Fine-Grained Accountable Privacy via Unlinkable Policy-Compliant Signatures

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Abstract. Privacy-preserving payment systems face the difficult task of balancing privacy and accountability: on one hand, users should be able to transact privately and anonymously, on the other hand, no illegal activities should be tolerated. The challenging question of finding the right balance lies at the core of the research on accountable privacy that stipulates the use of cryptographic techniques for policy enforcement, but still allows an authority to revoke the anonymity of transactions whenever such an automatic enforcement is technically not supported. Current state-of-the-art systems are only able to enforce rather limited policies, such as spending or transaction limits, or assertions about participants, but are unable to enforce more complex policies that for example jointly evaluate both, the private credentials of sender and recipient—let alone to do this without an auditor in the loop during payment. This limits the cases where privacy revocation can be avoided as the method to fulfill regulations, which is unsatisfactory from a data-protection viewpoint and shows the need for cryptographic solutions that are able to elevate accountable privacy to a more fine-grained level.

In this work, we present such a solution. We show how to enforce complex policies while offering strong privacy and anonymity guarantees by enhancing the notion of policy-compliant signatures (PCS) introduced by Badertscher, Matt and Waldner (TCC'21). In more detail, we first define the notion of unlinkable PCS (ul-PCS) and show how this cryptographic primitive can be generically integrated with a wide range of systems including UTxO-based ledgers, privacy-preserving protocols like Monero or Zcash, and central-bank digital currencies.

We give a generic construction for ul-PCS for any policy, and optimized constructions tailored for special policy classes, such as role-based policies and separable policies. To bridge the gap between theory and practice, we provide prototype implementations for all our schemes. We give the first benchmarks for policy-compliant signatures in general, and demonstrate their feasibility for reasonably sized attribute sets for the special cases.
1 Introduction

The inception of Bitcoin [51] and its novel approach to implement a transaction ledger via a blockchain brought to light a new type of payment system that does not rely on trusted parties like a central bank, but instead uses distributed ledger technology to settle direct transactions between parties and to protect against double-spends. Besides Bitcoin, decentralized anonymous payment (DAP) systems, such as Zcash [11] and Monero [3], have been proposed to improve privacy and anonymity guarantees. In these systems, parties enjoy full transaction privacy and anonymity, which makes it challenging to hold parties accountable for their actions, let alone for a regulator to be assured regulatory compliance is met. This led to the study of accountability and auditability in the context of distributed payment systems with the main goal of understanding the necessary adoption requirements of these systems in various jurisdictions [23].

The core meaning of auditability is to provide means to a regulator to ask for specific pieces of information, based on a legal system defining a catalogue of admissible questions, and be given the answer in a faithful way [23]. Clearly, an auditor only needs to (reactively) ask for information that the system does not proactively enforce by itself. This policy enforcement is precisely how accountability for private payment systems, or accountable privacy for short, has been defined in [23, 38]. However, in many of the currently proposed systems, the granularity of accountable privacy is not very high, and the focus lies on (functions about) the monetary value of transactions or spending limits on accounts [22, 38, 52, 61], where more centralized designs typically allow for a richer set of provable statements. To make matters worse, auditability is often equated explicitly or implicitly with the ability of an auditor to revoke the privacy and anonymity of transactions of any individual user (or given a key to supervise or view the transaction log) [4, 8, 20, 25, 27, 48]. While this trivially avoids the need for more sophisticated policy enforcement techniques, it goes without saying that such a powerful revocation capability is problematic as it could be subject to abuse. Furthermore, the implication that auditability must lead to transparent users is false, and that a more fine-grained design, distinguishing different types of transactions together with their specific requirements, do greatly strengthen the privacy of users [32, 57, 62].

In light of this, an important question arises: how detailed can we go in enforcing policies? As mentioned above, a blueprint to obtain accountable privacy in DAP systems, but also in the Central-Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC) context, is to consider transaction types for specific use cases where each use case is governed by a policy whose compliance can be enforced. In exchange for a potentially limited scope, users get back full and unrevocable anonymity for these transactions. For example the UTT system [57] defines a digital analogon of cash: the so-called budget coins are issued in a limited fashion to certified users. As soon as the user has obtained the coins, they can transact in a cryptographically secure way that, among other things, ensures full, unrevocable privacy.

Central to the success of such systems is the level of granularity for which one can enforce policy compliance. The richer the class of cryptographically enforceable policies, the easier it is to define different transaction types. In view of the developing ecosystem on digital credential systems [18, 24, 60], more legal policies can be translated to the digital world, such as predicates about which two individuals are allowed to transact based on age or residency, or on accredited attributes like financial reliability, credit worthiness, or other real-word certification. More concretely, this leads to transaction types that can go way beyond the digital cash realization of UTT. An example could be to lift certain limits for, say, residents spending coins in shops that are certified to only sell goods for everyday life. If such policies are enforceable by cryptographic means in a DAP system, this would heavily boost the privacy of users while satisfying regulatory needs. Unfortunately, there is no DAP system that supports this functionality and integrates smoothly with a credential issuance infrastructure. One reason is the strong, at first
sight contradictory, set of requirements, which are that (1) all credentials of a user must remain private, even during payment; (2) it must be possible to perform policy evaluation jointly on both, sender and receiver, attributes (such as whether they have the same residence, or whether they belong to jurisdictions across which money transfers are permitted); and (3) compatibility with DAP systems must be guaranteed, which means that evaluation must be possible whenever the sender knows just the recipient’s public key (and no further interaction is required to submit the transaction) and that compliance is publicly verifiable. It is important to see that even very elaborate but centralized designs such as Platypus [62] do currently not support this stronger type of joint policy evaluation (but admit individual attestations of users about their own attributes toward the central bank).

In this work, we give a generically applicable cryptographic policy-enforcement mechanism that is suitable to be integrated with DAP systems, i.e., it satisfies properties (1)-(3) above. The mechanism is generic—it has the interface of a signature scheme—and can be modularly composed with larger systems such as UTT and thereby can complement existing solutions to achieve fine-grained accountable privacy. Our solution is however not limited to decentralized ledgers, and can also be applied to centralized designs to reduce the information leakage about a transaction towards the auditor.

### 1.1 Contributions

This work makes a couple of contributions that are of independent interest:

**Definitions.** We introduce the enhanced cryptographic primitive called unlinkable policy-compliant signatures, a stronger version of policy-compliant signatures introduced by Badertscher, Matt, and Waldner [6]. We give precise definitions of unforgeability, attribute-hiding, and unlinkability. Since privacy (resp. anonymity) and unforgeability are intertwined in this definition, special care must be taken to arrive at a reasonable definition.

**Generic solution.** We provide a generic solution to the problem that realizes ul-PCS for arbitrary policies $F(x, y)$ defined for sender and receiver attributes $x$ and $y$, respectively, and formally prove its security. The purpose of this contribution is two-fold: first, it is a general solution based on standard cryptographic primitives that can, despite its theoretical focus, be directly instantiated, where the main practical challenges are the predicate encryption (PE) scheme and the non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems. We present an implementation of our generic construction for the inner-product (IP) predicate, i.e., for vectors $x$ and $y$ of attributes (encoded as field elements) $F(x, y) = 1$ iff the inner product of $x$ and $y$ is zero. Second, the generic solution serves as a natural conceptual blueprint and forms the basis to derive the more efficient alternatives for the specific policy classes, most notably by replacing the predicate encryption part with alternative tools that emulate its effect.

**More efficient constructions and implementations.** We provide two additional, specific construction for certain policy classes that are more lightweight in terms of cryptographic tools they require and have the additional features of constant-sized public keys and signatures, as well as constant verification times. We provide prototype implementations in Python and utilizing the Charm-crypto framework [2] for all constructions we present in this work, which includes the generic solution (instantiated with an IP-PE scheme).

For the experiments, we use a PC (laptop) with Intel Core i7-9850H CPU @ 2.60 GHz with 16 GB memory over the BN-254 curves. Our benchmarks demonstrate that the signing execution time for the specific schemes is less than 2 seconds for reasonably complex policy sizes. The verification procedure of signatures takes around 1.6 seconds, with public keys in the order of
28 kbytes, and signature sizes of about 16 kbytes (all independent of the number of attributes). Our prototypes for the specific policy classes thus suggest that although ul-PCS may at first sight appear like a heavy cryptographic tool, they are able to enforce policies with reasonable practical efficiency.

Finally, our prototype for the generic solution gives a first estimate about the real-world complexity of general-purpose PCS designs. Due to its relationship with predicate-encryption (which we explain in Section 1.2 below), the performance is largely influenced by the choice of the PE scheme. We run our benchmarks in the range of $n = 5$ up to 50 attributes. Signing takes 3 seconds for $n = 5$ and each additional attribute incurs, on average in that range, an estimated cost of 340 ms. For verification, we obtained around 4.5 seconds for $n = 5$ with an average cost per additional attribute of around 420 ms. Public key sizes on the other hand grow linearly, starting at 79 kbytes for $n = 5$, and incurring a cost of roughly 9.9 kbytes per additional attribute (which means that even for 50 attributes, we have key sizes similar to McEliece cryptosystems). Signatures are about 42 kbytes for $n = 5$ and grow by 5.14 kbytes per additional attribute. We compare these characteristics with the suggested PCS construction from [6], for which we provide the first prototype (with the same underlying PE scheme), which enables us to directly observe the overhead that our generic anonymity enhancement techniques impose.

Application and integration. We show how to integrate ul-PCS with UTxO ledgers, as well as with DAP systems like Zcash or Monero to ensure fine-grained policies on the transaction level without having any auditor in the loop. To this aim, we build on a recent abstract framework by Engelmann et al. [30] to modularly compose ul-PCS with so-called one-time accounts, effectively coupling addresses with private credentials. We point out that this integration does not introduce any additional trust assumptions beyond what a credential issuance infrastructure would need. If credential issuance is distributed across a set of servers to avoid a single point of failure, we show how the setup procedure and key-generation/enrollment of a user can be done in a distributed manner, which is an important observation. Note that a corruption of the credential issuer always impacts the user privacy as in this case, an adversary is able to generate keys by itself and can use them to brute force the attributes of every participant in the system by checking to which participants it is able to send with which self-issued attributes.

Finally, in the centralized settings of CBDC constructions [48,62] we showcase how an integration of ul-PCS would extend the set of policies that could be automatically enforced.

1.2 Technical Overview

Our core technical contribution is the strengthening of policy-compliant signatures introduced by Badertscher et al. [6] to make them suitable for the integration in privacy-preserving payments and, rather surprisingly, that this quite strong public-key primitive can be realized with reasonable efficiency, a question that remained unclear even for the standard PCS case [6].

To recall, the model presented in [6] involves three main entities: the Credential Issuing Authority (CA), Signers and Verifiers. The policy can be defined for a set of senders’ attributes $S$ and receivers’ attributes $R$ such that a predicate function $F : S \times R \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ determines which senders, with a given set of attributes, are allowed to create a signature for which receivers, that possess a subset of attributes. If $x$ and $y$ are the (private) attributes of sender and receiver, respectively, then creating a valid signature is allowed iff $F(x, y) = 1$. **Existential Unforgeability** demands that a signer cannot generate a valid signature for a recipient, identified by its public key (again with attributes $y$) unless it has obtained the secret key associated with $x$ (issued by the CA) such that $F(x, y) = 1$. **Attribute hiding** guarantees that nobody learns any meaningful information about the attributes of the signer and targeted verifier, except of course the bit that they jointly fulfill the policy when a valid signature emerges. We identify and introduce
Fig. 1: Usage of an unlinkable policy-compliant signature scheme. 1.) Alice with credentials $x$ and Bob with credentials $y$, run through a registration process with a credential authority. 2.) At any point, they can decide to re-randomize their keys in order to break any link to their previous actions. 3.) Alice generates a signature, e.g. on a private transaction, with Bob’s public key as the destination address. The fact that a valid signature can be generated proves that the policy $F(x, y)$ is satisfied. See Section 6 for the concrete format of such transactions.

a missing feature: *unlinkability*. A user must be able to change the representation (i.e., its public key) without interacting with the authority, to break the link between its actions—while retaining all security features above. Since ul-PCS combines anonymity with, for example, unforgeability requirements, the existing security games must be adapted. A complication is that winning conditions must remain well-defined, even if keys are re-randomized (possibly done by the adversary) and attributes are hidden.

The proposed generic PCS construction in [6] relies on three main cryptographic primitives: (Predicate-Only) Predicate Encryption, Digital Signatures and Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) proofs which can all be instantiated in the standard model. We present the first unlinkable PCS scheme whose design extends the above scheme. We use standard cryptographic tools to allow a party to evolve its public key according to pseudo-random sequences that are tied to their attributes using NIZK proofs. The details are given later. This generic scheme supports any policy but assumes predicate encryption which is a rather heavy primitive. Most efficient predicate-encryption schemes are known for the inner-product predicate described above, such as [53], which we leverage for our prototype implementation. Inner-product predicates are sufficient to realize various complex policies [47] such as DNF/CNF formulas, threshold clauses, or polynomial evaluations, which directly translate to the PCS setting [6]. Furthermore, since hidden-vector encryption can be realized from IP, it follows that IP is sufficient to implement all policies from [16].

Despite the fact that a PE scheme is the most elegant conceptual fit for general PCS, it impacts efficiency and public-key sizes as there is a direct implication that PCS gives rise to PE encryption (for a related predicate), and in fact, the reduction presented in [6] shows that a PCS public key can be turned into a PE ciphertext. In the ul-PCS case, this impact is even more dominant, as part of the construction is to prove the well-formedness of the public key. To improve this situation, we show how for specialized policies it is possible to avoid PE in order to obtain more practically performing schemes. We consider two specific policy classes:

**Role-based policies.** We consider role-based access-control matrices. Such a matrix can be seen as a function $F : [n_R] \times [n_R] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ (for a given, presumably relatively small set of $n_R$ number of roles) and captures which roles $i$ can transact toward which role $j$, namely iff $F(i, j) = 1$. Depending on the structure of such a matrix, one can implement a wide range of access control
policies, where “access control” here rather means which role is allowed to send a signed message (or transaction) to which other role akin to information flow in [19]. Of particular interest is the special case of equality, i.e., the identity matrix \( F(i, j) = 1 \) iff \( i = j \) [5] as we recall below. We present an approach based on accumulators (which are realizable based on pairing-based signatures of a specific type) instead of PE. For general RBAC matrices, the scheme satisfies what we call outsider-secure attribute hiding, sometimes referred to as transaction-graph obfuscation or confidentiality [20,23] (aside of unforgeability and unlinkability). This security notion captures the inability of an attacker to infer any useful information by just analyzing the transaction graph of a blockchain. For the special case of the equality policy, where users are grouped into categories, the scheme satisfies all security properties (in particular full attribute-hiding). The equality policy is particularly useful in contexts where users and/or services are clustered into groups or categories based on their real-world credentials, and to ensure that transactions are conducted within those groups.

Separable policies. Separable policies are policies that admit the simple representation \( F(x, y) = S(x) \land R(y) \), and thus belong to the important class of predicates w.r.t. individual assertions about an entity’s attributes, e.g., the ones supported by centralized solutions like Platypus [62]. We show that those can be realized by unlinkable PCS schemes in an efficient way, where the PE part can be replaced by standard encryption. We point out some of the application of these policies: on one hand, \( S(x) \) could be the predicate that a sender has undergone KYC regulations, while a priori anyone can be a receiver (\( R(y) = 1 \)). Translated to our scheme and its associated usage in a DAP system, this means that anyone can immediately start off and receive coins, while only being able to spend later once KYC regulations have been met. The second, more technical use-case appears in Zcash-like DAP systems: the three transaction types in Zcash, namely Mint, Burn, and Pour transactions can directly be lifted to user roles: Mint is an action from a sender-only role (\( S(x) = 1, R(y) = 0 \)), Burn is a transaction toward a receiver-only role (\( S(x) = 0, R(y) = 1 \)), and the normal use-case is a user that can send and receive (\( S(x) = R(y) = 1 \)). Combining this observation with the results of Section 6, gives a generic way to let the monetary policy be governed by accredited users while preserving their privacy and anonymity. In addition, when integrating Zcash with other ledger-based currencies, one can steer which users are allowed to convert base currency in exchange for newly minted zerocoins.

1.3 Related Work

Since ul-PCS are signatures, they can be composed with any transaction system to capture more fine-grained policies. We already contrasted this paper with [6], which serves as the basis we extend. Therefore, we now focus on an overview of how ul-PCS can improve the expressiveness of existing payment systems. We give the technical details later in Section 6.

In the context of distributed payment systems, the focus of prior works that support accountable privacy is on using NIZKs to prove statements about the content of a transaction such as a sequence of transactions are below a spending limit in total or below a receiving limit in total [38, 57, 61]. These policies are extremely useful and the involved NIZKs are practical. The systems are therefore able to publicly convince an auditor that certain actions are within limits but do not give assertions about the credentials of the involved parties and it seems hard to obtain unrevocable privacy for more than cash-like transactions [57]. Enriched with digital credentials, however, more classes of transactions can be defined. Parties involved in a payment could be accredited (trusted) institutions or shops, for which a sending or receiving limit is lifted. A PCS signature signing the transaction can assure money flow only between two such institutions. Furthermore, certain coins can be issued for a specific purpose to individuals, or
capital flow control can be ensured based on the credentials tied to a person’s public key, and the PCS signature can attest compliance.

In the context of recent CBDC proposals [48, 62], Platypus [62] is a very elaborate and nuanced system. During payments, where interaction with a central bank is required, it is proposed to carefully distinguish types of transactions and, depending on this, the bank might request further information, in plain or via zero-knowledge proofs. Although being centralized, the system does not admit to prove statements about sender and receiver of a transaction simultaneously, e.g., to control whether cash flow between two individuals are compliant with capital control. In such a scenario, information needs to be revealed to the central bank. However, the approach we take to make this possible in ul-PCS can be directly applied to such centralized designs and enrich them with even more fine-grained policies. The same holds for Peredi [48], which, compared to Platypus, does not put forth a fine-grained transaction model and presents a revocation-based auditability solution.

2 Preliminaries

Notation. We denote the security parameter by $\lambda$ and use $1^\lambda$ as its unary representation. We call a randomized algorithm $A$ probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) if there exists a polynomial $p(\cdot)$ such that for every input $x$ the running time of $A(x)$ is bounded by $p(|x|)$. A function $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ is called negligible if for every positive polynomial $p(\lambda)$, there exists $\lambda_0$ such that for all $\lambda > \lambda_0$: $\text{negl}(\lambda) < 1/p(\lambda)$. If clear from the context, we sometimes omit $\lambda$ for improved readability. The set $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ is denoted as $[n]$ for a positive integer $n$. For the equality check of two elements, we use “$=$”. The assign operator is denoted with “$:=$”, whereas randomized assignment is denoted with $a \leftarrow A$, with a randomized algorithm $A$ and where the randomness is not explicit. If the randomness is explicit, we write $a :=$ $A(x; r)$ where $x$ is the input and $r$ is the randomness. For algorithms $A$ and $B$, we write $A^{\circ B}(x)$ to denote that $A$ gets $x$ as an input and has black-box oracle access to $B$, that is, the response for an oracle query $q$ is $B(q)$.

2.1 Bilinear Group Setup

Some of our schemes require a bilinear group setup. We use multiplicative notation to refer to group operation.

Definition 1 (Bilinear Groups [14]). An asymmetric bilinear group generator $BG(1^\lambda)$ returns a tuple $pp := (G_1, G_2, G_T, p, e, G_1, G_2)$, such that $G_1$, $G_2$, and $G_T$ are cyclic groups of the same prime order $p$, $G_1 \in G_1$ and $G_2 \in G_2$ are the generators, and $e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T$ is an efficiently computable bilinear pairing with the following properties;

- non-degeneracy: $e(G_1, G_2) \neq 1_{G_T}$,
- bilinearity: $\forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p : e(G_1^a, G_2^b) = e(G_1, G_2)^{ab} = e(G_1^b, G_2^a)$.

Throughout we rely on Type-III bilinear groups that for the distinct cyclic groups $G_1 \neq G_2$, there is neither efficient algorithm to compute a nontrivial homomorphism in both directions [37]. This type is known as the most efficient choice.

2.2 Pseudorandom Functions

We recall the definition of a pseudorandom function (PRF) as it has been defined in [39].
Definition 2 (Pseudorandom Function). A pseudo-random function is a keyed function
\(\text{PRF} : \{0,1\}^\lambda \times X \to Y\), where evaluation is done via an efficient algorithm \(\text{PRF} \cdot \text{Eval}(k, x)\). For \(\beta \in \{0,1\}\), we define the experiment \(\text{IND}_\beta^{\text{PRF}}\) in Figure 2, where the oracle \(O\) is defined as:

\[
O(x) = \begin{cases} 
\text{PRF} \cdot \text{Eval}(k, x) & \text{if } \beta = 0 \\
\text{RF}(x) & \text{if } \beta = 1 
\end{cases}
\]

with \(\text{RF}(x)\) denoting a random function. We define the advantage of an adversary \(A\) in the following way:

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{IND}}_{\text{PRF}, A}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{IND}_0^{\text{PRF}}(\lambda, A)] - \Pr[\text{IND}_1^{\text{PRF}}(\lambda, A)]|.
\]

A pseudorandom function \(\text{PRF}\) is secure, if for any polynomial-time adversary \(A\), there exists a negligible function \(\text{negl}\) such that:

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{IND}}_{\text{PRF}, A}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

Fig. 2: Security Games for PRF

2.3 Digital Signatures

We recap the definition of digital signatures as well as existential unforgeability [41].

Definition 3 (Digital Signatures). A digital signature scheme (DS) is a triple of PPT algorithms \(\text{DS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})\), defined as follows:

- **Setup\((1^\lambda)\)**: Takes as input a security parameter \(\lambda\) and outputs a verification key \(\text{vk}\) and a signing key \(\text{sk}\).
- **Sign\((\text{sk}, m)\)**: Takes as input the signing key \(\text{sk}\), a message \(m \in M\) and outputs a signature \(\sigma\).
- **Verify\((\text{vk}, m, \sigma)\)**: Takes as input the verification key \(\text{vk}\), a message \(m\) and a signature \(\sigma\), and outputs 0 or 1.

A scheme \(\text{sig}\) is correct if (for all \(\lambda \in \mathbb{N}\), for all \(\text{vk}\) in the support of \(\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)\) and all \(m \in M\), we have

\[
\Pr[\text{Verify}(\text{vk}, m, \text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m)) = 1] = 1.
\]

Definition 4 (Existential Unforgeability). Let \(\text{DS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})\) be a DS scheme. We define the experiment \(\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{DS}}\) in Figure 3 with \(Q\) being the set containing the queries of \(A\) to the signing oracle \(\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, \cdot)\). The advantage of an adversary \(A\) is defined by

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{EUF-CMA}}_{\text{DS}, A}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{DS}}(1^\lambda, A) = 1].
\]

A Digital Signature scheme \(\text{DS}\) is called existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen-message attacks (EUF-CMA secure) if for any polynomial-time adversary \(A\) it holds that \(\text{Adv}^{\text{EUF-CMA}}_{\text{DS}, A}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)\) for a negligible function \(\text{negl}(\cdot)\).
Structure-Preserving Signatures on Equivalence Classes.

Structure-Preserving Signature (SPS) [1] are special type of digital signatures defined over bilinear groups that fulfills some extra properties. More precisely, the verification key, message and signature are only source group elements and to verify the validity of a signature only group membership checks and pairing product equations are allowed. SPS has the same algorithm as digital signatures as are defined in Definition 3 and guarantees the unforgeability as defined in Definition 4.

SPS on Equivalence classes (SPS-EQ) proposed by Hanser and Slamanig in [44] are special type of SPS that enable joint re-randomization of signatures and the signed messages. SPS-EQ provides controlled form of malleability s.t. one can change the representation of message and corresponding signature. More precisely, for a given prime-order group \( G \) we can define a projective vector \((G^*)^\ell \) based on the following relation, where \( \ell > 1 \) and \( G^* \) denotes the set of all group elements without the identity element of the group.

\[
\mathcal{R} := \{ (\vec{M}, \vec{M}^*) \in (G^*)^\ell \times (G^*)^\ell \mid \exists \mu \in \mathbb{Z}_p^* \text{ s.t. } \vec{M}^* = \vec{M}^\mu \}.
\]

This is an equivalence relation for prime order groups.

The equivalence class of a vector \( \vec{M} \in (G^*)^\ell \) for some \( \ell > 1 \) is defined by:

\[
[\vec{M}]_{\mathcal{R}} := \{ \vec{M}^* \in (G^*)^\ell \mid (\vec{M}, \vec{M}^*) \in \mathcal{R} \}.
\]

The Class-hiding property of equivalence classes guarantees that it is computationally hard to distinguish elements of the same equivalence class from randomly sampled group elements.

**Definition 5 (Class-Hiding [44]).** A relation \( \mathcal{R} \) is called class-hiding if for all PPT adversaries, \( \mathcal{A} \), and \( \ell > 1 \) we have:

\[
\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{c}
\vec{M} \xleftarrow{\$} (G^*)^\ell, \vec{M}_0 \xleftarrow{\$} (G^*)^\ell, \vec{M}_1 \xleftarrow{\$} [\vec{M}]_{\mathcal{R}}, \\
b' \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}, b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\vec{M}, \vec{M}_b) \mid b = b'
\end{array} \right] - \frac{1}{2} \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

Hanser and Slamanig [44] formally proved that as long as DDH is hard then the relation described in equation 1 is class-hiding. We only consider this relation in this work. In our bilinear setting, the message is based on the second group \( G_2 \), but we present the scheme in its general form:

**Definition 6 (Structure-Preserving Signatures on Equivalence classes [44]).** In an asymmetric bilinear group, a structure preserving signature over (message space) \((G_i^*)^\ell \) consists of the following PPT algorithms:

- **Setup\(_R\)(1^\lambda):** The setup algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that takes the security parameter \( \lambda \) in its unary representation as input. It returns public parameters \( \text{pp} \) including an asymmetric bilinear group as output.
– **KeyGen**\(_R\)(pp, ℓ): The key generation algorithm as a probabilistic algorithm takes the public parameters pp and a vector length ℓ > 1 as inputs. It then return key-pair (sk, vk) as output.

– **Sign**\(_R\)(pp, sk, M): The signing algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm and takes public parameters pp, secret key sk and a representative message M \(\in (\mathbb{G}_r^*)^\ell\) as inputs. It returns signature \(\sigma\) on message \(\hat{M}\) as output.

– **Verify**\(_R\)(pp, vk, M, σ): The verification algorithm is a deterministic algorithm and takes public parameters pp, a representative message M \(\in (\mathbb{G}_r^*)^\ell\), a signature \(\sigma\) and a verification key vk as inputs. It then returns 1 if \(\sigma\) is a valid signature on \(\hat{M}\) and 0 otherwise.

– **ChgRep**\(_R\)(pp, M, σ, µ, vk): The change representation algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm and takes public parameters pp, a representative message M \(\in (\mathbb{G}_r^*)^\ell\), a signature \(\sigma\), a scalar \(\mu \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\) and the verification key vk as inputs. It returns randomized signature \(\sigma'\) on a new representative message \(\hat{M}' = \hat{M}^\mu\) as output.

Since in our work, all keys are honestly generated we omit the specification of the function that checks whether a private key is consistent with a given public key (since this holds for honestly generated key pairs).

The primary security requirements for a SPS-EQ scheme are correctness and existential unforgeability against chosen message attack as are defined as follows:

**Definition 7 (Correctness).** A SPS-EQ scheme over \((\mathbb{G}_r^*)^\ell\) is called correct, if the following holds with overwhelming probability for a valid setup pp, any message \(\hat{M} \in (\mathbb{G}_r^*)^\ell\), any (valid) key pair in (sk, pk) in the support of KeyGen\(_R\)(pp, ℓ), and any scalar \(\mu \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*\):

\[
\Pr\left[\text{Verify}_R(p, \text{pk}, \hat{M}, \text{Sign}_R(p, \text{sk}, \hat{M})) = 1 \land \neg \text{Verify}_R(p, \text{pk}, \hat{M}', \text{ChgRep}_R(\hat{M}, \text{Sign}_R(p, \text{sk}, \hat{M}), \mu, \text{vk})) = 1\right] = 1.
\]

**Definition 8 (Existential Unforgeability).** A SPS-EQ over \((\mathbb{G}_r^*)^\ell\) is called adaptively EUF-CMA-secure if for all PPT adversaries \(A\) with an access to the signing oracle \(O_{\text{Sign}}\) we have:

\[
\Pr\left[\text{Verify}_R(p, \text{pk}, \hat{M}, \text{Sign}_R(p, \text{sk}, \hat{M})) = 1 \land \neg \text{Verify}_R(p, \text{pk}, \hat{M}^*, \text{ChgRep}_R(\hat{M}, \text{Sign}_R(p, \text{sk}, \hat{M}), \mu, \text{vk})) = 1\right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),
\]

where the signing oracle \(O_{\text{Sign}}\) takes a message \(\hat{M} \in (\mathbb{G}_r^*)^\ell\) of \(\hat{M}\) and adds the message to a query set \(Q_{\text{Sign}}\).

Finally, we need signature adaptation which shows that signature strings can be perfectly randomized (and thus made unlinkable).

**Definition 9 (Signature Adaptation).** An SPS-EQ scheme over \((\mathbb{G}_r^*)^\ell\) perfectly adapts signatures if for all tuples \((\text{sk}, \text{pk}, \hat{M}, \sigma, \mu)\), where \((\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(p, \ell), \hat{M} \in (\mathbb{G}_r^*)^\ell\) and \(\text{Verify}(p, \text{pk}, \hat{M}, \sigma) = 1\), the two distributions \(\text{Sign}(p, \text{sk}, \hat{M}^\mu)\) and \(\text{ChgRep}_R(p, \hat{M}, \sigma, \text{vk}, \mu)\) are identical.

### 2.5 A Weak Positive Accumulator

We recall a beautiful accumulator construction proposed by Karantaidou and Baldimtsi [46] and consider it in the asymmetric bilinear group setting. The construction is derived from Boneh-Boyen signatures [13] and based on the q-SDH assumption. We only need to consider the positive
Lemma 1. Let the public parameters be \( pp = (p, G_1, G_2, e) \). For any PPT adversary \( A \), asking at most \( q \) queries, that wins the game \( W\text{-SND}(pp, ACC, A) \) with probability \( \varepsilon \), there is a PPT adversary \( A' \) that on input the \( q\text{-SDH} \) instance \((G_1, yG_1, \ldots, y^qG_1, G_2, yG_2)\), where \( y \in Z_p^* \) is sample uniformly at random, returns a valid solution \((c, (y + c)^{-1}G_1)\) for some \( c \in Z_p \setminus \{-y\} \), with probability \( \varepsilon \) as long as \( q \leq q' \) (where the probability is taken over the random choice of \( y \) and the internal randomness of \( A' \)).

Proof. The proof follows directly from the security proof of the weakly-secure short signature scheme in [13] (version 2014) by observing that \( ACC \) is just the weakly-secure signature scheme in disguise, and that our soundness notion perfectly matches the notion of weak unforgeability of [13].
Note that since the statement holds for any concrete set of parameters, it also holds over any
distribution of parameters and thus we obtain the asymptotic statement that the accumulator
is sound except with negligible probability in $\lambda$ under the $q$-SDH assumption, relative to the
bilinear group generation algorithm $BG(1^\lambda)$ generating the parameters $pp$.

