quad i = \{1, \ldots, l\} \]  

We define a new blinding key \( \omega_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) and mix that with blinding key \( \upsilon_i \) in \( P_i \) and its corresponding blinding key \( \alpha_i \) in \( a' \) to create \( S_i, T_i \).

\[ S_i = g^{\omega_i} \in G \quad i = \{1, \ldots, l\} \]  
\[ T_i = g^{\upsilon_i - \alpha_i} \in G \quad i = \{1, \ldots, l\} \]

The prover then sends \( S_i, T_i \) for \( i = \{1, \ldots, l\} \) to the verifier. When the challenge \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) is available, the prover sends \( e_i \) s.t.:

\[ e_i = ((x\alpha_i \mod q) - x\alpha_i) \cdot x + \omega_i \cdot q \quad i = \{1, \ldots, l\} \]
\( e_i \) does not need to be in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \), but it is a good idea to keep \( e_i \) smaller than \( p \) to keep the communication cost low. The idea here is that when we subtract \( e_i \) from \( a_i \), we can subtract out the blinding modulo \( q \) element \( (x_0 \mod q) \) from \( a'_i \) (e.g. \( a'_i \cdot x - e_i = (a_i + x_0) \cdot x - \omega_i q \)). The verifier can replace \( x^\omega a_i - \omega_i q \) part with the new blinding element \( x^2 v_i \) as the exponent of generator \( g \) by adding the previously committed values \( S_i, T_i \).

\[
g^{a'_i \cdot x - e_i \cdot T_i^2 \cdot S_i} = (g^x)^{a'_i + x v_i} \in \mathcal{G} \text{ \ for \ } i \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \tag{66}
\]

With \((g^x)^{a'_i + x v_i}\) available, the verifier can trivially divide each \( P_i \) and taking their sum with powers of \( k \) to get \( PK_{v_i} \).

\[
PK_{v_i} = \prod_{i=1}^{l} \left( \frac{g^{a'_i \cdot x - e_i} \cdot T_i^{x^2} \cdot S_i}{P_i^{x}} \right) \in \mathcal{G} \tag{67}
\]

\( PK_{v_i} = ((h/g)^x)^{v_i} \). The verifier can confirm the correctness of the transformation except with negligible probability if the prover can prove the knowledge of \( v_i \) on generator \((h/g)^x \in \mathcal{G} \).

Finally, the verifier needs to make sure \( e_i \) doesn’t alter the value of \( a_i \). This can be done by taking the modulus \( q \) of \( e_i \) and checking if it returns 0. This is trivial to understand since \( a'_i \) is in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \). If \( e_i \) is a multiple of \( q \) then it is obvious that it cannot alter the value of \( a_i \).

\[
\text{if (} e_i \mod q \text{) } \overset{\gamma}{=} 0, \text{ then continue} \tag{68}
\]

This test also implies the transformation process explained in this section is sound since soundness of equation \(67\) is trivial to prove. This will be explained in more detail along with rest of the protocol in Appendix B.

This transformation process is zero-knowledge because \( e_i \) does not leak any information to the verifier either. This is because the first part of \( e_i \): \((x_0 \mod q) - x_0 \) is a multiple of \( q \), and can be represented as \( s \cdot q \) for some \( s \). This implies \( e_i = (s + \omega) \cdot q \) for some randomly chosen \( \omega \). Since every other transcript (in \( \mathcal{G} \)) is trivially zero-knowledge, we say this transformation process is zero-knowledge if \( \omega \) is correctly chosen (e.g. any number between \(-s \) to \( p/q \) s.t. \( e_i < p \)).

We have so far skipped the overflow problem. If \( a_i + (x_0 \mod q) > q \), then we will have an overflow problem in equation \(66, 67\) when computing \( a'_i \cdot x - e_i \). To get around this the prover simply needs to check if \( a_i + (x_0 \mod q) \) overflows \( q \), and subtracts \( q \cdot x \) from \( e_i \) if that’s the case.

\[
\text{if } a_i + (x_0 \mod q) > q, \text{ then } e_i = e_i - q \cdot x \text{ \ for } i \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \tag{69}
\]

We now merge the NTT conversion code introduced in this section and formally define the efficient version of our protocol in Protocol 2.

\[
\text{Input : } (\vec{P} \in \mathcal{G}^l, \vec{a} \in \mathcal{G}^m, g, h \in \mathcal{G}, \vec{a}, \vec{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^l) \tag{70}
\]

\[
\mathcal{P}'s \text{ input : } (\vec{P}, \vec{a}, g, h, \vec{a}, \vec{v}) \tag{71}
\]

\[
\mathcal{V}'s \text{ input : } (\vec{P}, \vec{a}, g, h) \tag{72}
\]

\[
\mathcal{P} \text{ compute : }
\begin{align*}
\alpha_i &\overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p, \quad i \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \tag{73} \\
\omega_i &\overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p, \quad i \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \\
r, \epsilon, \vec{r} &\overset{\$}{=} \text{computeKeys(equation, } \vec{a}, \vec{a}\text{)} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{m+2} \tag{74} \\
R &= g^r h^\epsilon \in \mathcal{G} \tag{75} \\
tr_c &= ((h/g)^x, \epsilon) \tag{76}
\end{align*}
\]
\[
C = \prod_{i=1}^{m_p} u_i^{\tau_i} \in G
\]

\[
S_i = g^{u_i q} \in G \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}
\]

\[
T_i = g^{v_i - u_i} \in G \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}
\]

\[\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} : \vec{S}, \vec{T}, C, R, \text{tr}_e\]

\[\mathcal{V} \text{ compute :} \]
\[x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\]

\[\mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P} : x\]

\[\mathcal{P} \text{ compute :} \]
\[a'_i = a_i + x\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}\]

\[e_i = (x\alpha_i \mod q) - x\alpha_i x + \omega_i q \in \mathbb{Z}_p \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}\]

\[
\text{if } a_i + (x\alpha_i \mod q) > q, \text{ then } e_i = e_i - q \cdot x \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}
\]

\[y = \sum_i t_i \cdot x^{i+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_p\]

\[\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} : \vec{c}, \vec{a'}, y\]

\[\mathcal{V} \text{ verify final output :} \]
\[o = \text{computeEquation(equation, } \vec{a'}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p\]

