

Linear-map Vector Commitments and their Practical Applications

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Abstract. Vector commitments (VC) are a cryptographic primitive that allow one to commit to a vector and then “open” some of its positions efficiently. Vector commitments are increasingly recognized as a central tool to scale highly decentralized networks of large size and whose content is dynamic. In this work, we examine the demands on the properties that an ideal vector commitment should satisfy in the light of the emerging plethora of practical applications and propose new constructions that improve the state-of-the-art in several dimensions and offer new tradeoffs. We also propose a unifying framework that captures several constructions and show how to generically achieve some properties from more basic ones. On the practical side, we focus on building efficient schemes that do not require new trusted setup (we can reuse existing ceremonies for pairing-based “powers of tau” run by real-world systems such as ZCash or Filecoin). Our (in-progress) implementation demonstrates that our work over-performs in efficiency prior schemes with same properties.

Our contributions can be resumed as follows:

- Theoretical Formalisation: We formally define the notion of Linear Map Vector Commitments (LVC) inspired by the work of Lai and Malavolta [CRYPTO19]. Our definition aims at recovering all previous notions of VC and include properties such as *updatability*, *aggregation* and *homomorphism*. We introduce a stronger new *unbounded aggregation* concept that allows to aggregate multiple times without a disaggregation procedure. This relaxes incremental aggregation which is hard to achieve in general.
- Black-box Frameworks for LVC: We show how to lift the homomorphic properties of a simple LVC in order to obtain an LVC with unbounded aggregation and/or updatability. We also show that we can construct generic LVC (i.e. for any $f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$) from homomorphic LVC for a more restricted class of openings, inner-products IP (for $n = 1$).
- VC Constructions: We show two pairing-based LVC constructions for inner products IP based on the properties of monomial and Lagrange polynomial basis. We prove that the two satisfy all the relevant homomorphic properties to obtain unbounded aggregation and transformation to LVC. We also extend such schemes to support subvector openings SVC in a native way for special subsets or via aggregation for generic subsets.
- Adding Maintainability: We present two novel maintainable VC constructions that can be instantiated from any underlying VC scheme with homomorphic proofs. We show how to achieve a stronger, more flexible form of maintainability: our schemes allow to arbitrarily tune the memory used to save on the opening time to obtain the desired trade-off. Both constructions are based on the tensor structure of multivariate and univariate polynomials:
 1. The multivariate case is a generalisation of a recent work, Hyperproofs that uses binary trees: we allow for any arity for the trees, so proofs are shorter and the leaves can be commitments for any LVC scheme, to allow more expressivity.
 2. The univariate construction is inspired by this generalization and it has the additional feature that the setup is independent of the trade-off, so the memory used can be decided by the prover on the fly.

* Arantxa Zapico has been funded by a Protocol Labs PhD Fellowship PL-RGP1-2021-062. Alexandros Zacharakis has been partially funded by Protocol Labs Research Grant PL-RGP1-2021-048

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1 Introduction

Vector commitment schemes [22, 7] (or VC) allow a party to commit to a vector \mathbf{v} through a short digest and then open some of its elements guaranteeing *position binding*⁴ (one should not be able to open a commitment at position i to two different values $v_i \neq v'_i$). For this primitive to be interesting the proof of opening—or just “opening”—should be of size sublinear in m , the size of the committed vector. A vector commitment with *subvector opening* also supports a short opening for arbitrary *subsets* of positions I (rather than individual ones only). More specifically this opening should be of size independent, not only of m , but of $|I|$. We denote commitment schemes with such property as SVC [20](also called VC with batch opening in [4]).

Functional Vector Commitments, first introduced by Libert, Ramanna and Yung in [21], capture the ability to compute commitments to vectors and later perform openings of linear functions (inner-products) $f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$ of these vectors, for some field \mathbb{F} .

Both vector commitments with subvector openings and functional commitments for inner-products can be captured as vector commitments with openings for a more general class of function families, linear-maps. Lai and Malavolta [20] were the first to introduce Linear Map Commitments (LMC). In such a scheme, the prover is able to open the commitment to some vector \mathbf{v} to the output of multiple linear functions or, equivalently, to the output of one linear-map $f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$, by producing a single short proof. In this work, we revisit Lai and Malavolta [20] LMC notion and augment it to a full-featured vector commitment generic definition that recovers all previously-defined schemes and more. We call our primitive Linear Map Vector Commitment and use LVC for short⁵.