2.6 Public-Key Encryption

Now, we introduce public-key encryption, together with the security notion of IND-CPA.

Definition 10 (Public-Key Encryption). A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme is a tuple of
three algorithms $PKE = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: Takes as input a unary representation of the security parameter $\lambda$ and outputs a
  public key $pk$ and a secret key $sk$.
- $\text{Enc}(pk, m)$: Takes as input the public key $pk$ and a message $m \in M$, and outputs a ciphertext
  $ct$.
- $\text{Dec}(sk, ct)$: Takes as input the secret key $sk$ and a ciphertext $ct$ and outputs a message $m'$
or $\perp$.

A public-key encryption scheme $PKE$ is correct if for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all key-pairs $(pk, sk)$ in the
support of $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, we have

$$\Pr[\text{Dec}(sk, \text{Enc}(pk, m)) = m] = 1.$$  

In this work, we give the adversary access to an encryption challenge oracle that can be
queried using multiple challenge message pairs $(m_0, m_1)$. This security definition follows from
the standard security definition for a single challenge query using a simple hybrid argument. This
modification is used to make the proofs later easier.

Definition 11 (Indistinguishability-Based Chosen-Plaintext Security). Let $PKE = ($
$\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a PKE scheme as defined above. For $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, we define the experiment
$\text{IND-CPA}_{PKE, \beta}$ in Figure 5, where the left-or-right oracle is defined as:

$Q\text{EncLR}_{\beta}(\cdot, \cdot)$: On input two messages $m_0$ and $m_1$, output $ct \leftarrow \text{Enc}(msk, m_\beta)$.

The advantage of an adversary $A$ is defined as:

$$\text{Adv}_{PKE, A}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr[\text{IND-CPA}_{PKE, 0}(1^\lambda, A) = 1] - \Pr[\text{IND-CPA}_{PKE, 1}(1^\lambda, A) = 1] \right|.$$  

A predicate-only predicate encryption scheme $PKE$ is called IND-CPA secure if for any valid
polynomial-time adversary $A$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}$ such that

$$\text{Adv}_{PKE, A}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

---

Fig. 5: IND-CPA security game of PKE.
2.7 Predicate Encryption

To allow for oblivious policy evaluations, we also recap the notion of predicate-only predicate encryption as it has been introduced by Katz et al. [47].

**Definition 12 (Predicate-Only Predicate Encryption).** Let \( \mathcal{F} = \{ \mathcal{F}_\lambda \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) be a family of sets \( \mathcal{F}_\lambda \) of predicates \( f : \mathcal{X}_\lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \). A predicate-only predicate encryption (PE) scheme for the functionality class \( \mathcal{F}_\lambda \) is a tuple of four algorithms \( \mathsf{PE} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec}) \):

- \( \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda) \): Takes as input a unary representation of the security parameter \( \lambda \) and outputs the master public key \( \mathsf{mpk} \) and the master secret key \( \mathsf{msk} \).
- \( \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, f) \): Takes as input the master secret key \( \mathsf{msk} \) and a function \( f \in \mathcal{F} \), and outputs a functional key \( \mathsf{sk}_f \).
- \( \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{mpk}, x) \): Takes as input the master public key \( \mathsf{mpk} \) and an attribute \( x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda \), and outputs a ciphertext \( \mathsf{ct} \).
- \( \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_f, \mathsf{ct}) \): Takes as input a functional key \( \mathsf{sk}_f \) and a ciphertext \( \mathsf{ct} \) and outputs 0 or 1.

A predicate-only predicate encryption scheme \( \mathsf{PE} \) is correct if for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), for all \( (\mathsf{mpk}, \mathsf{msk}) \) in the support of \( \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda) \), all functions \( f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda \), all secret keys \( \mathsf{sk}_f \) in the support of \( \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, f) \), and for all attributes \( x \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda \), we have

\[
\Pr[\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_f, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{mpk}, x)) = f(x)] = 1.
\]

In the initial work of Katz et al. [47], the authors only introduce the notion of selective security. The corresponding indistinguishability based adaptive security notion for predicate encryption has been introduced in [53]. We present a modification of this definition where the adversary has access to a challenge oracle to which it can submit multiple challenges instead of being able to only submit a single challenge. This security definition directly follows from the standard security definition using a simple hybrid argument.

**Definition 13 (Indistinguishability-Based Attribute Hiding).** Let \( \mathsf{PE} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec}) \) be a PE scheme for a function family \( \mathcal{F} = \{ \mathcal{F}_\lambda \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) as defined above. For \( \beta \in \{0, 1\} \), we define the experiment \( \mathsf{AH}^{\mathsf{PE}}_{\beta} \) in Figure 6, where the left-or-right oracle is defined as:

\( \mathsf{QEncLR}_{\beta}(\cdot, \cdot) \): On input two attribute sets \( x_0 \) and \( x_1 \), output \( \mathsf{ct} \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{msk}, x_0) \).

The advantage of an adversary \( A \) is defined as:

\[
\text{Adv}^{\mathbf{AH}}_{\mathsf{PE}, \beta}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{AH}^{\mathsf{PE}}_{\mathsf{A}}(1^\lambda, A) = 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{AH}^{\mathsf{PE}}_{\mathsf{A}}(1^\lambda, A) = 0]|.
\]

We call an adversary valid if for all queries \( (x_0, x_1) \) to the oracle \( Q_{\mathsf{EncLR}}_{\beta}(\cdot, \cdot) \) and for any function \( f \) queried to the key generation oracle \( \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \cdot) \), we have \( f(x_0) = f(x_1) \) (with probability 1 over the randomness of the adversary and the involved algorithms).

A predicate-only predicate encryption scheme \( \mathsf{PE} \) is called attribute hiding if for any valid polynomial-time adversary \( A \), there exists a negligible function \( \mathsf{negl} \) such that \( \text{Adv}^{\mathbf{AH}}_{\mathsf{PE}, \beta}(\lambda) \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda) \).

---

![Fig. 6: Attribute-Hiding game of PE.](image-url)
2.8 Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs

In this section, we introduce the notion of non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) proofs [10, 34, 40].

**Definition 14 (Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proofs).** Let $R$ be an NP Relation and consider the language $L = \{x \mid \exists w \text{ such that } (x, w) \in R\}$ (where $x$ is called a statement or instance). A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) for the relation $R$ is a triple of PPT algorithms $\text{NIZK} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: Takes as input the unary representation of the security parameter $\lambda$ and outputs a common reference string $\text{CRS}$.
- $\text{Prove}(\text{CRS}, x, w)$: Takes as input the common reference string $\text{CRS}$, a statement $x$ and a witness $w$, and outputs a proof $\pi$.
- $\text{Verify}(\text{CRS}, x, \pi)$: Takes as input the common reference string $\text{CRS}$, a statement $x$ and a proof $\pi$, and outputs $0$ or $1$.

A system $\text{NIZK}$ is complete, if (for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$), for all $\text{CRS}$ in the support of $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and all statement-witness pairs in the relation $(x, w) \in R$,

$$\Pr[\text{Verify}(\text{CRS}, x, \text{Prove}(\text{CRS}, x, w)) = 1] = 1.$$

Besides completeness, a NIZK system should also fulfill the notions of soundness and zero-knowledge, which we introduce in the following two definitions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\text{zk}^{\text{NIZK}}_{\lambda}(1^\lambda, A, S)$</th>
<th>$\text{zk}^{\text{NIZK}}_{\lambda}(1^\lambda, A, S)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\text{CRS} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$</td>
<td>$(\text{CRS}, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(1^\lambda)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha \leftarrow A^{\text{Prove}}(\text{CRS}, \cdot)(\text{CRS})$</td>
<td>$\alpha \leftarrow A^{\text{S}'}(\text{CRS}, \tau, \cdot)(\text{CRS})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Output: $\alpha$ | Output: $\alpha$

Fig. 7: Zero-knowledge property of NIZK.

**Definition 15 (Zero-Knowledge).** Let $\text{NIZK} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ be a NIZK proof system for a relation $R$ and the corresponding language $L$, $S = (S_1, S_2)$ a pair of algorithms (the simulator), with $S'(\text{CRS}, \tau, x, w) = S'_2(\text{CRS}, \tau, x)$ for $(x, w) \in R$, and $S'(\text{CRS}, \tau, x, w) = \text{failure}$ for $(x, w) \notin R$. For $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, we define the experiment $\text{zk}^{\text{NIZK}}_{\beta}(1^\lambda, A)$ in Figure 7. The associated advantage of an adversary $A$ is defined as

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{NIZK}, A, S}^{\text{NIZK}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{zk}^{\text{NIZK}}_{\lambda}(1^\lambda, A, S) = 1] - \Pr[\text{zk}^{\text{NIZK}}_{\lambda}(1^\lambda, A, S) = 1]|.$$

A NIZK proof system $\text{NIZK}$ is called perfect zero-knowledge, with respect to a simulator $S = (S_1, S_2)$, if $\text{Adv}_{\text{NIZK}, A, S}^{\text{NIZK}}(\lambda) = 0$ for all algorithms $A$, and computationally zero-knowledge, if $\text{Adv}_{\text{NIZK}, A, S}^{\text{NIZK}}(\lambda) \leq \negl(\lambda)$ for all PPT algorithms $A$.

Besides zero-knowledge and soundness, we rely on the notion of extractability [21].

**Definition 16 (Extractability).** Let $\text{NIZK} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ be a NIZK proof system for a relation $R$ and the corresponding language $L$, $\text{Ext} = (\text{Ext}_1, \text{Ext}_2)$ a pair of algorithms (the extractor). We define the extraction advantages of an adversary $A$ as

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{NIZK}, A, S}^{\text{NIZK}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{CRS} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda); 1 \leftarrow A(\text{CRS})] - \Pr[(\text{CRS}, \text{st}) \leftarrow \text{Ext}_1(1^\lambda); 1 \leftarrow A(\text{CRS})]|.$$
and

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{extract}}_{\text{NIZK}, A}(\lambda) := \Pr \left[ (\text{CRS}_{\text{Ext}}, \text{st}_{\text{Ext}}) \leftarrow \text{Ext}_1(1^\lambda), \text{Verify}(\text{CRS}_{\text{Ext}}, x, \pi) = 1 \land (x, \pi) \leftarrow A(\text{CRS}_{\text{Ext}}), R(x, \text{Ext}_2(\text{CRS}_{\text{Ext}}, \text{st}_{\text{Ext}}, x, \pi)) = 0 \right]$$

A NIZK proof system NIZK is called extractable, with respect to an extractor Ext = (Ext₁, Ext₂), if Adv^{\text{CRS}}_{\text{NIZK}, A}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) and Adv^{\text{extract}}_{\text{NIZK}, A}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda). Additionally, we call an extractable non-interactive zero-knowledge proof a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (NIZKPoK).

3 Unlinkable PCS: Model and Security Requirements

Now, we present the syntax of unlinkable policy-compliant signatures (ul-PCS). ul-PCS are basically defined as PCS [6] with the only difference that they contain an additional rerandomization algorithm that allows for the rerandomization of the key pairs.

Definition 17 (Unlinkable Policy-Compliant Signatures). Let \( \{X_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) be a family of attribute sets and denote by \( \lambda \times X_\lambda \) the powerset of \( X_\lambda \). Further let \( \mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) be a family of sets \( \mathcal{F}_\lambda \) of predicates \( \lambda \times \lambda \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \). Then an unlinkable policy-compliant signature (ul-PCS) scheme for the functionality class \( \mathcal{F}_\lambda \) is a tuple of four PPT algorithms \( \text{ULPCS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{RandKey}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify}) \):

- **Setup**\((1^\lambda, F)\): On input a unary representation of the security parameter \( \lambda \) and a policy \( F \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda \), output a master public and secret key pair \( (\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \).
- **KeyGen**\((\text{msk}, x)\): On input the master secret key \( \text{msk} \) and a set of attributes \( x \in X_\lambda \), output a public and secret key pair \( (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \).
- **RandKey**\((\text{mpk}, \text{sk})\) On input the master public key \( \text{mpk} \) and a secret key \( \text{sk} \), output a new public-secret-key pair \( (\text{pk}', \text{sk}') \).
- **Sign**\((\text{mpk}, \text{sk}_S, \text{pk}_R, m)\): On input the master public key \( \text{mpk} \), a sender secret key \( \text{sk}_S \), a receiver public key \( \text{pk}_R \) and a message \( m \), output either a signature \( \sigma \) or \( \bot \).
- **Verify**\((\text{mpk}, \text{pk}_S, \text{pk}_R, m, \sigma)\): On input the master public key \( \text{mpk} \), a sender public key \( \text{pk}_S \), a receiver public key \( \text{pk}_R \), a message \( m \) and a signature \( \sigma \), output either 0 or 1.

Remark 1 (On distributing Setup and KeyGen for the DAP use case). The described algorithms correspond to the intended use-case sketched in Figure 1. The signature scheme, in fact, can be used to sign any message towards some recipient’s public key. Note that the registration process of a party with attributes \( x \) is abstracted as a simple key-generation procedure to be able to focus on the core technical challenges of the construction and does not indicate that a single entity necessarily stands behind that. In fact, in a typical application, we don’t need the credential authority in the operational phase (after user enrollment) and it does not need to know users’ keys, which makes Setup and KeyGen suitable for distributed implementations without impacting the operational efficiency: \( \text{msk} \) is shared among \( n \) servers at the price of a more expensive enrollment. All our concrete schemes in later sections admit distributed implementations of Setup and KeyGen based on standard techniques (cf. Section 6.3.). This is important because, for example, if the whole master secret key is leaked there is no hope to achieve a reasonable notion of privacy for the attributes: the adversary can, with knowledge of the master secret key, generate keys by itself and consequently use them to generate signatures w.r.t. any public key in the system and check whether or not valid signatures can be established. This shows that credential issuance must not be corrupted in order to achieve a reasonable notion of privacy.
Remark 2 (On public vs. private re-randomization). The interface of \texttt{RandKey} is such that every party is in charge of its own re-randomizations. Alternatively, one could imagine a public re-randomization, that allows to randomize any given valid public key, yielding a new valid public key. We observe that the immediate benefit of such a public re-randomization does not appear to be substantial—given that the additional constraints has serious implications on the practical feasibility of PCS (as we explain further below).

Note that in the anticipated use-cases in payment systems, it is typical that cautious users maintain new keys across payment sessions or go even as far as using an address only once by default or for increased security (cf. Section 6). In addition, the sender in a payment session must determine the receiving address (i.e., public key) by some “off-chain” mechanism, at which point a receiver can present its (re-randomized) key. The benefit of public re-randomization appears to be in saving some bandwidth if the sender casts multiple transactions in one session, compared to the straightforward solution where a receiver—having precomputed in an offline phase a bunch of randomized keys—presents multiple receiving addresses to the sender at the beginning of a payment session. Furthermore, across payment sessions, a similar improvement is only achieved, if at all, if the recipient is willing to link its payment session to the current one in the offchain communication phase, and only if this is more efficient than just presenting a new key, in which case one can simply present a randomized version.

For this seemingly slight improvement, one would pay a rather hight price in practical feasibility of PCS: it follows from the relationship between predicate encryption and PCS (cf. Section 1.2) that such public re-randomization feature is much more difficult to achieve, as it does not only imply re-randomizable predicate-encryption but also that such a PE scheme comes with enough structural properties to enable a transferability of the validity assurance (such as achieved by SPS-EQ). It is an interesting open question whether such PE schemes can be constructed efficiently based on standard assumptions. The same reasoning applies to the more specialized policies, where the above considerations put additional constraints on the practical realizability. In contrast, we are able construct and implement PCS as defined above using standard tools and are able to give a concrete prototype of all proposed schemes.

3.1 Correctness and Detectability Relation

Correctness. A ul-PCS scheme is correct if in any execution, honestly generated signatures computed using honestly generated private and public keys, potentially re-randomized multiple times, reflect the policy. Compared to standard PCS, it is easier to capture this as a correctness experiment, since the interaction introduced with re-randomization leads to more complex scenarios. A ul-PCS scheme is called correct if for all efficient adversaries \( A = (A_1, A_2) \) in experiment \( \text{CORR} \) specified in Figure 8, the probability \( \Pr[\text{CORR}^{\text{ulPCS}}(1^\lambda, A) = 1] \) is negligible in the security parameter.

Detectability Relation. Compared to the requirements of a standard PCS scheme, the requirements for an unlinkable PCS scheme pose a definitional challenge: we need to capture unforgeability and policy-compliance in a security game, but at the same time, keys are randomized (potentially by the adversary) and no efficient algorithm could detect whether this is in fact a valid forgery—because all attributes are private and parties are not traceable. We solve this definitional issue by introducing what appears to be a quite natural requirement: any ul-PCS scheme must satisfy a detectability relation which intuitively captures the property that a party, knowing its own initial secret key, can detect whether a valid public key is in fact derived from it (that is, a party can detect its own public keys in a ledger). Using this detection property, the challenger in the security game can determine which keys belong to which oracle queries.
The algorithm is called Detect, and takes as input a target public key, and the keys generated by the challenger for different parties. The algorithm must return the index of the party that the target key belongs to. Looking ahead, this must hold even if the adversary is in charge of re-randomizations. Clearly, such an algorithm must satisfy a non-triviality condition: when keys are honestly generated and re-randomized, the algorithm detects only correct relations and never confuses parties.  

Let Detect be an algorithm that takes as input the master public key mpk, a candidate key pk*, and a list consisting of sequences of key pairs \((Q_1, \ldots, Q_c)\), and outputs an index or ⊥. A ULPCS scheme is said to have the detectability property if there is an efficiently computable algorithm Detect such that for all efficient adversaries \(\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)\) in experiment DTCT specified in Figure 9, the probability \(\Pr[\text{DTCT}_{\text{ULPCS}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1]\) is negligible in the security parameter.

\(^5\) It is instructive to observe that such (private-key) detectability relations are also studied in the context of RCCA variants [7].
We point out that this form of detectability is very different from tracing—the property or feature that an additional entity, the auditor, is able to trace parties by means of a special viewing or revocation key. This property is not entirely new and has already been introduced in the context of, e.g., Monero [3]. In Section 6, we give more details on how to embed ul-PCS in larger contexts and discuss the traceability requirement appearing in the literature on CBDCs.

3.2 Adversarial Capabilities in the Security Games

Before presenting the notions of unforgeability, attribute-hiding and unlinkability, we describe the adversarial capabilities in the different security games.

To keep track of all honestly generated keys, corrupted keys and the list of generated signatures we define the initially empty sets $QK$, $QC$ and $QS$, respectively.

**Key-Generation Oracle** $QKeyGen$: On the $i$-th input of an attribute set $x_i$, generate $(pk_i^0, sk_i^0) \leftarrow KeyGen(msk, x_i)$, add $((i, 0), pk_i^0, sk_i^0, x_i)$ to $QK$ and return $pk_i^0$.

**Left-or-Right Key-Generation Oracle** $QKeyGenLR_0$: On the $i$-th input of a pair of attribute sets $x_{i,0}$ and $x_{i,1}$, generate $(pk_i^0, sk_i^0) \leftarrow KeyGen(msk, x_{i,\beta})$, add $((i, 0), pk_i^0, sk_i^0, x_{i,0}, x_{i,1})$ to $QK$, and return $pk_i^0$.

**Randomization Challenge Oracle** $QRandKey$: On input an index $i$, if $QK$ contains entries $((i, 0), pk_i^0, sk_i^0, \ldots, (i, c_i), pk_i^{c_i}, sk_i^{c_i}, \ldots)$, then compute $(pk_i^{c_i+1}, sk_i^{c_i+1}) \leftarrow RandKey(mpk, sk_i^{c_i})$. Add $((i, c_i + 1), pk_i^{c_i+1}, sk_i^{c_i+1}, \ldots)$ to $QC$ and return $pk_i^{c_i+1}$.

**Corruption Oracle** $QCor$: On input an index $i$, if $QK$ contains entries $((i, j), pk_i^j, sk_i^j, \ldots)$ for $0 \leq j \leq c_i$ for some $c_i \geq 0$, then copy these entries from $QK$ to $QC$ and return the list $(sk_i^0, \ldots, sk_i^{c_i})$.

**Signing Oracle** $QSign$: On input an index pair $(i, j)$ (or a single index $i$ respectively), a public key $pk^j$ and a message $m$, if $QK$ contains an entry $((i, j), pk_i^j, sk_i^j, \ldots)$ (or an entry $(i, pk_i, sk_i, \ldots)$ respectively), then compute $\sigma \leftarrow Sign(mpk, sk_i^j, pk_i^j, m)$ or $\sigma \leftarrow Sign(mpk, sk_i^j, pk_i^j, m)$ respectively, add $((i, j), pk_i^j, pk_i^j, m, \sigma)$ to $QS$ and return the signature.

**Randomization-Challenge Oracle** $QRandKey_\beta$: On receiving a query, do the following: if $\beta = 0$ then set $(pk_i^\beta, sk_i^\beta) \leftarrow RandKey(mpk, sk_i)$, and if $\beta = 1$ set $(pk_i^\beta, sk_i^\beta) \leftarrow KeyGen(msk, x_i)$ where $(i, sk_i, \ldots)$ is the last entry of $QK$. Finally, add $(i + 1, pk_i^\beta, sk_i^\beta)$ to $QK$ and return $pk_i^\beta$.

For notational ease, if the set $QK$ contains the sequence $((i, 0), pk_i^0, sk_i^0, \ldots, (i, c_i), pk_i^{c_i}, sk_i^{c_i}, \ldots)$ we denote by $QK_i$ the corresponding sequence of keys $[(pk_i^0, sk_i^0), \ldots, (pk_i^{c_i}, sk_i^{c_i})]$ for party $i$.

3.3 Security of ul-PCS

**Unforgeability.** Unforgeability captures the property that signatures by honest parties cannot be forged and that it is not possible to created valid signatures that are not policy-compliant. In more detail, an adversary $A$ creates a valid forgery if: (a) it is able to generate a valid signature for a public key belonging to an honest and not corrupted party, or (b) it is able to generate a valid signature for a key that has never been issued for an attribute, or (c) it is able to generate a valid signature for a key pair $pk_S, pk_R$ where the corresponding attributes do not fulfill the policy $F$. We capture all these conditions in the security game in Figure 10, which is based on the unforgeability game of [6], incorporating the modifications mentioned above. To efficiently evaluate condition (c), we make use of the mentioned detection algorithm. In more detail, to check if the attributes associated with $pk$ and $pk^*$ of a potential forgery output $(pk, pk^*, m^*, \sigma^*)$
Definition 18 (Existential Unforgeability of a PCS Scheme). Let ULPCS = (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify) be a ul-PCS scheme that satisfies the detectability property. We define the experiment $\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{ULPCS}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A})$ in Figure 10, where all oracles are defined as in Section 3.2. The advantage of an adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$ is defined by
\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{ULPCS}}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{ULPCS}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1].
\]

Such a ul-PCS scheme ULPCS is called existential unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attacks or existential unforgeable for short if for any polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A} = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{A}_2)$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}$ such that:\n
\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{ULPCS}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda). \quad \text{We further call a ul-PCS scheme } \text{T}_{\text{Rand}}\text{-unforgeable if the number of key rerandomization queries } q \text{ is less than } \text{T}_{\text{Rand}}, \text{i.e. } q < \text{T}_{\text{Rand}}.
\]

Attribute-Hiding. Attribute hiding captures the strong property that the system does not leak anything about honest parties’ attributes except, of course, what can be inferred from legitimate signatures that are published in the system. To capture this, we define a security experiment based on [6], where we again have to include an additional oracle and, to make the definition well-defined, need to rely on the detect relation.

The adversary has access to different oracles: (1) a challenge oracle, to which it can submit an attribute pair $(x_0, x_1)$ and receives as a reply the public key $pk$ corresponding to $x_0$, for $x_0$ chosen by the challenger; (2) a rerandomization oracle, to which it can submit indices $i$ and then receives as a reply the rerandomization of the public key that corresponds to this index; (3) a corruption oracle, to which it can submit an index and then receives as a reply the secret key that corresponds to the public key associated with the index; and (4) a signing oracle, to which the adversary can submit an index pair $(i, j)$ as well as a public key $pk$ and a message $m$ and then receives as a reply a signature generated using the $j$’th rerandomization of the $i$’th
Let $\beta$ be a ul-PCS scheme that satisfies the detectability property. For $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, we define the experiment $AH^\beta_{ULPCS}$ in Figure 11, where all oracles are defined as in Section 3.2. The advantage of an adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$ is defined by

$$Adv^A_{ULPCS, \beta}(\lambda) = |\Pr[AH^\beta_{ULPCS}(1^\lambda, A) = 1] - \Pr[AH^\beta_{ULPCS}(1^\lambda, A) = 0]|.$$

We call an adversary valid if all of the following hold with probability 1 over the randomness of the adversary and all involved algorithms, where $i_{\max}$ denotes an upper bound on the number of queries to $Q\text{KeyGenLR}_\beta$:

- for every $((i, j), pk^i_k, sk^i_k, x_{i,0}, x_{i,1}) \in QC$ and for all $((k, \ell), pk^k_\ell, sk^k_\ell, x_{k,0}, x_{k,1}) \in QK$ we have $x_{i,0} = x_{i,1} = x_i$ and $F(x_i, x_{k,0}) = F(x_i, x_{k,1})$,
- and for all $((i, j), pk^i_k, pk, m, \sigma) \in QS$, $R \leftarrow \text{Detect}(mpk, pk, (QK_1, \ldots, QK_{i_{\max}}))$, and $((i, j), pk, sk, x_{i,0}, x_{i,1}) \in QK$, we either have $R = \bot$ or otherwise $F(x_{i,0}, x_{R,0}) = F(x_{i,1}, x_{R,1})$ holds.

Such a ul-PCS scheme ULPCS is called attribute hiding if for any valid polynomial-time adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}$ such that: $Adv^A_{ULPCS, \beta}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

We call a ul-PCS scheme $T_{Rand}$-attribute-hiding if the number of key rerandomization queries $q$ is less than $T_{Rand}$, i.e. $q < T_{Rand}$. Finally, we call a ul-PCS scheme outsider-attribute-hiding (outsider-AH) if the adversary does not have access to the corruption oracle.

Note that outsider security models e.g. an outsider attacker who is analyzing a transaction graph [20, 23].

**Unlinkability.** Unlinkability captures the property that a party can re-randomize its key such that it is not possible to tell afterwards, whether this party is acting again, or whether it is
another party that freshly joined the system. Coupled with attribute-hiding, this leads to strong privacy guarantees: observing a signature between two freshly re-randomized public keys does not reveal anything beyond the assertion that the attributes behind the keys satisfy the policy without any link to a party’s other actions in the system.

As the attribute-hiding security game, the unlinkability security game in Figure 12 is initialized using a bit $\beta$. Before submitting its challenge query $x$, the adversary has access to a key generation oracle that it can query using other attribute sets $x'$ and receives as a reply the corresponding public key secret key pair $(pk', sk')$. After the key generation queries, the adversary submits its challenge query $x$ and receives as a reply the public key $pk$. Afterwards, the adversary has again access to the key generation oracle as well as a rerandomization oracle that it can query using other attribute sets $x'$. When the adversary queries the rerandomization oracle, the challenger either rerandomizes the challenge key, i.e. $(pk^*, sk^*) \leftarrow \text{RandKey}(mpk, sk)$, if $\beta = 0$, or samples a fresh key $(pk^*, sk^*) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(msk, x)$, if $\beta = 1$, and then outputs the new key $pk'$ to $A$ and sets the key pair $(pk', sk')$ as the new challenge key. Additionally, the adversary has also access to a signing oracle that the adversary can query using $(i, pk', m)$. The challenge of the adversary is now to determine if the keys output by the rerandomization oracle are rerandomized keys of the initial challenge key ($\beta = 0$) or freshly generated keys each time ($\beta = 1$).

**Definition 20.** Let $\text{ULPCS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$ be a ul-PCS scheme that satisfies the detectability property. For $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, we define the experiment $\text{Link}_{\beta}^{\text{ULPCS}}$ in Figure 12, where all oracles are defined as in Section 3.2. The advantage of an adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$ is defined by

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{ULPCS}, A}^{\text{Link}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\text{Link}_{0}^{\text{ULPCS}}(1^{\lambda}, A) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Link}_{1}^{\text{ULPCS}}(1^{\lambda}, A) = 1]|.$$  

We call such a ul-PCS scheme ULPCS unlinkable if for any polynomial-time adversary $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}$ such that: $\text{Adv}_{\text{ULPCS}, A}^{\text{Link}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

We call a ul-PCS scheme $T_{\text{Rand}}$-unlinkable if the number of key rerandomization queries $q$ is less than $T_{\text{Rand}}$, i.e. $q < T_{\text{Rand}}$.

On first sight, one might think that this is not the strongest notion for unlinkability since it only captures the unlinkability of a single user. In Appendix A, we show that an unlinkability notion for multiple users is directly implied by the single key unlinkability notion above.

![Fig. 12: Single-Challenge Unlinkability game of ULPCS.](image)

Looking ahead, our concrete schemes achieve $T_{\text{Rand}}$ bounded security and in the instantiations we set $T_{\text{Rand}} = 2^{16} - 1$.  

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4 Unlinkable Policy-Compliant Signature Schemes

In this section, we present our unlinkable policy-compliant signature schemes. We start by presenting the scheme for general policies.

4.1 ul-PCS for Generic Policies

The main idea of the generic scheme in Figure 14 is best motivated by looking at the structure of public and private keys. We equip the public key with an encryption of the user’s attributes that can be re-encrypted by the user. For this we use a predicate-encryption scheme that supports the predicate class $f_x(y) := F(x, y)$, where $F$ is the policy (intuitively, a party must be able to evaluate whether it can send to someone else, which is what $f_x$ represents). There must be, however, a link to the issuance of attribute $x$ towards that user by the certification authority (CA). This link is established via pseudorandom identifiers that are developed over sequences of different public-key versions based on a PRF key signed by the CA which is part of the private key (a similar technique has been presented in [27] but targets a slightly different goal). This PRF key is bound not only to the attributes, but also to the functional key of the PE scheme, and to a signature public key—a master public key that grants the user to re-issue for itself fresh signature public keys akin to an identity-based signature scheme. Those fresh keys can be published as part of the public key, and signed with the master secret signing key. Note that due to the unlinkability requirement, the master signature keys as well as the generated signatures must remain private. The NIZK proof in the public key assures the well-formedness of the key. Therefore, the public key as depicted becomes re-randomizable in an unlinkable way. Since we are using a standard PRF, we must further limit the range on which it is evaluated (which is the parameter $T_{Rand}$ of the scheme), as otherwise, we cannot bound the collision probability sufficiently well (which is however needed to ensure a safe link between attributes and keys).

For signing and verification, things are a bit simpler. In order to sign a message towards a recipient, one first checks that the recipient’s public key is valid, and second, one proves that one is eligible to sign towards that recipient by proving that one has a functional key $sk_{f_x}$ of the PE scheme (signed by the CA) which is able to encrypt the ciphertext of the recipient’s public key. By definition of the PE scheme, the ability to decrypt with such a key implies $f_x(y) := F(x, y) = 1$ which is exactly the requirement. Finally, the user signs the message and the proof using the fresh signing key. Note that the proofs require public parameters that we refer to as $mpk$ in the formal description, which, for instance, contains the CRSs for the NIZKs and the public key of PE. We need two languages for the NIZK systems, each for a specific purpose:

1. $L_1$: Used to prove the correct formation of the public key, based on the attributes issued by the authority. We depict this language formally below, which is used during re-randomization of keys.
– \( L_2 \): Used to prove eligibility to sign a value towards an intended recipient by deriving joint policy fulfillment. This language is used during signing and is depicted below. In the generic scheme, this amounts to proving the ability to decrypt the PE ciphertext in the public key of the recipient.

