A More Accurate Automatic Search Model for Characterizing Division Property

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Abstract. Division property is a generalized integral property proposed by Todo at EUROCRYPT 2015. Subsequently, Todo and Morii extended division property to the bit level and proposed conventional bit-based division property (CBDP) and bit-based division property using three subsets (BDPT). At ASIACRYPT 2016, Xiang et al. applied MILP technique to model the CBDP propagation for the first time. To construct an automatic search model for BDPT propagation, Hu et al. characterized a variant BDPT based on SMT/SAT. Later at ASIACRYPT 2019, Wang et al. characterized the BDPT based MILP. However, the above two automatic search models have some limitations. In this paper, we focus on constructing an automatic search model that can more accurately characterize the BDPT propagation. Firstly, we define a new notion named BDPT Trail, which divides the BDPT propagation into three parts: the division trail K, division trail L, and Key-Xor operation. Secondly, we improve the insufficiency of the previous methods of calculating division trails and propose an effective algorithm that can obtain more valid division trails L of the S-box operation. Thirdly, we propose a new algorithm that models each Key-Xor operation based on MILP technique for the first time. Based on this, we can accurately characterize the Key-Xor operation by solving these MILP models. After that, by selecting appropriate initial BDPT and stopping rules, we construct an automatic search model that more accurately characterizes the BDPT propagation. As a result, our automatic search model is applied to search integral distinguishers for some block ciphers. For Rectangle, we find a 10-round integral distinguisher which is one more round than the previous best results. For Simon64, we can find more balanced bits than the previous longest distinguishers. For Present, we find a better 9-round integral distinguisher with less active bits.

Keywords: Division Property, Three-subset, MILP, Accuracy, Cross propagation

1 Introduction

Division property. Integral cryptanalysis is one of the most powerful cryptanalysis techniques [KW02]. For a set of chosen plaintexts, attackers encrypt them r rounds and calculate the value of the XOR of all ciphertexts. If the value is 0, we say that the cipher has an r-round integral distinguisher.

Division property, a generalization of the integral property, which was proposed by Todo at EUROCRYPT 2015 [Tod15b], could explicitly describe the properties hidden between traditional integral ALL and BALANCE properties. Later at CRYPTO 2015, Todo [Tod15a] applied the division property to MISTY1, and achieved the first theoretical integral attack of the full-round MISTY1, which proves the superiority of the division property. Sun et al. [SHZ+17] revisited division property and studied the property of
a multiset satisfying certain division property. At CRYPTO 2016, Boura and Canteaut proposed a new notion called parity set to characterize the division property of the S-box, based on which they found a better integral distinguisher for Present [BC16].

In order to exploit the algebraic structure of the round function, Todo and Morii [TM16] proposed bit-based division property, which treats each bit of the target primitive independently. Bit-based division property can be divided into two categories: conventional bit-based division property (CBDP) and bit-based division property using three subsets (BDPT). The CBDP classify all vectors $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ into two subsets such that the parity of $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_u(x)$ is 0 or unknown, while BDPT divides all vectors $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ into three subsets such that the parity of $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_u(x)$ is 0, 1, or unknown. Essentially, the set unknown in CBDP is divided into the sets 1 and unknown in BDPT. Therefore, the BDPT can characterize the integral property of the primitive more precisely. For example, CBDP has found a 14-round integral distinguisher of Simon32 while BDPT found the 15-round integral distinguisher of Simon32 [TM16]. However, the complexity of utilizing CBDP or BDPT is upper bounded by $2^n$, where $n$ denotes the block size.

Automatic Searching Integral Distinguishers Based on CBDP. In order to solve the restriction of the huge complexity, Xiang et al. used Mixed Integral Linear Programming (MILP) technique to construct an automatic search model, which was successfully applied to search integral distinguishers for lightweight ciphers whose block sizes were larger than 32 at ASIACRYPT 2016 [XZBL16]. By extending and improving the method, the integral attacks have been applied to many ciphers and many better integral distinguishers have been found [SWW17, FTIM17, WGR18, SWW20].

Automatic Searching Integral Distinguishers Based on BDPT. There are two problems in constructing automatic search model based on BDPT.

1. **Feasibility and Efficiency.** The automatic search model should be solved in practical time by openly available solvers.

2. **Accuracy and Completeness.** The automatic search model needs to accurately and completely characterize the complex propagation of BDPT, which means the set $K$, $L$, and the influence of the set $L$ on the set $K$ should be traced.

To tackle above problems, Hu et al. [HW19] proposed an automatic search model for a variant three-subset division property and applied the method to improve some integral distinguishers. However, it sacrifices quite some accuracy of the original BDPT. Later at ASIACRYPT 2019, Wang et al. [WHG\textsuperscript{+}19] proposed the pruning technique which removes redundant vectors, and a new notion “fast propagation” which can translate BDPT into CBDP. Then, they constructed a new automatic search model based on the above techniques to search integral distinguishers. We find some division trails are not correct in their automatic search model.

Our Contributions. In this paper, we construct an automatic search model which can more completely and accurately characterize the BDPT propagation. The details of our contributions are summarized as follows.

BDPT Trail. We define a new notion named BDPT Trail to completely and accurately characterize the BDPT propagation. The BDPT Trail divides the BDPT propagation into three parts: the propagation of the set $K$, the propagation of the set $L$, and Key-Xor operation. Moreover, we introduce two notions named division trail $K$ and division trail $L$ to illustrate the propagation of sets $K$ and $L$, respectively. With these notion, constructing an automatic search model that characterizes the BDPT propagation is equivalent to
modeling the division trail $K$ and $L$, and Key-Xor operation.

**Model the BDPT propagation of Nonlinear Layer.** We first propose an “S-box” technique, which treats the nonlinear layer of a block cipher as a blackbox, focusing only on its input and output, not on specific operations. More precisely, the “S-box” technique treats the basic operations that provide nonlinearity in non-S-box-based ciphers as an S-box. By the “S-box” technique, we construct a generalized model that reduces the number of basic operations and model the nonlinear layer uniformly. More specifically, we transform the modeling BDPT of the nonlinear layer into the modeling BDPT of the S-box. To characterize the BDPT propagation of S-box, we apply the method in [BC16, XZBL16] to calculate all the division trails $K$ of the S-box, and then we study the method to calculate all valid division trails $L$ of the S-box. We show that the method in [HW19] only finds a part of all valid division trails $L$, and the method in [WHG+19] finds some extra invalid division trails $L$. Then we present a theorem that can accurately find all valid division trails $L$ of the S-box according to its ANF directly. Based on this, we propose an effective algorithm that can obtain more valid division trails $L$ of the S-box. To model the division trails $K$ and $L$ of the S-box by a set of linear inequalities whose feasible solutions are exactly these division trails, we use SageMath to generate an initial set of linear inequalities [ST17].

**Model the BDPT propagation of Key-Xor operation.** When a Key-Xor operation is applied, new vectors generated from the set $L$ will be added to the set $K$. Therefore, how accurately characterizing the Key-Xor operation is a complex problem. To solve this problem, we propose a new algorithm that models each Key-Xor operation based on MILP technique for the first time. Based on this, we can accurately characterize the Key-Xor operation by solving these MILP models. Finally, by selecting appropriate initial BDPT and stopping rules, we can construct an automatic search model that more completely and accurately characterizes the BDPT propagation.

**Applications.** We apply our automatic search model to search integral distinguishers of Simon [BSS+15], Simeck [YZS+15], Rectangle [ZBL+15] and Present [BKL+07]. The results are shown in Table 1.

1. **For non-S-box-based block ciphers.** For Simon64, we can find a better 17-round integral distinguisher with 27 balanced bits, which has four more bits than the previous longest distinguisher [WHG+19]. For Simon32, 48, 96, 128 and Simeck32, 48, 64, the distinguishers we find are in accordance with the previous longest distinguishers [WHG+19].

2. **For S-box-based block ciphers.** For Rectangle, we find a 10-round integral distinguisher with 9 balanced bits, which is one more round than the previous best integral distinguisher in [WHG+19]. For Present, we find a better 9-round integral distinguisher with less active bits, i.e., the data complexity decreased from $2^{64}$ to $2^{62}$, and its number of balanced bits is in accordance with the paper [WHG+19]. For the above four block ciphers, our automatic search model reduces the time complexity of searching integral distinguishers compared with the previous methods.

**Organization.** This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we briefly review some basic background knowledge about the bit-based division property. Section 3 studies how to model these operations used in the round function of a block cipher by the MILP technique. Section 4 studies the initial and stopping rules, and search algorithm. Section 5
shows the applications of some lightweight block ciphers, and we conclude our works in Section 6. Some auxiliary materials are supplied in Appendix.

<table>
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<th>Cipher</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Round</th>
<th>Number of balanced bits*</th>
<th>Time</th>
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<td>15</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1h48m</td>
<td>[WHG+18]</td>
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<td>23</td>
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† The paper [WHG+18] in IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive is the preprint of [WHG+19]. The results of the two papers are consistent except for the time complexity.

* The balanced bit is divided into 0 and 1, where “0” represents the bit whose sum is 0, “1” represents the bit whose sum is 1. The details results are shown in Appendix F.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notations

Let $\mathbb{F}_2$ be the finite field $\{0, 1\}$ and $\mathbb{F}_2^n$ be the n-bit string over $\mathbb{F}_2$. For any $a \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$, let $a[i]$ be the i-th bit of $a$, and the Hamming weight of $a$ is calculated as $\sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a[i]$. For any $a = (a_0, \ldots, a_{m-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m_0} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{F}_2^{m_{m-1}}$, the vectorial Hamming weight of $a$ is defined as $W(a) = (w(a_0), \ldots, w(a_{m-1})) \in \mathbb{Z}^m$, where $w(a_i)$ is the Hamming weight of $a_i$, $\mathbb{Z}$ denotes the integer ring. For any $k \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ and $k' \in \mathbb{Z}^m$, we define $k \succeq k'$ if $k_i \geq k'_i$ for all $i = 0, 1, \ldots, m-1$. Otherwise, $k \nsubseteq k'$. Let $\mathbb{K}$ be the set of $k$, and $|\mathbb{K}|$ be the number of
vectors in $\mathbb{K}$. Moreover, we simply write $\mathbb{K} \leftarrow k$ when $\mathbb{K} := \mathbb{K} \cup \{ k \}$.

**Bit Product Function** [Tod15b] For any $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$, let $x \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ be the input. The $\pi_u(x) : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2$ is defined as

$$\pi_u(x) := \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} x[i]^u[i]$$

For any $u = (u_0, u_1, \ldots, u_{m-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \times \mathbb{F}_2^n \times \cdots \times \mathbb{F}_2^{n_{m-1}}$, let $x = (x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n_0} \times \mathbb{F}_2^{n_1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{F}_2^{n_{m-1}}$ be the input. The $\pi_u(x) : (\mathbb{F}_2^{n_0} \times \mathbb{F}_2^{n_1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{F}_2^{n_{m-1}}) \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2$ is defined as

$$\pi_u(x) := \prod_{i=0}^{m-1} \pi_{u_i}(x_i)$$

### 2.2 Bit-Based Division Property

Todo and Morii proposed two kinds of bit-based division property (CBDP and BDPT) at FSE 2016 [TM16]. Compared with the traditional division property, bit-based division property could trace the propagation of division property at the bit level. As a result, integral distinguishers of Simon32 have been improved from 10-round to 15-round by them. We will briefly review division property and bit-based division property and present some propagation rules for bit-based division property.

