Delegated Private Matching for Compute

Dimitris Mouris¹, Daniel Masny², Ni Trieu³, Shubho Sengupta², Prasad Buddhavarapu², and Benjamin Case²

¹ University of Delaware
² Meta Inc.
³ Arizona State University

Abstract. Private matching for compute (PMC) establishes a match between two databases owned by mutually distrusted parties (C and P) and allows the parties to input more data for the matched records for arbitrary downstream secure computation without rerunning the private matching component. The state-of-the-art PMC protocols only support two parties and assume that both parties can participate in computationally intensive secure computation. We observe that such operational overhead limits the adoption of these protocols to solely powerful entities as small data owners or devices with minimal computing power will not be able to participate.

We introduce two protocols to delegate PMC from party P to untrusted cloud servers, called delegates, allowing multiple smaller P parties to provide inputs containing identifiers and associated values. Our Delegated Private Matching for Compute protocols, called DPMC and D³PMC, establish a join between the databases of party C and multiple delegators P based on multiple identifiers and compute secret shares of associated values for the identifiers that the parties have in common. We introduce a novel rerandomizable encrypted oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) construction, called EO, which allows two parties to encrypt, mask, and shuffle their data and is secure against semi-honest adversaries. Note that EO may be of independent interest. Our D³PMC protocol limits the leakages of DPMC by combining our novel EO scheme and secure three-party shuffling. Finally, our implementation demonstrates the efficiency of our constructions by outperforming related works by approximately 10× for the total protocol execution and by at least 20× for the computation on the delegators.

Keywords: Oblivious pseudorandom function · private identity matching · private record linkage · secure multiparty computation

1 Introduction

Cloud computing has become a prominent solution for storage and analytics since it enables clients to outsource their data and not have to worry about scalability, data availability, and most importantly maintaining their own infrastructure. Gathering data from multiple input providers and computing statistics over all of their data enables a plethora of useful applications such as gathering real-time location data and notifying users of possible exposure to highly infectious diseases [21,44]. In certain applications, linking client data to proprietary information owned by multiple larger entities may unlock unique insights that are otherwise not possible. Users should not have to trust that the cloud servers will not store their sensitive personal data to use for other than its intended purposes. The problem of computing meaningful analytics across multiple input parties while preserving user privacy from cloud server providers becomes significantly more challenging.

Secure multi-party computation (MPC) offers prominent cryptographic solutions for jointly computing on private data from multiple input providers [46,32,23]. Although general-purpose MPC frameworks [5,45,18,25,28] enable running arbitrary computations over private data (e.g., analytics over medical data [22]), they generally incur significant performance overheads compared to solutions that are tailored to one application (for instance machine learning [29] and crowd-sourcing [13,35,6]). Similarly, specialized private set intersection (PSI) protocols [40,30,12,38,20,11,42] introduce significantly more efficient solutions than generic MPC but focus solely on private matching and disregard associated metadata.

A few recent protocols that are based on the hardness of Decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) and are inspired by [33] have attempted to solve a similar problem. More specifically, private matching for compute (PMC) [9,7,36] from Meta, private set intersection (PSI) [4] from Apple, and private join and compute (PJC) [27,31] from Google enable computing intersections and unions between two parties while protecting the privacy
of the underlying users. Unfortunately, prior works solely focus on two parties and require both of them to actively participate in the private matching protocol, which restricts the adoption of these protocols to solely powerful entities as non-crypto-savvy data owners or devices with minimal computing power will not be able to engage in secure computation protocols.

1.1 Previous Works

Private Matching for Compute (PMC) introduced DDH-based constructions for private matching protocols that compute a union of two databases held by mutually distrusting parties $C$ and $P$ without revealing which items belong to the intersection or not [7]. After the matching phase, both parties can input associated data for each row in the union and engage in a downstream secure computation. The core idea of PMC is to have each party first hash their records and then exponentiate them to random secret scalars. After exchanging the hashed and exponentiated records, each party exponentiates the other party’s records to their secret scalar and they both arrive at the same random identifiers. PMC assumes that each database record may have multiple identifiers as shown in Fig. 1, in which User A may be indexed by both an email address and a phone number in party $C$, whereas in another data owner the combination of identifiers may differ (e.g., name, email). [7] leverages a ranked deterministic join logic that collapses many-to-many connections and achieves a one-to-one mapping. The key idea is that each identifier has a predefined weight (i.e., a matching priority) and the matching is first performed on all the records based on the first identifier (as the single-key PMC) before continuing to the other identifiers. PMC leaks the intersection size to the two parties and in case of multiple keys per row, they learn the full bipartite graph of matches up to an isomorphism. Additionally, PMC supports matching between two databases and requires both parties to actively participate in both the matching and the downstream secure computation, which significantly limits the adoption in real-world applications. Contrary to PMC, our work allows matching between any number of parties and shifts the cost away from the parties by delegating the computation to a powerful server.

Private secret-shared set intersection ($PS^3I$) [9] is a natural extension of PMC that allows the two parties to input associated data to the matching protocol. Instead of learning a mapping to original inputs, the two parties only learn additive secret shares of those records which they can feed into any general-purpose MPC framework. $PS^3I$ is realized using Paillier additive homomorphic encryption scheme [37] and incurs significant performance overheads. Additionally, $PS^3I$ only works between two parties and requires both parties to be online for the whole protocol execution.

Private Join and Compute (PJC) [27,31] computes the intersection between two databases and aggregates the associated data for all the rows in the intersection using additive homomorphic encryption. Contrary to our work that computes secret shares for all the associated data, PJC only allows computing aggregated statistics for the data in the intersection. Additionally, as with all the previous related works, PJC only supports two parties whereas our protocols scale to multiple parties.

Mohassel et al. [34] utilize cuckoo hash tables and perform SQL-like queries over two secret shared databases in the honest majority three-party setting. Both the input and output tables are generically secret shared between the computing parties. Because the cuckoo hash tables do not support duplicates, [34] has leakages in the presence of non-unique identifiers. Additionally, the join protocols focus on two parties and in order to compute joins between multiple parties the protocol has to be iterated multiple times. Each party’s
database has to be joined with the output of the previous join or they can be combined in a binary-tree-like structure. Contrary, our delegated protocols are designed to support multiple delegators and do not have to be repeated for each input party.

Circuit-PSI and VOLE-PSI rely on oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (OPRF) for private set intersection (PSI) between two parties and they can additionally compute a function over the common data \cite{PSI, OPRF}. The two parties learn secret shares of 1 or 0 depending on whether each specific record was in the intersection and then they can use these shares to input associated data as both parties are actively participating in the protocol. On the other hand, Catalic \cite{Catalic} uses OPRFs between two parties but allows one party to delegate its computation to a powerful server. All the aforementioned works allow matching based solely on a single key, while our work supports matching based on databases of multiple parties and each database can have multiple keys (e.g., name, email, etc.). Finally, our protocols enable multiple parties to delegate their computation and then go offline.

1.2 Our Contributions

In this work, we propose a new family of Delegated Private Matching for Compute protocols, called DPMC and D$^3$PMC, that build upon PMC \cite{PMC, PMC2} and lift the burden of engaging in secure computation from parties with less computational power. Our protocols rely on a powerful server (which we call party $C$) and on a delegate node (which we refer to as party $D$) to perform private record linkage between the records of party $C$ and input parties, which we call delegators or parties $P$. Contrary to previous works that focus on linking data only between two parties, our work enables linkage between $C$ and multiple delegators ($P_1$ to $P_T$) and aims to make the computation in the delegators as lightweight as possible. Parties $C$ and $D$ engage in a two-party computation (2PC) to compute a private left join of party’s $C$ and all the delegators’ data.\footnote{Our core protocol computes the left join between party’s $C$ data and all delegators’ data. We show in Appendix E how to modify it to compute the inner join.} $C$’s input is a multi-key database where each row contains multiple identifiers (i.e., keys) that can be matched. The delegators’ inputs are multi-key databases with associated data, which comprise both identifiers and associated metadata that can be in any form (e.g., numbers, strings, etc.). Party $C$ learns a mapping from its users to the left join but does not learn which of its users have been matched. For each row in the left join, both $C$ and $D$ receive secret shares. The secret shares correspond to the delegators’ associated data if that row maps to one of the delegators’ identifiers or a secret share of NULL (i.e., zero), otherwise.

Our motivation for performing left join compared to a union or an intersection is that party $C$ learns a mapping from all their users into the join, which allows them to input additional associated data without re-executing the matching protocol and without learning which users matched or not. These data can either be labels (in the clear) that could be used to filter the secret shared values (e.g., in a GROUP BY fashion), or they can be additional secret shares for the downstream MPC computation. After the matching process and the XOR secret shares have been established, parties $C$ and $D$ only need to know the relative order of their shares, which can then be used for any downstream secure computation such as privacy-preserving analytics and machine learning. Our goal in this work is to create efficient protocols that can be realized in real-world applications for private left join and allow the delegators to outsource the computation to delegates.

We assume that party $C$ is semi-honest, meaning that it that will follow the protocol specification but it will try to exfiltrate information about the delegators’ data. Similarly, we assume that the delegate $D$ is semi-honest and will try to exfiltrate information about party’s $C$ and all parties’ $P$ data. Finally, we assume that it is in the delegators’ best interest to learn the correct result, and thus they will not provide malformed inputs.

Our delegated protocols operate over multi-key databases and consider matching between records on more than one identifier (i.e., key) that inherently generates many-to-many connections. We use a ranking-based technique to collapse multiple connections into one-to-many (C-to-P) connections.\footnote{Notably, the matching strategy can be easily modified and achieve multiple connections.} Next, we extend DPMC to D$^3$PMC, a protocol that uses two delegates (party $D$ and a shuffler $S$) to perform an honest majority shuffling protocol and achieve stronger security guarantees in the case of a corruption of Party $D$ and multiple delegators.

Towards that end, we introduce a novel primitive called rerandomizable encrypted OPRF (EO). This primitive allows to encrypt identifiers, shuffle multiple ciphertexts using a shuffle protocol, homomorphically...
evaluate a PRF on the ciphertexts and decrypt a homomorphically evaluated ciphertext to the PRF output with the identifier as input. Notice that an EO is a more powerful primitive than an OPRF since it allows to encrypt inputs for the PRF and send the ciphertexts to a third party (i.e., delegate the evaluation) whereas an OPRF asks that the input provider directly interacts with the PRF evaluator. Further, an EO allows to shuffle encrypted inputs such that the third party cannot correlate PRF outputs and the initially received ciphertexts. This allows us to significantly reduce the leakage to the third party, in our case Party \( D \). Furthermore, the PRF evaluation can be distributed between Party \( C \), who owns the key and homomorphically evaluates the PRF, and Party \( P \), who is able to decrypt the homomorphically evaluated ciphertext and thus obtain the PRF output.

We construct an EO that could be seen as a combination of the hashed DDH based OPRF, i.e., \( H(x)^k \) for key \( k \) and input \( x \), combined with a variant of ElGamal that encrypts hashed identifiers, i.e. \( H(x) \). The construction is secure against semi-honest adversaries under the DDH assumption. The bottleneck that prevents malicious security is the OPRF \( H(x)^k \). This OPRF only provides semi-honest security since a malicious delegator might send an arbitrary group element \( X \) instead of \( H(x) \). In that case, it does not result in a OPRF since it satisfies linear relations, e.g., \( X^k \cdot Y^k = (X \cdot Y)^k \). Note that the EO construction might be of independent interest and can facilitate other protocols as well.

We envision multiple applications that may leverage the aforementioned setup of merging multiple private databases across distrusting parties and securely computing analytics. A few example scenarios include:

- A healthcare provider holding patient records may gain critical insights such as calculating the risk of a health condition by merging with data stored on individual smart devices, without needing to access identifiable user data.
- An ad publisher holding user-provided information may be able to measure advertising efficacy and offer personalized ads by merging with data held by millions of businesses while still preserving user privacy.

Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- Design of a novel DPMC protocol for securely computing left join between multiple distrusting parties.
- We introduce a novel rerandomizable encrypted OPRF (EO) primitive that enables encrypting inputs, shuffling of ciphertexts, homomorphically evaluating a PRF on encrypted inputs and decrypting ciphertexts to PRF outputs. EO is of independent interest and we provide a construction that is secure against semi-honest adversaries.
- We combine our EO construction and a secure three-party shuffling protocol to extend DPMC to \( D^2\text{PMC} \), a protocol that reduces DPMC’s leakage and achieves stronger security guarantees.
- We finally detail potential real-world applications of DPMC and \( D^2\text{PMC} \) such as privacy-preserving analytics and machine learning in online advertising.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

We denote the computational and statistical security parameters by \( \kappa \) and \( \mu \), respectively. We use \([m]\) to refer to the set \( \{1,\ldots,m\} \). We denote the concatenation and exclusive OR (XOR) of two bit strings \( x \) and \( y \) by \( x \parallel y \) and \( x \oplus y \), respectively. We use \( r \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{R} \) to refer to a randomly chosen element \( r \) from set \( \mathbb{R} \). We use \( \text{ppt} \) to denote probabilistic polynomial time. We use \( \{} \) for unordered and \( () \) for ordered sets.

2.2 Definitions

**Definition 1 (Multi-Key Databases).** A multi-key database \( \text{DB} \) is a set of key sets \( c_i \), i.e. \( \text{DB} := \{c_i\}_{i \in [m]} \). Each set \( c_i \) contains \( m_i \) keys, i.e. \( c_i := \{c_{i,j}\}_{j \in [m_i]} \). When the key set is ordered, we denote it with \( c_i := \{c_{i,j}\}_{j \in [m_i]} \). Further, \( \text{DB} \) might contain \( m \) values \( v_i \) (for \( i \in [m] \)), one associated with each key set. In this case, we denote the key sets with \( p_i \) (for \( i \in [m] \)) and \( \text{DB} := \{p_i, v_i\}_{i \in [m]} = \{(p_{i,j}, v_i)_{j \in [m_i]}, v_i \}_{i \in [m]} \). Furthermore, for a database \( \text{DB} \), each key \( c_{i,j} \) is unique, i.e. there does not exist an \( (i', j') \neq (i, j) \) s.t. \( c_{i', j'} = c_{i,j} \).
Definition 2 (Multi-Key Left Join With Associated Data Between Two Databases). Let $DB_C := \{c_i\}_{i \in [m_C]}$ be a multi-key database of party $C$ that contains ordered key sets, i.e., $c_i := (c_{i,j})_{j \in [m_{C,i}]}$. Also, let $DB_P := \{p_{i,j}, v_i\}_{i \in [m_P]}$ be a multi-key database of party $P$ that contains both key sets, i.e. $p_i := \{p_{i,j}\}_{j \in [m_{P,i}]}$ and associated values $v_i$. The left join between $DB_C$ and $DB_P$ is defined by

$$DB_C \bowtie DB_P := (v_i)_{i \in [m_C]},$$

where $v_i := v_{i'}$ s.t. $j_i$ is the smallest element in $[m_{C,i}]$ for which there exists an $i' \in [m_P]$ and $j_{i'} \in [m_{P,i'}]$ with $c_{i,j_i} = p_{i',j_{i'}}$. If there does not exist such an $j_i$, $i'$ and $j_{i'}$, we define $v_i := 0$.

When considering multiple delegators as in case of DPMC, we extend Definition 2 as follows.

Definition 3 (Multi-Key Left Join With Associated Data Between $T + 1$ Databases). Let for all $t \in [T]$, $DB_t := \{p_{t,i}, v_{i,t}\}_{i \in [m_t]}$ be a multi-key database of party $P_t$ that contains both key sets, i.e. $p_{t,i} := \{p_{t,i,j}\}_{j \in [m_{t,i}]}$, and values, i.e. $v_{i,t}$. Also, let $DB_C := \{c_i\}_{i \in [m_C]}$ be a multi-key database of party $C$ that contains only ordered key sets, i.e. $c_i := \{c_{i,j}\}_{j \in [m_{C,i}]}$. The left join between $DB_C$ and $\{DB_t\}_{t \in [T]}$ is defined as:

$$DB_C \bowtie \{DB_1, \ldots, DB_T\} := (\pi_i(\hat{v}_{i,1}, \ldots, \hat{v}_{i,T}))_{i \in [m_C]},$$

where for each $t \in [T]$ and $i \in [m_C]$, $\hat{v}_{i,t}$ is defined as follows. Let for each $j \in [m_{C,i}]$, $S_{i,j,t} := \{i' \in [m_t] \mid \exists j' \in [m_{t,i'}] s.t. c_{i,j} = p_{i',j'}\}$. If $\bigcup S_{i,j,t} \neq \emptyset$, we define $\hat{v}_{i,t} := \min_j (\{i' \in [m_t] s.t. S_{i,j,t} \neq \emptyset\}, i')$ is defined as the unique $i' \in S_{i,j,t}$, and $\hat{v}_{i,t} := v_{i',t}$. If $\bigcup S_{i,j,t} = \emptyset$, we define $\hat{v}_{i,t} := 0$. Finally, the values $\hat{v}_{i,1}, \ldots, \hat{v}_{i,T}$ are permuted by a random permutation $\pi_i$ for each row $i \in [m_C]$.

This definition ensures that value $\hat{v}_{i,t}$ is associated to delegator $t$ such that each row in the join corresponds to $T$ values, one for each delegator. There might be multiple possible matching rows for each delegator with one of the identifiers in $c_i$. In that case, we include the row that matches with $c_{i,j}$ with the smallest $j$ in the join. Since each identifier is unique in each database, there is only one identifier that matches with $c_{i,j}$.