1.1 Motivation for Better Vector Commitments

Vector commitments are very useful to scale highly decentralized networks of large size and whose content is dynamic [8, 4, 6, 15](such dynamic content can be the state of a blockchain, amount stored on a wallet, the value of a file in a decentralized storage network, etc.). Beyond the basic requirement that openings should be efficient, in this work we also discuss how to achieve some additional properties of LVC. We discuss some of the most prominent applications of LVC to motivate and justify the importance of these properties in practice.

Verifiable Databases. One of the applications that can be significantly improved by Vector Commitments is Verifiable Databases (VDB). In this setting, a client outsources the storage of a database to a server while keeping the ability to access and change some of its records, i.e. query functions of the data and update some of the data and ensure the server does not tamper with the data. Solutions using (binding) commitment schemes provide security but not efficiency in such a setting. A popular instantiation that achieves both of them are Merkle trees [23], but these are clearly not expressive enough to allow for functional openings.

For a VC scheme to be the ideal solution for VDB application, we require to additionally support efficient updates and expressive openings. For example, a LVC scheme that allow the client to update records of the database in sublinear time and to verify linear-map queries at almost the same cost as simple position openings is a great improvement over current solutions.

Stateless Cryptocurrency. A recent application that motivated more efficient constructions of VC schemes is *stateless cryptocurrency*, i.e. a payment system based on a distributed ledger where neither validators of transactions nor system users need to store the full ledger state.

The ideal vector commitment scheme that provides the best trade-off between storage, bandwidth, and computation in this setting should have all of the following properties: it must have small commitment size, short proofs, efficient computation for openings and it should allow for proof updates and for aggregation to minimise communication in the transactions and *maintainability* for the proofs, that allows to update all pre-stored proofs in sublinear time.

⁴ For the applications considered in this work, hiding properties are not necessary. In particular our commitments are deterministic.

⁵ We prefer LVC rather than initially proposed LMC in order to emphasise the Vector Commitment aspect of our notion.

Proof of Space. Proof of Space (PoS) is a protocol that allows miners (storage providers) to convince the network that they are dedicating physical storage over time in an efficient way. In a nutshell, a miner commits to a file (data) that uses a specified amount of disk space and then the miner proves that it continues to store the data by answering to recurring audits that consist of random spot-checks.

A PoS construction based on vector commitments, as described in [12], requires short opening proofs for subvectors to be stored in a blockchain, cross-commitments aggregation techniques and the possibility to implement space-time tradeoffs to reduce the proving time for the miner (ideally sublinear in the size of the vector).

“Caching” Optimizations. In some applications, e.g. when performing HTTP queries, clients use the so-called *prefetching*⁶ and receive from a server not only the values of interest but other related values that could potentially be queried in the near future (e.g., values in a neighboring range of the queried values). Vector commitments with efficient proofs for special (“caching”) subset openings allow to add verifiability to such queries in a way that does not affect the speed of the server since the proving procedure for a bigger subset is close or the same as for individual positions.

1.2 Desired Properties and Limitations

At the very least basic a LVC should be *efficient* (small proof size and low opening/verifying computational needs). Obviously, the same design goals as with other cryptographic protocols apply, i.e. ideally one would like to prove security under as standard assumptions as possible.

Reusable setup refers to the structured reference string (SRS) that many pairing-based schemes use as public parameters. Ideally, one would like to have a transparent setup that does not rely on any trusted parameter generation. It is common to sacrifice this goal for efficiency and settle for a trusted setup that can be generated in a ceremony. But such ceremonies are complicated to implement⁷, so it is interesting to design LVC that can reuse existing setups for other primitives and do not have special SRS distributions.

Expressivity refers to the opening possibilities. One would like VC to be as expressive as possible, meaning that it should be possible to open to functions of the vector as general as possible (subvector openings, linear or arbitrary functions).