**Definition 1** (Division Property [Tod15b]). Let $X$ be a multiset whose elements take values from $(\mathbb{F}_2^{n_0} \times \mathbb{F}_2^{n_1} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{F}_2^{n_{m-1}})$. When the multiset $X$ has the division property $D_{\mathbb{K}}$, it satisfies the following conditions:

$$\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_u(x) = \begin{cases} 
\text{unknown} & \text{if there exist } k \in \mathbb{K} \text{ s.t. } W(u) \geq k, \\
0 & \text{otherwise.} 
\end{cases}$$

The conventional bit-based division property (CBDP) only limits the underlying space to binary domains, which can search for more fine-grained integral characteristics.

**Definition 2** (CBDP [TM16]). Let $X$ be a multiset whose elements take a value of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$. When the multiset $X$ has the division property $D_{\mathbb{F}_2^n}$, it satisfies the following conditions:

$$\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_u(x) = \begin{cases} 
\text{unknown} & \text{if there exist } k \in \mathbb{K} \text{ s.t. } u \geq k, \\
0 & \text{otherwise.} 
\end{cases}$$

where $u \geq k$ if $u_i \geq k_i$ for all $i$.

The bit-based division property using three subsets (BDPT) limits the underlying space to binary domains and further expands the search scope. Namely, it introduces a new set $\mathbb{L}$, which is the set of $u$ with $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_u(x) = 1$.

**Definition 3** (BDPT [TM16]). Let $X$ be a multiset whose elements take a value of $\mathbb{F}_2^n$. When the multiset $X$ has the bit-based division property using three subsets $D_{\mathbb{K}, \mathbb{L}}$, it satisfies the following conditions:

$$\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_u(x) = \begin{cases} 
\text{unknown} & \text{if there exist } k \in \mathbb{K} \text{ s.t. } u \geq k, \\
1 & \text{else if there is } \ell \in \mathbb{L} \text{ s.t. } u = \ell, \\
0 & \text{otherwise.} 
\end{cases}$$
According to [TM16], if there are \( k, k' \in \mathbb{K} \) satisfying \( k \geq k' \), \( k \) can be removed from \( \mathbb{K} \) because the vector \( k \) is redundant. Moreover, if there are \( \ell \in \mathbb{L} \) and \( k \in \mathbb{K} \) satisfying \( \ell \geq k \), the vector \( \ell \) is redundant. For any \( u \), the redundant vectors in \( \mathbb{K} \) and \( \mathbb{L} \) will not affect the parity of \( \bigoplus_{x \in \mathbb{X}} \pi_u(x) \).

**Propagation Rules.** We introduce only a few of the propagation rules used in the following sections. For more details, please refer to [TM16].

**Rule 1 (Key-Xor [TM16]).** Let the Key-Xor operation’s input and output division property be \( \mathcal{D}^{1^\mathbb{L}, \mathbb{L}'}_{\mathbb{K}, \mathbb{K}'} \) and \( \mathcal{D}^{1^\mathbb{L}, \mathbb{L}'}_{\mathbb{K}', \mathbb{K}'} \), respectively. Assume that the round key is XORed with the \( i \)-th bit, \( \mathbb{K}' \) and \( \mathbb{L}' \) are computed as

\[
\mathbb{L}' \leftarrow \ell, \text{ for } \ell \in \mathbb{L},
\]

\[
\mathbb{K}' \leftarrow k, \text{ for } k \in \mathbb{K},
\]

\[
\mathbb{K}' \leftarrow (\ell_0, \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_i \lor 1, \ldots, \ell_{m-1}), \text{ for } \ell \in \mathbb{L} \text{ satisfying } \ell_i = 0.
\]

Boura et al. presented the propagation rules of S-box for \( \mathbb{K} \) at bit-level in [BC16] for the first time, which is summarized in Rule 2.

**Rule 2 (S-box for \( \mathbb{K} \) [BC16]).** Let \( F : \mathbb{F}_2^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n \) be a function of substitution composed of \( (f_0, f_1, \ldots, f_{n-1}) \), where each \( f_i : \mathbb{F}_2^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2 \) is a boolean function. Assuming the input to the function \( F \) is \( x = (x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_2^m \), the output \( y = (y_0, y_1, \ldots, y_{n-1}) \) is calculated as

\[
y_0 = f_0 (x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}),
\]

\[
y_1 = f_1 (x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}),
\]

\[
\vdots
\]

\[
y_{n-1} = f_{n-1} (x_0, x_1, \ldots, x_{m-1}).
\]

For each vector \( k \) in the input division property \( \mathbb{K} \), check each vector \( u \in \mathbb{F}_2^m \) whether the polynomial \( \pi_u(y) \) contains any monomial \( \pi_k(x) \) satisfying \( k' \geq k \). If so, \((k, u)\) is a valid division trail for the S-box function.

### 2.3 Based-MILP Bit-Based Division Property

Although CBDP has been proved to be a powerful tool to find better integral distinguishers, the time and memory complexities were roughly \( 2^n \) for an \( n \)-bit block cipher [TM16]. Therefore, the CBDP was only applicable for block ciphers whose block sizes are less than 32 bits. At ASIACRYPT 2016, Xiang et al. [XZBL16] applied the MILP method to the search for CBDP for the first time. With the help of MILP solver Gurobi\(^1\), they can find CBDP for block ciphers with larger block sizes, e.g., Simon128 or Present. They introduced the definition of the CBDP trail, which is defined as follows.

**Definition 4 (CBDP Trail [XZBL16]).** Let \( f_r \) denote the round function of an iterated block cipher. Assume that the input multiset to the block cipher has initial division property \( \mathcal{D}^{1^n}_{\mathbb{K}}, \) and denote the division property after \( i \)-round propagation through \( f_r \) by \( \mathcal{D}^{1^n}_{\mathbb{K}} \). Thus we have the following chain of division property propagations:

\[
\{k\} \triangleq \mathbb{K}_0 \xrightarrow{f_r} \mathbb{K}_1 \xrightarrow{f_r} \mathbb{K}_2 \xrightarrow{f_r} \cdots .
\]

Moreover, for any vector \( k^*_{i} \in \mathbb{K}_i (i \geq 1) \), there must exist a vector \( k^*_{i-1} \in \mathbb{K}_{i-1} \) such that \( k^*_{i-1} \) can propagate to \( k^*_{i} \) by division property rules. Furthermore, for \( (k_0, k_1, \ldots, k_r) \in \mathbb{K}_0 \times \mathbb{K}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathbb{K}_r \), if \( k_{i-1} \) can propagate to \( k_i \) for all \( i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\} \), we call \((k_0, k_1, \ldots, k_r)\) an \( r \)-round division trail.

\(^1\)https://www.gurobi.com/
Xiang et al. [XZBL16] modeled CBDP propagations of basic operations (Copy, Xor, And) and S-box by linear inequalities. Iterating this process r times, they could build a MILP model to cover all the possible CBDP trails generated from a given initial CBDP. In our model, we will treat these basic operations as an S-box. Therefore, we only introduce the MILP models for S-box.

**Model 1 (S-box [XZBL16]).** The CBDP Rule 2 in Sect. 2.2 can generate the CBDP propagation property of the S-box. Then, we use the inequality_generator function in SageMath\(^2\) to get a set of linear inequalities. Sometimes the number of linear inequalities in the set is large. Thus, a Greedy Algorithm [SHW'14] was proposed to reduce this set.

### 3 Modeling BDPT Propagations

Suppose an iterated block cipher of the round function \(f_e\) consists of a nonlinear layer, linear layer, and Key-Xor operation. Let \(f_k\) be the Key-Xor operation, and \(f_e\) be the rest of the operations in the round function \(f_e\). To model the propagation of BDPT for the operation \(f_e\) and \(f_k\), we define a new notion named BDPT Trail.

**Definition 5 (BDPT Trail).** Assume that the input multiset \(X\) to the block cipher has initial BDPT \(\mathcal{D}_{k,e}^{i}\) and denote the BDPT after \(r\)-round propagation through \(f_k\) and \(f_e\) by \(\mathcal{D}_{k,e}^{i+r}\), where \(r \geq 1\). Thus we have the following chain of BDPT propagations:

\[
\begin{align*}
\{k\} & \triangleq \mathbb{K}_0 \xrightarrow{f_e} \mathbb{K}_1 \xrightarrow{f_k} \mathbb{K}_2 \xrightarrow{f_e} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_k} \mathbb{K}_{r-1} \xrightarrow{f_e} \mathbb{K}_r \\
\{\ell\} & \triangleq \mathbb{L}_0 \xrightarrow{f_e} \mathbb{L}_1 \xrightarrow{f_k} \mathbb{L}_2 \xrightarrow{f_e} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_k} \mathbb{L}_{r-1} \xrightarrow{f_e} \mathbb{L}_r 
\end{align*}
\]

where \(\mathbb{K}_i = f_e(\mathbb{K}_{i-1}) \cup f_k(\mathbb{L}_{i-1}) = f_e(\mathbb{K}_{i-1}) \cup f_k(\mathbb{L}_{i-1})\), \(\mathbb{L}_i = f_e(\mathbb{L}_{i-1})\), \(1 \leq i \leq r\).

Moreover, for any vector tuple \((k_i^\ast, \ell_i^\ast)\), \(k_i^\ast \in \mathbb{K}_i\) and \(\ell_i^\ast \in \mathbb{L}_i\) \((1 \leq i \leq r)\), there must exist a vector tuple \((k_{i-1}^\ast, \ell_{i-1}^\ast)\), \(k_{i-1}^\ast \in \mathbb{K}_{i-1}\) and \(\ell_{i-1}^\ast \in \mathbb{L}_{i-1}\), such that \((k_{i-1}^\ast, \ell_{i-1}^\ast)\) propagate to \((k_i^\ast, \ell_i^\ast)\) by BDPT propagation rules. Furthermore, for \((k_0, \ell_0), (k_1, \ell_1), \ldots, (k_r, \ell_r)\) \(\in \mathbb{K}_0 \times L_0 \times \mathbb{K}_1 \times L_1 \times \cdots \times \mathbb{K}_r \times L_r\), if \((k_{i-1}, \ell_{i-1})\) can propagate to \((k_i, \ell_i)\) for all \(i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}\), we call \((k_0, \ell_0) \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} (k_1, \ell_1) \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} (k_r, \ell_r)\) an \(r\)-round BDPT Trail.

By ignoring the Key-Xor operation (which the vector \(\ell \in L_i\) in be added to set \(K_i\)), we can get the following two chains which reflect the propagation property of \(f_e\).

\[
\begin{align*}
\{k\} & \triangleq \mathbb{K}_0' \xrightarrow{f_e} \mathbb{K}_1' \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} \mathbb{K}_2' \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} \mathbb{K}_{r-1}' \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} \mathbb{K}_r' \\
\{\ell\} & \triangleq \mathbb{L}_0 \xrightarrow{f_e} \mathbb{L}_1 \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} \mathbb{L}_2 \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} \cdots \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} \mathbb{L}_{r-1} \xrightarrow{f_k f_e} \mathbb{L}_r 
\end{align*}
\]

where \(\mathbb{K}_i' = f_e(\mathbb{K}_{i-1}')\), \(\mathbb{L}_i = f_k(\mathbb{L}_{i-1})\), \(1 \leq i \leq r\).