\[r' = o - y \in \mathbb{Z}_p \quad // r + x \cdot \epsilon\]

\[PK_e = R/g^{r'} \in G \quad // \text{equal to } (h/g)^e\]

\[
\text{if } \text{PolyCommitEval}(C, y, x; \vec{\tau}), \text{ then continue }\]

\[
\text{else reject}
\]

\[
\text{if } VerifyDL((h/g)^x, PK_e, \text{tr}_e), \text{ then continue }\]

\[
\text{else reject}
\]

\[\mathcal{V} \text{ compute :} \]
\[k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\]

\[\mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P} : k\]

\[\mathcal{P} \text{ compute :} \]
\[v_t = \sum_{i=1}^{l} v_ik^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p\]

\[\text{tr}_{v_t} = \text{ProveDL}((h/g)^x, v_t)\]

\[\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} : \text{tr}_{v_t}\]

\[\mathcal{V} \text{ verify inputs :} \]
\[
\text{if } (e_i \mod q) \neq 0, \text{ then continue } \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}
\]

\[
\text{else reject}
\]

\[PK_{v_t} = \prod_{i=1}^{l} \left( \frac{P_i^{x} \cdot g^{e_i \cdot x - e_i} \cdot T_i^{x} \cdot S_i}{g^{e_i \cdot x - e_i} \cdot T_i^{x} \cdot S_i} \right) ^{k^i} \in G\]

\[
\text{if } VerifyDL((h/g)^x, PK_{v_t}, \text{tr}_{v_t}), \text{ then accept }\]

\[
\text{else reject}
\]

The proof system presented in this section has perfect completeness, perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge, and computational witness extended emulation.

The proof for Theorem 2 is presented in Appendix B.

Since we are now evaluating the output polynomial at a smaller field \( q \), the soundness error is increased due to existence of polynomial roots. The NTT acceptable prime we use in our implementation is \( q = 194555609024054273 \), where \( r = 27, k = 56, g = 5 \) s.t. \( q = r * 2^k + 1 \).

3.2 The Asymptotic Cost of Protocol 2

The prover runtime of Protocol 2 is dominated by \( O(m \log m + m + l) \) field operations and \( O(m + m^{1/2} + l) \) group exponentiations; the verifier runtime is dominated by \( O(n + m^{1/2} + l) \) field operations and \( O(m^{1/2} + l) \) group exponentiations; and the communication cost is dominated by \( O(m^{1/2} + l) \) group elements and \( O(m^{1/2} + l) \) field elements.

The worst possible scenario for our protocol is when we have a sequence of multiplications where both multiplier and multiplicand are the product of the previous multiplication operation (e.g. \( (a^2)^2 \) is technically 3 multiplications, but it will result in \( m_p = 2^3 \)), in such case \( m_p \) will grow exponentially. One way to tackle such problem is to break the circuit into segments of smaller sub-circuits so that \( m_p \) value will be refreshed whenever it grows oversize, similar to the idea of bootstrapping in fully homomorphic encryption. We will explore this option in the next section.

4 Enhancing Efficiency for Circuits with High Depth

The efficiency of protocol 2 will degrade as the total number of multiplications in the path computing the output (\( m_p \) value) grow larger, a not-so-uncommon scenario for circuits with high depth. One way to get around this problem is to have multiple breakers so that the number of polynomial terms will never exceed \( b \) s.t. \( b = \frac{m_p}{m_b} \) (symbol \( m_b \) stands for the number of breakers).

4.1 Batch Verification With Multiple Breakers

Each breaker \( y_i \) is an evaluation at point \( x \) for terms \( x^2, \ldots, x^{b+1} \) of the polynomial accumulated thus far in the computation. Obviously, it is not efficient for us to commit and evaluate \( m \) number of polynomials, where \( m \) stands for the number of breakers \((y_1, \ldots, y_m)\) we use to evaluate a circuit.

Fortunately, we just need to make a simple modification to the polynomial commitment evaluation protocol defined by Bootle et al. to enable verifiers to evaluate \( m_b \) breakers all at once. We start by aligning each breaker \( y_i \) to the coefficients of the \( i \)th generator of vector commitments (columns of the \( m_b \times b \) matrix).

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\tau_{1,1} & \tau_{1,2} & \ldots & \tau_{1,b} \\
\tau_{2,1} & \tau_{2,2} & \ldots & \tau_{2,b} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
\tau_{m_b,1} & \tau_{m_b,2} & \ldots & \tau_{m_b,b}
\end{pmatrix}
\begin{pmatrix}
x^2 \\
x^3 \\
x^4 \\
\vdots \\
x^{b+1}
\end{pmatrix}
\]

13
Let $y_i = (y'_i) \mod q$, we can observe from figure 1 that each $y'_i$ can be computed from the sum of products of exponents of $u_i$ (e.g. $y'_i = \tau_{i,1}x^2 + \tau_{i,2}x^3 + \ldots + \tau_{i,b}x^{b+1}$).

In our protocol, the prover commits to the columns of the matrix in figure 1 in the same way as that in Bootle et al.’s polynomial commitment evaluation scheme.

$$C_j = \prod_{i=1}^{m_b} u_i^{\tau_{i,j}} \quad \text{for} \quad j = \{1, \ldots, b\}$$ (113)

When the evaluation point $x$ is known, the verifier computes the exponent of each $C_j$. If the equality below is true, all breakers are verified.

$$\prod_{i=1}^{m_b} y'_i = \prod_{j=1}^{b} C_j^{x^{j+1}}$$ (114)

Note that if each breaker $y'_i$ is equal to the sum of products of $b$ terms and each term is a product of $x^{j+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\tau_{i,j} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, then the bit length of $|y'_i|$ is approximately $|y'_i| \leq 2 \cdot |q| + |b|$. The value of $y'_i$ can also be expressed as $y'_i = y_i + z \cdot q$ for some $z$ and $|z| \leq |q| + |b|$. However, passing raw $y'_i$ values to the verifier may leak some information about the coefficients.