Proof Aggregation captures the ability to “pack” two or more proofs together obtaining a new proof for their combined claims (e.g. $\mathbf{f}(\mathbf{v}) = y$ and $\mathbf{f}'(\mathbf{v}) = y'$). This should be done without knowledge of the opening of the vector and aggregation cost should be sublinear in the vector length. Importantly, the resulting proof should not significantly grow each time we perform an aggregation. *One-hop* aggregation allows only to aggregate fresh proofs. Ideally, one would also want to aggregate already aggregated proofs.

Updatability allows to efficiently update opening proofs: if \mathbf{C} is a commitment to \mathbf{v} and a position needs to be updated resulting in a new commitment \mathbf{C}' , an updatable VC must provide a method to update an opening π_f for a function f that is valid for \mathbf{C} into a new opening for the same function that is valid for the new commitment \mathbf{C}' . The new opening should be computed by only knowing the portion of the vector that is supposed to change and in time faster than recomputing the opening from scratch.

Maintainability aims in amortizing the proving costs in systems where committed values have a long life span and evolve over time. This is achieved by means of dedicated memory to reduce the computation time needed to open proofs. Concretely, the property requires that (1) one can efficiently store some values to reduce the cost of computing any individual openings (2) after updating a single position of the committed vector, it should be possible to update all proofs in time sublinear in the size of the vector (less than computing a single proof from scratch in some cases).

Homomorphic properties apply to commitments as well as to proofs. An LVC has homomorphic commitments if it is possible to meaningfully combine commitments *without knowing their openings*: that is, from

⁶ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Link_prefetching_FAQ

⁷ This remains true even if many setups are updatable [18] and they can be generated and updated non-interactively in a secure way as long as one party is honest. There might be issues if not enough parties participate in generating the SRS or updates are not properly validated.

commitments C_1 and C_2 to \mathbf{v}_1 and \mathbf{v}_2 , any party must be able to compute a commitment to $\alpha\mathbf{v}_1 + \beta\mathbf{v}_2$ for any $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{F}$. The scheme has homomorphic openings if it is possible to derive a proof that $f(\mathbf{v}_1 + \mathbf{v}_2) = \mathbf{y}_1 + \mathbf{y}_2$ from proofs for the claims $f(\mathbf{v}_1) = \mathbf{y}_1$ and $f(\mathbf{v}_2) = \mathbf{y}_2$. Finally, a vector commitment scheme has homomorphic proofs when it is possible to combine proofs of statements for different functions but same vector. As we will see, this property is interesting for its implications.

1.3 Our Contributions

Theoretical Advances. On the theoretical frontier, we unify previous definitions and augment them with additional properties. The basic notion we use is Linear Map Vector Commitments (LVC) and is inspired by the work of Lai and Malavolta [20]. We then define additional properties on top of this definition and explore their relations. Specifically, we augment this notion with *updatability* and aggregation properties, including a novel notion -*unbounded aggregation*- capturing the ability to aggregate already aggregated proofs but relaxing incremental aggregation [6] in the sense that the verifier is allowed to do work linear in the number of aggregation hops (i.e. aggregation is “history” dependent), also, disaggregation is not possible. We show that having additional homomorphic properties is highly desirable, by arguing that any LVC that satisfies them: (1) can be augmented with unbounded aggregation as well as updatability; (2) can support general linear map openings (i.e. for any $f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$) as long as it supports inner product openings (i.e. for $f' : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$). This allows us to focus on efficient constructions for inner products with homomorphic properties.

VC Constructions. First, we present two pairing-based LVC constructions for inner products based on the properties of monomial and Lagrange polynomial basis and prove that they satisfy all the relevant homomorphic properties to obtain unbounded aggregation and support general linear maps. In terms of expressivity, these constructions generalize previous work [28, 29] by supporting linear functions instead of position or subvector openings. Vector commitments for this class of functions are core components of important primitives such as arguments of knowledge for Inner Product (IP) relations or aggregation arguments [9].

Second, we present two novel maintainable constructions by exploiting the tensor structure of multivariate and univariate polynomials. These constructions allow a stronger, more flexible form of maintainability: they support an arbitrary memory/time trade-off for openings, meaning that one can decide how much memory it wants to use to reduce the opening time.

