Efficient supersingularity testing over $\mathbb{F}_p$ and CSIDH key validation

Gustavo Banegas\textsuperscript{1}, Valerie Gilchrist\textsuperscript{2,1,*}, Benjamin Smith\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}Inria and Laboratoire d’Informatique de l’Ecole polytechnique, Institut Polytechnique de Paris, Palaiseau, France
\textsuperscript{2}University of Waterloo, Canada

Abstract Many public-key cryptographic protocols, notably non-interactive key exchange (NIKE), require incoming public keys to be validated to mitigate some adaptive attacks. In CSIDH, an isogeny-based post-quantum NIKE, a key is deemed legitimate if the given Montgomery coefficient specifies a supersingular elliptic curve over the prime field. In this work, we survey the current supersingularity tests used for CSIDH key validation, and implement and measure two new alternative algorithms. Our implementation shows that we can determine supersingularity substantially faster, and using less memory, than the state-of-the-art.

Keywords: Isogenies, Key validation, Supersingularity, Elliptic Curves

1 INTRODUCTION

The security of many public-key cryptosystems assumes that public keys are honestly generated: that is, that public keys have not been manipulated by adversaries. Key validation is the process of determining whether an incoming public key was plausibly constructed following the protocol.

The simplest example of this is in non-interactive key exchange (NIKE). Consider classic static Diffie–Hellman in a finite field: the system parameters fix a prime modulus $p$ and a generator $g$ in $\mathbb{F}_p$ for a subgroup $G = \langle g \rangle \subset \mathbb{F}_p^\times$ of prime order $r$. Alice samples a long-term secret integer $a$, and binds to the corresponding public key $A = g^a$. An honest Bob computes his keypair $(B = g^b, b)$, and the shared secret is $S = A^b = B^a$. However, if $G$ is a proper subgroup of $\mathbb{F}_p^\times$, then a dishonest Bob can choose some $h$ in $\mathbb{F}_p^\times \setminus G$, of order $s \mid (p - 1)/r$, and transmit the malformed public key $B' = B \cdot h$. The shared secret as computed by Alice is now $S' = (B')^a = S \cdot h^a$, while Bob derives the original $S = A^b$. The success or failure of subsequent encrypted communication tells Bob whether $S = S'$, and hence whether $a = 0 \pmod{s}$.

To avoid leaking information on her long-term private key to adaptive adversaries, then, Alice must validate incoming public keys as being honestly generated. In the example above, this amounts to checking that Bob’s public key really is an element of $G$: this can be done by checking that $B^{(p-1)/r} = 1$. In modern elliptic-curve Diffie–Hellman key exchange, key validation amounts to an analogous scalar multiplication by a (tiny or trivial) cofactor, plus a simple check that Bob’s public key $B$ really does encode a point on the curve.

Moving now to the post-quantum setting, the best-established NIKE candidate is CSIDH [3], a key exchange scheme based on the action of the ideal class group of $\mathbb{Z}[\sqrt{-p}]$ on the isogeny class of supersingular elliptic curves over $\mathbb{F}_p$ (recall that $E/\mathbb{F}_p$ is supersingular if $#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p + 1$; otherwise, it is is ordinary). The CSIDH group action has also been used to construct other post-quantum public-key cryptosystems, including signatures [2, 7, 9], threshold schemes [8], and oblivious transfer [15].

Validating CSIDH public keys is therefore important for long-term post-quantum security. The fundamental problem is: we are given an element $A$ in $\mathbb{F}_p$ corresponding to an elliptic curve with a Montgomery model

\[ E_A/\mathbb{F}_p : y^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1), \] 

and we must determine if $E_A$ is in the orbit of the group action. By [3, Proposition 8], to validate $A$ it suffices to

1. check that $A^2 \neq 4$ (that is, $E_A$ is an elliptic curve and not a singular cubic), a trivial task; and
2. check that $E_A$ is supersingular, a nontrivial and mathematically interesting task.

Key validation is not the bottleneck in CSIDH key exchange—it typically takes under 5% of the runtime—but it is still a critical problem to be solved efficiently. The main issue is supersingularity testing over $\mathbb{F}_p$, and we will focus entirely on this problem, ignoring the rest of the CSIDH cryptosystem and its derivatives (we refer the reader to [3, 4, 1] for further details and discussion). The only relevant detail is that in CSIDH, $p = 4\prod_{i=1}^{n} \ell_i - 1$.

*Corresponding Author: Valerie Gilchrist, vgilchrist@uwaterloo.ca

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where the \( \ell_i \) are small primes: this ensures that supersingular curves over \( \mathbb{F}_p \) have rational points of order \( \ell_i \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq n \), which can be used to compute the group action for ideals of smooth norm in a particularly efficient way. In particular, \( p \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \).

In this work we consider four algorithms for testing supersingularity over \( \mathbb{F}_p \) in the context of CSIDH key validation. The algorithms are listed in Table 1. We have implemented and benchmarked each of these algorithms for the 512-bit prime \( p \) defined by the CSIDH-512 parameter set; our practical results are also summarized in Table 1.

### Table 1: Supersingularity testing algorithms for elliptic curves over \( \mathbb{F}_p \). For Algorithms 2 and 3, \( p + 1 = 4 \prod_{i=1}^{n} \ell_i \).

(The experimental setup for the performance measurements with CSIDH-512 parameters is detailed below.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Test algorithm</th>
<th>Time (( \mathbb{F}_p )-ops)</th>
<th>Space (( \mathbb{F}_p )-elts)</th>
<th>Supersingular input</th>
<th>Non-Supersingular input</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alg. 2 (Random point)</td>
<td>( O(n \log p) )</td>
<td>( O(1) )</td>
<td>63.4 ( \pm ) 62.2</td>
<td>2890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alg. 3 (Product tree)</td>
<td>( O((\log n)(\log p)) )</td>
<td>( O(\log n) )</td>
<td>6.7 ( \pm ) 6.1</td>
<td>4344</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alg. 5 (Sutherland)</td>
<td>( O(\log^2 p) )</td>
<td>( O(1) )</td>
<td>35.4 ( \pm ) 35.1</td>
<td>2696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alg. 6 (Doliskani)</td>
<td>( O(\log p) )</td>
<td>( O(1) )</td>
<td>4.5 ( \pm ) 4.7</td>
<td>3280</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Algorithms

Algorithms 2 and 3, detailed in §3, are elementary algorithms based on determining the order of a random point on \( E_A \). These are the algorithms used in existing CSIDH implementations, and we include them as a baseline for comparison. These are the only supersingularity tests here that rely on the special form of CSIDH primes (they require the factorization of \( p + 1 \)).

Algorithm 5, described in §4, is our variant of Sutherland’s test [21] for curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \), adapted and optimized for Montgomery models over \( \mathbb{F}_p \). This test is based on distinguishing between the 2-isogeny graph structures of supersingular and ordinary elliptic curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \). While the asymptotic complexity of this algorithm is quadratic in \( \log p \) (the others are linear or quasi-linear), it has very good constants, and we find that it performs surprisingly well in practice. It is extremely easy to implement, and requires very little memory. It is also the only one of the four tests considered here that always produces definitive proof of supersingularity.

Algorithm 6, described in §5, is our variant of Doliskani’s test [11] for curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \), which uses Polynomial Identity Testing to distinguish between the \( p \)-th division polynomials of supersingular and ordinary curves. We have adapted and optimized this algorithm for Montgomery models over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \), drastically simplifying the division polynomial computation. This algorithm is particularly simple: it only requires a single scalar multiplication of a point over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \), followed by an easy field exponentiation. Algorithm 6 is a Monte Carlo algorithm with one-sided error: it may declare an ordinary curve supersingular, but the probability of this is in \( O(1/p) \), which is virtually zero for cryptographic \( p \): for the 512-bit \( p \) of CSIDH, a false-accept rate of \( 2^{-512} \) is more than covered by the claimed security level.