**Theorem 1.** The ul-PCS scheme for generic policies is based on pseudo-random functions, predicate encryption, unforgeable signatures and extractable NIZK systems for languages \( L_1 \) and \( L_2 \), defined below, is a \( T_{\text{Rand}} \) unforgeable, attribute-hiding, and unlinkable PCS scheme, where \( T_{\text{Rand}} \) is polynomial in the security parameter.

**Formal treatment.** The ul-PCS schemes is formally described using pseudo-code in Figure 14. Furthermore, we introduce a small and obvious helper function for improved readability: the function \( \text{ValidPK}(\text{mpk}, \text{pk}) \) verifies the NIZK \( L_1 \) proof of public-key well-formedness, whose proof appears within \( \text{pk} \) and outputs 1 if it verifies, otherwise it outputs 0. The languages \( L_1 \), which guarantees the correctness of the public keys, and the language \( L_2 \), which ensures the validity of the signature are defined as follows:

**Language \( L_1 \):** A statement \( x_{st} := (T_{\text{Rand}}, ID_{\text{ctr}}, vk_{\text{sig},1}, ct_{\text{ctr}}, vk_{\text{sig},A}, mpk_{\text{PE}}) \) is in the language \( L_1 \) if it holds for a witness \( w_{st} := (k, ctr, vk_{\text{sig}}, sk_{\text{sig}}, x, \sigma_{1\text{sig}}, \sigma_{2\text{sig}}, \sigma_{\text{ctr}}) \) that:

- \( \sigma_{\text{ctr}} < T_{\text{Rand}} \)
- \( ct_{\text{ctr}} = \text{PE.Enc}(mpk_{\text{PE}}, x) \)
- \( ID_{\text{ctr}} = \text{PRF.Eval}(k, ctr) \)
- \( \text{DS.Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}}^1, (k, x), \sigma_{1\text{sig}}^1) = 1 \) and \( \text{DS.Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}}^A, (k, vk_{\text{sig}}), \sigma_{2\text{sig}}) = 1 \)
- \( \text{DS.Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}}, (vk_{\text{sig},A}^{\text{ctr}}, ID_{\text{ctr}}), \sigma_{\text{ctr}}) = 1 \)

**Language \( L_2 \):** A statement \( x_{st} := (ID_S, ct_R, vk_{\text{sig}}^A) \) is in the language \( L_2 \) if it holds for a witness \( w_{st} := (k, ctr, sk_{f_x}, \sigma_{3\text{sig}}) \) that:

- \( \text{PE.Dec}(sk_{f_x}, ct_R) = 1 \)
- \( ID_S = \text{PRF.Eval}(k, ctr) \)
- \( \text{DS.Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}}^A, (k, sk_{f_x}), \sigma_{3\text{sig}}) = 1 \)

The formal theorem and its proof are given in Appendix B.

### 4.2 ul-PCS for Separable Policies

Identifying the usage of predicate encryption as the most heavy tool in this construction, we observe that for separable policies (cf. Section 1.2) we can apply a few tricks to get rid of it in exchange of ordinary encryption. Towards understanding this section, there are conceptually four items we are going to replace that leads to the scheme in Figure 15.

- The functional key \( sk_{f_x} \) based on attributes \( x \) used to decrypt part of the recipient’s public key will be replaced by an ordinary decryption key \( sk \). The reason is that we can precompute the matching: the recipient’s public key (for, say, attributes \( y \)) contains an encryption of \( R(y) \) and the sender is given the decryption key if \( S(x) \). This mimics the use of a functional key in this case, but at a much lower cost.
- Since the public encryption key can be defined as part of the public parameters, there is no need to sign the corresponding private key \( sk \).
- Signatures on attributes \( x \) can be replaced by a signature on a bit \( R(x) \).
- The re-encryption of the PE part of the ciphertext can be replaced by ordinary re-encryptions that admit efficient proofs.
### Setup($1^\lambda, F$):
- $\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}} \leftarrow \text{NIZK}_{E_1}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}} \leftarrow \text{NIZK}_{E_2}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $(sk^A_{\text{sig}}, vk^A_{\text{sig}}) \leftarrow \text{DS}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $(mpk_{PE}, msk_{PE}) \leftarrow \text{PE}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $mpk := (T_{\text{Rand}}, F, CR_{\text{Rand}}, CRS_{\text{Sign}}, vk^A_{\text{sig}}, mpk_{PE})$  
- $msk := (F, sk^A_{\text{sig}}, msk_{PE})$
- Return $(mpk, msk)$

### KeyGen($msk, x$):
- Parse $msk$ as defined above
- $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$
- $(sk^A_{\text{sig}}, vk^A_{\text{sig}}) \leftarrow \text{DS}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $sk_{f_x} \leftarrow \text{PE}.\text{KeyGen}(msk_{PE}, f_x)$
- $\sigma^A_{\text{sig}} \leftarrow \text{DS}.\text{Sign}(sk^A_{\text{sig}}, (k, x))$, $\sigma^2_{\text{sig}} \leftarrow \text{DS}.\text{Sign}(sk^A_{\text{sig}}, (k, vk^A_{\text{sig}}))$
- $\sigma^3_{\text{sig}} \leftarrow \text{DS}.\text{Sign}(sk^A_{\text{sig}}, (k, sk_{f_x}))$
- $usk := (k, vk^A_{\text{sig}}, sk^A_{\text{sig}}, \sigma^A_{\text{sig}}, \sigma^2_{\text{sig}}, \sigma^3_{\text{sig}}, x, sk_{f_x})$
- Return $(pk_{0}, sk_{0}) \leftarrow \text{RandKey}(mpk, (usk, -1, \bot))$

### RandKey($mpk, sk$):
- Parse $mpk, usk$ as defined above and $sk = (usk, ctr, \cdot)$
- $ctr := ctr + 1$
- If $ctr \geq T_{\text{Rand}}$, return $\bot$
- $ID_{\text{ctr}} := \text{PRF}.\text{Eval}(k, ctr)$
- $(vk^A_{\text{sig}}, sk^A_{\text{sig}}) \leftarrow \text{DS}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $\sigma^A_{\text{ctr}} := \text{DS}.\text{Sign}(sk^A_{\text{sig}}, (vk^A_{\text{sig}}, ID_{\text{ctr}}))$
- $ct_{\text{ctr}} \leftarrow \text{PE}.\text{Enc}(mpk_{PE}, x)$
- $\pi_{\text{ctr}} := \text{NIZK}_{E_1}.\text{Prove}(CRS_{\text{Rand}}, (T_{\text{Rand}}, ID_{\text{ctr}}, vk^A_{\text{sig}}, ct_{\text{ctr}}, vk^A_{\text{sig}}, mpk_{PE}), (usk, \sigma_{\text{ctr}}))$
- $pk_{\text{ctr}} := (ID_{\text{ctr}}, vk^A_{\text{sig}}, ct_{\text{ctr}}, \pi_{\text{ctr}})$
- Return $(pk_{\text{ctr}}, sk_{\text{ctr}} := (usk, ctr, sk^A_{\text{sig}}))$

### Sign($mpk, sk, pk_R, m$):
- Parse $mpk, sk, pk_R, m$ and $usk$ as above
- If $\text{ValidPK}(mpk, pk_R) = 0$ : return $\bot$
- $ID_{S} := \text{PRF}.\text{Eval}(k, ctr)$
- If $\text{PE}.\text{Dec}(sk_{f_R}, ct_{R}) = 0$ : return $\bot$
- $\pi_{s} \leftarrow \text{NIZK}_{E_2}.\text{Prove}(CRS_{\text{Sign}}, (ID_{S}, ct_{R}, vk^A_{\text{sig}}), sk)$
- $\sigma := \text{DS}.\text{Sign}(sk_{\text{ctr}}, (m, pk^A_{R}, \pi_{s}))$
- Return $(\pi_{s}, \sigma)$

### Verify($mpk, pk_S, pk_R, m, \sigma$):
- Parse $mpk$ as defined above and $\sigma = (\pi, \sigma')$
- If $\text{ValidPK}(mpk, pk_S) = 0$ or $\text{ValidPK}(mpk, pk_R) = 0$, return $\bot$
- Return $(\text{NIZK}_{E_2}.\text{Verify}(CRS_{\text{Sign}}, (pk^A_{S}, pk^A_{R}, \pi)) \land \text{DS}.\text{Verify}(vk^A_{S}, (m, pk^A_{R}, \pi), \sigma'))$

---

**Fig. 14:** The algorithms of the unlinkable PCS scheme for generic policies.
Correspondingly, we also have to change the languages $L_1$ and $L_2$ of this scheme, which we show below. The helper function $\text{ValidPK}(mpk, pk)$ is defined as in the previous scheme, i.e. it verifies the NIZK$_{L_1}$ proof of public-key well-formedness, whose proof appears within $pk$ and outputs 1 if it verifies, otherwise it outputs 0. Intuitively, this scheme is secure by a reduction to the generic one. In fact, the four replacements above mimic the generic scheme for separable policies. We have:

**Theorem 2.** The ul-PCS scheme for separable policies is based on pseudo-random functions, IND-CPA-secure encryption, unforgeable signatures and extractable NIZK systems for languages $L_1$ and $L_2$, defined below, is a $T_{\text{Rand}}$ unforgeable, attribute-hiding, and unlinkable PCS scheme, where $T_{\text{Rand}}$ is polynomial in the security parameter.

*Formal treatment.* The proof of this schemes proceeds analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 since the scheme is an optimized version of the generic scheme. We point out the few minor differences at the end of Appendices B.2 to B.4. The language $L_1$, that guarantees the correctness of the public keys, and the language $L_2$, that ensures the validity of the signature, can be simplified as follows:

**Language $L_1$:** A statement $x_{st} := (T_{\text{Rand}}, \text{ID}_{\text{ctr}}, \text{vk}_{\text{ctr}}^{A}, \text{ct}_{\text{ctr}}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^{A,R}, pk_{PKE}^{A})$ is in the language $L_1$ if it holds for a witness $w_{st} := (k, \text{ctr}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, \text{sk}_{\text{sig}}, m_{x}, \sigma_{\text{ctr}}^{1}, \sigma_{\text{sig}})$ that:
- $\text{ctr} < T_{\text{Rand}}$
- $\text{ct}_{\text{ctr}} = PKE.\text{Enc}(pk_{PKE}^{A}, m_{x})$
- $\text{ID}_{\text{ctr}} = \text{PRF.}\text{Eval}(k, \text{ctr})$
- $\text{DS.}\text{Verify}(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^{A,R}, (k, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, m_{x}), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{1}) = 1$
- $\text{DS.}\text{Verify}(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, (\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^{A}, \text{ID}_{\text{ctr}}), \sigma_{\text{ctr}}) = 1$

**Language $L_2$:** A statement $x_{st} := (\text{ID}_{S}, \text{ct}_{R}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^{A,S}, pk_{PKE}^{A})$ is in the language $L_2$ if it holds for a witness $w_{st} := (k, \text{ctr}, \text{sk}_{PKE}^{A}, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{2})$ that:
- $\text{PKE.}\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_{PKE}^{A}, \text{ct}_{R}) = 1$
- $\text{ID}_{S} = \text{PRF.}\text{Eval}(k, \text{ctr})$
- $\text{DS.}\text{Verify}(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^{A,S}, (k, \text{sk}_{PKE}^{A}), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{2}) = 1$

### 4.3 ul-PCS for Role-based Policies

We are going to “replace” the same four items from the generic scheme as before which leads us to the scheme for RBAC policies (cf. Section 1.2) of Figure 16.

- The functional key $\text{sk}_{f_x}$ based on attributes $x$ used to decrypt part of the recipient’s public key will be replaced by the witness for the accumulator for those roles the party can send to. This is in general more than one witness, which is more leakage than in the case of PE. This is the reason why we only achieve outsider-security for attribute hiding for general matrices. If a party only gets one witness (e.g., in the equality policy), then we achieve full attribute hiding. We further note that the accumulator we need is realized by a weakly-secure short signature scheme [13].
- Accordingly, in this scheme, we sign the witness(es) as opposed to the functional key in the generic scheme.
- Signatures on attributes $x$ needed in the generic scheme do not have a counterpart here. They are not needed by virtue of employing a structure-preserving signatures on equivalence-classes (SPS-EQ) that is able to re-randomize public accumulator values while keeping the witnesses intact.
Setup$(1^\lambda, F)$:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}} &\leftarrow \text{NIZK}_{\mathcal{L}_1}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}} &\leftarrow \text{NIZK}_{\mathcal{L}_2}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
(vk_{\mathcal{A},S}^{A,S}, sk_{\mathcal{A},S}^{A,S}) &\leftarrow \text{DS}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
(vk_{\mathcal{A},R}^{A,R}, sk_{\mathcal{A},R}^{A,R}) &\leftarrow \text{DS}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
(pk_{\mathcal{A},\text{PKE}}, sk_{\mathcal{A},\text{PKE}}^A) &\leftarrow \text{PKE}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
mpk &:= (T_{\text{Rand}}, F, \text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}, \text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}, vk_{\mathcal{A},S}^{A,S}, vk_{\mathcal{A},R}^{A,R}, pk_{\mathcal{A},\text{Enc}}^A) \\
msk &:= (F, sk_{\mathcal{A},S}^{A,S}, sk_{\mathcal{A},R}^{A,R}, sk_{\mathcal{A},\text{PKE}}^A) \\
\text{Return} (mpk, msk)
\end{align*}
\]

KeyGen$(msk, x)$:

Parse $msk$ as defined above

\[
k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda
\]

\[
(sk_{\mathcal{A},\text{sig}}, vk_{\mathcal{A},\text{sig}}) \leftarrow \text{DS}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)
\]

\[
m_x := R(x)
\]

\[
sig_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}} := \text{DS}.\text{Sign}(sk_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}^{A,S}, (k, vk_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}, m_x))
\]

If $S(x) = 1$:

\[
sig_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{R}} := \text{DS}.\text{Sign}(sk_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{R}}^{A,R}, (k, sk_{\mathcal{A},\text{PKE}}^A))
\]

\[
usk := (k, vk_{\mathcal{A},\text{sig}}, sk_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}^{A,S}, \sigma_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}^{1, m_x}, sk_{\mathcal{A},\text{PKE}}^A)
\]

Else $(S(x) = 0)$:

\[
usk := (k, vk_{\mathcal{A},\text{sig}}, sk_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}^{A,S}, \sigma_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}^{1}, \sigma_{\mathcal{A},\mathcal{S}}^{2} := \varepsilon, m_x, sk_{\mathcal{A},\text{PKE}}^A := \varepsilon)
\]

\[
(pk_0, sk_0) \leftarrow \text{RandKey}(usk, (-1, \perp))
\]

\[
\text{Return} (pk_0, sk_0)
\]

Fig. 15a: The setup and key generation algorithm of our unlinkable PCS scheme for separable policies.
RandKey(mpk, sk):
Parse mpk, usk as defined above and sk = (usk, ctr, ·)
ctr := ctr + 1
If ctr ≥ T_{Rand}: return ⊥
ID_{ctr} := PRF.Eval(k, ctr)
(vk_{sig}^{ctr}, sk_{sig}^{ctr}) ← DS.Setup(1^λ)
\sigma_{ctr} ← DS.Sign(sk_{sig}^{ctr}, (vk_{sig}^{ctr}, ID_{ctr}))
ct_{ctr} ← PKE.Enc(pk_{r}^{A, PKE}, m)
π_{ctr} ← \text{NIZK}_{L_1}.Prove(CRS_{Rand}, (T_{Rand}, ID_{ctr}, vk_{sig}^{ctr}, ct_{ctr}, vk_{sig}^{A, R}, pk_{r}^{A, PKE}), (usk, \sigma_{ctr}))
pk^{ctr} := (ID_{ctr}, vk_{sig}^{ctr}, ct_{ctr}, \pi_{ctr})
Return (pk^{ctr}, sk^{ctr} := (usk, ctr, sk_{ctr}))

Sign(mpk, sk, pk_{R}, m):
Parse mpk, sk := (usk, ctr, sk_{ctr}) and usk as above
If ValidPK(mpk, pk_{R}) = 0: return ⊥
ID_{S} := PRF.Eval(k, ctr)
If sk_{PKE} = \varepsilon: return ⊥
If PKE.Dec(sk_{PKE}^{A, PKE}, ct_{R}) = 0: return ⊥
π_{S} ← \text{NIZK}_{L_2}.Prove(CRS_{Sign}, (ID_{S}, ct_{R}, vk_{sig}^{A, S}, pk_{PKE}^{A}), sk)
\sigma ← DS.Sign(sk_{ctr}, (m, pk_{r}, π_{S}))
Return (π_{S}, σ)

Verify(mpk, pk_{S}, pk_{R}, m, σ):
Parse mpk as defined above and σ = (π, σ')
If ValidPK(mpk, pk_{S}) = 0 or ValidPK(mpk, pk_{R}) = 0
    Return ⊥
Return \text{NIZK}_{L_2}.Verify(CRS_{Sign}, (pk_{S}, pk_{R}, π) \land DS.Verify(vk_{S}, (m, pk_{r}, π), σ'))

Fig. 15b: The remaining algorithms of our unlinkable PCS scheme for separable policies.
Re-encryptions can be completely replaced by the re-randomization of SPS-EQ signatures and by relying on the fact that the weakly-sound positive accumulators (constructed from Boneh-Boyen signatures [13]) hide the elements in it.

Correspondingly, we also have to change the languages $L_1$ and $L_2$ of this scheme, which we describe below. The helper function for this scheme, $\text{ValidPK}(\text{mpk}, \text{pk})$, is defined differently to the helper function of the previous schemes. In more detail, it verifies the NIZK$_{L_1}$ proof as well as the SPS-EQ signature and outputs 1 only if both verifications are successful. Security again follows by showing that the modifications constitute a different way to evaluate the policy in this specific case.

Theorem 3. The ul-PCS scheme for role-based policies described is based on pseudo-random functions, structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes, ordinary (unforgeable) signatures, a weakly-sound accumulator, and extractable NIZK systems for languages $L_1$ and $L_2$, defined below, is a $T_{\text{Rand}}$-unforgeable, outsider-secure attribute-hiding, and unlinkable PCS scheme, where $T_{\text{Rand}}$ is polynomial in the security parameter. It is furthermore $T_{\text{Rand}}$-attribute-hiding for the equality-policy.

Formal treatment. The proof of this schemes proceeds analogous to the proof of Theorem 1 since the scheme is an optimized version of the generic scheme. We point out the few minor differences at the end of Appendices B.2 to B.4. The corresponding ul-PCS schemes is described in Figure 16. The language $L_1$ that guarantees the correctness of the public keys, and the language $L_2$, ensuring the validity of the signature, can be simplified as follows:

**Language $L_1$:** A statement $x_{st} := (T_{\text{Rand}}, \text{id}_{\text{ctr}}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, \tilde{M} := (A'_1, A'_2, G'_2), \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^A)$ is in the language $L_1$ if it holds for a witness $w_{st} := (k, \text{ctr}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, \text{sk}_{\text{sig}}, w_k, \sigma^1_{\text{sig}}, \sigma_{\text{ctr}})$ that:

- $\text{ctr} < T_{\text{Rand}}$
- $\text{ACC.} \text{MemVrf}(A'_1, k, w_k) = 1$ where $pp'$ is defined as $(p, G_1, G'_2, e)$ (that is, same as $pp$ but with the generator $G'_2$ instead.)
- $\text{id}_{\text{ctr}} = \text{PRF.Eval}(k, \text{ctr})$
- $\text{DS.Verify}(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^A, (k, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}), \sigma^1_{\text{sig}}) = 1$
- $\text{DS.Verify}(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, (\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^{\text{ctr}}, \text{id}_{\text{ctr}}), \sigma_{\text{ctr}}) = 1$

**Language $L_2$:** A statement $x_{st} := (\text{id}_{\text{S}}, \text{ct}_{\text{R}}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^A, pp', A')$ is in the language $L_2$ if it holds for a witness $w_{st} := (k, \text{ctr}, x, w, \sigma^2_{\text{sig}})$ that:

- $\text{ACC.} \text{MemVrf}(A', x, w) = 1$
- $\text{id}_{\text{S}} = \text{PRF.Eval}(k, \text{ctr})$
- $\text{DS.Verify}(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}^A, (k, w), \sigma^2_{\text{sig}}) = 1$
Setup($1^\lambda, F$):
Let pp be a bilinear setup
CRS\text{Rand} ← NI\text{ZK}_{\ell_1} . Setup($1^\lambda$)
CRS\text{Sign} ← NI\text{ZK}_{\ell_2} . Setup($1^\lambda$)
($sk_{\text{sig}}^A, vk_{\text{sig}}^A$) ← DS.Setup($1^\lambda$)
($vk_{\text{SEQ}}^A, sk_{\text{SEQ}}^A$) ← SEQ.KeyGen_R (pp)
Parse $F$ as an RBAC matrix with $n_R$ roles denoted by $1, \ldots, n_R$
For all $y \in [n_R]$
\( (A_y, \alpha_y) \leftarrow \text{ACC.Create}(pp) \)
\( S_y \leftarrow \{ i \in [n_R] : F(i, y) = 1 \}; W_y \leftarrow () \)
For all $i \in S_y$
\( w_i \leftarrow \text{ACC.Add}(pp, A_y, \alpha_y, i) \)
\( W_y \leftarrow W_y | | (i, w_i) \)
mpk := (pp, T_{\text{Rand}}, F, CRS\text{Rand}, CRS\text{Sign}, vk_{\text{sig}}^A, vk_{\text{SEQ}}^A)
msk := (pp, F, sk_{\text{SEQ}}^A, (A_j, W_j)_{j=1}^{n_R})
Return (mpk, msk)

KeyGen(msk, x):
Parse msk as defined above
\( k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \)
\( (sk_{\text{sig}}, vk_{\text{sig}}) \leftarrow \text{DS.Setup}(1^\lambda) \)
\( (A_k, \alpha_k) \leftarrow \text{ACC.Create}(pp) \)
\( w_k \leftarrow \text{ACC.Add}(A_k, \alpha_k, k) \)
\( \vec{M} := (A_k, A_x, G_2) \)
\( \sigma_{\text{SEQ}} \leftarrow \text{SEQ.Sign}_R (sk_{\text{SEQ}}^A, \vec{M}) \)
\( \sigma_{\text{sig}} \leftarrow \text{DS.Sign}(sk_{\text{sig}}^A, (k, vk_{\text{sig}})) \)
\( W := () \)
For each $y \in [n_R] : F(x, y) = 1$ do:
\( \text{Retrieve } (x, w) \in W_y \)
\( W \leftarrow W | | (w, \text{DS.Sign}(sk_{\text{sig}}^A, (k, w))) \)
\( \text{usk} := (\vec{M}, \sigma_{\text{SEQ}}, W, w_k, k, vk_{\text{sig}}, sk_{\text{sig}}, \sigma_{\text{sig}}, x) \)
\( (pk_0, sk_0) \leftarrow \text{RandKey}(mpk, (\text{usk}, -1, \bot)) \)
Return (pk_0, sk_0)

Fig. 16a: The setup and key generation algorithm of our unlinkable PCS scheme for RBAC policies.
RandKey(mpk, sk):
Parse mpk, usk as defined above and sk = (usk, ctr, ·)
ctr := ctr + 1
If ctr ≥ T_{Rand}: return ⊥
ID ctr := PRF.Eval(k, ctr)
(vk\text{ctr}_{sig}, sk\text{ctr}_{sig}) ← DS.Setup(\lambda)
σ\text{ctr} ← DS.Sign(sk\text{ctr}_{sig}, (vk\text{ctr}_{sig}, ID ctr))
µ\text{ctr} ← Z^*_p
(M^′, σ\text{SEQ}') ← SEQ.ChgRep_R(vk\text{SEQ}_{A}, M, σ\text{SEQ}, µ\text{ctr})
π\text{ctr} ← NIZK_{L1}.Prove(CRS_{Rand}, (T_{Rand}, ID ctr, vk\text{ctr}_{sig}, M^′, vk\text{SEQ}_{A}, (usk, σ\text{ctr})))
Return (pk\text{ctr}, sk\text{ctr} := (usk, ctr, sk\text{ctr}_{sig}))

Sign(mpk, sk, pk_R, m):
Parse mpk, sk := (usk, ctr, sk\text{ctr}_{sig}) and usk as above
If ValidPK(mpk, pk_R) = 0 : return ⊥
ID S := PRF.Eval(k, ctr)
Parse pk_R = (…, (A, A', G_2'), …)
Let pp' ← (p, G_1, G_2, e)
If \exists w* ∈ W | ACC.MemVrf(pp', A', x, w*) : return ⊥
Find w* ∈ W | ACC.MemVrf(pp', A', x, w*) = 1
π S ← NIZK_{L2}.Prove(CRS_{Sign}, (ID S, vk\text{SEQ}_{A'}, pp', A'), sk)
σ ← DS.Sign(sk\text{ctr}, (m, pk_R, π S))
Return (π S, σ)

Verify(mpk, pk_S, pk_R, m, σ):
Parse mpk as defined above and σ = (π, σ')
If ValidPK(mpk, pk_S) = 0 or ValidPK(mpk, pk_R) = 0
Return ⊥
Return (NIZK_{L2}.Verify(CRS_{Sign}, (pk_S, pk_R), π) ∧ DS.Verify(vk_S, (m, pk_R, π), σ'))

Fig. 16b: The rerandomization, signing and verification algorithm of our unlinkable PCS scheme for RBAC policies.

5 Instantiation and Performance Analysis

Before discussing the performance of our proposed schemes, we give a brief overview of the concrete instantiations of the cryptographic primitives. The full documentation how they are used to realize our schemes for different policies can be found in Appendices C and D.
5.1 Overview of Cryptographic Algorithms and Proof Systems

Digital Signatures. Three types of signature schemes are required to instantiate the proposed constructions. We use BLS signatures [15] wherever appropriate. For SPS-EQ we use the construction proposed in [35]. Additionally, if we need to have a Groth-Sahai (GS) friendly relation (see below), we use the structure-preserving signatures (SPS)—for example when users need to prove the knowledge of hidden messages and signatures that successfully verify under the verification key of the CA. For simplicity, we utilize a slightly modified variant of FHS’s SPS-EQ [35], without the change representation algorithm, as our implementation of standard SPS.

Predicate Encryption. The proposed generic ul-PCS scheme in Figure 14 relies on PE. We use the Okamoto-Takashima (OT12) [53] scheme based on dual pairing vector spaces that realizes the inner-product predicate functionality.

Public-Key Encryption. The proposed ul-PCS scheme with separable policies relies on public key encryptions and we use ElGamal encryption [29].

Pseudorandom Functions. We utilize the Dodis-Yampolskiy PRF [28] as a well-known and efficient PRF that operates over a cyclic group $G$ of prime order $p$.

Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge. Combining all of these concrete instantiations allows us to formalize the NP-relations described in the proposed constructions. We rely on three well-known proof systems: Sigma protocols, Groth-Sahai proofs, and range-proofs. We give a brief overview and defer the details to Appendix C.

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We use the standard sigma protocols [56] as well as some recent techniques described in [27, 49]. To make the schemes non-interactive, we use the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [33] w.r.t. a hash functions $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. In essence, whenever the prover has the knowledge of scalar witnesses, we use sigma protocols to obtain an efficient zero-knowledge proof. Additionally, we use Groth-Sahai (GS) proof systems [43], when the witness is a group element with hidden discrete logarithms. Over an asymmetric bilinear group $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \mathbb{p}, e, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2)$, this construction can prove the satisfiability of any pairing-product equations (PPE) of the form $\prod_{i=1}^{n} e(A_i, Y_i) \prod_{j=1}^{m} e(X_j, B_j) \prod_{j=1}^{m} e(X_j, Y_i)^{\gamma_{i,j}} = T$, where $X_1, \ldots, X_m \in \mathbb{G}_1$, $Y_1, \ldots, Y_n \in \mathbb{G}_2$ are the witnesses given as a commitment and $T \in \mathbb{G}_T$, $A_1, \ldots, A_n \in \mathbb{G}_1$, $B_1, \ldots, B_m \in \mathbb{G}_2$ and $\{\gamma_{i,j}\}_{i \in [1,m], j \in [1,n]} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are constant values which are a part of the instance or publicly known. Another advantage of using GS proofs is the ability to use verification batching techniques, such as the one described in this paper [45]. Finally, the range-proof allows a user to prove that a hidden value lies within a certain range. In the proposed constructions, the number of re-randomizations is upper bounded by a maximum number $T_{Rand}$ that is fixed in the setup. In order to prove that this condition is fulfilled, our instantiation relies on range-proofs proposed by Bünz et al. [17], known as Bulletproofs. We summarize in Figure 17 all the relations and proof systems used in our constructions. The concrete realizations of the NIZK relations are detailed in Appendix D.

5.2 Performance Analysis

Benchmark & Environment. We implemented the proposed ul-PCS schemes and evaluated their performance based on BN-254 elliptic curve groups [9], $y^2 = x^3 + b$, with embedding curve degree 12, where the first group $G_1$ is a standard curve defined over $\mathbb{Z}_p$. The second group $G_2$ and target group $G_T$ are defined over the extension fields $\mathbb{Z}_{p^2}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_{p^{12}}$, respectively. We use the Charm-crypto framework [2] written in Python as the main framework and our open-source
implementation is available at [59]. In our experiments, we used a machine that we believe represents typical workloads for ul-PCS. We used an HP Zbook 15 G6 with 16 GB of RAM, an Intel Core i7-9850H CPU @ 2.60GHz, and an SSD for storage running Ubuntu 22.04 LTS.

**Optimized constructions for special policies.** All computations are performed on the same machine and we achieve practical results, even for large attribute sets and policies. We report the execution times on an average of 100 executions without preprocessing. The maximum number of re-randomizations is assumed to be $T_{\text{Rand}} = 2^{16} - 1$. The length of secret key and signing time are shown in Figure 18. Also Table 1 depicts the constant execution timings and parameter sizes. A summary of our analysis is as follows:

In the role-based ul-PCS described in Figure 16, it takes around 1.2 seconds (resp. 2 seconds) to sign a message using a secret key with 5 roles (resp. 50 roles). The average cost per additional attribute is around 19 ms. It takes around 1.6 seconds for a verifier to verify the validity of a signature independent of the number of roles. The required memory for a user to store a secret key representing 5 roles (resp. 50 roles) is not larger than 2 kbytes (resp. 10 kbytes) and we pay 270 bytes per additional attribute. The corresponding public key has a constant size of 28
Table 1: Running time of constant operations and size of constant parameters.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>KeyGen time (ms)</th>
<th>RandKey time (ms)</th>
<th>Verify time (ms)</th>
<th>pk size (kbytes)</th>
<th>σ size (kbytes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ul-PCS, role-based</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>550</td>
<td>1 630</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ul-PCS, separable policies</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>1 020</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 18: Secret-key size and Signing time of our RBAC ul-PCS and ul-PCS for separable policies. Left: secret-key size versus the number of attributes/roles; Right: signing time versus the number of attributes/roles.

kbytes, again, independent of the number of roles. The signature of this scheme has a constant length of 16 kbytes.

