Obfuscating Decision Trees

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Abstract. We construct a new encoder for hiding parameters in an interval membership function. As an interesting application, we design a simple and efficient virtual black-box obfuscator for evasive decision tree classifiers. The security of our construction relies upon random oracle paradigm. Our exclusive goal behind designing the obfuscator is that, not only will the solution increase the class of functions that has cryptographically secure obfuscators, but also address the open problem of non-interactive prediction in privacy-preserving classification using computationally inexpensive cryptographic hash functions.

Keywords: program obfuscation · privacy-preserving classification · decision trees · hash functions.

1 Introduction

Program obfuscation has received considerable recognition by the cryptographic community over the recent years. An obfuscator $O$ is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that transforms a program $C$ to its semantically equivalent counterpart $\tilde{C}$, such that a secret that is efficiently computable from $C$, is hard to extract given $\tilde{C}$. However, the sustainability of such constructions rely upon a variety of computational and architectural assumptions, along with several notions of security guarantees.

The definitional framework of program obfuscation was given by Barak et al. in their seminal work [3] using a simulation-based security paradigm. They established the notion of virtual black-box (VBB) obfuscation, where a polynomial adversary $\mathcal{A}$ having access to $\tilde{C}$ has but a negligible advantage in extracting a desirable property over a polynomial simulator $\mathcal{S}$, who emulates the oracle of $C$; in short, anything that is efficiently computable from $\tilde{C}$, can also be computed efficiently from the input-output access to the program. Their main results rule out the possibility of designing efficient obfuscators for generic class of programs, nonetheless indicating that obfuscators for specific families of programs are less ambitious and thus achievable. Canetti [12] shows construction of an efficient obfuscator for point functions, that achieves a relaxed notion of virtual black-box using a probabilistic hashing algorithm $\mathcal{R}$, which imitates the 'useful' properties of a random oracle. The obfuscated program stores $\mathcal{R}(x)$, where $x$ is sampled
uniformly from a superlogarithmic min-entropy distribution, such that on input $y$, outputs 1, if $R(x) = R(y)$. Such favoring assertions were followed by designing efficient VBB obfuscation schemes for a special family of functions (evasive functions [2]) which achieve the goal that a PPT adversary cannot distinguish between the obfuscation of $C$ drawn randomly from the function family and obfuscation of a function that always outputs zero. Notable works in this direction include obfuscation of point-functions [26], pattern-matching with wildcards [6,7], compute-and-compare programs [18,27], fuzzy-matching for Hamming distance [17], hyperplane membership [13], etc. and give a strong intuition that learning a desirable property of a program by identifying the accepting input(s) is a hard problem.

In this paper, we focus on a new technique for encoding interval membership functions. We find an interesting and important application in designing an efficient virtual black-box obfuscator for evasive decision trees (see Definition 4.1). In the following, we present our intuition behind obfuscating decision trees.

1.1 Privacy-Preserving Classification using Decision Trees

In the interest of establishing the usefulness and significance of obfuscating decision trees, we provide a brief overview on privacy-preserving classification using decision tree classifiers.

Decision tree classifiers are extensively used for prediction and analysis in sensitive applications such as spam detection, medical or genomics, stock investment, etc. [8,15,23]. Consider an example of a medical facility (model-provider) who designs a model from sensitive profiles of patients to diagnose certain disease. The model is then outsourced to a cloud server to provide classification to a user who wants to make a prediction about her health. If the model is leaked, the sensitive training data will be disclosed [1,16], breaching the HIPAA\footnote{Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996} compliance. What’s more, the user does not want to reveal her queries and classification results to the cloud server. This calls for privacy-preserving classification techniques, where the model is hidden from anyone but the model-provider and prediction queries/classification remain private to the user, such that no leakage of useful information happens during the classification phase.

The state-of-the-art privacy-preserving classification solutions employ an interactive approach: encrypt and outsource the model to cloud server, where it processes encrypted queries and forwards encrypted classification to the users. The constructions involve multiple rounds of communication and rely upon expensive cryptographic computations using fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) [9,10], garbled circuits [4,5], etc. Brickell et al. [11] suggest an interactive two-party protocol employing additive homomorphic encryption and $ml$ oblivious transfers (where $l$ is the bit-length of each input feature and $m$ is the number of decision nodes), restricting the user from performing multiple queries on the...
encrypted tree. In their well-known work, Bost et al. [10] present a comparison protocol between model-provider and the user for each node in the decision tree using FHE methods. Tai et al. [24] make use of multiple communication rounds to transfer the path costs and encrypted labels to the client. The authors of [14] design an FHE-based solution (SortingHat) to secure the prediction queries and classification results with reduced communication costs, but do not guarantee the privacy of the model.

Our intuition behind obfuscating decision trees is to eliminate user-interaction the model-provider or cloud server. In particular, we aim to construct an efficient non-interactive solution to privacy-preserving classification with evasive decision tree classifiers. We now explain why we do not consider obfuscating arbitrary decision trees. If a decision tree could be learned from the input/output behaviour of the classifier, then protecting the privacy of the model would be impossible. Viewing along the lines, Tramer et al. [25] show how on submitting a total of \( m \cdot \log_2(b/\epsilon) \) queries, a model could be learned from its black-box access, where \( m \) is the number of internal nodes and \( \epsilon \) is the minimum width of an interval in a node; they call it model extraction attack. To prevent such attacks, the existing literature observes API calls to issue warnings [19,22] or adds perturbations [20,28]. However, since there are no theoretical restrictions on the number of prediction queries made by a user [21], limiting them is not a reasonable approach towards thwarting such attacks. We define a special class of decision trees, for which it is hard to find an accepting input, such that a polynomial adversary cannot extract the model except with negligible probability; we call such decision trees as evasive, and claim that if a decision tree is not evasive, it is impossible to protect the privacy of the model, and hence there is no choice but to restrict to evasive decision trees.

Note that, lockable obfuscation [27] encodes a class of branching programs under learning-with-errors (LWE) assumption and thus could be suitable for obfuscating decision trees. However, we focus on solutions that are simpler and more efficient.

1.2 Our Contributions

On the whole, we contribute towards designing a new technique for encoding interval membership functions, and as an application we construct an efficient VBB obfuscator for evasive decision trees (see Definition 4.4). We focus on trees at constant depth, but the techniques will apply to more general classes of decision trees. Note that, we do not consider privacy-preserving methods to construct the model, and how the model is trained is out of the scope of this study. A technical briefing of our construction is as follows:

Technical Overview. Let \( n, \ell, d \in \mathbb{N} \). Consider a function \( C : \mathbb{N}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) that classifies input \( (x_i)_{i \in [n]}, x_i \in \{0,1\}^{\ell} \) based on a full binary tree of depth \( d \). At each internal node \( v_j \), Boolean function \( g_j : \{0,1\}^{\ell} \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) outputs 1 if and
only if \( x_i \leq t_j \), where \( t_j \) is an integer in \([0, 2^\ell]\). we aim to encode \([t_j, i] \) at each \( r_j \), along with the label of terminal nodes \((s_1, \ldots, s_d+1)\), where \( s_k \in \{0, 1\} \). We assume that \( x_i \) is compared at most twice along a path (from root node at level 0 till it reaches terminal node at level \( d-1 \)), i.e. \( x_i \leq c_i + w_i, \quad x_i > c_i \), where \( c_i, c_i + w_i \in (t_1, \ldots, t_{2^\ell}) \) and \( w_i \leq \ell - \frac{1}{2^\ell} \). This defines an interval \((c_i, c_i + w_i]\) where \( x_i \) is true, such that \( C((x_i)_{i \in [n]}) = 1 \), if \( x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i] \) for every \( i \in [n] \).