Thus, for \((k_0', k_1', \ldots, k_r') \in \mathbb{K}_0' \times \mathbb{K}_1' \times \cdots \times \mathbb{K}_r'\), if \(k_{i-1}'\) can propagate to \(k_i'\) for all \(i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}\), we call \((k_0', k_1', \ldots, k_r')\) an \(r\)-round division trail \(K\). Similarly, for \((\ell_0, \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_r) \in \mathbb{L}_0 \times \mathbb{L}_1 \times \cdots \times \mathbb{L}_r\), if \(\ell_{i-1}\) can propagate to \(\ell_i\) for all \(i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, r\}\), we call \((\ell_0, \ell_1, \ldots, \ell_r)\) an \(r\)-round division trail \(L\).

Similar to methods in [XZBL16], for an initial BDPT \(\mathcal{D}_{k,e}^i\), we determine whether there exists useful integral distinguishers after \(r\)-round encryption, by finding all \(r\)-round BDPT trails which start with the vector tuple \((k, \ell)\). Thus, we need to accurately describe all valid division trails of the vectors \(k\) and \(\ell\) through \(f_e\) and \(f_k\). For the operation \(f_e\), we model the division trail \(K\) and \(L\), respectively. For the operation \(f_k\), we construct a new MILP model to characterize the process that the part of vectors \(\ell \in L_i\) are added to the set \(K_i\) by the Key-Xor operation.

---

\(^2\)https://www.sagemath.org/
3.1 Treat Nonlinear Layer as “S-box”

We classify block ciphers into two categories based on whether there is an S-box in the nonlinear layer. When we apply BDPT to non-S-box-based ciphers, we usually need to consider each of its specific operations for primitives. Taking the Simon family as an example, we have to consider how to represent these basic operations with a set of linear inequalities, such as Copy, Xor, And. We aim to construct a generalized model that reduces the number of basic operations and model the nonlinear layer uniformly. The intuitive idea is to regard these basic operations that provide nonlinearity as an S-box, which is named “S-box”. Theoretically, the core operation of the Simon family is represented by Fig. 1. We refer to the part surrounded by the red dotted line as the “S-box”.

![Fig. 1. Core operation of the Simon family [TM16] and “S-box”](image)

We represent the input to the “S-box” as \( x = (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) \), and the corresponding output as \( y = (y_0, y_1, y_2, y_3) \), the algebraic normal form (ANF) of the “S-box” is listed as follows:

\[
y_0 = x_0 \\
y_1 = x_1 \\
y_2 = x_2 \\
y_3 = x_0x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3
\]

(S-Box is an important component for most S-box-based block ciphers because it is the only nonlinear part. For non-S-box-based block ciphers, the “S-box” serves the same purpose. Based on this, we transform the modeling BDPT of the nonlinear layer into the modeling BDPT of the S-box.

3.2 Limitation of Previously Modeling BDPT of S-box

In [BC16, XZBL16], the rule to calculate all the division trails \( K \) of an S-box was presented. We study the rule to find all valid division trails \( L \) of an S-box.

We assume an \( n \)-bit S-box: \( \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n \) is composed of \( (f_0, f_1, \ldots, f_{n-1}) \), where the input \( x = (x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) and the output \( y = (y_0, \ldots, y_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \). Every \( y_i \) can be expressed as a boolean function of \( (x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1}) \), where \( i \in \{0, \ldots, n-1\} \).

There have been two previous methods for calculating all the division trails \( L \) of an S-box, as shown in Theorem 1. We briefly describe these methods as follows: firstly, by the algebraic normal form (ANF) of the S-box, each element \( y_i \) in the output \( y = (y_0, \ldots, y_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) can be represented as a boolean function by the input \( x = (x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1}) \), i.e., \( y_i = f_i(x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1}) \), where \( 0 \leq i \leq n-1 \). Secondly, suppose that the input \( \ell = (\ell_0, \ldots, \ell_{n-1}) \), for every \( u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \), we calculate the \( \pi_u(y) = \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} y_i^{u[i]} \), where \( y[i] = f_i(x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1}) \). Then, we obtain the \( \pi_u(y) = \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i(x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})^{u[i]} \), which is a polynomial representation about \( x \). Finally, according to rule \( L_1 \) or \( L_2 \) of Theorem 1, for the input vector \( \ell \), check each vector \( u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \) whether the polynomial \( \pi_u(y) \) contains \( \pi(x) \) and \( \pi_u(y) \) does...
Table 2: Propagation of the bit-based division property using three subsets for the Core Operation in Simon \[TM16\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input $D_{k,\ell}^i$</th>
<th>Output $D_{k,L}^i$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\ell = [0,0,0,0]$</td>
<td>$L = {[0,0,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ell = [1,0,0,0]$</td>
<td>$L = {[1,0,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ell = [1,1,0,0]$</td>
<td>$L = {[1,1,0,0],[0,0,0,1],[1,0,0,1],[0,1,0,1],[1,1,0,1]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ell = [0,0,1,0]$</td>
<td>$L = {[0,0,1,0],[0,0,0,1],[0,1,0,1],[1,0,1,1]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ell = [1,0,1,0]$</td>
<td>$L = {[1,0,1,0],[1,0,0,1],[1,0,1,1]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ell = [1,1,1,0]$</td>
<td>$L = {[1,1,1,0],[0,0,1,1],[1,0,1,1],[0,1,1,1],[1,1,0,1]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\ell = [\ell_1,\ell_2,\ell_3,1]$</td>
<td>$L = {[\ell_1,\ell_2,\ell_3,1]}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

not contain any monomial $\pi_\ell(x)$ satisfying $\ell \succ \ell$ (or polynomial $\pi_u(y)$ contains $\pi_\ell(x)$). If so, $(\ell, u)$ is a valid division trail $L$, for the S-box.

**Theorem 1** \([HW19, WHG^{+19}]\). If the input BDPT of S-box is $D_{k,\ell}^i$ where $k = (k_0, \ldots, k_{n-1})$, $\ell = (\ell_0, \ldots, \ell_{n-1})$, then the output BDPT of S-box can be calculated by $D_{k,L}^i$ or $D_{k,L_2}^i$, where

- $K = \{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \pi_u(y) \text{ contains any monomial } \pi_\ell(x) \text{ satisfying } \ell \succ k\}$
- $L_1 = \{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \pi_u(y) \text{ does not contain any monomial } \pi_\ell(x) \text{ satisfying } \ell \succ \ell \text{ and } \pi_u(y) \text{ contains } \pi_\ell(x)\}$
- $L_2 = \{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \pi_u(y) \text{ contains } \pi_\ell(x)\}$

**Remark 1.** The rules $K$ and $L_1$ are derived from \[HW19\]. Moreover, the rules $K$ and $L_2$ are derived from \[WHG^{+19}\].

We find the rules $L_1$ and $L_2$ both have some limitation, which are illustrated with two specific examples as follows.

**Example 1** (shows that the rule $L_1$ only finds a part of the division trails $L$). Take the “S-box”, which represents the core operation of the Simon family as an example. The “S-box” is a $4 \times 4$ S-box, and its input and output are shown in Fig. 1. Assume that the input multiset $X$ to the “S-box” has BDPT $D_{k,\ell}^i$. The process of getting the valid division trail $L$ is briefly describe as follows:

First, we get $y_i = f_i(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)$ where $0 \leq i \leq 3$, which is a Boolean function expression about the input $x$, as shown in Equation (1). Secondly, for every $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^3$, we calculate $\pi_u(y) = \prod_{i=0}^3 f_i(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)^{u[i]}$. For ease of understanding, we take $u = (0,1,0,1) \in \mathbb{F}_2^3$ and calculate $\pi_{u(1,0,1)}(y) = y_1 y_3 = x_1(x_0 x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3) = x_0 x_1 \oplus x_1 x_2 \oplus x_1 x_3$. Finally, according to rule $L_1$, we check whether $\pi_{u(1,0,1)}(y) = x_0 x_1 \oplus x_1 x_2 \oplus x_1 x_3$ contains $\pi_{u(0,1,0,1)}(x) = x_1 x_2$ and does not contain any monomial $\pi_\ell(x)$ satisfying $\ell \succ \ell$, where $\pi_\ell(x) = \{x_0 x_1 x_2, x_1 x_2 x_3, x_0 x_1 x_2 x_3\}$. Apparently, $\pi_{u(0,1,0,1)}(y)$ satisfies the above conditions. So $(0,1,1,0) \rightarrow (0,1,0,1)$ is a valid division trail $L$ of the “S-box”. To obtain all the division trails $L$ where $\ell = (0,1,1,0)$, we traverse $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^3$ and get another valid division trail $L: (0,1,1,0) \rightarrow (0,1,1,0)$. However, we find that there is a valid division trail $L: (0,1,1,0) \rightarrow (0,1,1,1)$ appears in Table 2 by \[TM16\] which cannot be found by the rule $L_1$. The reason is that $\pi_{u(0,1,1,1)}(y) = x_0 x_1 x_2 \oplus x_1 x_2 \oplus x_1 x_2 x_3$ contains not only $\pi_{u(0,1,1,0)}(x) = x_1 x_2$ but also
$x_0x_1x_2$ and $x_1x_2x_3 \in \pi_D(x)$. It is worth to explore the valid division trails which were missing by the rule $L_1$ compared to Table 2. Therefore, for each $\ell, u \in \mathbb{F}_2^3$, we calculate $\pi_u(y)$ and $\pi_D(x)$ where $\ell \succ \ell$, and obtain all valid division trails of the “S-box” by rule $L_1$. Note that the missing valid division trails compared to Table 2 are bolded.

**Example 2** (shows that the rule $L_2$ finds some invalid division trails $L$). Take the PRESENT S-box as an example. Let the input to PRESENT S-box be $x = (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)$, and the corresponding output be $y = (y_0, y_1, y_2, y_3)$, the algebraic normal form (ANF) of PRESENT S-box is shown in Equation (2). Assume that the input multiset $X$ to PRESENT S-box has BDPT $\mathcal{D}_{k, \ell=(1,1,1,0)}^{\text{BDPT}}$:

\[
\begin{align*}
y_0 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus 1 \\
y_1 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus 1 \\
y_2 &= x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_2 \\
y_3 &= x_1x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_3
\end{align*}
\]

(2)

Thus, for each $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^1$, we calculate $\pi_u(y) = \prod_{i=0}^{3} f_i(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)^{u[i]}$. For ease of understanding, we take $u = (0, 1, 0, 1) \in \mathbb{F}_2^4$ and calculate $\pi_{(0,1,0,1)}(y) = y_1y_3 = (x_0x_1x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus 1)(x_1x_2 \oplus x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus 1) = x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3$. According to rule $L_2$, we check whether $\pi_{(0,1,0,1)}(y) = (x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3)$ contains $\pi_{\ell=(1,1,1,0)}(x) = x_0x_1x_2$. Apparently, $\pi_{(0,1,0,1)}(y)$ satisfies this condition above, so $(1, 1, 1, 0) \rightarrow (0, 1, 0, 1)$ is a valid division trail $L$ of PRESENT S-box. To obtain all the division trails $L$ where $\ell = (1, 1, 0, 1)$, we traverse $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^4$ and obtain the other division trails $L_{c}(1, 1, 1, 0) \rightarrow (0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 1, 1, 0) \rightarrow (1, 0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 1) \rightarrow (1, 1, 1, 0)$ and $L_{c}(1, 1, 1, 0) \rightarrow (1, 1, 1, 1)$. However, we find that the division trail $(1, 1, 1, 0) \rightarrow (1, 1, 1, 1)$ discovered by rule $L_2$ is an invalid division trail $L$, i.e., $(1, 1, 1, 0) \nrightarrow (1, 1, 1, 1)$. The proof is described below:

\[
\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_{(1,1,1,1)}(y) = \bigoplus_{y \in Y} (y_0y_1y_2y_3) = \bigoplus_{x \in X} (x_0x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_1x_2 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_0x_2) = \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_{(1,1,1,1)}(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_{(1,1,0,0)}(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_{(1,0,1,1)}(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_{(1,0,1,0)}(x) = \text{unknown} \oplus 1 \oplus (0 \text{ or unknown depends on } k) \oplus 0 = \text{unknown}
\]

According to Definition 3, the parity of $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_{(1,1,1,1)}(x)$ is unknown because $u = (1, 1, 1, 1) \succeq k$ for any $k \in \mathbb{F}_2^4$. So the parity of $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_{(1,1,1,1)}(y)$ is unknown. In other words, $(1, 1, 1, 0) \rightarrow (1, 1, 1, 1)$ is an invalid division trail $L$. Therefore, some extra invalid division trails may be obtained by rule $L_2$.