The proposed ul-PCS for separable policies described in Figure 15, achieves a slightly better performance in most operations. More precisely, a secret key can be generated less than 490 ms independent of the number of attributes. The key re-randomization phase also benefits from this constant running time and requires 480 ms to re-randomize a secret key. Unsurprisingly, as illustrated in Figure 18, the signing time is also constant and it takes around 750 ms to sign a message. To verify a signature it takes around 1 second. The secret keys are also constant and require only 1 kbyte of storage while the corresponding public key is 28 kbytes large. A signature has a constant size of 14.5 kbytes, which is slightly shorter than the role-based ul-PCS.

Generic ul-PCS/PCS with IP-PE. In Figure 19 we compare the overhead of the proposed generic ul-PCS with the standard PCS scheme proposed by Badertscher et al. [6], where for both prototypes we use the same inner-product predicate encryption scheme. We are furthermore interested in the dependency on the number of attributes, where attributes are encoded as length-$n$ vectors (over a based field). Due to space constraints, we focus our attention on the “online” operations common to both schemes (signing and verification times; signature and public key sizes). We explore the range between 5 and 50 attributes. We observe that standard PCS has generally better performance characteristics, which can be attributed to the cost of unlinkability/anonymity.

A public key for 5 attributes in the generic ul-PCS scheme is around 79 kbytes and we pay 9.9 kbytes per additional attribute. In the generic standard PCS we start at 2.3 kbytes and pay 390 bytes per additional attribute. Signature sizes are almost identical in both schemes, a
signature generated in case of 5 attributes is around 40 kbytes and each additional attribute incurs a cost of about 5.14 kbytes. With respect to signing times, with the generic ul-PCS a message can be signed in around 3 seconds (resp. 18.5 seconds) in case of 5 attributes (resp. 50 attributes). The average cost per additional attribute in this range from 5 to 50 attributes can be estimated to be 340 ms. For standard PCS, we are at about 800 ms (resp. up to 6.9 seconds) to generate a signature for 5 attributes (resp. 50 attributes). The average cost per additional attribute here would be 130 ms. Finally, verification of a signature in the context of 5 attributes (resp. 50 attributes) takes about 4.59 seconds (resp. 23 seconds) for the generic ul-PCS. With the standard PCS the verification time is around 1.74 seconds (resp. 12.5 seconds) for 5 (resp. 50) attributes. In this range, the price per additional attribute can be estimated at 420 ms for the generic ul-PCS, respectively 230 ms for standard PCS.

6 Application to Payment Systems

We discuss the application of ul-PCS to pseudonymous UTxO-based transaction systems like Bitcoin, and to privacy-preserving transaction systems like Zcash [11] and Monero [3], and discuss how the enrollment process can be implemented in a distributed manner to avoid a single point of failure. We finally discuss how ul-PCS can enrich centralized currencies such as CBDCs.
Fig. 20: A simplified illustration of the main idea behind a mixer: parties generate new addresses which they communicate to the mixer in a secure way. The mixer accumulates coins at the deposit address and redistributes them when the number of participants is exceeding a threshold (which defines the anonymity set).

6.1 Integration with UTxO-based Systems

In UTxO-based systems like Bitcoin [51], a data structure of unspent transaction outputs is maintained by the ledger, where an unspent transaction output can be thought of as an address-value pair. In principle, every address corresponds to a public key (in Bitcoin it is the hash of a public key), and the value sitting at the address can be spent if a signature can be generated (signing a particular transaction spending the value) that verifies with respect to that public key. With respect to privacy, this system is pseudonymous: anyone can link transactions, but the real-world entity behind a key is not deducible from the ledger. To obfuscate the transaction graph, several techniques have been proposed for Bitcoin [36, 50, 58], all of them requiring the ability that a party can generate fresh public keys (i.e., addresses) at will. For example, in a mixer solution like Obscuro [58], parties would communicate privately a new return address to the mixer, send coins, and the mixer sends back the coins to the shuffled return addresses of many users.

Following [6], a ul-PCS can be naturally coupled with such transaction systems to achieve policy-compliance with strong privacy guarantees (hiding the attributes of parties) and without the need for privacy revocation because the policy is cryptographically enforced. However, the original PCS scheme did not allow a real-world entity to generate new public keys on their own, which makes them incompatible with the privacy-enhancing techniques above. Unlinkable PCS on the other hand enables all obfuscation techniques based on freshly generated addresses while delivering all guarantees of a PCS scheme that make it attractive to enforce policies at the transaction level. Unlinkable PCS cryptographically enforces a policy and enables a party to generate unlinkable public keys (i.e., addresses) that are all connected to its attributes. This opens the door for mixing services for UTxO based ledgers (such as Obscuro) to be provably compliant without revoking the privacy at any time: by equipping accredited users and mixers with appropriate credentials (connected to their jurisdiction), one can enforce on a transaction level that the service only serves admissible customers.

6.2 Integration with DAP Systems

Overview. We now show how unlinkable policy-compliant signatures can be integrated decentralized anonymous payment (DAP) systems such as Monero [3] or Zcash [11] who do not only
demonstrate the practicality of such systems, but are accompanied by rigorous security models and arguments [3, 11, 30]. In particular, in a recent work, Engelmann et al. [30] introduce a new abstraction model for protocols like Zcash and Monero and to reason about their confidentiality, privacy, and soundness properties. Recall that in such UTxO-like privacy-preserving transaction systems, confidentiality and anonymity of transacted amounts and involved addresses must be ensured. For example, the amount, or more generally speaking the output of a transaction, could be encrypted using the public key of the recipient and, by using key-private encryption [11], outputs of transactions are unlinkable when posted on a public ledger. To enable the UTxO functionality, such privacy-preserving UTxO like schemes must allow the generation of what is often called a “nullifier” value that anonymously marks a transaction output as spent.

To abstract the concrete mechanisms used in different systems, Engelmann et al. [30] define the notion of a one-time account (OTA) scheme. We recall the definition of OTA in Appendix F, which is a tuple of algorithms $\text{OTA} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{NoteGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Receive}, \text{NulEval})$. An OTA scheme is the privacy-preserving analogue and generalization of a plain UTxO based transaction system described above: instead of connecting a transaction output to a long-term cryptographic key (e.g. by including a hash of the recipient’s public key as part of the output), an OTA scheme allows to generate (knowing the intended recipients’ public keys), for each transaction output, a unique and anonymous one-time account which is called a “note” whose contents are only accessible by using the recipient’s public key, and who can further claim it by computing a unique nullifier value that anonymously marks it as spent. If the intended recipient requires auxiliary information to create the nullifier, an OTA scheme has an explicit function to encrypt such values toward the recipient (this ciphertext is formally part of the transaction output and accompanies the note).

Based on an OTA scheme, the main task of a higher-level transaction system (such as Zcash or Monero) is to maintain a ledger recording notes in its state, whether they have been spent or not, and to implement a certain monetary policy (such as conservation of money during a standard transaction, or how to mint coins in special transactions). This is highly application dependent, and the OTA scheme provides the core infrastructure underneath. The high-level transaction mechanic is as follows: in a transaction, one declares knowledge of (input) notes contained in the ledger state and presents their nullifiers plus a NIZK proof that they are constructed correctly based on the input notes. Importantly, the transaction reveals no link to the input notes other than their containment in the ledger state (the nullifiers ensure that no note can be spent more than once). Finally, a transaction specifies a new set of output notes, and an application-dependent proof that the output notes stand in a particular relation with the input notes (such as that the sum of all inputs equals the sum of all outputs minus a given fee). We refer to [11] and [30] on how these systems can be constructed based on an OTA scheme.

We now present two constructions how to combine PCS with OTA to achieve accounts that are bundled with private attributes about which policy compliance can be proved. The first construction is the generic composition of PCS and OTA, while the second construction constitutes an efficiency improvement in case the PCS is unlinkable.

\textit{Construction I.} The idea is to use the PCS scheme to sign the note but hide the involved public keys and signatures inside the OTA ciphertext such that the owner of a note can prove, using a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, the relevant values when claiming a note as part of a transaction as described above.

This generic composition is simple and obviously preserves all underlying OTA guarantees (cf. Appendix F), but pushes a lot of complexity into the NIZK: in order to show that the nullifier $\text{nul}$ spends a note $\text{note}$ (which contains a vector of type-value pairs $\vec{a}$ and is generated with randomness $r$ see Appendix F) that is contained in the ledger state $\text{st}$, at least the following
language must be supported for the construction:

\[
L = \{ (mpk, st, nul) \mid \exists (note, sk_{ota}, \bar{a}, r, pk_{pcs}, pk_{pcs}, sk_{pcs}, \sigma_{pcs}) : \\
\text{note} \in st \land \text{note} = \text{NoteGen}(P(sk_{ota}), \bar{a}, r) \land nul = \text{NulEval}(sk_{ota}, r) \land \\
\text{Verify}(mpk, pk_{pcs}^S, pk_{pcs}^R, note, \sigma_{pcs}) \land pk_{pcs}^R = P(sk_{pcs}) \},
\]

where \( P(sk) \) is an assumed mapping that computes the public key from the secret key (e.g., to prove knowledge of the secret key).

**Construction II.** We now present a much more efficient way to compose the two schemes while retaining essentially the same privacy guarantees as the first construction above by leveraging the unlinkability feature. We first describe the scheme and argue about the security below. The scheme works as follows: we have the sender create a note according to the OTA scheme, and PCS-sign a commitment to the note such that it verifies with the sender’s and recipient’s current PCS public keys respectively. We leave the format of the note unchanged, and transmit the additional information as well as the commitment opening as part of the ciphertext of the OTA scheme. The nullifier on the other hand will be the OTA nullifier, both PCS public keys, the PCS signature on the commitment, plus another PCS signature created by the recipient on the OTA nullifier, and finally a NIZK that proves knowledge of the opening information of the commitment. (Recall that PCS-Signing requires specifying a target public key, which is however not relevant at this step. For simplicity, we assume that a party can “sign toward itself”, in which case standard signatures is a special case of PCS.) In summary, a party can only claim ownership of a note (by constructing the nullifier) if it possesses the underlying OTA private key (to decrypt the output and to generate the OTA nullifier) and possesses the PCS private key that corresponds to the PCS public key towards which the note was created, i.e., for which the signature on the note successfully verifies. We observe that this construction avoids a NIZK about PCS signatures, and gets away with just a simple commitment proof. The scheme is formally given below.

We note that the only change to the interface is that KeyGen can have black-box access to a PCS key-gen oracle and it is parameterized by an attribute \( x \). Thanks to this modularity the OTA security requirements remain well-defined.

**Setup:** Run \((mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{ul-PCS.Setup}\) and \(pp \leftarrow \text{OTA.Setup}\) and define the public parameter \( p \leftarrow (mpk, pp)\). For simplicity, \( p \) is implicitly provided to all algorithms below and not explicitly mentioned.

\[\text{KeyGen}_{x}^{\text{KeyGen}_{pcs}(msk)}: \text{Run} (pk_{ota}, sk_{ota}) \leftarrow \text{OTA.KeyGen} \text{ and obtain } (pk_{pcs}, sk_{pcs}) \text{ for attribute } x \text{ via an oracle call. Define } pk = (pk_{ota}, pk_{pcs}) \text{ and } sk = (sk_{ota}, sk_{pcs}).\]

\[\text{NoteGen}((pk_{ota}^R, pk_{pcs}^R), \bar{a}, (r_1, r_2)): \text{Create note } note \leftarrow \text{OTA.NoteGen}(pk_{ota}, \bar{a}, r_1).\]

\[\text{Enc}((pk_{ota}^R, pk_{pcs}^R), \bar{a}, (r_1, r_2), (sk_{ota}, sk_{pcs}, \xi)): \text{Re-create the note note using } r_1 \text{ as above and compute } Com \leftarrow \text{Commit(note; } r_2). \text{ Run } (sk'_{pcs}, pk'_{pcs}) \leftarrow \text{ul-PCS.RandKey}(sk_{pcs}) \text{ and store the new PCS keys. Run } \sigma_{note} \leftarrow \text{ul-PCS.Sign}(sk'_{pcs}, pk'_{pcs}, Com). \text{ Compute } C \leftarrow \text{Enc}((pk_{ota}^R, \bar{a}, (r_1, r_2), pk'_{pcs}, pk_{pcs}^R, \sigma_{note}), \xi).\]

\[\text{Receive(note, } C, (sk_{ota}, sk_{pcs})\): \text{Compute OTA.Receive(note, } C, sk_{ota}).\]

\[\text{NulEval}(sk_{ota}^R, sk_{pcs}^R, \bar{a}, (r_1, r_2), pk_{pcs}, pk_{pcs}^R, \sigma_{note}): \text{ Verify that } pk_{pcs}^R \text{ is the public key corresponding to } sk_{pcs}^R \text{ (otherwise, abort). Generate } nul' \leftarrow \text{OTA.NulEval}(sk_{ota}^R), \text{ compute } \sigma_{nul} \leftarrow \text{ul-PCS.Sign}(sk_{ota}^R, pk_{pcs}^R, nul'), \text{ and recreate the commitment } Com \text{ (using } \bar{a}, r_1, \text{ and } r_2). \text{ Check that } \text{ul-PCS.Verify}(pk_{pcs}^S, pk_{pcs}^R, Com, \sigma_{note}) = 1 \text{ (otherwise abort). Finally, output } nul \leftarrow (nul', Com, pk_{pcs}^S, pk_{pcs}^R, \sigma_{note}, \sigma_{nul}).\]

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For this scheme, we need a NIZK for the following language, which is known to admit efficient proof systems [30, Section 5]:

\[ L' = \{ (st, Com, nul') \mid \exists (note, sk_{ota}, \vec{a}, r_1, r_2) : note \in st \land Com = \text{Commit}(note, r_2) \land note = \text{NoteGen}(P(sk_{ota}), \vec{a}, r_1) \land nul' = \text{NulEval}(sk_{ota}, r_1) \}. \]

Security analysis. We now elaborate on the provided guarantees by our construction. While it is easy to see that the strawman approach is as secure as OTA, for the more efficient construction above, we trade some security for efficiency. We now elaborate on the security provided by that construction following the OTA security goals.

Soundness and binding. An OTA ciphertext should decrypt to values that would correctly reconstruct the note that was given to it. On the other hand, binding ensures that a note is essentially a binding commitment to the vector \( \vec{a} \). Both of these properties are satisfied by the above construction since we do not interfere with the generation of the OTA note.

Note and Ciphertext Privacy. Privacy mandates note and ciphertext hiding as well as note and encryption anonymity. If the underlying OTA scheme satisfies this, then the above construction trivially achieves it too, since we do not interfere with note generation, and all the additional values are hidden by encrypting them as using the underlying OTA encryption function.

Note Uniqueness. Note uniqueness captures that honestly generated notes (aka addresses) do not collide except with negligible probability. This is obviously fulfilled by our construction.

Nullifier Uniqueness and collision resistance. Nullifier uniqueness demands that for the same note, no two nullifiers can be constructed and, furthermore, that the probability that two nullifiers collide is negligible. As above, this is retained by the above construction if the underlying OTA scheme satisfies it.

Nullifier security. The most crucial change of our construction is the nullifier. We gain efficiency by including signatures and (re-randomized) keys as part of the nullifier, but we trade the strong pseudo-random property, which has security implications (compared to the strawman approach).

If the creator of a note is honest, the corresponding owner is able to spend the note in a private and anonymous way. In particular, if the PCS recipient key is re-randomized accordingly, no linking within the transaction log is possible thanks to the hiding and unlinkability property of PCS and the security of the underlying OTA scheme. The transaction log only reveals that parties are transacting that are allowed to transact by the policy. On the other hand, if different notes are created for the same PCS receiver key, then the only information that leaks due to this, is the fact that the same party must again be transacting—but no link exists to the actual note or other transactions that use a re-randomized receiver key of this party, thanks to the privacy of the commitment scheme, the unlinkability of the sender PCS key (which by default gets re-randomized), and the security of the underlying OTA scheme.

However, if the creator of a note is malicious, then this creator (and only this creator) has enough information to determine that the owner of the note has been spending the note in a transaction due to the presence of the additional PCS-related values that are revealed (as part of the nullifier). It is however possible to remedy this situation proactively, namely by spending the note to itself using a freshly randomized PCS key as soon as the transaction appears in the log. This is incidentally one of the recommended measures by Zcash to achieve everlasting anonymity [11].

Finally, we observe that spending a note is only possible if a party has access to the OTA private key and the PCS private key (which follows from the security provided by the underlying OTA nullifier and the unforgeability of the PCS signature on this nullifier).
6.3 Distributed Setup and User Enrollment

In credential systems, issuance is often distributed across a set of servers to avoid a single point of failure, which includes the leakage malicious revelation of the master secret key. This improves security of the system if the system’s setup values and user enrollment is a distributed process such that only a large collusion of servers would be able to recreate crucial secret values. Note that a revelation of the master secret would directly limit the achievable level of attribute hiding, as it opens the door for an adversary to self-issue credentials and figuring w.r.t. which participants it generates valid signatures, which is a potentially arbitrary loss in privacy.

In Appendix E, we showcase how our constructions can be implemented in the distributed setting. In general, the idea is to have the master secret-key shared among the servers (plus additional shared randomness), and have a client obtain partial results $r_i \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}_i, x)$, and perform client-side aggregation to reconstruct the full output of KeyGen. Such a process ensures that unless a certain threshold of servers collude (e.g. up to $n - 1$ in an honest-but-curious scenario), the CA’s have no advantage over any other party in the system.

6.4 Application to Larger Systems and CBDCs

Zcash is a decentralized anonymous payment system, and while the considerations above capture the technical aspects of how to integrate PCS with private transaction systems, it is important to note that PCS can significantly improve the privacy for users in more complex, compliance-seeking systems, be it centralized or decentralized. Central-bank digital currencies, have received a lot of attention in recent years. A core requirement [48] in these systems is the so-called comprehensive regulatory compliance, which puts restrictions and requirements on (1) the number of coins in circulation, (2) sending and receiving limits, (3) transaction value limits, (4) privacy, (5) accountability and (6) auditability.

A critical feature is accountability and auditability [23]—how can a regulator be assured everything is complying with the jurisdiction? A somewhat standard technique to achieve auditability is by privacy revocation techniques [48]: in case of suspicious activities a user can be traced and its privacy can be revoked completely. Whether a user is considered suspicious is decided outside of the technical system, whereas the technical system provides, for example, viewing keys to an auditor to unmask any transaction by any user. For improved resiliency, the revocation capability is supposed to be shared by a group of anonymity revokers such that a quorum is needed to unlock the feature. It goes without saying that while this approach trivially ensures that an auditor can learn anything it needs to know to perform its task, this immense power comes with a huge risk for users. Not only is there the danger of false accusation and the revelation of an individual’s activities even if they were legal, but this also opens the door for pro-active surveillance. This puts the users into a weak position, and undermines the right for privacy in a rather extreme way.

Acknowledging that the other extreme, unconditional anonymity, is problematic as well, the research on accountable privacy has been picking up steam that tries to balance privacy, accountability, and auditability, such that users enjoy much stronger guarantees. Consider the UTT system as an example of such an approach in the DAP domain [57], that implements so-called budget coins which can be spent (unconditionally) private, yet accountable because the budget coin is governed by a spending limit, thus representing the digital analogue of cash.

Auditability is achieved by having a user fill up its budget in regular intervals by presenting credentials to the auditor. All remaining transaction are potentially subject to privacy revocation. As described in Section 1, the general approach is to define several types of assets, a strategy taken in [32], or different types of transaction for which different rules apply. In the CBDC domain Platypus [62] proposes such a path, too. Therefore, if there is a cryptographic way to
ensure a certain policy for a given asset, there is no need for revocation, and transactions can be made untraceable without harming anyone. For all other cases, traceable/revocable transactions can still be used. This design gives a user much stronger privacy guarantees for all policies that can be enforced on a technical level.

The compliance requirements (1)-(3) have received a lot of attention for automatic enforcement, since they affect the transaction content and are thus comparably simpler to handle. However, a lot of the need for identity revocation stems from the lack of cryptographic policy enforcement that involve relevant properties of sender and receiver, including age, citizenship, place of residency, more technical attributes like governing (tax) jurisdiction or financial score, and more generally certified attributes by external auditors (cf. the chosen policy classes for separable policies or RBAC, and of course the richer set computable by inner-product predicates). A PCS public key is the digital, private-preserving representation of a user’s relevant credentials while signatures between two users prove compliance. A user is furthermore free to change the representation to ensure unlinkability. We obtain the following: coupling ul-PCS with any system such as UTT or Platypus, it becomes possible to have a transaction system that (1) limits the number of coins (2) enforces sending and receiving limits and transaction value limits, and (3) achieves strong accountable privacy for a rich class of policies without the need for revocation. The capability to revoke is thus pushed to the boundary, i.e., to the edge cases which are not clearly governed by a reasonable (digital) policy.

Due to its low-level nature of being a signature scheme tied to digital credentials, there is a lot of flexibility in the usage of a PCS scheme. For example, if an application requires traceability or revocation, the user is still free to follow standard procedures to register its public key with a PKI to bind it to a real-world identity, or to secret share its private key with revocation servers that would enable traceability. Having a PKI in place can assist in disincentivizing users from sharing private keys, if that is deemed a concern, and any standard technique, such as PKI-assured non-transferability, can be used for this purpose [18] just like with ordinary credential or signature systems.

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References


A Note on Multi-Challenge Unlinkability

The definition of multi-challenge unlinkability is almost the same as the definition of unlinkability with the only difference that, instead of submitting a single challenge query $x$, the adversary has access to a key generation oracle $Q_{KeyGen}$ that it can query using multiple attributes to obtain multiple challenge public keys. Additionally, the adversary can query the rerandomization oracle using an index $i$ to obtain a rerandomized key for the public key associated with the index $i$.

If the adversary wants to obtain the corresponding secret key for a public key, it can query the corruption oracle $Q_{Cor}$ using the corresponding index $i$. The signing oracle in this case $Q_{Sign}$ takes the same inputs as in the unforgeability and the attribute-hiding game. More formally:

**Definition 21.** Let $ULPCS = (Setup, KeyGen, Sign, Verify)$ be a ul-PCS scheme that satisfies the detectability property. For $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$, we define the experiment $MC$-$Link_{ULPCS}^{\beta}(1^\lambda, A)$ in Figure 21, where the rerandomization oracle is defined as:

$QRandKey_{\beta}(\cdot)$: On input $i$, do the following: if $\beta = 0$ then set $(pk', sk') \leftarrow RandKey(mpk, sk)$, and if $\beta = 1$ set $(pk', sk') \leftarrow KeyGen(msk, x)$ where $((i, j), sk, \ldots)$ is the $i$'th entry of $Q_K$ with the highest $j$. Finally, add $((i, j + 1), pk', sk')$ to $Q_K$ and return $pk'$.

oracles are defined as in Appendix C.

The advantage of an adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$ is defined by

$$Adv_{ULPCS, A}^{MC-Link}(\lambda) = |Pr[MC-Link_{ULPCS}^{\beta}(1^\lambda, A) = 1] - Pr[MC-Link_{ULPCS}^{\beta}(1^\lambda, A) = 1]|.$$ 

An adversary $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$ is called valid, if no index $i$ is queried to both oracles $QRandKey_{\beta}(i)$ and $QCor(i)$.

We call such a ul-PCS scheme $ULPCS$ unlinkable if for any polynomial-time adversary $A = (A_1, A_2, A_3)$, there exists a negligible function $\negl$ such that: $Adv_{ULPCS, A}^{MC-Link}(\lambda) \leq \negl(\lambda)$.

```
MC-Link_{ULPCS}^{\beta}(1^\lambda, A)
(F, st_1) \leftarrow A_1(\lambda)
(mpk, msk) \leftarrow Setup(1^\lambda, F)
\alpha \leftarrow A_2^{Q_{KeyGen}(\cdot), Q_{RandKey}(\cdot), Q_{Cor}(\cdot), Q_{Sign}(\cdot)}(mpk, st_1)
Output: \alpha
```

Fig. 21: Many-Challenges Unlinkability game of $ULPCS$. 

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It is straightforward to verify that the single-challenge implies the multi-challenge extension. Formally, this extension is formalized by introducing the oracles QKeyGenC and QSignβ and defining the multi-challenge version in Figure 21. In the game, we maintain an additional set QCK (initially empty):

**Theorem 4 (Link implies MC-Link).** Let ULPCS be Link secure, then ULPCS is also MC-Link secure.

**Proof (Sketch).** This proof proceeds using a simple hybrid argument using the following game:

**Game Gk:** For the first \( k \) keys that are being queried to the rerandomization oracle QRandKeyβ, fresh keys are generated, whereas for the remaining keys all queries asked to QRandKeyβ are answered using rerandomized keys.

Let \( Q \) be the number of overall key queries, then it holds that

\[
\text{MC-Link}_0 = G_0 \approx \cdots \approx G_Q = \text{MC-Link}_1
\]

To conclude the proof, it needs to be shown that \( G_{k-1} \approx G_k \) for all \( k \in [Q] \). This can be done using a reduction to the Link security game by forwarding the \( k \)'th challenge query to the underlying challenger of the Link game and then reply using the obtained key. The remaining keys are generated using key generation queries to the underlying challenger. The obtained secret keys can then be used to answer potential corruption queries of the adversary. To answer signing queries, they are also directly forwarded to the underlying challenger or generated using the known secret keys.

Therefore it follows that \( G_{k-1} \approx G_k \) for all \( k \in [Q] \), which proves the theorem.

**B Security Analysis**

Here, we present the formal proof of the ul-PCS scheme for generic policies (Theorem 1). We prove three theorems in this supplement where each theorem covers one aspect, i.e., unforgeability, attribute-hiding, and unlinkability, respectively. Furthermore, we also argue the detectability of the schemes. For the sake of notation, we denote the unlinkable PCS scheme for generic policies \( F(x, y) \) by ULPCS. The concrete specification as pseudo-code can be found in the submission.

The proofs of Theorems 2 and 3 for separable and role-based policies, respectively, are given by describing which arguments need to be adjusted to accommodate the replacement of the PE scheme in these constructions. We describe these adjustments for unforgeability, attribute-hiding, and unlinkability right after the proofs of the generic scheme.

**B.1 Detectability**

The detect algorithm Detect behaves the same in all of the three different schemes. It takes as an input the master public key mpk, the challenge public key pk* as well as the lists \( (Q_1, \ldots, Q_c) \). It then behaves as follows: for all \( i \in [c] \), it generates the maximal amount of rerandomizations. In more detail, for all \( i \in [c] \), it executes as many rerandomizations of the keys contained in \( Q_i \) until \( Q_i \) contains \( T_{\text{Rand}} \) keys. Afterwards, it searches all the lists \( Q_i \) and if it finds an index pair \((i, i')\) for which it holds that \( Q_i[i'] = (pk^*, sk^*) \), then it adds \( i \) to its final list \( Q \). After Detect has iterated over all lists \( (Q_1, \ldots, Q_c) \), we distinguish between three cases: first, \( Q \) only contains a single \( i \), second, \( Q \) contains multiple \( i \)'s and, third, \( Q \) is empty. In the first case, Detect simply outputs the single \( i \), in the second case, Detect outputs the lower of the two indices contained in \( Q \) and, in the third case, Detect outputs ⊥. To argue the correctness of Detect, we need to analyze
the three different cases. We start by analyzing the third case. The third case can never occur because the key \( pk^* \) is generated by checking \( Q_1[j] \) and therefore the detect algorithm \( \det \) will also find this index pair. In the first case, \( \det \) behaves correct since there is only a single index pair which explains the key \( pk^* \) and this is output by \( \det \). The second case, can only occur if a key collision has happened as defined in the event \( \text{KeyColl}_A \) below, which is negligible due to the security of the PRF (see below for the argument). Therefore, it follows that the algorithm \( \det \) is correct with probability \( 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda) \), which concludes the detectability argument.

**B.2 Unforgeability**

**Theorem 5.** Let \( T_{\text{Rand}} = \text{poly}(\lambda) \). If \( \text{DS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify}) \) is an EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme, \( \text{PRF} \) a secure pseudorandom function, \( \text{NIZK}_{\lambda_1} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}) \) a knowledge sound proof system for language \( \mathcal{L}_1 \) and \( \text{NIZK}_{\lambda_2} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}) \) is a knowledge sound proof system for language \( \mathcal{L}_2 \), then \( \text{ULPCS} \) described in Figure 14 is \( T_{\text{Rand}} \) EUF-CMA secure, i.e. it holds that \( \text{Adv}_{\text{ULPCS}, A} = \text{negl}(\lambda) \).

**Proof.** Consider the random experiment \( \text{EUF-CMA}_{\text{ULPCS}}(1^\lambda, A) \) for which we define the following two events:

- **Event KeyColl\(_A\)**: The adversary \( A \) terminates and it holds that there are indices \( i, i', j, j' \) with \( i \neq j \) or \( i' \neq j' \) such that \( ((i, i'), (j, j'), \cdot, \cdot) \in QC \), where \( pk_i = (ID_j, \ldots) \).

- **Event KeyForge\(_A\)**: The adversary \( A \) terminates with output \( (pk_S, pk_R, m, \sigma) \) and there exists an entry \( (\cdot, pk_S, pk_R, m, \sigma) \in QS \cup \{(pk_S, pk_R, m, \sigma)\} \) for which the following condition holds: \( \text{Verify}(mpk, pk_S, pk_R, m, \sigma^*) = 1 \land (S = \bot \lor R = \bot) \) where \( S \leftarrow \text{Detect}(mpk, pk_S, \{QK_1, \ldots, QK_{i_{max}}\}) \) and \( R \leftarrow \text{Detect}(mpk, pk_R, \{QK_1, \ldots, QK_{i_{max}}\}) \).

We denote the winning condition of the experiment by the event \( \text{WIN}_A \) and split it into two parts:

- **Event WIN\(_{1A}\)**: The adversary generates the output \( (pk, pk^*, m^*, \sigma^*) \) for which it holds that \( \text{Verify}(mpk, pk, pk^*, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1 \land \exists \exists(i, j), (i', j'), \sigma : ((i, j), (i', j'), \cdot, \cdot) \in QC \land ((i', j'), pk, pk^*, m^*, \sigma) \notin QS \).

- **Event WIN\(_{2A}\)**: The adversary \( A \) generates the output \( (pk, pk^*, m^*, \sigma^*) \) for which it holds that \( \text{Verify}(mpk, pk, pk^*, m^*, \sigma^*) = 1 \land [(S \neq \bot) \land (R \neq \bot) \Rightarrow F(x_S, x_R) = 0] \) where \( S \leftarrow \text{Detect}(mpk, pk, \{QK_1, \ldots, QK_{i_{max}}\}) \), \( R \leftarrow \text{Detect}(mpk, pk^*, \{QK_1, \ldots, QK_{i_{max}}\}) \) and \( x_S \) and \( x_R \) denote the respective attributes.

By **Lemma 2** and **Lemma 3**, we obtain

\[
\Pr[\text{KeyForge}_A] = \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{KeyColl}_A] = \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

for adversaries \( B_1 \) and \( B_2 \) which are constructed based on \( A \) and have roughly the same efficiency as \( A \).