To cope with that, we make the prover commit to a blinding vector $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{mb}$ where $|m_b| \approx 2 \cdot |q| + |b|$, s.t. the exact upper bond for $m$ is unknown to the verifier. As a result, each $y'_i$ is now computed as:

$$y'_i = \sum_{j=1}^{b} \tau_{i,j}x^j + \beta_i \quad \text{for} \quad i = \{1, \ldots, m_b\}$$ (115)

Note that the power (exponent) of $x$ in each term in the equation above is one degree lower than it needs to be, so to get $y_i$ from $y'_i$ the verifier needs to multiply $x$ one more time:

$$y_i = (y'_i, x) \mod q \in \mathbb{Z}_q \quad \text{for} \quad i = \{1, \ldots, m_b\}$$ (116)

This implies the value of the circuit output $r'$ is now updated to $m_b$ number of $r'_i = r_i + x(\epsilon_1 + \beta_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, so we need to adjust the blinding key of $r'$ by adding $\beta_i$ to it in the computeKeys function. The updated equality graph is shown in figure 2 below.

$$u_{m_b}^{y'_{m_b}} \begin{pmatrix} u_1^{\tau_{1,1}} & u_1^{\tau_{1,2}} & \ldots & u_1^{\tau_{1,b}} \\ u_2^{\tau_{2,1}} & u_2^{\tau_{2,2}} & \ldots & u_2^{\tau_{2,b}} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ u_{m_b}^{\tau_{m_b,1}} & u_{m_b}^{\tau_{m_b,2}} & \ldots & u_{m_b}^{\tau_{m_b,b}} \end{pmatrix} \begin{pmatrix} u_1^{\beta_1} \\ u_2^{\beta_2} \\ \vdots \\ u_{m_b}^{\beta_{m_b}} \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} x^{\tau_{1,1}} \\ x^{\tau_{2,1}} \\ \vdots \\ x^{\tau_{m_b,1}} \end{pmatrix}$$

Figure 2

Let $B = \prod_{i=1}^{m_b} u_i^{y'_i}$, the equality in figure 2 can also be expressed using the equality check below:

$$\prod_{i=1}^{m_b} y'_i = \prod_{j=1}^{b} C_j^{x^{j+1}} \cdot B$$ (117)
If the commitments $\vec{C}, B$ and vector $\vec{y}$ satisfy the equation above, then we know breakers $\vec{y}$ are valid. The verifier applies equation 116 to each $y'_i$ to get the actual breakers $y_i$ used in computing $o_i$.

We are now ready to introduce Protocol 3, which replaces the generic polynomial commitment evaluation in Protocol 2 with the multi-breaker mechanism we introduced in this section.

**Input**: $(\vec{P} \in G^l, \vec{u} \in G^{m_b}, g, h \in G, \vec{a}, \vec{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^l)$ (118)

$P'$’s input : $(\vec{P}, \vec{u}, g, h; \vec{a}, \vec{v})$ (119)

$V$’s input : $(\vec{P}, \vec{u}, g, h)$ (120)

$P$ compute:

$$\alpha_i \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p, \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}$$ (122)

$$\omega_i \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p, \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}$$ (123)

$$\beta_i \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_m, \quad i = \{1, ..., m_b\}$$ (124)

$r, \varepsilon, \vec{r} = \text{computeKeys}(equation, \vec{a}, \vec{a}', \vec{b}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{m_p+2}$ (125)

$$R = g^r h^\varepsilon \in G$$ (126)

$$tr_\varepsilon = ((h/g)^r, \varepsilon)$$ (127)

$$C_j = \prod_{i=1}^{m_b} u_i^{r_{i,j}} \in G \quad i = \{1, ..., b\}$$ (128)

$$S_i = g^{\omega_i-q} \in G \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}$$ (129)

$$T_i = g^{\omega_i-\alpha_i} \in G \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}$$ (130)

$$B = \prod_{i=1}^{m_b} u_i^{\beta_i} \in G$$ (131)

$P \rightarrow V : \vec{S}, \vec{T}, \vec{C}, B, R, tr_\varepsilon$ (132)

$V$ compute:

$$x \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p$$ (134)

$V \rightarrow P : x$ (135)

$P$ compute:

$$a'_i = a_i + x\alpha_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}$$ (137)

$$e_i = ((x\alpha_i \mod q) - x\alpha_i)x + \omega_iq \in \mathbb{Z}_p \quad i = \{1, ..., l\}$$ (138)

if $a_i + (x\alpha_i \mod q) > q$, then $e_i = e_i - q \cdot x$ \quad $i = \{1, ..., l\}$ (139)

$$y'_i = \sum_{j=1}^{b} \tau_{i,j} \cdot x^j + \beta_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \quad i = \{1, ..., m_b\}$$ (140)

$P \rightarrow V : \vec{c}, \vec{a}', \vec{y}'$ (141)

$V$ verify final output:

if $\left(\prod_{i=1}^{m_b} y'_i, \prod_{j=1}^{b} C_{x^j} \cdot B \right)$ then continue (143)

else reject

for $i = 1, ..., m_b$ \{ $o_i = \text{computeEquation}(equation, \vec{a}', r') \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ (146)

$$y_i = (y'_i \cdot x) \mod q \in \mathbb{Z}_q$$ (147)
\( r'_i = a_i - y_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \)  \\
\( r' = r'_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q \)

\[ PK_e = R/g' \in \mathbb{G} \]  // equal to \((h/g)^e\)

if \( VerifyDL((h/g)^e, PK_e, tr_e) \), then continue

else reject

\( V \) compute:

\( k \in \mathbb{Z}_p \)

\( V \rightarrow P : k \)

\( P \) compute:

\( v_t = \sum_{i=1}^{l} v_i k^i \in \mathbb{Z}_p \)

\( tr_{v_t} = ProveDL((h/g)^x, v_t) \)

\( P \rightarrow V : tr_{v_t} \)

\( V \) verify inputs:

if \((e_i \mod q) = 0\), then continue \( i = \{1, \ldots, l\} \)

else reject

\[ PK_{v_t} = \prod_{i=1}^{l} \left( g^{a_i k^i} \cdot S_i \right)^{k^i} \in \mathbb{G} \]

if \( VerifyDL((h/g)^x, PK_{v_t}, tr_{v_t}) \), then accept

else reject

**Protocol 3**

**Theorem 3.** *(Efficient Zero Knowledge Argument for Arbitrary Circuits with Practical Efficiency).*
The proof system presented in this section has perfect completeness, perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge, and computational witness extended emulation.

