On iterated punctured Grover

Cezary Piłaszewicz and Marian Margraf

Freie Universität Berlin, Takustr. 9, 14195 Berlin, Germany
firstname.lastname@fu-berlin.de

Abstract. Grover’s algorithm is a very versatile cryptanalytical tool. Even though it doesn’t provide an exponential speed-up, it still changed the cryptographic requirements all over the world. Usually, Grover’s algorithm is executed with a fixed well-defined function indicating good states. In this paper, we want to investigate what happens if the function is changed over time to mark less and less good states. This is achieved by considering a family of $s$-long punctured ciphertexts. We compute the amplitudes after $2^{s/2}$ steps of an adjusted Grover’s algorithm proposed by Zheng et al. in Nested Quantum Search Model on Symmetric Ciphers and Its Applications (2023). We use the amplitudes to reason that such an approach always leads to a worse run-time when compared to the naïve version. We also indicate at which point in Zheng et al. the counterintuitive nature of quantum computation leads to false assumptions.

Keywords: Grover’s algorithm · quantum computation · cryptanalysis

1 Introduction

When discussing the power of quantum computers, Grover’s algorithm is often treated as an obvious argument to double the key length. The premise, no matter how strong, is simple enough that there is not much space left for improvements other than implementations of the oracle. This is even more amplified by the proofs of optimality of Grover’s algorithm [4]. This, and the esoteric nature of quantum computation, can often lead to wrong assumptions about its runtime.

In this paper, we want to investigate why intuitive arguments fail when discussing Grover’s speed-up.

The inspiration for this paper was a publication by Zheng et al. [5]. They suggested an iterated (nested) approach, where for a set of punctured ciphertexts $(z_1, z_2, ..., z_r)$, one investigates the sets of keys $K_1, K_2, ..., K_r$ such that $K_i = \{ k : f_i(k) = z_i \land k \in K_{i-1} \}$. In this case, a punctured ciphertext is a string created by projecting the ciphertext onto a subset of its bits. One can also consider what changes when we define $K_i$ as $K_i = \{ k : f_i(k) = z_i \}$, we will shortly mention this case in Section 4. The idea is to begin with a whole key space $K_0 = \{ k \in \{0,1\}^n \}$ and start searching for the consecutive key sets using oracles $O_{z_i}$:

$$K_0 \xrightarrow{O_{z_1}} K_1 \xrightarrow{O_{z_2}} K_2 \xrightarrow{O_{z_3}} ... \xrightarrow{O_{z_r}} K_r$$
Since for all $i : K_{i+1} \subset K_i$, for a good encryption function the sets will usually drop keys at a constant rate depending on the size of the punctured ciphertext. In fact, for an $s$-long punctured ciphertext, each round finds $|K_i|$ out of $|K_{i-1}|$ keys with $\frac{|K_{i-1}|}{|K_i|} = 2^s$. The assumption then is that this search with Grover would require $\sqrt{2^s}$ steps. For $r := n/s$ with high probability, $K_r$ consists of a single key that delivers a correct punctured ciphertext for all $i = 1, ..., r$. This results in a runtime of $\sqrt{2^s} \cdot n/s$, which if $s$ is chosen to be 2, gives us polynomial runtime of $n$.

We will first introduce the notation used throughout the paper, and briefly introduce Grover’s algorithm [2] and its iterated version [5]. In Section 3, we introduce methods and apply them to compare the two approaches. Finally, we will give an intuitive argument why the mentioned technique will not work.

## 2 Notation

Let $E : \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ be an encryption function with

$$E : (k, p) \mapsto c.$$ 

Further, for a fixed plaintext-ciphertext pair $(P, C)$, define $F : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ with

$$F(k) = E(k, P)$$

and for some index-set $I$:

$$F_I(k) = \big( E(k, P) \big)_{|I}.$$ 

In this case $x|_I$ is a projection of $x$ on the bits in $I$. If $|I| = s$, $F_I(k)$ is an $s$-bit punctured ciphertext of $P$. We are interested in finding a key $k'$ such that $F(k') = C$. This also implies that for any $I \subseteq \{1, 2, ..., n\}$, $F_I(k') = C_I$.

### 2.1 Grover’s algorithm

In this section, we will introduce Grover’s algorithm [2] and the notation we use to describe it. We begin by introducing the setting in which the algorithm is considered.

