Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption, Revisited
Improved Constructions with Strong Security

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\textbf{Abstract.} Identity-based matchmaking encryption (IB-ME) [Ateniese et al. Crypto 2019] allows users to communicate privately in an anonymous and authenticated manner. After the seminal paper by Ateniese et al., a lot of work has been done on the security and construction of IB-ME. In this work, we revisit the security definitions of IB-ME and provide improved constructions of it. First, we classify the existing security notions of IB-ME, systematically categorizing privacy into three categories (CPA, CCA, and privacy in the case of mismatch) and authenticity into four categories (NMA and CMA both against insiders and outsiders). In particular, we reconsider the privacy when the sender’s identity is mismatched during decryption, and provide a new simple security game, called mismatch security, capturing the essence of it. Second, we propose efficient and strongly secure IB-ME schemes from the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model and from anonymous identity-based encryption, identity-based signature, and reusable extractors in the standard model. The first scheme is based on Boneh-Franklin IBE similar to the Ateniese et al. scheme, but ours achieves a more compact decryption key and ciphertext and stronger CCA-privacy, CMA-authenticity, and mismatch security. The second scheme is an improved generic construction, which active not only stronger security but also the shortest ciphertext among existing generic constructions. Through this construction, we obtain, for example, a more efficient scheme from the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model, and a practical scheme from lattices in the quantum random oracle model.

\textbf{Keywords:} Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption · Security Model · Pairing-Based Cryptography · Generic Construction.
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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Identity-based matchmaking encryption (IB-ME), proposed by Ateniese et al. [AFNV19], is a new identity-based cryptographic primitive designed to guarantee confidential and authenticated message delivery while anonymizing both sender and receiver. Similarly to conventional identity-based encryption (IBE) [BF01], a key generation center generates secret keys of users corresponding to their identity, and in the IB-ME setting, both sender and receiver possess their secret keys. When a sender with identity $\sigma$ sends a message, it encrypts the message with its (secret) encryption key $ek_\sigma$ and the identity of the target receiver $rcv$. When a receiver with identity $\rho$ decrypts the ciphertext, it uses its secret decryption key $dk_\rho$ and specifies the identity of the target sender $snd$. The decryption process is successful only if the identities match, i.e., $\sigma = snd$ and $\rho = rcv$ hold. In case the identities do not match (i.e., $\sigma \neq snd$ or $\rho \neq rcv$), nothing is leaked except the fact that the identities are mismatched. IB-ME has many practical applications e.g., secret handshake protocols, privacy-preserving bulletin boards [AFNV19], etc.

Security notions for IB-ME. Ateniese et al. [AFNV19] defined privacy and authenticity as the security requirements for IB-ME. In essence, privacy guarantees the confidentiality of messages against unintentional receivers who do not have the legitimate decryption key; Authenticity guarantees the legitimacy of senders, preventing impersonation without knowing their encryption key. We can see that privacy (resp., authenticity) is similar to the semantic security of encryption schemes (resp., unforgeability of signature schemes).

Following the pioneering work by Ateniese et al., a lot of works have explored more desirable security notions. Regarding authenticity, Francati et al. [FGRV21] and Chen et al. [CLWW22] defined a new notion of authenticity that allows an adversary to compromise receiver secret keys freely, in contrast to the definition of Ateniese et al. Wang et al. [WWLZ22] proposed an extended version of the notions of authenticity, which they call “strong authenticity”, allowing the adversary to access an encryption oracle that computes a ciphertext of adversarially chosen messages. For stronger privacy guarantees, Chiku et al. [CHS23] and Lin et al. [LLC24] considered privacy against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA), where an adversary can access a decryption oracle that computes plaintexts of adversarially chosen ciphertexts. Furthermore, Francati et al. [FGRV21] highlighted a deficiency in the original definition of privacy by Ateniese et al. They pointed out that it does not account for privacy in the case where the target identity $snd$ chosen by a receiver mismatches with the actual sender’s identity $\sigma$. That is, the original definition does not guarantee the confidentiality of messages in the case $rcv = \rho$ but $snd \neq \sigma$ occurs during decryption. This gap led them to introduce a new privacy concept called “enhanced privacy”, which captures privacy in cases involving mismatched sender identities used during decryption.

As explained above, many security definitions for IB-ME have been considered, but it cannot be said that they are not well organized. In particular, existing works compared the efficiency of each scheme, ignoring the differences in the security properties. In other words, their comparisons are inaccurate. From such a situation, we realize the first question:

Q1: What are the proper security definitions of IB-ME for accurate comparisons?

Constructions of IB-ME. Ateniese et al. introduced the initial IB-ME scheme from the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption in the random oracle model (ROM) [AFNV19], based on the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [BF01]. A drawback of the scheme is long decryption keys and ciphertexts: they include three resp. two group elements. At the moment, it seems that their scheme is prone to an attack whereas is not. This raises the following second question.

---

3 The difference was not explained explicitly in [FGRV21, CLWW22] In particular, despite this difference, Francati et al. cited the original work, which misleads the reader into thinking that the two definitions are the same.

4 The attack scenario can be seen as ordinary chosen message attacks (CMA), but they did not explain it as such.

5 As mentioned in [FGRV21], Ateniese et al. noticed this gap and informally argued that their IB-ME scheme ensures the confidentiality of messages in such a case.
Table 1: Comparison between our IB-ME schemes and the existing schemes. (Re)Ext stands for (reusable) randomness extractors.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>Security properties</th>
<th>Privacy</th>
<th>Authenticity</th>
<th>Mismatch</th>
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<th>Model</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ateniese et al. [AFNV19]</td>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>oNMA</td>
<td></td>
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<td>BDH</td>
<td>ROM</td>
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<tr>
<td>Francati et al. [FGRV21]</td>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>iNMA</td>
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<td></td>
<td>q-ABDHE+NIZK+ReExt</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chen et al. [CLWW22]</td>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>iNMA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wang et al. [WWLZ22]</td>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>iCMA</td>
<td></td>
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<td>Anon IBE+IBS+ReExt</td>
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<td>Boyen and Li [BL23]</td>
<td>CPA</td>
<td>iCMA</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ours (§ 4)</td>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>oCMA</td>
<td>√</td>
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<td>BDH</td>
<td>ROM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ours (§ 5)</td>
<td>CCA</td>
<td>iCMA</td>
<td>√</td>
<td></td>
<td>Anon IBE+IBS+ReExt</td>
<td>StdM</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Q2: Can we construct a more efficient and strongly secure IB-ME scheme from the BDH assumption in the ROM?

Following the initial work by Ateniese et al., several works have made efforts to develop improved IB-ME schemes, with a particular focus on the standard model (StdM) [FGRV21,CLWW22,WWLZ22,BL23]. Francati et al. [FGRV21] proposed an IB-ME scheme in the StdM based on Gentry’s anonymous IBE scheme [Gen06]. Although their scheme is secure in the StdM, it relies on a non-standard q-augmented bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption. To remove the reliance on non-standard assumptions, Chen et al. [CLWW22] constructed an IB-ME scheme based on an anonymous IBE scheme by Chen et al. [CLL14], whose security relies on the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman (SXDH) assumption in the StdM, but it does not consider the stronger notion of security (i.e., enhanced privacy). Wang et al. [WWLZ22] proposed a generic construction of IB-ME from anonymous 2-level hierarchical IBE (HIBE) and identity-based signature (IBS) to realize lattice-based schemes. Recently, Boyen and Li [BL23] showed that IB-ME scheme with mismatch privacy can be constructed from IBE, IBS, and (reusable) extractors.

These works allow us to obtain various IB-ME schemes from both classical and post-quantum assumption. However, all of them only provide weaker CCA-privacy, which is insufficient for real-world applications. Another issue is their ciphertext sizes are long since they use heavily primitives (e.g., HIBE) or include many seeds for extractors in a ciphertext. This fact gives us the third question:

Q3: Can we generically construct a more efficient and strongly secure IB-ME scheme?

1.2 Our Contributions

We revisit the concept of IB-ME and answer the above three research questions. First, we reorganize the security notions for IB-ME. Then we present a highly efficient and strongly secure IB-ME scheme from the BDH assumption in the ROM. Finally, we proposed a new generic construction from IBE, IBS, and reusable extractors in the StdM. The comparison of our schemes and the existing ones is summarized in Table 1. See Section 6 for a detailed comparison, especially of the efficiency of them.

A1: Re-formalizing security notions of IB-ME. We sort out the differences in security notions for IB-ME. At first, we reorganize the authenticity notions in previous works. We notice that the existing definitions can be classified along two points: one is whether an adversary has access to the encryption oracle, and the other is whether it can compromise the target receiver’s secret key. For the former point, we name the respective attacks as chosen message attacks (CMA) and no message attacks (NMA) according to the presence or absence of access to the encryption oracle. For the latter point, we call the adversary who compromises the target receiver insiders and otherwise outsiders since we can regard the adversary, who knows the receiver’s key, as inside the communication. As a result, we define four authenticity notions oNMA, iNMA, oCMA, and iCMA (Table 1 shows their correspondence with the previous works).

6 Here, we employ the naming used in a similar situation in signcryption [MMS09]
7 The prefix o (resp. i) indicates the adversary is an outsider (resp. insider).
For privacy, we rename the original definition by Ateniese et al. as CPA privacy since the adversary cannot access the decryption oracle, and define CCA privacy as in [LLC24, CHS23]. Then, we redefine the security game for “enhanced privacy” which captures privacy in the case of mismatch during decryption. Francati et al. [FGRV21] defined a single definition that includes both the privacy originally considered (CPA privacy) and privacy in mismatch cases, which complicates understanding the definition and security proofs. Thus, we extract the essence of privacy in the case of mismatch and give a new simple security definition, called Priv-MisMatch security. Roughly, it captures the confidentiality of messages in the case the adversary knows the target receiver’s secret key but does not know the sender’s identity. As a result, we can separate security proofs for CPA/CCA privacy and privacy in the case of mismatch. See Section 3 for more details.

A2: An efficient and strongly secure IB-ME scheme from BDH in the ROM. We construct an improved IB-ME scheme from the BDH assumption in the ROM. Our basic idea is combining the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [BF01] and the Sakai-Ohgishi-Kasahara IB-NIKE scheme [SOK00]. At a high level, a sender with identity $\sigma$ has an IB-NIKE key $H(\sigma)^{\text{msk}}$ as its encryption key and a receiver with identity $\rho$ has an IB-NIKE key $H(\rho)^{\text{msk}}$ and an IBE key $H(\rho)^{\text{msk}'}$ as its decryption key, where $H$ is (appropriate) hash function, and $\text{msk}$ (resp., $\text{msk}'$) is a master secret key of the IB-NIKE scheme (resp., the IBE scheme). When the sender $\sigma$ encrypts a message $m$ to target a receiver $\text{rcv}$, it computes a ciphertext as $(g^m, e(H(e(X^r, H(\text{rcv}))), e(H(\sigma)^{\text{msk}}, H(\text{rcv}))))$, where $g$ is a generator (of the underlying group), $X = g^{\text{msk}'}$ is a public parameter of the IBE scheme, and $e$ is a symmetric pairing. To reduce the key size, we reuse the same master secret key for the IBE part and the IB-NIKE part. That is, we use the key $H(\text{id})^{\text{msk}}$ for both the IBE scheme and the IB-NIKE scheme, where $\text{id}$ is an identity for either sender or receiver. This reduces the size of a user’s secret key, but weakens the security level since the compromise of a user leaks both encryption and decryption keys. To overcome this problem, we separate the domains of senders’ and receivers’ keys by employing asymmetric pairings. Using different hash functions $H_1$ and $H_2$, we compute the key of a sender $\sigma$ as $H_1(\sigma)^{\text{msk}} \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and the key of a receiver $\rho$ as $H_2(\rho)^{\text{msk}} \in \mathbb{G}_2$. This allows us to reduce the key size without weakening security. Intuitively, privacy is followed by the security of the IBE scheme, and authenticity is followed by the security of the IB-NIKE scheme. To achieve the stronger CCA security, we employ the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation [FO99]. Quite surprisingly, the FO transformation allows us to achieve oCMA security for free. Moreover, we formally prove that our scheme also achieves Priv-MisMatch security. As a result, we get a highly efficient and strongly secure IB-ME scheme from the BDH assumption in the ROM. Both encryption and decryption keys contain only one group element, and the ciphertext contains one group element and a $\lambda$-bit string, both of which are smaller than those of the Ateniese et al. scheme. See Section 4 for more details.