We explain the obfuscation as follows: Boolean functions \( x_1 \leq (c_i + w_i) \) and \( x_i > c_i \) can be reduced to intervals \([0, c_i + w_i + 1) \) and \([c_i + 1, 2^\ell) \) respectively where \( x_i \) is true. We divide the intervals into disjoint sub-intervals of the form \([a, a + 2^p)\), where \( p \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\} \). Note that the intersection of the two sub-intervals produces sub-intervals, the union of which is equivalent to the \((c_i, c_i + w_i] \), which we want to encode. Consider \( f_i : [0, 1]^\ell \to [0, 1]^{\ell - 1} \) such that \( f_i(y) = \frac{y}{2^\ell} \) for \( i \in \{0, 1, \ldots, \ell - 1\} \). We generate the encodings \( A_i \) of the intersection of sub-intervals (of the form \([a, a + 2^p]) \) by calculating \( H(f_p(a)) \), where \( H : [0, 1]^n \to [0, 1]^n \) is a hash function. Finally, for each encoding in \( A_i \), we concatenate \( n \) entries sorted in order of \( i \) and hash them using \( H_c : [0, 1]^n \to [0, 1]^q \) and publish the set of hashes. Note that, reordering the nodes in order of \( i \) along each accepting path hides the structure, though the size of the obfuscated program may reveal the number of different accepting paths. To classify input \((x_i)_{i \in [n]}\), one computes the set of encodings for every \( i \in [n] \), by calculating \( H(f_p(x_i)) \), where \( p \in \{0, \ldots, \ell - 1\} \) and for each such encoding, concatenates \( n \) entries sorted in order of \( i \), and hashes them using \( H_c \). For an accepting input, one of the generated hashes will be contained in the set hashes published by the obfuscator.

2 Preliminaries

Let \( S \) be a set defined by an integer interval as \( S = \{x \in \mathbb{N} : 1 \leq x \leq n\} \). We denote by \(|S|\), size of the set \( S \). We use the standard notations to denote intervals as \((a, b)\), \((a, b]\), \([a, b)\) and \([a, b]\), for \( a, b \in \mathbb{N} \). We denote l-bit binary encoding of \( n \) as \( r_{\ell-1}2^{\ell-1} + \cdots + r_02^0 \) for \( n \in \mathbb{N}^+ \), where \( r_i \in \{0, 1\} \). We denote hamming weight of \( n \) as \( wt(n) = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} r_i \). For a program \( C \), we denote its size by \(|C|\). We rely upon the notion of computational security and follow the asymptotic approach throughout the paper. We provide the honest parties and the adversaries with a security parameter \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \). We model the adversaries as a family of probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) programs, running in time \( a.\lambda^c \), for some constants \( a, c \). A function \( \mu : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}^+ \) is called negligible in \( n \), if is grows slower than \( n^{-c} \), for every constant \( c \). We measure negligibility with respect to the security parameter \( \lambda \). We use \( \|n\| \) to denote concatenation of a sequence of strings \((a_1, \ldots, a_n)\).

3 Obfuscation Definitions

In this section, we present the standard definition of obfuscation and discuss distributional virtual black box (DVBB) security that our obfuscator satisfies.
We give formal definitions of evasive functions, as our obfuscator targets this specific class of functions.

**Definition 3.1 (Distributional Virtual Black-Box Obfuscation [2,3]).**
Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ be the security parameter. Let $\mathcal{C} = \{C_\lambda\}$ be the family of polynomial-size programs parameterized by inputs of length $n(\lambda)$, and let $\mathcal{D} = \{D_\lambda\}$ be the class of distribution ensembles, where $D_\lambda$ is a distribution over $C_\lambda$. A PPT algorithm $O$ is an obfuscator for the family $\mathcal{C}$ and the distribution $D$, if it satisfies the following conditions:

- **Functionality Preservation**: For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, there exists a negligible function $\mu(\lambda)$, such that:
  $$\Pr_{O}[\forall x \in \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)} : \tilde{C}(x) = C(x)] > 1 - \mu(\lambda)$$
  where the probability is over the coin tosses of $O$.

- **Polynomial Slowdown**: For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, there exists a polynomial $q$ such that the running time of $O(C)$ is bounded by $q(|C|)$, where $|C|$ denotes the size of the program.

- **Virtual Black-box**: For every (non-uniform) polynomial size adversary $A$, there exists a (non-uniform) polynomial size simulator $S$ with oracle access to $C$, such that for every distribution $D \in \mathcal{D}_\lambda$:
  $$\left| \Pr_{C \sim D_\lambda, O, A}[C(A(O(C)) = 1] - \Pr_{C \sim D_\lambda, S}[S^C(1^\lambda) = 1] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda)$$
  where $\mu(\lambda)$ is a negligible function.

**Definition 3.2 (Evasive Program Collection [2]).** A collection of programs $\mathcal{C} = \{C_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ parameterized by inputs of length $n(\lambda)$ is called evasive, if there exists a negligible function $\mu(\lambda)$, such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and every input $x \in \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)}$:
  $$\Pr_{C \sim \mathcal{C}_\lambda}[C(x) = 1] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$
  where the oracle access to the program allows at most $p(n)$ queries.

### 4 Decision Trees

In this section we briefly introduce binary decision trees and present some related formal definitions that will be used throughout the paper. Without loss of generality, we define decision tree as a full binary tree and restrict classification labels to be in $\{0,1\}$, i.e. the tree provides binary classification.

**Definition 4.1 (Decision Trees).** Let $n, d, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$ and $(x_i)_{i=1}^n = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{N}^n$ be a finite sequence of input elements, where $x_i$ is an integer between 0 and $2^{\ell} - 1$ and represents the value of some attribute for all $i \in [n]$. Classification
of an input \((x_1, \ldots, x_n)\) is defined as evaluation of the classification function \(C : \mathbb{N}^\ell \to \{0,1\}, (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \mapsto C(x_1, \ldots, x_n)\) based on a model decision tree defined as follows:

A full binary tree where \(\mathcal{D} = \{v_1, \ldots, v_{2d}\}\) denotes decision nodes in level-order sequence, and \(d\) is the depth of the tree. Let \(\mathcal{S} = (s_1, \ldots, s_{2^d+1})\) be the sequence of labels of terminal nodes where \(s_k \in \{0,1\}\). Each node \(v_j \in \mathcal{D}\) associates a Boolean function \(g_j : \{0,1\}^\ell \to \{0,1\}, (x_1) \mapsto g_j(x_1)\) such that \(g_j(x_1) = 1\), if \(x_i \leq t_j\), which specifies the branch to walk, where \(t_j \in [0,2^\ell)\) denotes the threshold value at \(v_j\). At input \((x_i)\), the function \(g_j\) iterates \((d-1)\) times starting from root node at level 0 such that function \(g_j\) at level \([\log_2 j]\) determines which function \(g_{j+1}\) at the next level \([\log_2 (j+1)]\) to be used, till it reaches the terminal nodes at level \((d-1)\) which are labeled by one of the classes in \(\{0,1\}\).