From Examples 1 and 2, we show that some valid division trails $L$ are missing by rule $L_1$, and some invalid division trails are produced by rule $L_2$. Thus, we have the following observation.

**Observation 1.** The correct rule to calculate all the division trails $L$ of an S-box is between rules $L_1$ and $L_2$.

From Theorem 1 and Observation 1, we find that the rules $L_1$ and $L_2$ only consider $\pi_u(y)$, not the specific parity of $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y)$, which is unknown or 1 or 0. Based on this, we propose Theorem 2 and Observation 2.
Theorem 2. Let $\ell \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$ represent the input of an S-box. For any $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^r$, $(\ell, u)$ is a valid division trail $L$ if and only if $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y) = 1$.

Proof. Assume that the input multiset $X$ to the S-box has BDPT $D_{k,\ell}^n$, where $k = (k_0, \ldots, k_{n-1})$, $\ell = (\ell_0, \ldots, \ell_{n-1})$, and the output multiset $Y$ to the S-box has BDPT $D_{k,\ell}^n$. On the other hand, if $(\ell, u)$ is a valid division trail, we have $u \in L$. According to Definition 3, for any $\ell' \in L$, we have $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y) = 1$. Thus, we get $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y) = 1$. Then, we get a valid division trail: $(\ell, u)$. Thus, Theorem 2 is proven.

Theorem 2 gives sufficient and necessary conditions for $(\ell, u)$ to be a valid division trail $L$, then we propose an observation as,

Observation 2. The parity of $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y)$ is related to the vector $k$.

Example 3. We take the “S-box” as an example. Assume that the input multiset $X$ to the “S-box” has BDPT $D_{k,\ell}^n$. In Example 1, we find a division trail $(0, 1, 1, 0) \rightarrow (0, 1, 1, 1)$ that cannot be discovered by rule $L_1$. Thus,

$\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u=(0,1,1,1)(y) = \bigoplus_{y \in Y} y_1 y_2 y_3$

$= \bigoplus_{x \in X} (x_0 x_1 x_2 \oplus x_1 x_2 \oplus x_1 x_2 x_3)$

$= \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi(1,1,1,0)(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi(0,1,1,0)(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi(0,1,1,1)(x)$

$= (0 \text{ or unknown depends on } k) \oplus 1 \oplus (0 \text{ or unknown depends on } k)$

To illustrate that the value of $k$ affects the parity of $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u=(0,1,1,1)(y)$, we take two specific values of the input vector $k$. If the input vector $k = (1, 0, 0, 1),$

$\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u=(0,1,1,1)(y) = \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi(1,1,1,0)(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi(0,1,1,0)(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi(0,1,1,1)(x)$

$= 0 \oplus 1 \oplus 0$

$= 1$

If the input vector $k = (1, 0, 1, 0),$

$\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u=(0,1,1,1)(y) = \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi(1,1,1,0)(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi(0,1,1,0)(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi(0,1,1,1)(x)$

$= \text{unknown} \oplus 1 \oplus 0$

$= \text{unknown}$

3.3 New Modeling Method for S-box

Let the set $U = \{0, 1\}^n$ represent all the elements on $\mathbb{F}_2^n$. For any $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^r$, we assume that $\pi_u(y)$ contains $i \leq 2^n$ monomials about the vector $x$, which are $\pi_{\varphi_0}(x), \ldots, \pi_{\varphi_{i-1}}(x)$, respectively. If $\pi_u(y)$ contains $\pi_\ell(x)$, we assume that $\ell = \varphi_j$, where $0 \leq j \leq i - 1$. According to Observation 2 and Theorem 2, we propose Theorem 3, which is a more accurate method to calculate all valid division trails $L$ of an S-box.
Theorem 3. If the input multiset $\mathcal{X}$ to the S-box has BDPT $D_{k,\ell}$, where $k = (k_0, \ldots, k_{n-1}), \ell = (\ell_0, \ldots, \ell_{n-1})$. Let the output multiset $\mathcal{Y}$ of S-box have BDPT $D_{k,\ell}$, which is calculated by

$$
\mathcal{K} = \{ u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \pi_u(y) \text{ contains any monomial } \pi_k(x) \text{ satisfying } k \geq k \}
$$

$$
\mathcal{L} = \{ u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n \mid \pi_u(x) \text{ contains } \pi_\ell(x) \text{ and the input vector } k \in \mathbb{S}_{\ell} \}.
$$

where $\mathbb{S}_1 = \bigcap_{l=0}^{l-1} \mathbb{S}_{\ell}$ and $\mathbb{S}_{\ell} = \bigcup \{ \varphi_q \mid \varphi_q \geq \varphi_q \}$. If $q \neq j$, the $\mathbb{S}_{\ell}$ represents the possible value of the input vector $k$ when $\bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \pi_\varphi(x) = 0$. If $q = j$, the $\mathbb{S}_j$ represents the possible value of the input vector $k$ when $\bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \pi_\varphi(x) = 1$.

The proof is provided in Appendix A. Moreover, Appendix B shows a simple example for Theorem 3. According to Theorem 3, we present a generalized algorithm to calculate all valid division trails $\mathbb{L}$ of an S-box.

Algorithm 1 Calculating division trails of an S-box

**Input:** The input BDPT of an $n$-bit S-box $D_{k,\ell}$, where $k = (k_0, \ldots, k_{n-1}), \ell = (\ell_0, \ldots, \ell_{n-1})$

**Output:** The output BDPT $D_{k,\ell}$

1: $\mathbb{S} = \{ k \mid k \geq k \}$, $F(\mathcal{X}) = \{ \pi_k(x) \mid k \in \mathbb{S} \}$
2: $\mathbb{K} = \emptyset, \mathbb{L} = \emptyset$ and $U = \{0, 1\}^n$
3: for $u \in (\mathbb{F}_2)^n$ do
4: $\mathbb{S}_{\ell} = \emptyset$
5: for $0 \leq q \leq i - 1$ do
6: $\mathbb{S}_q = \emptyset$ \> $i \leq 2^n$ represents $\pi_u(y)$ contains $i$ monomials
7: if $\pi_u(y)$ contains any monomial in $F(\mathcal{X})$ then
8: $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{K} \cup \{ u \}$
9: if $\pi_u(y)$ contains $\pi_\ell(x)$ then
10: for $\pi_u(y)$ contains every monomial $\pi_\varphi(x)$ do
11: $\mathbb{S}_q = \bigcup \{ \varphi_q \mid \varphi_q \geq \varphi_q \}$
12: $\mathbb{S}_q = \bigcap_{q=0}^{q=0} \mathbb{S}_{\ell}$
13: if the input vector $k \in \mathbb{S}_{\ell}$ then
14: $\mathbb{L} = \mathbb{L} \cup \{ u \}$
15: $\mathbb{K} = \text{SizeReduce}_k(\mathbb{K})$ and $\mathbb{L} = \text{SizeReduce}_l(\mathbb{L})$
16: return $\mathbb{K}, \mathbb{L}$

We explain Algorithm 1 line by line:

**Line 1** According to input BDPT $D_{k,\ell}$ and Definition 3, the parity of monomial $\pi_k(x)$ with $k \geq k$ over $\mathbb{X}$ is unknown, and we store these monomials in $F(\mathcal{X})$.

**Line 2** Initialize $\mathbb{K}, \mathbb{L}$ as empty sets and let the set $U = \{0, 1\}^n$ represent all the elements on $\mathbb{F}_2^n$.

**Line 3-6** For any possible $u$, let the set $\mathbb{S}_{\ell}$ be an empty set, and the set $\mathbb{S}_{\ell}$ represent the intersection of the possible values of the input vector $k$ when $\bigoplus_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \pi_u(y) = 1$. For $i$ monomials contained in $\pi_u(y)$, initialize $\mathbb{S}_{\ell}$ as an empty set, $0 \leq q \leq i - 1$.

**Line 7-8** For any possible $u$, if polynomial $\pi_u(y)$ contains any monomial in $F(\mathcal{X})$, the parity of $\pi_u(y)$ over $\mathbb{X}$ is unknown. We store all these vectors $u$ in $\mathbb{K}$.

**Line 9-14** For any possible $u$, if polynomial $\pi_u(y)$ contains the monomial $\pi_\ell(x)$ and the input vector $k \in \mathbb{S}_{\ell} = \bigcap_{l=0}^{l-1} \mathbb{S}_{\ell}$, where $\mathbb{S}_{\ell} = \bigcup \{ \varphi_q \mid \varphi_q \geq \varphi_q \}$ and $i \leq 2^n$ represent $\pi_u(y)$ contains $i$ monomials, the parity of $\pi_u(y)$ over $\mathbb{X}$ is 1. We store all these vectors $u$ in $\mathbb{L}$.

**Line 15** $\text{SizeReduce}_k$ function removes all redundant vectors in $\mathbb{K}$. Namely, if there are $u, u' \in \mathbb{K}$ satisfying $u \geq u'$, the vector $u$ can be removed from $\mathbb{K}$. Moreover, $\text{SizeReduce}_l$ function removes all redundant vectors in $\mathbb{L}$. If there are $\ell' \in \mathbb{L}$ and $u \in \mathbb{K}$ satisfying
Given an $n$-bit S-box and its input BDPT $D^n_{k′}$, Algorithm 1 returns the output BDPT $D^n_{k′,L}$. Thus for any vector $k'' \in \mathbb{K}$, $(k,k'')$ is a valid division trail $K$ of the S-box. Similarly, for any vector $\ell'' \in \mathbb{L}$, $(\ell, \ell'')$ is a valid division trail $L$ of the S-box. Because vector $\ell$ does not affect the propagation of vector $k$ through the S-box, we will obtain a complete list of the division trail $K$ by traversing $k \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$, and Xiang et al. [XZBL16] show the results of Present S-box. Similarly, for a certain input vector $\ell \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$, we will obtain a set of division trails $L$ by traversing $k \in \mathbb{F}_2^n$. If we try all the $2^n$ possible input vector $\ell$, we will obtain a complete list of division trails $L$. Table 4 in Appendix C presents a complete list of all the division trails $L$ of Present S-box.

Representing the Division Trails of S-box as Linear Inequalities. For an $n$-bit S-box, each of its valid division trail can be viewed as a $2n$-dimensional vector in $[0,1]^{2n}$. Thus, all valid division trails form a subset $A$ of $[0,1]^{2n}$. Similar to Model 1, we compute the H-Representation of convex hull $\text{Conv}(A)$ by using the inequality_generator function in SageMath. It will return a set of linear inequalities $L$ which characterize all valid division trails. However, $L$ contains too many inequalities, which will make the size of the corresponding MILP problem too large to solve. Generally, the Greedy Algorithm [SHW+14] is used to reduce this set $L$. However, Sasaki et al. [ST17] found that the number of inequalities selected by the greedy algorithm was not the optimal solution, and they proposed a new reduction algorithm. We apply it to reduce this set $L$, which we showed in Algorithm 2.