We adjust this definition for the D$^S$PMC protocol in which values cannot be assigned to specific delegators anymore. Therefore a row might contain multiple values of the same delegator while other delegators might not be represented with a value. Changing the definition of the join allows us to reduce the overall leakage. We adjust Definition 3 as follows.

Definition 4 (Multi-Key Left Join With Associated Data and Minimal Leakage Between $T + 1$ Databases). Let for all $t \in [T]$, $DB_t := \{p_{t,i}, v_{i,t}\}_{i \in [m_t]}$ be a multi-key database of party $P_t$ that contains both key sets, i.e. $p_{t,i} := \{p_{t,i,j}\}_{j \in [m_{t,i}]}$, and values, i.e. $v_{i,t}$. Also, let $DB_C := \{c_i\}_{i \in [m_C]}$ be a multi-key database of party $C$ that contains only ordered key sets, i.e. $c_i := \{c_{i,j}\}_{j \in [m_{C,i}]}$. The left join between $DB_C$ and $\{DB_t\}_{t \in [T]}$ is defined as:

$$DB_C \bowtie \{DB_1, \ldots, DB_T\} := (\pi_i(\hat{v}_{i,1}, \ldots, \hat{v}_{i,T}))_{i \in [m_C]},$$

where for each $i \in [m_C]$, $\hat{v}_{i,t}$ is defined as follows. Let for each $j \in [m_{C,i}]$, $S_{i,j,t} := \{i' \in [m_t] \mid \exists j' \in [m_{t,i'}] s.t. c_{i,j} = p_{i',j'}\}$. Further, we define the set of indices that have not been included in the join yet as $S_{i,j,<t} := S_{i,j} \setminus \{(t',i') \in ([T],[m_t]) \mid \exists t'' < t s.t. v_{i',t''} = v_{i',t'}\}$. If $\bigcup S_{i,j,<t} \neq \emptyset$, we define $j_{i,t} := \min_j (\{j \in [m_{C,i}] s.t. S_{i,j,<t} \neq \emptyset\}, (t',i')$ is defined as a random $(t',i') \leftarrow S_{i,j,<t}$. If $\bigcup S_{i,j,<t} = \emptyset$, we define $\hat{v}_{i,t} := 0$. Finally, the values $\hat{v}_{i,1}, \ldots, \hat{v}_{i,T}$ are permuted by a random permutation $\pi_i$ for each row $i \in [m_C]$.

Definition 4 defines the join as follows. It defines value $\hat{v}_{i,t}$ by matching $c_{i,j}$ for the smallest $j$ with a match that has not yet been included in the join and takes the value of a random row $i'$ of a random delegator $t'$ that matches with $c_{i,j}$. If there is no such a match left, $\hat{v}_{i,t}$ is defined as 0.

Definition 5 (Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM)). A key encapsulation with security parameter $\kappa$ is a triplet of algorithms $(KEM.KG, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec)$ with the following syntax.

KEM.KG(1$^\kappa$): On input 1$^\kappa$, output a key pair $(KEM.pk, KEM.sk)$.

KEM.Enc(KEM.pk): On input KEM.pk, PKE.Enc outputs an encapsulation KEM.cp and key KEM.k.

KEM.Dec(KEM.sk, KEM.cp): On input (KEM.sk, KEM.cp), PKE.Dec outputs a key KEM.k.
For correctness, we ask that

$$\Pr[\text{KEM}.\text{Dec}(\text{KEM}.\text{sk}, \text{KEM}.\text{cp}) = \text{KEM}.k] \geq 1 - \negl,$$

where the probability is taken over $(\text{KEM}.\text{pk}, \text{KEM}.\text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KEM}.\text{KG}(1^n)$ and $(\text{KEM}.\text{cp}, \text{KEM}.k) \leftarrow \text{KEM}.\text{Enc}(\text{KEM}.\text{pk})$.

In this work, we are only interested in KEMs that are simulatable which is the case for any commonly used KEM. A KEM is simulatable if there exists a ppt algorithm $\text{KEM}.\text{Sim}$ with $\text{KEM}.\text{cp} \leftarrow \text{KEM}.\text{Sim}(\text{KEM}.\text{sk}, \text{KEM}.k)$, where $\text{KEM}.\text{cp}$ has the same distribution as $\text{KEM}.\text{cp}' \leftarrow \text{KEM}.\text{Enc}(\text{KEM}.\text{pk})$ under the constraint that $\text{KEM}.k = \text{KEM}.\text{Dec}(\text{KEM}.\text{sk}, \text{KEM}.\text{cp}')$.

**Definition 6 (Key Indistinguishability).** We call a key encapsulation scheme key indistinguishable if for any ppt algorithm $A$,

$$|\Pr[A(\text{KEM}.\text{pk}, \text{KEM}.\text{cp}, \text{KEM}.k) = 1] - \Pr[A(\text{KEM}.\text{pk}, \text{KEM}.\text{cp}, u) = 1]| \leq \negl,$$

where $(\text{KEM}.\text{pk}, \text{KEM}.\text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{KEM}.\text{KG}(1^n)$, $(\text{KEM}.\text{cp}, \text{KEM}.k) \leftarrow \text{KEM}.\text{Enc}(\text{KEM}.\text{pk})$ and $u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*.$

**Definition 7 (Secret Sharing).** We call two values $\text{sh}_1, \text{sh}_2 \in \{0, 1\}^*$ a two-out-of-two XOR secret sharing of a secret value $a$ if $\text{sh}_1 \oplus \text{sh}_2 = a$ and for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ $\text{sh}_i$ is uniform and independent of $a$.

Secret sharing schemes allow a dealer to distribute shares of her data to multiple parties in a way that each share does not reveal anything about the original data [2]. Secret sharing allows any sufficient subset of parties to reconstruct the secret by combining their shares and at the same time, any smaller subset of parties cannot reveal any partial information about the secret. In multi-party computation, each input party creates secret shares of their data and shares them with the other parties. Then, each party computes a function of the shares and finally combines them to reconstruct the final output. Multi-party computation utilizes secret sharing to compute arbitrary arithmetic functions as arithmetic circuits [43,17,2,28]. In this work, we utilize binary (XOR) secret sharing as in Definition 7. To compute arbitrary functions as arithmetic circuits, XOR secret shares can be converted to arithmetic shares as in [14,29].

We include additional definitions such as the DDH assumption, pseudorandom generator, random oracle, symmetric and public key encryption, and IND-CPA security in Appendix A.
2.3 Ideal Functionality for Delegated PMC

We present the ideal functionality $F_{DPMC}$ for Delegated PMC in Fig. 2. In the ideal world, our functionality $F_{DPMC}$ is composed of a functionality for join $F_{JOIN}$ and a functionality for compute $F_{CMP}$. $F_{JOIN}$ gets input from party $C$ a multi-key database $DB_C$ and from parties $P_1$ to $P_T$ multi-key databases $DB_1, \ldots, DB_T$ which also contain associated values (i.e., $v_1, \ldots, v_T$) and computes a left join $J$ as described in Definition 3 (or alternatively Definition 4). For each record $c_t$ and for each party $t \in [T]$, $F$ holds $\hat{v}_{t,t}$ which represents either the associated metadata (if there was a match) or a zero (if no match was found for $c_t$) as $(\pi((\hat{v}_{t,1}, \ldots, \hat{v}_{t,T})))_{t \in [m_C]}$. Next, $F_{JOIN}$ samples secret shares $SH_C$ and $SH_D$ such that $J = SH_C \oplus SH_D$ and sends $SH_C$ to party $C$ and $SH_D$ to $D$.

Later on, parties $C$ and $D$ can query $F_{CMP}$ with their secret shares and $F_{CMP}$ will first reconstruct $J := SH_C \oplus SH_D$ and then compute $y := f(J)$. Our ideal functionality for delegated PMC $F_{DPMC}$ is composed by the functionality of join $F_{JOIN}$ and compute $F_{CMP}$.

Parties $P_1$ to $P_T$ do not get any output from either $F_{JOIN}$ or $F_{CMP}$, whereas parties $C$ and $D$ learn secret shares of the associated data of matched values from $F_{JOIN}$. Finally, from $F_{CMP}$ only $C$ learns the output $y$ which depends on function $f$. Even in the ideal world, if $f$ returns all the associated values without performing any computation (e.g., aggregation), party $C$ does not learn which value corresponds to which user, or even which of the users in dataset $DB_C$ have been matched. Finally, party $D$ learns a leakage function $Lx, y$ between databases $x$ and $y$, where $x$ and $y$ each represent any of $DB_C$ or $DB_1, \ldots, DB_T$. We extend our $F_{DPMC}$ functionality to $F_{D^*PMC}$ that limits the aforementioned leakage between databases $DB_C$ and $DB_P$, where $DB_P := \{DB_1, \ldots, DB_T\}$. We provide a formal definition of the leakage function when introducing the different protocols. In case of a single identifier per row, the leakage corresponds to the cardinality of the intersection.

![Fig. 3. Left-Join DPMC overview.](image)

**Fig. 3. Left-Join DPMC overview.** Parties $C$ and $D$ compute a left-join of their databases based on multiple identifiers (for simplicity we show join based on email addresses here). The goal of the DPMC protocol is to compute a left join and the XOR secret shares of the associated data (AD) of parties $P_i$. Notably, in this figure we assume that party $D$ has already gathered data from multiple parties $P_i$.

3 Left Join Delegated PMC Protocols

3.1 Overview

This work focuses on solving the problem of joining records that represent the same entities across databases that are held by different parties without revealing any information about the individual records apart from the final result. We focus on performing a left join between the databases of two or more parties and computing secret shares of the associated data of the matching records so they can be fed into any downstream general-purpose MPC for any arbitrary computation.
We realize our ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{DPMC} \) for delegated private matching for compute (DPMC) with two novel protocols that compute left join with associated data. We introduce a delegate party (party \( D \)) that enables multiple delegates (parties \( P_1 \) to \( P_T \)) to securely delegate their data and go offline, similarly to \( \mathcal{F}_{JOIN} \) in Fig. 2. Parties \( C \) and \( D \) engage in our proposed delegated protocols to privately link \( C \)'s and all the delegates’ records and compute secret shares of the associated data for the matched records. Both parties \( C \) and \( D \) learn \( T \) XOR secret shares for each row in the left join that correspond to either the delegates’ associated data (i.e., \( v_t \)) if that row maps to a record in \( \text{DB}_C \) or a secret share of zero (if that row is only present in \( \text{DB}_C \)). Party \( C \) also receives a mapping from its users into the join but does not learn which of its users have been matched.

By having the XOR secret shares as the protocol output allows parties \( C \) and \( D \) to realize \( \mathcal{F}_{CMP} \) and jointly compute a function \( f \) on the secret shared associated data. An overview of the output of the protocol is shown in Fig. 3, in which we assume that the delegate party \( D \) has already gathered records from multiple delegator parties \( P \). For simplicity, Fig. 3 only shows the matching based on e-mail addresses, but our DPMC protocols consider matching on multi-key databases as described in Definition 3.

### 3.2 Delegated PMC (DPMC)

Our first variant for left join DPMC protocol is shown in Fig. 4 and consists of three stages: “key generation”, “identify match”, and “recover shares”. DPMC performs a left join between \( T + 1 \) multi-key databases: \( \text{DB}_C \) and \( \text{DB}_t \) for \( t \in [T] \). Both parties \( C \) and \( D \) learn \( T \) XOR secret shares \( (\mathcal{J}_C \text{ and } \mathcal{J}_D, \text{respectively}) \) for each row in the join that corresponds to the delegates’ associated data if that row maps one of parties’ \( P_t \) to \( P_T \) records or a secret share of zero (if that record is only present in \( \text{DB}_C \)). Additionally, \( C \) receives a mapping from its users into \( \mathcal{J}_C \) but does not learn which of its users are in the intersection. The two parties can now use the secret shares \( \mathcal{J}_C \) and \( \mathcal{J}_D \) for any general-purpose MPC computation.

Intuitively, the protocol works as follows. The parties \( P_1 \) to \( P_T \) hash all their identifiers \( p_{t,i,j} \) using \( H_G \) and mask it with a random \( a_t \) \( \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q \). The values \( u_{t,i} \) are secret shared where the share for Party \( C \), i.e., \( \mathcal{sh}_{C,t,i} \) is the key of a key encapsulation mechanism. Each party encrypts the shares for Party \( D \), the mask \( a_t \) together with the key encapsulation towards party \( D \) using \( \text{pk}_D \) and sends it to party \( C \). It also sends the masked hashes of the identifiers, i.e., \( H_G(p_{t,i,j})^{a_t} \), to \( C \). Note that this does not leak any information to \( C \) since \( H_G(p_{t,i,j})^{a_t} \) could be seen as a PRF evaluation and is therefore pseudorandom based on DDH.

Party \( C \) permutes the messages and uses a random \( a_C \) \( \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q \) to compute \( \mathcal{hca}_{t,i,j} := H_G(p_{t,i,j})^{a_t \cdot a_C} \). \( a_C \) can be seen as a PRF key. It forwards the permuted messages including \( \mathcal{hca}_{t,i,j} \). It also sends the PRF evaluation of its own identifiers, i.e., \( \mathcal{h}_{t,i,j} := H_G(c_{t,i,j})^{a_C} \) to Party \( D \).

Party \( D \) decrypts all the ciphertexts and unmask the encrypted shares \( H_G(p_{t,i,j})^{a_t \cdot a_C} \) to \( H_G(p_{t,i,j})^{a_C} \) using \( a_t \). It then matches the results with the \( \mathcal{hca}_{t,i,j} \)'s sent by Party \( C \). If there is a match, it just forwards the key encapsulation and uses the decrypted share \( \mathcal{sh}_{P,t,i} \) as its own share. Otherwise, it generates a new key encapsulation and uses the key as its own share. In this step, we do not leak Party \( C \)'s share and therefore value \( u_{t,i} \) to Party \( D \), due to the key indistinguishability of the key encapsulation.

In the final step, Party \( C \) uses the secret key of the key encapsulation to recover its own shares. It cannot distinguish shares of \( u_{t,i} \) from shares of 0 since the encapsulations generated by parties \( P_1 \) to \( P_T \) have the same distribution as the encapsulations generated by Party \( D \).

In Fig. 4, we provide the formal protocol description. Below, we give a formal security theorem and definition of the leakage. We prove the theorem in Appendix D.1.

**Definition 8 (DPMC Leakage).** Given \( \text{DB}_C \) and \( \text{DB}_{1,\ldots,T} \), the leakage \( L_{x,y} \) of the ideal functionality in Fig. 2 for the DPMC protocol in Fig. 4 is defined as follows. Define \( \text{DB}_{u,C} \) by replacing \( c_{t,i,j} \in \text{DB}_C \) with \( u_{t,i,j} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^\kappa \). Define \( \text{DB}_{u,t} \) by replacing \( p_{t,i,j} \in \text{DB}_t \) with \( u_{t,i,j}' \) if there exist \( t',i',j' \) with \( p_{t,i,j} = c_{t',i,j}' \) or an already replaced \( p_{t',i',j'} \) with \( p_{t,i,j} = p_{t',i',j'}' \), otherwise replace it with \( u_{t,i,j} \) \( \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^\kappa \). \( L_{x,y} := \{(C,\text{DB}_{u,C}),(t,\text{DB}_{u,t})\}_{(t,i,j)\in[T]} \).

**Theorem 1.** Let the secret key encryption and the PKE scheme be IND-CPA secure, the KEM simulatable and key indistinguishable, and the DDH assumption hold.
Setup: All parties agree on a $g$ be a generator of a cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$ with order $q$ where DDH is hard and hash functions $H_L(\cdot) : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$, $H_r(\cdot) : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\kappa,1}$. All parties $P_i$ have access to the public key $pk_D$ of party $D$, party $D$ has secret key $sk_D$.

1. Key-Generation (Party $C$)
   Send to $P_i$ and $D$: KEM.pk

2. Identity Match (Party $P_i$)
   Input: $DB = \{(p_{t,i}, v_{t,i})\}_{i \in [m_i]}$ for data set size $m_i$.
   Messages: KEM.pk
   1: $a_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$, $sk_i \leftarrow \text{SKE.KG}(1^\kappa)$
   2: $ctb_i := \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_D, sk_i)$, $ctb_t := \text{SKE.Enc}(sk_t, a_t)$
   3: For $i \in [m_i]$: (Party $C$)
   4: $(\text{KEM.cp}_{t,i}, \text{KEM.k}_{t,i}) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Enc}(\text{KEM.pk})$
   5: For $j \in [m_i]$: $\hat{h}_{t,i,j} := H_G(pt_{t,i,j})$
   6: $\hat{sh}_{t,i} := \text{KEM.k}_{t,i}$
   7: $\hat{sh}_{C,t,i} := \text{KEM.k}_{t,i}$ $\triangleright$ Share of $v_{t,i}$ for party $C$
   8: $\hat{sh}_{D,t,i} := v_{t,i} \oplus \hat{sh}_{C,t,i}$ $\triangleright$ Share of $v_{t,i}$ for party $D$
   9: $\hat{ctc}_{t,i} := \text{SKE.Enc}(\hat{sk}_t, (\text{KEM.cp}_{t,i}, \hat{sh}_{D,t,i}))$
   Send to $C$: $\hat{cta}_i, \hat{ctb}_i$ and $(\hat{h}_{t,i,j})_{j \in [m_i]}$, $(\hat{ctc}_{t,i})_{i \in [m_i]}$.