**Statement 1.** Let $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ be an arbitrary boolean function with $|f^{-1}(1)| \geq 1$. There exists a quantum algorithm $A$ that, given oracle access to a unitary version of $f$, finds an $x : f(x) = 1$ in $O(\sqrt{n/|f^{-1}(1)|})$ time.

The original algorithm consists of multiple identical steps, each of them having 2 phases:
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– for a function $f$ we mark the states $|x\rangle$ which fulfil the clause $f(x) = 1$ using $U_f$:

$$U_f |x\rangle |y\rangle = \begin{cases} |x\rangle |^y\rangle, & \text{if } f(x) = 1 \\ |x\rangle |y\rangle, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We can then use the second register to obtain mapping

$$|x\rangle |f(x)\rangle \mapsto (-1)^{f(x)} |x\rangle |0\rangle.$$

– we apply Grover’s diffusion operator to reflect each amplitude by the mean of all amplitudes. This can be achieved by applying $U_s = 2 |m\rangle \langle m| - Id,$ where $|m\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{i=0}^{2^n-1} |i\rangle$.

In our setting the function $f$ will be defined as:

$$f(k) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } F(k) = C \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Upon the last step, we can apply the $U_f$ again and measure the second register. When $|1\rangle$ is measured, we know that all the $x$ values in the superposition in first register fulfil the clause $f$.

\begin{algorithm}
\textbf{Algorithm 1:} Grover’s algorithm
\begin{enumerate}
    \item \textbf{Input} : $U_f$, $K = |\{k : f(k) = 1\}|$, $L = \lceil \frac{2^n}{K} \rceil$
    \item Start with a uniform superposition $|s\rangle |y\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{k=0}^{2^n-1} |k\rangle |0\rangle$
    \item \textbf{for} step in range($\sqrt{L}$) \textbf{do}
    \item \hspace{1em} \textbf{Grover step}:
    \item \hspace{2em} Negate amplitude of the states marked by $U_f$
    \item \hspace{2em} Apply Grover’s diffusion operator to adjust the amplitudes
    \item Measure the $|y\rangle$ register
    \item \textbf{if} $|y\rangle = |1\rangle$ \textbf{then}
    \item \hspace{1em} $|s\rangle = \frac{1}{\pi} \sum_{k : f(k) = 1} |k\rangle$
\end{enumerate}
\textbf{Output}: $|s\rangle$, the uniform superposition of all keys fulfilling the clause $f$
\end{algorithm}

2.2 Iterated version

In this section, we will introduce the notation used for iterated version of Grover’s algorithm from [5]. For iterated (nested) approach, the algorithm consists of multiple iterations. We need a set of punctured ciphertexts $(z_1, z_2, ..., z_r)$, these are valid ciphertexts projected to some subset of bits of the original ciphertext. These can be generated by one or multiple ciphertexts. We will assume they are
generated from a single ciphertext (and therefore single plaintext) for the ease of notation, but this must not be the case. Define \( K_i = \{ k : F_i(k) = z_i \land k \in K_{i-1} \} \), with \((F_i)_{1 \leq i \leq r}\) being a family of projections of the original \( F \) function. We start off with an Assumption 1 which will help us determine the ratio \( \frac{|K_i|}{|K_{i-1}|} \).

**Assumption 1.** [5] For a strong pseudo-random function family \((F_m)_{m \in M}\), \( F_m : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^s \), a fixed vector (correct key) \( k' \) and an arbitrary vector (key) \( k \), the probability of a collision is:

\[
Pr_{k \neq k'} \left( F_m(k') = F_m(k) \right) = 2^{-s}
\]

**Assumption 2.** For a well-designed encryption function \( E(\cdot, \cdot) \) with a fixed plaintext \( P \), if given any \( r \) independent index-sets, then the corresponding functions \( F_1, ..., F_r \) are pairwise independent.

The Assumption 1 and Assumption 2 tell us that for two independent index-sets, given the set of keys \( K_{i-1} \), each key \( k \in K_{i-1} \) will fulfil the clause \( F_i(k') = F_i(k) \) with probability \( 2^{-s} \). This means \( \forall 1 \leq i \leq r \):

\[
\frac{|K_i|}{|K_{i-1}|} = \frac{|K_{i-1}| \cdot 2^{-s}}{|K_{i-1}|} = 2^{-s},
\]

so in each iteration we only keep \( 2^{-s} \) of the previous keys.