A3: An efficient and strongly secure generic construction of IB-ME in the StdM. We propose a new generic construction of IB-ME from anonymous IBE, IBS, and reusable extractors following the so-called “Sign-then-Encrypt” paradigm. In our construction, a sender $\sigma$ holds an IBS’s user key $\text{ek}_{\sigma}$, and a receiver $\rho$ holds an IBE’s user key. The sender $\sigma$ encrypts a message $m$ to a receiver $\text{rcv}$ as $c_t \leftarrow \text{IBE.Enc}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{rcv}, m || \text{sig})$, where $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}$ (resp., $\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}$) is a public parameter of the IBE (resp., IBS) scheme and $\text{sig} \leftarrow \text{IBS.Sign}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}, \text{ek}_{\sigma}, m || \rho)$. We can show that this simple construction achieves the CCA security and the iCMA security from the CCA security of the IBE scheme and the CMA security of the IBS scheme, respectively. However, it is not Priv-MisMatch secure because an adversary who knows the receiver’s keys can decrypt the IBE ciphertexts and thus obtain the encrypted messages without knowing the sender’s identity. To hide messages even in the case of mismatch (i.e., $\text{snd} \neq \sigma$), we employ reusable extractors similar to the work of Francati et al. [FGRV21]. Roughly speaking, the message and signature $m || \text{sig}$ are masked by the extracted randomness $Z \leftarrow \text{Ext}(\sigma)$. That is, $(m || \text{sig}) \oplus Z$ is encrypted by the IBE scheme. This seems to prevent an adversary from recovering messages without knowing the sender’s identity, but standard extractors are not sufficient due to the dependencies between the signature $\text{sig}$ and the extracted randomness $Z$.

8 Since all existing schemes, including ours, achieve CPA security against insiders who know sender’s secret keys, we do not consider privacy against weaker outsiders explicitly. Therefore, we simply use CPA to refer to security against insiders.

9 Due to the bilinearity in the IB-NIKE part, the authenticity only holds when both sender and receiver are not compromised, i.e., authenticity only holds against outsiders. This is also the case in the work by Ateniese et al.
both related to the sender’s identity $\sigma$. To overcome this problem, we employ special randomness extractors whose output looks random even if the signing key $ek_\sigma$ is given, as provided in [Fis07, BL23]. As a result, we can formally show the Priv-MisMatch security of our generic construction. The resulting scheme offers stronger CCA-privacy and its ciphertext is $2\lambda$-bits shorter than Boyen and Li scheme [BL23]. See Section 5 for more details.

1.3 Related Work

Identity-based encryption. Identity-based encryption, proposed by Shamir [Sha84], is an encryption scheme that allows users to use arbitrary strings (e.g., e-mail addresses) as their public keys. After quite a long time, Boneh and Franklin constructed the first IBE scheme [BF01] using bilinear pairings, and then a lot of IBE schemes have been proposed from various assumptions [Wat05, Wat09, Gen06, ABB10, HJP18, KYY18, DLP14]. In IBE, the sender specifies only the receiver’s identity, but in IB-ME, the sender specifies not only the receiver’s identity but also the sender’s identity.

Identity-based signcryption. Signcryption [Zhe97] is a cryptographic primitive that offers private and authenticated delivery of messages. The motivation for signcryption is to provide equivalent functionality more efficiently than a simple combination of encryption and signature schemes. The notion of identity-based signcryption (IB-SC) was proposed by Malone-Lee [Mal02]. The difference between IB-ME and IB-SC is that the former ensures the anonymity of communicating users and the confidentiality of messages when ciphertexts are decrypted with mismatched sender identities. Therefore, IB-ME provides better security properties than IB-SC.

(General) Matchmaking encryption. Ateniese et al. proposed matchmaking encryption [AFNV19]. In ME setting, the sender and the receiver have their own attribute, and they can specify access policies the other party must satisfy. Ateniese et al. also gave generic constructions of ME based on functional encryption, signature scheme, and non-interactive zero-knowledge. Recently, Francati et al. [FFMV22] proposed a simple ME scheme based on two-key predicate encryption. Note that IB-ME is an ME supporting the policy of identity equivalence.

1.4 Organization of This Paper

The remaining part of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce notations and definitions of the cryptographic primitives that will be used in this paper. Then, in Section 3, we give the relevant definitions including syntax and security definitions of IB-ME. Section 4 shows an efficient and strongly secure IB-ME scheme based on BDH assumption in the ROM. In Section 5, we provide a new generic construction of IB-ME based on IBE, IBS, and reusable extractor in the StdM. Finally, Section 6 presents a comparison between our IB-ME schemes and the existing schemes.

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we first define some notations used in this work. Then we recall asymmetric bilinear groups, identity-based encryption, identity-based signature, and reusable computational extractors.

2.1 Notation

$\mathbb{N}$ denotes the set of positive integers. $\emptyset$ denotes the empty set. $\hat{e}$ denotes the base of the natural logarithm. PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time. For $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we denote $[n] := \{1, 2, \ldots, n\}$. $x := y$ denotes that $x$ is defined by $y$. $y \leftarrow A(x; r)$ denotes that a PPT algorithm $A$ outputs $y$ on input $x$ and randomness $r$. We simply denote $y \leftarrow A(x)$ when $A$ uses uniform randomness. $A^O$ means $A$ has oracle access to a function $O(\cdot)$. poly($\lambda$) denotes a polynomial in $\lambda$. We say that a function $f(\lambda)$ is negligible in $\lambda$ if $f(\lambda) = o(1/\lambda^c)$ for every $c \in \mathbb{Z}$, and we write $\negl(\lambda)$ to denote a negligible function in $\lambda$. $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$ denotes an element $x$ is sampled uniformly
This work only uses asymmetric bilinear groups. So, we omit the term “asymmetric”.

at random from a finite set \( \mathcal{X} \). Let \( X \) be a distribution over \( \mathcal{X} \). The min-entropy of \( X \) is defined as \( H_\infty(X) := -\log \max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pr[X = x] \). We call a distribution with min-entropy \( \kappa \) \( \kappa \)-distribution. \( x \mapsto X \) denotes an element \( x \in \mathcal{X} \) is sampled following the distribution \( X \). The average conditional min-entropy of a distribution \( X \) over \( \mathcal{X} \) given a distribution \( Y \) over \( \mathcal{Y} \) is \( H_\infty(X \mid Y) := -\log \mathbb{E}_{y \mapsto Y} [\max_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \Pr[X = x \mid Y = y]] \).

2.2 Asymmetric Bilinear Groups

We recall (asymmetric) bilinear groups\(^{10}\) and the bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption from [BMW05]. Let \( G_1, G_2 \) and \( G_T \) be groups of prime order \( p \). Let \( g_1 \in G_1 \) and \( g_2 \in G_2 \) be respective generators of \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \). Let \( e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T \) be an efficiently computable function that satisfies (1) for any \( u \in G_1 \), \( v \in G_2 \) and \( \alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_p \), \( e(u^\alpha, v^\beta) = e(u, v)^{\alpha \beta} \) (i.e., bilinearity) and (2) \( e(1, 1) \neq 1 \), where 1 is the unit element in \( G_T \) (i.e., non-degeneracy). This function \( e \) is called a bilinear map or pairing. We call \( G := (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, g_1, g_2, e) \) a bilinear group. We define bilinear group generators that generate a bilinear group corresponding to the input security parameter.

Definition 1 (Bilinear Group Generator). A bilinear group generator \( G \) is a PPT algorithm that, on input \( 1^\lambda \), outputs the description of a bilinear group \( G = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, g_1, g_2, e) \).

We define the BDH assumption for \( G \).

Definition 2 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assumption [BMW05]). Let \( G \) be a bilinear group generator. We say that BDH assumption holds for \( G \) if for all PPT adversaries \( A \), it holds that

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{bdh}}_{\lambda, G}(\lambda) := \Pr \left[ D = e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \beta \gamma} \mid G := (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, g_1, g_2, e) \leftarrow G(1^\lambda), \right.
\alpha, \beta, \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p, \n D \leftarrow A(G, g_1^\alpha, g_2^\beta, g_1^\gamma) \bigg] = \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

2.3 Identity-Based Encryption

Syntax. An IBE scheme IBE consists of the following four algorithms.

Setup\((1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\text{mpk}, \text{msk})\): The setup algorithm takes the security parameter \( 1^\lambda \), and outputs a public parameter \( \text{mpk} \) and a master secret key \( \text{msk} \). \( \text{mpk} \) defines the identity space \( \mathcal{ID} \), the message space \( \mathcal{M} \), and the ciphertext space \( \mathcal{CT} \).

KGen\((\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \text{id}) \rightarrow \text{sk}_\text{id}\): The key generation algorithm takes \( \text{mpk} \), \( \text{msk} \) and an identity \( \text{id} \in \mathcal{ID} \) as input and outputs a secret key \( \text{sk}_\text{id} \).

Enc\((\text{mpk}, \text{id}, m) \rightarrow \text{ct}\): The encryption algorithm takes \( \text{mpk} \), \( \text{id} \in \mathcal{ID} \), and a plaintext \( m \in \mathcal{M} \) as input, and outputs a ciphertext \( \text{ct} \in \mathcal{CT} \).

Dec\((\text{mpk}, \text{sk}_\text{id}, \text{ct}) \rightarrow m \text{ or } \bot\): The decryption algorithm takes \( \text{mpk}, \text{sk}_\text{id} \), and \( \text{ct} \) as input, and outputs \( m \in \mathcal{M} \) or a special symbol \( \bot \notin \mathcal{M} \).

Correctness. We say that an IBE scheme IBE is correct if for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), \( \text{id} \in \mathcal{ID} \) and \( m \in \mathcal{M} \), it holds that

\[
\Pr \left[ \text{Dec}(\text{mpk}, \text{sk}_\text{id}, \text{ct}) = m \mid (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \text{sk}_\text{id} \leftarrow \text{KGen}(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \text{id}), \text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \text{id}, m) \right] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

\(^{10}\)This work only uses asymmetric bilinear groups. So, we omit the term “asymmetric”.

7
Security. We recall adaptive-identity anonymity against chosen-ciphertext attacks (ANO-IND-ID-CCA security) for IBE.

Definition 3 (ANO-IND-ID-CCA Security of IBE). We say that an IBE scheme $\text{IBE}$ is ANO-IND-ID-CCA secure if for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A};\text{IBE}}^{\text{ano-IND-ID-CCA}}(\lambda) := \Pr[\text{ANO-IND-ID-CCA}_{\text{IBE}}^\mathcal{A}(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} = \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where the security game $\text{ANO-IND-ID-CCA}_{\text{IBE}}^\mathcal{A}(\lambda)$ is depicted in Fig. 1.

2.4 Identity-Based Signature

Syntax. An IBS scheme $\text{IBS}$ consists of the following four algorithms.

Setup($1^\lambda$) → (mpk, msk): The setup algorithm takes the security parameter $1^\lambda$ and outputs a public parameter mpk and the secret master key msk. mpk defines the identity space $\mathcal{ID}$, message space $\mathcal{M}$, and signature bit length sigLen.

KGen(mpk, msk, id) → sk$_id$: The key generation algorithm takes mpk, msk, and an identity id ∈ $\mathcal{ID}$ as input and outputs a signing key sk$_id$.

Sign(mpk, sk$_id$, m) → sig: The signing algorithm takes mpk, sk$_id$, and a message m ∈ $\mathcal{M}$ as input and outputs a signature sig.

Ver(mpk, id, m, sig) → 0 or 1: The verification algorithm takes mpk, id ∈ $\mathcal{ID}$, m and sig as input, and outputs a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Correctness. We say that an IBS scheme $\text{IBS}$ is correct if for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, id ∈ $\mathcal{ID}$ and $m \in \mathcal{M}$, it holds that

$$\Pr[\text{Ver}(\text{mpk}, \text{id}, m, \text{sig}) = 1 | (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \text{sk}_id \leftarrow \text{KGen}(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \text{id}), \text{sig} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{mpk}, \text{sk}_id, m)] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Fig. 1: The security game for IBE.
as considered in [Fis07, BL23]. Moreover, an extractor is considered special reusable extractors whose output looks random even if some auxiliary information is given:

**Definition 6 (Reusable Computational Extractors (with Auxiliary Information)).** Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an efficient computable function and $\{s_i, \text{Ext}(s_i, x)\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ be an efficient computable function that on input a seed $s$ outputs $y \in \mathcal{Y}$. Suppose that the output looks random even if some auxiliary information is given, as considered in [Fis07, BL23]. Moreover, an extractor is reusable [DKL09] if it produces pseudo-random outputs even if the same input is evaluated multiple times with different seeds. The formal definition is provided below.

**Definition 6 (Reusable Computational Extractors (with Auxiliary Information)).** We say that $\mathcal{A}$ is a $(\kappa, n)$-reusable computational extractor if for any distribution $X$ over $\mathcal{X}$ and auxiliary information $\mathcal{A}$ that $H_{\infty}(X \mid \text{aux}) \geq \kappa$, for all PPT adversaries $A$, it holds that

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{ext}}_{A, \text{Ext}}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr \left[ 1 \leftarrow A \left( 1^\lambda, \text{aux}, \{(s_i, \text{Ext}(s_i, x))\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \right) \mid s_i \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\text{seedLen}}, x \leftarrow X \right] - \Pr \left[ 1 \leftarrow A \left( 1^\lambda, \text{aux}, \{(s_i, y_i)\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}} \right) \mid s_i \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\text{seedLen}}, y_i \leftarrow \mathcal{Y} \right] \right|.$$

$$= \text{negl}(\lambda).$$
As explained in [DKL09, BL23], reusable extractors can be constructed in both (Q)ROM [Boy04, SXY18] and StdM [NS09, DKL09, AKPW13]).