3. Identity Match (Party $C$)
   Input: $DB = \{c_i\}_{i \in [m_C]}$ for data set size $m_C$.
   Messages: $\{\hat{ct}_{t,i}, \hat{ctb}_t\}_{t \in [T]}\{\hat{h}_{C,i,j}\}_{j \in [m_i]}\{\hat{ctc}_{t,i}\}_{i \in [m_i]}$.
   1: $ac \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$
   2: For $t \in [T]$, $i \in [m_i]$, $j \in [m_i]$: $\hat{h}_{C,i,j} := (h_{C,i,j})^ac$
   3: Pick random permutation $\pi$, $\hat{t} := \pi(t)$.
   4: For $i \in [m_C]$: $\hat{h}_{C,i} := H_G(c_{i})$
   5: Use $c_i := (c_{i,j})_{j \in [m_i]}$ to order $(h_{C,i,j})_{j \in [m_i]}$.
   Send to $D$: $\{\hat{ct}_{t,i}, \hat{ctb}_t\}_{t \in [T]}\{\hat{h}_{C,i,j}\}_{j \in [m_i]}\{\hat{ctc}_{t,i}\}_{i \in [m_i]}$.

4. DPMC. Party $C$ and the delegators $P_i$ to $P_T$ compute the left-join of their records with the help of $D$. Parties $C$ and $D$ receive $JC$ and $JD$, respectively. These sets contain XOR secret shares for each row in the join. For each delegator $P_i$, if a row is in the intersection, the parties hold XOR shares of the delegator’s associated data, otherwise XOR shares zero. Party $C$ additionally learns a mapping from its users into the join a but does not learn which of its users have been matched.

Then, the protocol in Fig. 4 securely realizes ideal functionality in Fig. 2 for the join defined in Definition 3 for semi-honest corruption of one of the two parties $C$, $D$ and any amount of parties $P_1$ to $P_T$. In case of a corruption of $D$, the leakage graph of Definition 8 is leaked.

3.3 Rerandomizable Encrypted OPRF (EO)

We introduce a new primitive called rerandomizable encrypted OPRF (EO) that allows two parties to encrypt their identifiers, shuffle ciphertexts (using rerandomization), homomorphically evaluate a PRF on encrypted identifiers and decrypt the PRF evaluations. Our EO primitive consists of a collection of seven algorithms, shown in Definition 9.
Definition 9 (Rerandomizable Encrypted OPRF). A rerandomizable encrypted OPRF (EO) parameterized with security parameter \( \kappa \) is a collection of algorithms \((\text{EO.KG}, \text{EO.EKG}, \text{EO.Eval}, \text{EO.Enc}, \text{EO.Rnd}, \text{EO.OEval}, \text{EO.Dec})\) with the following syntax.

- \( \text{EO.KG}(1^\kappa) \): On input \( 1^\kappa \) output a public key, secret key pair \((\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.sk})\).
- \( \text{EO.EKG}(1^\kappa) \): On input \( 1^\kappa \) output a public function key, evaluation key pair \((\text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.ek})\).
- \( \text{EO.Eval}(\text{EO.ek}, x) \): On input \((\text{EO.ek}, x)\), \text{EO.Eval} outputs \( y = \text{PRF}(\text{EO.ek}, x) \).
- \( \text{EO.Enc}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, x) \): On input \((\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, x)\), \text{EO.Enc} outputs a ciphertext \( \text{EO.ct} \).
- \( \text{EO.Rnd}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.ct}) \): On input \((\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.ct})\), \text{EO.Rnd} outputs a ciphertext \( \text{EO.ct} \).
- \( \text{EO.OEval}(\text{EO.ek}, \text{EO.ct}) \): On input \((\text{EO.ek}, \text{EO.ct})\), \text{EO.OEval} outputs an evaluated ciphertext \( \text{EO.ect} \).
- \( \text{EO.Dec}(\text{EO.sk}, \text{EO.ect}) \): On input \((\text{EO.sk}, \text{EO.ect})\), \text{EO.Dec} outputs \( y \).

For correctness, we ask that for any \( x \in \{0, 1\}^* \),

\[
\Pr[\text{EO.Dec}(\text{EO.sk}, \text{EO.OEval}(\text{EO.ek}, \text{EO.Rnd}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.Enc}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, x)))) = \text{EO.Eval}(\text{EO.ek}, x)] \geq 1 - \text{negl},
\]

where \( (\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.sk}) \leftarrow \text{EO.KG}(1^\kappa) \) and \( (\text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.ek}) \leftarrow \text{EO.EKG}(1^\kappa) \).

We use our EO in the following way. We use \text{EO.Enc} to encrypt identifiers. Afterwards, we shuffle the ciphertexts using the \text{EO.Rnd}. We remark that for security, we require that neither possession of \text{EO.sk} nor \text{EO.ek} is sufficient to distinguish encryptions of two different messages. After the shuffle, we use \text{EO.OEval} to homomorphically evaluate a PRF on the encrypted identifier. Finally, we use \text{EO.Dec} to decrypt the PRF evaluation. We also require that the PRF can be evaluated on plaintext identifiers without knowledge of \text{EO.sk} by using \text{EO.Eval} and knowledge of \text{EO.ek}. In order to have a PRF, we require that \text{EO.Eval}'s outputs are pseudorandom given \text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.sk} and \text{EO.pf}.

In Appendix B, we define several security notions and show how to construct this primitive from DDH. In Appendix C, we show that our EO primitive is compatible with an MPC shuffle protocol introduced by [34] by relying on the rerandomization procedure of EO.

### 3.4 DPMC with Secure Shuffling (D\textsuperscript{S}PMC)

In the DPMC protocol, \( D \) performs the left join on the blinded (i.e., hashed and exponentiated) data between \( C \) and multiple delegators \( P_1 \). Thus, \( D \) learns the full bipartite graph of matches up to an isomorphism due to these common identifiers. We propose D\textsuperscript{S}PMC as an extension of DPMC to limit these leakages by utilizing two delegates and our novel rerandomizable encrypted OPRF (EO) scheme. D\textsuperscript{S}PMC relies on our EO scheme to perform a secure three-party shuffling protocol that combines, rerandomizes, and shuffles the data from all delegator parties \( P_1 \) to \( P_T \). We formally present our D\textsuperscript{S}PMC protocol in Fig. 5.

This protocol has two benefits compared to DPMC. For one, the leakage to party \( D \) is only between \( C \)'s data and the combined data of parties \( P_1 \) to \( P_T \), contrary to the pairwise leakages in the DPMC protocol. Since party \( C \) combines the inputs of all delegators, party \( D \) (who performs the join) only sees two encrypted databases (i.e., encrypted DB\textsubscript{C} and encrypted DB\textsubscript{PF}). For another, in the case that an adversary has corrupted all but one parties \( P_1 \) to \( P_T \) and one of \( C, D, \) or \( S \), the D\textsuperscript{S}PMC protocol guarantees that the data of the honest parties are protected. As we envision large-scale deployments for our delegated protocols, we need to protect the data of honest parties even if all but one delegators are corrupted.

The high-level idea is that our secure shuffling protocol breaks any link between the data that the delegators provide and the data that are used for the join and the secret sharing. Thus, in a potential corruption of the delegators and one of \( C, D, S \), the corrupted parties cannot infer any information as the data have been permuted and re-randomized. Our shuffling scheme is secure in the honest-majority setting, which is the case with multiple applications from both academia [1,13,34] and industry. For instance, Mozilla recently deployed a service that relies on the Prio protocol to collect telemetry data about Firefox [26], while Crypten [29] and TF Encrypted [15] build privacy-preserving machine learning frameworks for PyTorch and TensorFlow, respectively. We delve into the details of the security of D\textsuperscript{S}PMC in Appendix D.2.

D\textsuperscript{S}PMC follows a similar approach as DPMC, with the difference that it leverages our EO primitive. D\textsuperscript{S}PMC works intuitively as follows. Parties \( P_1 \) to \( P_T \) use the EO scheme to encrypt their identifiers, they
Setup: All parties $P_t$ have access to the public key $pk_D$ of party $D$, party $D$ has secret key $sk_D$. $M := \sum_{t=1}^{T} m_t$.

1. Key-Generation (Party $C$)
   1. $(\text{KEM.pk, KEM.sk}) \leftarrow \text{KEM.KG}(1^n)$
   2. $(\text{EO.pk, EO.sk}) \leftarrow \text{EO.EKG}(1^n)$
   Send to $P_t$, $S$, $D$: KEM.pk, EO.pk

2. Key-Generation (Party $D$)
   1. $(\text{EO.pk, EO.sk}) \leftarrow \text{EO.KG}(1^n)$
   Send to $P_t$: EO.pk

3. Identity Match (Party $P_t$)
   Input: $\mathbf{DB}_t = \{(\text{p}_i, t) \in [m_t], i \in [m_t]\}$ for data set size $m_t$.
   Messages: EO.pk, EO.pk
   1. $\text{seed}_t \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$
   2. $(\text{sh}_{D,t,1} = \text{PRG}((\text{seed}_t)$) $\triangleright$ shares for $D$
   3. $\text{ct}_a \leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}(\text{pk}_D, \text{seed}_t)$
   4. For $i \in [m_t]$:
   5. For $j \in [m_t]$:
   6. $\text{EO.ct}_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{EO.Enc}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pk}, \text{p}_i, t, j)$
   7. $\text{sh}_{C,t,i} := \nu_i \oplus \text{sh}_{D,t,i}$ $\triangleright$ shares for $C$.
   Send to $C$: $\text{ct}_a, \{(\text{EO.ct}_{i,j}) \in [m_t], \text{sh}_{C,t,i} \in [m_t]\}$

4. Forward Shares to $D$ (Party $C$)
   Messages: $\{(\text{EO.ct}_{i,j}) \in [m_t], \text{sh}_{C,t,i} \in [m_t]\}$
   Send to $D$: $\{\text{ct}_a\}_{i \in [T]}$

5. Reconstruct Shares (Party $D$)
   Messages: $\{\text{ct}_a\}$ for all $T$ parties $P$
   1. For $t \in [T]$:
   2. $\text{seed}_t := \text{PKE.Dec}(\text{sk}_D, \text{ct}_a)$
   3. $\text{sh}_{D,t,1}, \ldots, \text{sh}_{D,t,m_t} := \text{PRG}((\text{seed}_t)$)

6. Shuffling - Appendix C (Parties $C, S, D$)
   C Input: $\{(\text{EO.ct}_{i,j}) \in [m_t], \text{sh}_{C,t,i} \in [m_t], t \in [T]\}$
   S Input: $-$
   D Input: $\{\text{sh}_{D,t,i} \in [m_t], t \in [T]\}$
   $C$ receives output: $\{(\text{EO.ct}_{i,j}) \in [M], j \in [m_t]\}$
   $S$ receives output: $\text{sh}_{C,t,i} \in [M]$.
   $D$ receives output: $\text{sh}_{D,t,i} \in [M]$.

7. Mask Shares (Party $S$)
   Input: $\{\text{sh}_{C,t,i} \in [M]\}$
   Messages: KEM.pk
   1. For $i \in [m_t]$:
   2. $(\text{KEM.cp}_i, \text{KEM.k}_i) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Enc}(\text{KEM.pk})$
   3. $\text{sh}_{D,t,i} := \text{sh}_{C,t,i} \oplus \text{KEM.k}_i$
   Send to $D$: $\{\text{KEM.cp}_i, \text{sh}_{D,t,i}\}_{i \in [m_t]}$

8. Prepare Match Keys (Party $C$)
   Input: $\mathbf{DB}_C = \{(\text{ct}_{i,j}) \in [m_c], j \in [m_c]\}$ for data set size $m_c$.
   Messages: $\{(\text{EO.ct}_{i,j}) \in [M], j \in [m_c]\}$
   1. For $i \in [M], j \in [m_c]$:
   2. $\text{EO.ect}_{i,j} := \text{EO.Eval}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.ct}_{i,j})$
   3. For $i \in [m_c], j \in [m_c]$:
   4. $\text{h}_{C,t,i,j} := \text{EO.Eval}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.ct}_{i,j})$
   5. Use $\text{c}_i := (\text{ct}_{i,j}) \in [m_c]$ to order $(\text{h}_{C,t,i,j}) \in [m_c]$.
   Send to $D$: $(\text{h}_{C,t,i,j}) \in [m_c], j \in [m_c],$
   $\{(\text{EO.ect}_{i,j}) \in [M], j \in [m_c]\}$

9. Identity Match and Recover Shares (Party $D$)
   Input: $\text{EO.sk}$ and $\{\text{sh}_{D,t,i}\}_{i \in [M]}$
   Messages: $\{\text{KEM.cp}_t, \text{sh}_{D,t,i} \in [M]\}$
   1. $(\text{h}_{C,t,i,j} \in [m_c], j \in [m_c]), \{\text{EO.ect}_{i,j} \in [M], j \in [m_c]\}$
   2. $\text{KEM.pk}$
   1. For $i \in [M], j \in [m_c]$:
   2. $\text{h}_{C,t,i,j} := \text{EO.Eval}(\text{EO.sk}, \text{EO.ect}_{i,j})$
   3. For $i \in [m_c]$:
   4. For $j \in [m_c]$:
   5. $\text{S}_{i,j} := \{t' \in [M] \mid \exists j' \in [m_c], j = h_{C,t,i,j}, t' \in [M]\} t_i := 1$
   7. $S_T := \emptyset$
   8. $\text{For } j \in [m_c], i$
   9. If $\bigcup_{i \in [m_c]} \text{S}_{i,j} \setminus S_T \neq \emptyset$ and $t_i < T$:
   10. $i' := \text{S}_{i,j} \setminus S_T
   11. S_T := S_T \cup \{i', t_i := t_i + 1$
   12. $\text{KEM.cp}_t := \text{KEM.cp}_j$
   13. $\text{sh}_{D,t,i} := \text{sh}_{D,t',i} \oplus \text{sh}_{D,t',i}$
   14. $t_i := t_i + 1$
   15. For $i \in \{t, t', \ldots, T\}$:
   16. $(\text{KEM.cp}_t, \text{KEM.k}_i) \leftarrow \text{KEM.Enc}(\text{KEM.pk})$
   17. $\text{sh}_{D,t,i} := \text{KEM.k}_i$ $\triangleright$ use share of 0
   18. Pick $m_c$ random permutations $\{\pi_i\}_{i \in [m_c]}$
   19. $J_D := \{\pi_i(\text{sh}_{D,t,i}) \in [m_c]\}$
   Send to $C$: $\{\pi_i(\text{KEM.cp}_i) \in [T]\}_{i \in [m_c]}$

10. Recover Shares (Party $C$)
   Input: KEM.sk
   Messages: $\{\text{KEM.cp}_t, i \in [m_c], t \in [T]\}$
   1. For $i \in [m_c], t \in [T]$:
   2. $\text{sh}_{C,t,i} \leftarrow \text{KEM.Dec}(\text{KEM.sk}, \text{KEM.cp}_t) \triangleright \text{KEM.k}_{t,i}$
   3. $J_C := \{\text{sh}_{C,t,i} \in [m_c], t \in [T]\} \triangleright$ Aligned with $(\text{c}_i)_{i \in [m_c]}$

Fig. 5. D³PMC. This protocol uses two delegate parties (party $S$ and party $D$) and is based on a permutation network approach as well as the ideas from DPMC presented in Fig. 4.
encrypt the shares for party $D$ towards Party $D$ using $pk_D$. They send the shares for Party $C$ in the clear to Party $C$ together with all of the ciphertexts.

Party $C$ then forwards the encrypted shares for Party $D$ to Party $D$ who decrypts them. Then Party $C$, Party $D$ and Party $S$ run a shuffle protocol in which Party $S$ obtains the shares for Party $C$.

Party $S$ uses a key encapsulation and replaces Party $C$’s random shares with an encapsulated key. It sends an "update" $\tilde{sh}_{D,t}$ to Party $D$ that allows Party $D$ to adjust their shares to be consistent with the new shares of Party $C$. It also sends the encapsulations to Party $D$.

Party $C$ homomorphically evaluates the PRF on the EO ciphertexts as well as evaluates the PRF on its own identifiers $c_{i,j}$ in the clear and sends the outcomes to Party $D$. As previously, Party $D$ computes the matches after decrypting the evaluated EO ciphertexts. Party $D$ uses the matching logic of Definition 4 since it does not know which decrypted PRF identifier belongs to which delegator. Similar to DP-MC, it replaces the encryption with a fresh encapsulation when no match is found. It then forwards the encapsulations to Party $C$. Party $C$ finalizes the protocol by recovering the encapsulated keys from the encapsulations.

We describe our protocol’s leakage in Definition 10 and its security in Theorem 2. We prove the theorem in Appendix D.2. Note that we actually do not need ciphertext indistinguishability for the secret key owner (i.e., Lemma 4) since Party $D$ does not handle any EO ciphertexts, only evaluated ciphertext. This might change when a different shuffle protocol is used.

**Definition 10 (D$^8$PMC Leakage).** Given $DB_C$ and $DB_1, \ldots, DB_T$, the leakage $L_{x,y}$ of the ideal functionality in Fig. 2 for the D$^8$PMC protocol in Fig. 5 is defined as follows. Merge $DB_1, \ldots, DB_T$ to $DB_P := \bigcup_{i \in [T]} DB_i$.

Define $DB_{u,C}$ by replacing $c_{i,j} \in DB_C$ with $u_{i,j} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\kappa$. Define $DB_{u,P}$ by replacing $p_{i,j} \in DB_P$ with $u_{i',j'}$, if there exists an $i',j'$ pair with $p_{i,j} = c_{i',j'}$ or an already replaced $p_{i',j'}$ with $p_{i,j} = p_{i',j'}$, otherwise replace it with $u_{i,j} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\kappa$. $L_{x,y} := \{(C, DB_{u,C}), (D, DB_{u,P})\}$.