Each iteration consists of a classical Grover search for a changing punctured function \( f_i \):

- choose an index \( i \)
- define \( U_{f_i} \) as
  \[
  U_{f_i} \left| x \right| y \rangle = \begin{cases} 
  \left| x \right| \left| \neg y \rightangle, & \text{if } f_i(x) = 1 \\
  \left| x \right| \left| y \rightangle, & \text{otherwise},
  \end{cases}
  \]

for \( f_i \) defined as:

\[
 f_i(k) = \begin{cases} 
  1, & \text{if } F_i(k) = z_i \land k \in K_{i-1} \\
  0, & \text{otherwise}.
  \end{cases}
\]

\( i \) indexes a changing subset of bits of the ciphertext \( C \).
- perform standard Grover search as in Algorithm 1 using \( U_{f_i} \).

After sufficiently many steps are repeated, as in classical Grover, we can apply \( U_{f_i} \) again and measure the second register to get a superposition of all keys fulfilling the clause \( |\phi \rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|K_i|}} \sum_{k \in K_i} |k\rangle \). This concludes the \( i \)th iteration and we move on to the next punctured ciphertext.
Algorithm 2: Iterated Grover by [5]

Input : \(U_{f_1}, U_{f_2}, \ldots, U_{f_r}\), a constant rate \(L = \frac{|K - 1|}{K} = 2^s\)

1. Start with a uniform superposition \(|s\rangle |y\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{k=0}^{2^n-1} |k\rangle |0\rangle \)

2. for \(i\) in 1 to \(r\) do
   - \(i\)’th Grover iteration:
     - Use \(U_{f_i}\) as the oracle for Grover’s algorithm with \(|s\rangle |y\rangle\) as input:
     - for step in range(\(\sqrt{L}\)) do
       - Grover step:
         - Negate amplitude of the states marked by \(U_{f_i}\)
         - Apply Grover’s diffusion operator to adjust the amplitudes
     - Measure the \(|y\rangle\) register
     - if \(|y\rangle = |1\rangle\) then
       - \(|s\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|K|}} \sum_{k : f_i(k) = 1} |k\rangle\)
     - if \(|y\rangle = |1\rangle\) then
       - \(|s\rangle = |k'\rangle\)
   - Output: \(k'\), the correct key that fulfills all the clauses \(f_1, \ldots, f_r\)

We finish by applying the last punctured function \(f_r\) one more time and measuring the second register. If a \(|1\rangle\) is measured, the value in the first register holds the correct key \(k'\).

3 Comparison of amplitudes in two cases

In this section we will compare the behaviour of the amplitudes in the scenario described in [5] and standard Grover’s algorithm. We will prove that a single iteration of the nested approach results in a worse amplitude distribution (needing more follow-up Grover’s steps to land at a comparable state) than if we perform the same amount of steps immediately searching for the single correct key.

We start by introducing a useful theorem which lets us compare the states of quantum registers. It uses the amplitudes distribution to estimate the amount of steps needed to guarantee the highest success rate of the measurement.

Theorem 1. [1] Let \(f : \{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}\) be a boolean clause. Further, let \(\overline{k}_{|\tau\rangle}(t)\) be the average over amplitudes of the keys which fulfill the clause \(f\) (correct keys) at time \(t\) for quantum state \(|\tau\rangle\). Analogously, let \(\overline{l}_{|\tau\rangle}(t)\) be the average amplitude of the keys which don’t fulfill the same clause \(f\) (incorrect keys). Finally, let \(N = 2^n\), and \(K\) be the amount of the correct keys \(K := |f^{-1}(1)|\). Then:

1. \(C(t) = \frac{2}{N} \left( (N - K) \cdot \overline{l}_{|\tau\rangle}(t) - K \cdot \overline{k}_{|\tau\rangle}(t) \right)\)
2. \(\overline{k}_{|\tau\rangle}(t + 1) = C(t) + \overline{k}_{|\tau\rangle}(t)\)
3. \(\overline{l}_{|\tau\rangle}(t + 1) = C(t) - \overline{l}_{|\tau\rangle}(t)\).