The proof for Theorem 3 is presented in Appendix C.

From line 146 to 151 in protocol 3 we assumed our circuit is a linear circuit where there is only one path because it is easy to model. In practice, binary circuits generally have multiple “bit” paths that executes in parallel.

### 4.2 Booleanity Check and Bit Decomposition/Reposition

A common requirement in proving binary circuits is the need to enforce input data \( a_i \in \{0,1\} \) for some \( i \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \). In practice, it is useful to decompose \( l \) full integer inputs into \( l \cdot 32 \) bits (assuming we use 32 bits to represent a full integer, like the int type in Java) in order to perform comparison operations on input data. If a committed value \( a_i \) is in \([0,1]\), then its linear polynomial form \( a_i \) must have the following property:

\[ (a'_i - a'_i - a'_i) = \beta_1 x + \beta_2 x^2 \]  

Where \( \beta_2 = \alpha^2 \), and \( \beta_1 = \alpha \) when \( a_j = 1 \) and \( \beta_1 = -\alpha \) when \( a_j = 0 \). To prove the correctness for all \( a_i \in \{0,1\} \), the prover commits to two polynomials \( K_1, K_2 \) s.t.

\[ K_1 = u_1^{\beta_1} \cdot u_2^{\beta_2} \cdots u_l^{\beta_l} h^{\beta_1} \quad \text{and} \quad K_2 = u_1^{\beta_2} \cdot u_2^{\beta_2} \cdots u_l^{\beta_1} h^{\beta_2} \]
Where \( K_1 \) commits to coefficients on \( x \) term for \( i \in \{1, \ldots, l\cdot32\} \) and \( K_2 \) commits to coefficients on \( x^2 \) term for \( i \in \{1, \ldots, l\cdot32\} \). The prover sends \( K_1, K_2 \) to the verifier. When the challenge \( k \) is received, the prover sends the evaluation results \( y_1, y_2 \) to the verifier, and the verifier uses the polynomial commitment protocol to verify the correctness of \( y_1, y_2 \) at point \( k \), and checks if the equality below is true:

\[
y_1 \cdot x + y_2 \cdot x^2 = \sum_{j=1}^{l\cdot32} (a'_i \cdot a'_i - a'_i) \cdot k^i
\]

(169)

Once we know all linear polynomials maps to either 0 or 1, it is trivial to recompose the linear polynomial form of a full integer input \( a'_i \) from 32 decomposed bits \( a'_{i,j} \) for \( j = \{1, \ldots, 32\} \).

\[
a'_i = \sum_{j=1}^{32} a'_{i,j} \cdot 2^j
\]

(170)

In practice, we will conduct booleanity test on all \( l\cdot32 \) bit values at once and then use equation (170) to convert them into \( l \) full integer values so that we can perform the "linear polynomial to Pedersen commitment" mapping test explained in the last two sections.

### 4.3 The Asymptotic Cost of Protocol 3

For a circuit with \( l \) input parameters s.t. each input parameter is composed of 32 bits, the prover runtime of the final version (Protocol 3) of our protocol is dominated by \( O(m_p \log m_p^{1/2} + m_p + l + 32 \cdot l^{1/2}) \) field operations (assuming additive operations in \( \mathbb{F} \) are practically free) and \( O(m_p + m_p^{1/2} + l + 32 \cdot l^{1/2}) \) group exponentiations; the verifier runtime is dominated by \( O(n + m_p^{1/2} + l + 32 \cdot l^{1/2}) \) field operations and \( O(m_p^{1/2} + l + 32 \cdot l^{1/2}) \) group exponentiations; and the communication cost is dominated by \( O(m_p^{1/2} + l + 32 \cdot l^{1/2}) \) group elements and \( O(m_p^{1/2} + l + 32 \cdot l^{1/2}) \) field elements.

### 5 Performance Comparison

We compare the performance of our protocol to some of the most popular transparent Zero Knowledge Protocols for which open source codes are available. Our test runs are performed on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-9750H CPU @ 2.60 Ghz. Only one core is being utilized, and all tests are run on a single CPU thread. Our test code is a non-interactive implementation (using Fiat-Shamir heuristic) of Protocol 3.

The baseline protocols we picked are Hyrax, Ligero, Aurora, and Spartan-NIZK. These protocols are chosen because they are the most representative of popular zero-knowledge protocols and can be verified with open source code. In particular, Aurora outperforms STARK in all key parameters (prover runtime, verifier runtime, proof size), and the NIZK version of Spartan offers the most balanced performance across all performance parameters. We also do not consider SNARKs even though most of them can be made transparent by switching to a transparent polynomial commitment scheme, as they are hardly efficient after the switch.

We didn’t consider transparent protocols that highly depend on circuit depth such as GKR based protocols simply because they can’t handle \( 2^{20} \) sequential multiplications. We also don’t consider VOLE based protocols as they are only optimized for prover work. Other popular transparent schemes such as Bulletproofs are also not being considered because they have linear verifier runtime and therefore are not succinct.

Spartan++ and Lakonia are two more recent developments that we didn’t include in our benchmark testing but are worth mentioning. The improvement of Spartan++ over SpartanNIZK is marginal, and the performance of Lakonia is largely comparable to that of SpartanNIZK (the prover performance of
SpartanNIZK is approximately 3X more efficient, and the verifier performance is 1.5X more efficient than that of Lakonia, while Lakonia is 4X more efficient than SpartanNIZK in proof size.

We set the number of inputs to our protocol to 30 integers, and each input is represented by 32 bits so that there are a total of $30 \cdot 32 = 960$ input bits to the circuit. The circuit we use performs $n$ sequential multiplications on $l$ inputs, so we have $m_p = n$, likely much closer to the worst case scenario of our protocol than the test cases of other protocols that we are comparing against. If we run a shallow circuit where $m_p$ number is small, the benchmark result will likely be significantly better. For example, if we have a circuit where $m_p = 1$, then its prover runtime performance will be comparable to that of verifier runtime.