3 Identity-Based Matchmaking Encryption

In this section, we first recall the syntax and security definition of identity-based matchmaking encryption (IB-ME) defined by Ateniese et al. [AFNV19]. Then, we introduce stronger security notions of them and reformulate privacy in the case of mismatch during decryption introduced by Francati et al. [FGRV21].

3.1 Syntax

An IB-ME scheme IB-ME consists of the following five algorithms.

\[
\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}): \text{The setup algorithm takes the security parameter } 1^\lambda, \text{ and outputs a public parameter mpk and master secret key msk. mpk defines the identity space } ID, \text{ the message space } M \text{ and the ciphertext space } CT.
\]

\[
\text{SKGen}(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \sigma) \rightarrow \text{ek}_\sigma: \text{The sender key generation algorithm takes mpk, msk, and a sender’s identity } \sigma \in ID \text{ as input, and outputs an encryption key } \text{ek}_\sigma.
\]

\[
\text{RKGen}(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \rho) \rightarrow \text{dk}_\rho: \text{The receiver key generation algorithm takes mpk, msk, and a receiver’s identity } \rho \in ID \text{ as input and outputs a decryption key } \text{dk}_\rho.
\]

\[
\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \text{ek}_\sigma, \text{rcv}, m) \rightarrow \text{ct}: \text{The encryption algorithm takes mpk, ek}_\sigma, \text{ a receiver identity rcv, and a plaintext } m \in M \text{ as input and outputs a ciphertext } \text{ct } \in CT.
\]

\[
\text{Dec}(\text{mpk}, \text{dk}_\rho, \text{snd}, \text{ct}) \rightarrow m \text{ or } \perp: \text{The decryption algorithm takes mpk, dk}_\rho, \text{ a sender identity snd, and ct as input and outputs } m \in M \text{ or a special symbol } \perp \notin M.
\]

**Correctness.** We say that an IB-ME scheme IB-ME is correct if for all } \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \sigma, \rho, \text{snd,rcv } \in ID \text{ such that } \text{snd } = \sigma \text{ and } \text{rcv } = \rho, \text{ and } m \in M, \text{ it holds that}

\[
\Pr \left[ \text{Dec}(\text{mpk}, \text{dk}_\rho, \text{snd}, \text{ct}) = m \mid (\text{mpk, msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \text{ek}_\sigma \leftarrow \text{SKGen}(\text{mpk, msk, } \sigma), \text{dk}_\rho \leftarrow \text{RKGen}(\text{mpk, msk, } \rho), \text{ct } \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \text{ek}_\sigma, \text{rcv, } m) \right] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

We say that an IB-ME scheme is perfectly correct if the above probability is equal to 1 (i.e., no error occurs).

3.2 Security Notions, Reconsidered

**Standard security notions.** IB-ME schemes must satisfy two primary security properties: privacy and authenticity. In essence, privacy ensures that nothing is disclosed to unintended recipients who do not adhere to the sender’s policy, while authenticity guarantees that it is impossible to impersonate the sender without possessing the sender’s secret key. We revisit the definitions of privacy and authenticity outlined by Ateniese et al. [AFNV19]. To clarify, we rename their definitions privacy against chosen plaintext attacks (Priv-CPA), and authenticity against no-message attacks from outsiders (Auth-oNMA). The term “outsiders” indicates that neither the target sender nor the target receiver is compromised. Subsequently, an authenticity notion is considered in which adversaries can compromise the target receiver [CLWW22,FGRV21]. Since the adversary knows the target receiver’s key, we call such adversary insiders and call the corresponding authenticity notion authenticity against no-message attacks from insiders (Auth-iNMA). It is worth noting that this distinction between insider and outsider adversaries is a well-established concept in the context of signcryption [MMS09].

The security games are depicted in Fig. 3. We remark that we employ a “real-or-random” style Priv-CPA game instead of the “left-or-right” style game of Ateniese et al. In greater detail, to account for sender and receiver anonymity, Ateniese et al. designed the security game where the adversary outputs \(\{ (\text{snd}_i, \text{rcv}_i, m_i) \}_{i \in \{0,1\}}\)
and presents a challenge ciphertext generated with one of them depending on the challenge bit \( \text{coin} \in \{0, 1\} \).

On the contrary, we define the game in a way that the adversary outputs \((\text{snd}, \text{rcv}, m)\) and is provided with either a real ciphertext generated using this information or a random ciphertext sampled from ciphertext space \(CT\) similar to anonymity in IBE (cf. Section 2.3). In essence, our definition asserts that ciphertexts convey no information beyond what is derived from the master public keys. Although we do not furnish formal proof, our definition immediately encompasses Ateniese et al.’s definition.

**Definition 7 (Priv-CPA Security of IB-ME).** We say that an IB-ME scheme IB-ME is Priv-CPA secure if for all PPT adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \), it holds that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\text{IB-ME}}^{\text{priv-CPA}}(\lambda) := \Pr\left[\text{Priv-CPA}_{\text{IB-ME}}^A(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1\right] - \frac{1}{2} = \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

where the security game \( \text{Priv-CPA}_{\text{IB-ME}}^A(\lambda) \) is depicted in Fig. 3.

**Definition 8 (Auth-\{o,i\}NMA Security of IB-ME).** Let \( x \in \{o, i\} \). We say that an IB-ME scheme IB-ME is Auth-\(x\)NMA secure if for all PPT adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \), it holds that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\text{IB-ME}}^{\text{auth-xNMA}}(\lambda) := \Pr\left[\text{Auth-xNMA}_{\text{IB-ME}}^A(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1\right] = \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

where the security game \( \text{Auth-xNMA}_{\text{IB-ME}}^A(\lambda) \) is depicted in Fig. 3.

**Stronger security notions.** In this work, we define stronger security notions for IB-ME. We consider privacy against chosen-ciphertext attacks (Priv-CCA) and authenticity against chosen-message attacks from outsiders or insiders (Auth-oCMA or Auth-iCMA). In the Priv-CCA game, the adversary can access the decryption oracle, similar to the standard CCA attack scenario. In the Auth-xCMA game, the adversary can access the encryption oracle and receive a ciphertext for a message of its choice, as with the signing oracle in the standard digital signature security game. These notions Priv-CCA and Auth-xCMA are the desired security properties in practice. We note that Priv-CCA security was first defined in [LLC24, CHS23] and Auth-iCMA is the same as “strong authenticity” by Wang et al. [WWLZ22] while Auth-oCMA is newly introduced in this paper.

**Definition 9 (Priv-CCA Security of IB-ME).** We say that an IB-ME scheme IB-ME is Priv-CCA secure if for all PPT adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \), it holds that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\text{IB-ME}}^{\text{priv-CCA}}(\lambda) := \Pr\left[\text{Priv-CCA}_{\text{IB-ME}}^A(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1\right] - \frac{1}{2} = \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

where the security game \( \text{Priv-CCA}_{\text{IB-ME}}^A(\lambda) \) is depicted in Fig. 3.

**Definition 10 (Auth-\{o,i\}CMA Security of IB-ME).** Let \( x \in \{o, i\} \). We say that an IB-ME scheme IB-ME is Auth-xCMA secure if for all PPT adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \), it holds that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\text{IB-ME}}^{\text{auth-xCMA}}(\lambda) := \Pr\left[\text{Auth-xCMA}_{\text{IB-ME}}^A(\lambda) \Rightarrow 1\right] = \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

where the security game \( \text{Auth-xCMA}_{\text{IB-ME}}^A(\lambda) \) is depicted in Fig. 3.

**Privacy in the case of mismatch during decryption.** We additionally consider the case where ciphertexts are decrypted with the valid receiver’s key but mismatched sender’s identities. Intuitively, IB-ME must ensure the privacy of messages in this case from the design concept of IB-ME. This guarantees that an adversary who compromises a receiver but has no knowledge about the sender cannot decrypt ciphertexts. This is a crucial security property of IB-ME, but the original work did not consider it explicitly.\(^\text{11}\) Subsequently, Francati et al. [FGRV21] defined a new privacy notion called “enhanced privacy” that captures

\(^{11}\) Atieniese et al. informally argued that their IB-ME scheme hides the message and the sender’s identity in the case of mismatch, but they did not provide a formal model or a formal proof.
Fig. 3: The privacy and authenticity games for IB-ME schemes. The boxed lines are only for the Priv-CCA game.
privacy in this case. To model the adversary does not know who the sender is, Francati et al. assumed that the target sender’s identities are chosen from the corresponding high min-entropy distributions. Their definition effectively captures this intuition, but they used a single game that includes both conventional privacy and privacy in the case of mismatch, complicating the understanding of the definition and security proofs. In addition, their original definition does not capture the so-called “offline guessing attack,” where the adversary who knows the decryption key can try to guess the sender’s identity locally after it gets a ciphertext. Therefore, in this work, we redefine the above intuition as another simple security game, which we call Priv-MisMatch security.

The new security game Priv-MisMatch is shown in Fig. 4. The difference from Francati et al. is that (1) the adversary specifies one target receiver and is given the secret key of the target receiver explicitly, and (2) the adversary tries to distinguish whether the challenge ciphertext is real or random as Priv-CPA/Priv-CCA games. This represents the intuition that, even if the adversary knows the key of the target receiver if it is difficult for the adversary to guess the sender’s identity, the privacy of messages is guaranteed (i.e., a ciphertext does not leak any information about the sender, receiver, and the encrypted message). Also, we explicitly consider the advantage due to the offline guessing attack. The formal definition is as follows.

**Definition 11 (Priv-MisMatch Security of IB-ME).** We say that an IB-ME scheme IB-ME is Priv-MisMatch secure if for all \( \kappa \)-admissible PPT adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \), it holds that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\text{IB-ME}}^{\text{priv-mismatch}}(\lambda) := \left| \Pr[\text{Priv-MisMatch}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\text{IB-ME}}(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| \leq \frac{T_{\mathcal{A}}}{2^\kappa} + \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

where the security game \( \text{Priv-MisMatch}^{\mathcal{A}}_{\text{IB-ME}}(\lambda) \) is depicted in Fig. 4 and \( T_{\mathcal{A}} = \text{poly}(\lambda) \) denotes the running time of \( \mathcal{A} \). Note that we say that the adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) is \( \kappa \)-admissible if its outputs \( \Sigma_0 \) and \( \Sigma_1 \) are \( \kappa \)-distributions.

The term \( T_{\mathcal{A}}/2^\kappa \) represents the advantage of the adversary’s offline guessing attacks. Since the adversary knows the receiver’s decryption key, it can perform an exhaustive search offline and find the correct sender’s identity. If the sender’s identities are chosen from a distribution with sufficiently large entropy, such a guess is infeasible for PPT adversaries. Therefore, for a reasonable Priv-MisMatch security, \( \kappa \geq \omega(\log \lambda) \) would be assumed [FGRV21]. In this case, we have \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},\text{IB-ME}}^{\text{priv-mismatch}}(\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda) \).

**Remark 1.** The enhanced privacy [FGRV21] defined by Francati et al. considered the following three cases: (1) the adversary cannot decrypt the challenge (i.e., it does not hold a valid decryption key), (2) the sender’s
In a nutshell, this condition is a hybrid of (1) and (2). Our Priv-CPA/Priv-CCA and Priv-MisMatch correspond to the cases (1) and (2), respectively. Although we do not formally define the hybrid case (3), if an IB-ME scheme satisfies both Priv-CPA/Priv-CCA and Priv-MisMatch security, the scheme is also secure in the case (3). Since cases (1) and (2) guarantee that if the adversary does not know the sender’s identity or the receiver’s secret key, ciphertexts look like random elements in the ciphertext space, the adversary in case (3) also cannot distinguish ciphertexts. Therefore, by showing an IB-ME scheme satisfies Priv-CPA/Priv-CCA and Priv-MisMatch, we guarantee the security in the hybrid case considered by Francati et al.

4 Improved IB-ME Scheme from BDH in the ROM

This section shows an improved IB-ME scheme from the BDH assumption in the ROM. Our idea is to combine the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [BF01] and the Sakai-Ohigashi-Kasahara IB-NIKE scheme [SOK00]. We also introduce several optimizations to reduce secret key and ciphertext sizes. To achieve stronger security, we employ the FO transformation [FO99]. Interestingly, the FO transformation allows us to achieve not only Priv-CCA security at minimum costs but also Auth-cMA security for free. We also provide a formal proof of its Priv-MisMatch security. As a result, we obtain a highly efficient and strongly secure IB-ME scheme compared to the scheme of Ateniese et al. [AFNV19].

4.1 Construction

The proposed IB-ME scheme IB-ME$^\text{BDH}$ is as follows. Its identity and message spaces are $\mathcal{ID} = \{0, 1\}$ and $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^{\text{msgLen}}$, respectively.

Setup($1^\lambda$): It first generates a bilinear group $G := (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, g_1, g_2, e) \leftarrow G(1^\lambda)$ and selects hash functions $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G_1$, $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G_2$, $H : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \times G_1 \times G_T \times G_T \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{msgLen}+\lambda}$, and $G : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^{\text{msgLen}} \times \{0, 1\}^\lambda \rightarrow Z_p$. Then, it samples $x \leftarrow Z_p$ and sets $X := g_1^x$. Finally, it outputs $\text{mpk} := (G, H_1, H_2, H, G, X)$ and $\text{msk} := x$.