Algorithm 2 Based-MILP Select a subset of linear inequalities from $L$ of an S-box

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input: $A$: the set of all division trails of an S-box</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$L$: the set of all inequalities in the H-Representation of $\text{Conv}(A)$ with $A$ a subset of $[0,1]^{2n}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Output: $O$: a set of inequalities selected from $L$ whose feasible solutions restricted in $\{0,1\}^{2n}$ are exactly $A$ |

1. $O = \emptyset$ and $C = \emptyset$
2. $B = \{0,1\}^{2n} \setminus A = \{b^{(0)}, b^{(1)}, \ldots, b^{(m-1)}\}$
3. $L = \{l^{(0)}, l^{(1)}, \ldots, l^{(t-1)}\}$
4. for $b^{(i)} \in B$ do
   $\triangleright 0 \leq i \leq m - 1$
5. $L^* = \emptyset$
6. for $l^{(j)} \in L$ do
   $\triangleright 0 \leq j \leq t - 1$
7. if the inequality $l^{(j)}$ excludes impossible division trails $b^{(i)}$ then
8.   $L^* = L^* \cup \{j\}$
9. $C$.AddConstraints($L^*$)
10. $\text{Obj} = \text{Minimize}(L)$
11. $M = \text{ConstructModel}(C, \text{Obj})$
12. $O = M$.Optimize()
13. return $O$

We explain Algorithm 2 line by line:

**Line 1** Initialize $O$ and $C$ as empty sets.

**Line 2-3** Let the set $B = \{0,1\}^{2n} \setminus A$ represent all impossible division trails, and the set $L$ represent $t$ inequalities obtained by using the inequality_generator function in SageMath.

**Line 4-9** For each impossible division trail $b^{(i)}$, let the set $L^*$ be an empty set. For any inequality $l^{(j)} \in L$, if the inequality $l^{(j)}$ excludes impossible division trails $b^{(i)}$, we store

$\ell \succeq u$, the vector $\ell'$ can be removed from $\overline{L}$.

**Line 16** Return $K, L$ as output.
the tags $j$ of all these inequalities in $\mathcal{L}^*$. AddConstraints() function adds an inequality constraint $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{L}} z_j \geq 1$ to the constraint set $\mathcal{C}$ with the binary variables $z_0, z_1, \ldots, z_{t-1}$, in which $z_j = 1$ represents that inequality $l^{(j)}$ is chosen and $z_j = 0$ represents that inequality $l^{(j)}$ will not be chosen. The constraint set $\mathcal{C}$ means that every impossible division trail is removed with at least one inequality. Thus, there are $m$ constraints in the constraint set $\mathcal{C}$.

**Line 10** Set the objective function $Obj$: Minimize $\sum_{j=0}^{t-1} z_j$.  

**Line 11** ConstructModel function construct a MILP model $M$ by using the constraint set $\mathcal{C}$ and the objective function $Obj$.  

**Line 12** The MILP model $M$ is optimized by the openly available solver Gurobi. It will return a set of inequalities that is composed of all inequalities $l^{(j)} \in \mathcal{L}$ satisfying $z_j = 1$, where $0 \leq j \leq t - 1$.  

**Line 13** Return $O$ as output.

We applied the Algorithm 2 to a set of linear inequalities generated with SageMath against all valid division trails of various S-boxes. Compared to the previous reduction algorithm based on the greedy algorithms, a smaller number of inequalities can be obtained by Algorithm 2. The results are shown in Table 3. To show the effectiveness of Algorithm 2, the division trails $K$ and $L$ of the “S-box” is characterized by the 6 and 10 inequalities in Appendix D, respectively.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S-box</th>
<th>The number of division trails</th>
<th>#inequalities</th>
<th>SageMath</th>
<th>Previous</th>
<th>Algorithm 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SIMON “S-box”</td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>= 26$</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>= 30$</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRESENT S-box</td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>= 47$</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>= 84$</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RECTANGLE S-box</td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>K</td>
<td>= 49$</td>
<td>201</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>$</td>
<td>L</td>
<td>= 80$</td>
<td>246</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3.4 Modeling BDPT of Key-Xor operation

To model the Key-Xor operation, we propose Proposition 1 according to Definition 5. The proof is provided in Appendix E.

**Proposition 1 (Cross Propagation).** Assume that the input multiset $X$ to an iterated block cipher has initial BDPT $\mathcal{D}_k$. And let $\mathcal{D}_{k_1, ..., k_r}$ denote the BDPT of the output multiset after $r$-round propagation through $f_e$ and $f_k$, where

$$
\mathcal{K}_r = f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_r(k) \cup f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_r(f_k(\mathcal{L}_1)) \cup \cdots \cup f_k(\mathcal{L}_r)
$$

$$
= f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_r(k) \cup f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_r \circ f_k \circ f_e (\mathcal{L}) \cup \cdots \cup f_k \circ f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_r (\mathcal{L})
$$

$$
\mathcal{L}_r = f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_r(\mathcal{L})
$$

Thus, the set of the last vectors of all $r$-round division trails $K$ which start with the vector $k$, and the set of the last vectors of all $r$-round BDPT trails which start with the vector $\ell$, is equal to $K_r$. Besides, the set of the last vectors of all $r$-round division trails $L$, which start with the vector $\ell$ is equal to $L_r$. 

According to Definition 5 and Proposition 1, the Key-Xor operations are independent of each other during \( r \)-round BDPT propagation. Without loss of generality, we consider the \( t \)-th Key-Xor operation, i.e.,

\[
f_c \circ \cdots \circ f_k \circ f_c \circ \cdots \circ f_c(\ell) \in \mathbb{K}_r
\]

We assume that the input vector \( \ell \) is propagated through \( t \)-round and get the set \( L_t \). For the \( t \)-th Key-Xor operation, the input and output BDPT are \( \{ L_t \} \) and \( \{ K^*_t, L^*_t \} \), respectively. Our model uses three \( n \)-bit variables \( L_i, K^*_i, L^*_i \) to denote them, where \( n \) is the block size. In many block ciphers, the round key is only XORed with a part of block. Without loss of generality, we assume that the round key is XORed with the left \( s \) \((1 \leq s \leq n)\) bits and is represented by an \( n \)-bit vector \( m = (m_0, \ldots, m_{n-1}) \), where

\[
m_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } 0 \leq i \leq s - 1, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}
\]

We consider the effect of the \( t \)-th Key-Xor operation on \( K^*_t, L^*_t \), respectively.

For the output BDPT \( L^*_t \), according to Rule 1, \( f_k \) does not affect the propagation from \( L_t \) to \( L^*_t \). Therefore, the constraint on \( L_t \) and \( L^*_t \) is \( L^*_t = L_t \).

For the output BDPT \( K^*_t \), according to Rule 1, for every vector \( \ell^* \in L_t \) satisfying \( \ell^*_i = 0, 0 \leq i \leq s - 1 \), we calculate \( \ell^* \lor m \) and add it to the set \( K^*_t \). Thus, the constraint on \( L_t \) and \( K^*_t \) is \( \ell^*_t + \ell^*_1 + \cdots + \ell^*_t \leq s - 1 \) and \( K^*_t = L_t \lor m \).

We only considered the \( t \)-th Key-Xor operation \( f_k \) instead of considering a complete BDPT propagation chain, i.e., \( \ell \rightarrow K^*_t \rightarrow K^*_r \). We give Algorithm 3 to characterize the BDPT propagation chain based on MILP. In Algorithm 3, we construct a constraint set \( C_i \) using a linear inequality system, which accurately characterizes the BDPT trails of the set generated by the \( t \)-th Key-Xor operation.

**Algorithm 3** Based-MILP Characterize the Propagation Rule of Key-XOR Operations

**Input:** The initial input BDPT of an \( n \)-bit iterated block cipher \( D_{X_0=\{k\}, L_0=\{\ell\}} \)

- \( O_k(\mathbb{K}) \): a constraint set of linear inequalities whose feasible solutions are all valid division trails \( \mathbb{K} \) of the round function
- \( O_L(\mathbb{L}) \): a constraint set of linear inequalities whose feasible solutions are all valid division trails \( \mathbb{L} \) of the round function

An \( n \)-bit vector \( m \) representing the Key-XOR operation

**Output:** \( \mathcal{P} \): A collection of MILP models with constraints for Key-XOR Operations

1. \( \mathcal{P} = \emptyset \)
2. Allocate \( n \)-bit variables \( K^*_i \) to denote \( \mathbb{K}^*_i \), where \((i = 0, 1, \ldots, r)\)
3. Allocate \( n \)-bit variables \( L_i \) to denote \( \mathbb{L}^*_i \), where \((i = 0, 1, \ldots, r)\)
4. \( \text{Obj} = \text{Minimize}((k^*_0 + \cdots + k^*_r)) \)
5. for \((t = 1; t < r; t++)\) do
6.   \( C_t = \emptyset \)
7.   for \((i = 0; i < t; i++)\) do
8.     \( C_t \leftarrow O_k(L_i, L_{i+1}) \)
9.     \( C_t \leftarrow \{ \ell^+_t + \ell^*_1 + \cdots + \ell^*_t \leq s - 1 \} \)
10. \( K^*_t = L_t \lor m \)
11. for \((j = t; j < r; j++)\) do
12.    \( C_t \leftarrow O_k(K^*_j, K^*_j) \)
13. \( \mathcal{M}_t = \text{ConstructModel}(C_t, \text{Obj}) \)
14. \( \mathcal{P} = \text{addModel}(\mathcal{M}_t) \)
15. return \( \mathcal{P} \)
We explain Algorithm 3 line by line:

**Line 1** Initialize \( \mathcal{P} \) as empty sets.

**Line 2-3** In the MILP model, each \( n \)-bit variable represents the BDPT \( K \) or \( L \). Thus, we allocate two sets of \( n \)-bit variables \( K^*_r \) and \( L_r \) to represent the sets \( K^*_r \) and \( L_r \), where \( n \) is the block size and \( 0 \leq i \leq r \).

**Line 4** Set the objective function \( \text{Obj} \): Minimize \( \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} k^*_i r \), where \( k^*_i r \) represents the \( i \)-th bit of the \( n \)-bit variables \( K^*_i \).

**Line 5-8** For the \( t \)-th Key-Xor operation \((1 \leq t \leq r - 1)\), let the constraint set \( \mathcal{C}_t \) be an empty set. The former \( t \)-round BDPT propagation is characterized by linear inequalities constraint set \( \mathcal{O}_t(L) \), and the inequality constraints of each round are added to the constraint set \( \mathcal{C}_t \).

**Line 9-10** For the \( t \)-th Key-Xor operation, we choose vectors that can be added to the set \( K^*_t \), calculate a new constraint \( \mathcal{L}_t \) \( \vee \) \( m \) and assign it to \( K^*_t \).

**Line 11-12** The remaining \((r - t)\)-round BDPT propagation is characterized by linear inequalities constraint set \( \mathcal{O}_r(K) \), and the inequality constraints of each round are added to the constraint set \( \mathcal{C}_t \).

**Line 13** \texttt{ConstructModel} function constructs a MILP model \( \mathcal{M}_t \) using the constraint set \( \mathcal{C}_t \) and the objective function \( \text{Obj} \).