**Theorem 2.** Let PKE be an IND-CPA secure and correct PKE scheme, KEM a correct and key-indistinguishable key encapsulation mechanism, PRG as secure pseudorandom generator, and EO be a correct and satisfy statistical rerandomized ciphertext indistinguishability, the (semi-honest) ciphertext indistinguishability for the evaluation key and secret key owner and ciphertext well-formedness.

Then, the protocol in Fig. 5 securely realizes ideal functionality in Fig. 2 for the join defined in Definition 4 for semi-honest corruption of one of the three parties $C$, $D$, $S$, and any amount of parties $P_1$ to $P_T$. In case of a corruption of $D$, the leakage graph of Definition 10 is leaked.

### 4 Matching Strategy

Recall from Fig. 1 that the view of each party for a specific record may be different and a single record may have multiple identifiers (e.g., email address, phone number, etc.). Additionally, when combining databases from multiple input parties $P$, the uniqueness of the identifiers cannot be guaranteed as the same record might appear in more than one dataset. Thus, potential matches for each row can occur based on different identifiers across different parties $P$. For instance, a match on the $j$th identifier of record $c_t$ may occur for identifiers in different positions between different parties (e.g., with $p_{i',i''}$ with $i \neq i'$ and $j \neq j'$). Parties $C$ and $D$ in our protocols (Figs. 4 and 5) compute the left join as described in Definition 3 and acquire $J_C$ and $J_D$, respectively. To capture all the aforementioned matches, for $T$ input parties $P$, $J_C$ and $J_D$ have $T$ permuted columns of secret shares which either correspond to shares of the associated metadata of one of the input parties (if a match was found) or to shares of NULL (in case no match was found).

As the number of input parties $P_1$ to $P_T$ grows, it is natural for our resulting $J_C$ and $J_D$ tables to contain multiple secret shares of NULL. This becomes more evident if each individual database $DB_i$ is relatively small compared to $DB_C$; even if all the records of $DB_i$ match with records in $DB_C$, there would still be multiple unmatched records in $DB_C$ which will get secret shares of NULL. To optimize both our matching and our downstream computation, we now delve into a matching strategy to generate one-to-many connections that do not depend on the number of input parties $T$ and minimize the number of NULL secret shares.

First, party $C$ and the delegate agree on a maximum number of connections $K$ to capture. The delegate performs a ranked left join by starting from the identifier with the highest priority in $DB_C$ and checking whether it appears in each $DB_i$ before moving to the next record in $DB_C$. After searching by the first identifier
of each record in DB_C, the delegate continues with the next identifier, and so on. If a record from party P_i is matched, we mark that record as done and continue to the next record in order to avoid counting the same associated values more than once. For each record c_i, if K or more matches are found, the delegate creates secret shares of the associated values of the first K records, otherwise (if less than K matches are found), the delegate pads the remaining columns (up to K) with secret shares of NULL. We note that this is an implementation-specific detail that can be trivially extended to different matching strategies. Each of the resulting tables J_C and J_D has K columns and captures a one-to-K matches for each record in the left join.

5 Real-World Applications

Recall that our ideal functionality $F_{DPMC}$ from Fig. 2 (and $F_{D^rP PMC}$) consists of $F_{JOIN}$ and $F_{CMP}$. Our delegated protocols realize $F_{JOIN}$ and output secret shares to parties C and D for the left join of parties $C$ and $P_1, \ldots, P_T$. Next, $F_{CMP}$ can be realized by running any general-purpose MPC between C and D. We foresee multiple real-world applications for $F_{CMP}$ that may leverage our DPMC client-server architecture merging multiple private databases across distrusting parties with a centralized entity (party C) to securely compute analytics. For example, DPMC enables calculating the risk of a health condition by merging information held by a larger healthcare provider with data stored on millions of individual smart devices. In another example, an ad publisher holding user-provided information may be able to measure advertising efficacy and offer personalization by merging with data held by multiple advertisers while still preserving user privacy. In this section, we focus on the latter and outline how client-server style DPMC enables privacy-preserving analytics (e.g., ad measurement) and delivery of personalized advertising leveraging privacy-preserving machine learning. The former provides advertisers useful insights about how their ad campaigns are performing, while the latter enables delivering personalized ads while preserving user privacy.

5.1 Privacy-Preserving Ad Attribution

Inputs. To formalize our constructions, we assume the following input data held by an ad publisher, denoted by $C$ and $T$ advertisers, denoted by $P_1, \ldots, P_T$.

- Party $C$ is a powerful server that holds a dataset of ad actions (i.e., clicks) performed by individuals on product-related advertisements. These ads were shown to users after they expressed an intent via an online search engine. Users may be shown advertisements related to multiple products owned by hundreds of advertisers.
- Advertisers, parties $P_1$ to $P_T$, hold conversion information for their customers, such as purchase amount and time of the purchase.
- All parties also hold annotated sets of common identifiers (e.g., email addresses) to be able to perform matching between ad actions and conversions.

$F_{JOIN}$ phase. Executing the DPMC protocol for $F_{JOIN}$ with the above input data from $C$ and multiple $P$ parties, the following output is available at the ad publisher $C$ and the delegate servers.

- Party $C$ holds a mapping of secret shares of conversion data to dataset of ad actions. This mapping does not reveal any new information to Party $C$ apart from random-looking secret shares. In the case of no matches, party $C$ receives secret shares of zero.
- Party $D$ receives a set of secret shares of the conversion data or a dummy value (e.g., zero) that is also aligned to party’s $C$ records (i.e., left join).
- Parties $P_1$ to $P_T$, receive nothing.

$F_{CMP}$ phase. Parties $C$ and $D$ now hold secret shares of conversion metadata such as conversion time and values. Party $C$ can then further input metadata of ad actions, such as click timestamp, as secret shares using the link to the original records that were established by the DPMC protocol. Now, parties $C$ and $D$ engage in multi-party computation to compute the attribution function that flags when a conversion (product was bought) occurred within a pre-specified time window from the ad action. Note that the MPC computation is embarrassingly parallel given the row-wise output structure of DPMC. The output of the privacy-preserving ad attribution remains at the ad action level, hence remains secret shared between parties $C$ and $D$ and is used as an input into further downstream computations such as private measurement or personalization, described next.
5.2 Privacy-Preserving Analytics

Privacy-preserving analytics for measuring the efficacy of advertising requires first computing aggregated conversion outcomes such as the total number of attributed conversions per campaign. Note that DPMC maintains the left join of the ad actions without revealing any user-level information to party C at any stage. Party C may attach campaign-level identifiers with limited entropy ensuring sufficient K-anonymity guarantees. At this point, parties C and D engage in another round of MPC (i.e., a new \( F_{\text{CMP}} \) phase) to compute aggregated conversion outcomes per campaign. Finally, differentially private noise can be added to the aggregated outcomes within MPC before revealing the results to party C, so that C only learns noisy aggregates for each ad campaign.

5.3 Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning

privacy-preserving personalization typically entails training a machine learning model to be able to estimate the relevance of potential advertisements for users. Note that privacy-preserving ad attribution during the data pre-processing phase (Section 5.1) generates secret shares of ad attribution outcomes for both parties C and D. Leveraging the mapping produced by DPMC from secret shares to original ad actions, party C may attach any private features to the private attribution outcomes without revealing any individually identifiable information. At this stage, parties C and D can run a new \( F_{\text{CMP}} \) in multi-party computation for model training with privately input features (from party C) and secret shared labels (from both parties C and D). For example, CrypTen [29], a multi-party computation framework for machine learning, may be leveraged between the parties C and D downstream to the DPMC protocol. Similarly to the aforementioned analytics example, privacy-preserving machine learning would also include differential privacy guarantees and we point avid readers to one such implementation [47].

6 Evaluations

In Table 1 we present the asymptotic costs (communication and number of exponentiations) of each protocol for each party. Parties C and D incur similar communication overhead which scales with both the size of party’s C database and with the size of the delegators’ databases. The communication cost for each delegator \( P_t \) is only linear to their database. In D\( S \)PMC, party S incurs a communication overhead linear to the size of all the delegators’ databases. Finally, we observe that the number of exponentiations of D\( S \)PMC for each party is close to these of DPMC.

6.1 Implementation

We implemented all our protocols in Rust (version 1.62.1) and open-sourced it at the Private-ID GitHub repository [8]. We use the Dalek library for Elliptic Curve Cryptography which utilizes the Ristretto technique for Curve25519 [16,24]. This enables the use of a fast curve while avoiding high-cofactor curve vulnerabilities. For the symmetric encryption scheme, we use the Fernet library with AES-128 in CBC mode of operation, while for public key encryption we used El Gamal with elliptic curves. Finally, for the key encapsulation mechanism, we use El Gamal KEM. The performance measurements were carried out on AWS m5.12xlarge

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>( C )</th>
<th>( D )</th>
<th>( S )</th>
<th>( P_t )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DPMC</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(mc + M) )</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(mc + M) )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Num. of Exp.</td>
<td>( 2mc + M )</td>
<td>( M + mc - I )</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D( S )PMC</td>
<td>Communication</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(mc + M) )</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(mc + M) )</td>
<td>( \mathcal{O}(M) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Num. of Exp.</td>
<td>( 2mc + 3M )</td>
<td>( M + mc - I )</td>
<td>( 4M )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Communication cost & number of exponentiations. \( T \) is the number of parties \( P_t \); \( mc \) and \( m_t \) are the set sizes of party C and each delegator \( P_t \), respectively, and \( M := \sum_{t=1}^{T} m_t \). I is the intersection size between \( \text{DB}_C \) and the union of \( \text{DB}_t \) for all \( t \in [T] \).
Input Size

Wall Clock Runtime(s)

DPMC
DSPMC
Baseline
(PID)
PS3I
PJC

Fig. 6. Measured execution time for DPMC, DŠPMC, PJC, Private-ID (PID), PJC, and PS3I with an increasing number of database sizes $m_C$ and $m_P$, where $m_C = m_P$ and an intersection size of 50%$m_C$. For fair comparisons, we evaluate DPMC, DŠPMC with a single delegator. We use PID as a baseline as it only performs the matching and does not consider associated values.

(Intel Xeon Scalable Processors with an all-core CPU frequency of 3.1GHz, 48 vCPU, 192GB RAM) EC2 instances. To simulate $C$, $D$ and multiple $P$ parties we leverage three separate AWS EC2 instances in the same region and availability zone, where $C$ and $D$ are hosted by two separate instances, and the third instance hosts all parties $P_1$ to $P_T$. All parties communicate via RPC over TLSv1.3 using Protocol Buffers.

6.2 Comparisons with Related Work

In this section, we compare the concrete costs of our protocols with those of related works. More specifically, we use the PS3I [9] and PJC [27] protocol implementations from [8], which both use Paillier with 2048-bit public key as the additive homomorphic encryption scheme. Similarly to our protocols, both these protocols assume that party $P$ has associated metadata: PS3I generates additive secret shares, whereas PJC aggregates the associated values of the items in the intersection. Additionally, we compare with multi-key Private-ID [7,8] as a baseline, which only focuses on establishing a private matching and does not consider associated metadata.

As all these works only assume two parties ($C$ and $P$), in these comparisons we run our protocols with a single party $P$ (i.e., $T = 1$). Finally, all three prior works assume that both $C$ and $P$ are online for the whole protocol execution and do not consider any delegation to shift the computation cost away from party $P$. Although the comparisons with these works are not perfect for the aforementioned reasons, we believe they are still very informative.

**Total protocol time.** We create artificial databases where each record has one 128-bit identifier and two 64-bit unsigned integers for the associated values. Both parties $C$ and $P$ have the same number of records.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>$C$</th>
<th>$D$</th>
<th>$S$</th>
<th>$P_T$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$10^3$</td>
<td>0.3/0.3</td>
<td>0.3/0.1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1/0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^4$</td>
<td>3.7/3.7</td>
<td>3.4/2.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1/2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^5$</td>
<td>33/33</td>
<td>33/4.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1/28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^6$</td>
<td>312/312</td>
<td>320/44</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.1/279</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Size</th>
<th>$C$</th>
<th>$D$</th>
<th>$S$</th>
<th>$P_T$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$10^3$</td>
<td>0.2/0.2</td>
<td>0.1/0.1</td>
<td>0.1/0.1/0.1</td>
<td>0.1/0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^4$</td>
<td>2.3/2.5</td>
<td>1.5/0.4</td>
<td>1/1</td>
<td>0.1/0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^5$</td>
<td>22/24</td>
<td>14/4.3</td>
<td>9.5/9.5</td>
<td>0.1/8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$10^6$</td>
<td>220/241</td>
<td>145/42</td>
<td>94/94</td>
<td>0.1/84.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. For each party $C, P, D, S$ we show In/Out in MB with $m_C = m_P$ and intersection size $I = 50\%$ of $m_C$. 

15
and the intersection size is fixed to 50%. We vary the size of the input sets of each party from \(10^3\) to \(10^6\). Fig. 6 shows how our delegated protocols significantly outperform both PS\(^3\)I and PJC by more than a factor of 10x. On the other hand, our delegated protocols are only \(\approx 1.8x\) slower than Private-ID although the latter does not include associated values and is only between two parties. This means that our protocols process approximately twice the amount of data that Private-ID processes since each row of \(P\)’s database \(DPMC\) and \(D^5PMC\) also create secret shares of the associated data. As expected, we see a linear increase in the wall clock time as we increase the number of records for all protocols.

Table 2 shows the incoming and outgoing traffic for each party in MBs. Similarly to the wall clock time performance, we see a linear increase in the communication for each party as we increase the input sizes. Interestingly, we observe that although \(D^5PMC\) performs more rounds than \(DPMC\), the communication for each party is lower than \(DPMC\). This happens because each \(P^{(t)}\) encrypts their XOR shares in order to prevent \(C\) from accessing them during the fourth step of the protocol (Fig. 4).

**Protocol time for delegator** \(P\). Next, we fixed the input of party \(C\) to 1 million records with a single identifier per record and varied the size of the database of the delegator. In Fig. 7 we show the execution times for party \(P\) for \(DPMC\), \(D^5PMC\), PJC, and PS\(^3\)I. The blue and the orange trends show the execution time of a single delegator running the \(DPMC\) and the \(D^5PMC\) protocols, respectively, which are approximately the same. We observe that the execution time for both are approximately 10x faster than party \(P\) in PJC and multiple orders of magnitude faster than party \(P\) in PS\(^3\)I. Party \(P\) in PJC scales linearly with \(P\)’s database size, however, this is not the case with PS\(^3\)I as the execution time for \(P\) is also affected by \(C\)’s database. This experiment demonstrates the benefits of our delegated protocols for the input parties \(P\) compared to the two-party protocols.
6.3 Experiments with Varying Input Sets

Varying intersection size. In our next experiment, we fixed the input size at 1 million records for both parties and the number of identifiers at 2 per record and varied the intersection size (1%, 25%, 50%, and 100%). We observed negligible performance variations (i.e., less than a second) for the different intersection sizes since our protocol always outputs the left join and depends on the size of $C$’s database.

Varying number of identifiers. In this experiment, we show how the number of keys affects the performance of our protocols. Again, we fix the input size to 100 thousand records for both parties and the intersection size to 50%. Fig. 8 shows the wall clock execution time for DPMC (light green trend) and $D^S$PMC (light blue trend) as well as the input and output traffic for each party for DPMC. Notably, the communication of $D^S$PMC shows a similar trend for an increasing number of identifiers as the matching strategy is the same for the two protocols.

Varying number of delegators. In Fig. 9, we fix the size of $C$’s database to 1 million and vary both the number of delegators and their database sizes. More specifically, in the orange and the red trends, we used a single delegator for DPMC and $D^S$PMC with database sizes indicated by the x axis. In the blue and the green trends, we split the database into ten delegators, where each party has $1/10$ of the input size shown in the x axis. Although the combined size of the database of the ten parties is the same, the local computation for each delegator is significantly less. In this case, the performance time for each delegator is about ten times faster than having a single $P^{(1)}$ party with a bigger database.

7 Conclusions

We have presented two delegated private matching for compute (DPMC) protocols that establish relations between datasets that are held by multiple distrusting parties and enable them to run any arbitrary secure computation. Our protocols allow the input parties to submit their identifiers (i.e., records to be matched) along with vectors of associated values and they generate secret shares of the associated values for the matched records and secret shares of predefined values (e.g., zero) otherwise.

A novelty of our DPMC protocols is that the input parties outsource the expensive computation to delegate parties which perform both the matching and any arbitrary downstream secure computation based on the generated secret shares while preserving the privacy of the datasets. In contrast with prior works that only support two parties, our work is designed to gracefully scale to multiple parties. Additionally, DPMC allows one of the input parties (i.e., party $C$) to input more data after the matching has been established which can be used for the downstream secure computation without requiring to rerun the private matching. While prior works mostly focus on intersection and union, we have focused on a novel left join matching and we demonstrate its benefits with two privacy preserving applications (analytics and machine learning).
implementation demonstrates the efficiency of our constructions by outperforming related works by at least $10 \times$ on the total execution time and by at least two orders of magnitude on the computation of the delegators (i.e., party $P$).

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to thank Anderson Nascimento, Erik Taubeneck, Gaven Watson, Sanjay Saravanan, Shripad Gade, and Pratik Sarkar for the fruitful discussions.