Let \(I \subseteq \{1, \ldots, n\}\) be a set with \(s\) elements. In this case \(F_I\) produces a punctured ciphertext of length \(s\). Define our \(F_1\) from Algorithm 2 as the \(F_I\)
function (and by extend, the \( f_1 \) clause is \( f_T \)). By Assumption 2, to find a superposition of only the keys in \( K_1 \) we would need a single iteration of Algorithm 2, which requires \( \sqrt{\frac{2^n}{2^n-s}} = 2^{s/2} \) Grover steps. After the measurement in step 7 of Algorithm 2, the resulting quantum state would be:

\[
|\psi\rangle = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n-s}} \sum_{k \in K_1} |k\rangle.
\]

Now assume we want to find a specific key \( k' \) in \( |\psi\rangle \).

From Theorem 1 we know, that the runtime of Grover’s algorithm for arbitrary amplitude distribution depends only on the average amplitude of the correct and incorrect keys.

**Proposition 1.** For the state \( |\psi\rangle \) achieved after one iteration of Algorithm 2 with \( 2^{s/2} \) Grover steps, we have:

\[
\overline{k|\psi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n-s}}
\]

\[
\overline{l|\psi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) \approx \frac{\sqrt{2^n-s}}{2^n}
\]

**Proof.** In our scenario, the only correct key is \( k' \):

\[
\overline{k|\psi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) = 1 \cdot \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n-s}} = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n-s}}
\]

By the same formula, for the incorrect states we have:

\[
\overline{l|\psi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) = \left(2^n-s-1\right) \cdot \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n-s}} + (2^n - 2^{n-s}) \cdot 0
\]

\[
= \frac{2^n-s - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n-s}}}{2^n-1}
\]

\[
= \frac{\sqrt{2^n-s} - 1}{2^n-1}
\]

\[
\approx \frac{\sqrt{2^n-s}}{2^n}
\]

The value of \( \overline{l|\psi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) \) is computed as the average of the \( 2^n-s-1 \) incorrect keys in \( K_T \) each with amplitude \( \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n-s}} \), and the keys in \( K_0 \setminus K_T \) with amplitude 0.

Next, we want to compare this result with the state of the register if we would immediately start the search for \( k' \) instead of \( K_1 \) (this would correspond to performing standard Grover’s search, not the iterated approach).
Proposition 2. For the state $|\phi\rangle$ achieved after $2^{s/2}$ Grover steps of Algorithm 1, we have:

$$k_{|\phi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) \approx \sqrt{\frac{4}{2^{n-s}} + 2^{-n/2}}$$

$$l_{|\phi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) \approx \frac{\sqrt{2^{n-s}}}{2^n} \cdot \sqrt{2^s}.$$

Proof. The state $|\phi\rangle$ at time $t$ can be described as [3]:

$$|\phi_t\rangle = \sin \theta |k'\rangle + \cos \theta \left( \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n-1}} \sum_{k \neq k'} |k\rangle \right)$$

$$=: \sin \theta |k'\rangle + \cos \theta |k'^\perp\rangle,$$

with $\theta = \arcsin \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}$. For small values, we know

$$\sin(x) \approx x,$$

so $\theta \approx \frac{1}{2^n}$. Further, $\theta_t = (2t + 1)\theta$, so for $t = 2^{s/2}$ we have:

$$\theta_{2^{s/2}} = (2 \cdot 2^{s/2} + 1) \cdot \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n}}$$

$$= 2^{s-n+1} + \frac{1}{2^{n/2}}$$

$$= \sqrt{2^{n-s-2}} + 2^{-n/2}$$

$$= \sqrt{\frac{4}{2^{n-s}}} + 2^{-n/2}.$$  

Using (1) we get:

$$k_{|\phi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) = \sin \theta_{2^{s/2}} = \sin \left( \sqrt{\frac{4}{2^{n-s}} + 2^{-n/2}} \right)$$

$$\approx \sqrt{\frac{4}{2^{n-s}}} + 2^{-n/2}.$$  

Further, using Pythagorean trigonometric identity, we know:

$$\cos \theta_{2^{s/2}} = \sqrt{1 - \sin^2 \theta_{2^{s/2}}} = \sqrt{1 - \left( \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n-s-2}} + 2^{-n/2}} \right)^2}$$

$$\approx \sqrt{\frac{2^n \cdot 2^{n-s}}{2^n}}.$$
and the average amplitude of an incorrect state is:

\[ l_{|\phi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) = \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n} \cdot \cos \theta_{2^{s/2}}} \]

\[ \approx \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n} \cdot \sqrt{2^n \cdot 2^{n-s}}} \]

\[ = \frac{\sqrt{2^{n-s}}}{2^n} \cdot \sqrt{2^s}. \]

This means that \( k_{|\phi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) > k_{|\psi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) \) resulting in higher probability to measure \( k' \) in \( |\phi\rangle \) than in \( |\psi\rangle \) and less following iterations of Grover’s algorithm to arrive at the desired state.