Guided by our objective to prevent an adversary from extracting the model, we make an effort to define \textit{assets} in a classification program. Each decision node \(v_j\) associates Boolean function \(g_j\) that checks whether the inequality \(x_i \leq t_j\) holds or not. We identify \(t_j\) and index \(i\) in \((x_i)_{i \in [n]}\), along with the labels of terminal nodes \(\mathcal{S}\), as critical and central to the predictive behavior of the model. In what follows, we define Structure of Decision Trees as the assets that we want to protect in a decision tree classification program.

\textbf{Definition 4.2 (Structure of Decision Trees).} For each decision node \(v_j \in \mathcal{D}\), there exists a tuple \([t_j, i]\), where \(t_j\) denotes the corresponding threshold value and \(i\) denotes the index in the sequence \((x_1, \ldots, x_n)\). Structure of a decision tree, denoted by \(\text{str}(C)\) defines the sequence of \(2^d\) tuples and the sequence of labels of the terminal nodes \(\mathcal{S}\).

We assume \(x_i\) to be compared at most twice along an accepting path. Let \(w_{\text{max}} \in \mathbb{N}\) and \(c_i, c_i + w_i\) be integers between 0 and \(2^\ell - 1\) and \(w_i \in [0, w_{\text{max}}]\). Consider \(x_i \leq c_i + w_i\) and \(x_i > c_i\) along a path from root at level 0 till terminal nodes at level \(d-1\). The collection of inequalities define an interval \([c_i, c_i + w_i]\), where \(x_i\) is true. Finally, \(C((x_i)_{i \in [n]}) = 1\) if \(x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i]\) for every \(i \in [n]\).
Definition 4.3 (Decision Region). Let $n, \ell, w_{\max} \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $c_i, c_i + w_i$ be integers between 0 and $2^\ell - 1$ and $w_i \in [0, w_{\max})$. Define decision region to be the hyper-rectangular region formed by $n$ overlapping intervals $(c_i, c_i + w_i]$ determined by the classification function $C$, such that $x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i]$ for every $i \in [n]$.

Evasive Function Family. As stated in Definition 4.1, a binary classification program maps input $(x_i)_{i \in [n]}$ to one of the classes $\{0, 1\}$. From [25], it is evident that an adversary, by identifying the accepting/rejecting inputs, can extract the model (learn the assets in the classification program using binary search) within polynomial attempts. From our discussion in Section 1, we can conjecture that it is impossible to protect the privacy of the model from generic model-extraction attacks, and this is our intuition behind restricting to a special class of classification programs, for which it is computationally hard to find an accepting input. We call this evasive collection which states that for every input, a random program selected from this collection evaluates to 0 with overwhelming probability. In what follows, we define evasive decision tree collection, with the exclusive goal of obfuscating this class of programs, such that adversary cannot learn the assets from the input/output behavior of the programs. Throughout the paper, we assume that an adversary knows the domain of inputs, but not the accepting inputs.

Definition 4.4 (Evasive Decision Tree Collection). Let $C = \{C_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ be a family of polynomial-size classification functions where $C_\lambda$ defines a set of decision tree classifiers with a security parameter $\lambda$. Every $C \in C_\lambda$ maps an input sequence $(x_i)_{i \in [n]}$ to a single output bit, where $n = n(\lambda)$ and $d = d(\lambda)$. We say, $C$ is evasive, if there exists a negligible function $\mu$ such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for every input $(x_i)_{i \in [n]}$:

$$P_{C \leftarrow C_\lambda} [C((x_i)_{i \in [n]}) = 1] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

In short, Definition 4.4 points out that for every $(x_i)_{i \in [n]}$, a program $C$ chosen randomly from the collection $C_\lambda$ evaluates to 1 with negligible probability.

Any distribution $X_n \in [0, 2^\ell)^n$ defines a distribution $C_\lambda$, such that $C \leftarrow C_\lambda$ computes whether an input $(x_i)_{i \in [n]}$ is accepted or not. This is equivalent to choosing $(c_1, \ldots, c_n) \leftarrow X_n$ and $(w_1, \ldots, w_n) \in [0, w_{\max})^n$, such that $x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i]$, for every $i \in [n]$. For the program collection to be evasive, it is necessary that this probability is negligible. Thus we require $X_n$ to have large entropy. As uniform distributions provide the highest entropy, we have the best possible conditions guaranteed under these distributions. However, while dealing with real-world applications, we might come across scenarios where the sampling is done from non-uniform distributions. Intuitively, the scenarios that lead to non-evasiveness are: (1) the decision regions are too big; (2) the number of points in the space $[0, 2^\ell)^n$ representing $(c_1, \ldots, c_n)$ are too few; (3) the decision regions overlap with each other. Figure 2 shows two example distributions that lead towards
non-evasiveness in decision trees. Hence for an evasive collection, the distribution $X_n$ needs to have a large number of points representing $(c_1, \ldots, c_n)$. Adding to that, the distribution needs to be 'well-spread', such that the overlapping between points are relatively small. We further this discussion with the calculation of the required parameters for identifying an evasive program collection. We start with uniform distribution on $[0, 2^\ell)^n$, where $n, \ell$ are polynomials in $\lambda$.

**Lemma 4.1.** Let $n, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$. Let $c_i$ is integer between $0$ and $2^\ell - 1$ and $w_i$ is an integer between $0$ and $w_{\text{max}} - 1$. The maximum number of elements in the decision region defined by $(c_i, c_i + w_i)$, for $i \in [n]$, is at most $(w_{\text{max}})^n$.

**Proof.** For an $c_i$ selected uniformly in $[0, 2^\ell)$, $w_i$ has to be selected such that $w_i < w_{\text{max}}$, for some $w_{\text{max}} \in \mathbb{N}$. It can be readily seen that the number of ways of selecting the elements along an interval is $w_{\text{max}}$. For all the $n$ intervals chosen uniformly and independently of each other, the number of possible ways is at most $(w_{\text{max}})^n$.

**Lemma 4.2.** Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ be the security parameter and $n, \ell, w_{\text{max}} \in \mathbb{N}$, where $w_{\text{max}} \leq 2^{(\ell - \frac{1}{2})}$. Fix an input $(x_i)_{i \in [n]}$. Then the probability that $(x_i)_{i \in [n]}$ belongs to the decision region defined by $(c_i, c_i + w_i)$, for $i \in [n]$, where $c_i$ is chosen uniformly from $[0, 2^\ell)$, $w_i$ is chosen uniformly from $[0, w_{\text{max}})$, is not more than $2^{-\lambda}$.

**Proof.** The total number of points in the space $[0, 2^\ell)^n$ is given by $2^{n\ell}$. The input $(x_i)_{i \in [n]}$ is contained in the decision region defined by $(c_i, c_i + w_i)$, $i \in [n]$, when $x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i)$ for every $i \in [n]$, where $c_i$ and $w_i$ are chosen uniformly from $[0, 2^\ell)$ and $[0, w_{\text{max}})$ respectively.