The NTT acceptable prime number we picked for our benchmark testing is $q = 1945555039024054273$, a 61-bit number that implies the soundness error will be at most $2^{-51}$ for a circuit with $2^{20}$ sequential multiplications where $m_p = n$, more than enough in most real-life applications. If this is not enough, one can pick a bigger NTT acceptable prime number. For example, if we use a 90 bit prime number (soundness error at most $2^{-80}$), the size of $\vec{a}'$ will increase by approximately 1/2 or approximately 29 kb for 960 input bits, and additional (to a lesser extent) prover and verifier costs will also increase marginally as we move field computations from int64 to int128.

To maximize the advantage of the NTT algorithm in computing sequential multiplications, we process each segment $(1, \ldots, m_b)$ of our circuit in binary tree format, such tuning may not be required in real-world applications since large circuits should have multiplication gates somewhat balanced out across layers.

For group operations, we use curve25519-dalek implementation, and Pippenger acceleration is applied to all sum-of-product group operations. For field operations, we use Montgomery algorithm to accelerate modular multiplications on the 61-bit NTT prime $q$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Circuit size</th>
<th>$2^{10}$</th>
<th>$2^{12}$</th>
<th>$2^{14}$</th>
<th>$2^{16}$</th>
<th>$2^{18}$</th>
<th>$2^{20}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyrax</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>486</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ligero</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>485</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SpartanNIZK</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This Work($m_p = n$)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.08</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Prover performance comparison (seconds)

Table 1 shows that as the circuit size gets bigger, the prover performance of our protocol is becoming increasingly more efficient than all of our baseline protocols. This is because the cost associated with the number of inputs to the circuit is fixed (960 bits), and its impact relative to the cost of evaluating the whole circuit gradually declines as the circuit size gets bigger (the same effect will also apply to verifier runtime and proof size benchmarks below).

From the chart, we can observe that only SpartanNIZK offers comparable (only slightly worse) prover runtime performance to that of our protocol, but it is worth to note that this is not a fair comparison in our favor since we’re comparing the evaluation of $2^{20}$ constraints in SpartanNIZK (provided by its test code) with the unlikely scenario of $2^{20}$ sequential multiplications in that of our protocol.

Table 2 shows that the communication cost of our protocol dominates that of Ligero and Aurora, while largely comparable to SpartanNIZK and Hyrax. For higher input number counts, see Table 4 for more detail.

Table 1 and 2 shows that our protocol is largely comparable to the current state of art in prover runtime and communication cost. Table 3 demonstrates that our protocol achieves significant im-
Circuit size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$2^{10}$</th>
<th>$2^{12}$</th>
<th>$2^{14}$</th>
<th>$2^{16}$</th>
<th>$2^{18}$</th>
<th>$2^{20}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyrax</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ligero</td>
<td>546</td>
<td>1,076</td>
<td>2,100</td>
<td>5,788</td>
<td>10,527</td>
<td>19,828</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora</td>
<td>477</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>1,069</td>
<td>1,315</td>
<td>1,603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SpartanNIZK</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This Work ($m_p = n$)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Proof size comparison (kilobytes)

Circuit size

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>$2^{10}$</th>
<th>$2^{12}$</th>
<th>$2^{14}$</th>
<th>$2^{16}$</th>
<th>$2^{18}$</th>
<th>$2^{20}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hyrax</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>331</td>
<td>594</td>
<td>1.6s</td>
<td>8.1s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ligero</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td>7.5s</td>
<td>33s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aurora</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>2s</td>
<td>7.2s</td>
<td>29.8s</td>
<td>118s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SpartanNIZK</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>This Work ($m_p = n$)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Verifier performance comparison (milliseconds)

provement by at least one order of magnitude in verifier runtime over all baseline protocols we are comparing against. Like that of communication cost, the verifier runtime of our protocol will grow when the number of inputs to the protocol grows.

Some may consider 30 integer inputs and 960 input bits to a circuit too small, so in table 4 we list performance benchmarks for different number of inputs ($l$) to a circuit with $2^{20}$ sequential multiplications.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input bits ($l \cdot 32$)</th>
<th>Input Integers ($l$)</th>
<th>Prover time(s)</th>
<th>Verifier time(ms)</th>
<th>Proof size(kb)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>960</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,280</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,920</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,240</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,560</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2,880</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4. Performance comparison for different input numbers on circuits with $2^{20}$ sequential multiplications s.t. $m_p = n$

In table 4 we can observe that increases in prover runtime and verifier runtime are small as the input bits count approaching 3,200. This is because the total input number is still small compared to the size of the circuit ( $2^{20}$ sequential multiplications ). Communication cost gets impacted the most as the input count gets higher. This is because the prover have to send $l \cdot 32$ linear polynomials to the verifier. Technically speaking, more inputs usually implies lower circuit depth and less complex business logic.

6 Related Work

Recursive SNARK is a hot area of research of late, they are especially useful for Blockchain use cases where the proof of the earlier block can be used as an input to the circuit of proving the later block.
Early recursive SNARKs \cite{37 23 10 8 22} built a prover for the whole SNARK circuit and then reuse this prover repeatedly. More recent recursive SNARKs are built on accumulation schemes \cite{13 18 11 17 32} that are more scalable. One requirement for recursive SNARKs is that the protocol needs to have succinct proof size and verification time. Although our protocol performs well in practice, it is not fully succinct as the verifier runs a linear number of field operations (in \textit{computeEquation} function). This linear operation part constitutes approximately 25\% of the total verification cost when running a circuit with $2^{20}$ sequential multiplications.

Appendix

A. Proof for Theorem One

Proof. Perfect completeness follows from the fact that Protocol 1 is trivially complete. To prove perfect honest-verifier zero-knowledge, we define a simulator $S$ to show that protocol 1 has perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge for relation 4. $S$ uses simulator $S_S$ to simulate proof transcripts for proof of knowledge (or proof of discrete logarithm, which we know for a fact that it exists) protocols, and simulator $S_P$ to simulate proof transcripts for polynomial commitment evaluation function PolyCommitEval.

Simulator $S$ generates random group elements for $C, R$, proof of knowledge transcript $tr_{\epsilon}$. After receiving challenge $x$ from the verifier, the simulator generates $l$ random integers to represent linear polynomials $\vec{a}'$ and one random integer to represent $y$ and sends them to the verifier.