SKGen($\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \sigma$): It computes $u_\sigma := H_1(\sigma)$ and outputs $\text{ek}_\sigma := u_\sigma^x$.

RKGen($\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \rho$): It computes $u_\rho := H_2(\rho)$ and outputs $\text{dk}_\rho := u_\rho^y$.

Enc($\text{mpk}, \text{ek}_\sigma, \text{rcv}, m$): It picks $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and computes $r := G(\sigma, \text{rcv}, m, k)$. Then, it computes $u_{\text{rcv}} := H_2(\text{rcv})$ and

\[
R := g_1^x, \quad \text{ctxt} := (m||k) \oplus \tilde{H}(\sigma, \text{rcv}, R, e(X^r, u_{\text{rcv}}), e(\text{ek}_\sigma, u_{\text{rcv}})).
\]

Finally, it outputs $\text{ct} := (R, \text{ctxt})$.

Dec($\text{mpk}, \text{dk}_\rho, \text{snd}, \text{ct} = (R, \text{ctxt})$): It computes $u_{\text{snd}} := H_1(\text{snd})$ and

\[
m||k := \text{ctxt} \oplus \tilde{H}(\text{snd}, \rho, R, e(R, \text{dk}_\rho), e(u_{\text{snd}}, \text{dk}_\rho)).
\]

It then computes $r := G(\text{snd}, \rho, m, k)$ and checks if $R = g_1^x$. If so, it outputs $m$. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.

Correctness. We can verify that IB-ME$^\text{BDH}$ is perfectly correct. For any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \in \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and any $\sigma, \rho, \text{snd}, \text{rcv} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ such that $\sigma = \text{snd}$ and $\rho = \text{rcv}$, we have

\[
e(X^r, u_{\text{rcv}}) = e((g_1^x)^r, H_2(\text{rcv})) = e(g_1^x, H_2(\rho)^r) = e(R, \text{dk}_\rho),
\]

\[
e(\text{ek}_\sigma, u_{\text{rcv}}) = e(H_1(\sigma)^x, H_2(\text{rcv})) = e(H_1(\text{snd}), H_2(\rho)^x) = e(u_{\text{snd}}, \text{dk}_\rho).
\]

That is, it holds that

\[
\tilde{H}(\sigma, \text{rcv}, R, e(X, u_{\text{rcv}})^r, e(\text{ek}_\sigma, u_{\text{rcv}})) = \tilde{H}(\text{snd}, \rho, R, e(R, \text{dk}_\rho), e(u_{\text{snd}}, \text{dk}_\rho)),
\]

and thus the receiver recovers $m||k$ that the sender $\sigma = \text{snd}$ encrypts. Thus, the receiver can recompute $r := G(\text{snd}, \rho, m, k)$ that satisfies $R = g_1^x$.
4.2 Security Proof

We can show that IB-ME$^{\text{BDH}}$ is Priv-CCA, Priv-MisMatch and Auth-oCMA secure in the ROM. There proofs are deferred to Appendix A.

**Theorem 1.** Suppose the hash function $G$ is a random oracle. If there exists an adversary $A$ that breaks the Priv-CCA security of IB-ME$^{\text{BDH}}$, there exists an adversary $B$ that breaks the Priv-CPA security of IB-ME$^{\text{Basic}}$ such that

$$
\text{Adv}_{A,\text{IB-ME}^{\text{BDH}}}^{\text{priv-cca}}(\lambda) \leq 3\tilde{c}(1 + q_R)q_H \cdot \text{Adv}_{B,G}^{\text{bdh}}(\lambda) + \frac{q_{\text{Dec}}}{p} + \frac{3q_G}{2^\lambda}.
$$

where $p$ is the order of the underlying bilinear group and $q_R,q_D,q_H$, and $q_G$ are the maximum number of queries $A$ makes to are the maximum number of queries $A$ sends to $O_R$, $O_D$, $H$, and $G$ oracles, respectively.

**Theorem 2.** IB-ME$^{BDH}$ is Priv-MisMatch secure in the ROM. Formally, a $\kappa$-admissible adversary $A$ attacking the Priv-MisMatch security of IB-ME$^{BDH}$ has advantage

$$
\text{Adv}_{A,\text{IB-ME}^{\text{BDH}}}^{\text{priv-mismatch}}(\lambda) \leq \frac{q_H + q_G}{2^{\kappa - 1}},
$$

where $q_H$ and $q_G$ are the maximum number of queries $A$ makes to the $H$ and $G$ oracles, respectively.

**Theorem 3.** Suppose the hash functions $H_1$, $H_2$, $\hat{H}$, and $G$ are random oracles. Under the BDH assumption, IB-ME$^{BDH}$ is Auth-oCMA secure in the ROM. Formally, if there exists an adversary $A$ that breaks the Auth-oCMA security of IB-ME$^{BDH}$, there exists an adversary $B$ that breaks the BDH assumption such that

$$
\text{Adv}_{A,\text{IB-ME}^{\text{BDH}}}^{\text{auth-oCMA}}(\lambda) \leq \frac{c^2(q_S + q_R)^2q_H}{2} \cdot \text{Adv}_{B,G}^{\text{bdh}}(\lambda) + \frac{q_G}{2^{\text{msgLen} + \lambda}} + \frac{1}{p},
$$

where $p$ is the order of the underlying bilinear group and $q_S$, $q_R$, $q_H$, and $q_G$ are the maximum number of queries $A$ makes to the $O_S$, $O_R$, $H$, and $G$ oracles, respectively.

5 Improved IB-ME Scheme from IBE and IBS in the Standard Model

This section shows a new generic construction of IB-ME based on IBE, IBS, and reusable extractors, which we call IB-ME$^{\text{IBE+IBS}}$. To achieve Priv-MisMatch security, we hide messages with reusable extractors similarly to Francati et al. [FGRV21].

5.1 Construction

To construct an IB-ME scheme with identity space $\mathcal{ID} = \{0,1\}^*$ and message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{\text{msgLen}}$, we use the following building blocks.

- An IBE scheme $\text{IBE} = (\text{IBE.Setup}, \text{IBE.KGen}, \text{IBE.Enc}, \text{IBE.Dec})$ with $\mathcal{ID}_{\text{IBE}} = \{0,1\}^*$ and $\mathcal{M}_{\text{IBE}} = \{0,1\}^{\text{msgLen} + \text{sigLen} + \text{seedLen}}$.
- An IBS scheme $\text{IBS} = (\text{IBS.Setup}, \text{IBS.KGen}, \text{IBS.Sign}, \text{IBS.Ver})$ with $\mathcal{ID}_{\text{IBS}} = \{0,1\}^*$ and $\text{sigLen}$ bits signatures.
- A reusable computational extractor $\text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^{\text{seedLen}} \times \mathcal{ID} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\text{msgLen} + \text{sigLen}}$.

The proposed IB-ME scheme $\text{IBE-ME}^{\text{IBE+IBS}}$ is as follows.

Setup$(1^\lambda)$: It computes $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}) \leftarrow \text{IBE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and $(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBS}}) \leftarrow \text{IBE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$, and outputs $\text{mpk} := (\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}})$ and $\text{msk} := (\text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBS}})$.

SKGen$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \sigma)$: It outputs $\text{ek} \leftarrow \text{IBE.KGen}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, \sigma)$.

RKGen$(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}, \rho)$: It outputs $\text{ek} \leftarrow \text{IBE.KGen}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBE}}, \rho)$.

Enc$(\text{mpk}, \text{ek}, \text{rcv}, m)$: It samples $s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\text{seedLen}}$ andcomputes $Z := \text{Ext}(s, \sigma)$, $\text{sig} \leftarrow \text{IBS.Sign}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}, \text{ek}_s, m | \text{rcv})$, $\hat{m} \leftarrow (m | \text{sig}) \oplus Z$, and $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{IBE.Enc}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{rcv}, \hat{m} | s)$. It outputs $\text{ct}$.

Dec$(\text{mpk}, \text{ek}_s, \text{snd}, \text{ct})$: It computes $m' | s' \leftarrow \text{IBE.Dec}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{ek}_s, \text{ct})$. If the output is equal to $\bot$, it outputs $\bot$. Otherwise, it computes $Z' := \text{Ext}(s', \text{snd})$ and $m'' | \text{sig}' \leftarrow m' \oplus Z'$. Then, it computes $b \leftarrow \text{IBS.Ver}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}, \text{snd}, m'' | \rho, \text{sig}')$. If $b = 1$, it outputs $m''$; otherwise, it outputs $\bot$. 

5
We do not consider Francati et al. scheme [FGRV21] here since its security relies on a non-standard q-type as-
correctness. We can verify that the size of respective group elements.

Table 2: Comparison of the IB-ME schemes from the BDH assumption in the ROM. The column “Ciphertext”
indicates the difference between the length of ciphertext and that of plaintext. \(|G_1|, |G_2|\) and \(|G_T|\) denotes
the size of respective group elements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>Security Priv Auth Mismatch Enc. key Dec. key Ciphertext</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ateniese et al. [AFNV19]</td>
<td>CPA oNMA (</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyen and Li [BL23]</td>
<td>CPA iCMA (\sqrt{</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(IBE [BF01]+IBS [CC03])</td>
<td>CCA oCMA (\sqrt{</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB-ME^{IBE+IBS} (§ 4)</td>
<td>CCA iCMA (\sqrt{</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB-ME^{IBE+IBS} (§ 5)</td>
<td>CCA iCMA (\sqrt{</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Correctness. We can verify that IB-ME^{IBE+IBS} is correct with negligible correctness errors. Under condition
\(rCV = \rho\) and the correctness of the IBE scheme, for any messages and seeds, we have \(m'||s' = \hat{m}||s\) with all
but negligible probability. Furthermore, the condition \(\sigma = \text{snd}\) ensures \(Z' = \text{Ext}(s', \sigma) = \text{Ext}(s, \text{snd}) = Z\),
and thus we have

\[ \hat{m}'||\text{sig} = \hat{m}' \oplus Z' = \hat{m} \oplus Z = m||\text{sig}. \]

Finally, the correctness of the IBS scheme ensures IBS.Ver(mpk_{IBS}, \text{snd}, m'||\rho, \text{sig}') = 1. Therefore, the decrypt-
ion algorithm finally outputs the encrypted message \(m\) with a probability of all but negligible.

5.2 Security Proof

We can show that IB-ME^{IBE+IBS} is Priv-CCA, Priv-MisMatch and Auth-iCMA secure. The proofs are deferred
to Appendix B.

Theorem 4. If there exists an adversary \(A\) that breaks the Priv-CCA security of IB-ME^{IBE+IBS}, there exists
an adversary \(B\) that breaks the ANO-IND-ID-CCA security of IBE such that

\[ \text{Adv}_{A,\text{IB-ME}}^{\text{priv-cca}}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}_{B,\text{IBE}}^{\text{ano-ind-id-cca}}(\lambda). \]

Theorem 5. If there exists a \(\kappa + \eta\)-admissible adversary \(A\) that breaks the Priv-MisMatch security of
IB-ME^{IBE+IBS}, there exists an adversary \(B\) that breaks the security of Ext such that

\[ \text{Adv}_{A,\text{IB-ME}}^{\text{priv-mismatch}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{B,\text{Ext}}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda). \]

Theorem 6. If there exists an adversary \(A\) that breaks the Auth-iCMA security of IB-ME^{IBE+IBS}, there exists
an adversary \(B\) that breaks the EUF-ID-CMA security of IBS such that

\[ \text{Adv}_{A,\text{IB-ME}}^{\text{auth-iCMA}}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}_{B,\text{IBS}}^{\text{euf-id-cma}}(\lambda). \]

6 Comparison

We compare our IB-ME schemes, IB-ME^{BDH} and IB-ME^{IBE+IBS}, with the existing schemes by Ateniese et
al. [AFNV19], Chen et al. [CLWW22], Wang et al. [WWLZ22] and Boyen and Li [BL23], which are based
on standard assumptions\(^{12}\). Their security and secret key and ciphertext sizes are summarized in Tables 2 and 3.

IB-ME from the BDH assumption in the ROM. We compare IB-ME^{BDH} and IB-ME^{IBE+IBS} with the
Ateniese et al. scheme and the Boyen and Li scheme. We instantiate IB-ME^{IBE+IBS} and the Boyen and Li

\(^{12}\) We do not consider Francati et al. scheme [FGRV21] here since its security relies on a non-standard q-type ass-
umption.
Table 3: Comparison of IB-ME schemes from lattices in the QROM. The data sizes are provided in bytes. The column “Ciphertext” indicates the difference between the length of ciphertext and that of plaintext. All achieve 80-bit security.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>Security</th>
<th>Space complexity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Wang et al. [WWLZ22] (LATTE-3 [ZMS+21]+Falcon-IBS†)</td>
<td>CPA iCMA</td>
<td>1595 82944 29941</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boyen and Li [BL23] (DLP-0 [DLP14,Eur19]+Falcon-IBS†)</td>
<td>CPA iCMA √</td>
<td>1595 1152 4117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IB-MEIBE+IBS ([§ 5] (DLP-0 [DLP14,Eur19]+Falcon-IBS†)</td>
<td>CCA iCMA √</td>
<td>1595 1152 4053</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

†: IBE scheme derived from Falcon-512 [PFH+22] via the signature-to-IBS conversion [KN09].