We will see that Algorithm 6 is the simplest and fastest supersingularity test for CSIDH public key validation.

### Implementation and experimental results

We implemented our algorithms in C for the 512-bit prime \( p \) of the CSIDH-512 parameter set, which was built from \( n = 74 \) small primes \( \ell_i \). For \( \mathbb{F}_p \)-arithmetic, we used the assembly code from the CTIDH library [1]. For \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \)-arithmetic, we used the “tricks” from [19], which we reproduce for easy reference in Appendix A. The implementation of Algorithm 3 was taken directly from the CTIDH library.

Algorithms 2, 5, and 6 are our own implementations.

We ran our experiments on an Intel i7-10610U processor running at 4.90 GHz with TurboBoost and SpeedStep disabled, running Arch Linux with kernel 5.15.41-1-lts and GCC 12.1.0. Cycles were measured using the bench utility provided in the CSIDH code package. For our experiments, we generated 500 valid (supersingular) curves and 500 invalid (ordinary) curves. Table 1 presents the average and median runtime for each algorithm (in millions of cycles), and the maximum stack use (in bytes) for a complete run of the algorithm (including subroutines). We note that the algorithm used to compute square roots in \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) inside Algorithm 5 uses several temporary variables, which increases the stack footprint; this might be further optimized.

### Notation

Throughout, \( p \) denotes a (large) odd prime, and \( q \) is a power of \( p \). For every integer \( m > 0 \), we write

\[
\text{len}(m) := \lceil \log_2 m \rceil + 1 \quad (\text{i.e., the bitlength of } m).
\]

### 2 Montgomery Arithmetic

We assume that the reader is familiar with basic elliptic curve arithmetic (see e.g. [20] for background). However, Algorithm 6 requires some fine detail on the Montgomery ladder algorithm [17], which is also a subroutine of

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1We used version 26216523, available from http://ctidh.isogeny.org/software.html.
Algorithms 2, 3, and CSIDH itself, so we take a moment to recall it here. (For further detail, see [6].)

In practice, most isogeny-based cryptosystems (including CSIDH) work with Montgomery models

\[ E_A : y^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1). \]

We call the parameter \( A \) the Montgomery coefficient. We write \( \oplus \) and \( \odot \) for addition and subtraction on \( E_A \).

Let \( P \) and \( Q \) be points on \( E_A \). Any three of \( x(P), x(Q), x(P \odot Q) \), and \( x(P \oplus Q) \) determines the fourth, so we can define a differential addition

\[ x\text{ADD} : (x(P), x(Q), x(P \odot Q)) \mapsto x(P \oplus Q) \]

and a pseudo-doubling operation

\[ x\text{DBL}_A : x(P) \mapsto x([2]P). \]

We can evaluate these maps on affine representatives for projective points as follows. Given points \( P \) and \( Q \) on \( E_A \), we write \( (X_P : Z_P) = x(P), (X_Q : Z_Q) = x(Q) \), \( (X_0 : Z_0) = x(P \odot Q) \), and \( (X_0 : Z_0) = x(P \odot Q) \) (recall that \( x((X : Y : Z)) = (X : Z) \) if \( Z \neq 0 \), and \( (1 : 0) \) if \( Z = 0 \)). Now we can compute \( x\text{ADD} \) using the formul\( e\)

\[
\begin{align*}
X_0 &= Z_0 \cdot [U + V]^2, \\
Z_0 &= X_0 \cdot [U - V]^2, \\
U &= (X_P - Z_P)(X_Q + Z_Q), \\
V &= (X_P + Z_P)(X_Q - Z_Q).
\end{align*}
\]

Note that if we replace \( (X_P, Z_P) \) and \( (X_Q, Z_Q) \) with the projectively equivalent \( (\lambda P X_P, \lambda P Z_P) \) and \( (\lambda Q X_Q, \lambda Q Z_Q) \) in (2), then \( (X_0, Z_0) \) becomes \((\lambda P \lambda X_0, \lambda Q \lambda Z_0)\).

Similarly, writing \( (X_{[2]P} : [2]P, Z_{[2]P}) \) for \([2]P\), we can compute \( x\text{DBL}_A \) using

\[
\begin{align*}
X_{[2]P} &= R \cdot S, \\
Z_{[2]P} &= T \cdot (S + A^2 T), \\
R &= (X_P + Z_P)^2, \\
S &= (X_P - Z_P)^2, \\
T &= 4X_P \cdot Z_P = Q - R.
\end{align*}
\]

If we replace \( (X_P, Z_P) \) with \((\lambda P X_P, \lambda P Z_P)\) in (3), then \( (X_{[2]P}, Z_{[2]P}) \) becomes \((\lambda P^2 X_{[2]P}, \lambda P^2 Z_{[2]P})\).

Algorithm 1 is the Montgomery ladder, which efficiently computes the map \( (m, x(P)) \mapsto x([m]P) \).

**Algorithm 1:** The Montgomery ladder on the x-line \( \mathbb{F}_p \) under \( E_A : y^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1) \)

Input: \( A \in \mathbb{F}_q, m = \sum_{i=0}^{\beta-1} m_i 2^i \), and \( (X_P, Z_P) \in \mathbb{P}^2_q \) with \( X_P Z_P \neq 0 \)

Output: \( (X_m, Z_m) \) and \( (X_{m+1}, Z_{m+1}) \) in \( \mathbb{P}^2_q \) such that \( x((X_m : Z_m)) = x([m]P) \) and \( x((X_{m+1} : Z_{m+1})) = x([m+1]P) \) where \( P \) is a point on \( E_A \) with \( x(P) = (X_P : Z_P) \)

1. **Function Ladder:** \( (m, (X_P, Z_P)) \)
2. \( (R_0, R_1) \leftarrow ((1, 0), (X_P, Z_P)) \) \hspace{1cm} // \( (1 : 0) = x(0) \) and \( (X_P : Z_P) = x(P) \)
3. for \( i \) in \( (\beta - 1, \ldots, 0) \) do \hspace{1cm} // Invariant: \( R_0 = x([m/2^i]P) \) and \( R_1 = x([m/2^i]+1]P) \)
4. \hspace{1cm} if \( m_i = 0 \) then
5. \hspace{1cm} \hspace{1cm} \( (R_0, R_1) \leftarrow (x\text{DBL}_A(R_0), x\text{ADD}(R_0, R_1, (X_P, Z_P))) \)
6. \hspace{1cm} else
7. \hspace{1cm} \hspace{1cm} \( (R_0, R_1) \leftarrow (x\text{ADD}(R_0, R_1, (X_P, Z_P)), x\text{DBL}_A(R_1)) \)
8. return \( R_0 \) and optionally \( R_1 \) \hspace{1cm} // \( R_0 = x([m]P) \) and \( R_1 = x([m+1]P) \)

3 ELEMENTARY SUPERSINGULARITY TESTS

We begin by considering the two supersingularity tests that have been proposed for use with CSIDH [3]. These elementary tests are included as a point of reference when comparing performance with our new algorithms below; for detailed discussion, see [3, §5 and §8].