Now, for a fixed input $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ to be contained in the decision region, the $c_i$’s need to be selected such that $c_i \in (x_i - w_i, x_i)$, for every $i \in [n]$. It can be readily seen from Lemma 4.1 that the number of ways of selecting $(c_1, \ldots, c_n)$ such that the $w_i$’s are less than $w_{\text{max}}$ are $(w_{\text{max}})^n$ and thus the probability that $(x_i)_{i \in [n]}$ belongs to the decision region defined by $(c_i, c_i + w_i)$ is given by $\frac{(w_{\text{max}})^n}{2^{n\ell}}$. For $w_{\text{max}} \leq 2^{(\ell - \frac{1}{2})}$, the above probability is at most $2^{-\lambda}$.
Lemma 4.3. Let $\lambda$ be the security parameter and $\ell, n$ are polynomials in $\lambda$. Let $w_{\text{max}}(\lambda)$ be some function such that $w_{\text{max}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{\ell(\lambda) - \frac{\lambda}{2n\ell}}$. Let $2^{-\lambda}$ be a negligible function. Let $X_n$ be an uniform distribution on $[0, 2^\ell)^n$ and $C_\lambda$ be the corresponding distribution on decision trees that checks if $(x_i)_{i\in[n]}$ belongs to the decision region defined by the $c_i$’s and $w_i$’s in the distribution. Then $C_\lambda$ is an evasive program collection.

Proof. A uniform distribution on $[0, 2^\ell)^n$ defines a $C_\lambda$, and we need to show that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and every $(x_i)_{i\in[n]}$, $\Pr_{C \leftarrow C_\lambda} [C((x_i)_{i\in[n]}) = 1] \leq \mu(\lambda)$. For a $C \leftarrow C_\lambda$, probability that $(x_i)_{i\in[n]}$ gets accepted is equivalent to the probability of choosing intervals $(c_i, c_i + w_i]$, where $c_i \leftarrow [0, 2^\ell)$, $w_i \leftarrow [0, w_{\text{max}}]$, such that $x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i]$, for every $i \in [n]$. It is evident from Lemma 4.2 that the probability is at most $2^{-\lambda}$, which is a negligible function in $\lambda$.

We next discuss what it means to learn a decision tree classification program. An attacker aims to reverse-engineer the program to identify $\text{str}(C)$ and thus unlearnability means that an attacker, with oracle access to the $C$, cannot determine $\text{str}(C)$ with overwhelming probability.

Definition 4.5 (Unlearnable Decision Trees). A collection of classification functions $C$ is unlearnable, if for every polynomial time adversary $A$ with oracle access to $C$, there exists a negligible function $\mu$, such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\Pr_{C \leftarrow C_\lambda} [(A)^{C(1^\lambda)} = \text{str}(C)] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

5 Constructing the Obfuscator for Evasive Decision Trees

This section presents our construction for obfuscating evasive decision trees along with an introduction to some basic assumptions and an insight to the building blocks availed for designing the proposal.

5.1 Setup

Without loss of generality, we assume decision trees to be full binary trees that perform binary classification on an input $(x_i)_{i\in[n]}$, where $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$. We consider a decision tree classification program $C \leftarrow C_\lambda$ with depth $d$. We denote internal nodes by $(v_1, \ldots, v_{2d})$ and terminal nodes by $S = (s_1, \ldots, s_{2d+1})$. An accepting path $P_{s_\tau}$ is defined to be the sequence of tuples $[t_j, i, b]$, such that $v_j$ is an ancestor node of $s_\tau \in S$, where $s_\tau = 1$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$ denotes the output of Boolean function $g_j(x_i)$. We assume each element in the input sequence to be used at most twice along an accepting path. This assumption in reasonable, since any collection of inequalities in the form $x_i \leq t_j$ or $x_i > t_j$ defines an interval and so is defined by a pair of comparisons. We assume that Evaluation procedure (Algorithm 5.6) is oblivious to the tuples in $P_{s_\tau}$ and is only allowed to know $d$. 

5.2 Building Blocks.
We want the obfuscated tree to be unlearnable i.e. we aim to hide \( str(C) \) from a PPT adversary. To achieve the same, we develop a library of building blocks that enables encoding arbitrary integer intervals, which we leverage to build our obfuscator.

Reducing Inequality into Intervals. A decision node associates function \( g : \{0, 1\}^t \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \), such that \( g(x) = 1 \), if \( x \leq t \) and 0 otherwise, where \( t \) is any integer between 0 and \( 2^t - 1 \). Thus, the Boolean function splits the integer interval \([0, 2^t)\) at each node into two distinct partitions, call it \( X = [0, t+1) \) and \( X' = [t+1, 2^t) \), where each interval contains \( \ell \)-bit binary encoding of the integers. We further divide intervals \( X \) and \( X' \) into a sequence of disjoint sub-intervals of the form \([a, a+2^b)\), which is the primary building block of our construction. We present the formal description in Algorithm 5.1 and Algorithm 5.2.

**Algorithm 5.1 GenInt(\( t \))**

**Input:** \( \ell \in \mathbb{N}, t \in [0, 2^t) \)

**Output:** \( \{[a_j, a_j+2^p_j]\}_{j \in [k]} \)

1. Compute \( X = [0, t+1) \), where \( X \) contains \( \ell \)-bit binary encoding of integers.
2. Compute \( k = wt(|X|) \), where \( wt(n) \) calculates hamming weight of \( n \).
3. Partition \([0, t+1) \) into \( k \) disjoint sub-intervals \([a_j, a_j+2^p_j)\), such that \( a_j = a_{j+1} + 2^{p_j} \) and \( a_1 = 0 \), where \( p_1, \ldots, p_k (p_1 > p_2 > \cdots > p_k) \) denote the bit positions of the 1’s in the binary encoding of \(|X|\).

**Algorithm 5.2 GenInt(\( X' \))**

**Input:** \( \ell \in \mathbb{N}, t \in [0, 2^t) \)

**Output:** \( \{[a_j, a_j+2^p_j]\}_{j \in [k]} \)

1. Compute \( X' = [t+1, 2^t) \), where \( X' \) contains \( \ell \)-bit binary encoding of integers.
2. Compute \( k' = wt(|X'|) \).
3. Partition \([t+1, 2^t) \) into \( k' \) disjoint sub-intervals \([a_j, a_j+2^p_j)\), such that \( a_j = a_{j-1} + 2^{p_j} \) and \( a_1 = t+1 \), where \( p_1, \ldots, p_{k'} (p_1 < p_2 < \cdots < p_{k'}) \) denote the bit positions of the 1’s in the binary encoding of \(|X'|\).

Intersection of Intervals. Let \( \mathcal{I}_x \) be a set of sub-intervals, all of the form \([a, a+2^j)\) for some \( a \) and \( j \). Let \( \mathcal{I}_x \) be a set of sub-intervals, all of the form \([b, b+2^r)\) for some \( b \) and \( r \). Define intersection of \( \mathcal{I}_x \) and \( \mathcal{I}_x \) as \( \mathcal{I} = \{ I \cap J : I \in \mathcal{I}_x, J \in \mathcal{I}_x \} \setminus \emptyset \).