We assume that the secret key of Falcon is a seed of 32 bytes.

scheme with the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [BF01], the Cha-Cheon IBS scheme [CC03] and a RO-based reusable extractor. Table 2 summarizes their properties. Among them, IB-ME^BDH is the best in terms of key and ciphertext sizes, as they are only one group element. In addition, it achieves stronger Priv-CCA and Auth-oCMA security. We can see that IB-ME^BDH is a pure improvement of the Ateniese et al. scheme. IB-ME^IBE+IBS has about twice the ciphertext of IB-ME^BDH, but achieves Auth-iCMA security (that is, secure even if the receiver’s key is compromised), which is stronger than Auth-oCMA security. Thus, IB-ME^BDH and IB-ME^IBE+IBS offer a trade-off between efficiency and security level. Compared with the Boyen and Li scheme, IB-ME^IBE+IBS is better because it achieves Priv-CCA security and offers more compact ciphertexts.

**IB-ME from lattices in the QROM.** We finally compare post-quantum lattice-based IB-ME schemes in the QROM derived from our IB-ME^IBE+IBS, the Wang et al. scheme, and the Boyen and Li scheme. Our scheme and Boyen and Li scheme are instantiated with a lattice-based anonymous IBE scheme by Ducas, Lyubashevsky and Prest (DLP) [DLP14,Eur19] while the Wang et al. scheme is based on a lattice-based anonymous HIBE scheme LATTE [ZMS+21]. All use a lattice-based IBS scheme derived from Falcon [PFH+22] through signature-to-IBS conversion [KN09] and a QRO-based reusable extractor. Table 3 summarizes their security and space complexity. Our scheme offers small secret keys and ciphertexts of less than 5 kilobytes. Compared to the Wang et al. scheme, our decryption key and ciphertext are only 1.4% and 13.5% of theirs, respectively. This is due to the fact that our scheme is simply based on IBE, not HIBE. Compared to the Boyen and Li scheme, our scheme offers similar space complexity, but the ciphertext is 64 bytes (=2^A bits) shorter than their scheme. Therefore, our construction is considered to be more sophisticated than that of Boyen and Li. It should be noted that our scheme achieves Priv-CCA security differently from existing schemes.

**IB-ME in the StdM.** Our IB-ME^IBE+IBS can be instantiated in the standard model. For example, by using the CCA-secure anonymous IBE scheme [HJP18] along with an IBS scheme [PS06] based on the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption and a reusable extractor based on the DDH assumption, we obtain the IB-ME scheme from the SXDH assumption in the StdM. Compared with the other IB-ME schemes in the StdM [WWLZ22,CLWW22], our scheme achieves stronger Priv-CCA and Auth-iCMA security. However, since our ciphertext includes the seed for the extractor, the ciphertext size may be longer than the existing schemes. It remains open to constructing a practical and strongly secure IB-ME scheme in the StdM.

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LATTE is based on the anonymous HIBE scheme by Cash et al. [CHKP10].
References


A Proofs for Our BDH-Based Scheme

A.1 Proof of Theorem 1

To prove the Priv-CCA security of IB-ME_{BDH}^B, we use the intermediate scheme IB-ME_{Basic}^BDH, which is a simplified version of IB-ME_{BDH}^B. We prove that IB-ME_{Basic}^BDH is Priv-CPA secure under the BDH assumption, and then prove the Priv-CCA security of IB-ME_{BDH}^B assuming the Priv-CPA security of IB-ME_{Basic}^BDH.
Basic IB-ME scheme. The IB-ME scheme \texttt{IB-MEBasic} is as follows. The differences between \texttt{IB-MEBasic} and \texttt{IB-MEBDH} are that \texttt{IB-MEBasic.Enc} samples uniform randomness \( r \) instead of generating it with a hash function \( G \), and \texttt{IB-MEBasic.Dec} does not perform the ciphertext validity check (i.e., do not check if \( R = g_1^r \) holds). Its identity and message spaces are \( \mathcal{ID} = \{0,1\}^* \) and \( \mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{\text{msgLen}+\lambda} \), respectively.

**Setup(\( 1^\lambda \)):** It is identical to \texttt{IB-MEBDH.Setup} except that \( G \) is not chosen.

- **SKGen(mpk, msk, \( \sigma \)):** It is identical to \texttt{IB-MEBDH.SKGen}.
- **RKGen(mpk, msk, \( \rho \)):** It is identical to \texttt{IB-MEBDH.RKGen}.
- **Enc(mpk, \( ek_\sigma \), rcv, \( m \)):** It chooses \( r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) and computes \( u_{\text{rcv}} := H_2(\text{rcv}) \) and
  \[
  R := g_1^r, \quad \text{ctxt} := m \oplus H(\sigma, \text{rcv}, R, e(X^r, u_{\text{rcv}}), e(ek_\sigma, u_{\text{rcv}})).
  \]
  It outputs \( \text{ct} := (R, \text{ctxt}) \).
- **Dec(mpk, \( dk_\rho \), snd, \( \text{ct} = (R, \text{ctxt}) \)):** It computes \( u_{\text{snd}} := H_1(\text{snd}) \) and
  \[
  m := \text{ctxt} \oplus H(\text{snd}, \rho, R, e(R, dk_\rho), e(u_{\text{snd}}, dk_\rho)).
  \]
  Finally, it outputs \( m \).

We can easily verify that \texttt{IB-MEBasic} is correct. We now show that \texttt{IB-MEBasic} is \texttt{Priv-CPA} secure.

**Theorem 7.** Suppose that the hash functions \( H_1, H_2, H \) are random oracles. If there exists an adversary \( A \) that breaks the \texttt{Priv-CPA} security of \texttt{IB-MEBasic}, there exists an adversary \( B \) that breaks the \texttt{BDH} assumption for \( G \) such that

\[
\text{Adv}_{\lambda,\text{IB-MEBasic}}(\lambda) \leq \epsilon(1 + q_R)q_H \cdot \text{Adv}_{B, G}(\lambda),
\]

where \( q_R \) and \( q_H \) are the maximum number of queries \( A \) sends to \( \mathcal{O}_R \) and \( H \) oracles, respectively. The running time of \( B \) is about that of \( A \).

**Proof of Theorem 7.** To prove the theorem, we consider the following sequence of games \texttt{Game}_i for \( i \in \{0, 1, 2\} \). We define the advantage of \( A \) in \texttt{Game}_i as

\[
\epsilon_i := \Pr[\text{Game}_i^A(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}.
\]

- **Game_0.** This is the original security game. By definition, we have
  \[
  \epsilon_0 = \text{Adv}_{\lambda, \text{IB-MEBasic}}(\lambda).
  \]
- **Game_1.** In this game, we add abort conditions. We guess the challenge identity \( \rho^* \) that is not sent to \( \mathcal{O}_R \) oracle. If the guess fails, the game aborts and sets a random coin as \( A \)'s output. To do so, we change the challenger’s procedures as follows. (The other procedures are worked as in the previous game.)
  
  - When \( A \) sends \( \rho \) to \( H_2 \) oracle, it flips a coin \( d \) which yields 0 with probability \( 1 - \delta \). Then, it samples \( b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \), computes \( u_\rho := g_2^b \) and updates \( \mathcal{L}_H_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_H_2 \cup \{ (\rho, u_\rho, b, d) \} \). Then it returns \( u_\rho \) to \( A \).
  - When \( A \) sends \( \rho \) to \( \mathcal{O}_R \) oracle, it searches an entry \( (\rho, u_\rho, b, d) \in \mathcal{L}_H_2 \). If \( d = 0 \), the game aborts. Otherwise (i.e., \( d = 1 \)), it computes \( \text{dk}_\rho := (g_2^b)^b \) and returns it to \( A \).
  - When \( A \) outputs \( (\sigma^*, \text{rcv}^*, m^*) \) to request a challenge ciphertext, it searches \( (\text{rcv}^*, \text{u}_{\text{rcv}}^*, b, d) \) from \( \mathcal{L}_H_2 \). If \( d = 1 \), the game aborts. Otherwise (i.e., \( d = 0 \)), it works as in \texttt{Game}_0.

\[\text{Adv}_{\lambda, \text{IB-MEBasic}}(\lambda) \leq \epsilon(1 + q_R)q_H \cdot \text{Adv}_{B, G}(\lambda),\]

14 If no entry exists, \( H_2(\rho) \) is internally queried and flips a coin \( d \). (In the rest of this paper, when we have a similar situation, we also deal with it in the same manner.)
The advantage of $A$ in $\text{Game}_1$ is equal to the advantage of $A$ in $\text{Game}_0$ conditioning on the game does not abort. Therefore, we have

$$\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_0 \cdot \Pr[\text{--abort}].$$

Let us estimate the probability $\Pr[\text{--abort}]$. The probability that the game does not abort in $O_R$ oracle is $\delta^{q_R}$. The probability that the game does not abort when $A$ request a challenge ciphertext is $1 - \delta$. Hence, the overall non-aborting probability is $\delta^{q_R}(1 - \delta)$. This value is maximum when $\delta = \frac{q_R}{1 + q_R}$, and thus we have $\Pr[\text{--abort}] \leq \frac{1}{\epsilon(1 + q_R)}$ for large $q_R$. Therefore, we have

$$\epsilon_0 \leq \epsilon(1 + q_R) \cdot \epsilon_1.$$

$\text{Game}_2$. In this game, the challenge $ct_0 := (R^*, \text{ctxt}^*)$ is computed as

$$r^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p, \quad Z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{msgLen} + \lambda}, \quad R^* := g_1^{r^*}, \quad \text{ctxt}^* \leftarrow m^* \oplus Z.$$

Let $\text{BadQ}$ be the event that $A$ queries $(\cdot, \text{rcv}^*, R^*, U^*, \cdot)$ to the oracle $H$ where $U^* := e(R^*, dk_{\text{recr}})$. Since $Z$ is chosen independently at random from random oracles, $A$ can distinguish the two games if $\text{BadQ}$ occurs, and otherwise, they proceed identically. Thus, we have

$$|\epsilon_2 - \epsilon_1| \leq \Pr[\text{BadQ}].$$

To estimate $\Pr[\text{BadQ}]$, we show that if $A$ triggers $\text{BadQ}$, we can construct an adversary $B$ that solves the BDH problem. The construction of $B$ is as follows.

1. Upon receiving $(G = (p, G_1, G_2, \mathbb{G}_T, q_1, g_2, e), g_1^\alpha, g_2^\beta, g_1^\gamma, g_1^\delta)$, $B$ sets $X := g_1^\beta$ (i.e., $\text{msk}$ is implicitly set $\alpha$) and prepares three random oracles $H_1, H_2, H$ (i.e., initialize the lists $L_{H_1}, L_{H_2}, L_H$). Also, $B$ flips a coin $\text{coin} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. Then, $B$ executes $A$ on input $mpk := (G, H_1, H_2, \hat{H}, X)$.

2. When $A$ makes oracle queries, $B$ answers them as follows:
   (a) When $A$ sends $\sigma$ to $H_1$ oracle, $B$ samples $b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes $u_\sigma := g_1^b$. Then, $B$ updates $L_{H_1} \leftarrow \{\sigma, u_\sigma, b\}$ and returns $u_\sigma$ to $A$.
   (b) When $A$ sends $\rho$ to $H_2$ oracle, $B$ samples $b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. With probability $1 - \delta$, $B$ computes $u_\rho := g_2^b$ and updates $L_{H_2} \leftarrow \{\rho, u_\rho, b, 0\}$. Otherwise, $B$ computes $u_\rho := g_2^b$ and updates $L_{H_2} \leftarrow \{\rho, u_\rho, b, 1\}$. Then, $B$ returns $u_\rho$ to $A$.
   (c) When $A$ sends $(\sigma, \rho, R, U, V)$ to $H$ oracle, $B$ samples $Z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{msgLen}}$ and updates $L_H \leftarrow L_H \cup \{\sigma, \rho, R, U, V, Z\}$. Then, $B$ returns $Z$ to $A$.
   (d) When $A$ sends $\sigma$ to $O_S$ oracle, $B$ searches $(\sigma, u_\sigma, b) \in L_{H_1}$ and computes $ek_{\sigma} := (g_1^\alpha)^b$. Then, $B$ returns $ek_{\sigma}$ to $A$.
   (e) When $A$ sends $\rho$ to $O_R$ oracle, $B$ searches $(\rho, u_\rho, b, d) \in L_{H_2}$. If $d = 0$, $B$ aborts the game otherwise (i.e., $d = 1$), $B$ computes $dk_\rho := (g_2^\beta)^b$. Then, $B$ returns $dk_\rho$ to $A$.
   (f) When $A$ outputs $(\sigma^*, \text{rcv}^*, m^*)$ to request a challenge ciphertext, $B$ searches $(\text{rcv}^*, u_{\text{rcv}^*}, b^*, d^*) \in L_{H_2}$. If $d^* = 1$, $B$ aborts the game. Otherwise, $B$ sets $R^* := g_1^\gamma$ and computes $\text{ctxt}^* := m^* \oplus Z$ where $Z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{msgLen} + \lambda}$. Then $B$ sets $ct_0 := (R^*, \text{ctxt}^*)$ and $ct_0 \leftarrow CT$, and returns $ct_0$ to $A$.