The goal of these two tests is to try to exhibit a point of order \( N \mid (p + 1) \) with \( N > 4\sqrt{p} \); then, the only multiple of \( N \) in the Hasse interval is \( p + 1 \), so we can conclude that the curve has order \( p + 1 \) and is therefore supersingular. On the other hand, if we find a point whose order can be shown to not divide \( p + 1 \), then we can immediately declare the curve ordinary. To efficiently determine (a divisor of) the order, we need to know the factorization of \( p + 1 \), which in the case of CSIDH is \( 4 \prod_{\ell_i} \ell_i \) with the \( \ell_i \) very small.

Algorithm 2 proceeds in the simplest way: let \( u \) be a random element of \( \mathbb{F}_p \setminus \{0\} \). Now \( u \) is the x-coordinate of a point \( P \) in \( E(\mathbb{F}_p) \), which has exponent \( p + 1 \). For each of the primes \( \ell_i \), we compute \( Q_i = [(p + 1)/\ell_i]P \).
If \( Q_i = 0 \), then we learn nothing from \( \ell_i \);

if \( Q_i \neq 0 \) but \( [\ell_i]Q_i = 0 \) then we know that \( \ell_i \) divides the order of \( P \);

if \( [\ell_i]Q_i \neq 0 \) then the order of \( P \) cannot divide \( p + 1 \), so we know the curve is ordinary.

Once we have accumulated enough \( \ell_i \) that \( \prod_i \ell_i > 4\sqrt{p} \), we can stop and declare the curve supersingular.

Algorithm 2 is quite simple to follow and has low memory requirements, but its expected runtime is rather slow. Indeed, each \( \ell_i \) that we treat entails two Ladder calls, with \( m = (p + 1)/\ell_i \) and \( \ell_i \), and this adds up to approximately the cost of a Ladder with \( m = p + 1 \). The asymptotic runtime is therefore \( O(n \log p) \) \( \mathbb{F}_p \)-operations.

For a more concrete perspective: to minimise the total runtime before exceeding \( 4\sqrt{p} \) (or declaring ordinariness), we treat the \( \ell_i \) from largest to smallest. If the curve is supersingular (which is the worst case for runtime), then we will need a little under half of the \( \ell_i \); that is, we expect an effort equivalent of around \( n/2 \) full-length Ladder calls over \( \mathbb{F}_p \). Of course, in practice we can compute these point multiplications using precalculated optimal differential addition chains, rather than the ladder, but this is only a small improvement.

It is possible, though extremely improbable for cryptographic-size \( p \), for Algorithm 2 to fail and return \( \bot \). (This would imply that the random point has very small order.) If this happens, then we can simply re-run Algorithm 2 with a new random \( u \).

**Algorithm 2**: Supersingularity testing for \( E/\mathbb{F}_p : y^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1) \) via random point multiplication [3, Algorithm 1]. Assumes the factorization \( p + 1 = 4 \prod_{i=1}^{n} \ell_i \) is known, with \( \ell_n > \cdots > \ell_1 \).

| Input: \( A \in \mathbb{F}_p \). |
| Output: True or False or \( \bot \). |
| Function IsSupersingular(A) |
| 1 \( u \leftarrow \text{Random}(\mathbb{F}_p \setminus \{0\}) \) |
| 2 \( N \leftarrow 1 \) |
| 3 for \( i \) in \( (n, \ldots, 1) \) do |
| 4 \( (X, Z) \leftarrow \text{Ladder}(A, (p + 1)/\ell_i, (u, 1)) \) |
| 5 \( (X', Z') \leftarrow \text{Ladder}(A, \ell_i, (X, Z)) \) |
| 6 if \( Z' \neq 0 \) then |
| 7 \( \text{return False} \) |
| 8 if \( Z \neq 0 \) then |
| 9 \( N \leftarrow N \cdot \ell_i \) |
| 10 if \( N > 4\sqrt{p} \) then |
| 11 \( \text{return True} \) |
| 12 \( \text{return } \bot \) |

Algorithm 3 is a simple version of Algorithm 2 exploiting the fact that the various scalar multiplications are products of the same small primes, so we can compute them more efficiently using a classic product-tree structure. The algorithm proposed in [3, §8] traverses the product tree breadth-first. Algorithm 3, which is essentially the algorithm currently used in the CSIDH and CTIDH reference implementations, does this depth-first instead, handling the leaves corresponding to the largest \( \ell_i \) first (the depth-first approach saves a lot of memory, and a little time too).

The product-tree approach is essentially a space-time tradeoff: we mutualise much of the effort of the scalar multiplications in the basic Algorithm 2, at the cost of storing the internal nodes of the product tree on the path to the current leaf. The depth of the tree is \( \lceil \log_2 n \rceil \), so we have an asymptotic time complexity of \( O(k \log n) \) \( \mathbb{F}_p \)-operations and a space complexity of \( O(\log n) \) \( \mathbb{F}_p \)-elements.

## 4 ISOGENY VOLCANOES AND SUTHERLAND’S TEST

Our first non-elementary supersingularity test is Sutherland’s algorithm [21], which actually detects supersingularity over \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \). As such, we will need a slightly more evolved perspective on supersingularity before describing the algorithm. The facts stated here without proof are all covered in [20] (for supersingularity), and [14] and [12] (for isogeny graphs and volcanoes).
Algorithm 3: Supersingularity testing for $E/\mathbb{F}_p : y^2 = x(x^3 + Ax + 1)$ via random point multiplication with an implicit product tree. Assumes the factorization $p + 1 = 4 \prod_{i=1}^{n} t_i$ is known.

Input: $A \in \mathbb{F}_p$

Output: True or False

Function IsSupersingular(A)
  Function OrderRec(A, (X_Q, Z_Q), L, U, m)
    if $U - L = 1$ then // At this point, $Q = [(p + 1)/L]P$
      if $Z_Q = 0$ then // In this case, we learn nothing
        return $m$
      else
        $(X_Q, Z_Q) \leftarrow \text{Ladder}(A, \ell_U, (X_Q, Z_Q))$
      endif
    else
      $(X_Q, Z_Q) \leftarrow \text{Ladder}(A, \prod_{i=[L+1]}^{[U/L]} \ell_i, (X_Q, Z_Q))$
    endif
    $m \leftarrow \text{OrderRec}(A, (X_L, Z_L), [(U + L)/2], U, m)$
    if $m > 4\sqrt{\ell}$ then
      return $m$
    else
      $(X_R, Z_R) \leftarrow \text{Ladder}(A, \prod_{i=[U+1]}^{[U/L]} \ell_i, (X_Q, Z_Q))$
      $m \leftarrow \text{OrderRec}(A, (X_R, Z_R), L, [(U + L)/2], m)$
      return $m$
    endif
  endif
  $u \leftarrow \text{Random}(\mathbb{F}_p)$
  $m \leftarrow \text{OrderRec}(A, (u, 1), 0, n, 1)$
  if $m = 0$ then
    return False
  else if $m > 4\sqrt{n}$ then
    return True
  else
    return ⊥
end

4.1 SUPERSINGULARITY IN GENERAL

Let $E : y^2 = x^3 + ax^2 + ax + a_6$ be an elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_{p^e}$, and let $\pi : (x, y) \mapsto (x^{p^e}, y^{p^e})$ be the $p^e$-power Frobenius endomorphism. Like all endomorphisms, $\pi$ satisfies a quadratic characteristic polynomial in the form

$$\chi_\pi(X) = X^2 - tX + p^e.$$  

The integer $t$ is called the trace of Frobenius, or simply the trace of $E$; Hasse’s theorem tells us that $|t| \leq 2p^{e/2}$. Since the $\mathbb{F}_{p^e}$-rational points of $E$ are precisely the points fixed by $\pi$, we have

$$\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^e}) = \chi_\pi(1) = p^e - t + 1.$$  

We say that $E$ is supersingular if $p \mid t$; otherwise, $E$ is ordinary. (In particular, in the case $e = 1$, Hasse’s theorem implies that $E$ is supersingular if and only if $t = 0$, and only if $\#E(\mathbb{F}_p) = p + 1$.) Equivalently, $E$ is supersingular if $E[p^e]/(\mathbb{F}_p)$ is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}/p^e\mathbb{Z}$.