The verifier follows the protocol to compute $PK_{\epsilon}$, then simulator $S$ calls simulator $S_S$ to interact with the verifier and generate all necessary transcripts to prove it knows the value of $\epsilon$. This makes sense since we already know for a fact that schnorr and many other proof of knowledge protocols have perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge. Similarly, the simulator $S$ calls simulator $S_P$ to simulate the transcripts for proving $y$ is the evaluated value at point $x$ for polynomial commitment $C$.

The simulator then simulates the transcripts to prove it knows $\alpha_t$ and $\kappa$. The simulator simply sends randomly generated $PK_{\kappa \mu}$ and random transcripts for $tr_{\kappa \mu}$ and $tr_{\alpha_t \mu}$, and calls simulator $S_S$ to simulate transcripts needed to prove the knowledge of $\kappa$ and $\alpha_t$.

Simulator $S$ chooses all proof elements and challenges according to the randomness supplied by the adversary from their respective domains or computes them directly as described in the protocol. Since all elements in proof transcripts are either independently randomly distributed or their relationship is fully defined by the verification equations, we can conclude that protocol 1 has perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.

To prove computational witness extended emulation, we construct an extractor $X$, which uses extractor $X$ to extract witnesses from proof of knowledge transcripts and extractor $X$ to extract witnesses from polynomial commitments.

We validate the soundness of Protocol 1 in three steps. First, we show how to construct an extractor $X$ for Protocol 1 s.t. on input $\vec{P} \in G', R \in G$, it either extracts witnesses $r, \epsilon, \vec{\tau}$ for relation 4 or discovers a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation among $g, h, \vec{u} \in G$. Next, we show that the extractor $X$ either extracts witnesses $\vec{a}, \vec{\upsilon}$ s.t. $\vec{\upsilon}$ maps to $\vec{a}$ or discovers a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation among $g, h, u \in G$. Finally, we validate the proof by checking if $r, \epsilon, \vec{\tau}$ can be computed from witnesses $\vec{a}, \vec{\alpha}$.

In step one, extractor $X$ interacts with the prover in the same way as any verifier would and receives $C, R, tr_{\epsilon}$ from the prover. The extractor $X$ then generates a challenge $x_1$ and forwards it to the prover. After receiving $\vec{a}_1, y_1$, the extractor rewinds the prover and sends another challenge $x_2$ to retrieve $\vec{a}_2, y_2$.

The extractor then follows the protocol and computes $o$ and $PK_{\epsilon}$, then calls extractor $X_S$ to extract $\epsilon$ from $tr_{\epsilon}$ and $PK_{\epsilon}$. With either $x_1$ or $x_2$, we can trivially retrieve $r, \epsilon$ from $r'$ since $r' = r + x \cdot \epsilon$,.
and validate if \( R = g^\ell h^\epsilon \). To validate if \( r, \epsilon \) is correctly computed from the circuit, extractor \( X \) calls extractor \( \mathcal{X} \) to retrieve set \( \mathcal{T} \) from polynomial commitment \( \mathcal{C} \).

We have now retrieved witnesses \( r, \epsilon, \mathcal{T} \) using the prover committed values \( C, R, tr_\epsilon \), and we know for a fact that \( o \) must also be computed from \( \vec{a}, \vec{\alpha} \) and evaluation point \( x \) since:

\[
o = r + \epsilon \cdot x + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \tau_i \cdot x^{i+1}
\]

If the prover is honest, \( r, \epsilon, \mathcal{T} \) must be computed by the prover from witnesses \( \vec{a}, \vec{\alpha} \)

So in the second step, we validate if witnesses of \( \vec{a}^\prime (\vec{a}, \vec{\alpha}) \) used in computing \( o \) maps to \( \vec{a}, \vec{\epsilon} \) in \( \mathcal{P} \) by checking if we can extract these witnesses. With \( \vec{a}_1 \) and \( \vec{a}_2 \) extractor \( \mathcal{X} \) retrieved earlier, we can trivially retrieve \( \vec{a}, \vec{\alpha} \) since for all \( i \in \{1, \ldots, l\} \) we have:

\[
a'_i - a'_{2i} = \alpha_i(x_1 - x_2)
\]

We then extracts witnesses \( \vec{a}, \vec{\epsilon} \) using \( \vec{a}^\prime \) and input commitments \( \vec{P} \). The extractor first generates \( k_1 \) and then follows the protocol to get \( PK_{\kappa_1}, tr_{\kappa_1}, PK_{\alpha_1, \mu_1}, tr_{\alpha_1, \mu_1} \) from the prover. The extractor then calls extractor \( \mathcal{X}_2 \) to retrieve \( \kappa_1 \) and \( \alpha_1 \). Rewind and repeat this procedure for another \( l \) times to retrieve \( k_2, \ldots, k_{l+1} \) and \( \alpha_2, \ldots, \alpha_{l+1} \) using evaluation points \( k_2, \ldots, k_{l+1} \). (The extractor also retrieves blinding keys \( \vec{\mu} \) in the process, but we don’t use them here)

Through interpolation technique the extractor retrieves \( \{\alpha_i - \nu_i\} \) and \( \alpha_i \) for \( i \) in \( \{1, \ldots, l\} \). With these information, we can now trivially compute \( \vec{\nu} \) and verify if they can be mapped \( \mathcal{P} \) s.t. \( P_1 = g^{a_i h^{\nu_i}} \) unless we found a non-trivial relationship among generators \( g, h, \vec{u} \).

In the last step, we must be able to re-compute witnesses \( r, \epsilon, \mathcal{T} \) from \( \vec{a}, \vec{\alpha} \) for equality 171. We can therefore conclude Protocol 1 has computational witness extended emulation.

**B. Proof for Theorem Two**

**Proof.** Perfect completeness follows from the fact that Protocol 2 is trivially complete. To prove perfect honest-verifier zero-knowledge, we define a simulator \( S \) to show that protocol 2 has perfect special honest-verifier zero-knowledge for relation 7. \( S \) uses simulator \( S_S \) to simulate proof transcripts for proof of knowledge (discrete logarithm) protocols, and simulator \( S_p \) to simulate proof transcripts for polynomial commitment evaluation function \( PolyCommitEval \).