**Line 14** We add the MILP model \( \mathcal{M}_t \), which characterizes the BDPT propagation of the \( t \)-th Key-Xor operation, to the model set \( \mathcal{P} \).

**Line 15** Return \( \mathcal{P} \) as output.

Algorithm 3 constructs a MILP model for the former \( r - 1 \) Key-Xor operations of an \( r \)-round block cipher, which characterizes all division trails of a complete BDPT propagation chain, i.e., \( \ell \rightarrow K^*_t \rightarrow K^*_r, 1 \leq t \leq r - 1 \). By solving each model \( \mathcal{M}_t \) in the model set \( \mathcal{P} \) separately, we can obtain the set of the last vectors of all \( r \)-round BDPT trails, which start with the vector \( \ell \).

Remark 2. The \( r \)-th Key-Xor operation is ignored in our Algorithm 3, since it does not produce any unit vector for \( K_r \) in our model.

## 4 Initial, Stopping Rule and Search Algorithm

In this section, we first study the initial BDPT and stopping rule in searching for integral distinguishers based on BDPT. According to Definition 5 and Proposition 1, for each model which starts with the input vector \( k \) or \( \ell \), we convert the stopping rule into an objective function of the MILP model. At last, we propose an algorithm to search integral distinguishers based on BDPT given the initial BDPT \( D^{n}_{k,\ell} \) for an \( n \)-bit block cipher.

### 4.1 Initial BDPT

In [TM16], Todo and Morii set the initial BDPT as \((k = 1, \ell = 7fffffff)\) to search the BDPT of Simon32, where the active bits of the vector \( \ell \) are set as 1, and the constant bit is set to 0. Similarly, we assume that \((k^0_0, k^0_1, \ldots, k^0_{n-1}) , (\ell^0_0, \ell^0_1, \ldots, \ell^0_{n-1})\) denotes the initial BDPT, where \( n \) is the block size. The constraints on \( k^0_i \) and \( \ell^0_i \) are

\[
k^0_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{for } i = 0, 1, 2, \ldots, n-1 \\
0, & \text{otherwise}
\end{cases}
\]

\[
\ell^0_i = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if the } i\text{-th bit is active,} \\
0, & \text{otherwise.}
\end{cases}
\]
4.2 Stopping Rule

Stopping Rule 1 (for a single model). We consider the stopping rule of the \( r \)-th round output sets \( K_r \) and \( L_r \), respectively.

According to Proposition 1, the set \( K_r \) is composed of all \( r \)-round division trails \( \Phi \), which start with the vector \( k \), and all \( r \)-round BDPT trails produced by the Key-XOR operations, which start with the vector \( \ell \). In the BDPT propagation, we note that only the vector 1 can propagate to vector 1. Thus, if the given initial BDPT is \( D^L_{k_0} \) with \( k = 1 \), the \( r \)-round division trails \( \Phi \) can be ignored because it does not produce any unit vector for \( K_r \), i.e.,

\[
K_r \setminus f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_e(k)
\]

Therefore, the model set \( P \) constructed by Algorithm 3 can accurately describe the vectors in \( K_r \). For each model \( M_t \) in the model set \( P \), let \((f^t_0, f^t_1, \ldots, f^t_{n-1}) \xrightarrow{f} \cdots \xrightarrow{f} (f^t_0, f^t_1, \ldots, f^t_{n-1})\) denote an \( r \)-round BDPT trail for the \( t \)-th Key-Xor operation. The objective function can be set as follows:

\[
\text{Obj: } \text{Minimize}\{k_0^r + k_1^r + \cdots + k_{n-1}^r\}
\]

According to Proposition 1, the set \( L_r \) is composed of all \( r \)-round division trails \( \Lambda \), which start with the vector \( \ell \). Let \((f^t_0, f^t_1, \ldots, f^t_{n-1}) \xrightarrow{f} \cdots \xrightarrow{f} (f^t_0, f^t_1, \ldots, f^t_{n-1})\) denote an \( r \)-round division trail \( \Lambda \). Thus, we can set the objective function as:

\[
\text{Obj: } \text{Minimize}\{f^t_0 + f^t_1 + \cdots + f^t_{n-1}\}
\]

Stopping Rule 2 (for the overall model). Our overall model is divided into model sets \( P \) and model \( M_L \), which describe all vectors in sets \( K_r \) and \( L_r \), respectively. Our overall MILP model only focuses on the parity of one output bit. Without loss of generality, we consider the \( q \)-th output bit. For each model \( M_t \) in the model set \( P \), we can use the solver Gurobi to determine whether the MILP model \( M_t \) has feasible solution \( K_q = (k_0^r, \ldots, k_{n-1}^r) \), where

\[
k_i^r = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i = q, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}
\]

If any \( M_t \) in the model set \( P \) has feasible solution \( K_q \), there is a unit vector \( e_q \in K_r \), and further the \( q \)-th output bit is unknown.

If there is not feasible solution \( K_q \) of model set \( P \) and the number of solutions \( L_q = (f^t_0, \ldots, f^t_{n-1}) \) of model \( M_L \) is odd, where

\[
f_i^r = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } i = q, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases}
\]

there is a unit vector \( e_q \in L_r \), and further the parity of the \( q \)-th output bit is 1. Otherwise the \( q \)-th output bit is 0.

4.3 Search Algorithm

We present the automated search integral distinguishers algorithm, which decides the parity of the \( q \)-th output bit with the given initial BDPT \( D^L_{K_0} \) for an \( n \)-bit block cipher. Firstly, we allocate all round variables and auxiliary variables. Secondly, we construct a MILP model \( M_L \) that describes all \( r \)-round division trails \( L \) and calls Algorithm 3 to save the model set \( P \). At last, according to the initial and stopping rules, we can obtain the parity of the \( q \)-th output bit based on BDPT. We illustrate the whole framework in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Automated search r-round integral distinguishers

Input: The cipher \( E \), the initial input BDPT of the \( n \)-bit block cipher \( D_{K_0=\{k\}, L_0=\{\ell\}} \), and the number \( q \)

Output: The balanced information of the \( q \)-th output bit based on BDPT

1: Allocate all the variables denoting the input and output BDPT
2: \( \text{Obj} = \text{Minimize} (\{\ell_0 + \cdots + \ell_{n-1}\}) \)
3: \( \mathcal{M}_L = \text{ConstructModel}(\{O(L) \times r\}, \text{Obj}) \)
4: Call Algorithm 3 and save the model set \( \mathcal{P} \)
5: for every model \( \mathcal{M}_t \in \mathcal{P} \) do
6: \( \text{flag} = 0 \)
7: if the MILP model \( \mathcal{M}_t \) has solutions \( K_q \) then
8: \( \text{flag} = \text{flag} + 1 \)
9: if \( \text{flag} \geq 1 \) then
10: \( \text{return unknown} \)
11: else if the number of solutions \( L_q \) of model \( \mathcal{M}_L \) is odd then
12: \( \text{return 1} \)
13: else
14: \( \text{return 0} \)

5 Applications

In this section, we apply our algorithm to Simon, Simeck, Present, and Rectangle block ciphers. The results are listed in Table 1. All the experiments are conducted on the following platform: Xeon(R) CPU E5-2620 v3 @2.40GHz, 128 G RAM. And the optimizer used to solve MILP models is Gurobi 9.0.3. In addition, for the integral distinguishers, the label “a” represents the active bit, “c” represents the constant bit, “?” represents unknown, “0” represents the balanced bit whose sum is 0, “1” represents the balanced bit whose sum is 1.

5.1 Applications to Simon and Simeck

Simon [BSS+15] is a family of lightweight block ciphers published by the U.S. National Security Agency (NSA) in 2013. Simon adopts the Feistel structure, and it has a very compact round function that only involves bit-wise And, Xor, and Circular shift operations. The structure of one round Simon encryption is depicted in Fig. 2, where \( S^i \) denotes the left circular shift by \( i \) bits. The core operation of the round function, and “S-box” are represented in the Fig. 1. Simeck [YZS+15] is a family of lightweight block cipher proposed at CHES 2015, and its round function is very similar to that of Simon except for the rotation constants. We only introduce the automatic search model for Simon2n based on BDPT.

![Fig. 2. Round function of Simon](image-url)
In Algorithm 3, we introduce two constraint sets, $O_b(K)$ and $O_l(L)$, which describe division trails $K$ and $L$ of the round function, respectively. For 1-round description of SIMON2n, they are similar except for the characterization of "S-box". Therefore, we only introduce 1-round description for $O_l(L)$ of SIMON2n.

**1-round Description for $O_l(L)$ of SIMON2n.** Denote one round division trail $L$ of SIMON2n by \((a_0^0, \ldots, a_{n-1}^0, b_0^0, \ldots, b_{n-1}^0) \rightarrow (a_0^{i+1,0}, \ldots, a_{n-1}^{i+1,0}, b_0^{j+1,0}, \ldots, b_{n-1}^{j+1,0})\). In our model, we divide the round function of SIMON2n into $n$ "S-box" operations and a Key-Xor operation. We first consider the "S-box" operation and assume that the input and output of the $j$-th "S-box" are denoted as \((a_0^{i,j}, a_{n-1}^{i,j}, b_0^{j}, \ldots, b_{n-1}^{j})\) and \((a_0^{i,j}, a_{n-1}^{i,j}, b_0^{j}, \ldots, b_{n-1}^{j})\), respectively. According to Fig. 2, the input set that actually participates in the $j$-th "S-box" operation is \(\{a_0^{i,j}, a_{n-1}^{i,j} \mod n, a_1^{(1-j) \mod n} \mod n, a_1^{(8-j) \mod n} \mod n, a_1^{(2-j) \mod n} \mod n, a_1^{(n-j) \mod n} \mod n\}\), and the corresponding output set is \(\{a_0^{i,j} \mod n, a_1^{(8-j) \mod n} \mod n, a_1^{(2-j) \mod n} \mod n, a_1^{(n-j) \mod n} \mod n\}\).

Appendix D shows the 10 inequalities for the division trails $L$ of the "S-box", and thus the 4-bit input and output can be modeled by the 10 inequalities, which be denoted by $L_1$.

For the rest $(2n - 4)$ bits, which remains unchanged, we have

\[
L_2 : \begin{cases}
    a_{i,n}^{i,j} = a_{i,n}^{i,j-1} & m \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\} \backslash \{(1-j), (8-j), (2-j)\} \mod n \\
    b_{i,n}^{i,j} = b_{i,n}^{i,j-1} & m \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\} \backslash \{(n-j)\} \mod n
\end{cases}
\]

Therefore, we get an accurate description \(\{L_1, L_2\}\) of the division trails $L$ of the $j$-th "S-box". By repeating this procedure $n$ times, we can get a set of linear inequalities for the $n$ "S-box" operations.

At last, we consider the Key-Xor operation, and its input and output are denoted as \((a_0^{i,n}, a_{n-1}^{i,n}, b_0^{n}, \ldots, b_{n-1}^{n})\) and \((a_0^{i+1,0}, a_{n-1}^{i+1,0}, b_0^{j+1,0}, \ldots, b_{n-1}^{j+1,0})\), respectively. According to Rule 1, the Key-Xor operation does not affect the propagation of division trails $L$. Therefore, the Key-Xor operation in SIMON2n can be modeled by the following inequalities:

\[
L_3 : \begin{cases}
    a_{m}^{i+1,0} = b_{m}^{i,n} & m \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\} \\
    b_{m}^{i+1,0} = a_{m}^{i,n} & m \in \{0, 1, \ldots, n-1\}
\end{cases}
\]

So far, we have modeled all operations used in the round function of SIMON2n and get an accurate description \(\{\{L_1, L_2\} \times n, L_3\}\) of 1-round division trails $L$, i.e., $O_l(L)$. Similarly, we can get the 1-round description for $O_l(K)$ of SIMON2n.