3. Finally, $A$ outputs a guess $\hat{\text{coin}}$. Then, $B$ picks an entry $(\cdot, \text{rcv}^*, R^*, U^*, \cdot) \in L_H$ at random and outputs $D := (U^*)^\dagger$ as the solution of the BDH problem.

We can see that $B$ perfectly simulates the Priv-CPA game against $A$ if $B$ does not abort. Moreover, we know that $dk_{\text{recr}} = (u_{\text{recr}})^\alpha = (g_2^{\beta^0})^b$ and $R^* = g_1^\gamma$, and thus

$$U^* = e(R^*, dk_{\text{recr}}) = e(g_1^\gamma, g_2^{g_2^{\beta^0}}) = (e(g_1^\gamma, g_2^{\alpha^\beta}))^{b^*}.$$ 

If $A$ distinguishes the two games, $A$ has queried $\hat{H}(\cdot, \text{rcv}^*, R^*, U^*, \cdot)$, and thus with probability at least $\frac{1}{\eta_0}$, $B$ can solve the BDH problem correctly. Thus we have

$$|\epsilon_2 - \epsilon_1| \leq \Pr[\text{BadQ}] \leq g_{\hat{H}} \cdot \text{Adv}_{G, B}^{\text{bdh}}(\lambda).$$
In Game$_2$, both ct$_0$ and ct$_1$ are chosen at random from the ciphertext space. Since coin is information-theoretically hidden from $\mathcal{A}$, we have $\epsilon_2 = 0$.

Putting everything together, we obtain
\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{priv-cca}}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}} (\lambda) \leq \hat{c}(1 + q_R)q_H \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{bdh}}_{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{G}} (\lambda).
\]

We now prove the Priv-CCA security of IB-ME$^{\text{BDH}}$ assuming the Priv-CPA security of IB-ME$^{\text{Basic}}$. The proof is similar to the proof of the FO transformation for PKE schemes [FO99].

**Proof of Theorem 1.** To prove the theorem, we consider the following sequence of games Game$_i$ for $i \in \{0, \cdots , 5\}$. Define the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in Game$_i$ as
\[
\epsilon_i := \left| \Pr[\text{Game}^A_i (\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right|.
\]

**Game$_0$.** This is the original security game. By definition, we have
\[
\epsilon_0 = \text{Adv}^{\text{priv-cca}}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}} (\lambda).
\]

**Game$_1$.** In this game, the randomness $k^* \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ (used to generate the challenge ciphertext) is chosen in the setup phase instead of the challenge phase. Since there is no difference in $\mathcal{A}$’s view, we have
\[
\epsilon_1 = \epsilon_0.
\]

**Game$_2$.** In this game, we change the behavior of $G$ oracle. When $\mathcal{A}$ sends a tuple $(\sigma, \rho, m, k)$ to $G$, the challenger picks $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, and computes
\[
ek := H_1 (\sigma)^r, \quad \text{ct} \leftarrow \text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}. \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, \ek, \rho, m\|k; r).
\]

Then, it updates $\mathcal{L}_G \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_G \cup \{((\sigma, \rho, m, k), r, \text{ct})\}$ and returns $r$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

Since there is no difference in the behaviors of oracles from $\mathcal{A}$’s viewpoint, we have
\[
\epsilon_2 = \epsilon_1.
\]

We remark that $\ek$ is unique for each identity $\sigma$, and thus the ciphertext computed as above can be uniquely determined by $(\sigma, \rho, m, k)$.

**Game$_3$.** In this game, we change the behavior of $O_D$ oracle. When $\mathcal{A}$ sends $(\text{snd}, \rho, \text{ct})$ to $O_D$, it finds an entry $((\text{snd}, \rho, m, k), r, \text{ct}) \in \mathcal{L}_G$. If such a tuple exists, $m\|k$ is returned to $\mathcal{A}$. Otherwise, $\bot$ is returned to $\mathcal{A}$.

Let $\text{BadD}$ be the event that $\mathcal{A}$ submits a decryption query on $(\text{snd}, \rho, \text{ct})$ such that $((\text{snd}, \rho, m, k), r, \text{ct}) \notin \mathcal{L}_G$ but it is not rejected in the previous game. Due to the perfect correctness of the scheme, the two games proceed identically unless $\text{BadD}$ occurs. Thus, we have
\[
|\epsilon_3 - \epsilon_2| \leq \Pr[\text{BadD}] .
\]

We now estimate $\Pr[\text{BadD}]$. In the previous game, if $((\text{snd}, \rho, m, k), r, \text{ct}) \notin \mathcal{L}_G$ when $(\text{snd}, \rho, \text{ct})$ is sent to $O_D$, $G(\text{snd}, \rho, m, k)$ is queried internally and $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ is sampled. Then, $O_D$ checks whether $R = g_1^r$ holds. For any $R \in \mathbb{G}_1$, the probability that $R = g_1^r$ holds for randomly chosen $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is $1/p$. Since $\mathcal{A}$ queries $O_D$ at most $q_D$, we have
\[
|\epsilon_3 - \epsilon_2| \leq \Pr[\text{BadD}] \leq \frac{q_D}{p} .
\]

For simplicity, we use the same symbol mpk for IB-ME$^{\text{Basic}}$ and IB-ME$^{\text{BDH}}$ since mpk of IB-ME$^{\text{BDH}}$ covers that of IB-ME$^{\text{Basic}}$. 
After this game, the decryption oracle is simulated without any decryption keys.

**Game$_4$.** In this game, we add an abort condition into $G$ oracle. If $A$ sends a tuple $(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, k)$ such that $k = k^*$ before the challenge phase, the game aborts. Since $k^* \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ is chosen at random and information-theoretically hidden from $A$ before the challenge phase, we have

$$|\epsilon_4 - \epsilon_3| \leq \frac{q_G}{2^\lambda}.$$  

**Game$_5$.** In this game, we change how to generate the challenge ciphertext $ct_0$. To generate $ct_0$, the challenger chooses $r^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes

$$ek_{\sigma, r^*} \leftarrow H_2(\sigma^{*})^{r^*}, ct_0 \leftarrow \text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}(\text{Enc}(mpk, ek_{\sigma, \cdot}, r\cdot, m^{*}||k^{*}; r^*))$$

Now, the randomness $r^*$ is chosen independently from $G$. Let $\text{BadQ}$ be the event that $A$ sends $(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, k^*)$ to $G$ oracle after it requests the challenge ciphertext. Since $A$'s view is identical unless $\text{BadQ}$ occurs, we have

$$|\epsilon_5 - \epsilon_4| \leq \Pr[\text{BadQ}].$$

To estimate $\Pr[\text{BadQ}]$, we show that if $A$ can trigger the event $\text{BadQ}$, there exists an adversary $B_1$ that breaks the Priv-CPA security of $\text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}$.

The construction of $B_1$ is as follows. Upon receiving $mpk$ (of $\text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}$), $B_1$ samples $k^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, prepares $mpk$ of $\text{IB-ME}^{\text{BDH}}$, and executes $A$ on input it. Then, $B_1$ simulates the Priv-CCA game against $A$ as in Game$_5$. When a query is sent to $O_S$ or $O_R$ oracle, $B_1$ uses its oracles to generate encryption or decryption keys. When $A$ requests a challenge ciphertext on $(\sigma^{*}, r\cdot, m^{*})$, $B_1$ sends $(\sigma^{*}, r\cdot, m^{*})$ to its challenger, receiving the challenge ciphertext $ct^*$. $B_1$ forwards it to $A$. When $A$ triggers the event $\text{BadQ}$, $B_1$ outputs $\text{coin} := 0$ to its challenger as its guess of coin. If $A$ does not trigger the event $\text{BadQ}$, $B_1$ outputs a randomly chosen $\text{coin} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ to its challenger.

Now, we evaluate the $B_1$’s advantage. Let $\text{Fail}$ be the event that $\text{BadQ}$ occurs when $\text{coin} = 1$ (i.e., $ct^*$ is sampled from $CT$). Since $k^*$ is uniformly distributed and independent from $B_1$’s view when $ct^*$ is sampled from $CT$, $\Pr[\text{Fail}] \leq \frac{q_G}{2^\lambda}$. Assume $\text{Fail}$ did not happen, i.e., $\text{BadQ}$ occurs only when $\text{coin} = 0$. Since $B_1$ always outputs 0 when $\text{BadQ}$ occurs, $\Pr[\text{coin} = \text{coin}] = 1$. If $\text{BadQ}$ did not occur, $B_1$ outputs a random coin and thus $\Pr[\text{coin} = \text{coin}] = 1/2$. Thus, we have

$$\text{Adv}_{B_1, \text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}}^{\text{priv-cca}}(\lambda) + \frac{q_G}{2^\lambda} \geq \Pr[\text{coin} = \text{coin}] - \frac{1}{2} = \Pr[\text{BadQ}] + \frac{1}{2} \Pr[\text{BadQ}] - \frac{1}{2} = \frac{1}{2} \Pr[\text{BadQ}].$$

Therefore, we have

$$|\epsilon_5 - \epsilon_4| \leq \Pr[\text{BadQ}] \leq 2\text{Adv}_{B_1, \text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}}^{\text{priv-cca}}(\lambda) + \frac{2q_G}{2^\lambda}.$$  

We finally bound $\epsilon_5$. If $A$ can breaks the Priv-CCA security in Game$_5$, there exists an adversary $B_2$ that breaks the Priv-CPA security of $\text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}$ such that

$$\epsilon_5 = \text{Adv}_{B_2, \text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}}^{\text{priv-cca}}(\lambda).$$

The proof is straightforward because $B_2$ can simulate $O_D$ without any decryption keys and the challenge ciphertext is generated with independent randomness $r^*$.

Putting everything together and folding both adversaries $B_1$ and $B_2$ into one adversary $B$, we obtain

$$\text{Adv}_{A, \text{IB-ME}^{\text{BDH}}}^{\text{priv-cca}}(\lambda) \leq 3\text{Adv}_{A, \text{IB-ME}^{\text{Basic}}}^{\text{priv-cca}}(\lambda) + \frac{q_D}{p} + \frac{3q_G}{2^\lambda}$$

$$= 3\epsilon(1 + q_R)q_G \cdot \text{Adv}_{BDH}^{\text{bh}}(\lambda) + \frac{q_{Dec}}{p} + \frac{3q_G}{2^\lambda}.$$  

$\square$
A.2 Proof of Theorem 2

Proof. To prove the theorem, we consider the following sequence of games Game$_i$ for $i \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. Define the advantage of $A$ in Game$_i$ as

$$\epsilon_i := \left| \Pr[\operatorname{Game}_i^A(\kappa) \Rightarrow 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right|.$$

Game$_0$. This is the original security game. By definition, we have

$$\epsilon_0 = \operatorname{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{IB} - \mathcal{ME}^{\mathcal{HO}}}^\mathcal{priv \text{- mismatch}}(\kappa).$$

Game$_1$. In this game, the challenger aborts the game if $\sigma_0^*$ or $\sigma_1^*$ are sent to $\hat{H}$ or $G$ oracle before $A$ requests the challenge ciphertext. Since both are chosen independently at random and from $\kappa$-distribution, we have

$$|\epsilon_1 - \epsilon_0| \leq \frac{q_H + q_G}{2^\kappa}.$$

Game$_2$. In this game, the challenge ciphertext $ct_0$ is computed as $ct_0 \leftarrow (g_1^{r_0}, (m_0||k_0) \oplus Z_0)$ for random $r_0 \leftarrow Z_p$ and $Z_0 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{msgLen} + \lambda}$. $A$ may notice this change when it sends $\sigma_0^*$ or $\sigma_1^*$ to $\hat{H}$ or $G$ oracle. Since $\sigma^*$ is chosen independently at random from $\kappa$-distribution, we have

$$|\epsilon_2 - \epsilon_1| \leq \frac{q_H + q_G}{2^\kappa}.$$

In Game$_2$, both $ct_0$ and $ct_1$ are distributed uniformly at random. This means that $\text{coin}$ is information-theoretically hidden from $A$, so we have

$$\epsilon_2 = 0.$$

Putting everything together, we obtain

$$\operatorname{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{IB} - \mathcal{ME}^{\mathcal{HO}}}^\mathcal{priv \text{- mismatch}}(\kappa) \leq \frac{q_H + q_G}{2^\kappa - 1}. \quad \square$$

A.3 Proof of Theorem 3

Proof. To prove the theorem, we consider the following sequence of games Game$_i$ for $i \in \{0, \cdots, 3\}$. Define the advantage of $A$ in Game$_i$ as

$$\epsilon_i := \Pr[\operatorname{Game}_i^A(\kappa) \Rightarrow 1].$$

Game$_0$. This is the original Auth-oCMA game. By definition, we have

$$\epsilon_0 = \operatorname{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{IB} - \mathcal{ME}^{\mathcal{HO}}}^\mathcal{auth \text{- oCMA}}(\kappa).$$

Game$_1$. In this game, we change the behavior of $\mathcal{O}_S$, $\mathcal{O}_R$, and $\mathcal{O}_E$ as follows.