The simulator \( S \) generates random group elements for \( S, \mathcal{T}, C, R, \) proof of knowledge transcript \( tr_\epsilon \). After receiving challenge \( x \) from the verifier, the simulator generates \( l \) random integers to represent \( \vec{\epsilon}, l \) random integers to represent \( \vec{\alpha} \), and one random integer to represent \( y \) and sends them to the verifier.

The simulator follows the protocol to compute \( o \) and \( PK_{\ell} \), then the simulator \( S \) calls simulator \( S_S \) to interact with the verifier and randomly generate all necessary transcripts to prove it knows the value of \( \epsilon \). This makes sense since we already know for a fact that schnorr and many other proof of knowledge protocols have perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge. Similarly, the simulator \( S \) also calls simulator \( S_P \) to simulate transcripts for proving \( y \) is the evaluated value at point \( x \) for polynomial commitment \( C \).

Next, simulator \( S \) simulates transcripts for proving the mapping from \( \vec{a}^\prime \) to \( \mathcal{P} \). After challenge \( k \) is received from the prover, the simulator follows the protocol to compute \( PK_{\kappa_1} \), then calls simulator \( S_S \) to simulate transcripts needed to prove knowledge of \( v_2 \).

The simulator chooses all proof elements and challenges according to the randomness supplied by the adversary from their respective domains or computes them directly as described in the protocol. Since all elements in proof transcripts are either independently randomly distributed or their relationship is fully defined by the verification equations, we can conclude that protocol 2 is perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.
To prove computational witness extended emulation, we construct an extractor $X$, which uses extractor $X$ to extract witnesses from proof of knowledge transcripts and extractor $X$ to extract witnesses from polynomial commitment $C$.

Like that of Protocol 1, we validate the soundness of Protocol 2 in three steps. First, we show how to construct an extractor $X$ for Protocol 2 s.t. on input $\vec{P} \in \mathbb{G}^l, R \in \mathbb{G}$, it either extracts witnesses $r, \epsilon, \vec{\tau}$ for relation (171) or discovers a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation among $g, h, \vec{u} \in \mathbb{G}$. Next, we show that the extractor $X$ either extracts witnesses $\vec{a}, \vec{\alpha}$ s.t. $\vec{v}$ maps to $\vec{\alpha}$ or discovers a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation between $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$. Finally, we validate the proof by checking if $r, \epsilon, \vec{\tau}$ can be computed from witnesses $\vec{a}, \vec{\alpha}$.

In step one, the extractor $X$ interacts with the prover in Protocol 2 and receives $\vec{S}, \vec{T}, C, R, tr_x$ from the prover. The extractor $X$ then generates a challenge $x_1$ and forward it to the prover. After receiving $\vec{e}_1, \vec{a}_1, y_1$, the extractor rewinds the prover and sends another challenge $x_2$ to receive $\vec{e}_2, \vec{a}_2, y_2$.

The extractor then follows the protocol and calls extractor $X_S$ to extract $\epsilon$ from $tr_x$ and $PK_\epsilon$. With either $x_1$ or $x_2$, we can trivially retrieve $r$ from $r'$ since $r' = r + x \cdot \epsilon$ and validate $R = g^r h^\epsilon$.

Likewise, the extractor $X$ calls extractor $X_P$ using either $x_1, y_1$ or $x_2, y_2$ pair to retrieve coefficient set $\vec{\tau}$ from polynomial commitment $C$. Like that of Protocol 1, we can compute $o$ from $r, \epsilon$ at any evaluation point $x$ as equality (171) states.

We have now retrieved witnesses $r, \epsilon, \vec{\tau}$ using transcripts $C, R, tr_x$. If the prover is honest, $r, \epsilon, \vec{\tau}$ are coefficients computed by the prover from $\vec{a}, \vec{\alpha}$, where as $\vec{a}$ maps to blinding keys $\vec{u}$.

In step two, we validate if witnesses of $\vec{a}'$ used in computing $o$ maps to $\vec{a}, \vec{u}$ in $\vec{P}$ by checking if we can extract these witnesses. The extractor first generates $k_1$ and then follows the protocol to get $PK_{\upsilon_{i+1}}, tr_{\upsilon_{i+1}}$, then calls extractor $X_S$ to retrieve $\upsilon_{i+1}$. The extractor then rewinds and repeats the above step $l$ times to retrieve $\upsilon_{2}, ..., \upsilon_{l+1}$. Through interpolation the extractor retrieves witnesses $\upsilon_i$ for all $i \in \{1, ..., l\}$. Dividing dividing $P_1$ by $h^{\upsilon_i}$ we will get:

$$P_1 / h^{\upsilon_i} = g^{\upsilon_i}$$  \hspace{1cm} (172)

Using the two different challenges $x_1, x_2$ we mentioned earlier, the extractor gets $\vec{a}_1$ and $\vec{a}_2$ from the prover, which we can trivially retrieve $\vec{a}, \vec{\alpha}$ for all $i \in \{1, ..., l\}$ since:

$$a_1' - a_2' = \alpha_i (x_1 - x_2)$$

If each $\upsilon_i$ maps to each $\alpha_i$, then $\alpha_i$ must be the exponent of $g$ in equality (173) or we found a non-trivial relationship among generators $g, h$.

In step three, we check that if we can re-compute witnesses $r, \epsilon, \vec{\tau}$ from $\vec{a}, \vec{\alpha}$ . This must be true for equality (171) to be true except for a negligible probability or we found a non-trivial relationship among generators $g, h, \vec{u}$. We can therefore conclude Protocol 2 has computational witness extended emulation.

C. Proof for Theorem Three

Proof. Perfect completeness follows from the fact that Protocol 3 is trivially complete. To prove perfect honest-verifier zero-knowledge, we define a simulator $S$ to show that protocol 3 has perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge for relation (4). $S$ uses simulator $S_S$ to simulate proof transcripts for proof of knowledge (or proof of discrete logarithm) protocols.

The simulator $S$ generates random group elements to represent $\vec{S}, \vec{T}, \vec{C}, B, R$, and the proof of knowledge transcript $tr_x$. After receiving challenge $x$ from the verifier, the simulator generates $l$ random integers to represent $\vec{e}$, $l$ random integers to represent $\vec{\tau}$, and $m_0$ random integers to represent breakers $\vec{y}_i$. The simulator sends them to the verifier.