**Integral Distinguishers.** We use Algorithm 3 and 4 to search the integral distinguishers of SIMON and SIMECK family based on BDPT.

1. For SIMON64, we can find a 17-round integral distinguisher with 27 balanced bits, which has four more bits than the previous longest distinguisher [WHG+19]. For SIMON32, 48, 96, 128, the distinguishers we find are in accordance with the previous longest distinguishers found in [WHG+19].

2. For SIMECK32,48, 64, the distinguishers we find are in accordance with the previous longest distinguishers found in [XZBL16, WHG+19].

The detailed integral distinguishers of SIMON and SIMECK are listed in Appendix F. To further prove the accuracy of our automatic search model, we apply Algorithm 3 and 4 to search integral distinguishers of SIMON(102) [KLT15] based on BDPT, and show the detailed results in Appendix G.
5.2 Applications to Present and Rectangle

Present [BKL+07] has an SPN structure and uses 80- and 128-bit keys with 64-bit blocks through 31 rounds, of which the linear layers are bit permutations. Fig. 3 illustrates the one-round structure of Present. Rectangle [ZBL+15] is a bit-slice lightweight block cipher proposed in 2015, and its structure is very similar to Present.

Fig. 3. One-round SPN Structure of Present

Integral Distinguishers. We have shown how to model the $O_L(K)$ and $O_L(L)$ in Simon. Thus, we omit the details for these two ciphers due to the limit of space. We apply Algorithm 3 and 4 to search the integral distinguishers of Present and Rectangle based on BDPT.

1. For Present, we find a better 9-round integral distinguisher with less active bits, i.e., the data complexity decreased from $2^{63}$ to $2^{62}$, and its number of balanced bits is in accordance with the paper [WHG+19].

2. For Rectangle, we find a 10-round integral distinguisher with 9 balanced bits, which is one more round than the previous best integral distinguisher in [WHG+19].

The detailed integral distinguishers of Present and Rectangle are listed in Appendix F.

6 Conclusions

In this paper, we proposed an automatic search model to search integral distinguishers based on BDPT. We first proposed an effective algorithm that can more accurately obtain the division trails $K$ and $L$ of the S-box according to its ANF directly. Then we model each Key-Xor operation based on MILP technique for the first time. By solving these MILP models, we could accurately characterize the Key-Xor operation. Finally, by selecting appropriate initial and stopping rules, we can construct an automatic search model that more accurately characterizes the BDPT propagation, based on which we present an algorithm to estimate whether the $q$-th output bit is balanced.

We apply our automatic search model to search integral distinguishers of some block ciphers. For Simon64, Present, and Rectangle, we obtained much better integral distinguishers than previous results in the open literature. For other block ciphers, our results are in accordance with the previous longest distinguishers. Moreover, compared with the previous methods, our automatic search model reduces the time complexity of searching integral distinguishers for the above block ciphers.

References

Huawei Liu, Zilong Wang and Liu Zhang


According to Theorem 2, for the input vector $\ell$, calculating $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y)$ for all $u \in F_2^n$, if $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y) = 1$, we obtain a valid division trail $(\ell, u)$. In order to obtain the condition that $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y) = 1$ is established, we first study the properties of $\pi_u(y)$, which is a polynomial representation about $x$.

$$
\pi_u(y) = \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} y[i]^{u[i]}, \text{ where } y[i] = f_i(x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})
$$

$$
= \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} f_i(x_0, \ldots, x_{n-1})^{u[i]}
$$

$$
= \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} \left( \bigoplus_{v \in F_2^n} a_{\ell}^{f_i} \pi_v(x) \right)^{u[i]}
$$

Let

$$
g(x) = \prod_{i=0}^{n-1} \left( \bigoplus_{v \in F_2^n} a_{\ell}^{f_i} \pi_v(x) \right)^{u[i]} = \bigoplus_{\varphi \in F_2^n} a_{\varphi}^g \pi_\varphi(x)
$$

where $a_{\ell}^{f_i} \in F_2$ is a constant value depending on $f_i$ and $v$, $a_{\varphi}^g \in F_2$ also is a constant value depending on $g$ and $\varphi$. Thus,

$$
\pi_u(y) = \bigoplus_{\varphi \in F_2^n} a_{\varphi}^g \pi_\varphi(x)
$$

we assume the set $\mathcal{O} = \{ \varphi \in F_2^n | a_{\varphi}^g = 1 \}$, we have

$$
\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y) = \bigoplus_{x \in X} \bigoplus_{\varphi \in \mathcal{O}} a_{\varphi}^g \pi_\varphi(x)
$$

$$
= \bigoplus_{x \in X} \bigoplus_{\varphi \in \mathcal{O}} \pi_{\varphi_0}(x) \oplus \cdots \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_{\varphi_{|\varphi|-1}}(x)
$$

where the $\varphi_j \in \mathcal{O}$, $0 \leq i \leq |\mathcal{O}| - 1$. According to Definition 3, the parity of $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_\varphi(x)$ is unknown or 1 or 0, where $0 \leq i \leq |\varphi| - 1$. If $\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y) = 1$, i.e.,

$$
\bigoplus_{x \in X} \bigoplus_{\varphi \in \mathcal{O}} \pi_{\varphi_0}(x) \oplus \cdots \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_{\varphi_{|\varphi|-1}}(x) = 1
$$

Obviously, the input vector $\ell \in \mathcal{O}$ and $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_\ell(x) = 1$. Let $\ell = \varphi_j$, where $j \in \{i | 0 \leq i \leq |\mathcal{O}| - 1\}$. For any $\varphi_i \in \mathcal{O}\backslash\{\varphi_j\}$, $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_\varphi_i(x) = 0$. Thus,

$$
\bigoplus_{y \in Y} \pi_u(y) = 1 \iff \text{ for every } \varphi_i \in \mathcal{O}\backslash\{\varphi_j\}, \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_\varphi_i(x) = 0 \text{ and } \bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_{\ell=\varphi_j}(x) = 1 \quad (3)
$$

According to Definition 3, for every $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_\varphi_i(x) = 0$ and $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_\varphi_j(x) = 1$, the possible value of the input vector $k$ is $S_k = \bigcup \{\varphi_i | \varphi_i \geq \varphi_j\}$, where $0 \leq i \leq |\mathcal{O}| - 1$(Because $j \in \{i | 0 \leq i \leq |\mathcal{O}| - 1\}$, we have $0 \leq i \leq |\varphi| - 1$). Therefore, for all $0 \leq i \leq |\mathcal{O}| - 1$, we have

$$
S_{\ell} = S_0 \cap \cdots \cap S_{|\mathcal{O}|-1}
$$

The set $S_{\ell}$ represents the intersection of the possible values of $k$ when the $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_\varphi_i(x) = 0$ and $\bigoplus_{x \in X} \pi_\varphi_j(x) = 1$. If the input vector $k \in S_{\ell}$, it means that the input vector $k$ such that (3) holds. So (3) is equivalent to $\pi_u(y)$ contains $\pi(x)$ and $k \in S_{\ell}$. 

B Example for Theorem 3

To help readers understand the Theorem 3, we show a simple example of the core operation of SIMON family. We first treat the core operation of SIMON family as an “S-box”, which is a $4 \times 4$ S-box, and its input and output are shown in Fig. 1. Let the input multiset $X$ to the “S-box” have BDPT $D^i_{k,l}$. For every $u \in \mathbb{F}_2^4$, we calculate the $\pi_u(y) = \prod_{i=0}^{4} f_i(x_0,x_1,x_2,x_3)^{u[i]}$ as shown in Table 4. According to Theorem 3 and Table 4, if the $\pi_u(y)$ contains $\pi_x(x)$, the vector $u \in \{(0,0,0,1),(0,0,1,0),(0,0,1,1)\}$. We consider the following three cases respectively.

1. When the vector $u = (0,0,0,1)$, we calculate:

$$\bigoplus_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \pi_{u=(0,0,0,1)}(y) = \bigoplus_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} y^3$$

$$= \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} (x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3)$$

$$= \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \pi_{(1,1,0,0)}(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \pi_{(0,0,1,0)}(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \pi_{(0,0,0,1)}(x)$$

$$= (0 \text{ or unknown Depends on } k) \oplus 1 \oplus (0 \text{ or unknown Depends on } k)$$

if $\bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \pi_{(1,1,0,0)}(x) = 0$, the vector $k \in S_0 = \bigcup \{ \varphi_0 \mid \varphi_0 = (1,1,0,0) \geq \varphi_0 \}$. Similarly, we can get $k \in S_1 = \bigcup \{ \varphi_1 \mid \varphi_1 = (0,0,1,0) \geq \varphi_1 \}$ and $k \in S_2 = \bigcup \{ \varphi_2 \mid \varphi_2 = (0,0,1,0) \geq \varphi_2 \}$. We calculate the intersection of the values of the vector $k$, i.e.,

$$S_\cap = S_0 \cap S_1 \cap S_2 = \{(0,0,1,1),(0,1,0,1),(0,1,1,0),(0,1,1,1),(1,0,0,1),$$

$$(1,0,1,0),(1,0,1,1),(1,1,0,1),(1,1,1,0),(1,1,1,1)\}$$

Thus, $(0,0,1,0) \rightarrow (0,0,0,1)$ is an valid division trail when the input vector $k \in S_\cap$.

2. When the vector $u = (0,0,1,0)$, we calculate:

$$\bigoplus_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \pi_{u=(0,0,1,0)}(y) = \bigoplus_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} y^2$$

$$= \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} x_2$$

$$= \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \pi_{(0,0,1,0)}(x)$$

$$= 1$$

if $\bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \pi_{(0,0,1,0)}(x) = 1$, the vector $k \in S_0 = \bigcup \{ \varphi_0 \mid \varphi_0 = (0,0,1,0) \geq \varphi_0 \}$. We calculate the intersection of the values of the vector $k$, i.e.,

$$S_\cap = S_0 = \{(0,0,0,1),(0,0,1,1),(0,1,0,0),(0,1,0,1),(0,1,1,0),(0,1,1,1),(1,0,0,0),$$

$$(1,0,0,1),(1,0,1,0),(1,0,1,1),(1,1,0,0),(1,1,0,1),(1,1,1,0),(1,1,1,1)\}$$

Thus, $(0,0,1,0) \rightarrow (0,0,0,1)$ is an valid division trail when the input vector $k \in S_\cap$. 