- When $A$ sends $\sigma$ to $\mathcal{O}_S$ oracle, it computes $ek_\sigma := H_1(\sigma)^r$. Then, it searches entries $(\text{snd}, \text{rcv}, m||k, ctxt) \in \mathcal{L}_E$ such that $\text{snd} = \sigma$. If such entries exist, it works as follows for each such entry. Let $u_{\text{rcv}} := H_2(\text{rcv})$ and $r := G(\sigma, \text{rcv}, m, k)$.
  - If there exists an entry $(\text{snd}, \text{rcv}, g_1^{r_1}, e(X^r, u_{\text{rcv}}), e(ek_\sigma, u_{\text{rcv}}), *) \in \mathcal{L}_H$, it aborts the game. (In this case, it cannot program the random oracle.)
  - Else, it updates

$$\mathcal{L}_H \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_H \cup \{(\text{snd}, \text{rcv}, g_1^{r_1}, e(X^r, u_{\text{rcv}}), e(ek_\sigma, u_{\text{rcv}}), ctxt \oplus (m||k))\}.$$

After that, it removes the programmed entries from $\mathcal{L}_E$. 

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Finally, it returns $ek_\sigma$ to $A$.

- When $A$ sends $\rho$ to $O_{R}$ oracle, it computes $dk_\rho := H_2(\rho)^x$. Then, it searches entries $(snd, rcv, m||k, ctxt) \in L_E$ such that $rcv = \rho$. If such entries exist, it works as follows for each such entry. Let $u_{snd} := H_1(snd)$ and $r := G(snd, \rho, m, k)$.
  
  - If there exists an entry $(snd, rcv, g_1^r, e(g_1^r, dk_\rho), e(H_1(snd), dk_\rho), *) \in L_H$, it aborts the game.
  
  - Else, for each entry, it updates
    \[
    L_H \leftarrow L_H \cup \{(snd, rcv, g_1^r, e(g_1^r, dk_\rho), e(u_{snd}, dk_\rho), ctxt \oplus (m||k))\}.
    \]

Finally, it returns $dk_\rho$ to $A$.

- When $A$ sends a tuple $(\sigma, rcv, m)$ to $O_{E}$ oracle, it samples $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and computes $r := G(\sigma, rcv, m, k)$ and $R := g_1^r$. Then, it computes $ctxt$ as follows.

1. If $\sigma \in L_S$, it retrieves $ek_\sigma$\(^{16}\) and computes $u_{rcv} := H_2(rcv)$ and
    \[
    ctxt := (m||k) \oplus \tilde{H}(\sigma, rcv, R, e(X^r, u_{rcv}), e(ek_\sigma, u_{rcv})).
    \]

2. If $\sigma \notin L_S$ and $rcv \in L_R$, it retrieves $dk_{rcv}$\(^{17}\) and computes $u_{snd} := H_1(snd)$ and
    \[
    ctxt := (m||k) \oplus \tilde{H}(\sigma, rcv, R, e(R, dk_{rcv}), e(u_{snd}, dk_{rcv})).
    \]

3. If $\sigma \notin L_S$ and $rcv \notin L_R$, it samples $ctxt \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{maglen}+\lambda}$ and updates $L_E \leftarrow L_E \cup \{(\sigma, rcv, m||k, ctxt)\}$.

Let $\text{Fail}$ be the event that $\text{Game}_0$ aborts if $(snd, rcv, g_1^{r'}, e(X^r, u_{rcv}), e(ek_\sigma, u_{rcv}), *) \in L_H$ exists. $\text{Game}_0$ and $\text{Game}_1$ are identical unless $\text{Fail}$ occurs. Therefore, we have
\[
|\epsilon_1 - \epsilon_0| \leq \Pr[\text{Fail}].
\]

To estimate $\Pr[\text{Fail}]$, we show that if $A$ can trigger $\text{Fail}$, we can construct an adversary $B_1$ that solves the BDH problem. The construction of $B_1$ is as follows.

1. Upon receiving $(G = (p, G_1, G_2, G_7, g_1, g_2, e), g_1^a, g_2^b, g_7^\gamma)$, $B_1$ sets $X := g_1^a$ (i.e., $msk$ is implicitly set $\alpha$) and prepares the random oracles $H_1$, $H_2$, $H$, and $G$ (i.e., initialize the lists $L_{H_1}$, $L_{H_2}$, $L_H$, and $L_G$).

Then, $B_1$ samples $I \leftarrow [q_H]$ and executes $A$ on input $mpk := (G, H_1, H_2, H, G, X)$.

2. When $A$ makes oracle queries, $B_1$ answers them as follows:

   a. When $A$ sends $\sigma$ to $H_1$ oracle, $B_1$ samples $b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. With probability $1 - \delta$, $B_1$ computes $u_{\sigma} := (g_7^\gamma)^b$, and updates $L_{H_1} \leftarrow L_{H_1} \cup \{(\sigma, u_{\sigma}, b, 0)\}$. Otherwise, $B_1$ computes $u_{\sigma} := g_1^b$ and updates $L_{H_1} \leftarrow L_{H_1} \cup \{(\sigma, u_{\sigma}, b, 1)\}$.

   b. When $A$ sends $\rho$ to $H_2$ oracle, $B_1$ samples $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. With probability $1 - \delta$, $B_1$ computes $u_{\rho} := (g_2^\gamma)^{\tilde{b}}$, and updates $L_{H_2} \leftarrow L_{H_2} \cup \{(\rho, u_{\rho}, \tilde{b}, 0)\}$. Otherwise, $B_1$ computes $u_{\rho} := g_2^\tilde{b}$ and updates $L_{H_2} \leftarrow L_{H_2} \cup \{(\rho, u_{\rho}, \tilde{b}, 1)\}$.

   c. When $A$ sends $(\sigma, \rho, R, U, V)$ to $H$ oracle, if this is the $I$-th query to $H$, $B_1$ checks if both $(\sigma, u_{\sigma}, b, d) \in L_{H_1}$ and $(\rho, u_{\rho}, \tilde{b}, \tilde{d}) \in L_{H_2}$ has coin $d = 0$ and $\tilde{d} = 0$. If not, $B_1$ aborts the game. Otherwise ($d = \tilde{d} = 0$), $B_1$ outputs $D := V^b\hat{\delta}$ as the solution of the BDH problem. If this is not the $I$-th query, $B_1$ samples $Z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{maglen}}$ and updates $L_{H_2} \leftarrow L_{H_2} \cup \{(\sigma, \rho, R, U, V, Z)\}$. $B_1$ returns $Z$ to $A$.

   d. When $A$ sends $(\sigma, \rho, m, k)$ to $G$ oracle, $B_1$ samples $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and updates $L_G \leftarrow L_G \cup \{(\sigma, \rho, m, k, r)\}$.

   Then, $B_1$ returns $r$ to $A$.

   e. When $A$ sends $(\sigma, rcv, m)$ to $O_{E}$ oracle, it answers as in $\text{Game}_1$.

   f. When $A$ sends $(\sigma, \rho, m, k)$ to $O_{R}$ oracle, $B_1$ extracts $(\sigma, u_{\sigma}, b, d)$ from $L_{H_1}$. If $d = 0$, $B_1$ aborts the game.

   Otherwise, if $d = 1$, $B_1$ computes $ek_\sigma = (g_7^{\gamma})^b$ and works as in $\text{Game}_1$.

   g. When $A$ sends $(\sigma, rcv, m)$ to $O_{E}$ oracle, $B_1$ extracts $(\rho, u_{\rho}, \tilde{b}, \tilde{d})$ from $L_{H_2}$. If $\tilde{d} = 0$, $B_1$ aborts the game.

   Otherwise, if $d = 1$, $B_1$ computes $dk_{\rho} = (g_2^{\gamma})^{\tilde{b}}$ and works as in $\text{Game}_1$.

\(^{16}\)Since $\sigma \in L_S$, the challenger already has computed $ek_\sigma$.

\(^{17}\)Since $rcv \in L_R$, the challenger already has computed $dk_{rcv}$.
Roughly, $B_1$ guesses the identities and the $\hat{H}$ query that causes the event Fail, and if $B_1$ succeeds to guess, it perfectly simulates the Auth-oCMA game against $A$. Let us estimate the probability that $B_1$ succeeds to guess. The probability Fail occurs at the $I$-th $\hat{H}$ query is $\frac{1}{q_n}$. The probability $\mathcal{O}_S$ and $\mathcal{O}_R$ do not abort is $\delta^{qs+q_R}$. The probability the game does not abort when $A$ sends the $I$-th $\hat{H}$ query is $(1-\delta)^2$. Hence, the overall probability that $B_1$ succeeds to guess is $\frac{1}{q_n} \cdot \delta^{qs+q_R}(1-\delta)^2$. This value is maximum when $\delta = 1 - \frac{2}{qs+q_R+2}$, and thus the probability is at most $\frac{\epsilon(q_R)^2}{q_n}$ for large $qs + q_R$. Moreover, if $B_1$ succeeds to guess, we know that $u_\sigma = (g_1^\gamma)^b$ and $u_\rho = (g_2^\delta)^b$ if $\sigma \notin \mathcal{L}_S$ and $\rho \notin \mathcal{L}_R$, and thus

$$V = e(u_\sigma, u_\rho)^\alpha = e(g_1^\gamma, g_2^\delta)^{\beta} = (e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \beta \gamma})^{bb}.$$ 

$B_1$ can solve the BDH problem correctly when it does not abort. Thus, we have

$$|\epsilon_1 - \epsilon_0| \leq \Pr[\text{Fail}] \leq \frac{\epsilon^2(q_S + q_R)^2q_n^\delta}{4} \cdot \text{Adv}_{b, q}^{\text{bdh}}(\lambda).$$

**Game 2.** In this game, the challenger decrypts $\text{ctxt}^*$ with a random $Z^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{msgLen} + \lambda}$ instead of $Z^* := \text{H}(\text{snd}^*, \rho^*, R^*, e(R^*, \text{dk}_\rho), e(H_1(\text{snd}^*), \text{dk}_\rho))$.

Let $\text{BadQ}$ be the event that $A$ makes a query $(\sigma^*, \rho^*, \cdots, V^*)$ to the oracle $\hat{H}$ where $V^* := e(u_{\sigma^*}, u_{\rho^*})^r$. Since $Z^*$ is now chosen independently from random oracles, $A$ notices the difference between the two games if $\text{BadQ}$ occurs and otherwise the two games proceed identically. Thus, we have

To estimate $\Pr[\text{BadQ}]$, we show that if $A$ triggers $\text{BadQ}$, we can construct an adversary $B_2$ that solves the BDH problem. The construction of $B_2$ is as follows.

1. Upon receiving $(G = (p, G_1, G_2, G_T, g_1, g_2, e), g_1^\alpha, g_2^\beta, g_1^\gamma, g_2^\delta)$, $B_2$ sets $X := g_1^\alpha$ (i.e., msk is implicitly set $\alpha$) and prepares three random oracles $\mathcal{H}_1$, $\mathcal{H}_2$, $\mathcal{H}_3$, and $\mathcal{L}_G$.

Then, $B_2$ executes $A$ on input $\text{mpk} := (G, H_1, H_2, H, G, X)$.

2. When $A$ makes oracle queries, $B_2$ answers them as follows:

   a. When $A$ sends $\sigma$ to $\mathcal{H}_1$ oracle, $B_2$ samples $b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. With probability $1 - \delta$, $B_2$ computes $u_\sigma = (g_1^\gamma)^b$ and updates $\mathcal{L}_H_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_H_1 \cup \{(\sigma, u_\sigma, b, 0)\}$. Otherwise, $B_2$ computes $u_\sigma := g_1^\gamma$ and updates $\mathcal{L}_H_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_H_1 \cup \{(\sigma, u_\sigma, b, 1)\}$. Then, $B_2$ returns $u_\sigma$ to $A$.

   b. When $A$ sends $\rho$ to $\mathcal{H}_2$ oracle, $B_2$ samples $b \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. With probability $1 - \delta$, $B_2$ computes $u_\rho := (g_2^\delta)^b$ and updates $\mathcal{L}_H_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_H_2 \cup \{(\rho, u_\rho, b, 0)\}$. Otherwise, $B_2$ computes $u_\rho := g_2^\delta$ and updates $\mathcal{L}_H_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_H_2 \cup \{(\rho, u_\rho, b, 1)\}$. Then, $B_2$ returns $u_\rho$ to $A$.

   c. When $A$ sends $(\sigma, \rho, R, U, V)$ to $\mathcal{H}$ oracle, $B_2$ samples $Z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\text{msgLen}}$ and updates $\mathcal{L}_H \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_H \cup \{(\sigma, \rho, R, U, V, Z)\}$. Then, $B_2$ returns $Z$ to $A$.

   d. When $A$ sends $(\sigma, \rho, m, k)$ to $\mathcal{G}$ oracle, $B_2$ samples $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and updates $\mathcal{L}_G \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_G \cup \{(\sigma, \rho, m, k, r)\}$. Then, $B_2$ returns $r$ to $A$.

   e. When $A$ sends $(\sigma, \text{rcv}, m)$ to $\mathcal{O}_E$ oracle, it answers as in the previous game.

   f. When $A$ sends $\sigma$ to $\mathcal{O}_S$ oracle, $B_2$ extracts $(\sigma, u_\sigma, b, d)$ from $\mathcal{L}_H_1$. If $d = 0$, $B_2$ aborts the game.