If $E$ is supersingular, then its multiplication-by-$p$ endomorphism $[p]$ is purely inseparable, hence isomorphic to the $p^2$-power Frobenius isogeny, which is therefore isomorphic to an endomorphism. Hence, if $E$ is supersingular, then the $j$-invariant of $E$ must be in $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, and $E$ is $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$-isomorphic to a supersingular curve over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$. Thus, supersingularity testing over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ reduces immediately to supersingularity testing over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$.

The ring $\mathbb{Z}[\pi]$ forms a subring of the endomorphism ring $\text{End}(E)$. If $E$ is ordinary, then $\text{End}(E)$ is an order in the quadratic imaginary field $\mathbb{Q}(\pi) \cong \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{t^2 - 4p^e})$. If $E$ is supersingular, then $\text{End}(E)$ is a maximal order in a quaternion algebra ramified at $p$ and $\infty$.

4.2 2-ISOGENY GRAPHS

An isogeny $\phi : E \rightarrow E'$, is a non-zero morphism of elliptic curves. We say $\phi$ is a $d$-isogeny if the associated extension of function fields has degree $d$ (we are only concerned with 2-isogenies in this paper).
If \( \phi : E \to E' \) is a \( d \)-isogeny, then there exists a dual \( d \)-isogeny \( \hat{\phi} : E' \to E \). The composition of two isogenies is another isogeny, and every elliptic curve has an isogeny to itself (the identity map, for example). Isogeny is therefore an equivalence relation: the set of all elliptic curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) decomposes into isogeny classes. Isogenous curves have the same trace; in particular, supersingularity is preserved by isogeny.

The 2-isogeny graph of elliptic curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) is the graph whose vertices are isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \), and where there is an edge between two vertices corresponding to (the isomorphism class of) each 2-isogeny between elliptic curves representing the vertices. While this graph is technically directed, away from the vertices of \( j \)-invariant 0 and 1728 it behaves exactly like an undirected graph.

The components of 2-isogeny graphs containing ordinary and supersingular curves have very different structures.

• The 2-isogeny graph of supersingular curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) is a connected 3-regular graph.

• The 2-isogeny graph of ordinary curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) decomposes into a set of volcanoes, formed by a (possibly trivial) cycle whose vertices form the roots of a forest of regular binary trees, all of the same height.

Figure 1 illustrates an example of a 2-isogeny volcano. Following the terminology of [12], the cycle (at the top) is called the crater, and the leaves of the trees form the floor.

Figure 1: Example isogeny volcano.

As shown in [14], the volcano structure can be interpreted in terms of endomorphism rings. Let \( E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) be an ordinary curve representing a vertex in a 2-isogeny volcano, let \( t \) be the trace of \( E \), and let \( \Delta := t^2 - 4p^2 \); then the algebra \( \mathbb{Q}(\pi) \) generated by the Frobenius endomorphism \( \pi \) is isomorphic to the quadratic imaginary field \( K := \mathbb{Q}(\sqrt{\Delta}) \). Let \( \Delta_0 \) be the fundamental discriminant of \( \Delta \), so \( \Delta = c^2\Delta_0 \) for some \( c > 0 \), which is the conductor (or index) of \( \mathbb{Z}[\pi] \) in the maximal order \( \mathcal{O}_K \) of \( K \).

Now, if \( E \) is on the crater, then \( \text{End}(E) \otimes \mathbb{Z}_2 \cong \mathcal{O}_K \otimes \mathbb{Z}_2 \); if \( E \) is on the floor, then \( \text{End}(E) \otimes \mathbb{Z}_2 \cong \mathbb{Z}[\pi] \otimes \mathbb{Z}_2 \).

In between, if \( E \) is \( d \) levels down from the crater, then \( \text{End}(E) \otimes \mathbb{Z}_2 \) has index \( 2^d \) in \( \mathcal{O}_K \otimes \mathbb{Z}_2 \); that is, the level \( d \) gives the 2-valuation of the conductor of \( \text{End}(E) \) in \( \mathcal{O}_K \). The height \( h \) of the volcano is therefore bounded by the 2-valuation of \( c \), which can never be greater than \( \log_2(\sqrt{t^2 - 4p^2}) \leq \log_2(\sqrt{4p^2}) = \log_2 p + 1 \).

4.3 SUPERSINGULARITY TESTING WITH ISOGENY VOLCANOES

Sutherland’s supersingularity test [21] determines the supersingularity of an elliptic curve \( E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) by exploring the 2-isogeny graph around \( E \) and determining whether it is a volcano or not. If it is, then \( E \) must be ordinary; otherwise, it is supersingular.

We explore the graph using modular polynomials. The (classical) modular polynomial of level 2 is

\[
\Phi_2(J_1, J_2) = J_1^2 + J_2^2 - J_1J_2 + 1488(J_1^3J_2 + J_1J_2^3) - 162000(J_1^5 + J_2^5) + 40773375J_1J_2 + 8748000000(J_1 + J_2) - 15746400000000 .
\]

This polynomial has the property that

\[
\text{there exists a 2-isogeny } E_1 \to E_2 \iff \Phi_2(j(E_1), j(E_2)) = 0 .
\]

Hence, given a vertex \( j(E) \) in the 2-isogeny graph, we can compute its neighbours by computing the roots of the cubic polynomial \( \Phi_2(j_0, X) \) in \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \).

Algorithm 4 is Sutherland’s algorithm for curves \( E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2} \). We start three non-backtracking walks in the graph from the vertex of \( E \). If the graph is a volcano, then one of the walks must head towards the floor; if we find the floor (that is, a vertex with only one neighbour), then we can declare the curve ordinary. On the other hand, we
know the maximal distance to the floor, if it exists; so if no walk finds the floor in less than \( \log_2 p + 1 \) steps, then we can declare the curve supersingular.

Initialising the three walks requires factoring the cubic \( \Phi_3(j(E), X) \). In every proceeding step, we can avoid backtracking by dividing the evaluated modular polynomial by \( X - j' \), where \( j' \) is the \( j \)-invariant of the previous vertex. Therefore, each subsequent step in a walk requires factoring only a quadratic, which can be done easily via the quadratic formula; the cost of each step is therefore dominated by the computation of a square root in \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \).