**Lemma 5.1.** Let \( \ell \in \mathbb{N} \). Consider algorithms GenInt(\( X \)) (Algorithm 5.1) and GenInt(\( X' \)) (Algorithm 5.2). Let \( c, c + w \in \mathbb{Z} \) be such that \( 0 \leq c < c + w < 2^t \). Let \( \mathcal{I}_x \leftarrow \text{GenInt}(c+w), \mathcal{I}_x \leftarrow \text{GenInt}(c) \). Let \( \mathcal{I} = \{ I \cap J : I \in \mathcal{I}_x, J \in \mathcal{I}_x \} \setminus \emptyset \). Then every interval in \( \mathcal{I} \) is of the form \([a, a+2^i)\), for some \( i \).
Proof. We will prove that if $I \in \mathcal{I}_X$ and $J \in \mathcal{I}_X'$ are such that $I \cap J \neq \emptyset$, then $I \subseteq J$ or $J \subseteq I$. GenInt$(c + w)$ divides $[0, c + w + 1)$ into $k$ disjoint sub-intervals $[a_j, a_j + 2^{p_j})$, where $k$ is the hamming weight of $\ell$-bit binary encoding of $c + w + 1$. Since $p_j > p_{j-1}$, we can conclude that $2^{p_j} \leq c + w + 1 < 2^{p_{j+1}}$ and $\mathcal{I}_x = \{[0, 2^{p_1}), \ldots, [2^{p_1} + \cdots + 2^{p_k}, 2^{p_1} + \cdots + 2^{p_k})\}$, where $\ell > p_1$. Since $c \in [0, c + w + 1)$, we consider the following:

- If $c + 1 = 2^q$, where $q \leq p_1$, then $\mathcal{I}_x = \{[2^i, 2^{i+1})\}_{i \in \{q, q+1, \ldots, \ell-1\}}$, and it can be clearly seen that for every non-empty intersection $I \cap J$, either $I \subseteq J$ or $J \subseteq I$.
- If $2^{q-1} < c + 1 < 2^q$, where $q \leq p_1$. Let $k'$ be the hamming weight of $\ell$-bit binary encoding of $2^q -(c+1)$. Then, for $J \in \{[c+1, c+1+2^k'), \ldots, [c+1 + \cdots + 2^{k'}-1, c+1 + \cdots + 2^{k'}]\}$, where $2^q = c + 1 + \cdots + 2^{k'}$, $J \subseteq I$, where $I = [0, 2^p)$. Also note, for $J = [2^{p_1}, 2^{p_1+1})$ and $I \in \mathcal{I}_x \setminus \{[0, 2^{p_1})\}$, $I \subseteq J$.
- If $2^{p_1} + \cdots + 2^{p_{m-1}} \leq c + 1 < 2^{p_1} + \cdots + 2^{p_m}$, where $m \leq k$. Since GenInt$(c)$ divides $[c+1, 2^q)$ into $k'$ sub-intervals $\{[b_r, b_r+2^{p_r})\}_{r \in [k']}$, then let $p'_1 < \cdots < p'_k \leq p_m < p_{m+1} < \cdots < p_{k'}$ for some $s < k'$. Let $I = [2^{p_1} + \cdots + 2^{p_{m-1}}, 2^{p_1} + \cdots + 2^{p_m}) \subseteq \mathcal{I}_x$. Then, for a non-empty intersection $J$, let $J \subseteq \mathcal{I}_x$ be such that $I \cap J \neq \emptyset$. Then $J$ is an element of the set $\{[c+1, c+1+2^{p_1}), \ldots, [c+1 + \cdots + 2^{p_{m-1}}, c+1 + \cdots + 2^{p_m})\}$. Note that, $2^{p_1} + \cdots + 2^{p_m} = c + 1 + \cdots + 2^{p_m}$ as $0$ to $m-1$ bits of $2^q -(c+1)$ and $2^{p_1} + \cdots + 2^{p_m} - (c+1)$ are equal, and thus $J \subseteq I$. For all other non-empty intersections, $I \subseteq J$.

It is clear from algorithms 5.1 and 5.2 that $|\mathcal{I}_x|, |\mathcal{I}_x'| \leq \ell$ (when the hamming weight of $|X|$ and $|X'|$ are $\ell$). Let $|\mathcal{I}_x| = |\mathcal{I}_x'| = \ell$. Since $0 \notin (c, c+w)$, there exists an $[a_j, a_j + 2^{p_j}) \in \mathcal{I}_x$, such that $[a_j, a_j + 2^{p_j}) \notin \mathcal{I}$. Also, since $2^\ell - 1 \notin (c, c+w)$ as $w(c+w+1) = \ell$, there exists a $[b_r, b_r+2^{p_r}) \in \mathcal{I}_x$, such that $[b_r, b_r+2^{p_r}) \notin \mathcal{I}$ and thus $|\mathcal{I}| \leq 2^\ell - 2$.

**Encodings of Interval.** Let $\mathcal{I}$ be a set of sub-intervals, all of the form $[a, a+2^j)$. The encoder (Algorithm 5.3) receives $\mathcal{I}$ as input and outputs the set of encodings $\{h_1, \ldots, h_{|\mathcal{I}|}\}$. Define a family of functions $F$ as follows: $F = \{f_0, \ldots, f_{\ell-1}\}$ where $f_i(y) : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell-i}$ such that $f_i(y) = \lfloor \frac{y}{2^i} \rfloor$. Let $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^w$ be a hash function with $\ell < w$ such that $H$ is injective on the set of all strings of length less than or equal to $\ell$. The decoding algorithm 5.4 receives as input $\{h_1, \ldots, h_{|\mathcal{I}|}\} \leftarrow \text{IntEnc}(\mathcal{I})$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and outputs 1 if $x$ belongs to any of the sub-intervals in $\mathcal{I}$.

**Algorithm 5.3 IntEnc**

**Input:** $\mathcal{I} = \{[a_j, a_j + 2^{p_j})\}_{j \in [k]}$

**Output:** $\{h_1, \ldots, h_{|\mathcal{I}|}\}$

1: for $j = 1$ to $k$
2: Compute $\mu_j = f_{p_j}(a_j)$
3: return $h_j = H(\mu_j)$
4: end for
Algorithm 5.4 Dec (with embedded data \{h_1,\ldots,h_{|X|}\})

Input: \(\ell \in \mathbb{N}, x \in \{0,1\}^\ell\)
Output: 0 or 1.
1: for \(i = 0\) to \(\ell - 1\) do
2: Compute \(H(f_i(x))\)
3: if \(H(f_i(x)) \in \{h_1,\ldots,h_{|X|}\}\) then
4: return 1
5: end if
6: end for
7: return 0

Lemma 5.2 (Correctness). Consider Algorithms GenInt_{\mathcal{Y}} (Algorithm 5.1), GenInt_{\mathcal{X}} (Algorithm 5.2), IntEnc (Algorithm 5.3), Dec (Algorithm 5.4) and input \(x \in \{0,1\}^\ell\). Let \(I_1 \leftarrow \text{GenInt}_{\mathcal{Y}}(c + w)\) and \(I_2 \leftarrow \text{GenInt}_{\mathcal{X}}(c)\) and \(I \leftarrow I_1 \cap I_2\). Let \(H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\omega\) be injective on the set of all strings of length less than or equal to \(\ell\), where \(\ell < \omega\). For every integer \(c, c + w \in [0,2^\ell]\), for every \(\{h_1,\ldots,h_{|X|}\} \leftarrow \text{IntEnc}(I)\) and for every \(x \in (c,c+w)\), \(\text{Dec}\) outputs 1.