Finally, we obtain by **Lemma 4** and by **Lemma 5** that

\[
\Pr[\text{WIN}_{1A}] = \text{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{and} \quad \Pr[\text{WIN}_{2A} \cap \text{KeyColl}_A \cup \text{KeyForge}_A] = \text{negl}(\lambda).
\]

By definition of the events, we have

\[
\Pr[\text{WIN}_A] \leq \Pr[\text{KeyColl}_A \cup \text{KeyForge}_A] + \Pr[\text{WIN}_A \cap \text{KeyColl}_A \cup \text{KeyForge}_A] \leq \Pr[\text{KeyColl}_A] + \Pr[\text{KeyForge}_A] + \Pr[\text{WIN}_{1A} \cup \text{KeyColl}_A \cup \text{KeyForge}_A] + \Pr[\text{WIN}_{2A} \cap \text{KeyColl}_A \cup \text{KeyForge}_A].
\]
This concludes the proof of the theorem. □

Lemma 2. It holds that $\Pr[\text{KeyColl}_{A}] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Proof. To bound the probability for the occurrence of $\text{KeyColl}_{A}$, we need to bound the probability that there exist two honestly generated/rerandomized keys $pk := (ID, \ldots)$ and $pk' := (ID', \ldots)$ with $ID = ID'$. The ID of an honestly generated key is generated using a PRF evaluation as well as an attached zero-knowledge proof that proves that the resulting string is indeed an honest PRF evaluation. By relying on the soundness of the zero-knowledge proof, it is ensured that the resulting ID is indeed a valid PRF evaluation, which, by the $n$-instance/parallel composable security of the PRF, allows us to consider the ID’s in this analysis as randomly sampled. Therefore, to conclude the proof of the lemma, it suffices to bound the collision probability for randomly sampled identities.

In our setting, we have $n$ different keys that are being generated, where each of those keys can be randomized $T$ times. This means that overall $n \cdot T$ different ID’s are being sampled. The probability that all of these ID’s are different is $(1 - \frac{1}{2^T})(1 - \frac{2}{2^T}) \cdots (1 - \frac{nT - 1}{2^T}) \prod_{k=1}^n (1 - \frac{k}{2^T})$. For this probability it holds that $\prod_{k=1}^n (1 - \frac{k}{2^T}) \geq (1 - \frac{2T - 1}{2^T})^{nT - 1}$, which, in turn, can be bounded using Bernoulli’s inequality $(1 - \frac{2T - 1}{2^T})^{nT - 1} \geq 1 - (nT - 1) \cdot \frac{nT - 1}{2^T} = 1 - \frac{(nT - 1)^2}{2^T}$. Considering now the complementary event that at least one collision of ID’s occurs, then the resulting probability for this event is equal to $1 - (1 - \frac{(nT - 1)^2}{2^T}) = \frac{(nT - 1)^2}{2^T}$, which is negligible in $\lambda$. This concludes the proof of the lemma. □

Lemma 3. Let $DS = (\text{Setup, Sign, Verify})$ be an EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme and $\text{NIZK}_{L_1} = (\text{Setup, Prove, Verify})$ is a knowledge sound proof system for $L_1$, then $\Pr[\text{KeyForge}_{A}] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Proof. On a high-level, the adversary needs to prove a wrong claim which can either be done by attacking the NIZK directly, or if the NIZK is extractable, then the attacker must attack the underlying signature scheme in order to possess a valid witness.

We first make a first transition to a hybrid world $\text{EUF-CMA}^\text{ULPCS}_{\text{Hyb}}$, which is identical to $\text{EUF-CMA}^\text{ULPCS}$ except that we replace $\text{NIZK}_{L_1}, \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ by the CRS simulation algorithm $\text{Ext}_1$ associated to the NIZK scheme which also outputs the state $\text{st}_{\text{Rand}}$ for the second extraction algorithm $\text{Ext}_2$. All above defined events are still defined in this hybrid experiment. It follows directly from the knowledge soundness property of the NIZK, using a standard reduction, that

$$\Pr[\text{KeyForge}_{A}] \leq \Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{KeyForge}_{A}] + \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $\Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\cdot]$ makes explicit that this probability is taken w.r.t. experiment $\text{EUF-CMA}^\text{ULPCS}_{\text{Hyb}}$.

Now, to bound the probability of the occurrence of $\text{KeyForge}$, we need to bound three different subcases:

1. The adversary is not able to forge a signature $\sigma^1_{\text{sig}}$ or $\sigma^2_{\text{sig}}$ that would suffice as a proof for the relation $R_{L_1}$.
2. The adversary is not able to forge a signature $\sigma_{k+1}$ that would suffice as a proof for the relation $R_{L_1}$.
3. The adversary is not able to break the soundness of the underlying $\text{NIZK}_{L_1}$ to generate a valid proof without being in possession of a witness.

To bound the first case above, we now build an adversary $B$ that simulates $\text{EUF-CMA}^\text{ULPCS}_{\text{Hyb}}$ towards $A$ when interacting with the underlying $\text{EUF-CMA}^\text{ULPCS}_{\text{Hyb}}$ experiment. We show that if $A$ outputs $(pk, pk', m^*, \sigma^*)$ as defined in event $\text{KeyForge}$, then it can be used as a forgeability attack
in the EUF-CMA\textsuperscript{DS} experiment unless a certain failure event \text{Fail}_{\text{ext}} occurs in the reduction, which we then relate to the extraction advantage.

The adversary \( B \) behaves using the algorithms described in the protocol with the only difference that it does not generate the key pair \( (vk_{\text{sig}}^k, sk_{\text{sig}}^k) \) on its own but obtains it from an underlying challenger. Also the corresponding signatures \( \sigma_{\text{sig}}^1, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^2 \) and \( \sigma_{\text{sig}}^3 \), that are the outputs of key generation queries, are not generated by \( B \) directly but through signing oracle queries of \( B \) to its underlying challenger.

When \( A \) terminates with \( (pk_S^x := (ID_S^x, vk_S^x, ct_S^x, \pi_S^x), pk_R^x := (ID_R^x, vk_R^x, ct_R^x, \pi_R^x), m^*, \sigma^* := (\pi^*, \sigma^*) \), \( B_1 \) first checks whether the conditions of event KeyForge\text{\_}A holds, using the detect procedure which will output \( S' \) and \( R' \). If the conditions of KeyForge\text{\_}A do not hold, then abort. For the remainder of the proof we assume that, WLOG the condition is fulfilled w.r.t. \( S' \). The \( R' \) case follows accordingly.

If the conditions of event KeyForge\text{\_}A are fulfilled, then \( B \) calls \( (usk^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \text{Ext}_2(\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}, \text{st}_{\text{Rand}}, (T_{\text{Rand}}, ID_S^x, vk_S^x, ct_S^x, vk_{\text{sig}}^A, mpk_{\text{PE}}), (\pi_S^x)) \) and checks whether \( (x := (T_{\text{Rand}}, ID_S^x, vk_S^x, ct_S^x, \pi_S^x), w := (usk^*, \sigma^*)) \in R_{\text{ci}} \) (which is efficiently checkable). Afterwards, \( B \) parses \( usk^* := (k^*, vk_{\text{sig}}^*, sk_{\text{sig}}^*, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*,1}, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*,2}, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*,3}, x^*, sk_{\text{sig}}^*) \) and checks if \( \text{DS.\text{\_}Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}}^*, (k^*, x^*), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*,1}) = 1 \) or \( \text{DS.\text{\_}Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}}^*, (k^*, x^*), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*,2}) = 1 \) and submits the corresponding message-signature-pair that verifies, i.e. either \( (k^*, x^*), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*,1} \) or \( (k^*, x^*), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*,2} \), to its challenger if it has not been previously output by the signing oracle. Otherwise, it aborts.

Before we analyze what happens in the case that \( (x, w) \notin R_{\text{ci}} \), we need to bound the case where the adversary \( A \) outputs a forgery for the signature \( \sigma_{k+1} \). This part of the proof, i.e. the adversary \( B \) in this case, almost behaves as before, with the only difference that the adversary \( B \) randomly samples a value \( i \leftarrow [q] \), where \( q \) is the number of key generation queries asked by the adversary \( A \), receives \( vk_{\text{sig}}^i \) from the underlying challenger and uses \( vk_{\text{sig}}^i \) from the challenger to answer the \( i \)th key generation query asked by \( A \). To finish the key generation and for further rerandomization queries that are asked for the \( i \)th key, the adversary \( B \) uses the signing oracle of its underlying challenger. When \( A \) terminates with \( (pk_S^x := (ID_S^x, vk_S^x, ct_S^x, \pi_S^x), pk_R^x := (ID_R^x, vk_R^x, ct_R^x, \pi_R^x), m^*, \sigma^* := (\pi^*, \sigma^*) \), \( B_1 \) first checks whether the conditions of event KeyForge\text{\_}A holds, using the detect procedure which will output \( S' \) and \( R' \). If the conditions of KeyForge\text{\_}A do not hold, then it aborts. Also, as described above, we assume that, WLOG the condition is fulfilled w.r.t. \( S' \). The \( R' \) case follows accordingly. If the conditions of event KeyForge\text{\_}A are fulfilled, then \( B \) calls \( (usk^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \text{Ext}_2(\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}, \text{st}_{\text{Rand}}, (T_{\text{Rand}}, ID_S^x, vk_S^x, ct_S^x, vk_{\text{sig}}^A, mpk_{\text{PE}}), (\pi_S^x)) \), checks whether \( (x := (T_{\text{Rand}}, ID_S^x, vk_S^x, ct_S^x, vk_{\text{sig}}^A, mpk_{\text{PE}}), w := (usk^*, \sigma^*)) \in R_{\text{ci}} \) (which is efficiently checkable) and if \( S' \) identified by Detect corresponds to the key that has been generated as the answer to the \( i \)th query. Afterwards, \( B \) checks if \( \text{DS.\text{\_}Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}}^i, (pk_S^x || ID_S^x), \sigma^*) = 1 \) and submits the signature \( \sigma^* \), if it passes the test and has not been previously output by the signing oracle of the underlying challenger, as a forgery. Otherwise, it aborts. To conclude the analysis we argue that the above described case occurs with probability \( \frac{1}{q} \), which is exactly the probability that the adversary \( B \) guesses the index for the rerandomized key correctly.

If \( (x, w) \notin R_{\text{ci}} \) then abort with failure event \text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}. Therefore, taking into account the two reductions described above, it holds that the advantage can be reduced to the unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme with probability \( \text{Pr}_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{KeyForge}\text{\_}A \cap \text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}] \). This, in turn, results in the fact that \( \text{Pr}_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{KeyForge}\text{\_}A \cap \text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}] = \text{negl}(\lambda) + \frac{1}{q} \text{negl}(\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda) \) (after the two analysis above) and, to conclude the proof, it only remains to show that \( \text{Pr}_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}] = \text{negl}(\lambda) \).
This can be done by relying on the soundness property of the underlying \textsc{NIZK}_{L_1}, as mentioned in the second of the two cases above.

To conclude the proof, it remains to show that $\Pr[\text{Fail}_{\text{Ext}}] = \negl(\lambda)$. Also here, we assume that, WLOG the condition is fulfilled w.r.t. $S'$. The $R'$ case follows accordingly. Our adversary $B'$ for this case receives as an input the $\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}$ and executes the same instructions as $B$, with the exceptions that it generates $(vk_{\text{sig}}^A, sk_{\text{sig}}^A)$ by itself and uses it to generate the corresponding signatures by itself. Additionally, when $A$ terminates with output $(pk_S^* := (ID_S^*, vk_S^*, ct_S^*, \pi_S^*))$, $pk_R^* := (ID_R^*, vk_R^*, ct_R^*, \pi_R^*), m^*, \sigma^* := (\pi^*, \sigma'))$, $B'$ behaves as $B$ without running the extractor. Instead, it just outputs $(x := (T_{\text{Rand}}, ID_S^*, vk_S^*, ct_S^*, vk_{\text{sig}}^A, mpk_{\text{PE}}, \pi_S^*), \pi_S^*)$ in case the conditions of $\text{KeyForge}_A$ are satisfied (note that the extractor is run as part of the knowledge soundness experiment). As above, the emulation towards $A$ is perfect until the point where $B'$ would abort. This results in the claimed advantage since the event of interest is that the extractor $\text{Ext}_2$ is called precisely on the accepting proof string $\pi_S^*$ output by $A$ which produces a witness $w$ but for which $(x, w) \not\in R_{L_1}$. This concludes the proof of the lemma.

\textbf{Lemma 4.} Let $DS = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$ be an EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme, then $\Pr[\text{WIN1}_A] = \negl(\lambda)$.

\textit{Proof.} To prove this lemma, we construct an adversary $B$ that simulates EUF-CMA$_{\text{ULPCS}}$ towards $A$. We show that if $A$ outputs $(pk, pk^*, m^*, \sigma^*)$ as defined in event \text{WIN1}, then it can be used in a forgeability attack in the EUF-CMA$^\text{DS}$ experiment.

Let $q$ denote the number of queries to $\text{QRandKey}$. The adversary $B$ behaves exactly as described in the experiment, with the only difference that it randomly samples values $i \leftarrow [q], j \leftarrow [\ell]$, where $q$ denotes the number of queries to $\text{QKeyGen}$ and $\ell$ denotes the number of queries to $\text{QRandKey}$, and, to reply to the $j$'th $\text{QRandKey}$ query of the $i$'th key, it uses the key $vk$ obtained from its underlying challenger. If later a signature query is being asked for the $j$'th rerandomization of the $i$'th key, then the adversary $B$ relies on the signing oracle of its underlying challenger to generate the final signature. In case that the $i$'th key is being corrupted, the adversary $B$ aborts.

Finally, when $A$ terminates with output $(pk_S^* := (ID_S^*, vk_S^*, ct_S^*, \pi_S^*), pk_R^* := (ID_R^*, vk_R^*, ct_R^*, \pi_R^*), m^*, \sigma^* := (\pi^*, \sigma'))$ check the conditions of \text{WIN1} and check furthermore that the forgery output by $A$ corresponds to the $j$'th rerandomization of the $i$'th key. If this is not the case, $B$ aborts. If both of the conditions are satisfied, the adversary $B$ outputs $((m^*, pk_{\text{sig}}^A, \pi^*), \sigma')$ as its forgery to the underlying EUF-CMA$^\text{DS}$ experiment.

To analyze the above reduction, we need to calculate the probability with which the adversary $B$ succeeds with the advantage of $A$. This happens with probability $\frac{1}{q\ell}$, since the adversary $B$ needs to guess the correct key $i$ that is used by the adversary $A$ in the forgery, as well as the correct rerandomization $j$. Since $q\ell$ is polynomial in the security parameter, the lemma follows.

\textbf{Lemma 5.} Let $DS = (\text{Setup}, \text{Sign}, \text{Verify})$ be an EUF-CMA-secure signature scheme and $\text{NIZK}_{L_2} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ is a knowledge sound proof system for $L_2$, then $\Pr[\text{WIN2}_A \cap \text{KeyColl}_A \cup \text{KeyForge}_A] = \negl(\lambda)$.

\textit{Proof.} On a high-level, in this setting, the adversary needs to prove a wrong claim which can either be done by attacking the NIZK directly, or if the NIZK is extractable, then the attacker must attack the underlying signature scheme in order to possess a valid witness.

We first make a first transition to a hybrid world EUF-CMA$_{\text{Hyb}}^\text{ULPCS}$, which is identical to EUF-CMA$_{\text{ULPCS}}$ except that we replace $\text{NIZK}_{L_2}^\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ by the CRS simulation algorithm $\text{Ext}_1$ associated to the NIZK scheme which also outputs the state $st_{\text{Sign}}$ for the second extraction
algorithm $\text{Ext}_2$. It follows directly from the knowledge soundness property of the NIZK, using a standard reduction, that

$$
\Pr[\text{WIN}_2 \cap \text{KeyColl}_A \cup \text{KeyForge}_A] \\
\leq \Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{WIN}_2 \cap \text{KeyColl}_A \cup \text{KeyForge}_A] + \negl(\lambda),
$$

where $\Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\cdot]$ makes explicit that this probability is taken w.r.t. the experiment $\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{ULPCS}}_{\text{Hyb}}$.

Now, to bound the probability of the occurrence of $\text{KeyForge}$, we need to bound two different subcases:

1. The adversary is not able to forge a signature $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^3$ that would suffice as a proof for the relation $R_{\mathcal{L}_2}$.
2. The adversary is not able to break the soundness of the underlying NIZK$_{\mathcal{L}_2}$ to generate a valid proof without being in possession of a witness.

To bound the first case above, we build an adversary $B$ that simulates $\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{ULPCS}}_{\text{Hyb}}$ towards $A$ when interacting with the underlying $\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{DS}}$ experiment. We show that if $A$ outputs $(pk, pk^*, m^*, \sigma^*)$ as defined in event $\text{WIN}_2$, then it can be used as a forgeability attack in the $\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{DS}}$ experiment unless a certain failure event $\text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}$ occurs in the reduction, which we can then relate to the extraction advantage.

The adversary $B$ behaves using as described in the protocol with the only difference that it does not generate the key pair $(vk_{\text{sig}}, sk_{\text{sig}})$ on its own but obtains it from an underlying challenger. Also the corresponding signatures $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^1, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^2$ and $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^3$ that are the outputs of key generation queries, are not generated by $B$ directly but through signing oracle queries of $B$ to its underlying challenger.

When $A$ terminates with $(pk^*_S := (ID^*_S, vk^*_S, ct^*_S, \pi^*_S), pk^*_R := (ID^*_R, vk^*_R, ct^*_R, \pi^*_R), m^*, \sigma^* := (\pi^*, \sigma^*))$, $B_1$ first checks whether the conditions of event $\text{WIN}_2$ are fulfilled (and $\text{KeyForge}_A$ and $\text{KeyColl}_A$ did not occur), using the detect procedure which will output $S'$ and $R'$. If the conditions of $\text{WIN}_2$ are not fulfilled, then $B$ aborts.

If the conditions of event $\text{WIN}_2$, and not $\text{KeyForge}_A$ and $\text{KeyColl}_A$, are fulfilled, then $B$ calls $sk^* \leftarrow \text{Ext}_2(CRS_{\text{Sign}}, st_{\text{Sign}}, (ID^*_S, vk^*_S, ct^*_R, \pi^*_R), \pi^*)$ and checks whether $(x := (ID^*_S, ct^*_R, vk^*_S), w := sk^*) \in R_{\mathcal{L}_2}$ (this is efficiently checkable). Afterwards, $B$ parses $sk^* := (usk^*, ctr^*, sk_{\text{sig}}^{*1})$ and $usk^* := (k^*, vk_{\text{sig}}', sk_{\text{sig}}', \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*1}, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*2}, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*3}, \pi_{\text{sig}}^*, sk_{\text{sig}}'^*)$, checks if $\text{DS.Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}}', (k^*, \pi_{\text{sig}}^*), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*3}) = 1$ and submits the message-signature-pair $((k^*, sk_{\text{sig}}'^*), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^{*3})$ to its challenger if it has not been previously output by the signing oracle. Otherwise, it aborts.

If $(x, w) \notin R_{\mathcal{L}_2}$ then abort with failure event $\text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}$. Therefore, since the described reduction is perfect, it holds that the advantage can be reduced to the unforgeability of the underlying signature scheme with probability $\Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{KeyForge}_A \cap \text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}]$. This, in turn, results in the fact that $\Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{KeyForge}_A] = \Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{KeyForge}_A \cap \text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}] + \Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}] + \negl(\lambda)$.

Since a forgery for the underlying $\text{EUF-CMA}^{\text{DS}}$ experiment only occurs with negligible probability, it follows that $\Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{KeyForge}_A \cap \text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}] = \negl(\lambda)$ and, to conclude the proof, it only remains to show that $\Pr_{\text{Hyb}}[\text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}] = \negl(\lambda)$. This can be done by relying on the soundness property of the underlying NIZK$_{\mathcal{L}_2}$ as mentioned in the second of the two cases above.

Our adversary $B'$ in the case that $\text{Fail}_{\text{ext}}$ occurs receives as an input the $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ and executes the same instructions as $B$, with the exceptions that it generates $(vk_{\text{sig}}^A, sk_{\text{sig}}^A)$ by itself and can use it to generate signatures by itself. In addition, when $A$ terminates with output $(pk^*_S := (ID^*_S, vk^*_S, ct^*_S, \pi^*_S), pk^*_R := (ID^*_R, vk^*_R, ct^*_R, \pi^*_R), m^*, \sigma^* := (\pi^*, \sigma^*))$, $B'$ behaves as $B$ but does not execute the final steps running the extractor, but instead just outputs $(x := (ID^*_S, ct^*_R, vk_{\text{sig}}^A), \pi^*)$ in the case the conditions of $\text{WIN}_2$, and not $\text{KeyForge}_A$ and $\text{KeyColl}_A$, are satisfied (note that the
extractor is run as part of the knowledge soundness experiment). As above, the emulation towards \( A \) is perfect until the point where \( B' \) would abort. This results in the claimed advantage since the event of interest is that the extractor \( \text{Ext}_2 \) is called precisely on the accepting proof string \( \pi^* \) output by \( A \) which produces a witness \( w \) such that \( (x, w) \notin R_{\mathcal{L}_2} \). This concludes the proof of the lemma.

### Analysis in the case of Separable & RBAC Policies

**Separable Policies.** The security proofs for the scheme covering separable policies proceeds exactly in the same way as the proof described above, i.e. in the proof of Lemmas 3 and 5, where the occurrence of exactly the same subevents are being bounded. The reason is that we still have the same components, signatures and encryptions, but thanks to the pre-computation of \( S(x) \) and \( R(x) \) we can mimic the PE part of the generic scheme accurately and securely.

**RBAC Policies.** The proof for the scheme covering RBAC policies has a few differences when bounding the event \( \text{KeyForge}_A \) (Lemma 3). Instead of bounding the unforgeability of the signatures \( \sigma_1^1 \) and \( \sigma_2^1 \) for the PE-based scheme, in the RBAC scheme it is necessary to bound the unforgeability of \( \sigma_1^2 \) and invoke the unforgeability of the SEQ scheme to make sure that none of the parties can obtain a different role (akin to re-encryptions of attributes of the generic scheme). This was previously captured within the NIZK, and now, thanks to SEQ, can be verified outside the NIZK. To argue unforgeability now, we first rely on the secure adaptation property of SEQ to argue that the signature generated using \( \text{ChgRep}_R \) is indistinguishable from a signature generated using \( \text{Sign} \). Afterwards, we can conclude the proof by relying on the unforgeability of the SEQ scheme and the fact that with overwhelming probability, every party is its own equivalence class, which stems from the fact that for each party, the first component of the vector \( \vec{M} \) is a randomly sampled group element. For the proof of event \( \text{WIN}_2 \) (Lemma 5), we also need to rely on the weak soundness property of the accumulator to argue that an adversary cannot forge a signature by forging a valid accumulator. To rely on the accumulator soundness, we observe that a party cannot claim to own different roles than the ones it got issued (akin to the signature on the attribute \( x \) in the generic scheme).

### B.3 Attribute Hiding

In this section, we prove the attribute hiding of our scheme.

**Theorem 6.** Let \( T_{\text{Rand}} = \text{poly}(\lambda) \). If \( \text{PE} = (\text{PE.Setup}, \text{PE.KeyGen}, \text{PE.Enc}, \text{PE.Dec}) \) is a predicate encryption scheme, \( \text{NIZK}_{\mathcal{L}_1} = (\text{NIZK.Setup}, \text{NIZK.Prove}, \text{NIZK.Verify}) \) is a NIZK proof system for language \( \mathcal{L}_1 \), \( \text{NIZK}_{\mathcal{L}_2} = (\text{NIZK.Setup}, \text{NIZK.Prove}, \text{NIZK.Verify}) \) is a NIZK proof system for language \( \mathcal{L}_2 \) and \( \text{DS} = (\text{DS.Setup}, \text{DS.Sign}, \text{DS.Verify}) \) an unforgeable signature scheme, then the construction \( \text{ULPCS} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}) \), defined in Figures 12 and 13, is attribute hiding. Namely, for any valid PPT adversary \( A \), it holds that \( \text{Adv}^{\text{AH}}_{\text{ULPCS},.A}(\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda) \).

**Proof.** To prove this statement, we use a hybrid argument where the games are defined as follows:

**Game \( G_0 \):** This game is defined as \( \text{AH}^{\text{ULPCS}}_0(1^\lambda, A) \).

**Game \( G_1 \):** In this game, we change the behavior of the sign oracle \( \text{QSign} \) and define a modified sign oracle \( \text{QSign}' \). The oracle \( \text{QSign}' \) is defined as \( \text{QSign} \) with the difference that it only answers queries for receiver keys that have been honestly generated (keys that have been output by the key generation oracle \( \text{QKeyGenLR}_0 \) or are an honest rerandomization of these
keys, which can be determined using the Detect procedure), for a query $(i, pk', m)$ with $(i', \ldots, i') \notin QK$ or $(j', \ldots, j') \notin QK$, where $j \leftarrow \text{Detect}(mpk, pk', QK)$ the sign oracle $QSign'$ outputs ⊥. The transition from $G_0$ to $G_1$ is justified by the bounds on the key forgery event as described in the proof of Theorem 5. We show this transition more formally in Lemma 6.

**Game $G_2$:** In this game, we change from an honestly generated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}$ and honestly generated proofs to a simulated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}$ and simulated proofs. That is, for the randomization of challenge keys that can never be corrupted, i.e. for the challenge query $(x_0, x_1)$ it holds that $x_0 \neq x_1$, the proof in the randomization for $R_{\ell_1}$ is simulated and therefore does not require the attributes used in the witness. Furthermore, we also remove the signatures $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^1$ and $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^2$ from the scheme in this transition. The transition from $G_1$ to $G_2$ is justified by the zero-knowledge property of $\text{NIZK}_{\ell_1}$. We show this transition more formally in Lemma 7.

**Game $G_3$:** In this game, we change from an honestly generated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ and honestly generated proofs to a simulated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ and simulated proofs. That is, upon a signing query we check, from the transcript of the generated keys and using the detect function, if the requested key pair in the signing query fulfills the policy. If this is the case, the proof $\pi_s$ is simulated using $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$. Here, we furthermore also remove the key $sk_{f_\ell}$ as well as the signature $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^3$ from the key generation procedure. As in the previous transition, this also only happens for explicitly honest keys, i.e. keys where $x_0 \neq x_1$. The transition from $G_2$ to $G_3$ is justified by the zero-knowledge property of $\text{NIZK}_{\ell_2}$. We show this transition more formally in Lemma 8.

**Game $G_4$:** In this game, we change the attributes used in the rerandomization for the explicitly honest challenge keys from $x_0$ to $x_1$ for all $i$ by changing the encryption that is being generated in the randomization procedure. The transition from $G_3$ to $G_4$ is justified by the attribute-hiding property of $\text{PE}$. We show this transition more formally in Lemma 9.

**Game $G_5$:** In this game, we change back from a simulated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ and simulated proofs to an honestly generated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ and honestly generated proofs. Here, we also reintroduce the signature $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^3$ but this time w.r.t. the challenge messages $x_1$. Similar to the transition from $G_2$ to $G_3$, this transition is justified by the zero-knowledge property of $\text{NIZK}_{\ell_2}$.

**Game $G_6$:** In this game, we change back from a simulated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ and simulated proofs to an honestly generated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ and honestly generated proofs. Here, we also reintroduce the signatures $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^1$ and $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^2$ but this time w.r.t. the challenge messages $x_1$. Similar to the transition from $G_1$ to $G_2$, this transition is justified by the zero-knowledge property of $\text{NIZK}_{\ell_1}$.

**Game $G_7$:** This game is the $\text{AH}_{\text{ULPCS}}^1(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A})$ game. In this game, we change the behavior of the signing oracle back from $QSign'$ to $QSign$. Similar to the transition from $G_0$ to $G_1$, this transition is justified by the event $\text{KeyForge}_A$.

From the definition of the games it is clear that

$$\text{AH}_{\text{ULPCS}}^1 = G_0 \approx G_1 \approx \cdots \approx G_7 = \text{AH}_{\text{ULPCS}}^1$$

and hence the theorem follows.

**Lemma 6 (Transition from $G_0$ to $G_1$).** The games $G_0$ and $G_1$ are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof (Sketch).** As described above, the difference between the games $G_0$ and $G_1$ is that in the game $G_0$ the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has access to the sign oracle $QSign$ and in the game $G_1$ the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has access to the sign oracle $QSign'$, which we informally described above and which is formally defined as:

$QSign'(i, pk', m)$: On input a (sender) index $i$, a (receiver) public key $pk'$, and a message $m$, if $QK$ contains an entry $(i, pk, sk, x_0, x_1) \in QK$ and an entry $(j, pk', sk', x'_0, x'_1) \in QK$ with $j \leftarrow$
NIZK DS Proof of Theorem 5, and which can be defined and analyzed analogously here. This results in the fact that \( \text{Pr}[\text{SignForge}(\text{Lemma 8 (Transition from } G_0 \text{ to } G_1 \text{)})] \) is negligible. We denote this as the event \( \text{SignForge}_A \).

For the event \( \text{SignForge}_A \) to occur, the adversary \( A \) needs to generate a receiver key that has a valid zero-knowledge proof \( \pi \), or where the underlying witness is forged, a valid signature \( \sigma_{\text{sig}} \) and the signature scheme \( \text{DS} \), i.e., it needs to generate a key \( \text{pk}' := (\text{ID}', \text{vk}', c', \pi) \) such that \( \text{NIZK}_\text{sign}, \text{Verify}(\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}, (\text{ID}', \text{vk}', c', \text{vk}_A^{\text{sig}}), \pi) = 1 \) where \( \pi \) is generated using \( \text{usk}' := (k, \text{vk}_\text{sig}, \text{sk}_\text{sig}, \text{sk}_\text{PE}, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^1, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^2, x) \) and it must holds that \( \text{DS}\cdot\text{Verify}(\text{vk}_A^{\text{sig}}, (k, x), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^1) = 1 \) and \( \text{DS}\cdot\text{Verify}(\text{vk}_A^{\text{sig}}, (k, \text{vk}_\text{sig}), \sigma_{\text{sig}}^2) = 1 \). This means that adversary \( A \) must either break the soundness of \( \text{NIZK} \) or generate a key forgery for \( \text{DS} \) as captured by the event \( \text{KeyForge}_A \) in the proof of Theorem 5, and which can be defined and analyzed analogously here.

Therefore, the event \( \text{SignForge}_A \) is bounded by \( \text{KeyForge}_A \), i.e., \( \Pr[\text{SignForge}_A] \leq \Pr[\text{KeyForge}_A] \), and the analysis of event \( \text{KeyForge}_A \) follows the same reasoning as in Lemma 3. This results in the fact that \( \Pr[\text{SignForge}_A] = \text{negl}(\lambda) \), which proves the lemma.

**Lemma 7 (Transition from \( G_0 \) to \( G_2 \)).** The games \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof.** We build an adversary \( B \) that simulates \( G_{1+\beta} \) towards \( A \) when interacting with the underlying \( \text{ZK}^{\text{NIZK}}_A \) experiment.

The adversary \( B \) behaves in the same way as described in \( G_1 \) with the difference that it does not generate \( \text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}} \) by itself but receives it from the underlying challenger. Additionally, whenever the adversary \( A \) asks a rerandomization query to \( \text{QRandKey} \) for a key that cannot be corrupted, i.e., where the key generation query is for \( x_0 \neq x_1 \), the adversary \( B \) behaves as described in the protocol but uses the proof oracle of the challenger for the generation of the proof \( \pi_{k+1} \). Furthermore, the signature \( \sigma_{\text{sig}}^1 \) and \( \sigma_{\text{sig}}^2 \) are not generated.

Finally, the adversary \( B \) outputs the same bit \( \beta' \) returned by \( A \).