Further, one must notice that \( l_{|\phi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) \approx \sqrt{2^n \cdot l_{|\psi\rangle}(2^{s/2})} \). Counter-intuitively this results in state \( |\phi\rangle \) needing fewer Grover steps to arrive at the desired distribution. This is caused by the fact that the amplitudes follow the corresponding recurrence (by Theorem 1):

\[ \overline{k}(t + 1) = C(t) + \overline{k}(t) \]

\[ \overline{l}(t + 1) = C(t) - \overline{l}(t) \]

where \( C(t) \) is the doubled mean of all the states. Bigger value of \( l_{|\phi\rangle}(2^{s/2}) \) means the updates of \( \overline{k} \) increase the amplitudes of the correct states (decrease the amplitudes of the incorrect states) quicker.

Finally, we would like to note that the evaluation time of the function \( F_i \) should not be much higher than that of the function \( F \). Even the naïve approach of simply computing \( F \) and only considering the interesting bits can be implemented with a constant time overhead (e.g. since all punctured ciphertexts are derived from the same message, instead of picking a new set of indices for projection we can just expand the current one).

4 Discussion

As seen in the previous section, directly searching for the single correct state brings a better result than the iterated approach. An equally distributed amplitude among the incorrect states gives us a higher amplitude amplification for the correct state. Equally important, the amplitude of the correct state after \( 2^{n/2} \) steps is higher in the case of standard Grover’s approach.

First, we want to highlight the faulty intuition when considering the search in a partially collapsed quantum state:

\[ |\phi\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{|K_{i-1}|}} \sum_{k \in K_{i-1}} |k\rangle. \]
Both of Grover’s iteration steps, the negation of the correct amplitudes and computation of the mean of all amplitudes, are implemented over the whole register. This means that states $|k\rangle \notin K_{i-1}$ with 0 amplitude will be reintroduced into the superposition. Therefore, we do not search in key space of size $|K_{i-1}|$ but in $K_{0}$ with non-uniform amplitudes. To overcome this, we would have to define Grover’s operators over $K_{i-1}$, meaning we need to know which exact keys are in $K_{i-1}$ defeating the purpose of the previous $i-1$ searches.

Another argument could be the previously mentioned optimality of Grover’s search [4]. It states that any algorithm, which accesses the oracle negating the amplitude of the correct states, requires at least as many oracle queries as standard Grover. One could question whether the special structure of the nested approach plays any role. After all, we are dropping keys at a constant rate after each measurement, which is only the case for good cryptographic functions, not for any arbitrary search problem. However, we draw attention to the so-called Deferred Measurement Principle. It states that delaying measurements until the very end of a quantum computation does not affect the probability distribution of the final outcome. Therefore, skipping steps 7-9 of Algorithm 2 does not affect the probability of success, nor the outcome of the procedure. In other words, the rate at which we drop the keys has no impact on the required amount of Grover’s iterations, only the rate of the final correct keys to the whole space.

Finally, we wanted to mention the different behaviour if we define the sets $K_{i}$ as $K_{i} = \{ k : f_{i}(k) = z_{i}\}$. The difference is that now the correct states might also have a 0 amplitude. In fact, for a good cipher, we would on average expect only a few of the states from $K_{i-1}$ to also be in $K_{i}$ (besides the one correct key). This means that the average over the correct keys would be

$$\overline{k_{\psi}}(2^{s/2}) \approx \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n-s}} \cdot \frac{1}{2^{s-\epsilon}}}$$

which is significantly smaller than in any other previously mentioned case. This, however, should not be a surprise, since the set of correct keys diverges in each iteration, and the one correct key which is present in each of them has very little influence on the average amplitude of the correct keys.

References