Proof. Let \(I = \{(a_j, a_j + 2^{p_j})\}_{j \in [k]}\), then from Lemma 5.1, we can say that \(\bigcup_{j=1}^k [a_j, a_j + 2^{p_j})\) contains all sub-intervals in \((c,c + w)\). Let \(x\) be an integer in \((c,c + w)\), then it must belong to at least one of the sub-intervals in \(I\). Algorithm 5.3 computes \(f_p(y) = \mu_j\), for every \([a_j, a_j + 2^{p_j}) \in I\). If \(x \in [a_j, a_j + 2^{p_j})\), then there exists an \(i \in \{0,\ldots,\ell - 1\}\) such that \(f_i(x) = f_p(a_j) = \mu_j\). Hence \(H(f_i(x)) \in \{h_1,\ldots,h_{|X|}\} \leftarrow \text{IntEnc}(I)\) and \(\text{Dec}\) outputs 1. If \(x \notin [a_j, a_j + 2^{p_j})\), \(\exists i = \{1,\ldots,\ell - 1\}\), such that \(f_i(x) \in \{\mu_j\}_{j=1}^{|X|}\) and therefore, \(\{h_1,\ldots,h_{|X|}\}\) will not contain \(H(f_i(x))\). Finally, \(\text{Dec}\) will correctly reject the input.

5.3 Obfuscator \(O_D\)

We now put forward the design of proposed decision tree obfuscator \(O_D\) which takes \(C \in C_S\) as input and produces \(C' \in C'\), where \(C'\) denotes a separate family of polynomial-size programs. We remind the readers that \(S\) is the set of terminal nodes and \(s_r = 1\) denotes an accepting path. Each accepting path through the tree is a conjunction of inequalities, and our objective is the obfuscate each such conjunction using our encoding technique for interval membership functions.

Note that, our construction uses the fact that the terms in a conjunction can be reordered. Each \(x_i \in (x_i)_{i \in [n]}\) is present at most twice along an accepting path, and as such the collection of inequalities \(x_i \leq (c_i + w_i)\) and \(x_i > c_i\) define \(x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i]\), where \(c_i, n \in (t_1,\ldots,t_{2^\ell})\). Ultimately, \(C((x_i)_{i \in [n]})) = 1\), if \(x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i]\), for every \(i \in [n]\). Our aim is to encode \((c_i, c_i + w_i]\) for every \(i \in [n]\) along an accepting path. To do so, we calculate \(I_2^i \leftarrow \text{GenInt}_{\mathcal{Y}}(c_i + w_i)\) and \(I_1^i \leftarrow \text{GenInt}_{\mathcal{X}}(c_i)\) which gives the set of sub-intervals in \([0,c_i + w_i + 1)\) and \([c_i + 1,2^\ell)\) respectively. Next, we determine \(I' \leftarrow I_2^i \cap I_1^i\) to generate sub-intervals, the union of which is equivalent to the interval \((c_i, c_i + w_i]\). To encode the interval,
we calculate encodings $A^i \leftarrow \text{IntEnc}(I^i)$. Let $H_c : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^q$ be a hash function which maps arbitrary length bit strings to $q$-bit strings. Finally, for every element in $A^i$, we concatenate $n$ entries sorted in ascending order of $i$ and hash them using $H_c$ and publish the hashes. Formally, the obfuscation and evaluation is given in Algorithms 5.5 and 5.6 respectively.

**Algorithm 5.5 Obfuscator $O_D$**

**Input:** $d, n, \ell \in \mathbb{N}, \text{str}(C)$.

**Output:** $\alpha$ hashes values, where $\alpha \leq |S|^{\ell - 1}$.

1: Compute $P_s = \{[t_j, i, b] : v_j \text{ is an ancestor of } s^\tau \in S, s^\tau = 1 \text{ and } b = g_j(t_j)\}$.

2: for all $\tau$ such that $s^\tau = 1$
3: for $i = 1$ to $n$
4: if $[t_j, i, 1] \in P_s$ then
5: $I_i \leftarrow \text{GenInt}(t_j)$
6: end if
7: if $[t_j, i, 0] \in P_s$ then
8: $I_i \leftarrow \text{GenInt}(t_j)$
9: end if
10: $I_i \leftarrow I_i \cap I_i$
11: if $I_i = \emptyset$ then
12: $A_i = 1$
13: else
14: $A_i \leftarrow \text{IntEnc}(I_i)$
15: end if
16: end for
17: end for
18: Denote $A_i = \{h_1^i, \ldots, h_{\sigma_i}^i\}$, where $\sigma_i \leq \ell$.
19: for all $(q_i \in \sigma_i \wedge h_{\alpha_i}^i \in A^i)$ do
20: return $H_c(\|_{i=1}^w h_{\alpha_i}^i)$
21: end for

**Algorithm 5.6 Evaluation (with embedded $\alpha$ hashes published by $O_D$)**

**Input:** $B = (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$, $\ell, d$.

**Output:** 0 or 1.

1: for $i = 1$ to $n$
2: $E_i \leftarrow I_i \cup \{H(f_0(x_i)), \ldots, H(f_{\ell - 1}(x_i))\}$
3: end for
4: $E = \{h_1^i, \ldots, h_{\sigma}^i\}$, $\sigma \leq \ell + 1$.
5: for all $(q_i, \ldots, q_i) \in (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n)$ do
6: if $H_c(\|_{i=1}^w h_{\alpha_i}^i)$ is contained in the set of $\alpha$ hashes then
7: return 1
8: else
9: return 0
10: end if
11: end for
5.4 Correctness and Efficiency

In this section we analyze the correctness of the our construction and evaluate the efficiency of the proposed obfuscator.

**Lemma 5.3 (Correctness).** Consider Algorithms 5.5 and 5.6 and an input \( (x_i)_{i \in [n]} \), where \( x_i \in \{0,1\}^d \). For every \( [t_j, i, b] \in P_s \), where integer \( t_j \in [0,2^\ell-1], i \in \{1,\ldots,n\}, b \in \{0,1\} \), every \( S = (s_1, \ldots, s_{2^{\ell+1}}) \), where \( s_r \in \{0,1\} \), every set of \( \alpha \) hashes output by Algorithm 5.5 and every input \( (x_i)_{i \in [n]} \), if \( C((x_i)_{i \in [n]}) = 1 \), Algorithm 5.6 outputs 1, and 0 otherwise.

**Proof.** Algorithm 5.5 calculates set of encodings \( A' \leftarrow \text{IntEnc}(I') \) for every \( i \in [n] \). If \( \exists i \) such that \( [t_j, i, b] \not\in P_s \), then \( A' \leftarrow 1' \). Let \( (x_i)_{i \in [n]} \) be an accepting input. Then from Definition 4.3, it is evident that \( x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i) \), for every \( i \in [n] \). From Lemma 5.2, we can conclude that if \( x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i) \), then there exists a unique \( h_k^i \in E' \), such that \( h_k^i \in A' \). If \( \exists i \), such that \( [t_j, i, b] \not\in P_s \), then \( h_k^i = 1' = A' \). Thus, for an accepting input \( (x_i)_{i \in [n]} \), there exists a unique \( (h_k^1, \ldots, h_k^n) \), where \( h_k^i \in E' \) and \( H_c(h_k^1 \| \ldots \| h_k^n) \) will be contained in the set of \( \alpha \) hashes published by \( \mathcal{O}_D \) and Algorithm 5.6 will correctly output 1.