References

\section*{A Additional Definitions}

\textbf{Definition 11 (DDH Assumption).} \cite{19} Let $G(\kappa)$ be a group parameterized by security parameter $\kappa$ and $g$ be a generator. We say that the Decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption holds in group $G(\kappa)$ if for every \textit{ppt} adversary $A$:

$$\left| \Pr[A(g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab}) = 1] - \Pr[A(g, g^a, g^b, g^c) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl},$$

where the probability is taken over $a \xleftarrow{\$} Z_q$, $b \xleftarrow{\$} Z_q$, $c \xleftarrow{\$} Z_q$ and the random coins of $A$.

\textbf{Definition 12 (Pseudorandom Generator).} We call a deterministic polynomial time algorithm $\text{PRG}$ a pseudorandom generator if for any \textit{ppt} adversary $A$,

$$\left| \Pr[A(x) = 1] - \Pr[A(u) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl},$$

where $\ell > \kappa$, $u \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$, $\text{seed} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{\kappa}$ and $x = \text{PRG}(\text{seed})$.

\textbf{Definition 13 (Random Oracle).} \cite{3} A random oracle RO is a family of functions that maps an input from $\{0, 1\}^*$ to an $\ell$-bit image $\{0, 1\}^\ell$ s.t. each output is selected uniformly and independently.

\textbf{Definition 14 (Symmetric Key Encryption).} A symmetric encryption scheme parameterized with security parameter $\kappa$ is a triplet of algorithms $(\text{SKE.KG}, \text{SKE.Enc}, \text{SKE.Dec})$ with the following syntax.

- \text{SKE.KG}(1^\kappa)$: On input $1^\kappa$ output secret key $sk$.
- \text{SKE.Enc}(sk, x)$: On input $(sk, x)$, \text{SKE.Enc} outputs a ciphertext $ct$.
- \text{SKE.Dec}(sk, ct)$: On input $(sk, ct)$, \text{SKE.Dec} outputs a message $x$.

For correctness, we ask that for any message $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$,

$$\Pr_{sk \xleftarrow{\$} \text{SKE.KG}(1^\kappa)}[\text{SKE.Dec}(sk, \text{SKE.Enc}(sk, x)) = x] \geq 1 - \text{negl}.$$

\textbf{Definition 15 (Public Key Encryption).} A public encryption scheme parameterized with security parameter $\kappa$ is a triplet of algorithms $(\text{PKE.KG}, \text{PKE.Enc}, \text{PKE.Dec})$ with the following syntax.

- \text{PKE.KG}(1^\kappa)$: On input $1^\kappa$ output a key pair $(pk, sk)$.
- \text{PKE.Enc}(pk, x)$: On input $(pk, x)$, \text{PKE.Enc} outputs a ciphertext $ct$.
- \text{PKE.Dec}(sk, ct)$: On input $(sk, ct)$, \text{PKE.Dec} outputs a message $x$.

For correctness, we ask that for any message $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$,

$$\Pr_{(pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{PKE.KG}(1^\kappa)}[\text{PKE.Dec}(sk, \text{PKE.Enc}(pk, x)) = x] \geq 1 - \text{negl}.$$

\textbf{Definition 16 (IND-CPA Security).} We call an encryption scheme indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks (IND-CPA secure) if for any \textit{ppt} algorithm $A$,

$$\left| \Pr[A(pk, ct_0) = 1] - \Pr[A(pk, ct_1) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl},$$

where $(pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{PKE.KG}(1^\kappa)$, $(x_0, x_1), A(pk)$, $\forall i \in \{0, 1\}$ : $ct_i \xleftarrow{\$} \text{PKE.Enc}(pk, x_i)$. In case of a symmetric key encryption, we replace $A$’s access to $pk$ with access to an encryption oracle for key $sk$. We also replace $(\text{PKE.KG}, \text{PKE.Enc}, \text{PKE.Dec})$ with $(\text{SKE.KG}, \text{SKE.Enc}, \text{SKE.Dec})$. 

\textbf{Acknowledgments.} This work is supported in part by NSF awards CCF-1929973 and CCF-2101729. The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.
B Rerandomizable Encrypted OPRF (EO)

B.1 EO Definition

In Definition 9, we introduce a new construction called rerandomizable encrypted OPRF (EO) that allows two parties to encrypt, mask, and shuffle their data.

Definition 17 (Pseudorandomness of the Evaluation). We say that the evaluation is pseudorandom if for any ppt adversary $A$ with query access to $O_{EO,Enc}(EO.pk,EO.mpf)$, $\Pr[A_O(EO.pk,EO.mpf) = 1] - \Pr[A_O(EO.pk,EO.mpf) = 0] \leq negl$,

where $(EO.pk,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.KG(1^\kappa)$, $(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.EKG(1^\kappa)$, and for $x \in \{0,1\}^\kappa$, $O_u$ outputs a uniform $y$ whereas $O_{EO,Enc}(EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$ outputs $y = EO.Eval(EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$.

A stronger definition of pseudorandomness of the evaluation is malicious pseudorandomness of the oblivious evaluation. We add the definition for completeness even though our construction only satisfies the pseudorandomness of the evaluation.

Definition 18 (Malicious Pseudorandomness of the Oblivious Evaluation). We say that the oblivious evaluation is pseudorandom if for any ppt adversary $A$ with query access to $O_{EO,Enc}(EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$, $\Pr[A_O(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) = 1] - \Pr[A_O(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) = 0] \leq negl$,

where $(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.KG(1^\kappa)$, $(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.EKG(1^\kappa)$, and for $EO.ct \leftarrow A^{EO}(EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$ with $EO.mpf,EO.mpf \leftarrow A^{EO}(EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$ and $EO.ct = A^{EO}(EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$, $O_u$ outputs a uniform $y$ whereas $O_{EO,Enc}(EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$ outputs $y = EO.Eval(EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$.

Definition 19 (Ciphertext Indistinguishability for Evaluation Key (EO.mpf) Owner). We call EO ciphertext indistinguishable for the evaluation key owner if for any ppt algorithm $A$,

$\Pr[A(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) = 1] - \Pr[A(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) = 0] \leq negl$,

where $(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.KG(1^\kappa)$. In the adaptive malicious setting $(m_0,m_1,EO.mpf) \leftarrow A(EO.mpf)$ whereas in the semi-honest setting $(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.KG(1^\kappa)$ and $(m_0,m_1) \leftarrow A(EO.mpf,EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$. $\forall i \in \{0,1\}$: $EO.ct_i \leftarrow EO.Enc(EO.mpf,EO.mpf,x_i)$.

Definition 20 (Ciphertext Indistinguishability for Secret Key Owner). We call EO ciphertext indistinguishable for the secret key owner if for any ppt algorithm $A$,

$\Pr[A(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) = 1] - \Pr[A(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) = 0] \leq negl$,

where $(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.KG(1^\kappa)$. In the adaptive malicious setting $(m_0,m_1,EO.mpf) \leftarrow A(EO.mpf)$ whereas in the semi-honest setting $(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.KG(1^\kappa)$ and $(m_0,m_1) \leftarrow A(EO.mpf,EO.mpf,EO.mpf)$. $\forall i \in \{0,1\}$: $EO.ct_i \leftarrow EO.Enc(EO.mpf,EO.mpf,m_i)$.

Definition 21 (Rerandomized Ciphertext Indistinguishability). We call EO rerandomized ciphertext indistinguishable if for any ppt algorithm $A$,

$\Pr[A(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) = 1] - \Pr[A(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) = 0] \leq negl$,

$(x,EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow A(1^\kappa)$, $EO.ct_0 \leftarrow EO.Rnd(EO.mpf,EO.mpf,EO.Enc(EO.mpf,EO.mpf,x))$ and $EO.ct_1 \leftarrow EO.Enc(EO.mpf,EO.mpf,x)$.

Definition 22 (Ciphertext Well-Formedness). We call an EO scheme ciphertext well formed if for any $x_0,x_1$ with $EO.Eval(EO.mpf,x_0) = EO.Eval(EO.mpf,x_1)$

$\Delta_s(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leq negl$,

where $(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.KG(1^\kappa)$, $(EO.mpf,EO.mpf) \leftarrow EO.EKG(1^\kappa)$ and $\Delta_s$ is the statistical distance.
Definition 23 (Evaluated Ciphertext Simulatability). We call an EO scheme evaluated ciphertext simulatable if there exists an ppt algorithm EO.Sim such that for any $x,$

$$\Delta_x(\text{EO.ect}_0, \text{EO.ect}_1) \leq \text{negl},$$

where $(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.sk}) \leftarrow \text{EO.KG}(1^\kappa),$ $(\text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.ek}) \leftarrow \text{EO.EKG}(1^\kappa),$ $\text{EO.ect}_0 \leftarrow \text{EO.OEval}(\text{EO.ek}, \text{EO.Enc}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, x)),$ $\text{EO.ect}_1 \leftarrow \text{EO.Sim}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.sk}, \text{EO.OEval}(\text{EO.ek}, x))$ and $\Delta_x$ is the statistical distance.

B.2 EO Construction and Security Analysis

In this section, we instantiate our EO construction in cyclic groups and prove its security against both semi-honest and malicious adversaries.

Definition 24 (EO Construction in Cyclic Groups). Let $g$ be a generator of a cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$ with order $q$ and $H_\mathbb{G}(-) : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ a hash function. Then the EO collection of algorithms are constructed as follows.

EO.KG$(1^\kappa)$: Sample $a \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and output $(\text{EO.pk} := g^a, \text{EO.sk} := a)$.

EO.EKG$(1^\kappa)$: Sample $b \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and output $(\text{EO.pf} := g^b, \text{EO.ek} := b)$.

EO.Enc$(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, x)$: Sample $r \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and define $\text{EO.ct}_1 := \text{EO.pf}^r,$ $\text{EO.ct}_2 := \text{EO.pk}^r \cdot H_\mathbb{G}(x).$ If $\text{EO.pk} \neq \text{EO.pf}$ output ciphertext $\text{EO.ct} := (\text{EO.ct}_1, \text{EO.ct}_2)$ otherwise output $\bot.$

EO.Rnd$(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.ct})$: Let $\text{EO.ct} = (\text{EO.ct}_1, \text{EO.ct}_2).$ Sample $r \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and define $\text{EO.ct}_1' := \text{EO.ct}_1 \cdot \text{EO.pf}^r,$ $\text{EO.ct}_2' := \text{EO.ct}_2 \cdot \text{EO.pk}^r$ and output ciphertext $\text{EO.ct}' := (\text{EO.ct}_1', \text{EO.ct}_2').$

EO.OEval$(\text{EO.ek}, \text{EO.ct})$: Let $\text{EO.ct} = (\text{EO.ct}_1, \text{EO.ct}_2).$ Define $\text{EO.ect}_2 := \text{EO.ct}_2 \cdot \text{EO.ek}$ and output $\text{EO.ect} := (\text{EO.ct}_1, \text{EO.ect}_2).$

EO.Dec$(\text{EO.sk}, \text{EO.ect})$: Let $\text{EO.ect} = (\text{EO.ect}_1, \text{EO.ect}_2).$ Output $y := \text{EO.ect}_2 / \text{EO.ect}_1 \text{EO.sk}.$

For correctness, we ask that for any $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$,

$$\Pr[\text{EO.Dec}(\text{EO.sk}, \text{EO.OEval}(\text{EO.ek}, \text{EO.Rnd}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.Enc}(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.pf}, x)))) = \text{EO.OEval}(\text{EO.ek}, x)] \geq 1 - \text{negl},$$

where $(\text{EO.pk}, \text{EO.sk}) \leftarrow \text{EO.KG}(1^\kappa)$ and $(\text{EO.pf}, \text{EO.ek}) \leftarrow \text{EO.EKG}(1^\kappa).$

Lemma 1. Definition 24 defines a correct EO scheme.

Proof. Let $(g^a, a) \leftarrow \text{EO.KG}(1^\kappa)$ and $(g^b, b) \leftarrow \text{EO.EKG}(1^\kappa).$ The correctness of the EO construction is satisfied as shown below:

EO.Dec$(a, \text{EO.OEval}(b, \text{EO.Rnd}(g^a, g^b, \text{EO.Enc}(g^a, g^b, x)))) = \text{EO.OEval}(b, x) \iff$

EO.Dec$(a, \text{EO.OEval}(b, \text{EO.Rnd}(g^a, g^b, (g^{br} \cdot g^{ar} \cdot H_\mathbb{G}(x)))))) = H_\mathbb{G}(x)^b \iff$

EO.Dec$(a, \text{EO.OEval}(b, (g^{br} \cdot g^{ar} \cdot g^{ar} \cdot H_\mathbb{G}(x)))) = H_\mathbb{G}(x)^b \iff$

EO.Dec$(a, \text{EO.OEval}(b, (g^{br+rr} \cdot g^{a(r+rr)} \cdot H_\mathbb{G}(x)))) = H_\mathbb{G}(x)^b \iff$

EO.Dec$(a, (g^{br+rr}, (g^{a(r+rr)} \cdot H_\mathbb{G}(x))^b) = H_\mathbb{G}(x)^b \iff$

EO.Dec$(a, (g^{br+rr}, g^{ab(r+rr)} \cdot H_\mathbb{G}(x)^b) = H_\mathbb{G}(x)^b \iff$

$$g^{ab(r+rr)} \cdot H_\mathbb{G}(x)^b / (g^{br+rr})^a = H_\mathbb{G}(x)^b.$$

Lemma 2. Definition 24 satisfies pseudorandomness of the evaluation under the DDH assumption in the Random Oracle Model.
**Proof.** We use a sequence of hybrids in which we replace step by step (based on the order of random oracle queries) \( \textsf{EO.Eval}(\textsf{EO.ek}, x) \) with a uniform group element. If there is a distinguisher against the pseudorandomness of \( \textsf{EO.Eval} \) with probability \( \epsilon \) then there is a distinguisher against at least two consecutive intermediate hybrids with probability \( \epsilon / q \), where \( Q \) is the maximum between the amount of random oracle and \( \textsf{EO.Eval} \) oracle queries. Given such a distinguisher, we build a distinguisher against DDH as follows. The DDH distinguisher receives challenge \( A, B, C \) and sets \( \textsf{EO.pk} := A \). Once the random oracle query is made that differentiates the two hybrids (let that be the \( i^{th} \) query), it programs \( H_G(x) := B \). For all following queries \( i > i^* \) program \( H_G(x) := g^{r_i} \), where \( r_i \in_Z Z_q \). When a query for \( x \) to the \( \textsf{EO.Eval} \) oracle is made, query \( x \) to the random oracle if it has not been made yet. If \( x \) matches the query \( i^* \), respond with \( C \). If \( x \) corresponds to a query \( i < i^* \), respond with a uniform group element. Otherwise respond with \( B^{r_i} \).

If \( A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^c \) then the DDH distinguisher simulates the first of the two hybrids. In case of uniform \( A, B, C \) it simulates the second of the two hybrids where the output of the \( \textsf{EO.Eval} \) oracle that corresponds to the \( i^* \)th message is uniform.

Since \( Q \) is polynomial and the distinguishing probability against DDH is negligible, the probability to break the pseudorandomness of \( \textsf{EO.Eval} \) is also negligible.

\( \Box \)

**Lemma 3.** Definition 24 is ciphertext indistinguishable for the evaluation key owner in the semi-honest setting under the DDH assumption.

**Proof.** We use three hybrids, the first hybrid uses \( x_0 \) for the challenge ciphertext. In the second hybrid, the ciphertext is independent of the message. The third hybrid uses \( x_1 \) for the challenge ciphertext. We show now that these three hybrids cannot be distinguished based on the DDH assumption.

We build a DDH distinguisher for hybrid one and two (two and three) as follows. It receives DDH challenge \( A, B, C \) and samples \((\textsf{EO.pk}, \textsf{EO.ek}) \leftarrow \textsf{EO.EKG}(1^\kappa)\). It defines \( \textsf{EO.pk} := A \) and sends \((\textsf{EO.pk}, \textsf{EO.ek}, \textsf{EO.pk})\) to the distinguisher against the ciphertext indistinguishability. It receives \( x_0 \) and \( x_1 \). Return challenge ciphertext \( \textsf{EO.ct}_1 := B^{\textsf{EO.ek}}, \textsf{EO.ct}_2 := C \cdot x_0 \) \((\textsf{EO.ct}_2 := C \cdot x_1)\). Output the output of the ciphertext indistinguishability distinguisher.

If \( A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^c \) then the challenge ciphertext follows the output distribution of \( \textsf{EO.Enc} \) for \( x_0 \) as in the first hybrid (and \( m_1 \) in the third hybrid). Otherwise, the challenge ciphertext is independent of the message as in the second hybrid.

\( \Box \)

**Lemma 4.** Definition 24 is ciphertext indistinguishable for the secret key owner in the semi-honest setting under the DDH assumption for prime groups (every element is a generator).

**Proof.** We use three hybrids, the first hybrid uses \( x_0 \) for the challenge ciphertext. In the second hybrid, the ciphertext is independent of the message. The third hybrid uses \( x_1 \) for the challenge ciphertext. We show now that these three hybrids cannot be distinguished based on the DDH assumption.

We build a DDH distinguisher for hybrid one and two (two and three) as follows. It receives DDH challenge \( A, B, C \) and samples \((\textsf{EO.pk}, \textsf{EO.sk}) \leftarrow \textsf{EO.KG}(1^\kappa)\). It defines \( \textsf{EO.pk} := A \) and sends \((\textsf{EO.pk}, \textsf{EO.sk}, \textsf{EO.pk})\) to the distinguisher against the ciphertext indistinguishability. It receives \( x_0 \) and \( x_1 \). Return challenge ciphertext \( \textsf{EO.ct}_1 := C, \textsf{EO.ct}_2 := B^{\textsf{EO.sk}} \cdot x_0 \) \((\textsf{EO.ct}_2 := B^{\textsf{EO.sk}} \cdot x_1)\). Output the output of the ciphertext indistinguishability distinguisher.