To conclude the proof, we argue that our emulation is perfect. The fact that the simulation is perfect follows since \( B \) generates all components of the statement for which the proof oracle is queried honestly.

In the case that the challenger outputs an honestly generated \( \text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}} \) and honestly generated proofs, the adversary \( B \) is simulating the game \( G_1 \) and in the case that the challenger simulates the \( \text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}} \) and the proofs, the adversary \( B \) is simulating the game \( G_2 \).

This concludes the simulation of the game \( G_{1+\beta} \) and the lemma follows. □

**Lemma 8 (Transition from \( G_2 \) to \( G_3 \)).** The games \( G_2 \) and \( G_3 \) are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof.** We build an adversary \( B \) that simulates \( G_{2+\beta} \) towards \( A \) when interacting with the underlying \( \text{ZK}^{\text{NIZK}}_A \) experiment.
The adversary $B$ behaves in the same way as described in $G_2$ with the difference that it does not generate $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$, by itself but receives it from the underlying challenger. Additionally, whenever the adversary $A$ asks a signing query $(i, \text{pk}', m)$ to $\text{QSign}'$, the adversary $B$ computes $j \leftarrow \text{Detect}(\text{mpk}, \text{pk}', \text{QK})$ and checks that $F(x_0, y_0) = 1$ where $(i, \cdot, x_0, x_1) \in \text{QK}$ and $(j, \cdot, y_0, y_1) \in \text{QK}$. If the check succeeds, then $B$ queries its underlying proof oracle to obtain $\pi_s$ and finishes the signature generation. Furthermore, for all keys that cannot be corrupted, i.e. where the key generation query is for $x_0 \neq x_1$, the signature $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^3$ is not generated and the key $\text{sk}_{f_x}$ is not generated. This makes the secret key completely independent of the attributes $x_0/x_1$.

Finally, the adversary $B$ outputs the same bit $\beta'$ returned by $A$.

To conclude the proof, we argue that our emulation is perfect. The fact that the simulation is perfect follows since $B$ only submits proof queries to the underlying challenger for which the statement fulfills the relation $R_L$, which $B$ checks as described above as well as from the perfect correctness of the predicate encryption scheme. In more detail, by the perfect correctness of the predicate encryption scheme, we know that the challenger always replies, i.e., we have that $\text{PE} \cdot \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_{f_x}, \text{ct}) = F(x, y)$. Therefore, whenever a proof is simulated this matches the correct generation of a proof $\pi_s$.

In the case that the challenger outputs an honestly generated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ and honestly generated proofs, the adversary $B$ is simulating the game $G_2$ and in the case that the challenger simulates the $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ and the proofs, the adversary $B$ is simulating the game $G_3$.

This concludes the simulation of the game $G_{2+\beta}$ and the lemma follows. □

**Lemma 9 (Transition from $G_3$ to $G_4$).** The games $G_3$ and $G_4$ are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof.** We build an adversary $B$ that simulates $G_{3+\beta}$ towards $A$ when interacting with the underlying $\text{AH}_{\beta}^{\text{PE}}$ experiment.

The adversary $B$ behaves in the same way as described in $G_3$ with the difference that whenever the adversary $A$ asks a key generation query for a key that can be corrupted, i.e. $x := x_0 = x_1$, the adversary $B$ asks its underlying key generation oracle using $x$ to obtain $\text{sk}_{f_x}$.

Additionally, when $A$ asks a rerandomization query to $\text{QRandKey}$ for a key that cannot be corrupted, i.e. where the key generation query is for $x_0 \neq x_1$, the adversary $B$ behaves as described in the protocol but uses its underlying left-or-right oracle for the generation of the ciphertext, i.e. for every rerandomization query for a key $i$, $B$ retrieves $(i, \cdot, x_0, x_1) \in \text{QK}$ and submits $(x_0, x_1)$ to its underlying challenger to obtain $\text{ct}$ which it uses for the rerandomization.

Furthermore, for every sign query $(j, \text{pk}_R, m)$ to $\text{QSign}'$ asked by $A$, $B$ computes $j \leftarrow \text{Detect}(\text{mpk}, \text{pk}', \text{QK})$ checks the list $\text{QK}$ to find $(i, \cdot, x_0, x_1)$ and $(j, \cdot, y_0, y_1)$. If no such entries exists, $B$ outputs $\bot$. Otherwise, $B$ checks that the attributes associated with the public keys $\text{pk}_B$ and $\text{pk}_R$ fulfill the policy, i.e. it checks that $F(x_0^0, y_0^0) = 1$ and $F(x^1, y^1) = 1$, and if this is the case the simulator outputs the signature.

Finally, the adversary $B$ outputs the same bit $\beta'$ returned by $A$.

In the next step, we need to argue that the adversary $B$ is a valid adversary with respect to the $\text{AH}_{\beta}^{\text{PE}}$ experiment if the adversary $A$ fulfills all the checks described above, i.e. is a valid adversary in the $G_{3+\beta}^{\text{AH}_{\beta}^{\text{ULPCS}}}$ game. One of the validity requirements above (and in the attribute hiding game) that $A$ needs to fulfill is that for every $x$ where $x := x_0 = x_1$ with $(\cdot, \cdot, x_0, x_1) \in \text{QS}$ it needs to hold that $F(x, x_0) = F(x, x_1)$ for all the challenge queries $(x_0, x_1)$. This results in the fact that $f_\beta(x_0) = f_\beta(x_1)$ for all $(\cdot, \cdot, x, x) \in \text{QC}$ and for all challenge queries $(x_0, x_1)$. This matches exactly the validity requirements asked for $B_2$ in the $\text{AH}_{\beta}^{\text{PE}}$ experiment. Therefore, it follows that the adversary $B_2$ is a valid adversary with respect to the $\text{AH}_{\beta}^{\text{PE}}$ experiment and does not abort if the adversary $A$ is a valid adversary in the game $G_{2+\beta}^{\text{AH}_{\beta}^{\text{ULPCS}}}$.  

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To conclude the proof, we observe that the difference in the two games is the generation of the challenge rerandomization keys, which either consists of a ciphertext encrypting the attribute set \( x_0 \) or the attribute set \( x_1 \). The computation of the ciphertexts is done by the underlying challenger of the attribute-hiding game. Together with the analysis above, it follows that, for a valid adversary \( A \), the game \( G_{3+\beta} \) is simulated towards \( A \) when the challenger encrypts the attribute set \( x_\beta \) for \( \beta \in \{0,1\} \).

This concludes the simulation of the game \( G_{3+\beta} \) and the lemma follows.

Analysis in the case of Separable & RBAC Policies

Separable Policies. The security proof for the scheme covering separable policies proceeds in almost the same way as the proof for general policies. The only difference is the transition from \( G_3 \) to \( G_4 \) (Lemma 9), where in the proof for separable policies we need to rely on the IND-CPA security of the underlying public-key encryption scheme \( PKE \) instead of the attribute-hiding security of a \( PKE \) scheme.

RBAC Policies. For the security proof of the scheme covering RBAC policies, we also need to adjust the transition from game \( G_3 \) to \( G_4 \) (Lemma 9). In this case, we need to rely on the class-hiding property as well as the secure adaptation property. In more detail, the class-hiding property guarantees that a switch from attributes \( x_0 \) to \( x_1 \) (in the case of outsider attribute-hiding or in the case of the equality policy) is possible and the secure adaptation property of SEQ ensures that the ChgRep algorithm is as good as re-generating \( \vec{M} \), which fulfills the same purpose as the re-encryption for the schemes covering general and separable policies.

B.4 Unlinkability

This section covers the unlinkability proof of our schemes.

**Theorem 7.** Let \( T_{Rand} = \text{poly}(\lambda) \). If \( \text{PRF} \) is a pseudorandom function, \( \text{NIZK}_{L_1} = (\text{NIZK}.\text{Setup}, \text{NIZK}.\text{Prove}, \text{NIZK}.\text{Verify}) \) a NIZK proof system for \( L_1 \), \( \text{NIZK}_{L_1} = (\text{NIZK}.\text{Setup}, \text{NIZK}.\text{Prove}, \text{NIZK}.\text{Verify}) \) a NIZK proof system for \( L_1 \) and \( \text{DS} = (\text{DS}.\text{Setup}, \text{DS}.\text{Sign}, \text{DS}.\text{Verify}) \) an unforgeable signature scheme, then the construction ULPCS = (Setup, KeyGen, Enc, Dec), defined in Figures 12 and 13, is unlinkable. Namely, for any valid PPT adversary \( A \), it holds that \( \text{Adv}^{\text{Link}}_{\text{ULPCS},A}(\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda) \).

**Proof.** To prove this statement, we use a hybrid argument where the games are defined as follows:

**Game \( G_0 \):** This game is the same as the experiment \( \text{Link}^{\text{ULPCS}}_0(1^\lambda, A) \).

**Game \( G_1 \):** In this game, we change the behavior of the key generation oracle \( \text{QKeyGen} \) and define a modified key generation oracle \( \text{QKeyGen}' \). The oracle \( \text{QKeyGen}' \) is defined as \( \text{QKeyGen} \) with the difference that it does not output a key collision, i.e. it does not output the same public key twice, and therefore does also not output the same public key as the challenge key. More formally, if for a query \( x' \), the output is \( \text{pk}' := (ID', \ldots) \) where \( \text{QK} \) already contains \( (\ldots, \text{pk}^* := (ID', \ldots), \ldots) \) with \( \text{ID}' = \text{ID}^* \) or \( \text{ID}' = \text{ID}' \) with \( \text{pk} := (ID, \ldots) \) being the challenge public key, then the key-generation oracle \( \text{QKeyGen}' \) outputts \( \bot \), otherwise it returns \( \text{pk}' \). The transition from \( G_0 \) to \( G_1 \) is justified by the bounds on the key collision event as described in the proof of Theorem 5. We show this transition more formally in Lemma 10.
Game $G_2$: In this game, we change the behavior of the sign oracle $QSign$ and define a modified sign oracle $QSign'$. As in the proof of Theorem 6, the oracle $QSign'$ is defined as $QSign$ with the difference that it only answers queries for receiver keys that it can detect to have come out of the key-gen oracle. For further details on $QSign'$, we refer to the proof of Theorem 6. The transition from $G_1$ to $G_2$ is justified by the bounds on the key forgery event as described in the proof of Theorem 5 and because the detect property is fulfilled by the scheme. This transition has been shown in Lemma 6.

Game $G_3$: In this game, we change from an honestly generated $CRS_{Rand}$ and honestly generated proofs w.r.t. rerandomizations of the challenge public key $pk$ to a simulated $CRS_{Rand}$ and simulated proofs for the rerandomizations of $pk$. Due to the fact that the proofs for the rerandomizations are now simulated, the PRF key $k$ is not needed as part of the witness anymore. The transition from $G_2$ to $G_3$ is justified by the zero-knowledge property of $NIZK_{L_1}$. We show this transition more formally in Lemma 11.

Game $G_4$: In this game, we change from an honestly generated $CRS_{Sign}$ and honestly generated proofs for signing queries w.r.t. the challenge public key $pk$ acting as the sender to a simulated $CRS_{Sign}$ and simulated proofs. That is, upon a signing query for $pk$, acting as the sender, we check, from the transcript of the generated keys and using the detect function, if the requested key pair in the signing query fulfills the policy. If this is the case, the proof $\pi_s$ is simulated using $CRS_{Sign}$. Since the proof $\pi_s$ is now simulated, the PRF key $k$ is not needed as part of the witness anymore. The transition from $G_3$ to $G_4$ is justified by the zero-knowledge property of $NIZK_{L_2}$. We show this transition more formally in Lemma 12.

Game $G_5$: In this game, we change from PRF evaluations for the updated ID’s in the rerandomization of the challenge key $pk$ to randomly sampled ID’s. The transition from $G_4$ to $G_5$ is justified by the security of the PRF. We show this transition more formally in Lemma 13.

Game $G_6$: In this game, we change from randomly sampled updated ID’s in the rerandomization of the challenge key $pk$ to PRF evaluations w.r.t. different keys. In more detail, whenever a new rerandomization for the challenge key $pk$ is generated a new PRF key $k_i$ is sampled and the ID is generated by evaluation PRF using $k_i$ on 0. The transition from $G_5$ to $G_6$ is justified by relying on the security of the PRF $q$-times where $q$ is the number of rerandomization queries. Since it holds that $q < T_{Rand}$, we can upper bound it by relying on the security of the PRF $T_{Rand}$ times. We show this transition more formally in Lemma 14.

Game $G_7$: In this game, we change back from a simulated $CRS_{Sign}$ and simulated proofs to an honestly generated $CRS_{Sign}$ and honestly generated proofs. Here, we also reintroduce the usage of the PRF key $k$, which is different for every rerandomization, into the generation of the proof. Similar to the transition from $G_3$ to $G_4$, this transition is justified by the zero-knowledge property of $NIZK_{L_2}$.

Game $G_8$: In this game, we change back from a simulated $CRS_{Sign}$ and simulated proofs to an honestly generated $CRS_{Sign}$ and honestly generated proofs. Here, we also reintroduce the usage of the PRF key $k$, which is different for every ID, into the generation of the proof. Similar to the transition from $G_2$ to $G_3$, this transition is justified by the zero-knowledge property of $NIZK_{L_1}$.

Game $G_9$: In this game, we change the behavior of the signing oracle back from $QSign'$ to $QSign$. Similar to the transition from $G_1$ to $G_2$, this transition is justified by the event $KeyForge_{A}$.

Game $G_{10}$: This game is the $\text{Link}^\text{ULPCS}_{1}(A, A)$ game. In this game, we change the behavior of the key generation oracle back from $QKeyGen'$ to $QKeyGen$. Similar to the transition from $G_0$ to $G_1$, this transition is justified by the event $KeyColl_{A}$.

From the definition of the games it is clear that
\[
\text{Link}^\text{ULPCS}_0 = G_0 \approx G_1 \approx \cdots \approx G_{10} = \text{Link}^\text{ULPCS}_1
\]
and hence the theorem follows.

**Lemma 10 (Transition from $G_0$ to $G_1$).** The games $G_0$ and $G_1$ are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof (Sketch).** As described above, the difference between the games $G_0$ and $G_1$ is that in the game $G_0$ the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has access to the key generation oracle $\text{QKeyGen}$ and in the game $G_1$ the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ has access to the key generation oracle $\text{QKeyGen}'$, which we informally described above and which is formally defined as:

$\text{QKeyGen}'(x')$: On input an attribute set $x'$, generate $\text{pk}' := (\text{ID}', \ldots)$ and if $\text{QC}$ already contains an entry $(\ldots, \text{pk}^* := (\text{ID}^*, \ldots), \ldots)$ with $\text{ID}' = \text{ID}^*$ or if $\text{ID}' = \text{ID}$ where $\text{pk} := (\text{ID}, \ldots)$ is the challenge public key, then output $\bot$. Otherwise, return $\text{pk}'$.

Compared to the oracle $\text{QKeyGen}'$, the key generation oracle $\text{QKeyGen}$ does not require a generated public key to be entirely new, i.e. $(\ldots, \text{pk}^* := (\text{ID}^*, \ldots), \ldots) \notin \text{QC}$ with $\text{ID} \neq \text{ID}^*$ and $\text{ID}' \neq \text{ID}$ where $\text{pk} := (\text{ID}, \ldots)$ is the challenge public key. To show that the games $G_0$ and $G_1$ are indistinguishable, it suffices to show that the probability that two honestly generated IDs do not collide is negligible. This directly matches the description of the event $\text{KeyColl}_\mathcal{A}$ defined in the proof of Theorem 5 and, since the it holds that $\Pr[\text{KeyColl}_\mathcal{A}] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$, the lemma follows.

**Lemma 11 (Transition from $G_2$ to $G_3$).** The games $G_2$ and $G_3$ are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof.** This proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 7.

We build an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that simulates $G_{2+\beta}$ towards $\mathcal{A}$ when interacting with the underlying $\text{ZK}_{\beta}^{\text{NIZK}}$ experiment.

The adversary $\mathcal{B}$ behaves in the same way as described in $G_2$ with the difference that it does not generate $\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}$ by itself but receives it from the underlying challenger. Additionally, whenever the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ asks a rerandomization query to $\text{QRandKey}$ for the challenge public key $\text{pk}$, or a rerandomization of it, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ behaves as described in the protocol but uses the proof oracle of the challenger for the generation of the proof $\pi_{k+1}$. Furthermore, the PRF key $k$ is not used as a witness for the proof generation anymore.

Finally, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the same bit $\beta'$ returned by $\mathcal{A}$.

To conclude the proof, we argue that our emulation is perfect. The fact that the simulation is perfect follows since $\mathcal{B}$ generates all components of the statement for which the proof oracle is queried honestly.

In the case that the challenger outputs an honestly generated $\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}$ and honestly generated proofs, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ is simulating the game $G_2$ and in the case that the challenger simulates the $\text{CRS}_{\text{Rand}}$ and the proofs, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ is simulating the game $G_3$.

This covers the simulation of the game $G_{2+\beta}$ and leads to the advantage mentioned in the lemma.

**Lemma 12 (Transition from $G_3$ to $G_4$).** The games $G_3$ and $G_4$ are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof.** This proof is very similar to the proof of Lemma 8.

We build an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that simulates $G_{3+\beta}$ towards $\mathcal{A}$ when interacting with the underlying $\text{ZK}_{\beta}^{\text{NIZK}}$ experiment.

The adversary $\mathcal{B}$ behaves in the same way as described in $G_3$ with the difference that it does not generate $\text{CRS}_{\text{Sign}}$ by itself but receives it from the underlying challenger. Additionally, whenever the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ asks a signing query $(\text{pk}', m)$ to $\text{QSign}'$, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ computes
$j \leftarrow \text{Detect}(\text{mpk}, \text{pk}', \mathcal{Q}_\text{K})$ and checks that $F(x, y) = 1$ where $x$ is the challenge attribute and $(j, \ldots, y) \in \mathcal{Q}_\text{K}$. If the check succeeds, then $\mathcal{B}$ queries its underlying proof oracle to obtain $\pi_s$ and finishes the signature generation. Furthermore, the PRF key $k$ is not needed for the generation of the proof $\pi_s$.

Finally, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the same bit $\beta'$ returned by $\mathcal{A}$.

To conclude the proof, we argue that our emulation is perfect. The fact that the simulation is perfect follows since $\mathcal{B}$ only submits proof queries to the underlying challenger for which the statement fulfills the relation $R_{\mathcal{L}_2}$, which $\mathcal{B}$ checks as described above as well as from the perfect correctness of the predicate encryption scheme. In more detail, by the perfect correctness of the predicate encryption scheme, we know that the challenger always replies, i.e., we have that $\text{PE.Dec}(sk_f, ct_R) = F(x, y)$. Therefore, whenever a proof is simulated this matches the correct generation of a proof $\pi_s$.

In the case that the challenger outputs an honestly generated $\text{CRS}_\text{Sign}$ and honestly generated proofs, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ is simulating the game $G_3$ and in the case that the challenger simulates the $\text{CRS}_\text{Sign}$ and the proofs, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ is simulating the game $G_4$.

This covers the simulation of the game $G_{3+}\beta$ and leads to the advantage mentioned in the lemma. \qed

**Lemma 13 (Transition from $G_4$ to $G_5$).** The games $G_4$ and $G_5$ are computationally indistinguishable.

*Proof.* We build an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that simulates $G_{4+}\beta$ towards $\mathcal{A}$ when interacting with the underlying security experiment for PRF.

The adversary $\mathcal{B}$ behaves in the same way as described in $G_4$ with the difference that whenever the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ asks the challenge key generation query or a rerandomization query, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ submits the corresponding index, i.e. $i := 0$ for a key generation query and $i := i + 1$ for a rerandomization query, to the underlying PRF challenger and receives as a reply the ID that it uses to answer the queries.

Finally, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the same bit $\beta'$ returned by $\mathcal{A}$.

To conclude the proof, we observe that the difference in the two games is the generation of the ID’s, which is either PRF evaluation, in which case the simulation corresponds to game $G_4$, or a random value, in which case the simulation corresponds to game $G_5$.

This concludes the simulation of the game $G_{4+}\beta$ and the lemma follows. \qed

**Lemma 14 (Transition from $G_5$ to $G_6$).** The games $G_5$ and $G_6$ are computationally indistinguishable.

*Proof.* We build an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that simulates $G_{5+}\beta$ towards $\mathcal{A}$ when interacting with $T$ instances\(^6\) of the security experiment for PRF.

The adversary $\mathcal{B}$ behaves in the same way as described in $G_5$ with the difference that whenever the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ asks the challenge key generation query or a rerandomization query, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ submits the 0 query to the $i$’th PRF instance. In more detail, for the challenge key generation query, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ queries the first instance of the PRF experiment on 0 to obtain the ID, for the first rerandomization query, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ queries the second instance of the PRF experiment on 0 to obtain the ID and so on.

Finally, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the same bit $\beta'$ returned by $\mathcal{A}$.

To conclude the proof, we observe that the difference in the two games is the generation of the ID’s, which is either a random value, in which case the simulation corresponds to game $G_4$, or a fresh PRF evaluation on zero, in which case the simulation corresponds to game $G_5$.

This concludes the simulation of the game $G_{4+}\beta$ and the lemma follows. \qed

\(^6\) where $T$ instances means multiple PRF experiments that either all output random values or all PRF evaluations on a fresh key.
Analysis in the case of Separable & RBAC Policies

Separable Policies. The security proof for the scheme covering separable policies proceeds in the same way as the proof for general policies. In both of these cases, general policies and separable policies, it is not necessary to rely on any of the properties of the predicate encryption scheme or the public-key encryption scheme since, in both cases, rerandomization and key generation, a fresh ciphertext is being generated. Therefore no indistinguishability needs to be argued.

RBAC Policies. In the RBAC case, there is a difference between the rerandomization and the key generation w.r.t. the \( \text{SEQ} \) scheme. In the case of a fresh key generation, a signature is generated on which \( \text{ChgRep}_R \) is applied once. In the case of an actual rerandomization, the \( \text{ChgRep}_R \) is applied multiple times on a single signature. To argue that these two cases are indistinguishable, we need to rely on the secure adaptation property of \( \text{SEQ} \) which can be understood as an additional game transition between \( G_5 \) and \( G_6 \) (Lemma 14).

C Details on the Instantiations

C.1 Cryptographic Algorithms

Given the formal definitions from Section 2, this section provides a detailed overview on the underlying cryptographic tools that we implement to realize ul-PCS.

**Dodis-Yampolskiy PRF.** This PRF is defined over a cyclic group \( G \) of prime order \( p \) with generator \( G \) and can be described as follows:

- \( \text{PRF.Eval}(k, x) \): It takes a key \( k \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) and input \( x \) as inputs. It then computes \( y = G^{1/(k+x)} \) and returns \( y \) as output.

In this scheme, pseudo-randomness is achieved through decisional Diffie-Hellman inversion assumption, which only holds for small domains, i.e. input \( x \) should be super-logarithmic in the security parameters.

**BLS Signatures.** For a given assymetric bilinear pairing group \((G_1, G_2, G_T, e, G_1, G_2)\) and a hash-to-curve function \( H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow G_2 \), as denoted by public parameters \( pp \), we recall the BLS signatures [15] as follows:

- **DS.Setup(1^\lambda)**: Take \( pp \) as input. Sample \( x \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^* \). Return \((sk, vk) = (x, G_1)\).

- **DS.Sign(sk, m)**: Take secret key \( sk \) and message \( m \in \{0,1\}^* \) as inputs. Return \( \sigma := H(m)^sk \) as output.

- **DS.Verify(vk, \sigma, m)**: Take the verification key \( vk \), a signature \( \sigma \) and message \( m \) as inputs. If the equation \( e(G_1, \sigma) = e(vk, H(m)) \) holds, return 1 and 0 otherwise.

**FHS SPS-EQ.** We recall the SPS-EQ construction proposed by Fuchsbauer et al. in [35] as follows:

- **SEQ.Setup(1^\lambda)**: Run \( \text{BG} \leftarrow \text{BG}(1^\lambda) \) and return \( pp := \text{BG} \) as output.

- **SEQ.KeyGen_R(pp, \ell)**: Take \( pp \) and vector size \( \ell > 1 \) as inputs. Sample the secret key \( sk \) as a set of random integers \( sk := \{x_i\}_{i \in [1,\ell]} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} (\mathbb{Z}_p^*)^\ell \). Compute \( \hat{X}_i := G_1^{x_i} \). Return \((sk, vk) \) as output.
Consider pairing group of the form \((G, e, p, e, G_1, G_2)\), like Type-III bilinear groups, the ElGamal encryption \([29]\) can be formalized as follows:

- **ElGamal Encryption.** Consider a group description \((G, G, p)\), the ElGamal encryption \([29]\) can be formalized as follows:

  - **PKE.Setup(1\(^\lambda\)):** It takes security parameter \(\lambda\) as input and then samples random integer \(sk \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\ast\) and computes \(pk = G^{sk}\). It then returns the key-pair \((sk, pk)\) as output.
  - **PKE.Enc(pp, pk, m):** It takes \(pp\), public key \(pk\) and message \(m \in G\) as inputs. It samples a random integer \(r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\ast\) and returns the ciphertext \(ct = (ct_1, ct_2) = (G^r, m \cdot pk^r)\) as output.
  - **PKE.Dec(pp, sk, ct):** It takes \(pp\), the secret key \(sk\) and ciphertext \(ct\) as inputs. It then returns \(m' = ct_2/(ct_1)^{sk}\) as output.

The security of this construction relies on the hardness of DDH assumption over group \(G\). Over a bilinear group, if SXDH holds (DDH is hard in \(G_1\) and \(G_2\)), like Type-III bilinear groups, then ElGamal encryption remains secure over source groups \((G_1, G_1, p)\) and \((G_2, G_2, p)\).

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**Pedersen Commitment.** Commitment schemes enable a committer to commit to a hidden value by ensuring two main security properties: (perfectly) hiding and (computationally) binding. The hiding of the commitment ensures that no information about the hidden committed value is revealed and binding guarantees no committer can open the same commitment under two distinct messages. The Pedersen commitment \([54]\) can be described as follows:

- **COM.Setup(1\(^\lambda\)):** Take security parameter \(\lambda\), as input. Sample \(G \leftarrow \mathbb{G}\) and \(H \leftarrow \mathbb{G}\). Return the public parameters \(pp = (G, p, G, H)\) as output.
COM.Com(pp, m; τ): Take public parameters pp, a message \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) and random opening \( τ \) as inputs. Output \( cm = G^{mH^{\tau}} \).

COM.Verify(pp, cm, m′, τ′): Compute \( cm′ = G^{m′H^{\tau′}} \). Return 1, if \( cm = cm′ \); otherwise return 0.

**Generalized Pedersen Commitments.** The Pedersen commitment can be extended to the Generalized Pedersen commitment that enables to commit to more than one message. To be more precise, the message space can be defined as \( \mathcal{M} = \mathbb{Z}_p^n \), where \( n \) is an upper bound for the number of committed messages.

- COM.Setup(\( 1^λ, n \)): Take security parameter, \( λ \) and an integer \( n \) as inputs. Sample \( n + 1 \) random generators \( G, H_1, H_2, \ldots, H_n \) \( \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^{(n+1)} \). Return the public parameters \( pp = (G, p, G, H_1, \ldots, H_n) \) as output.
- COM.Com(pp, \( \vec{m} \), \( \tau \)): Take the public parameters \( pp \), a message vector \( \vec{m} := (m_1, \ldots, m_n) \) and random opening \( \tau \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) as inputs. Output \( cm = G^T \prod_{i=1}^n H_{i,m_i}^{\tau}. \)
- COM.Verify(pp, cm, \( \vec{m}', \tau' \)): Compute \( cm' = G^{T' \prod_{j=1}^n H_{i,m'_j}^{\tau'}} \). Return 1 if \( cm = cm' \) and 0 otherwise.

**Inner-product predicate encryption by Okamoto-Takashima** We give a brief overview of what we briefly refer to as OT12 scheme [53]. While describing the full scheme is outside the scope of this overview section, we briefly describe the basics behind public-key generation, encryption and decryption. Assume we are in a bilinear group setting \( pp := (G_1, G_2, G_T, p, e, G_1, G_2) \) as before. We describe there the predicate-only version already adapted to the asymmetric pairing case that we use in our implementation.

**Public key and master secret.** We first sample an invertible matrix \( X \) of dimension \( N = 4n + 2 \) (where \( n \) is the number of attributes) with elements in \( \mathbb{F}_p^* \) and consider the matrix \( X^{-1} \) for a random, non-zero field element \( \psi \). For syntactical purposes only, the transpose is actually considered, i.e., we define \( Y = \psi \cdot (X^{-1})^T \).

For notational purposes, we define basis vectors \( \vec{a}_i = (1_{G_2}, \ldots, 1_{G_2}, G_2, 1_{G_1}, \ldots, 1_{G_1}) \) and
\[
\vec{a}_i' = (1_{G_1}, \ldots, 1_{G_1}, G_1, 1_{G_1}, \ldots, 1_{G_1}).
\]
For an element \( c \in \mathbb{F}_p \) the notation \( c\vec{a}_i \) is shorthand for \((1_{G_2}, \ldots, 1_{G_2}, G_2, 1_{G_1}, \ldots, 1_{G_1})\). And for two vectors \( \vec{b} = (B_1, \ldots, B_N) \in G_i \) and \( \vec{b}' = (B'_1, \ldots, B'_N) \in G_i \), we write \( \vec{b} \odot \vec{b}' := (B_1B'_1, \ldots, B_NB'_N) \). Finally, a pairing operation continued for vectors is defined: let \( \vec{c} = (C_1, \ldots, C_N) \in \mathbb{G}_1^N \) and \( \vec{c}' = (C'_1, \ldots, C'_N) \in \mathbb{G}_2^N \), then \( e(\vec{c}, \vec{c}') := \prod_{i=1}^N e(C_i, C'_i) \).

Armed with these tools and in particular the matrices \( X = (x_{i,j}) \) and \( Y = (y_{i,j}) \), we now define the public key and the master secret key: the public key \( \mathcal{B} = (\vec{b}_1, \ldots, \vec{b}_N) \) consists of \( N \) vectors \( \vec{b}_i = \bigodot_{j=1}^N x_{i,j} \vec{a}_j \). The master secret key \( \mathcal{B}^* = (\vec{b}_1^*, \ldots, \vec{b}_N^*) \) consists of \( N \) vectors \( \vec{b}_i^* := \bigodot_{j=1}^N y_{i,j} \vec{a}_j^* \).

We observe that there is the following relationship between \( \mathcal{B} \) and \( \mathcal{B}^* \) that follows from the definition of matrices \( X \) and \( Y \): \( e(\vec{b}_i, \vec{b}_j) = e(G_1, G_2)^{x_{i,y_{i,j}} = y_{i,j}x_{i,j}} \)
where
\[
\begin{cases} e(G_1, G_2) =: G_T, & \text{if } i = j, \\ 1_{G_T}, & \text{if } i \neq j. \end{cases}
\]
Key generation. For an attribute vector \( \vec{v} \in \mathbb{F}_p^n \setminus \{\vec{0}\} \), one first samples \( \sigma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p \) and \( \vec{n} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^n \) at random. We then form the vector \( \vec{z}^* := (1, \sigma \vec{v}, 0, \ldots, 0, \vec{n}, 0) \). The key for attribute \( \vec{v} \) is defined as \( \vec{k}^* := \bigoplus_{i=1}^{2n} z_i^* \vec{b}_i \).