If \( C((x_i)_{i \in [n]}) \neq 1 \), then from Lemma 5.2 it is evident that \( \exists h_k^i \) such that \( h_k^i \in E' \) and \( h_k^i \notin A' \). Thus \( H_c(h_k^1 \| \ldots \| h_k^n) \) will not be contained in the set of \( \alpha \) hashes published by the obfuscator \( \mathcal{O}_D \) with overwhelming probability and Algorithm 5.6 will correctly reject the input.

**Efficiency.** Let \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), and \( d, \ell, n \) are polynomials in \( \lambda \). Storing \( [t_j, i, b] \) at a decision node requires \( (\ell + \log n + 1) \) bits. Since \( |A'| < 2\ell \), where each hash value is of \( \omega \) bits, overall storage (in bits) along an accepting path \( P_s \) is given by \( \text{cost}_{s_r} < 2(n \omega + \ell + \log n + 1) \). Since \( |S| = m + 1 \), where \( m \) is the number of decision nodes, \# accepting paths < \( m + 1 \); the overall complexity for storing the obfuscated decision tree is given by \( O(m(\ell + (\log n + n \omega))) \). Evaluation requires \( \ell + 1 \) computations at each decision node, with the overall running time of the order \( O(\ell^d) \).

We now prove polynomial slowdown only for some special cases.

**Lemma 5.4 (Polynomial Slowdown).** Let \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \) be the security parameter and \( \ell, n, d \) be polynomials in \( \lambda \). Define \( T_\lambda \) to be a special family of evasive decision trees, where \( d = 5 \) and \( \ell = \frac{\lambda}{4} \). For every \( C \leftarrow T_\lambda \), there exists a polynomial \( p \) such that the running time of \( \mathcal{O}_D(C) \) is bounded by \( p(|C|, \lambda) \).

**Proof.** Let \( C \leftarrow T_\lambda \) computes whether an input \( (x_i)_{i=1}^n \) is contained in the decision region defined by intervals \( (c_i, c_i + w_i) \), where \( w_i \in [0, w_{\text{max}}] \). From Lemma 4.2, we get \( w_{\text{max}} \leq 2^{\ell - \frac{n}{4}} \), which specifies the maximum width of the intervals. For evasiveness, we require \( \ell - \frac{n}{4} \geq 0 \), which gives \( \ell n \geq \lambda \). Now, for \( \ell = \frac{\lambda}{4} \) and \( n = 4 \), we get \( \ell n = \lambda \), which is a feasible condition for evasiveness. Since \( d = 5 \), we equate \( d - 1 = n \). The cost of evaluating \( \mathcal{O}_D \) is given by \( \ell^n = (\frac{\lambda}{4})^4 \).
Parameters for Secure Construction of $O_D$. The aim of this section is to explain how to choose the necessary parameters that adhere to the restrictions of a secure and efficient obfuscator. Our a priori knowledge on the parameters are as follows: $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$, $d = d(\lambda)$, $n = n(\lambda)$, where $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ is the security parameter. For evasiveness, the maximum width of the intervals representing the decision regions should be $w_{\text{max}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{\ell(\lambda)} - \frac{\lambda}{2}$, keeping to Lemma 4.2. Adding to that, we require $d \leq n + 1$. We give some example parameters along with their bit-security in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$d$</th>
<th>$\ell$</th>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$\lambda$</th>
<th>$\alpha$</th>
<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>Total Cost (in bits)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>$80 \times 65^*$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>$80 \times 65^*$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Example parameter sets for an obfuscated decision tree with $w_{\text{max}} \leq 2^{\ell(\lambda)} - \frac{\lambda}{2}$, $\omega = 80$ bits and one accepting path, where $\omega$ is the output size of hash function $H_c$.

For each parameter set, we calculate the number of hashes $\alpha$ (maximum value) and $\beta$ computed by algorithms 5.5 and 5.6 respectively, along with the overall complexity.

6 Proof of VBB Security

Our VBB security is based upon the random oracle paradigm. The security of our construction relies upon the existence of two preimage resistant hash functions $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\omega$ and $H_c : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^q$, which we model as random oracles. Our objective is to show that a PPT adversary having access to the obfuscated function has no advantage over a simulator having oracle access to the function. This is achieved by simulating the execution of the adversary and outputting what the adversary does, such that the adversary cannot distinguish between the simulation and the real environment, a notion called simulation-based obfuscation. We first give a brief intuition to our security proof. If an adversary never queries the circuit with an accepting input, the everything is a correct simulation. However, if the adversary does query the circuit with an accepting input, then the security reduction immediately uses this clue to mount a model extraction attack, and hence learn the corresponding accepting path in the decision tree. The security reduction can run the obfuscator correctly for that accepting path, and program the random oracles to be consistent with the simulated $O_D$. Hence, again everything is a correct simulation.

**Theorem 6.1.** Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ be the security parameter and $\ell = \ell(\lambda)$ and $n = n(\lambda)$. Let $C_\lambda$ be a special family of evasive decision trees following Lemma 5.4. Then for random oracles $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\omega$ and $H_c : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^q$, the decision tree obfuscator $O_D$ is a VBB obfuscator.

**Proof.** As evident from Lemma 5.2, $O_D$ satisfies functionality preservation. Lemma 5.4 shows that the obfuscator causes polynomial slowdown. Thus it suffices to
show that there exists a (non-uniform) PPT simulator $S$ for every (non-uniform) PPT adversary $A$, such that for an ensemble of decision tree evasive distributions $C_{\lambda}$, the following holds:

$$\Pr_{C \leftarrow C_{\lambda}}[C(O(1^\lambda, C))] = 1 - \Pr_{C \leftarrow C_{\lambda}}[S^C(1^\lambda) = 1] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

Every $C \leftarrow C_{\lambda}$ identifies unique $(c_1, \ldots, c_n) \leftarrow X_n$ and $(w_1, \ldots, w_n) \leftarrow [0, w_{max})^n$ and on input $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ checks if $x_i \in (c_i, c_i + w_i]$, for all $i \in [n]$. Let $O(1^\lambda, C) = \{h_1, \ldots, h_n\}$ denote the obfuscation of $C$. Let $A$ be a PPT adversary that takes as input $O(1^\lambda, C)$. We use this adversary to design a PPT simulator $S$ that simulates an execution of $A$.

Since $A$ expects the oracles $H$ and $H_c$, $S$ provides a simulation of both the oracles. In order to record the choices of the random oracles, $S$ maintains two tables: $T_1$ to record responses for queries to $H$ and $T_2$ to record responses for queries to $H_c$. Since $S$ does not have access to $O(1^\lambda, C)$, it prepares a purported obfuscation of $C$ as follows: It takes as input $\pi = (\alpha, \ell, n)$ and samples values uniformly at random from the co-domain of $H_c$ to compute the purported obfuscation of $C$, given by $\{h_1', \ldots, h_n'\}$.