If \( A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^c \) then the challenge ciphertext follows the output distribution of \( \textsf{EO.Enc} \) for \( x_0 \) \((x_1)\) as in the first hybrid (third hybrid). Otherwise, the challenge ciphertext is independent of the message as in the second hybrid as long as \( B \) is a generator of the group and thus \( B^{\textsf{EO.sk}} \) is uniform for a uniform \( B \).

\( \Box \)

**Lemma 5.** Definition 24 is statistically randomized ciphertext indistinguishable.

**Proof.** Let \( \textsf{EO.ct} := (g^{br}, g^{ar} \cdot H_G(x)) \) be an encryption of \( x \) for some random \( r \in Z_q \). Then the randomized ciphertext \( \textsf{EO.Rnd}(g^b, g^b, \textsf{EO.ct}) \) is defined as \( (g^{br}, g^{br}, g^{ar} \cdot H_G(x)) = (g^{br+r'}, g^{ar+r'}, H_G(x)) \) for random \( r' \in Z_q \). Since both \( r \) and \( r' \) are random elements in \( Z_q \), \( r + r' \) is also a random element in \( Z_q \) and the ciphertext is statistically randomized ciphertext indistinguishable.

\( \Box \)

**Lemma 6.** Let \( \textsf{EO.sk} \) and \( q \) be coprime. Then Definition 24 is ciphertext well formed.
The ideal shuffle functionality from Fig. 10 gets inputs from parties C. The three-party secure shuffling for Theorem 3.

Proof. Follows from Lemma 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

Lemma 7. Definition 24 is evaluated ciphertext simulatable.

Proof. EO.Sim takes as input EO.pk = g^a, EO.pf = g^b, EO.sk = a and y = H_G(x). It outputs EO.ect = (EO.ect_0, EO.ect_1) where EO.ect_0 = EO.pf^{r'}, EO.ect_1 = EO.pf^{mr'}, y. This identically distributed as EO.ect = EO.EOval(EO.ek, EO.Enc(EO.pk, EO.pf, x)) = (g^{r'}, g^{mr'}, H_G(x)).

Theorem 3. Definition 24 is a secure and correct EO scheme. More precisely, it is correct, satisfies pseudorandomness of the evaluation and ciphertext well-formedness, evaluated ciphertext simulatability, is randomized ciphertext indistinguishable as well as ciphertext indistinguishable for the evaluation and secret key owner. The latter two are semi-honest secure under the DDH assumption.

Proof. Follows from Lemma 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7.

C Three-Party Secure Shuffling for D^S PMC

C.1 Ideal Shuffle Functionality

The ideal shuffle functionality from Fig. 10 gets inputs from parties C and D secret shares and generates fresh shuffled shares and sends them back to parties S and D. Additionally, F_{shuffle} gets multiple EO ciphertexts from C, generates fresh shuffled ciphertexts, and sends them back to C. Parties P_1 to P_T do not participate in the protocol but do have information about the encrypted and secret shared information and might be corrupted.
We define $M = \sum_{t=1}^{T} m_t$.

1. **First Shuffling** (Party C)
   - **Input:** $\{ (EO,ct_{i,j}) \}_{i \in [m_1], j \in [T]}$
   - $V_{CD}, V_{CS} \xleftarrow{} \{0, 1\}^{|v|}$
   - $\pi_{CD}, \pi_{CS} \xleftarrow{} \text{Perm}(M)$
   - For $i \in [T], i \in [m_1], j \in [m_1]$, \(\triangleright\) Randomize
   - $EO, CT \xleftarrow{} \text{EO.Rnd}(EO.pk, EO, pf, EO, ct_{i,j})$
   - $SH_C := (sh_{C,1}, \ldots, sh_{C,m_1}, T)$
   - $EO, CT := (EO, ct_{(-1),i,j})$
   - $SH_C := \pi_{CS}(\pi_{CD}(SH_C) \oplus V_{CD}) \oplus V_{CS} \triangleright \text{Perm. & Rand.}$
   - $EO, CT := \pi_{CS}(\pi_{CD}(EO, CT)) \triangleright \text{Permute}$
   - **Send to:** $SH_C$
   - **Output of first shuffle:** $SH_C$

2. **First Shuffling** (Party D)
   - **Input:** $\{ sh_{D,1}, \ldots, sh_{D,m_1}, T \}$
   - **Messages:** $V_{CD}, \pi_{CD}$
   - $SH_D := (sh_{D,1}, \ldots, sh_{D,m_1}, T)$
   - $SH_D := \pi_{CD}(SH_D) \oplus V_{CD} \triangleright \text{Permute and Randomize}$
   - **Send to:** $SH_D$
   - **Output of first shuffle:** $SH_D$

3. **First Shuffling** (Party S)
   - **Input:**
   - **Messages:** $\pi_{CS}, V_{CS}, SH_D, EO, CT$
   - $SH_S := \pi_{CS}(SH_D) \oplus V_{CS} \triangleright \text{Permute and Randomize}$
   - **Output of first shuffle:** $SH_S, EO, CT$

4. **Second Shuffling** (Party C)
   - **Input:** $SH_S, EO, CT$
   - $1: \{ (EO, ct_{i,j}) \}_{i \in [M_1], j \in [M_2]} := EO, CT$
   - $2: V_{SC}, V_{SD} \xleftarrow{} \{0, 1\}^{|v|}$
   - $3: \pi_{SC}, \pi_{SD} \xleftarrow{} \text{Perm}(M)$
   - For $i \in [M], j \in [m_1]$, \(\triangleright\) Randomize
   - $EO, CT := (EO, ct_{i,j})$
   - $SH_C := \pi_{SD}(\pi_{SC}(SH_S) \oplus V_{SC}) \oplus V_{SD} \triangleright \text{Perm. & Rand.}$
   - $EO, CT := \pi_{SD}(\pi_{SC}(EO, CT)) \triangleright \text{Permute}$
   - **Send to:** $SH_C$
   - **Output:** $SH_C$

5. **Second Shuffling** (Party D)
   - **Input:** $SH_C$
   - **Messages:** $\pi_{SD}, V_{SD}, SH_C$
   - $1: SH_D := \pi_{SD}(SH_C) \oplus V_{SD} \triangleright \text{Permute and Randomize}$
   - **Send to:** $SH_D$
   - **Output:** $SH_D$

6. **Second Shuffling** (Party S)
   - **Input:**
   - **Messages:** $\pi_{SD}, V_{SD}, SH_C$
   - $SH_S := \pi_{SD}(SH_C) \oplus V_{SD} \triangleright \text{Permute and Randomize}$
   - **Output:** $SH_D$

Fig. 11. **Three-Party Shuffling.** Parties $C$ and $D$ get secret shares $sh_C$ and $sh_D$ of a vector $v$ as inputs such that $v = sh_C \oplus sh_D$. Party $C$ additionally inputs a Rerandomizable Encrypted OPRF ciphertext vector $EO, ct$ of same length as $sh_C$ and $sh_D$. The protocol reshares $(sh_C, sh_D)$ to $(SH_C, SH_D)$ and carries along $EO, ct$ and reshares it to $EO, CT$.

### C.2 Shuffle Protocol

We define a permutation of size $m_C$ as an injective function $\pi : [N] \rightarrow [N]$. We denote as $\pi_{AB}$ a permutation generated from party $A$ and sent to party $B$. Fig. 11 demonstrates the honest majority shuffling protocol utilized by $D^S$PMC. Our shuffling protocol performs two iterations of a permutation network and reshares $C$’s and $D$’s inputs $(sh_C$ and $sh_D$, respectively). Parties $C$ and $D$ have $T$ $sh_C$ and $sh_D$ vectors (indicated as $sh_{C,t}, sh_{D,t}$ for $t \in [T]$), each of which has $m_1$ elements. Additionally, the shuffling protocol reshares $EO, ct$ to prevent leakage of honest parties’ data in the presence of an adversary that has corrupted $D$ and multiple parties $P$.

The first iteration of the permutation network is demonstrated in steps 1-3 in Fig. 11 and reshares $sh_C, sh_D$ to $SH_C, SH_S$ and $EO, ct$ to $EO, CT$. Party $C$ generates two permutations $(\pi_{CS}$ and $\pi_{CD})$ as well as two vectors of scalars $(V_{CS}$ and $V_{CD})$ to rerandomize $sh_C$ and $sh_D$. $C$ locally applies the two permutations and XORs with the vectors of scalars. $C$ then sends one permutation and one vector of scalars to each of $D$ and $S$. $D$ first permutes and XORs $sh_D$ with $V_{CD}$ and sends the result to $S$ who, in turn, permutes it with $\pi_{CS}$ and XORs it with $V_{CS}$ to compute $SH_S$.

In the second iteration, party $S$ generates two more permutations $(\pi_{SC}$ and $\pi_{SD})$ as well as two vectors of scalars $(V_{SC}$ and $V_{SD})$ to rerandomize the outputs of the first iteration (i.e., $SH_C$ and $SH_S$). Next, $S$ applies both permutations on $SH_S$ and XORs it with both vectors $V_{SC}$ and $V_{SD}$, while parties $C$ and $D$ communicate to apply the same operations on $SH_C$. At the end of the protocol, $S$ gets $SH_C$ and $D$ gets $SH_S$ such that $SH_C \oplus SH_S = sh_C \oplus sh_D$. Finally, party $C$ gets $EO, CT$, which is the blinded and rerandomized $EO, ct$.  

25
Observe that the communication in the aforementioned protocol is only linear to the size of EO.CT. We can further optimize the communication by having each two parties \((C \text{ with } D, C \text{ with } S, \text{ and } S \text{ with } D)\) pre-share some randomness and use that randomness as a PRF key. These PRF keys can then be used to generate both the random permutations and the random vectors of scalars which will be consistent between the parties they use the same pseudorandom function.

### C.3 Security Analysis of Secure Shuffling

**Theorem 4.** Let EO be a correct Rerandomizable Encrypted OPRF scheme that satisfies statistical rerandomized ciphertext indistinguishability, ciphertext indistinguishability (for evaluation key or secret key owner) and ciphertext well-formedness. Then, the shuffling protocol in Fig. 11 realizes the ideal shuffling functionality in Fig. 10 when at most one of the parties \(C, D\) and \(S\) and any amount of the parties \(P_1\) to \(P_t\) are corrupted and semi-honest.

**Proof.** We prove the theorem by showing that for each of the parties there exists a simulator that produces a view that is indistinguishable from the views of the corrupted party in the real shuffle protocol.

**Claim.** Let EO be correct, satisfy statistical randomized ciphertext indistinguishability and ciphertext well-formedness. Then, there is a simulator that produces a view of Party \(C\) that is indistinguishable from the real view of Party \(C\) for any amount of corrupted parties \(P_1\) to \(P_t\). We emphasize that the distinguisher also receives the in and outputs to and from the ideal functionality (which is identical to the real output) of the honest parties.

**Proof.** We first show the simulator in case none of the parties \(P_1\) to \(P_t\) is corrupted. The view of Party \(C\) can be generated from its input \(\{\{EO.ct_{i,j}\}_{j\in[m_i]},SH_{C,t}\}_{i\in[m],t\in[T]}\), output EO.CT and the message \(\pi_{SC}, V_{SC}, EO.CT\) from Party \(S\). Our simulator emulates these messages and otherwise follows the description of the computation of Party \(C\).

Our simulator receives input \(\{\{EO.ct_{i,j}\}_{j\in[m_i]},SH_{C,t}\}_{i\in[m],t\in[T]}\), EO.CT and generates Party \(S\)’s message as follows. It uses EO.CT that was part of the input and samples \(\pi_{SC} \leftarrow \text{Perm}(M)\) and \(V_{SC} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{M \cdot |v|}\).

We now show that this simulator emulates the correct distribution. Let

\[
\widehat{\text{EO.CT}} = \pi(\{\{EO.ct_{i,j}\}_{j\in[m_i]}\}_{i\in[m],t\in[T]}),
\]

where \(\pi_{SD}, \pi_{SC}, \pi'_{CS}, \pi'_{CD}\) are defined as in the original protocol and \(\pi'_{SC}, \pi'_{CS}, \pi'_{CD}\) are part of party Cs view. Sampling \(\pi_{SD}, \pi_{SC}, \pi'_{CS}, \pi'_{CD} \leftarrow \text{Perm}(M)\) and defining \(\pi\) as their composition results in the same distribution as when sampling \(\pi, \pi_{SC}, \pi_{CS}, \pi_{CD} \leftarrow \text{Perm}(M)\) and defining \(\pi_{SD}\) such that it is consistent with the protocol specification. The former is the distribution during a real protocol execution while the later is the distribution during the simulated run where the ideal functionality samples \(\pi\) and the simulator samples \(\pi'_{SC}, \pi'_{CS}, \pi'_{CD}\). \(\pi\) and \(\pi'_{SD}\) remain hidden from the view of Party \(C\).

We follow this argument for the distribution of \(V_{SC}\). There exists a unique \(V \in \{0,1\}^{M \cdot |v|}\) such that \(SH_D = SH_D' \oplus V\), where \(SH_D\) denotes the original shares sent by Party \(D\) to the ideal functionality and \(SH_D'\) are the shares generated and output by the ideal functionality. The same holds for \(SH_C\) and \(SH_C'\). Further, as specified by the protocol \(V\) can also be defined as \(V := V_{SD} \oplus V_{SC} \oplus V_{CD}\). Here we ignore the fact that \(V\) is actually impacted by the permutations \(\pi_{SD}, \pi_{SC}, \pi_{CS}, \pi_{CD}\) since it can simply be accounted for by permuting \(V_{SD}, V_{SC}, V_{CD}\). All definitions of \(V\) are consistent since any two out of two secret shares result in the same shares up to an offset vector in \(\{0,1\}^{M \cdot |v|}\). As previously sampling first \(V_{SD}, V_{SC}, V_{CD}\) results in the same distribution as sampling first \(V, V_{SC}, V_{CD}\).

The last part to show is that the output \(\widehat{\text{EO.CT}}\) of the ideal functionality is identically distributed as the Party \(C\)’s output in the real execution. From the statistical randomized ciphertext indistinguishability of EO follows that any rerandomized ciphertext for input \(p_{i,j}\) is indistinguishable from a fresh encryption of \(p_{i,j}\) even when given EO.ek (and EO.sk). Using a hybrid argument over all \(N = \sum_{i=1}^{M} (m_i)\) (i.e., \(M\) total rows and each row \(i\) has \(m_i\) identifiers) distinguishing the real from the simulated view with advantage \(\epsilon\) results in a \(\epsilon/|N|\) distinguishing advantage in the randomized ciphertext indistinguishability game. Now, we show that brute
forcing a $p'_{t,j}$ from a ciphertext and encrypting it is except negligible probability identically distributed as a ciphertext of $p_{t,j}$. By the correctness property it follows that except negligible probability, both ciphertexts evaluate to the same OPRF evaluation, i.e., $EO.Eval(EO.ek, p_{t,j}) = EO.Eval(EO.ek, p'_{t,j})$. Now, we can invoke the ciphertext well-formedness which ensures that the rerandomized $EO.CT$ is with overwhelming probability identically distributed as the fresh $EO.CT$ generated by the ideal functionality.

In case some of the parties $P_1$ to $P_T$ are corrupted we actually do not need to adapt our simulator. The difference is that when adding the views of the corrupted parties among $P_1$ to $P_T$ to the view of $C$, Party $C$ has access to some of the shares $\{SH_{D,t,i}\}_{t \in [T]}$. However, knowing these shares do not have impact on the distribution of the view generated by our simulator and can therefore simply added to the view. $\square$

**Claim.** There exists a simulator that produces a view of Party $D$ that is indistinguishable from the real view of Party $D$ for any amount of corrupted parties $P_1$ to $P_T$.

**Proof.** We start with the case where there is no corruption among parties $P_1$ to $P_T$. Party $D$'s view can be generated from its input $\{sh_{D,t,i}\}_{t \in [T]}$, output $SH_D$ and the messages $(\pi_{CD}, V_{CD})$, $SH_C$ from Party $C$ and $\pi_{SD}, V_{SD}$ from Party $S$. Therefore it suffices for our simulator to emulate these messages and generate the view from these messages according to the protocol description.

Our simulator on input $\{sh_{D,t,i}\}_{t \in [T]}$, $SH_D$ samples $\pi_{CD}, \pi_{SD} \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \text{Perm}(M)$, $V_{CD}, V_{SD}, \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0,1\}^{M\cdot|\pi|}$. $SH_C$ is picked such that $SH_D = \pi_{SD}(SH_C) \oplus V_{SD}$. We define $\pi$ as in the previous claim. As previously, first sampling $\pi_{SD}, \pi_{SC}, \pi_{CS}, \pi_{CD}$ and defining $\pi$ as their composition as done in the real protocol execution results in the same distribution as when sampling $\pi, \pi_{SD}, \pi_{CD}$ first and then defining and sampling $\pi_{SC}, \pi_{CS}$ (not part of the view) such that they are consistent with the real protocol distribution. Using the same approach, we can show that $V_{CD}, V_{SD}$ are also correctly distributed.