Algorithm 4: Sutherland’s supersingularity test for elliptic curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function IsSupersingular(j)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Input:</strong> ( j \in \mathbb{F}<em>{p^2} ) (the ( j )-invariant of an elliptic curve ( E/\mathbb{F}</em>{p^2} ))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Output:</strong> True or False</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1. \( \Phi \leftarrow \text{ClassicalModularPolynomial}(2) \mod p \) \hspace{1cm} // \( \Phi(X, Y) \in \mathbb{F}_p[X, Y] \)
2. \( f \leftarrow \text{Evaluate}(\Phi, (j, X)) \) \hspace{1cm} // \( f(X) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}[X] \), degree 3
3. \( J \leftarrow \text{Roots}(f, \mathbb{F}_{p^2}) \) \hspace{1cm} // Roots may be repeated
4. if \( \#J < 3 \) then
5.   return False
6. \( (j_1, j_2, j_3) \leftarrow J \)
7. \( (j_1', j_2', j_3') \leftarrow (j, j, j) \)
8. for \( 0 \leq s \leq \lfloor \log_2 p \rfloor \) do \hspace{1cm} // 2-isogeny walk steps
9.   for \( 1 \leq i \leq 3 \) do \hspace{1cm} // Three parallel walks
10.   \( f_i \leftarrow \text{Evaluate}(\Phi, (j, X)) \) \hspace{1cm} // \( f_i(X) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}[X] \), degree 3
11.   \( f_i \leftarrow f_i/(X - j_i') \) \hspace{1cm} // No backtracking
12.   \( J_i \leftarrow \text{Roots}(f_i, \mathbb{F}_{p^2}) \) \hspace{1cm} // Roots may be repeated
13. if \( \#J_i \neq 2 \) then
14.   return False \hspace{1cm} // We have hit the volcano floor
15. \( (j_1, j_1') \leftarrow (\text{Random}(J_i), j_i) \) \hspace{1cm} // Next step
16. return True

4.4 AN IMPROVED VOLCANO TEST FOR CURVES OVER PRIME FIELDS

Sutherland suggests a speed-up for the case that the given curve is defined over \( \mathbb{F}_p \)—which is exactly the CSIDH setting. The key fact is that if we consider the subgraph of the supersingular 2-isogeny graph supported on vertices with \( j \)-invariants in \( \mathbb{F}_p \), then this part looks like a particularly stumpy volcano; \(^2\) that is, it consists of a cycle, with descending trees of height at most 1 (see [10] for a detailed treatment of this graph). When we allow vertices over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \), then we obtain the usual complete 3-regular graph. On the other hand, if \( E/\mathbb{F}_p \) is an ordinary curve, then it is in the upper part of the volcano of curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \), because the ring generated by the \( p^2 \)-power Frobenius is (obviously) a subring of the ring generated by the \( p \)-power Frobenius.

Using these facts, when running Sutherland’s algorithm from a vertex in \( \mathbb{F}_p \), the “descending” path can quickly be determined: as soon as we encounter a \( j \)-invariant in \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) (which, in the supersingular case, will happen within two steps) we know that this is the only possibility for a “descending” walk, so we can continue that walk and stop the two others. This simple modification translates into a rough \( 3 \times \) speedup when the input is in \( \mathbb{F}_p \).

In fact, we can do even better. Sutherland bounds the length of a maximal descending walk by \( \log_2 p + 1 \), which is the maximum height of the 2-isogeny volcano containing any ordinary curve over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \). But as we noted above, when working with curves defined over \( \mathbb{F}_p \), we can quickly step into the \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \)-part of the 2-isogeny graph, and then continue there. Lemma 1 shows that the length of a “descending” walk in the \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \)-part of the graph is bounded by \( 1/2 \log_2 p + 1 \): that is, essentially half of Sutherland’s bound. Combined with the modification above, this yields a \( \approx 6 \times \) speedup over the general algorithm.

**Lemma 1.** Let \( E \) be an ordinary elliptic curve over \( \mathbb{F}_p \). The height of the \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \)-part of the 2-isogeny volcano containing \( E \) is at most \( 1/2 \lfloor \log_2 p \rfloor + 1 \).

**Proof.** Let \( \pi_p \) be the \( p \)-power Frobenius endomorphism of \( E \), and \( \iota_p \) its trace. The height of the \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \)-part of the 2-isogeny volcano containing \( E \) is the 2-valuation of the conductor of \( \mathbb{Z}[[\pi_p^2]] \subseteq \mathbb{Z}[[\pi_p]] \). The discriminants of \( \mathbb{Z}[[\pi_p]] \)

\(^2\)In fact, this description corresponds to the graph whose vertices correspond to \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \)-isomorphism classes of supersingular curves over \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \); using \( j \)-invariants corresponds to quotienting this structure by the involution mapping each curve to its quadratic twist, but in practice this makes no difference to the operation or correctness of the algorithm.
and \( \mathbb{Z}[\pi_p^2] \) are \( \Delta_1 = t_p^2 - 4p \) and \( \Delta_2 = (t_p^2 - 2p)^2 - 4p^2 = t_p^2 \Delta_1 \), respectively, so the relative conductor is \(|t_p|\). But \(|t_p| < 2\sqrt{p}\) by Hasse’s theorem; hence, the 2-valuation of \(|t_p|\) is bounded above by \( \log_2(2\sqrt{p}) = \frac{1}{2} \log_2 p + 1 \). \(\square\)

Our second improvement is to streamline the isogeny step computations. Rather than computing roots of the classical modular polynomial \( \Phi_2 \), we can use Lemma 2 to compute explicit 2-isogenies.

**Lemma 2.** Let \( E/\mathbb{F}_p^2 \) be an elliptic curve defined by an equation in the form \( y^2 = x(x^2 + ax + a_4) \). Choose a square root \( \delta := \sqrt{D} \) in \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \) of \( D := a_2^2 - 4a_4 \). Then \( \alpha = -(a_2 - \delta)/2 \) is a root of \( x^2 + ax + a_4 \), there is a quotient isogeny

\[
\varphi : E \longrightarrow E/((\alpha, 0)) \cong E' : y^2 = x(x^2 + a_2'x + a_4') \quad \text{where} \quad \begin{cases} a_2' = a_2 - 3\delta, \\ a_4' = a_2(a_2 + \delta)/2 - a_4 \end{cases}
\]

defined over \( \mathbb{F}_p^2(\delta) \), and the kernel of its dual isogeny \( \tilde{\varphi} \) is generated by \( (0, 0) \).

**Proof.** Follows on composing the normalized 2-isogeny given by Vélu’s formula (see [22] or [14, §2.4]) with the map \((x, y) \mapsto (x + \delta, y)\). \(\square\)

We are now ready to define and analyze our variant of Sutherland’s algorithm. We will use a subroutine \( \text{SqrtFp} \) which, given \( \alpha \) in \( \mathbb{F}_p \), returns either a square root of \( \alpha \) in \( \mathbb{F}_p \) (if one exists), or \( \bot \) (if \( \alpha \) is not a square in \( \mathbb{F}_p \)), and an analogous subroutine \( \text{SqrtFp}^2 \) for \( \alpha \) in \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \). When \( p \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \)—as is the case for CSIDH, and many other isogeny-based cryptosystems—we can make use of the efficient arithmetic for quadratic extensions from Appendix A. In particular, the square roots in \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \) required by Algorithm 5 each cost essentially two square roots in \( \mathbb{F}_p \).

**Algorithm 5:** Modified supersingularity test using 2-isogeny volcano.

```plaintext
Input: A ∈ \( \mathbb{F}_p \)
Output: True or False
1 Function IsSupersingular(A)
2 (a_2, D) ← (A, A^2 - 4)
3 δ ← SqrtFp(D)
4 if δ = \bot then return False // D is not a square in \( \mathbb{F}_p \)
5 for 0 ≤ i ≤ \( \frac{1}{2} \left( \log_2 p \right) + 1 \) do
6 \quad (a_2, D) ← (a_2 - 3δ, 8(D - δ · a_2))
7 \quad δ ← SqrtFp2(D)
8 if δ = \bot then // D is not a square in \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \)
9 \quad return False
10 return True
```

**Proposition 1.** Given a Montgomery coefficient \( A \in \mathbb{F}_p \) corresponding to an elliptic curve \( E_A : y^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1) \). Algorithm 5 returns True if and only if \( E \) is supersingular. It requires \( O(\log^2 p) \mathbb{F}_p \)-operations (in the worst case, which is when \( E \) is supersingular) and \( O(1) \mathbb{F}_p \)-elements worth of space.