3. When the vector $u = (0, 0, 1, 1)$, we calculate:

$$\bigoplus_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} \tau_{u=(0,0,1,1)}(y) = \bigoplus_{y \in \mathcal{Y}} y_2 y_3$$

$$= \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} (x_0 x_1 x_2 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_2 x_3)$$

$$= \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \tau_{(1,1,1,0)}(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \tau_{(0,0,1,0)}(x) \oplus \bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \tau_{(0,0,1,1)}(x)$$

$$= 0 \text{ or unknown (Depends on } k) \oplus 1 \oplus 0 \text{ or unknown (Depends on } k)$$

if $\bigoplus_{x \in \mathcal{X}} \tau_{(1,1,1,0)}(x) = 0$, the vector $k \in S_0 = U \setminus \{\varphi_0 \mid \varphi_0 = (1, 1, 1, 0) \supset \varphi_0\}$. Similarly, we can get $k \in S_1 = U \setminus \{\varphi_1 \mid \varphi_1 = (0, 0, 1, 0) \supset \varphi_1\}$ and $k \in S_2 = U \setminus \{\varphi_2 \mid \varphi_2 = (0, 0, 1, 1) \supset \varphi_2\}$. We calculate the intersection of the values of the vector $k$, i.e.,

$$S_{\gamma} = S_0 \cap S_1 \cap S_2 = \{(0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 1, 1, 1), (1, 0, 0, 1), (1, 0, 1, 1), (1, 1, 0, 1), (1, 1, 1, 1)\}$$

Thus, $(0, 0, 1, 0) \rightarrow (0, 0, 1, 1)$ is an valid division trail when the input vector $k \in S_{\gamma}$. 

Table 4: Correspondence between the vector $u$ and $\tau_u(y)$ for the “S-box"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vector u</th>
<th>$\tau_u(y)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$u = [0, 0, 0, 0]$</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [0, 0, 0, 1]$</td>
<td>$y_1 = x_0 x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [0, 0, 1, 0]$</td>
<td>$y_2 = x_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [0, 0, 1, 1]$</td>
<td>$y_2 y_3 = x_0 x_1 x_2 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_2 x_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [0, 1, 0, 0]$</td>
<td>$y_1 = x_1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [0, 1, 0, 1]$</td>
<td>$y_1 y_2 = x_1 x_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [0, 1, 1, 0]$</td>
<td>$y_1 y_2 y_3 = x_0 x_1 x_2 \oplus x_1 x_2 \oplus x_1 x_2 x_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [1, 0, 0, 0]$</td>
<td>$y_0 = x_0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [1, 0, 0, 1]$</td>
<td>$y_0 y_3 = x_0 x_1 \oplus x_0 x_2 \oplus x_0 x_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [1, 0, 1, 0]$</td>
<td>$y_0 y_2 = x_0 x_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [1, 0, 1, 1]$</td>
<td>$y_0 y_2 y_3 = x_0 x_1 x_2 \oplus x_0 x_2 \oplus x_0 x_2 x_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [1, 1, 0, 0]$</td>
<td>$y_0 y_1 = x_0 x_1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [1, 1, 0, 1]$</td>
<td>$y_0 y_1 y_2 = x_0 x_1 \oplus x_0 x_1 x_2 \oplus x_0 x_2 x_3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [1, 1, 1, 0]$</td>
<td>$y_0 y_1 y_2 = x_0 x_1 x_2$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u = [1, 1, 1, 1]$</td>
<td>$y_0 y_1 y_2 y_3 = x_0 x_1 x_2 x_3$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
C  Division trail $L$ of Present S-box

Table 5 presents the division trails $L$ of Present S-box.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Input $\ell$</th>
<th>Output $L$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$[0,0,0,0]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[0,0,0,1]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,0,1],[0,1,0,1],[1,0,0,0],[1,1,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[0,0,1,0]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,1,0],[0,1,1,0],[1,0,0,0],[1,1,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[0,0,1,1]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,1,1],[0,1,0,1],[0,1,0,0],[1,0,0,1],[1,0,1,0],[1,1,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[0,1,0,0]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,0,1],[0,1,0,0],[1,0,0,1],[1,1,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[0,1,0,1]$</td>
<td>${[0,1,0,1],[1,0,0,1],[1,1,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[0,1,1,0]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,0,1],[0,1,1,0],[1,0,0,1],[1,1,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[0,1,1,1]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,1,1],[0,1,0,1],[1,0,1,0],[1,1,1,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[1,0,0,0]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,0,1],[0,0,1,0],[0,0,1,1],[0,1,0,0],[1,0,0,1],[1,1,0,1],[1,1,1,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[1,0,0,1]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,0,1],[0,0,0,0],[0,1,0,1],[1,0,0,1],[1,0,1,0],[1,1,0,1]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[1,0,1,0]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,0,1],[0,1,0,0],[0,1,0,1],[0,1,1,0],[1,0,0,1],[1,1,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[1,0,1,1]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,0,1],[0,0,0,0],[0,1,0,0],[0,1,0,1],[0,1,1,0],[1,0,0,1],[1,0,1,0],[1,1,0,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[1,1,0,0]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,1,0],[0,1,0,0],[0,1,1,0],[1,0,0,0],[1,1,0,0],[1,1,0,1],[1,1,1,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[1,1,0,1]$</td>
<td>${[0,0,1,0],[0,1,0,0],[0,1,1,0],[1,0,0,0],[1,0,1,0],[1,1,1,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[1,1,1,0]$</td>
<td>${[0,1,0,1],[0,1,1,1],[1,0,0,1],[1,1,0,1],[1,1,1,0]}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[1,1,1,1]$</td>
<td>${[1,1,1,1]}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D  Linear inequalities description BDPT of the Extension-S-box

The following inequalities are the 6 inequalities used to describe the “S-box” whose feasible solutions are exactly the 26 division trails $L$ of the “S-box” where $(a_0,a_1,a_2,a_3) \rightarrow (b_0,b_1,b_2,b_3)$ denotes a division trail.

$$
\mathcal{O} = \begin{cases} 
-a_0 - a_2 - a_3 + b_0 + b_2 + b_3 \geq 0 \\
-a_2 - a_3 + b_1 + b_2 + b_3 \geq 0 \\
a_2 + a_3 - b_0 - b_2 - b_3 + 1 \geq 0 \\
a_2 + a_3 - b_1 - b_2 - b_3 + 1 \geq 0 \\
a_0 + a_1 + a_2 + a_3 - b_0 - b_1 - b_2 - b_3 \geq 0 \\
a_2 - b_2 \geq 0 \\
a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3 \text{ are binaries}
\end{cases} \quad (4)
$$

The following inequalities are the 10 inequalities used to describe the “S-box” whose feasible solutions are exactly the 30 division trails $L$ of the “S-box” where $(a_0,a_1,a_2,a_3) \rightarrow$
\((b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3)\) denotes a division trail.

\[
\mathcal{O} = \begin{cases} 
-a_1 - a_2 - a_3 + b_1 + b_2 + b_3 \geq 0 \\
a_0 - b_0 \geq 0 \\
a_1 - b_1 \geq 0 \\
a_0 - a_2 - a_3 + b_0 + b_2 + b_3 \geq 0 \\
a_2 - b_2 \geq 0 \\
a_0 - a_1 + b_1 \geq 0 \\
a_0 + a_2 + a_3 - b_3 \geq 0 \\
a_0 + a_1 + b_0 \geq 0 \\
a_1 + a_2 + a_3 - b_3 \geq 0 \\
a_3 - b_0 - b_1 - b_2 - b_3 + 3 \geq 0 \\
a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3, b_0, b_1, b_2, b_3 \text{ are binaries} 
\end{cases} 
\tag{5}
\]

### E Proof of Proposition 1

According to Definition 5, we have the following iteration expression

\[
\mathbb{K}_i = f_e(\mathbb{K}_{i-1}) \cup f_k(\mathbb{L}_{i-1}) = f_e(\mathbb{K}_{i-1}) \cup f_k \circ f_e(\mathbb{L}_{i-1})
\]

\[
\mathbb{L}_{i-1} = f_e(\mathbb{L}_{i-1})
\]

Thus,

\[
\mathbb{K}_r = f_e(\mathbb{K}_{r-1}) \cup f_k(\mathbb{L}_r)
\]

\[
= f_e (f_e(\mathbb{K}_{r-2}) \cup f_k(\mathbb{L}_{r-1})) \cup f_k(\mathbb{L}_r)
\]

\[
= f_e \circ f_e (\mathbb{K}_{r-2}) \cup \cdots \cup f_e \circ f_k(\mathbb{L}_{r-1}) \cup f_k(\mathbb{L}_r)
\]

\[
\vdots
\]

\[
= \underbrace{f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_e}_r (k) \cup \underbrace{f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_k}_r (\ell) \cup \cdots \cup f_k \circ \cdots \circ f_e (\ell)
\]

\[
\mathbb{L}_r = \underbrace{f_e \circ \cdots \circ f_e}_r (\ell)
\]

### F Integral Distinguishers listed in Table 1

For SIMON and SIMECK family block ciphers, all the integral distinguishers can be extended one more round by the technique in [WLV+14].

#### F.1 SIMON32’s 14-round Distinguisher

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)

Output: (?????????????????, 000000000000000000000000)

#### F.2 SIMON48’s 15-round Distinguisher

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)

Output: (?????????????????????????, 00000000000000000000000000000000)
F.3 SIMON64’s 17-round Distinguisher

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)
Output: (?????????????????????????????????????????????????0????0?0)

F.4 SIMON96’s 21-round Distinguisher

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)
Output: (?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????!!!!!)

F.5 SIMON128’s 25-round Distinguisher

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)
Output: (?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????!!!!!)

F.6 SIMECK32’s 14-round Distinguisher

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaa)
Output: (?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????!!!!!)

F.7 SIMECK48’s 17-round Distinguisher

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)
Output: (?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????!!!!!)

F.8 SIMECK64’s 20-round Distinguisher

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)
Output: (?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????!!!!!)

F.9 PRESENT’s 9-round Distinguisher

Input: (aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaacc)
Output: (???????????????0000????????????????????????0000, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????!!!!!)
F.10 **RECTANGLE’s 10-round Distinguisher**

\[
\begin{pmatrix}
\text{aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa} \\
\text{aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa} \\
\text{aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa} \\
\text{aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa}
\end{pmatrix}
\rightarrow
\begin{pmatrix}
?0??0000???00?0 \\
????????????????? \\
????????????????? \\
?????????????????
\end{pmatrix}
\]

**G Integral Distinguishers of SIMON(102)**

In [KLT15], another variant of SIMON family named SIMON(102) is proposed with rotation constants (1,0,2). Hu et al. [HW19] proposed a variant BDPT and applied it to improve the integral distinguishers of SIMON(102). The results are shown in G.1–G.3, where ‘*’ represents that the output bit is ‘0’ or ‘1’.

**G.1** **SIMON(102) 32’s 14-round Distinguisher in [HW19]**

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)  
Output: (?????????????????, 0****************)

**G.2** **SIMON(102) 48’s 15-round Distinguisher in [HW19]**

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)  
Output: (?????????????????????????, 0****************)

**G.3** **SIMON(102) 64’s 17-round Distinguisher in [HW19]**

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)  
Output: (?????????????????????????????????, 0****************)

Determining ‘*’ is ‘0’ or ‘1’ can be helpful to integral attacks on SIMON(102). Therefore, we apply Algorithm 3 and 4 to search integral distinguishers of SIMON(102) based on BDPT, and obtain more accurate integral distinguishers compared with [HW19]. The results are shown in G.4–G.6. Besides, these integral distinguishers can be obtained by the method of exploring secret keys in [WHG+20]. Note that our automatic search model supposes that all secret keys are chosen randomly. If consider the secret keys, we may obtain better integral distinguishers.

**G.4** **SIMON(102) 32’s 14-round Distinguisher**

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)  
Output: (?????????????????, 01?????????????)

**G.5** **SIMON(102) 48’s 15-round Distinguisher**

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)  
Output: (?????????????????????????, 01?????????????)
G.6 SIMON(102) 64’s 17-round Distinguisher

Input: (caaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa, 
aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa)

Output: (?????????????????????????????????????????????????????,
01???????????????????????????????????????????????????1)