Similar to the previous claim, corrupting any amount of parties $P_1$ to $P_T$ and adding them to the view of Party $D$ does not impact the distribution of the view generated by the simulator. Again, we can simply add $\{\{EO.ct_{t,i,j}\}_{j \in [m_i]}, sh_{C,t,i}\}_{t \in [T]}$ to the corrupted parties to the view generated by our simulator. $\square$

**Claim.** Let $EO$ satisfy statistical rerandomized ciphertext indistinguishability and ciphertext indistinguishability (for evaluation key or secret key owner). Then, there is a simulator that produces a view of Party $S$ that is indistinguishable from the real view of Party $S$ for any amount of corrupted parties $P_1$ to $P_T$.

**Proof.** Let $\{\{EO.ct'_{t,i,j}\}_{j \in [m_i]}, sh'_{C,t,i}, sh'_{D,t,i}\}_{t \in [T]}$ be the views of the corrupted parties among $P_1$ to $P_T$. The view of Party $S$ and the corrupted parties among $P_1$ and $P_T$ can be generated from $\{\{EO.ct'_{t,i,j}\}_{j \in [m_i]}, sh'_{C,t,i}, sh'_{D,t,i}\}_{t \in [T]}$, $S$'s output $SH_C$, the messages $\pi_{CS}, V_{CS}, EO.CT$ from Party $D$ and $SH_D$ from Party $D$.

Our simulator has inputs $\{\{EO.ct'_{t,i,j}\}_{j \in [m_i]}, sh'_{C,t,i}, sh'_{D,t,i}\}_{t \in [T]}$ and generates $EO.CT$ as encryptions of 0.

We now show that the simulator generates the correct distribution. We define $\pi$ as in the previous claims. $\pi_{SD}, \pi_{SC}, \pi_{CS}, \pi_{CD}$ are part of the simulated view except $\pi$ and $\pi_{CD}$. By using the same sampling argument as before, $\pi_{CS}$ and $V_{CS}$ follow the correct distribution.

It remains to show that $EO.CT$ are distributed correctly. We use a hybrid argument to show this.

**Hybrid 1:** The first hybrid defines $EO.CT$ according to the real execution. In the real execution, Party $C$ uses the $EO.Rnd$ procedure to rerandomize $\{EO.ct'_{t,i,j}\}_{j \in [m_i],t \in [T]}$ and applies the permutations $\pi_{CD}$ and $\pi_{CS}$ the outcome is $EO.CT$.

**Hybrid 2:** This hybrid generates $EO.CT$ as a fresh encryption of $p'_{t,i,j}$ using $EO.Enc(EO.pk, EO.pf, p_{t,i,j})$.

Based on the statistical ciphertext indistinguishability of $EO$, Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 1 generate up to negligible probability the same distribution. We can use a standard hybrid argument to show this. Let $\epsilon$ be the distinguishing probability between Hybrid 0 and Hybrid 1 and let $N = \sum_{i=1}^{m_i}$ be the amount of ciphertexts, then the statistical ciphertext indistinguishability can be broken with probability $\frac{\epsilon}{N}$. We show now that Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2 are computationally indistinguishable based on the ciphertext indistinguishability (for secret key or evaluation key owner). The two notions give the adversary access to
either EO.sk or EO.ek. Since the corrupted parties among P₁ to P₇ as well as Party S do not have access to either of the keys, a weaker notion suffices in which no access to EO.sk, EO.ek is given. This weaker notion is implied by both of the ciphertext indistinguishability notions of an EO scheme.

We use a standard hybrid in which we replace step by step one of the N ciphertexts with an encryption with 0. The last hybrid matches Hybrid₁ and the first hybrid Hybrid₂. For each step we use a reduction to the ciphertext indistinguishability game in which given EO.pk, EO.pf, we need to construct a distinguisher D’ that distinguishes between an encryption of x₀ = pt,i,j and x₁ = 0. We construct this distinguisher by invoking the distinguisher D between two intermediate hybrids. D’ forwards EO.pk and EO.pf, it generates the view of the corrupted parties as specified by the hybrids with the exception of the one ciphertext that is different in the hybrids. D’ uses the challenge ciphertext for this ciphertext. Finally D’ outputs the output of D.

If D successfully distinguishes two intermediate hybrids, D’ breaks the ciphertext indistinguishability for the secret key and evaluation key owner of the EO scheme. Let ϵ be an upper bound on the distinguishing probability in the ciphertext indistinguishability game. Then the distinguishing probability between Hybrid₁ and Hybrid₂ is upper bounded by ϵ/N.

The indistinguishability between Hybrid₀, Hybrid₁, and Hybrid₂ concludes our claim. □

D Security Analysis

D.1 Security Analysis of DPMC

Proof. We prove Theorem 1 by proving the following two claims.

Claim. Let the secret key encryption and the PKE scheme be IND-CPA secure, the KEM simulatable and the DDH assumption hold.

Then there exists a simulator that generates the joint view of Party C and any subset of parties P₁ to P₇ that is computationally indistinguishable from the real view.

Proof. The joint view of Party C and the subset of corrupted parties among P₁ to P₇, identified by C ∈ [T] can be generated from their inputs DB₇, DB₆, DB₅,..., the outputs SH₇, and the messages {c₁₇, c₁₆,...}, c₁₇ ∈ [m₁]T.

The simulator on input DB₇, DB₆,..., SH₇ simulates the messages as follows. It samples (KEM.pk, KEM.sk) ← KEM.KG(1λ) and uses KEM.Sim on input KEM.sk, SH₇ to compute message {KEM.cp₁₇,t}t∈[m₇],t∈[T]. For all t /∈ C, it samples sk₄ ← SKE.KG(1λ), c₄ₗ ← PKE.Enc(pk₀, 0), c₄ₗ ← SKE.Enc(sk₄, 0), c₄ₗ ← SKE.Enc(sk₄, 0), r₄ₗ ← Zₗ and defines ha₄ₗ,j := gₗ⁻¹⁻¹ denote.

We use the following sequence of hybrids to show that the joint view during the real execution is indistinguishable from the view generated by the simulator.

Hybrid₁: Identical to the view during the real protocol execution.

Hybrid₂: Computes (KEM.pk, KEM.sk) ← KEM.KG(1λ) as output of KEM.Sim on input KEM.sk, SH₇. For all t ∈ C, compute c₄ₗ as c₄ₗ ← PKE.Enc(pk₀, 0).

Hybrid₃: For all t ∈ C, compute c₄ₗ as c₄ₗ ← SKE.Enc(sk₄, 0), c₄ₗ ← SKE.Enc(sk₄, 0).

Hybrid₄: For all t ∈ C, compute ha₄ₗ,j as ha₄ₗ,j := gₗ⁻¹⁻¹ where r₄ₗ,j ← Zₗ.

Hybrid₁ and Hybrid₂ are indistinguishable except with negligible probability based on the simulatability of the key encapsulation scheme.

Hybrid₂ and Hybrid₃ are indistinguishable based on the IND-CPA security of the PKE scheme. Notice that only party D has access to sk₀. The reduction works as follows. Let there be a distinguisher against Hybrid₂ and Hybrid₃ with probability ϵ. Then, we define a sequence of T + 1 hybrids in which we step by step replace c₄ₗ with encryptions of 0. The distinguisher can distinguish at least one of the hybrids with at least probability ϵ/T. We can use it to construct a distinguisher against the IND-CPA game as follows. The distinguisher receives pk from the IND-CPA game and defines pk₀ := pk. It sets x₀ := sk₀ and x₁ := 0 and receives back a challenge ciphertext ct. It defines c₄ₗ := ct. It outputs whatever the distinguisher between Hybrid₂ and Hybrid₃ outputs. This distinguisher breaks the IND-CPA security with probability ϵ/T by the
security of the PKE scheme, this must be negligible and therefore Hybrid\textsubscript{2} and Hybrid\textsubscript{3} can be distinguished with at most negligible probability as well.

Since cta is independent of the symmetric key, we can now use the IND-CPA security of the symmetric key encryption to replace ctb and ctc with encryptions of 0. Again, we define a sequence of hybrids in which we replace step by step the ciphertexts by encryptions of 0. The distinguisher against Hybrid\textsubscript{3} and Hybrid\textsubscript{4} can distinguish at least two consecutive intermediate hybrids with at least probability $\epsilon/(\sum_{t \in C} m_t)$. The distinguisher against the IND-CPA game can use $x_0 := a_t$ ($x_0 := sh_{D,t,i}$) and $x_1$ in the IND-CPA game for the challenge ciphertext. Then, the distinguisher can use the challenge ciphertext to either simulate the first or second consecutive intermediate hybrid and output whatever the distinguisher against the hybrids outputs. Therefore, Hybrid\textsubscript{3} and Hybrid\textsubscript{4} can be distinguished at most with negligible probability.

Notice that the ciphertexts are now independent of scalar $a_t$. We can use the DDH assumption (Definition 11) to argue that Hybrid\textsubscript{4} and Hybrid\textsubscript{5} are indistinguishable. Again, we use a sequence of hybrids in which we replace step by step $h_{a_t,i,j}$ with a uniform group element, i.e., $h_{a_t,i,j} := g_{r_t,i,j}^{\frac{1}{t}}$ where $r_t,i,j \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. There are $\sum_{t \in C, i \in [m_t]} m_t,i$ hybrids. Let there be a distinguisher between Hybrid\textsubscript{4} and Hybrid\textsubscript{5} with probability $\epsilon$. Then, there are two consecutive intermediate hybrids that this distinguisher distinguishes with at least probability $\epsilon/(\sum_{t \in C, i \in [m_t]} m_t,i)$. The reduction to DDH works as follows. The DDH distinguisher receives challenge $A, B, C$. Before invoking the hybrid distinguisher, it programs $H_{G}(p_{t,i,j}) := B$ and defines $h_{t,i,j} := C$. For all other $h_{t,i,j}$ that are not uniform yet, it programs $H_{G}(p_{t,i,j}) := g_{r_t,i,j}^{\frac{1}{t}}$, where $r_t,i,j \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and defines $h_{t,i,j} := A^{r_t,i,j}$. The DDH distinguisher outputs the output of the hybrid distinguisher. When $A = g_t, B = g_u, C = g_{ab}$, all $h_{t,i,j}$ are correctly defined as in the first consecutive hybrid. When $A, B, C$ are uniform group elements, $h_{t,i,j} := C$ is uniform while all other $h_{t,i,j}$ are distributed according to the second (and first) of the consecutive hybrids. Therefore, Hybrid\textsubscript{4} and Hybrid\textsubscript{5} can be distinguished with at most negligible probability which concludes the proof of our claim.

\textbf{Claim.} Let the KEM scheme be key indistinguishable and the DDH assumption hold.

Then there exists a simulator with access to the leakage defined in Definition 8 that generates the joint view of Party \textit{C} and any subset of parties $P_1 \rightarrow P_T$ that is computationally indistinguishable from the real view.

\textbf{Proof.} The joint view of Party $D$ and the subset of corrupted parties among $P_1 \rightarrow P_T$, i.e., defined by $C \subseteq [T]$ can be generated by the inputs $sk_D$, $\{DB_t\}_t \in C$, output $SH_D$ and messages $KEM.pk$, $\{(h_{C,i,j})_{t \in [m_C,i]} \}_i \in [m_C]$ and $\{\text{ctau, ctb,} \{(h_{C,i,j})_{t \in [m_C,i]} \}_i \in [m_C]\}

\text{t} \in [T]$.

Given the leakage defined in Definition 8 and inputs $sk_D$, $\{DB_t\}_t \in C$, $SH_D$, the simulator works as follows. The simulator uses the leakage to define $\{(h_{C,i,j})_{t \in [m_C,i]} \}_i \in [m_C]$ and $\{(h_{C,i,j})_{t \in [m_C,i]} \}_i \in [m_C]\}

\text{t} \in [T]$. For all $t \notin C$, it samples $a_t \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ (for all other $t$, $a_t$ is already defined when generating the view for $P_1$). $h_{C_a,t,i} := h_{C_a,t,i}$. For all $t \notin C$, sample $sk_t \leftarrow SKE.KG(1^n)$ and use $sk_t$ and $pk_D$ to define cta, ctb and ctc according to the protocol description, where $sh_{D,t,i}$ is defined s.t. it is consistent with $SH_D$ and $(KEM.cpa_{t,i},KEM.k_{t,i}) \leftarrow KEM.Enc(KEM.pk)$.

We prove that the view generated by the simulator is indistinguishable from the real view using the following hybrids.

Hybrid\textsubscript{1} is identical to the view during the protocol.

Hybrid\textsubscript{2}: For all $t \notin C$, generate $(KEM.cpa_{t,i},KEM.k_{t,i}) \leftarrow KEM.Enc(KEM.pk)$. (Now KEM.$k_{t,i}$ is independent of $sh_C$).

Hybrid\textsubscript{3}: Use the leakage to define $\{(h_{C,i,j})_{t \in [m_C,i]} \}_i \in [m_C]$ and $\{(h_{C,i,j})_{t \in [m_C,i]} \}_i \in [m_C]\}

\text{t} \in [T]$.

Hybrid\textsubscript{1} and Hybrid\textsubscript{2} are indistinguishable based on the key indistinguishability of the key encapsulation. To show this, we use a sequence of hybrids in which we replace KEM.$cp_{t,i}$ generated by $P_t$ for $t \notin C$ and related to $sh_{C,t,i}$ with $(KEM.cpa_{t,i},KEM.k'_{t,i}) \leftarrow KEM.Enc(KEM.pk)$. We use the triangular inequality which implies that if KEM.$cp$, KEM.$k$ cannot be distinguished with more than probability $\epsilon$ from KEM.$cp$, $u$ for a uniform $u$, KEM.$cp$, KEM.$k$ cannot be distinguished from KEM.$cp'$, KEM.$k$ with more than probability $2\epsilon$. Let there be a distinguisher that distinguishes Hybrid\textsubscript{1} and Hybrid\textsubscript{2} with probability $\epsilon$. Then it distinguishes at least two consecutive intermediate hybrids with probability $\epsilon/(\sum_{t \in C} m_t)$. Given this distinguisher, we build a distinguisher against the key indistinguishability which receives challenge KEM.$cp$, KEM.$k$ and sets $sh_{C,t,i} := KEM.k$. The
distinguisher outputs the output of the hybrid distinguisher. When KEM.k is consistent with KEM.cp, the
distinguisher simulates Hybrid1, and otherwise Hybrid2. This distinguisher breaks the key indistinguishability
with probability \( \epsilon/(2 \sum_{m_i} m_i) \). Since this is negligible, Hybrid1 and Hybrid2 cannot be distinguished except
negligible probability.

Hybrid2 and Hybrid3 are indistinguishable based on the DDH assumption. We show this by using a sequence
of intermediate hybrids in which we replace \( \{ (h_{C,i,j})_{j \in [m_i]} \}_{t \in [T]} \) and \( \{ h_{C,i,j}^{t,i,j} \}_{j \in [m_i], t \in [T]} \) with uniform
group elements. If there is a distinguisher that distinguishes Hybrid2 and Hybrid3 with probability \( \epsilon \), then it
distinguishes at least two consecutive intermediate hybrids with probability \( \epsilon/(2 \sum_{m_i} m_i + \sum_{t \in [T], j \in [m_i]} m_{t,i,j}) \).

The distinguisher against DDH receives \( A, B, C \) and defines \( h_{C,i,j}^{1/a_t} := C (h_{C,i,j} := C) \), programs \( H_G (p_{i,j}) := B \ (H_E (c_{i,j}) := B) \). For all \( h_{C,i,j}, h_{C,i,j} \) that are not uniform yet, program \( H_G (p_{i,j}) := g^{x_t,i,j}, H_E (c_{i,j}) := g^{x_t,i,j} \) and define \( h_{C,i,j} := A^{x_t,i,j}, h_{C,i,j} := A^{x_t,i,j} \). When \( A = g^a, B = g^b, C = g^{ab} \), the DDH distinguisher simulates
the first of the intermediate hybrids otherwise the second one. Notice that in the latter case, \( h_{C,i,j} := h_{C,i,j}^{1/a_t} \)
(\( h_{C,i,j} \)) is uniform. This concludes the proof of our claim.

D.2 Security Analysis of \( D^5PMC \)

Proof. We prove Theorem 2 by constructing a simulator that can generate a view of the corrupted parties
from their inputs and outputs that is indistinguishable from their view during a real execution. We emphasize
that the distinguisher has access to the inputs and outputs of the honest parties specified by the ideal
functionality in Fig. 2, which matches the outputs of the real protocol. We show this in the following three
claims.

Claim. Let PKE be an IND-CPA secure and correct PKE scheme, PRG a secure pseudorandom generator
and EO be a correct and satisfy statistical rerandomized ciphertext indistinguishability, the (semi-honest)
ciphertext indistinguishability for the evaluation key owner and ciphertext well-formedness.

Then, there exists a simulator that generates the joint view of Party C and any subset of parties \( P_t \) to
\( P_T \) that is indistinguishable from the joint view during the protocol execution.

Proof. The joint view can be generated from the input and messages received by party \( C \) and the subset of
parties \( P_t \) to \( P_T \). Let this subset be \( C \subseteq [T] \). Notice that the parties do not have any outputs as specified in
the ideal functionality in Fig. 2.

The inputs are \( DB_C \) and \( \{ DB_t \}_{t \in C} \) and the output is \( SH_C \). The parties \( P_t \) to \( P_T \) receive messages
\( EO.pk, EOpf \) and have access to \( pk_D \), where \( EOpf \) is generated by Party \( C \). Party \( C \) receives the messages
\( \{ EO.ct_{t,i,j} \}_{j \in [m_i], t \in [T]} \), \( sh_{C,t,i,j} \), \( ct_{t,i,j} \) and \( \{ KEM.cp_{t,i,j} \}_{j \in [m_i], t \in [T]} \).