**Proof.** Let \( \alpha \) and \( 1/\alpha \) be the roots of \( x^2 + Ax + 1 \) in \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \). Having a Montgomery model implies that \( E_A \) is on the floor of the \( \mathbb{F}_p \)-volcano [3, Prop. 8]; there is only one \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \)-rational 2-isogeny (its kernel is \((0, 0)\)), and this isogeny must be ascending. In particular, if \( E_A \) is supersingular then \( x^2 + Ax + 1 \) can have no roots in \( \mathbb{F}_p \); hence, if \( A^2 - 4 \) is a square in \( \mathbb{F}_p \), then we already know that \( E_A \) is ordinary and we can return False at Line 5.

Otherwise, Lemma 2 states that we can continue with a non-backtracking walk into the \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \)-part of the 2-isogeny graph by iterating the mapping \( (a_2, D = a_2^2 - 4a_4) \mapsto (a_2', D' = (a_2')^2 - 4a_4') \) defined by (4), starting with \( (a_2, D) = (A, A^2 - 4) \). The \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \)-rationality of each step depends on whether or not \( D \) is a square in \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \); the choice between each pair of descending isogenies is made arbitrarily, according to which of the two square roots is returned by \( \text{SqrtFp2} \). Algorithm 5 repeats this process until we either hit the floor of \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \)-rationality and conclude that \( E_A \) is ordinary, or go beyond the maximal path length specified by Lemma 1 and conclude that \( E_A \) is supersingular.

Algorithm 5 is therefore correct. It requires (in the worst case) one square root in \( \mathbb{F}_p \) and \( \frac{1}{2} \log_2 p + 2 \) iterations of a loop consisting of a square root in \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \) plus a handful of \( \mathbb{F}_p^2 \)-operations. Each square root costs \( O(\log p) \ \mathbb{F}_p \)-operations using the Tonelli–Shanks algorithm, so we have a total complexity of \( O(\log^2 p) \ \mathbb{F}_p \)-operations. \(\square\)
5 DIVISION POLYNOMIALS AND DOLISKANI’S TEST

Doliskani gives an interesting probabilistic supersingularity test in [11], based on Polynomial Identity Testing and properties of division polynomials. To the best of our knowledge, this algorithm has not yet been used in practice. We will provide some important algorithmic improvements that will ultimately make this the most efficient of our supersingularity tests.

5.1 DIVISION POLYNOMIALS AND SUPERSINGULARITY

Recall that that for \( m \geq 0 \), the \( m \)-th division polynomial \( \psi_{E,m} \) of an elliptic curve \( E \) satisfies

\[
\psi_{E,m}(x(P), y(P)) = 0 \iff P \in E[m] \setminus \{0\}.
\]

For \( E : y^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1) \), the first few division polynomials are

\[
\psi_{E,0} = 0, \quad \psi_{E,1} = 1, \quad \psi_{E,2} = 2y,
\]

then (for Montgomery models)

\[
\psi_{E,3} = 3x^3 + 4Ax^3 + 6x^2 - 1, \quad \psi_{E,4} = 4y(x^2 - 1)(x^4 + 2Ax^3 + 6x^2 + 2Ax + 1).
\]

The higher-degree polynomials satisfy the standard recurrences

\[
\psi_{E,2m} = (\psi_{E,m+1}^2 \psi_{E,m} \psi_{E,m+2} - \psi_{E,m} \psi_{E,m+2}^2) / \psi_{E,2} \quad \text{for } m \geq 3 \tag{5},
\]

\[
\psi_{E,2m+1} = \psi_{E,m+1}^3 - \psi_{E,m-1} \psi_{E,m+2}^3 \quad \text{for } m \geq 2 \tag{6}.
\]

We see that \( \psi_{E,m}^2 \) is a polynomial in \( \mathbb{F}_p[A][x] \) for any \( m > 0 \), and indeed \( \psi_{E,m} \) is in \( \mathbb{F}_p[A] \) for odd \( m \).

**Lemma 3.** The \( p \)-th division polynomial satisfies \( \psi_{E,p}(x) = \tilde{\psi}_{E,p}(x)^p \) where \( \tilde{\psi}_{E,p}(x) \) is either a polynomial of degree \( (p - 1)/2 \) if \( E \) is ordinary, or \( \pm 1 \) if \( E \) is supersingular. In particular,

\[
\psi_{E,p}(x) = 1 \iff E \text{ is supersingular}.
\]

**Proof.** See Theorem 3.1 and Propositions 3.3 and 3.4 of [13] (where the sign in the \( \pm 1 \) for the supersingular case is made completely explicit, though we only need the fact that \( \tilde{\psi}_{E,p}^2(x) = 1 \) here). \( \Box \)

**Example 1.** Let \( E : y^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1) \) be the generic Montgomery model over \( \mathbb{F}_p(A) \). We find

\[
\psi_{E,7}(x) = \tilde{\psi}_{E,7}(x)^7 \quad \text{where} \quad \tilde{\psi}_{E,7}(x) = A(A^2 - 1)(x^3 - A(A^2 - 2)x^2 + 2(A^2 + 1)x) - 1.
\]

In particular, if \( A \in \{-1, 0, 1\} \) then \( \tilde{\psi}_{E,7} = -1 \) and \( E \) is supersingular; otherwise, \( \deg \tilde{\psi}_{E,7} = 3 \) and \( E \) is ordinary.

Doliskani’s test applies basic Polynomial Identity Testing to check the supersingularity criterion of Lemma 3. The algorithm presented in [11] samples a uniformly random \( u \) in \( \mathbb{F}_p \), and computes \( \psi_{E,p}(u) \) as \( \psi_{E,p}(u)^2 \). If this yields \( \psi_{E,p}(u) = 1 \), then the Schwartz–Zippel lemma (see e.g. [18]) tells us that \( \tilde{\psi}_{E,p}(x) = 1 \), and \( E \) is supersingular, with probability \( 1 - (\deg \tilde{\psi}_{E,p}(x)) / p^2 \approx 1 - ((p - 1)/2)/p^2 \approx 1 - 1/2p \).

5.2 EFFICIENT EVALUATION OF DIVISION POLYNOMIALS

To evaluate \( \psi_{E,p}(u) \), Doliskani proposes an algorithm based on the standard recurrences of (5) and (6), which resembles a vectorial addition chain where the vector tracks the values of nine consecutively-indexed division polynomials. This algorithm seems to be folklore, but Cheng gives a detailed analysis in [5].

We can significantly improve the efficiency of division polynomial evaluation by using the link between division polynomials and scalar multiplication. Recall that

\[
[m](x, y) = \left( \frac{\psi_{E,m}(x)}{\psi_{E,m}(x)^2}, \frac{\omega_{E,m}(x, y)}{\psi_{E,m}(x)^3} \right) \quad \text{where} \quad \omega_{E,m}(x) := x\psi_{E,m}(x)^2 - \psi_{E,m+1}(x)\psi_{E,m-1}(x) \tag{7}
\]

and \( \omega_{E,m}(x, y) = (4y)^{-1}(\psi_{E,m+2}(x)\psi_{E,m-1}(x) - \psi_{E,m-2}(x)\psi_{E,m+1}(x)) \) (though we will not need \( \omega_m \) in what follows). Hence, if \( (u : v : 1) \) is a point on \( E_A \), and we use the Montgomery ladder to compute the \( (X, Z) \)-coordinates of \( [p](u : v : 1) \), then (7) tells us that the \( X \) and \( Z \) coordinates are \( \psi_{E,p}(u) \) and \( \psi_{E,p}^2(u) \), respectively, up to a common projective factor—which we can predict and remove. Proposition 2 makes this explicit for general \( m \).
**Proposition 2.** On input $A, m, \text{and} (x, 1)$, Algorithm 1 (the Montgomery ladder) returns
\[ (X_m, Z_m) = (\phi_{E,m}(x) \cdot f_m(x), \psi^2_{E,m}(x) \cdot f_m(x)) \] where
\[ f_m(x) := (4x)^{m(2^\text{len}(m) - m)}. \] (8)