Encryption. For encryption, which is done relative to attribute vector \( \vec{x} \in \mathbb{F}_p^n \setminus \{\vec{0}\} \), one samples random values \( \omega, \phi \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p \) and defines the helper vector \( \vec{z} := (1, \omega \vec{x}, 0, \ldots, 0, \vec{n}, \phi) \). The ciphertext is defined as \( \vec{c} := \bigoplus_{i=1}^{3n} z_i \vec{b}_i \).

Decryption. In the predicate-only case, a key \( \vec{k}^* \) decrypts a ciphertext \( \vec{c} \) iff \( \hat{e}(\vec{k}^*, \vec{c}) = \mathcal{G}_T \).

We observe, for correctness, that due to the above relation between \( \mathcal{B}^* \) and \( \mathcal{B} \), the operation \( \hat{e} \) in fact computes the inner product of the vectors \( \vec{z}^* \) and \( \vec{z} \) in the exponent of \( \mathcal{G}_T \). That is, \( \hat{e}(\vec{k}^*, \vec{c}) = e(G_1, G_2)^1 + e(\vec{z}^*, \vec{z}) \), and therefore \( \hat{e}(\vec{k}^*, \vec{c}) = \mathcal{G}_T \) when the inner product \( \langle \vec{v}, \vec{x} \rangle \) is zero.

We refer to [53] for the proof that this scheme is attribute hiding in the sense defined in Section 2.7.

C.2 Proof Systems

In this section, we give some background on the proof systems we use in our implementation with a selection of useful basic protocols.

Sigma protocols. We first summarize the utilized sigma protocols (that is, the non-interactive versions via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic) in our efficient instantiation and give an overview on the techniques implied in their implementations. All the protocols are assumed a bilinear group setting \((G_1, G_2, \mathcal{G}_T, p, e, G_1, G_2)\) and the Pedersen commitment.

\underline{Proving the Knowledge of Discrete Logarithm.} Figure 22 describes a non-interactive sigma protocol that enables a prover to prove the knowledge of a scalar witness \( a \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) under the public instance of \( A = G^a \), where \( G \) is a generator of a group \( \mathcal{G} \) of prime order \( p \). Note that the hash function \( H : \{0, 1\}^* \to \mathbb{Z}_p \) is modeled in the random oracle model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \Sigma )-\text{Dlog}{ ( (a) \mid A = G^a ) }</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prove(CRS, x, w):</strong> Takes the instance ( x = (A) ) and the witness ( w = (a) ) as inputs. It then samples ( r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^* ) and computes ( R = G^r ) and challenge ( c = H(A, R, G) ) and forms ( z = r - ca ) mod ( p ). It then returns the proof ( \pi = (c, z, R) ) as output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verify(CRS, x, \pi):</strong> Takes the instance ( x = (A) ) and proof ( \pi = (c, z, R) ) as inputs. It then computes ( c' = H(A, R, G) ) and checks the equality of ( c' = c ) and ( R = A^c G^z ). It returns 1 if they hold and 0 otherwise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 22: Non-interactive proof of knowledge of Dlog.

\underline{Proving the Knowledge of a Committed value and its ElGamal encryption.} Figure 23 describes a sigma protocol proving the knowledge of a palintext \( m \) encrypted based on ElGamal encryption and committed via Pedersen commitment. In other words, proving the knowledge of scalar
message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ such that $cm = G^m H^c$ and simultaneously we have, $ct = (ct_1, ct_2) = (G_1^m, G_1^n pk^e)$. The hash function $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ is modeled in the random oracle model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Sigma$-ElGamal ${ (m, r, e) \mid ct_1 = G_1^r \land ct_2 = G_1^e pk^e \land cm = G^m H^c }$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prove</strong>(CRS, $x, w$): Takes the instance $x = (ct_1, ct_2, cm)$ and the witness $w = (m, r, e)$ as inputs. It then samples $r_1, r_2, r_3 \overset{$}{\triangleleft} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes $R_1 = G_1^{r_1}, R_2 = G_1^{r_2} pk^3$ and $R_3 = COM.Com(pp, r_2; r_3) = G_2^{r_2} H^{r_3}$, the challenge $c = H(ct_1, ct_2, cm, R_1, R_2, R_3, G, H)$ and forms $z_1 = r_1 - cr \mod p$, $z_2 = r_2 - cm \mod p$ and $z_3 = r_3 - ce \mod p$. It then returns the proof $\pi = (c, z_1, z_2, z_3, R_1, R_2, R_3)$ as output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verify</strong>(CRS, $x, \pi$): Takes the instance $x = (ct_1, ct_2, cm)$ and proof $\pi = (c, z_1, z_2, z_3, R_1, R_2, R_3)$ as inputs. It then computes $c' = H(ct_1, ct_2, cm, R_1, R_2, R_3, G, H)$ and checks the equality of equations $c' = c$, $R_1 = ct_1 G_1^{r_1}$, $R_2 = G_1^{z_1} pk^3 ct_2$ and $R_3 = G_2^{z_2} H^{z_3} cm^c$. It returns 1 if all the equations hold; 0 otherwise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Proving the Equality of Committed Values in different groups.** We extend the protocol proposed in [27] s.t. for a given cyclic groups $G_1$ and $G_2$ of prime order $p$, Figure 24 describes a sigma protocol enabling a prover to prove that two commitments $cm_1 = G_1^m H_1^{e_1} K_1^{z_1}$ and $cm_2 = G_2^n H_2^{e_2} K_2^{z_2}$ are committing to the same message $m$. Note that $G_1, H_1, K_1 \in G_1$ and $G_2, H_2, K_2 \in G_2$ s.t. the discrete logarithms $\log_{G_1} (H_1)$, $\log_{G_1} (K_1)$ and $\log_{G_2} (H_2)$, $\log_{G_2} (K_2)$ are unknown to the prover. The hash function $H' : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{2^k}$, where $k$ is a fixed integer and $2^k < p$ is modeled in the random oracle model.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\Sigma$-Bridging ${ (m, e_1, e_2, u_1, u_2) \mid cm_1 = G_1^m H_1^{e_1} K_1^{u_1} \land cm_2 = G_2^n H_2^{e_2} K_2^{u_2} }$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Prove</strong>(CRS, $x, w$): Takes the instance $x = (cm_1, cm_2)$ and the witness $w = (m, e_1, e_2, u_1, u_2)$ as inputs. It then samples $r_1, r_2, r_3, r_4, r_5 \overset{$}{\triangleleft} \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes $R_1 = G_1^{r_1} H_1^{r_2} K_1^{r_3}$, $R_2 = G_1^{r_4} H_1^{r_5} K_1^{r_6}$ and the challenge $c = H'(cm_1, cm_2, R_1, R_2, G_1, H_1, K_1, G_2, H_2, K_2)$ and forms $z_1 = r_1 - cm \mod p$, $z_2 = r_2 - ce_1 \mod p$, $z_3 = r_3 - cu_1 \mod p$, $z_4 = r_4 - ce_2 \mod p$ and $z_5 = r_5 - cu_2 \mod p$. It then returns the proof $\pi = (c, z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4, z_5, R_1, R_2)$ as output.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Verify</strong>(CRS, $x, \pi$): Takes the instance $x = (cm_1, cm_2)$ and proof $\pi = (c, z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4, z_5, R_1, R_2)$ as inputs. It then computes $c' = H'(cm_1, cm_2, R_1, R_2, G_1, H_1, K_1, G_2, H_2, K_2)$ and checks the equality of $c' = c$, $R_1 = cm_1 G_1^{z_1} H_1^{z_2} K_1^{z_3}$ and $R_2 = cm_2 G_2^{z_1} H_2^{z_2} K_2^{z_3}$. It returns 1 if the checks hold and 0 otherwise.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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**Proving a Multiplicative Relation on Committed Values.** Figure 25 describes a sigma protocol to prove the knowledge of committed values and also a multiplicative relation between them. More precisely, this protocol enables to prove the knowledge of integers $x_1$ and $x_2$ s.t. $x_3 = x_1 x_2$.
mod $p$ by issuing the commitments $\text{cm}_i = G^{x_i} H^{e_i}$ for $i = 1, 2, 3$. Note that the hash function $H': \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, where $k$ is a fixed integer and $2^k < p$ is modeled in the random oracle model.

**Fig 26:** Non-Interactive proof of multiplicative relation on committed values.

**Proving the Knowledge of a DY PRF key and its Well-Formedness.** Figure 26 recalls the DY PRF well-formedness protocol described in [27]. As part of this protocol, a prover using DY PRF key $k$ shows that the PRF output is formed correctly under a given input $\text{ctr}$, i.e. $\text{ID} = \text{PRF.Eval}(k, \text{ctr}) = G_1^{1/(k+\text{ctr})}$.

**Fig. 26:** Non-interactive proof of knowledge of DY’s PRF key and its well-formedness.

**Proving the Knowledge of opening of Generalized Pedersen Commitment.** Figure 27 recalls the proving knowledge of opening in a Generalized Pedersen commitment protocol described in [42]. As part of this protocol, a prover using a vector of messages $\vec{m}$ shows that the commitment $\text{cm}$ is computed correctly and it has the knowledge of opening $\tau$ under a given public parameter $\text{pp}$, i.e. $\text{cm} = \text{COM.Com}(\text{pp}, \vec{m}, \tau) = G^* \prod_{i=1}^{n} H_i^m$. 

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pairing product equations satisfiability of the following form, equations in bilinear setting. However, in this paper, we only use GS proofs to demonstrate Groth-Sahai proofs.

GS proofs \[43\] are able to prove the satisfiability of some quadratic equation satisfies using the committed assignments. Therefore, there are two steps: verification phase.

• **Prove**(CRS, \(x, w\)): Takes the instance \(x = (cm, G, H_1, \ldots, H_n)\) and the witness \(w = (m_1, \ldots, m_n, \tau)\) as inputs. It samples \(\vec{x} = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^n\) and \(\tau_x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p\) and computes \(cm_x = G^{\vec{x}} \prod_{i=1}^n H_i^{m_i}\). It then computes the challenge \(c = H'(cm, cm_x, G, H_1, \ldots, H_n)\) and forms \(z_i = x_i + c \cdot m_i \mod p\) for \(i \in [1, n]\) and \(t = \tau_x + c \cdot \tau \mod p\). It returns the proof \(\pi = (cm_0, z_1, \ldots, z_n, t)\) as output.
• **Verify**(CRS, \(x, \pi\)): Takes the instance \(x = (cm, G, H_1, \ldots, H_n)\) and proof \(\pi = (cm_0, z_1, \ldots, z_n, t)\) as inputs. It then computes \(c' = H'(cm, cm_x, G, H_1, \ldots, H_n)\) and checks the equality of equations \(c' = c, cm_x \cdot cm^c = \text{COM}(\vec{x}, t) = G^\gamma \prod_{i=1}^n H_i^{z_i}\). It returns 1 if they hold and 0 otherwise.

Fig. 27: Non-Interactive proof of knowledge of opening of Generalized Pedersen commitments.

**Groth-Sahai proofs.** GS proofs \[43\] are able to prove the satisfiability of some quadratic equations in bilinear setting. However, in this paper, we only use GS proofs to demonstrate pairing product equations satisfiability of the following form,

\[
\prod_{i=1}^n e(A_i, Y_i) \prod_{i=1}^m e(X_i, B_i) \prod_{j=1}^n e(X_j, Y_j)^{\gamma_{i,j}} = T,
\]

where \(X_1, \ldots, X_m \in G_1\), \(Y_1, \ldots, Y_n \in G_2\) are the witnesses given as a commitment and \(T \in G_T\), \(A_1, \ldots, A_n \in G_1, B_1, \ldots, B_m \in G_2\) and \(\Gamma := \{\gamma_{i,j}\}_{i \in [1, m], j \in [1, n]} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{m \times n}\).

GS proofs are essentially commit-and-prove systems, in which the prover proves that a quadratic equation satisfies using the committed assignments. Therefore, there are two steps: first, the prover commits to the values, and then it proves their validity through some relation. This scheme can be instantiate in two possible settings: non-interactive witness-indistinguishable (NIWI) and non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK). If in the described PPE, the constant value \(T = 1_{G_T}\) this construction can guarantee Zero-Knowledge property\(^7\). Thus in the rest of this section we take this condition into account. In the following, we briefly summarize the most efficient instantiation of GS proofs based on SXDH assumption (i.e. DDH holds in both source groups \(G_1\) and \(G_2\), both in terms of proof size and number of basic pairings required in the verification phase.\(^8\)

Extended bilinear maps, \(E : G_1^2 \times G_2^2 \rightarrow G_T^2\), are a generalization for the standard bilinear pairings, defined in Definition 1. For any given group elements \(a_1, a_2 \in G_1\) and \(b_1, b_2 \in G_2\), an extended bilinear map (tensor product) is defined as follows:

\[
E \left( \begin{pmatrix} a_1 \\ a_2 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} b_1 \\ b_2 \end{pmatrix} \right) = \begin{pmatrix} e(a_1, b_1) & e(a_1, b_2) \\ e(a_2, b_1) & e(a_2, b_2) \end{pmatrix}.
\]

GS proofs additionally rely on a variation of the Pedersen commitments, which are discussed in Appendix C.1, where the commitments are generated based on two generators rather than a single one. Loosely speaking, this special commitment scheme enables proof simulation. The double generator Pedersen commitment over a cyclic group \(\mathbb{G} = \langle G \rangle\) with a prime order \(p\) consists of the following PPT algorithms:

---

\(^7\) According to Escala and Groth [31], the proof system remains zero-knowledge if the base element for the group and public constant are paired to each other.

\(^8\) To implement the Groth-Sahai proofs, we modified the GS implementation provided in this repository.
\[ \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{COM.Setup}(1^\lambda): \text{Take security parameter, } \lambda \text{ in its unary representation as input.} \]

Sample \( H_1, H_2 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G \). Return the public parameters \( \text{pp} = (G, p, G.H_1, H_2) \) as output.

\[ \text{cm} \leftarrow \text{COM.Com}(\text{pp}, M; \tau_1, \tau_2): \text{Take public parameters pp, a message } M \in G \text{ and random openings } \tau_1, \tau_2 \text{ as inputs. Output } \text{cm} = M.H_1^{\tau_1}H_2^{\tau_2}. \]

0/1 \leftarrow \text{COM.Verify}(\text{pp, cm, } M', \tau_1', \tau_2'): \text{Compute } \text{cm}' = M'.H_1^{\tau_1'}H_2^{\tau_2'}. \text{ Return 1, if } \text{cm} = \text{cm}'; \text{ otherwise return 0.} \]

Next we outline GS proofs for a simple case based on SXDH assumption that the prover aims to prove the knowledge of group elements \( X, Y \in G_1 \times G_2 \) as witnesses s.t. \( e(X, Y)^\gamma = T \), where \( T \in G_T \) is a known constant value.

\[ \text{CRS} \leftarrow \text{GS.Setup}(1^\lambda): \text{Take the security parameter } \lambda \text{ as input. Sample eight group elements } \]

\[ \text{CRS} := (H_1, H_2, K_1, K_2, U_1, U_2, V_1, V_2) \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} G_1^4 \times G_2^4. \text{ It then returns CRS as output.} \]

\[ \pi \leftarrow \text{GS.Prove} \text{(CRS, x, w). It takes CRS, witness } w = (X, Y) \in G_1 \times G_2 \text{ and instance } x = (T) \text{ as inputs. It samples the random integers } r_1, r_2, s_1, s_2 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Z_p^* \text{ and commits to witness by computing } \]

\[ (a_1, a_2) = (H_1^r H_2^s, X^{r_1} Y^{r_2} K_1^{s_1} K_2^{s_2}) \text{ and } (b_1, b_2) = (U_1^r U_2^s, Y^{r_1} V_1^{r_2} V_2^{s_2}). \text{ It samples the random integers } \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} Z_p \text{ and then generates the proofs } \phi_1 = (b_1^{\gamma s_1} U_1^\delta V_1^{\beta s_2} U_2^{\gamma s_2} V_2^\delta), \phi_2 = (b_2^{\gamma s_1} U_1^\delta V_1^{\beta s_2} U_2^{\gamma s_2} V_2^\delta), \theta_1 = (H_1^{\gamma s_1} K_1^{\beta s_2} X^{r_1} Y^{r_2} H_2^{s_1} K_2^{s_2}), \theta_2 = (H_1^{\gamma s_1} K_1^{\beta s_2} X^{r_1} Y^{r_2} H_2^{s_1} K_2^{s_2}), \text{ and return the proof } \pi = (a_1, a_2, b_1, b_2, \phi_1, \phi_2, \theta_1, \theta_2) \text{ as output.} \]

0/1 \leftarrow \text{GS.Verify} \text{ (CRS, x, } \pi): \text{It takes CRS, the instance x and proof } \pi \text{ as inputs. It then checks the validity of the following pairing product equation:}

\[
E(\begin{pmatrix} a_1 \\ a_2 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} b_1 \\ b_2 \end{pmatrix}) = E\left(\begin{pmatrix} H_1 \\ H_2 \end{pmatrix}, \phi_1\right) E\left(\begin{pmatrix} K_1 \\ K_2 \end{pmatrix}, \phi_2\right) E\left(\theta_1, \begin{pmatrix} U_1 \\ U_2 \end{pmatrix}\right) E\left(\theta_2, \begin{pmatrix} V_1 \\ V_2 \end{pmatrix}\right) \left(\begin{pmatrix} T \\ 1 \end{pmatrix}_{G_T} \right) \text{.}
\]

If the equation holds it returns 1 and accepts the proof; 0 otherwise.

This simple example results in a single \( \gamma \in \{-1, 0, 1\} \) value because \( m = n = 1 \). In general, however, \( F \) is a matrix of dimension \( m \times n \). Throughout the next section, we discuss how this matrix can be defined for different PPEs.

\textit{Herold et al.’s batching technique [45].} To check the validity of a GS proof for any PPE consisting of \( n \) first-group elements and \( m \) second-group elements, a verifier must compute \( 4(n + m + 4) \) pairings. However, Herold et al. described a batching technique in [45] that reduces the number of pairings by a factor of 4. This means that a verifier checking the same proof needs to compute only \( n + m + 4 \) pairings, which is a significant improvement, especially in real-world use cases.

The authors replace an extended pairing product equation to a basic pairing product equation using linear algebra. As a simple example, for a given group vectors \( \vec{a} \in G_1^2 \) and \( \vec{b} \in G_2^2 \) the extended bilinear equation can be written as follows:

\[
E(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) = \begin{pmatrix} e(a_1, b_1) & e(a_1, b_2) \\ e(a_2, b_1) & e(a_2, b_2) \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} t_1 t_2 \\ t_3 t_4 \end{pmatrix},
\]

where \( t_i \in G_T \) for \( i \in [1, 4] \). A verifier computes \( A = a_1^{r_1}a_2^{r_2} \) and \( B = b_1^{s_1}b_2^{s_2} \) using the randomness \( r_1, r_2, s_1, s_2 \in Z_p^* \). In this case, the above extended pairing product equation can be rewritten as follows:

\[
e(A, B) = t_1^{r_1 s_1}t_2^{r_1 s_2}t_3^{r_2 s_1}t_4^{r_2 s_2}.
\]
It is easy to see that the above technique is correct. However, the soundness error is at most $2/p$. More interestingly, it reduces the number of pairings by 75% compared to the naive approach. Specifically, it only requires a single pairing instead of 4 pairings.

**Range-proofs.** Range-proofs enable a prover to prove a committed value $x$ computed as $cm = COM.Com(pp, x, r)$ is in the range of $[0, 2^n]$.$^9$

### D Realization of NIZK relations

Next, we give a detailed description of the languages in the proposed ul-PCS constructions and the used techniques for their implementation. Note that for the ease of following we use the *gray* background to highlight the hidden values that should be considered as witnesses in each relation. Additionally, the described relations are given solely on their own, while the prover is expected to make a bridge between them. As the underlying proof systems rely on the commit-and-prove principle, and a commitment to a witness is issued by the prover, we can bridge the relations by applying the sigma protocol described in Figure 24 whenever a hidden parameter is used in more than one relation. In what follows, a bridging proof is indicated by $\Sigma$. As it is illustrated in Figure 17, the relations are proved with three main proof systems, including sigma protocols, range-proofs and Groth-Sahai (GS) proofs.

#### D.1 Generic ul-PCS instantiated with Inner-Product Predicate Encryption

**Language $\mathcal{L}_1$.** The first language in the generic ul-PCS takes the instances $x_{st} = (T_{Rand}, ID_{ctr}, vk_{sig}^{ct}, ct_{ctr}, vk_{sig}^A, mpk_{PE})$ and the witness $w_{st} := (k, ctr, vk_{sig}, sk_{sig}, x, \sigma^1_{sig}, \sigma^2_{sig}, \sigma_{ctr})$ as inputs and the prover proves the satisfiability of the following relations:

\[ \Sigma - \text{PRF}\{ (k, ctr) | ID_{ctr} = G_1^{1/(k+ctr)} \}. \]

- **$\Sigma_{ctr}<T_{Rand}$:** Additionally, the prover utilizes the range-proof techniques to prove $ctr \in [0, T_{Rand})$.

\[ \Sigma \] To show that the used $ctr$ in the above proofs are the same, the prover uses the bridging sigma protocols described in Figure 24. More precisely, it runs $\Sigma$-Bridging $\{ (ctr, e_1, e_2, 0, 0) | cm_1 \in G_1^{1H_{14}} \land cm_2 \in G_1^{3H_{23}^e} \}$, where $cm_1$ is obtained via $\Sigma$-PRF protocol while $cm_2$ is computed by the range-proof protocol. Note that the generators $G_1, H_1, G_2, H_2$ are random elements of any cyclic group.

- **$\Sigma$-BSEnjoy$(vk_{sig}^A, (k, x), \sigma^A_{sig}) = 1$** We instantiate this signature with the recalled SPS signature $\sigma^A_{sig}$ on hidden message $\tilde{M} = (G_1^1, G_1^4)$ that is signed by the CA can be written as a PPE of the form, $e\left( G_1^4, X_1^4 \right) e\left( G_1^4, X_2^4 \right) = e\left( R_1^1, T_1^1 \right) \land e\left( S^1_{sig}, G_1 \right) = e\left( G_1, T^1_{sig} \right)$. We use GS proof systems to show the satisfiability of this equation.

\[ \Sigma \] To demonstrate that the used $k$ in the first relation and the above relation are the same, the prover uses the bridging sigma protocols described in Figure 24. More precisely, it runs $\Sigma$-Bridging $\{ (k, e_1, e_2, 0, 0) | cm_1 \in G_1^{1H_{14}} \land cm_2 \in G_1^{3H_{23}^e}K_{22}^e \}$, where $cm_1$ is obtained via $\Sigma$-PRF protocol while $cm_2$ is computed by the GS proof systems.

---

$^9$ To implement the range-proof, we use the open-source bulletproof Python implementation available in this repository.
To prove the well-formedness of the ciphertext $\text{ct}_{\text{ctr}}$ obtained from $\text{PE.Enc(mpKE, x)}$ algorithm in the key re-randomization phase and demonstrate the fact that the attributes $\vec{x}$ are certified by the CA and folded with the PRF seed $\vec{k}$, i.e. $\text{SPS.Verify(vk_{\text{sig}}, \{G_1^k, G_2^k\}, \sigma_{\text{sig}}^0) = 1}$, we must make a few observations. Recall that the statements together should assure that the ciphertext is a correct encryption of some attribute $\vec{x}$, and that this attribute is linked to the particular party’s actual seed $\vec{k}$ (which it uses to provably derive its public pseudo-random identifier). The trick to obtain an implementation of this is fourfold:

(a) We employ OT12 as our POPE scheme described in Appendix C.1 and observe that the computation of the ciphertext $\vec{c} := \bigodot_{i=1}^N z_i \vec{b}_i$, which means in a component-wise notation that $c_i = \vec{b}_1[i] \cdot \vec{b}_2[i] \cdots \cdot \vec{b}_N[i]^z_i$, for $\vec{z} := (1, x_1, \ldots, x_n, 0, \ldots, 0, \phi)$. This computation is very close to a generalized Pedersen commitment w.r.t. the vector of generators $(\vec{b}_1[i], \ldots, \vec{b}_N[i])$.

(b) Generalized Pedersen Commitments have a homomorphic property, and thus it is easy to, for a commitment $\vec{c}_m$ to some vector $\vec{x}$, a commitment to $\omega \vec{x}$ by raising the commitment to the power of $\omega$.

(c) The next step is to connect it to SPS-EQ in order to transfer the issuance of attributes by the authority to re-randomizations following the idea of Section 4.3 (cf. also Appendix D.3). This means that if the authority issues an initial OT12 ciphertext, in the form of an $N$ generalized Pedersen commitments $\vec{c}_m$, that are blindings of the $c_i$ values above for the vector $\vec{z} := (1, x_1, \ldots, x_n, 0, \ldots, 0)$, together with an SPS-EQ signature on that vector, then a party is able to generate, using the homomorphic property, a commitment to a scaled vector on its attributes $\vec{c}_m \omega \vec{z}$ (as required by OT12), and by the signature adaptation and unforgeability property of the SPS-EQ scheme it can indeed be verified that this is done correctly. By using the same trick as in Section 4.3, we can further bind this vector specifically to a party (see next point).

To randomize the ciphertext correctly according to OT12, we further compute a commitment to a vector $\vec{\phi} := (1, 0, \ldots, 0, \phi_1, 0, \ldots, 0, \phi')$, where $\phi_1, \phi_2 \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $n = \left\lfloor \frac{N-2}{3} \right\rfloor$, and prove knowledge of the opening (cf. Figure 27), in particular, this includes that we verify that the zero-positions are indeed zero (or alternatively, that is indeed a vector of length 3) [42]. The Generalized Pedersen commitments of this vector under the same basis denoted by $cm_{\omega \vec{z}, i}$ and can be homomorphically combined with the $N$ commitments $cm_{\omega \vec{z}, i}$ to yield $N$ commitments $cm_{\text{OT12}}$ to the OT12 ciphertext components $\vec{c}_t$, where each component is now encoding the vector $\vec{z}_i := (1, x_1, \ldots, x_n, 0, \ldots, 0, \phi')$. We reveal $\vec{c}_t$ by revealing the final randomness of the Pedersen commitment. We further need to prove knowledge of the committed vector (using Figure 27 where the verifier can use the revealed $r_i$ directly) in order to be formally extractable.\footnote{This step could be omitted in an implementation to improve efficiency while trading provable for heuristic security. This appears acceptable in environments where a CRS is established using a ceremony to ensure that no trapdoor does exist in the system.} Note that some care must be taken when revealing the $r_i$, which is why we encode vectors $\vec{z}_i := (1, x_1, \ldots, x_n, 0, \ldots, 0, \phi')$ and not just...
(1, x_1, \ldots, x_n, 0, \ldots, 0, \phi')
}. The additional randomness contribution, \( \phi' \), injected at a position that does not affect the inner-product computation of OT12 ensures that we can reveal \( r_i \) (masking the \( i \)th component) without leaking information about the intermediate computations relevant for OT12 in the commitments \( \text{cm}_{\phi_i} \) and \( \text{cm}_{\omega \bar{X}_i} \). In particular, this can be thought of as masking \( \phi' \).

Now, all ingredients are in place: a verifier is able to retrace the computation (where we put all elements required to do so in the proof string), and verify the SPS-EQ signature to be sure the OT12 ciphertext is correctly formed and connected to the attribute that was issued to the party.

(d) Finally, in order to link the party’s seed \( k \) to this vector, we apply the same trick as in Section 4.3 (cf. also Appendix D.3) and create an accumulator \( A_k \) to which we add \( k \) (cf. Section 2.5). We add the pair \((A_k, G_2, \ldots)\) to the above vector. As shown in Section 4.3 and Appendix D.3, re-randomizing both elements \((A_k, G_2)\) preserves the relationship to prove that an element, in this case \( k \), is in the accumulator. Thus, the party cannot only present a randomized vector (which is a commitment to the scaled attributes \( \bar{X} \) as required by OT12), but also that this vector has been issued in connection with the seed \( k \) (which it uses to develop the PRF as described below) by proving that it has the corresponding accumulator witness. This completes the high-level realization of the two assertions above.

To demonstrate that the used \( A_k \) in the vector \((A_k, \ldots)\) is a valid accumulator value under the same PRF seed \( k \) in the first relation we first run a GS proof to prove the accumulator verification holds under \( k \). Additionally we use the bridging sigma protocols described in Figure 24 to show this seed is the same as the one in the first relation on the well-formedness of PRF. More precisely, it runs \( \Sigma\text{-Bridging}\{(k, e_1, e_2, 0, u_2) \mid \text{cm}_1 = G_1^1 H_{1}^{01} \land \text{cm}_2 = G_2^2 H_{2}^{02} K_{2}^{02}\}, \) where \( \text{cm}_1 \) is obtained via \( \Sigma\text{-PRF} \) protocol while \( \text{cm}_2 \) is computed by the GS proof systems on the validity of the accumulator verification.

\[ L.5. \quad DS.\text{Verify}(vk^1_{\text{sig}}, (k, vk_{\text{sig}}), \sigma^2_{\text{sig}}) = 1 \]

As we discuss in Appendix C.1, this signature scheme is instantiated by a SPS. The knowledge of a SPS signature \( \sigma^2_{\text{sig}} \) on hidden message \( M = (G_1^k, vk_{\text{sig}}) \) that is signed by the CA can be written as a PPE of the form, \( e(G_1^k, X^1 \bar{X}_i) e(vk_{\text{sig}}, X^2 \bar{r}_i) = e(R^2_{\text{sig}}, T^2_{\text{sig}}) \land e(S^2_{\text{sig}}, G_2) = e(G_1, T^2_{\text{sig}}) \), where \( vk^1_{\text{sig}} := (X^1, \bar{X}_i) \) and \( \sigma^2_{\text{sig}} := (R^2_{\text{sig}}, \bar{r}_i, T^2_{\text{sig}}) \). We use GS proof systems to show the satisfiability of this equation.

The prover additionally runs \( \Sigma\text{-Bridging}\{(k, e_1, e_2, 0, u_2) \mid \text{cm}_1 = G_1^1 H_{1}^{01} \land \text{cm}_2 = G_2^2 H_{2}^{02} K_{2}^{02}\}, \) where \( \text{cm}_1 \) is obtained via \( \Sigma\text{-PRF} \) protocol while \( \text{cm}_2 \) is computed by the GS proof systems on the knowledge of SPS signature \( \sigma^2_{\text{sig}} \).

\[ L.6. \quad DS.\text{Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}}, (vk^2_{\text{sig}}, \text{ID}_{\text{ctr}}), \sigma_{\text{ctr}}) = 1 \]

This signature is instantiated by the BLS signature, discussed in Appendix C.1. The prover should prove the satisfiability of the PPE relation described below in order to validate a newly generated verification key, \( vk_{\text{sig}} \), and to bind it with the new identifier \( \text{ID}_{\text{ctr}} \), \( e(vk_{\text{sig}}, H(vk_{\text{sig}}||\text{ID}_{\text{ctr}})) = e(G_1, \sigma_{\text{ctr}}) \) that represents the validity of BLS signature. We use GS proof systems to instantiate this relation in zero-knowledge.