The simulator follows the protocol to compute $r'$ and $PK_\epsilon$, then the simulator $S$ calls the simulator $S_S$ to interact with the verifier to randomly generate all the necessary transcripts to prove it knows
the value of \( \epsilon \). This makes sense since we already know for a fact that Schnorr and many other proof of discrete log protocols have perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.

Next, simulator \( S \) simulates transcripts for proving the mapping from \( \vec{a} \) to \( \vec{P} \). After challenge \( k \) is received from the verifier, the simulator randomly generates \( tr_{\vec{u}} \), and then follows the protocol to compute \( PK_{\vec{u}} \). In the final step, the simulator calls \( S \) the simulator \( S_S \) to simulate transcripts needed to prove knowledge of \( \vec{v} \).

The simulator chooses all proof elements and challenges according to the randomness supplied by the adversary from their respective domains or computes them directly as described in the protocol. Since all elements in proof transcripts are either independently randomly distributed or their relationship is fully defined by the verification equations, we can conclude that protocol 3 is perfect special honest verifier zero-knowledge.

To prove computational witness extended emulation, we construct an extractor \( X \), which uses extractor \( X_S \) to extract witnesses from proof of knowledge transcripts.

Like that of Protocol 1 and 2, we validate the soundness of Protocol 3 in three steps. First, we show how to construct an extractor \( X \) for Protocol 3 s.t. on input \( \vec{P} \in \mathbb{G}^l, R \in \mathbb{G}, \) it either extracts witnesses \( r, \epsilon, \vec{r} \) for relation \([4]\) or discovers a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation among \( g, h, \vec{u} \in \mathbb{G} \). Second, we show that the extractor \( X \) either extracts witnesses \( \vec{a}, \vec{v} \) s.t. \( \vec{v} \) maps to \( \vec{a} \) or discovers a non-trivial discrete logarithm relation among \( g, h, \vec{u} \in \mathbb{G} \). Third, we complete validating the proof by checking if \( r, \epsilon, \vec{r} \) can be computed from witnesses \( \vec{a}, \vec{a} \).

In the first step, the extractor \( X \) interacts with the prover in Protocol 3 and receives \( \vec{S}, \vec{T}, \vec{C}, B, R, \text{tr} \), from the prover. The extractor \( X \) then generates at least \( b + 3 \) challenges \( \vec{x} \) and forwards them to the prover. After receiving \( \vec{e}_1, \vec{e}_1', \vec{y}_1 \), the extractor rewinds and repeats this step \( b + 2 \) times to receive \( \vec{e}_2, ..., \vec{e}_{b+3}, \vec{a}_2, ..., \vec{a}_{b+3}, \) and \( \vec{y}_2, ..., \vec{y}_{b+3} \).

The extractor then follows the protocol and calls extractor \( X_S \) to extract \( \epsilon \) from \( \text{tr} \) and \( PK_{\vec{a}} \). With any two challenges \( x_i, x_{i+1} \), we can trivially retrieve \( r, \epsilon \) since \( r' = r + x \cdot \epsilon \), which must match the witness \( r, \epsilon \) retrieved from \( R = g' h^\epsilon \) and \( PK_{\vec{a}} \) using extractor \( X_S \) except with a negligible probability of discovering a non-trivial discrete log relation among generators \( g, h \in \mathbb{G} \).

With challenges \( x_1, ..., x_{b+3} \) and evaluation (breaker) sets \( \vec{y}_1, ..., \vec{y}_{b+3} \), we apply Lagrange polynomial interpolation to retrieve witnesses \( \vec{r}_1, ..., \vec{r}_{m_b} \) and \( \vec{\beta} \), coefficients of commitments \( \vec{C}, \vec{B} \).

We have now retrieved witnesses \( r, \epsilon, \vec{r}_1, ..., \vec{r}_{m_b} \) using transcripts \( C, B, R, \text{tr} \). If the prover is honest, \( r, \epsilon, \vec{r}_1, ..., \vec{r}_{m_b} \) are coefficients computed by the prover from \( \vec{a}, \vec{a} \), where as \( \vec{a} \) maps to blinding keys \( \vec{v} \).

In the second step, we validate if witnesses \( \vec{a}, \vec{a} \) of \( \vec{a}' \) used in computing \( o \) map to witnesses \( \vec{a}, \vec{v} \) of \( \vec{P} \) by checking if we can extract these witnesses and that \( \vec{a} \) map to \( \vec{v} \). The extractor first generates \( k_1 \) and then follows the protocol to get \( tr_{\vec{v}_1}, PK_{\vec{v}_1} \), then calls the extractor \( X_S \) to retrieve \( \vec{v}_1 \). The extractor then rewinds and repeats this step \( l \) times to retrieve \( \vec{v}_{12}, ..., \vec{v}_{1l+1} \). Through interpolation, the extractor retrieves witnesses \( \vec{v}_i \) for all \( i \) in \( \{1, ..., l\} \). Dividing dividing \( P_i \) by \( h^{\vec{v}_i} \), we get:

$$
P_i/h^{\vec{v}_i} = g^{\alpha_i} \tag{173}$$

Using any two different challenges \( x_i, x_{i+1} \) mentioned earlier, the extractor gets \( \vec{a}'_1 \) and \( \vec{a}'_2 \) from the prover, which we can trivially retrieve \( \vec{a}, \vec{a} \) for all \( i = \{1, ..., l\} \) since:

$$
\alpha_1' - \alpha_2' = \alpha_i(x_1 - x_2)
$$

If each \( \vec{v}_i \) maps to each \( \alpha_i \), then \( \alpha_i \) must be the exponent of \( g \) in equality \([173]\) or we found a non-trivial relationship among generators \( g, h \).

In the final step, we validate the proof by checking if \( r, \epsilon, \vec{r} \) can be computed from witnesses \( \vec{a}, \vec{a} \). This must be true for equality \([174]\) to be true except for a negligible probability or we found a non-trivial relationship among generators \( g, h, \vec{a} \). We can therefore conclude Protocol 3 has computational witness extended emulation.
References