**Proof.** Let $P$ be a point on $E_A$ with $x$-coordinate $x \neq 0$. We saw in §2 that Ladder($A, m, (x, 1)$) returns $R_0 = (X_m, Z_m)$ and $R_1 = (X_{m+1}, Z_{m+1})$ such that $X_m/Z_m = x([m]P)$ and $X_{m+1}/Z_{m+1} = x([m+1]P)$. Equation (7) therefore tells us that
\[ R_0 = (X_m, Z_m) = (\phi_{E,m}(x) \cdot f_m(x), \psi^2_{E,m}(x) \cdot f_m(x)) \]
\[ R_1 = (X_{m+1}, Z_{m+1}) = (\phi_{E,m+1}(x) \cdot g_m(x), \psi^2_{E,m+1}(x) \cdot g_m(x)) \]
for some projective factors $f_m(x)$ and $g_m(x)$. Looking at the differential addition (xADD) and doubling (xDBL) formulæ in (2) and (3), respectively, we see that the projective factors satisfy mutually recursive relationships:
\[ f_{2m}(x) = f^4_m(x), \quad f_{2m+1}(x) = g_{2m}(x) = 4xf^2_m(x)g^2_m(x), \quad g_{2m+1}(x) = g^4_m(x). \] (9)

We claim that
\[ f_m(x) = (4x)^{F_m} \quad \text{and} \quad g_m(x) = (4x)^{G_m} \quad \text{where} \quad \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
F_m := m(2^{\text{len}(m)} - m), \\
G_m := (m + 1)(2^{\text{len}(m)} - (m + 1)).
\end{array} \right. \] (10)

We will proceed by induction. First, the base case: on input $(A, 1, (x, 1))$, Algorithm 1 outputs
\[ R_0 = (4x^2, 4x) = (\phi_{E,1}(x) \cdot 4x, \psi_{E,1}(x) \cdot 4x), \]
\[ R_1 = (x^4 - 2x^2 + 1, 4x^2 + 4x) = (\phi_{E,2}(x) \cdot 1, \psi^2_{E,2}(x) \cdot 1), \]
which is exactly (10) with $m = 1$. For the inductive step: substituting (10) into (9), it suffices to show that
\[ F_{2k} = 4F_k, \quad G_{2k} = 2F_k + 2G_k + 1 = F_{2k+1}, \quad \text{and} \quad G_{2k+1} = 4G_k. \]

Noting that $\text{len}(2k) = \text{len}(k) + 1$, we find that
\[ F_{2k} = 2k(2^{\text{len}(2k)} - 2k) = 2k(2 \cdot 2^{\text{len}(k)} - 2k) = 4k(2^{\text{len}(k)} - k) = 4F_k \]
and similarly
\[ G_{2k+1} = (2k + 2)(2^{\text{len}(2k)} - (2k + 2)) = 2k(2 \cdot 2^{\text{len}(k)} - 2k + 1) = 4k(2^{\text{len}(k)} - (k + 1)) = 4G_k. \]

Since $F_{2k+1} = G_{2k}$ by definition, it remains to show that $G_{2k} = 2F_k + 2G_k + 1$, and indeed
\[ G_{2k} = (2k + 1)(2^{\text{len}(2k)} - (2k + 1)) \]
\[ = (2k + 1)(2 \cdot 2^{\text{len}(k)} - 2k) - 2k - 1 \]
\[ = 2k(2^{\text{len}(k)} - k) + 2k(1 + 2^{\text{len}(k)} - (k + 1)) + 1 \]
\[ = 2F_k + 2G_k + 1, \]
as required. \[\square\]

When $m = p$, we can use the fact that $\alpha^p = \alpha$ for $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}_p$ to replace (8) with the simpler formula
\[ f_p(u) = (4\bar{u})^{2^{\text{len}(p)}}/(4u) \quad \text{where} \quad \bar{u} = u^p. \] (11)

If $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$ and we realise $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ as $\mathbb{F}_p(i)$, then $\overline{a + bi} = a - bi$, so computing $\bar{u} = u^p$ is almost free.

In general, computing $\psi_{E,m}^2(u)$ using the Montgomery ladder with Proposition 2 requires keeping track of four polynomial values (the two components of $R_0$ and of $R_1$) and carrying out $\approx 19 \text{len}(m)$ arithmetic operations (each bit of $m$ requires 18 operations per ladder step, plus one squaring in the final exponentiation). This compares very favourably with Cheng’s algorithm, which requires $\approx 72 \text{len}(m)$ operations and 8 polynomial values worth of storage to compute $\psi_{E,m}(u)$ (see [5, §4]).

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Efficient supersingularity testing over $\mathbb{F}_p$ and CSIDH key validation

Algorithm 6: Doliskani’s PIT supersingularity test with fast ladder-based division polynomial evaluation

\begin{verbatim}
Algorithm 6: Doliskani’s PIT supersingularity test with fast ladder-based division polynomial evaluation
Input: $A \in \mathbb{F}_p$
Output: True or False
1 Function IsSupersingular(A)
2    $u \leftarrow \text{Random}(\mathbb{F}_p^* \setminus \{0\})$
3    $(X_p, Z_p) \leftarrow \text{Ladder}(A, p, (u, 1))$
4    if $X_p \neq u \cdot Z_p$ then // Order of $(u : * : 1)$ does not divide $p \pm 1$
5        return False
6    if $4u \cdot Z_p = (4u)^{\text{ord}(p/2)}$ then // Polynomial Identity Testing: $Z_p = \psi_{E,p}(u)f_p(u)$
7        return True
8    else
9        return False
\end{verbatim}

5.3 DOLISKANI’S TEST REVISITED

Doliskani’s original test from [11] samples a value $u$ uniformly at random from $\mathbb{F}_p^*$, and returns True if and only if $\psi_{E,p+1}(u)\psi_{E,p-1}(u) = 0$ and $\psi_{E,p}^2(u) = 1$. Algorithm 6 combines Doliskani’s test with our efficient algorithm for evaluating division polynomials. Remarkably, we can replace the computation of $\psi_{E,p}^2(u)$, $\psi_{E,p+1}(u)$, and $\psi_{E,p-1}(u)$ with a single application of the Montgomery ladder over $\mathbb{F}_p^*$.

Proposition 3. Let $A \in \mathbb{F}_p$ be the Montgomery coefficient of an elliptic curve $E_A: y^2 = x(x^2 + Ax + 1)$.

- If $E_A$ is supersingular, then Algorithm 6 returns True.
- If $E_A$ is ordinary, then Algorithm 6 returns True with probability $1/(2p + 2)$, and False otherwise.

Algorithm 6 requires one random element of $\mathbb{F}_p^*$, $O(\log p) \mathbb{F}_p$-operations and $O(1) \mathbb{F}_p$-elements worth of space.

Proof. As mentioned above, Doliskani’s test samples $u$ uniformly at random from $\mathbb{F}_p^*$, and returns True if and only if $\psi_{E,p+1}(u)\psi_{E,p-1}(u) = 0$ and $\psi_{E,p}^2(u) = 1$. We make a small change here, requiring $u \neq 0$ to ensure that the Montgomery ladder returns valid output on input $(u, 1)$.