We assume that $A$ makes polynomially many queries to both the random oracles. We use the notation $A \rightarrow u$ to indicate that adversary $A$ is making a random oracle query $u$ and $A \leftarrow v$ to indicate that $v$ is returned to $A$ as a response to this query. When $A$ queries random oracle $H$ with $u^*$, the simulator looks up $v$ such that $(u^*, v) \in T_1$ and returns it to the adversary. If no such $v$ exists, then the simulator assigns $v$ with a value chosen uniformly at random from the co-domain of $H$, registers the value in $T_1$ and returns it to $A$.

When $A$ makes a query $h^*$ to the random oracle $H_c$, the simulator checks for a $val$ such that $(h^*, val) \in T_2$ and returns it to $A$. If there are no entries corresponding to $h^*$, the simulator parses $h^*$ as a sequence of $n$ strings $(h_i^*)_{i \in [n]}$ and looks up table $T_1$ to find an entry corresponding to each string.

If there does not exist any entry in $T_1$ corresponding to the parsed strings, then $val \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ entry $(h^*, val)$ is recorded in $T_2$ and $val$ is returned it $A$. If there exists a unique $u$ such that $(u, h_i^*) \in T_1$, then the simulator calculates $j \leftarrow \ell - |u|$, where $|u|$ denotes the bit length of $u$, and $x_i \leftarrow u \times 2^j$. Since $u$ corresponds to the representative value $\mu_j$ for a correct input, adding $j$ 0’s yields an accepting input for $C$.

Eventually, the simulator queries the oracle $C$ with the $(x_i)$. If $C$ returns 1, $S$ determines the $c_i$’s and $w_i$’s, calculates pairs $(u, v)$ and registers the entries in $T_1$. Thereafter the simulator calculates the $\alpha$ input entries of $T_2$, maps them to the $\alpha$ entries from the purported set $\{h_1', \ldots, h_n'\}$, registers the pairs in $T_2$ and returns $val$ to the adversary. If there are multiple entries in $T_1$, the simulation halts. The simulation in form of pseudo code is presented as follows:
Algorithm 6.1 Simulator $S^C(1^\lambda, \pi)$

Initialize:

for $i = 1$ to $\alpha$

$h_i' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^q$ \hspace{1cm} \text{\triangleright Set denoting purported obfuscation}

end for

$T_1 \leftarrow ()$; $T_2 \leftarrow ()$ \hspace{1cm} \text{\triangleright Initialize tables to record choices of the random oracles}

counter $\leftarrow 0$

/* Begin simulation for adversary $A^*$ */

Hash Query:

$A \rightarrow v^*$ \hspace{1cm} \text{\triangleright $A$ submits hash query to $H$}

if $(u^*, v) \notin T_1$

$v \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\omega$

$T_1 \leftarrow T_1 \cup (u^*, v)$

end if

if $\exists w (u^* \neq w)$, such that $(u^*, v) \in T_1$ and $(w, v) \in T_1$

HALT \hspace{1cm} \text{\triangleright Simulation aborts}

end if

$A \leftarrow v$ \hspace{1cm} \text{\triangleright Return $v$ as response to $A$}

$A \rightarrow h^*$ \hspace{1cm} \text{\triangleright $A$ submits hash query to $H_c$}

if $(h^*, val) \notin T_2$

Parse $h^*$ as sequence $(h_i^*)_{i \in [n]}$

for $i = 1$ to $n$

if $\exists u$, such that $(u, h_i^*) \in T_1$

$counter \leftarrow counter + +$

$j \leftarrow \ell - |u|$

$x_i \leftarrow u \times 2^j$

end if

end for

if $(counter < n)$

$val \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^q$

$T_2 \leftarrow T_2 \cup (h^*, val)$

else

$S \rightarrow (x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ \hspace{1cm} \text{\triangleright $S$ submits $(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$ to the oracle $C$}

if $S \leftarrow 1$

Determine $(c_1, \ldots, c_n)$ and $(w_1, \ldots, w_n)$ using Binary Search

Calculate pairs $(u, v)$

$T_1 \leftarrow T_1 \cup (u, v)$

if $\exists u_1, u_2 (u_1 \neq u_2)$, such that $(u_1, v) \in T_1$ and $(u_2, v) \in T_1$

HALT \hspace{1cm} \text{\triangleright Simulation aborts}

else

for $i = 1$ to $\alpha$

Calculate $h_i$

$val_i \leftarrow h_i'$

$T_2 \leftarrow T_2 \cup (h_i, val_i)$

end for

end if

else

$val \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^q$

$T_2 \leftarrow T_2 \cup (h^*, val)$

end if

end if

$A \leftarrow val$ \hspace{1cm} \text{\triangleright Return $val$ as a response to $A$}
At any point, the simulated view is identical to the real view such that the adversary cannot distinguish between the real and purported obfuscation.

We now analyze the scenario where the simulator fails due to conflicts in table $T_1$ and show that the probability of such conflicts is negligible in $\lambda$.

**Lemma 6.1.** Let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ be the security parameter and let $\ell, n, \alpha$ are polynomials in $\lambda$. Let $C_\lambda$ be an ensemble of decision tree evasive distributions and let $O(1^\lambda, C)$ denote the obfuscation of $C \leftarrow C_\lambda$. Consider Algorithm 6.1 and random oracles $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\omega(\lambda)}$ and $H_c : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\varphi(\lambda)}$. Let $\eta = \eta(\lambda)$ be the number of entries in $T_1$, then there exists a negligible function $\mu(\lambda)$ such that:

$$\Pr_{C \leftarrow C_\lambda} [S^C(1^\lambda, \pi) = \bot] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

where $S$ is a (non-uniform) PPT algorithm having oracle access to the function $C$.

**Proof.** The simulation fails when there is a conflict in table $T_1$ and $S$ halts. Conflicts may arise when $S$ has responded to a random oracle query $u^*$ to $H$ with $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\omega}$ and later, on the hash query $h^*$ to $H_c$, it makes a call to oracle $C$ and populates $T_1$ with a pair $(w, v)$ such that $w \neq u^*$. The probability that a conflict occurs in $T_1$ is equal to the probability that a hash value is same as at least one of the $\eta$ values in table $T_1$. Since $H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\omega(\lambda)}$, there are $2^{\omega(\lambda)}$ choices for a hash value. When there are no entries in $T_1$, the collision probability is 0, when there is one entry in $T_1$, the collision probability is $\frac{1}{2^{\omega(\lambda)}}$ and continuing the same way, when there are $\eta - 1$ entries in $T_1$, the probability of collision is $\frac{(\eta - 1)}{2^{\omega(\lambda)}}$. Assuming all the samples are independent, the probability with which $S^C(1^\lambda, \pi)$ fails is given by:

$$\Pr_{C \leftarrow C_\lambda} [S^C(1^\lambda, \pi) = \bot] = \frac{1 + \cdots + (\eta - 1)}{2^{\omega(\lambda)}}$$

$$= \frac{\eta^2 - \eta}{2^{\omega(\lambda) + 1}}$$

$$\leq \mu(\lambda)$$

### 7 Conclusion

In this paper, we have designed a new special-purpose VBB obfuscator for binary evasive decision trees. While doing so, we have presented an encoder for hiding parameters in an interval-membership function. Our security analysis follows the Random Oracle paradigm. To the best of our knowledge, our construction provides the first non-interactive solution for privacy-preserving classification with evasive decision trees. Furthermore, our methods rely upon hash functions as opposed to computationally expensive cryptographic primitives used by the state-of-art protocols.
References


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