The simulator receives input \( DB_C \), \( \{ DB_t \}_{t \in C} \), \( SH_C \) and emulates the view as follows. It samples \( (KEM.pk, KEM.sk) \leftarrow KEM.KG(1^\kappa), (EO.pk, EO.sk) \leftarrow EO.KG(1^\kappa) \) and \( (pk_D, sk_D) \leftarrow PKE.KG(1^\kappa) \). It samples \( ct_{t,i,j} \leftarrow PKE.Enc(pk, 0) \) for all \( t \notin [T] \). It samples \( sh_{C,t,i,j} \leftarrow 0, 1 \) for all \( t \notin C \). It defines \( sh_{C,t,i,j} \) consistently
with \( SH_C \) for all \( t \in [T] \) and defines \( KEM.cp_{t,i,j} \leftarrow KEM.Sim(KEM.sk, sh_{C,t,i,j}) \). Further, it defines \( EO.ct_{t,i,j} \leftarrow EO.Enc EO.pk, EOpf, 0 \) for all \( t \notin C \). For \( t \in C \), \( EO.ct_{t,i,j} \leftarrow EO.Enc EO.pk, EOpf, p_{t,i,j} \), where \( p_{t,i,j} \) is \( DB_t \).

We use the following sequence of hybrids to show that the simulated view is indistinguishable from the
view during the real protocol execution.

Hybrid0: Identical to the view during the real protocol execution.

Hybrid1: Sample \( ct_{t,i,j} \leftarrow PKE.Enc(pk, 0) \) for all \( t \notin C \).

Hybrid2: Sample \( sh_{D,t,i,j} \leftarrow \{ 0, 1 \}^\kappa \) for all \( t \notin C \) (instead of using PRG).

Hybrid3: Invoke the simulator of the shuffling protocol to simulate the view during the shuffling. The
input \( \{ EO.ct_{t,i,j} \}_{j \in [m_i], t \in [T]} \), \( sh_{C,t,i,j} \), \( ct_{t,i,j} \) of the simulator is distributed as in Hybrid2.

Notice that the simulator also receives \( EO.pk, EOpf \) and \( EOek \).

Hybrid4: Replace \( EO.ct_{t,i,j} \leftarrow EO.Enc EO.pk, EOpf, 0 \) for all \( t \notin C \) and all \( EO.ct_{t,i,j} \leftarrow EO.Enc EO.pk, EOpf, 0 \) with independent encryptions
of 0. More precisely, \( EO.ct_{t,i,j} \leftarrow EO.Enc EO.pk, EOpf, 0 \) and \( EO.ct_{t,i,j} \leftarrow EO.Enc EO.pk, EOpf, 0 \).
Hybrid₅: Samples $\text{sh}_{C,t,i} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{v}$ for all $t \notin C$. Further, defines $\hat{\text{sh}}_{C,t,i}$ consistently with $\text{SH}_C$ and samples $\text{KEM.cp}_{t,i} \xleftarrow{\$} \text{KEM.Sim}(\text{KEM.sk}, \text{sh}_{C,t,i})$.

Notice that the view in Hybrid₅ is identically distributed as the view generated by the simulator.

We now show that the hybrids are indistinguishable. Let Hybrid₀ and Hybrid₁ be distinguishable with probability $\epsilon$. We define a sequence of intermediate hybrids that replaces the ciphertexts $\text{ct}_i \xleftarrow{\$} \text{PKE.Enc}(pk, \text{seed}_i)$ with $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}((pk, 0))$. Then there is a distinguisher that distinguishes one of the intermediate hybrids with at least probability $\epsilon/\tau$. Such a distinguisher would directly distinguish challenge ciphertexts for $x_0 := \text{seed}_i$ from $x_1 := 0$ in the IND-CPA game of the PKE scheme. Therefore the distinguishing probability between Hybrid₀ and Hybrid₁ is upper bounded by the IND-CPA security of PKE.

Let Hybrid₁ and Hybrid₂ be distinguishable with probability $\epsilon$. We define a sequence of intermediate hybrids in which we step by step replace $(\text{sh}_{D,t,1}, \ldots, \text{sh}_{D,t,m}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{PRG}(\text{seed}_i)$ with $(\text{sh}_{D,t,1}, \ldots, \text{sh}_{D,t,m}) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{m\cdot v}$. Then, there would be a distinguisher that distinguishes two consecutive intermediate hybrids with at least probability $\epsilon/\tau$. This would imply a distinguisher that breaks the security of the PRG with the same probability. Since the PRG is indistinguishable except negligible probability, Hybrid₀ and Hybrid₁ cannot be distinguished except negligible probability.

Let Hybrid₂ and Hybrid₃ be distinguishable with probability $\epsilon$. Then, this would allow to distinguish the simulated view during the shuffle protocol from the real view. However, as shown in Theorem 4 this probability is upper bounded the correctness, the statistical rerandomized ciphertext indistinguishability, the (semi-honest) ciphertext indistinguishability (for evaluation key or secret key owner) and ciphertext well-formedness of the EO scheme. Therefore Hybrid₂ and Hybrid₃ cannot be distinguished beyond the bound given in the proof of Theorem 4.

We use the (semi-honest) ciphertext indistinguishability for the evaluation key owner to argue that Hybrid₃ and Hybrid₄ are indistinguishable. Notice that in the ideal shuffle functionality (see Fig. 10), the ciphertext sets $\{\text{EO.ct}_{t,i,j}\}_{t \in [M], j \in [m]}$ and $\{\text{EO.ct}_{t,i,j}\}_{t \in [M], j \in [m]}$ are independent encryptions. Therefore, we can replace them independently with encryptions of 0. We need to use the ciphertext indistinguishability for the evaluation key owner since the simulator need access to EO.ek which is also used by the simulator of the shuffling protocol. The indistinguishability between Hybrid₃ and Hybrid₄ follows from a straightforward reduction to the ciphertext indistinguishability using a hybrid argument in which we replace step by step each ciphertext with an encryption of 0 until all ciphertexts are encryptions of 0. If there exists a distinguisher between Hybrid₃ and Hybrid₄ that distinguishes them with probability $\epsilon$, then there is a distinguisher that distinguishes one of the intermediate hybrids with at least probability $\epsilon/2N$, where $N$ is the size of $\{\text{DB}_t\}_{t \in [T]}$. The distinguisher for the intermediate hybrids would then lead to a distinguisher against the ciphertext indistinguishability for the evaluation key owner of the EO scheme.

We finalize the claim by showing the indistinguishability of Hybrid₄ and Hybrid₅. Similar as in case of the ciphertexts, the ideal shuffle functionality samples the shares $\text{sh}_{C,t,i}$ and $\hat{\text{sh}}_{C,t,i}$ independently. Therefore, we can also sample them independently. Hybrid₅ generates statistically the same view as Hybrid₄ for the following reason. Sampling $\text{sh}_C \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{v}$ and $\text{sh}_D \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{v}$ under the constraint that $\text{sh}_C \oplus \text{sh}_D = \nu$ (Hybrid₄) results in the same distribution as when sampling $\text{sh}_C \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{v}$ and defining $\text{sh}_D := \nu \oplus \text{sh}_C$ (Hybrid₄), where $\text{sh}_D$ and $\nu$ are not known to the simulator. Thus, $\text{sh}_C$ can be sampled independently of $\text{sh}_D$ and $\nu$ by sampling $\text{sh}_C \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{v}$. Further, by the property of KEM.Sim, KEM.cpₜᵢ has the same distribution when being an output of KEMEnc and KEM.Sim. This concludes our claim.

Claim. Let PKE be a correct PKE scheme, KEM a secure and correct key encapsulation scheme and EO secure, correct and evaluated ciphertext simulatable.

Then, there exists a simulator with access to the leakage graph of Definition 10 that generates the joint view of Party $D$ and any subset of parties $P_1$ to $P_T$ that is indistinguishable from the joint view during the protocol execution.

Proof. The joint view of Party $D$ and the subset of parties $P_1$ to $P_T$ (defined by $C \subseteq [T]$) can be generated from inputs $(pk_D, sk_D), \{\text{DB}_t\}_{t \in C}$, output $\text{SH}_D$ and messages KEM.pk, EO.pf, $\{\text{ct}_i\}_{i \in C}$ and $\{\text{KEM.cp}_{i, \text{sh}_{D,t,i}}\}_{i \in [M], j \in [m]}$, $\{h_{C,i,j}\}_{i \in [m], j \in [m_i]}$, $\{\text{EO.ect}_{t,j}\}_{t \in [M], j \in [m_i]}$. Further, the view depends on the leakage graph defined in Definition 10.
The simulator emulates the joint views as follows. It samples \((\text{KEM}\.pk, \text{KEM}\.sk) \leftarrow \text{KEM}\.KG(1^n)\) and \((\text{EO}\.pf, \text{EO}\.ek) \leftarrow \text{EO}\.EKG\). The simulator defines \(\{h_{C,i,j}|i \in [m_C]|j \in [m_C]\} \) and \(\{h_{i,j}|i \in [M]|j \in [m]\}\) such that they are consistent with the leakage graph. It then defines \(\text{EO}\.ect_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{EO}\.Sim(\text{EO}\.pk, \text{EO}\.sk, h_{i,j})\). It samples \(\overline{sh}_{D,i} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{w}\) and \((\text{KEM}\.cp_i, \text{KEM}\.k_i) \leftarrow \text{KEM}\.Enc(\text{KEM}\.pk)\). Define \(\overline{sh}_{D,i}\) s.t. it is consistent with \(\text{SH}_D\) and \(\overline{sh}_{D,i}\). For all \(\overline{sh}_{D,i}\) that are not defined, sample \(\overline{sh}_{D,i} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{w}\). For \(t \notin \mathbb{C}\), it samples seed, \(\leftarrow \{0,1\}^\epsilon\) and \(\text{ct}_{at} \leftarrow \text{PKE}\.Enc(\text{pk}, \text{seed}_t)\), which is identical to the protocol description.

We prove the claim by using the following sequence of hybrids.

\textbf{Hybrid}_0: Is identical to the views during the real execution of the protocol.

\textbf{Hybrid}_1: Simulates the view during the shuffling by using the simulator of the shuffle protocol.

\textbf{Hybrid}_2: Sample \(\text{EO}\.ect_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{EO}\.Sim(\text{EO}\.pk, \text{EO}\.sk, h_{i,j})\), where \(h_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{EO}\.Eval(\text{EO}\.ek, p_{i,j})\) and \(p_{i,j}\) is the reshuffled \(p_{t,i,j}\), which can be computed from the shuffle permutation \(\pi\) and \(\{DB_t\}_{t \in [T]}\).

\textbf{Hybrid}_3: It defines \(\{h_{C,t,i}|i \in [m_C]|j \in [m_C]\} \) and \(\{h_{i,j}|i \in [M]|j \in [m]\}\) such that they are consistent with the leakage graph.

\textbf{Hybrid}_4: Samples \((\text{KEM}\.cp_i, \text{KEM}\.k_i) \leftarrow \text{KEM}\.Enc(\text{KEM}\.pk)\) s.t. it is independent of \(\overline{sh}_{D,i}, \overline{sh}_{D,i}\) and \(\text{SH}_D\).

\textbf{Hybrid}_5: Samples \(\overline{sh}_{D,i} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{w}\) and defines \(\overline{sh}_{D,i}\) s.t. it is consistent with \(\text{SH}_{J,D}\) and \(\overline{sh}_{D,i}\). For all \(\overline{sh}_{D,i}\) that are not defined, sample \(\overline{sh}_{D,i} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{w}\).

If \(\textbf{Hybrid}_0\) and \(\textbf{Hybrid}_1\) can be distinguished with probability \(\epsilon\), then there is a distinguisher against the simulator of the shuffle protocol with probability \(\epsilon\). Since such a distinguishing probability is negligible (based on the security of \(\text{EO}\), see Theorem 4), distinguishing \(\textbf{Hybrid}_0\) from \(\textbf{Hybrid}_1\) is also negligible.

If \(\textbf{Hybrid}_1\) and \(\textbf{Hybrid}_2\) can be distinguished with probability \(\epsilon\), we can define a sequence of hybrids that step by step replaces \(\text{EO}\.ect_{i,j}\) with outputs of \(\text{EO}\.Sim\). Now, there are at least two consecutive intermediate hybrids that can be distinguished with probability \(\epsilon/\sum_{i,j}\). Since this probability is negligible due to the evaluated ciphertext simulatability of \(\text{EO}\), \(\textbf{Hybrid}_1\) and \(\textbf{Hybrid}_2\) can also only be distinguished with negligible probability.

In \(\textbf{Hybrid}_2\) \(h_{i,j}\) and \(h_{C,t,i,j}\) are the outputs of \(\text{EO}\.Eval\) whereas in \(\textbf{Hybrid}_3\) they are uniform in \(\{0,1\}^\epsilon\). We prove that \(\textbf{Hybrid}_2\) and \(\textbf{Hybrid}_3\) are indistinguishable except negligible probability by a reduction to the pseudorandomness of \(\text{EO}\.Eval\). Let there be a distinguisher distinguishing \(\textbf{Hybrid}_2\) and \(\textbf{Hybrid}_3\) with probability \(\epsilon\), then we can build a distinguisher against the pseudorandomness of \(\text{EO}\.Eval\) with probability \(\epsilon\). The latter requests all \(h_{i,j}\) and \(h_{C,t,i,j}\) from the \(\text{EO}\.Eval\) oracle, uses them to simulate \(\textbf{Hybrid}_2\), \(\textbf{Hybrid}_3\) and outputs the output of the former distinguisher. When they are actual \(\text{EO}\.Eval\) outputs, it simulates \(\textbf{Hybrid}_2\) and when they are uniform, it simulates \(\textbf{Hybrid}_3\).

If \(\textbf{Hybrid}_2\) and \(\textbf{Hybrid}_3\) can be distinguished with probability \(\epsilon\), we can define a sequence of hybrids that step by step replaces \((\text{KEM}\.cp_i, \text{KEM}\.k_i)\) with \((\text{KEM}\.cp_i, \text{KEM}\.k_i)\) where \((\text{KEM}\.cp_i, \text{KEM}\.k_i) \leftarrow \text{KEM}\.Enc(\text{pk})\). Now there exist two consecutive intermediate hybrids that can be distinguished which implies a distinguisher for \((\text{KEM}\.cp, \text{KEM}\.k)\) and \(\text{KEM}\.cp, \text{KEM}\.k\) with probability \(\epsilon/\sum_{M}\). By the triangular inequality, we can then build a distinguisher for \((\text{KEM}\.cp, \text{KEM}\.k)\) and \((\text{KEM}\.cp, \text{KEM}\.k)\) with probability \(\epsilon/\sum_{M}\), where \(u \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{w}\). Such a distinguisher breaks the key indistinguishability for the KEM. Since this is negligible, \(\textbf{Hybrid}_2\) and \(\textbf{Hybrid}_3\) cannot be distinguished except negligible probability.

\textbf{Hybrid}_4 and \(\textbf{Hybrid}_5\) produce identically distributed views. Notice that \(\overline{sh}_{D,i}, \overline{sh}_{D,i}\) and \(\text{SH}_{J,D}\) are independent of \((\text{KEM}\.cp_i, \text{KEM}\.k_i)\). Further, due to the simulator of the shuffling, they are independent of \(\overline{sh}_{C,t,i,j}\) and \(\overline{sh}_{D,i}\). Therefore, they can be sampled independently which concludes the proof of our claim. \(\square\)

\textit{Claim.} Let \(\text{EO}\) be a secure and correct randomizable encrypted OPRF scheme. Then, there exists a simulator that generates the joint view of Party \(S\) and any subset of parties \(P_1\) to \(P_T\) that is indistinguishable from the joint view during the protocol execution.

\textit{Proof.} The joint view of Party \(S\) and the corrupted subset of parties \(P_1\) to \(P_T\) (defined by set \(C \subseteq [T]\)) can be generated from their input \(\{DB_t\}_{t \in C}\) and the received messages \(\{\text{ct}_{at}\}_{i \in [M]}\) and \(\text{KEM}\.pk\).

The simulator samples \(\overline{sh}_{C,t} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{w}\) and uses the simulator of the shuffle protocol to simulate the view during the shuffling.

The view generated by the simulator is indistinguishable from the view during the real protocols by the indistinguishability of the simulated view of shuffling from the real view of the shuffling. Notice that in case
of using the simulated view of the shuffling, \( \{ \tilde{sh}_{C,i} \}_{i \in [M]} \) are independent of \( \{ sh_{C,t,i} \}_{i \in [m], t \in [T]} \). Therefore, \( \tilde{sh}_{C,i} \) can be sampled independently when using the simulated view during the shuffling.

\[ \square \]

\[ \square \]

### E Extending Left Join to Inner Join

DPMC and D\( ^{S} \)PMC can be extended to support other types of joins such as an inner join instead of a left join. In both protocols, party \( D \) performs the join based on the encrypted databases of \( C \) and all delegators (i.e., in DPMC in step 4 and in D\( ^{S} \)PMC in step 9). Performing the left join in party \( D \) hides from party \( C \) which of its rows have been matched with one of the delegators’ rows and which have not. It is straightforward to extend our delegated protocols to compute the inner join (i.e., intersection) between DB\( C \) and DB\( P \) and secret share the associated metadata for these rows. This can be performed very efficiently using hash join over the encrypted identifiers and sending the KEM cp value to \( C \) only for the records present in both databases. Notably, computing the inner join leaks the intersection size to party \( C \) but also renders the downstream MPC computation more efficient since it does not have to process secret shares of NULL.