   Otherwise (that is, $d = 1$), $B_2$ computes $\text{dk}_\sigma := (g_1^\gamma)^b$ and returns it to $A$.

   g. When $A$ sends $\rho$ to $\mathcal{O}_R$ oracle, $B_2$ extracts $(\rho, u_\rho, b, d)$ from $\mathcal{L}_H_2$. If $d = 0$, $B_2$ aborts the game.

   Otherwise (that is, $d = 1$), $B_2$ computes $\text{dk}_\rho := (g_2^\delta)^b$ and returns it to $A$.

3. $A$ outputs $(\text{snd}^*, \rho^*, \text{ctxt}^* := (R^*, \text{ctxt}^*))$. $B_2$ sets $\sigma^* := \text{snd}^*$. If both $(\sigma^*, u_{\sigma^*}, b^*, d^*) \in \mathcal{L}_H_1$ and $(\rho^*, u_{\rho^*}, b^*, d^*) \in \mathcal{L}_H_2$ do not have coins $d^* = 0$ and $d^* = 0$, $B_2$ aborts the game. Otherwise, $B_2$ picks an entry $(\sigma^*, \rho^*, R^*, U, V, \hat{b}) \in \mathcal{L}_H_2$ at random, and outputs $D := V^{\sigma^* \rho^* \hat{b}}$ as the solution of the BDH problem.

We can see that $B_2$ perfectly simulates the Auth-oCMA game if $B_2$ does not abort. Let us estimate the probability $\Pr[\text{not abort}]$. The probability $\mathcal{O}_S$ and $\mathcal{O}_R$ do not abort is $\delta^{qs+q_R^*}$. The probability the game does not abort when $A$ outputs a forgery is $(1-\delta)^2$. Hence, the overall non-aborting probability is $\delta^{qs+q_R^*}(1-\delta)^2$. 

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This value is maximum when \( \hat{\delta} = \frac{q_S + q_R}{q_S + q_R + 2} \), and thus \( \Pr[\text{\texttt{abort}}] \leq \frac{4}{\eta (q_S + q_R)^2} \) for large \( q_S + q_R \). Moreover, we know that \( u_\sigma = (g_1^{\gamma})^{b^*}, u_{\rho} = (g_2^{\beta})^{b^*} \), and thus

\[
V^* = e(u_\sigma^{\gamma}, u_{\rho}^{\beta}) = e(g_1^{\gamma b^*}, g_2^{\beta b^*}) = (e(g_1, g_2)^{\alpha \beta})^{b^*}.
\]

If \( A \) can distinguish the two games, \( A \) has queried \( \text{\texttt{H}}(\sigma^*, r c v^*, \cdot, \cdot, V^*) \), and thus \( B_2 \) can solve the BDH problem correctly with probability at least \( \frac{1}{q_H} \). Therefore,

\[
|\epsilon_2 - \epsilon_1| \leq \Pr[\text{\texttt{BadQ}}] \leq \frac{e^2(q_S + q_R)^2}{4} \cdot \text{Adv}_{B_2, \rho}^{\text{bdh}}(\lambda).
\]

**Game_3.** In this game, the challenger checks if \( G(m^*, k^*, \text{\texttt{snd}}^*, \rho^*) \) has been queried, and if so, it aborts the game. Otherwise, it samples \( r^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) at random instead of generating it with \( G \). Since \( m^* || k^* \) is chosen independently at random, the probability \( G(m^*, k^*, \text{\texttt{snd}}^*, \rho^*) \) was queried is \( \frac{q_G}{2 \text{msgLen} + \lambda} \), and thus we have

\[
|\epsilon_3 - \epsilon_2| \leq \frac{q_G}{2 \text{msgLen} + \lambda}.
\]

We finally evaluate \( \epsilon_3 \). In **Game_3**, \( A \) breaks the Auth-oCMA security if \( R^* = g_1^{r^*} \) holds for randomly chosen \( r^* \in \mathbb{Z}_p \). Since for any \( R \in \mathbb{G}_1 \) the probability that \( R^* = g_1^{r^*} \) holds for a randomly chosen \( r^* \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) is \( \frac{1}{p} \), we have

\[
\epsilon_3 = \frac{1}{p}.
\]

Putting everything together and folding both adversaries \( B_1 \) and \( B_2 \) into one adversary \( B \), we obtain

\[
\text{Adv}_{A, \text{IB-ME}^{\text{IND}}}(\lambda) \leq \frac{e^2(q_S + q_R)^2}{2} \cdot \text{Adv}_{B, \rho}^{\text{bdh}}(\lambda) + \frac{q_G}{2 \text{msgLen} + \lambda} + \frac{1}{p}.
\]

\[ \square \]

## B Proofs for Our Generic Constructions

### B.1 Proof of Theorem 4

**Proof.** Let \( A \) be an adversary that breaks the Priv-CCA security of IB-ME_{IBE+IBS}. We show an adversary \( B \) that breaks the ANO-IND-ID-CCA security of IBE by using \( A \). The description of \( B \) is as follows.

1. Upon receiving the master public key \( \text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}} \), \( B \) generates \( (\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBS}}) \leftarrow \text{IBS.Setup}(\lambda) \) and executes \( A \) on input \( \text{mpk} = (\text{mpk}_{\text{IBE}}, \text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}) \).
2. \( B \) answers queries from \( A \) as follows.
   - When \( A \) sends \( \sigma \) to \( C_S \) oracle, \( B \) computes \( \text{ek}_\sigma \leftarrow \text{IBS.KGen}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}, \text{msk}_{\text{IBS}}, \sigma) \) and returns it to \( A \).
   - When \( A \) sends \( \rho \) to \( C_R \) oracle, \( B \) sends \( \rho \) to \( C_{SK} \) oracle and receives \( \text{dk}_\rho \). Then \( B \) returns it to \( A \).
   - When \( A \) sends \( (\text{snd}, \rho, \text{ct}) \) to \( C_D \) oracle, if \( \text{ct} = \text{ct}^* \), it outputs \( \bot \). Otherwise, \( B \) sends \( (\rho, \text{ct}) \) to its decryption oracle and receives \( (m||s) \). Then, it computes \( m||\text{sig} \leftarrow m \oplus \text{Ext}(s, \text{snd}) \) and \( b \leftarrow \text{IBS.Ver}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}, \text{snd}, m||\rho, \text{sig}) \). If \( b = 1 \), it returns \( m \); else it returns \( \bot \).
3. When \( A \) sends \( (\sigma^*, r c v^*, m^*) \) to request a challenge ciphertext, \( B \) first samples \( s^* \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\text{seedLen}} \) and computes \( \text{sig}^* \leftarrow \text{IBS.Sign}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}, \text{ek}_\sigma, m^*) \), \( \hat{m}^* \leftarrow (m^*||\text{sig}^*) \oplus \text{Ext}(s^*, \sigma^*) \). Then, it sends \( (rcv^*, \hat{m}^*||s^*) \) to its challenger and receives the challenge ciphertext \( ct^* \), which is sent to \( A \).
4. Finally, when \( A \) outputs \( \text{coin} \), \( B \) sends it to the challenger as its guess.

We can verify that \( B \) perfectly simulates the Priv-CCA game against \( A \). Moreover, \( r c v^* \notin \mathcal{L}_R \) implies \( r c v^* \notin \mathcal{L}_{SK} \). Therefore, if \( A \) breaks the Priv-CCA security, \( B \) also breaks the ANO-IND-ID-CCA security, that is,

\[
\text{Adv}_{A, \text{IB-ME}}^{\text{priv-cca}}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}^{\text{ano-IND-ID-CCA}}_{B, \text{IBE}}(\lambda).
\]

\[ \square \]
B.2 Proof of Theorem 5

Proof. To prove the theorem, we consider the following sequence of games Game_i for i ∈ {0, 1, 2}. Define the advantage of A in Game_i as

\[ \epsilon_i := \Pr[\text{Game}_i^A(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}. \]

Game_0. This is the original security game. By definition, we have

\[ \epsilon_0 = \text{Adv}_{\text{priv}-\text{mismatch}}^{A, \text{IB-IBS}}(\lambda). \]

Game_1. In this game, when A sends (0, rcv, m) to O_E, and requests the challenge ciphertext ct_0, ciphertexts are generated with Z ← {0, 1}^{msgLen+sigLen} instead of Z := Ext(s, σ_0).

We will show that Game_0 and Game_1 are indistinguishable due to the security property of the extractor Ext. We can assume that the maximum information about σ_0^* that A can obtain from the oracle queries is ek_{σ_0^*} because O_S returns ek_{σ_0^*} when A happens to send σ_0^* and signatures depends on ek_{σ_0^*}. Thus, \( \eta \)-identity-lossyness of IBS and that fact that σ_0^* is sampled from k + \eta-distribution \( \Sigma_0 \) leads \( H_\infty(\sigma_0^{*} \mid \text{ek}_{\sigma_0^{*}}) \geq H_\infty(\sigma_0^{*}) - \eta = \kappa + \eta - \eta = \kappa \). Also, A requests ciphertexts on σ_0^* at most q_E + 1 times. Therefore, (κ, q_E + 1)-reusable computational extractor Ext ensures that the extracted randomness Z looks random for A. Hence, Game_0 and Game_1 are indistinguishable, and there exists an adversary B_1 such that

\[ |\epsilon_1 - \epsilon_0| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{B_1,Ext}}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda). \]

In Game_1, the ciphertexts ct generated via O_E, and the challenge ciphertexts ct_0 and ct_1 encrypt a random message. Therefore, they do not have information about the encrypted messages and the sender. This means that the challenge bit coin is information-theoretically hidden from A, so we have

\[ \epsilon_2 = 0. \]

Therefore, we obtain

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{A,IB-ME}}^{\text{priv}-\text{mismatch}}(\lambda) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{E,Ext}}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda). \]

\[ \square \]

B.3 Proof of Theorem 6

Proof. Let A be an adversary that breaks the Auth-I-CMA security of IB-ME^{IBE+IBS}. We show an adversary B that breaks the EUF-ID-CMA security of IBS by using A. The description of B is as follows.

1. Upon receiving the master public key mpk_{IBS}, B generates (mpk_{IBE}, msk_{IBE}) ← IBE.Setup(\lambda) and executes A on input mpk := (mpk_{IBE}, mpk_{IBS}).
2. B answers queries from A as follows.
   - When A sends σ to O_S oracle, B sends σ to its key generation oracle O_S and oracle and receives ek_{σ}.
   - Then B returns it to A.
   - When A sends \( (\sigma, rcv, m) \) to O_E oracle, B first sends (σ, m | rcv) to its signing oracle and receives sig.
   - Then, it samples s ∈ {0, 1}^{\text{msgLen}} and computes \( \hat{m} \leftarrow (m | \text{sig}) \oplus \text{Ext}(s, \sigma) \) and ct ← IBE.Enc(mpk_{IBE}, rcv, \hat{m} | s).
   - It returns ct to A.
3. When A outputs (snd^*, ρ^*, ct^*) as a forgery, B computes \( \hat{m}^* \leftarrow \text{IBE.Dec}(mpk_{IBE}, \text{dk}_\rho, \text{ct}^*) \). If the output is not \( \bot \), it computes \( m^* | \text{sig}^* \leftarrow \hat{m}^* \oplus \text{Ext}(s^*, \text{snd}^*) \) and \( b^* \leftarrow \text{IBS.Ver}(mpk_{IBS}, \text{snd}^*, m^* | \rho^*, \text{sig}^*) \).
   - If \( b^* = 1 \), it outputs \( (m^* | \rho^*, \text{sig}^*) \) as its forgery.
We can verify that $B$ perfectly simulates the Auth-iCMA game. If $A$ creates a valid forgery, we have $\text{snd}^* \notin \mathcal{L}_S$, $(\text{snd}^*, \rho^*, m^*) \notin \mathcal{L}_E$, and $\text{IBS.Ver}(\text{mpk}_{\text{IBS}}, \text{snd}^*, m^* || \rho, \text{sig}^*) = 1$. $\text{snd}^* \notin \mathcal{L}_S$ implies $\text{snd}^* \notin \mathcal{L}_{SK}$, and $(\text{snd}^*, \rho^*, m^*) \notin \mathcal{L}_E$ implies $(\text{snd}^*, m^* || \rho^*) \notin \mathcal{L}_{SIG}$. Therefore, if $A$ breaks the Auth-iCMA security, $B$ also breaks the EUF-ID-CMA security. Thus, we have

\[
\text{Adv}_{A, \text{IB-ME}}^{\text{auth-iCMA}}(\lambda) = \text{Adv}_{B, \text{IBS}}^{\text{euf-id-cma}}(\lambda).
\]

\[\square\]