To show that the \( vk_{\text{sig}} \) element in the relations discussed in \( L.5 \) and \( L.6 \) are identical we need to make a bridge between them. Due to the fact that both of these relations are proven via GS proof systems, we can instead combine them as follows [43]:

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We use the sigma protocols to demonstrate the well-formedness of the PE secret key. Additionally, the prover runs the statement as follows:

\[ e \left( G_1^k, X_1^A \right) e \left( \sigma_{\text{sk}} \cdot X_2^A \right) e \left( R_2^2, T_2^2 \right)^{-1} = 1_{G_T} \land e \left( S_{\text{sig}}^2, G_2 \right) e \left( G_1, T_{\text{sig}}^2 \right)^{-1} = 1_{G_T} \land e \left( \sigma_{\text{sk}} \cdot H \left( \sigma_{\text{sk}} || \text{ID}_{\text{ctr}} \right) \right) e \left( G_1, T_{\text{sig}}^3 \right)^{-1} = 1_{G_T}. \]

This PPE involves both relations in \( L_{1.5} \) and \( L_{1.6} \) and we make sure to use the same commitment to the group element \( \sigma_{\text{sk}} \).

**Language \( L_2 \).** In the second relation of the proposed generic ul-PCS scheme, the prover takes the statement \( \sigma_{\text{sk}} := (\text{ID}_S, \text{ct}_{\text{R}}, \sigma_{\text{sk}}) \) and the witness \( u_{\text{st}} := (k, \text{ctr}, \sigma_{\text{sk}}) \) as inputs and acts as follows:

**L2.1.** \( [\text{ID}_S = \text{PRF.Eval}(k, \text{ctr})] \): We use the sigma protocols to demonstrate the well-formedness of DY PRF, by running \( \Sigma\text{-PRF}\{k \mid \text{ID}_S = \sigma_1^{1/(k + \text{ctr})}\} \), as described in Figure 26.

**L2.2.** \( [\text{PE}.\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_{\text{f}_j}, \text{ct}_j) = 1]\): To prove the knowledge of an PE secret key \( \text{sk}_{\text{f}_j} := (\text{sk}_1, \ldots, \text{sk}_N) \) and proving the fact that it correctly decrypts the receiver’s PE ciphertext \( \text{ct}_j := (\text{ct}_1, \ldots, \text{ct}_N) \) to the identity value \( 1_{G_T} \), we utilize the GS proof systems. As we already discussed in Appendix C.1 the OT12’s decryption algorithm can be formalized with a PPE equation of the form, \( \prod_{j=1}^N e \left( \text{sk}_{f_j}, \text{ct}_j \right) = e(G_1, G_2). \)

**L2.3.** \( [\text{ID}_S.\text{Verify}(\sigma_{\text{sk}}^3, k, \text{sk}_{\text{f}_j}, \sigma_{\text{sk}}^3) = 1]\): This signature is also instantiated by a SPS and similar to the previous languages, to prove the knowledge of a SPS signature \( \sigma_{\text{sk}}^3 \) on hidden message \( \tilde{M} = (G_1^k, \text{sk}_{\text{f}_j}) \) that is signed by the CA we can use the GS proof systems. Towards the arithmeticization of this relation we can write the verification equation with a PPE of the form, \( e \left( G_1^k, X_0^A \right) \left( \prod_{j=1}^N e \left( \text{sk}_{f_j}, X_j^A \right) \right) = e \left( R_{\text{sig}}^3, T_{\text{sig}}^3 \right) \land e \left( S_{\text{sig}}^3, G_2 \right) = e(G_1, T_{\text{sig}}^3), \) where \( \text{sk}_{f_j} := (\text{sk}_1, \ldots, \text{sk}_N), \sigma_{\text{sk}}^3 := (X_0^A \cdot X_1^A, \ldots, X_N^A) \) and \( \sigma_{\text{sig}}^3 := (R_{\text{sig}}^3, S_{\text{sig}}^3, T_{\text{sig}}^3). \)

Additionally, the prover runs \( \Sigma\text{-Bridging}\{k \mid \text{cm}_1 = G_1^k H_1^{e_1} \land \text{cm}_2 = G_2^k H_2^{e_2} K_2^{u_2}\} \), where \( \text{cm}_1 \) is obtained via \( \Sigma\text{-PRF} \) protocol while the commitment \( \text{cm}_2 \) is computed by the GS proof systems on the knowledge of SPS signature \( \sigma_{\text{sig}}^3. \)

To demonstrate the fact that the used PE’s secret key \( \text{sk}_{f_j} \) in the relations discussed in \( L_{2.2} \) and \( L_{2.3} \) are the same, the prover makes a bridge between them. Due to the fact that both of these relations are proven via GS proof systems, we can instead combine them and prove the following PPE.

\[ e \left( G_1, G_2 \right)^{-1} \prod_{j=1}^N e \left( \text{sk}_{f_j}, \text{ct}_j \right) = 1_{G_T} \land e \left( G_1^k, X_0^A \right) \prod_{j=1}^N e \left( \text{sk}_{f_j}, X_j^A \right) e \left( R_{\text{sig}}^3, T_{\text{sig}}^3 \right)^{-1} = 1_{G_T} \land e \left( S_{\text{sig}}^3, G_2 \right) e \left( G_1, T_{\text{sig}}^3 \right)^{-1} = 1_{G_T}. \]

This PPE involves both relations in \( L_{2.2} \) and \( L_{2.3} \) using the same commitment to group element \( \text{sk}_{f_j}. \)
D.2 ul-PCS for Separable Policies

Language $\mathcal{L}_1$. The first language in the ul-PCS with separable policies takes the instance $x_{st} := (T_{Rand}, \text{ID}_{ctr}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, \text{ct}_{\text{ctr}}, \text{vk}^{A,R}_{\text{sig}}, \text{pk}_{\text{PKE}}^{A})$ and witness $w_{st} := (\text{k}, \text{ctr}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, \text{sk}_{\text{sig}}, m, x, \sigma_{\text{sig}}, \sigma_{\text{ctr}})$ as inputs and then the prover proves the satisfiability of the following relations:

$L_1.1. \quad (\text{ID}_{ctr} = \text{PRF.} \text{Eval}((k, \text{ctr})))$: To prove the well-formedness of the DY PRF, we use the sigma protocol described in Figure 26 and the prover runs $\Sigma$-$\text{PRF} \{ (k, \text{ctr}) \mid \text{ID}_{ctr} = G_1^{1/(k+\text{ctr})}) \}$.

$L_1.2. \quad \text{ctr} < T_{Rand}$: Additionally to prove $\text{ctr} \in [0, T_{Rand})$, the prover uses the range-proofs.

To demonstrate the fact that the used $\text{ctr}$ in the above proofs are identical, the prover utilizes the bridging sigma protocol described in Figure 24. More precisely, it runs $\Sigma$-$\text{Bridging} \{ (\text{ctr}, e_1, e_2, 0, 0) \mid \text{cm}_1 = G_1^{e_1}H_1^{e_1}$ $\land \text{cm}_2 = G_2^{e_1}H_2^{e_1} \}$, where $\text{cm}_1$ is obtained via $\Sigma$-$\text{PRF}$ protocol while the commitment $\text{cm}_2$ is computed by the range-proof protocol.

$L_1.3. \quad \text{ID.} \text{Verify}((\text{vk}^{A,R}_{\text{sig}}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, m, e_1, e_2), (\text{G}_1, \text{G}_2, e_1, e_2), \text{G}_{\text{sig}}, \text{G}_{\text{ctr}}) = 1$. To prove the knowledge of a valid SPS signature $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^1$ on message $M = (G_1^k, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, G_{\text{ctr}}^{m,e})$ signed by the CA we can prove the satisfiability of the PPE of the form, $e(G_1^{\beta}, \hat{X}_1^{A,R}) e(G_1^{m,\beta}, \hat{X}_2^{A,R}) e(G_1^{m,\beta}, \hat{X}_3^{A,R}) = e(R_{\text{sig}}^{1}, T_{\text{sig}}^{1}) \land e(S_{\text{sig}}^{1}, G_2) = e(G_1^1, T_{\text{sig}}^{1})$, where $\text{vk}^{A,R}_{\text{sig}} := (\hat{X}_1^{A,R}, \hat{X}_2^{A,R}, \hat{X}_3^{A,R})$ and $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^1 := (R_{\text{sig}}^{1}, S_{\text{sig}}^{1}, T_{\text{sig}}^{1})$. Thus we use the GS proofs to instantiate this relation in zero-knowledge.

To prove that the used $\text{k}$ in the first relation and the above relation are the same, the prover uses the bridging sigma protocols described in Figure 24. More precisely, it runs $\Sigma$-$\text{Bridging} \{ (k, e_1, e_2) \mid \text{cm}_1 = G_1^{e_1}H_1^{e_1}$ $\land \text{cm}_2 = G_2^{e_1}H_2^{e_1} \}$, where $\text{cm}_1$ is obtained via $\Sigma$-$\text{PRF}$ protocol while $\text{cm}_2$ is computed by the GS proof systems.

$L_1.4. \quad \text{ct}_{\text{ctr}} = \text{PKE.} \text{Enc}((\text{mpk}_{\text{PKE}}^{A}, m, e))$. To prove the knowledge of a valid ciphertext encrypting the hidden message $m_{x}$, we utilize the sigma protocol described in Figure 23 and the prover runs $\Sigma$-$\text{ElGamal} \{ (m, x, e) \mid \text{ct}_x = G_1^x \land \text{ct}_2 = G_1^{m,x}(\text{pk}_{\text{PKE}}^{A})^y \land \text{cm} = G_1^{m,x}H_1^{x} \}$.

To prove the message $m_{x}$ in the SPS relation and the above relation are the same, the prover runs $\Sigma$-$\text{Bridging} \{ (m_{x}, e_1, e_2, u_1, 0) \mid \text{cm}_1 = G_1^{e_1}H_1^{e_1}$ $\land \text{cm}_2 = G_2^{e_1}H_2^{e_1} \}$. In which the commitment $\text{cm}_1$ is obtained via the GS proof of SPS signature $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^1$, while $\text{cm}_2$ is computed by the sigma protocol $\Sigma$-$\text{ElGamal}$.

$L_1.5. \quad \text{ID.} \text{Verify}((\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, \text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, \text{ID}_{\text{ctr}}), \text{G}_{\text{sig}}, \text{G}_{\text{ctr}}) = 1$. The knowledge of a BLS signature on public message $m = (\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, \text{ID}_{\text{ctr}})$ signed under the hidden signing key $\text{sk}_{\text{sig}}$ can be written as a PPE of the form, $e(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, H(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}} || \text{ID}_{\text{ctr}})) = e(G_1, \text{G}_{\text{ctr}})$, where $H(\cdot)$ is a hash-to-curve function as a part of public parameters. We use the GS proofs to instantiate this relation in zero-knowledge.

To show the fact that the verification key, $\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}$, used in the above GS proof is already certified by the CA and is identical to the one in the GS of the SPS signature $\sigma_{\text{sig}}^1$, the prover makes a bridge between the relations discussed in $L_1.3$ and $L_1.5$ via proving the following PPE instead with shared commitments [43].

\[
e(G_1^{\beta}, \hat{X}_1^{A,R}) e(G_1^{m,\beta}, \hat{X}_2^{A,R}) e(G_1^{m,\beta}, \hat{X}_3^{A,R}) e(R_{\text{sig}}^{1}, T_{\text{sig}}^{1})^{-1} = 1_{\text{G}_{\text{T}}} \land
\]
\[
e(S_{\text{sig}}^{1}, G_2) = e(G_1^1, T_{\text{sig}}^{1}) \land
\]
\[
e(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}}, H(\text{vk}_{\text{sig}} || \text{ID}_{\text{ctr}})) e(G_1, \text{G}_{\text{ctr}})^{-1} = 1_{\text{G}_{\text{T}}}.
\]
This PPE involves both relations in $L_{1.3}$ and $L_{1.5}$ and we use the same commitment to the group element $vk_{\text{sig}}$ in all relations.

**Language $L_2$.** The second language in the ul-PCS with separable policies takes the instance $x_{st} = \{ID_S, ct_R, vk_{\text{sig}} A, sk_{PKE}, pk_{PKE}\}$ and witness $w_{st} = (k, \text{ctr}, sk_{PKE}, \sigma^2_{\text{sig}})$ as inputs and then the prover proves the satisfiability of the following relations:

$L_{2.1}$. \[ ID_S = \text{PRF.Eval}(k, \text{ctr}) \] The prover runs $\Sigma$-PRF \[ \{(k, \text{ctr}) \mid ID_S = G_1^{1/(k+\text{ctr})}\} \], depicting the well-formedness of ID$_S$.

$L_{2.2}$. \[ ID_S.\text{Verify}(vk_{\text{sig}} A, k, sk_{PKE}, \sigma^2_{\text{sig}}) = 1 \]

The possession of a SPS signature on message $M = (G_1^e, sk_{PKE})$, signed by the CA can be written as a PPE of the form, $e(G_1^e, \hat{X}_{1, A, S})e(G_{sk_{PKE}}^e, \hat{X}_{2, A, S}) = e(R_{\text{sig}}^2, T_{\text{sig}}^2) \land e(S_{\text{sig}}^2, G_2) = e(G_1^e, T_{\text{sig}}^2)$, where $vk_{\text{sig}} A := (\hat{X}_{1, A, S}, \hat{X}_{2, A, S})$ and $\sigma^2_{\text{sig}} := (R_{\text{sig}}^2, S_{\text{sig}}^2, T_{\text{sig}}^2)$. We use the GS proof systems to represent the satisfiability of this PPE.

To demonstrate the fact that the PRF key $k$ used in $\Sigma$-PRF and in the above GS proof is indeed the same, the prover runs $\Sigma$-Bridging \[ \{(k, e_1, e_2, 0, u_2) \mid cm_1 = G_1^{e_1} \land cm_2 = G_2^{e_2} H_2^{u_2}\} \]. The commitment $cm_1$ is obtained via the sigma protocol described in Figure 26 while the commitment $cm_2$ is computed by the GS proof of knowledge $\sigma^2_{\text{sig}}$ on the satisfiability of the SPS.

$L_{2.3}$. \[ \text{PKE.DEC} (sk_{PKE}, ct_R) = 1 \]

The knowledge of a valid secret key $sk_{PKE}$ such that it can decrypt the receiver’s ciphertext $ct_R$ to $m = 1$. To prove this relation in zero-knowledge we use the Dlog sigma protocol described in Figure 22 and the prover runs, $\Sigma$-Dlog \[ \{(sk_{PKE}) \mid ct_{R, 2}/G_1 = (\text{ct}_{R, 1})^{sk_{PKE}}\} \].

To show the used secret key $sk_{PKE}$ in the above protocol is the same as the one signed in $\sigma^2_{\text{sig}}$, the prover runs $\Sigma$-Bridging \[ \{(sk_{PKE}) \mid cm_1 = G_1^{sk_{PKE}} H_1^{e_1} \land cm_2 = G_2^{sk_{PKE}} H_2^{u_2}\} \], where $cm_1$ is obtained via $\Sigma$-Dlog protocol while the commitment $cm_2$ is computed by the GS proof systems on the knowledge of SPS signature $\sigma^2_{\text{sig}}$.

$L_{2.4}$. \[ sk_{PKE} A \approx vk_{\text{sig}} A \]

The prover to show the knowledge of the secret key $sk_{PKE}$ and the fact that it corresponds to the public encryption key $pk_{PKE}$ uses the sigma protocol described in Figure 22 and runs $\Sigma$-Dlog \[ \{(sk_{PKE}) \mid pk_{PKE} = G_1^{sk_{PKE}}\} \].

The prover runs the bridging sigma protocol $\Sigma$-Bridging \[ \{(sk_{PKE}) \mid cm_1 = G_1^{sk_{PKE}} H_1^{e_1} \land cm_2 = G_2^{sk_{PKE}} H_2^{u_2}\} \] to prove the used secret key $sk_{PKE}$ in the above relations are the same. The commitment $cm_1$ is obtained by the sigma protocol $\Sigma$-Dlog of the PKE’s decryption correctness while the commitment $cm_2$ is computed by sigma protocol $\Sigma$-Dlog to show the relation of PKE’s public and secret keys.

**D.3 ul-PCS for RBAC Policies**

**Language $L_1$.** The first language in the RBAC ul-PCS takes the instance $x_{st} = \{T_{\text{rand}}, ID_{\text{ctr}}, vk_{\text{sig}} A, M := (A_1, A_2, G_2), vk_{\text{sig}} A\}$ and witness $w_{st} = (k, \text{ctr}, vk_{\text{sig}}, sk_{\text{sig}}, w_k, \sigma^2_{\text{sig}}, \sigma_{\text{sig}})$ as inputs and the prover proves the satisfiability of the following relations:

\[ L_1 \]
\[ L_1. \] \( \text{ACC} (\text{MemVerify}(\mathcal{A}_k, k, \sigma_k)) = 1 \) To prove the possession of a hidden membership witness \( w_k \) that verifies the accumulator value \( \mathcal{A}_k \), the prover uses the GS proof systems. The satisfiability of the verification of the given accumulator scheme can be written as a PPE of the form, \( e(w_k, \mathcal{A}_k) e(G_k, k) = e(G_1, G_2) \). We use the GS proofs to prove the satisfiability of this equation in zero-knowledge.

\[ L_2. \] \( \text{DS} \) To prove the verification phase of the SPS signature \( \sigma_k \) to show the fact that the verification key, \( \sigma_k \), the prover to make a bridging between the above relations and showing the fact that the used PRF key \( k \) in both of them is the same secret witness runs \( \Sigma \)-Bridging \( \{ (\mathcal{ctr}, e_1, e_2, 0, u_2) \mid cm_1 = G_1^e H_1^e \land cm_2 = G_2^e H_2^e \} \). In which the commitment \( cm_1 \) is obtained via \( \Sigma \)-PRF protocol while the commitment \( cm_2 \) is computed in the GS proof on the satisfiability of the accumulator verification algorithm.

\[ L_3. \] Additional, the prover utilizes the range-proof techniques to prove \( \mathcal{ctr} \in [0, T_{\text{Rand}}) \).

\[ L_4. \] \( \text{DS} \) Verify \( (\mathcal{v}_k, (\mathcal{v}_k, \mathcal{w}_k)) = 1 \) To prove the verification phase of the SPS signature \( \mathcal{v}_k \) satisfies under message \( M = (\mathcal{A}_1, \mathcal{v}_k) \) and the fact that it is signed by the CA, we can show it via a PPE of the form, \( e(G_1, \hat{X}_1^k) e(v_k, \hat{X}_2^k) = e(R_{\mathcal{v}_1}, T_{\mathcal{v}_1}) \land e(S_{\mathcal{v}_1}, G_2) = e(G_1, T_{\mathcal{v}_1}) \), where \( \mathcal{v}_k := (\hat{X}_1^k, \hat{X}_2^k) \) and \( \sigma_{\mathcal{v}_1} := (R_{\mathcal{v}_1}, S_{\mathcal{v}_1}, T_{\mathcal{v}_1}) \). We use GS proof systems to show the satisfiability of this equation.

\[ L_5. \] \( \text{DS} \) Verify \( (\mathcal{v}_k, (\mathcal{v}_k, \mathcal{w}_k)) = 1 \) To validate a newly generated verification key and to bind it with the new identifier \( \mathcal{ID}_{\mathcal{v}_k} \), the prover needs to prove the satisfiability of a PPE relation described as, \( e(v_k, H(v_k, \mathcal{ID}_{\mathcal{v}_k})) = e(G_1, \sigma_{\mathcal{v}_k}) \) that represents the validity of BLS signature. We use GS proof systems to instantiate this relation in zero-knowledge.

\[ L_6. \] To show the fact that the verification key, \( \mathcal{v}_k \), used in the above GS proof is already certified by the CA and is identical to the one in the GS of the SPS signature \( \sigma_{\mathcal{v}_1} \), the prover makes a bridge between the relations discussed in \( L_4 \) and \( L_5 \) via proving the following PPE instead.

\[
e \left(G_1^k, \hat{X}_1^k\right) e \left(v_k, \hat{X}_2^k\right) e \left(R_{\mathcal{v}_1}, T_{\mathcal{v}_1}\right)^{-1} = 1_{G_T} \land \\
e \left(S_{\mathcal{v}_1}, G_2\right) e \left(G_1, T_{\mathcal{v}_1}\right)^{-1} = 1_{G_T} \land \\
e \left(v_k, H(v_k, \mathcal{ID}_{\mathcal{v}_k})\right) e \left(G_1, \sigma_{\mathcal{v}_k}\right)^{-1} = 1_{G_T}.
\]

This PPE involves both relations in \( L_4 \) and \( L_5 \) with a single commitment to \( v_k \).

**Language** \( L_2 \). In the second relation, the prover takes the instance \( x_{st} = (\mathcal{ID}_S, ct_R, v_k^{A_1}, pp', A') \) and the witness \( w_{st} = (k, ct, x, w, \sigma_{w}^{A_1}) \) as input and acts as follows:
\( \mathcal{L}_2.1 \) [ID\( _S = \text{PRF.Eval}(k, \text{ctr}) \)]. To prove the well-formedness of the PRF evaluation the prover runs the sigma protocol \( \Sigma\text{-PRF}\{(k, \text{ctr}) | \text{ID}\_S = G_1^{t(k+\text{ctr})} \} \) over the cyclic group \( G_1 \).

\( \mathcal{L}_2.2 \) [ID\( _S \).Verify(\( \text{vk}_\text{sig}^A(w, \sigma^2_\text{sig}) = 1 \text{\_k} \)]. This relation can be formulated by a PPE of the form, \( e(G_1^1, \hat{X}_1^A) e(w, \hat{X}_2^A) = e(R^2_\text{sig}, T^2_\text{sig}) \land e(S^2_\text{sig}, G_2) = e(G_1^1, T^2_\text{sig}) \), where \( \text{vk}_\text{sig}^A := (\hat{X}_1^A, \hat{X}_2^A) \) and \( \sigma^2_\text{sig} := (R^2_\text{sig}, S^2_\text{sig}, T^2_\text{sig}) \) and the prover can prove the satisfiability of the relation by GS proof systems.

The prover runs \( \Sigma\text{-Bridging}\{(k, e_1, e_2, 0, u_2) | \text{cm}_1 = G_1^e_{H_1^1} \land \text{cm}_2 = G_2^e_{H_2^2}K^a_{2} \} \) to prove the fact that the PRF key \( k \) used in \( \Sigma\text{-PRF} \) and is already signed by the CA. The commitment \( \text{cm}_1 \) is obtained via the sigma protocol described in Figure 26 while the commitment \( \text{cm}_2 \) is computed by the GS proof of knowledge \( \sigma^2_\text{sig} \).

\( \mathcal{L}_2.3 \) [ACC\_MemVrf(\( A', \hat{\vec{x}}, \vec{w} \)) = 1\_\text{ID}]. Similar to the previous languages, the prover can describe the membership verification of the accumulator scheme by the satisfiability of a PPE of the form, \( e(w, A') e(w, (G_2^e)^x) = e(G_1^1, G_2^2) \). Thus it runs the GS proof to show the possession of hidden parameters.

The prover bridges the relations describe in \( \mathcal{L}_2.2 \) and \( \mathcal{L}_2.3 \) to show the fact that the membership witness \( w \) which passes the accumulator verification is already certifies and is signed in SPS signature \( \sigma^2_\text{sig} \). For this aim the prover proves the following PPE instead:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{e}(G_1^1, \hat{X}_1^A) \cdot e(w, \hat{X}_2^A)^{-1} \cdot e(R^2_\text{sig}, T^2_\text{sig})^{-1} = 1_{G_T} \land \\
e(S^2_\text{sig}, G_2^1) e(G_1^1, T^2_\text{sig})^{-1} = 1_{G_T} \land \\
e(w, A') \cdot e(w, (G_2^e)^x) \cdot e(G_1^1, G_2^2)^{-1} = 1_{G_T}.
\end{align*}
\]

## E Distributed Setup and KeyGen Algorithms

In the following, we showcase that using standard techniques we can achieve distributed implementations of the algorithms Setup and KeyGen for our argument, however a lifting to malicious security would again follow standard techniques.

### E.1 The Generic ul-PCS Scheme

First, we look at how the generic ul-PCS, proposed in Figure 14, and its concrete instantiation based on the OT12’s inner product predicate encryption [53] can be distributed. Recall that the CA holds the predicate encryption’s master secret key, \( \text{msk}_{\text{pe}} \), along with a signature key \( \text{sk}^A_{\text{sig}} \).

On the other hand, a user keeps will obtain the PRF seed \( k \) and a predicate encryption secret key \( \text{sk}^x_f \) along with its root signature key-pair (\( \text{sk}^x_{\text{sig}}, \text{vk}^x_{\text{sig}} \)). To generate these secret elements in a distributed manner, we can follow the following steps:

1. **CA-side setup:**
   a. Given the description of the OT12 IP-PE scheme in Appendix C, we can generate the keys in a distributed way, where each server holds a share \( B_i^* \) of the matrix \( B^* = \prod_i B_i^* \) (component-wise product). This could be done with a standard MPC, and essentially, we need a sum-sharing of a matrix \( X \) and its inverse \( \bar{X} \). In particular, this means each entry \( Y_{ij} \) is shared among \( n \) distinct certificate authorities. While this is a heavier computation, implementations of such an operation based on the methods by Blom et al. are possible [12].
(b) Each CA possesses its own signature key-pair.

2. Registration of a client for attributes $x$:
   (a) Each CA samples random seed $k_i$ and a public key share $v_{k_i}$.
   (b) The CAs create additional shared randomness in anticipation of the creation of the secret functional key. They compute a sum-sharing of $n + 1$ random elements $r_k$.
   (c) Then they run a multiplication protocol to obtain a sharing of selected matrix elements: $r_1Y_{1,2}, \ldots, r_1Y_{1,n+1}$ (those are the positions for generating a scaled vector of attributes) and $r_jY_{i,3n+j}$ ($1 < j \leq n + 1$) (those are the positions where random exponents are needed).
   (d) Recalling from Appendix C.1 that in OT12 the functional key $sk_f$ is a vector whose $i$th component is $\prod_{i=1}^{N} G_{Y_{ij}}^{z_i}$, we observe that each CA can compute a meaningful share $sk_f^i$ by doing this computation based on the attribute $x$ and the sharing of elements $Y_{ij}$ resp. $r_kY_{ij}$ (for those indices where additional randomness is needed).
   (e) The CA signs the pairs $(k_i, x)$, $(k, sk_f)$, and $(k, v_{k_i})$.
   (f) Aggregation step:
      i. Functional key shares are aggregated by component-wise multiplication of the vectors $sk_f^i$. The addition in the exponent leads to the expression in (d) as everything has been computed as a sum-sharing.
      ii. Seed shares are summed up $k = \sum_i k_i$.
      iii. Root key pairs are summed up as well (e.g. assuming a simple DL-based signature scheme).

3. Finally, the aggregated pairs $(k, sk_f)$, $(k, x)$ and $(k, v_{sk_{sig}})$ are certifiable, because in any of the languages $\mathcal{L}_1$ and $\mathcal{L}_2$, instead of proving the knowledge of a signature from the CA, one would have to prove the aggregation is done correctly based on the signed shares by each CA. While conceptually possible, by an additional round of interaction, one can even shift more computational overhead to the registration phase as outlined below:

3’. Alternatively to the above certification, one can add one round of interaction, where the client commits to each aggregated pair, proves the well-formedness using a NIZK and obtains a threshold signature on the commitments. In this case, each pair is certifiable in the first and second NIZK languages by having one additional commitment plus a signature on it. In this case, for further efficiency, the utilized SPS scheme can be replaced with the recent Threshold SPS-scheme of Crites et al. [26]. In this case, each CA has its own SPS signature key-pair and a sufficiently large number of issuers is needed to obtain a valid signature (with respect to the aggregated public key). This strategy pushes most of the computational overhead into the registration phase.

Furthermore, simplifications can be made depending on the adversarial model. We observe that the root key pair $(sk_{sig}, v_{sk_{sig}})$ for the party is never revealed by the party in any operation, and thus we can simply let one of the servers decide for that one if we are in an honest-but-curious setting.

E.2 The ul-PCS with Separable Policies

Similarly, we can distribute the generation of the secret keys in the ul-PCS scheme with separable policies. In this scheme, the PE scheme is “realized” using ordinary PKE with keys $(pk_{PKE}, sk_{PKE})$. Furthermore, we have signature keys to authorize sender and receiver predicates. Compared to the generic scheme discussed above, it is much simpler and we can run a distributed-key generation in advance and each CA has its own signature key-pair. We briefly discuss how the user’s registration works concretely.
1. **CA-side setup:** Each CA samples random PRF seed \( k_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{p^k} \) and a public key share \( v_k_i \).

2. **Registration of a client for attributes \( x \):** Each CA issues a signature on the value \((k_i, v_k_i, m)\), where \( m \in \{0, 1\} \) is a bit. If \( m = 1 \), the client also gets a signature on \((k_i, s_k_i)\). The client performs standard aggregation to compute all relevant values \((s_k_{sig} \text{ from all } s_k_i's, k \text{ from all } k_i's)\).

3. Certification is again possible via a NIZK, or via one more round of interaction as above.

### E.3 The Role-based ul-PCS Construction

The signing process in the role-based ul-PCS is as above, but the relevant values that could break privacy are the accumulator witnesses (because they would allow to test which attributes can send to a target public key), and the seed values. Hence, here one has to do the following:

1. **CA setup:** As the accumulator witnesses in this case are just signatures on roles that belong to an accumulator value, we just set up a threshold signature scheme. Each CA then holds a signature share on a role \( i \) for accumulator \( A \) (identified by the signature public key).

2. **Registration of a client for attributes \( x \):**
   - (a) Each CA samples random PRF seed \( k_i \) and a public key share \( v_k_i \).
   - (b) The user can simply obtain the partial signature shares and a combination of them and finally is in possession of the full witness for its role \( x \).
   - (c) The remaining steps are as above: the client can reconstruct the full seed \( k_i \), the full root signature keypair \((v_k_{sig}, s_k_{sig})\), and has all witnesses.

3. Certification can be done via a NIZK or via another round of interaction as above.

### F Preliminaries on One-Time Accounts (OTA)

An OTA scheme \([30]\) is defined as a tuple of algorithms \( \text{OTA} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{NoteGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Receive}, \text{NulEval}) \) with the following syntax and intended semantics:

- **Setup:** Generates the public parameters that is given implicitly to any algorithm below as input.
- **KeyGen:** Generates an asymmetric key-pair \((pk, sk)\).
- **NoteGen**\((pk, \vec{a}, r)\): Takes a public key and a vector of type-value pairs and generates the note, i.e. the account.
- **Enc\((pk, (\vec{a}, r))\):** Encrypts the information toward the recipient such that the recipient will be able to reconstruct the note’s content and to spend it (see below).
- **Receive**\((note, C, sk)\): If the note and ciphertext are created for the public key belonging to \( sk \), then the algorithm returns the values \((\vec{a}, r)\), and otherwise returns \( \perp \).
- **NulEval\((sk, r)\):** Returns the nullifier value that is tied to a particular note (generated with randomness \( r \)). The nullifier is needed to spend the tokens contained in a note.

OTA’s must be accompanied by some efficient NIZK languages, including the ones we need in our construction in Section 6, which are shown to be efficiently realizable \([30]\) using for example Groth-Sahai proof systems. The security requirements from an OTA scheme include:

1. Nullifiers should appear pseudo-random and be unique, such that they can be presented as evidence of spending a coin, and double spends would directly visible by repeated nullifiers.
2. The note is binding to the key and values, unique, as well as private in that it hides its content.

We discuss these requirements in the security analysis of our extended scheme.