Let $v \in \mathbb{F}_p^*$ be such that $P = (u : v : 1)$ is a point in $E_A(\mathbb{F}_p)$. If $E_A/\mathbb{F}_p$ is supersingular, then $E_A(\mathbb{F}_2^* \setminus \{0\}) \cong (\mathbb{Z}/(p^2 - 1)\mathbb{Z})^2$, so the condition $\psi_{E,p+1}(u)\psi_{E,p-1}(u) = 0$ amounts to checking that $P$ has order dividing $p^2 - 1$. But we can equivalently check that $[p]P = \pm P$, which is what Line 4 does.

It remains to check that $\psi_{E,p}^2(u) = 1$, which holds if and only if $\psi_{E,p}^2(\bar{u}) = 1$. The probability that $\psi_{E,p}(x) \neq \pm 1$ (that is, while $E_A$ is ordinary) is $\deg \psi_{E,p}/\#(\mathbb{F}_p^* \setminus \{0\}) = ((p - 1)/2)/(p^2 - 1) = 1/(2p + 2)$ by the Schwartz–Zippel lemma. We compute $\psi_{E,p}^2(u)$ using Proposition 2 and (11). This requires one application of the Montgomery ladder over $\mathbb{F}_p^*$ with a scalar of length $\log(p) = \lceil \log_2 p \rceil$, followed by $\log(p)$ squarings in $\mathbb{F}_p^*$, both cost $O(\log p) \mathbb{F}_p$-operations, storing only $O(1) \mathbb{F}_p$-elements.

Remark 1. The projective factor $f_p$ of Proposition 2 depends on the ladder algorithm as presented in Algorithm 1 and the differential addition and doubling formulæ in §2. If the ladder is initialised differently, or replaced with an optimal differential addition chain, or if alternative formulæ are used, then $f_p$ should be redefined accordingly.

6 CONCLUSION

This paper improves two supersingularity tests, originally due to Sutherland and Doliskani, and compares them with the state-of-the-art in the context of CSIDH public-key validation.

Our modification of Sutherland’s algorithm specialized to prime fields reduces the running time and space; while it does not change the asymptotic complexity, it does improve the constant hidden by the $\bigO$. It performs relatively slowly for valid keys (though it is still quite practical for CSIDH-512 parameters), but it rejects invalid keys much faster than the other tests: it is therefore probably more useful in computational number theory (where we mostly encounter ordinary input) than in CSIDH key validation (where we mostly expect supersingular input from honest parties). In any case, it has the advantages of low memory and definitive proof of supersingularity.

Our modification of Doliskani’s algorithm shows a more significant improvement due to our new method for evaluating squared division polynomials. This algorithm achieved a substantial speedup over the alternatives for valid CSIDH-512 keys, while remaining competitive on invalid keys. It uses less memory than the currently-used product-tree algorithm, and is far simpler to implement correctly. We therefore suggest that this algorithm is a better choice for key validation in CSIDH and similar isogeny-based protocols.
Our benchmarks all used the CSIDH-512 parameter set, with a 512-bit prime $p$. We expect that our algorithms and results will be relevant for larger primes, but more work needs to be done to optimize these cases.

REFERENCES


A Finite Field Arithmetic

Square roots in \( \mathbb{F}_p \). In our case we have \( p \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \), so the classic Tonelli–Shanks algorithm (see e.g. [16, §3.51]) reduces to computing \( t = a^{(p+1)/4} \) for \( a \in \mathbb{F}_p \); if \( t^2 = a \) then \( t \) is a square root of \( a \); otherwise, \( a \) is not a square in \( \mathbb{F}_p \). The subroutine \texttt{SqrtFp} can therefore be implemented using a simple exponentiation by \((p + 1)/4\), which can be computed using a precomputed optimal chain of squares and multiplications.

Representing \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \). Since \( p \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \), we can realise \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) as \( \mathbb{F}_p(i) \), where \( i^2 = -1 \). Elements \( x \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \) are encoded as the pair of elements \((x_r, x_i)\) of \( \mathbb{F}_p \) (the “real” and “imaginary” parts) such that \( x = x_r + x_i \cdot i \).

Addition. Given two elements \( a, b \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \), we can compute \( c = a + b \) at the cost of two additions in \( \mathbb{F}_p \) using

\[
c_r = a_r + b_r \mod p, \quad c_i = a_i + b_i \mod p.
\]

Subtraction. Similarly, we can compute \( c = a - b \) at the cost of two subtractions in \( \mathbb{F}_p \) using

\[
c_r = a_r - b_r \mod p, \quad c_i = a_i - b_i \mod p.
\]

Multiplication. We can compute \( c = a \cdot b \) for 4 multiplications, 1 addition, and 1 subtraction in \( \mathbb{F}_p \) using

\[
c_r = a_r \cdot b_r - a_i \cdot b_i \mod p, \quad c_i = a_i \cdot b_r + a_r \cdot b_i \mod p.
\]

A Karatsuba-style method computes \( c \) with 3 multiplications, 3 additions, and 2 subtractions: first we compute

\[
t_0 := a_r \cdot b_r, \quad t_1 := a_i \cdot b_1, \quad t_2 := a_r + a_i, \quad t_3 := b_r + b_i, \quad t_4 := t_2 \cdot t_3, \quad t_5 := t_0 + t_1,
\]

and then

\[
c_r = t_0 - t_1 \mod p, \quad c_i = t_4 - t_5 \mod p.
\]

Square roots in \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \). Algorithm 7 computes square roots in \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \); following the method of [19] with some minor corrections. The exponentiations in Lines 4 and 11 are done using an optimal precomputed addition chain.

### Algorithm 7: Square root in \( \mathbb{F}_{p^2} = \mathbb{F}_p(i) \) where \( p \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \) and \( i = \sqrt{-1} \), as in [19].

**Input:** \( x \) in \( \mathbb{F}_p(i) \)

**Output:** \( r \) in \( \mathbb{F}_p(i) \) such that \( r^2 = x \), if it exists; otherwise \( \perp \)

1. **Function SqrtFp2(\( x \))**
   2. \( a + bi \leftarrow x \)  // \( a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p \)
   3. \( \delta \leftarrow a^2 + b^2 \)  // \( \delta = \text{norm of } x \)
   4. \( \lambda \leftarrow \delta^{(p-3)/4} \)  // \( \lambda = \text{progenitor of } \delta \)
   5. \( \rho \leftarrow \delta \cdot \lambda \)  // \( \rho = \text{candidate square root of } \delta \)
   6. if \( \rho^2 = \delta \) then
      7. \( \text{return } \perp \)
   8. \( \gamma \leftarrow (a + \rho)/2 \)  // Can happen when \( b = 0 \) and \( \rho = -a \)
   9. if \( \gamma = 0 \) then
      10. \( \gamma = -\rho \)  // Now \( \gamma = (a - \rho)/2 \)
   11. \( \mu \leftarrow \gamma^{(p-3)/4} \)  // \( \mu = \text{progenitor of } \gamma \)
   12. \( \sigma \leftarrow \gamma \cdot \mu \)  // \( \sigma = \text{candidate square root of } \gamma \)
   13. \( \gamma^{-1} \leftarrow \sigma \cdot \mu^3 \)  // True inverse of \( \gamma \)
   14. \( \tau \leftarrow \sigma \cdot \gamma^{-1} \)  // \( \tau = \text{candidate square root of } \gamma^{-1} \)
   15. \( \omega \leftarrow (b/2) \cdot \tau \)
   16. if \( \sigma^2 = \gamma \) then
      17. \( \text{return } \sigma + \omega i \)
   18. else
      19. \( \text{return } \omega - \sigma i \)

   // \( -\sigma = \sqrt{-\gamma} \) and \( \tau = \sqrt{-\gamma^{-1}} \)