The multivariate case is a generalization of Hyperproofs [28] in several dimensions. Roughly speaking maintainability is achieved in Hyperproofs by constructing a binary tree of proofs where at the leaves there are the values of individual positions. We present a single construction that can be instantiated in several ways (recovering Hyperproofs as a special case) with these features: (i) the tree can be of any arity, so proofs are shorter⁸; (ii) the leaves can be commitments for any LVC and not only individual openings, to achieve a fully flexible trade-off. As a result of (ii), the scheme is more expressive (as it can support openings to linear functions/subvector opens at leaf level if the underlying commitment supports it).

The univariate construction is inspired by this generalization and it has the additional feature that the setup is independent of the trade-off, and can be decided by the prover on the fly.

Practical Improvements. As in some applications like Proof of Space, the subset of opened positions is not very meaningful and its distribution is expected to be known in advance, we study how to improve verification efficiency for certain special subsets I openings in our inner-product constructions. For some structured sets I , we achieve a verifier that performs half of the work it does for arbitrary sets J of the same size in the Lagrange construction, and only a constant number of group operations in the one that uses the monomial basis.

⁸ If one uses the Inner Pairing Product argument of Bünz et al. [5] on top of PST commitments as suggested in Hyperproofs the difference in proof size is not so relevant, but IPP will be much cheaper to run.

VC Scheme	Setup	Aggregation	Updates	Assumption	Functional Opening	Special Sets Opening (size n)
PoS aggSVC [6]	Trusted	Incremental Same-Com	hint	RSA	SVC	$O(n)$
Pointproofs [15]	Trusted	One-hop Cross-Com	key	pairings	\times	$O(n)$
Stateless aggSVC [29]	Trusted	One-hop Same-Com	key	pairings	SVC	$O(1)$
Our Lagrange LVC	Reusable	Unbounded Cross-Com	key	AGM	LVC	$O(1)$
Our Monomial LVC	Reusable	Unbounded Cross-Com	keyless	AGM	LVC	$O(1)$

Table 1: Comparison of our LVCs with other aggregatable VC schemes (aggSVC) designed for Stateless Cryptocurrencies and Proof of Space applications. All schemes have $O(1)$ -sized proofs that verify in $O(1)$ time and can update commitments in $O(1)$ time.

VC Scheme	Setup	Homomorphic Aggregation	$ \pi $	Prove	OpenAll	UpdateAll	
Merkle Trees	Transparent	\times	SNARK	$\log m$	$O(k)$	$O(m)$	$O(k + \log m')$
Hyperproofs [28]	Trusted	\checkmark	IPP	$\log m$	$O(k)$	$O(m \log m')$	$O(\log m')$
Our Multivariate LVC	Trusted	\checkmark	IPP	$\log_{\ell} m'$	$O(k)$	$O(m \log m')$	$O(\log m')$
Our Univariate LVC	Reusable	\checkmark	IPP	$\log m'$	$O(k)$	$O(m \log m')$	$O(\log m')$

Table 2: Comparison of our schemes with other maintainable VC. We consider vectors of dimension $m = k \cdot m'$ where m' is the amount of memory dedicated for storing proofs. All schemes are aggregatable using generic techniques, SNARKs or Inner Pairing Products [5]. All times/sizes omit the dependence on the security parameter λ . We omit constant additive terms from proof sizes. In the multivariate construction, ℓ refers to a constant parameter.

Second, we mitigate the challenges of deploying these constructions due to their need of a trusted setup. With the exception of the multivariate variant of the maintainable construction, all our constructions can reuse trusted setups such as “powers of tau” that were run for pairing-based SNARK schemes used in real-world applications.⁹, as opposed to for example [15], in which a certain middle power of τ needs to be missing in the SRS. In Appendix 7 we demonstrate the practical benefits of our special subset construction by providing an implementation and comparisons with current solutions.

1.4 Related Work

Vector commitments were fully formalized in [7] and two first constructions were proposed under standard, constant-size, assumptions: CDH in bilinear groups and RSA respectively. Many following works built on these constructions to obtain better efficiency and more properties such as subvector openings, functional openings, aggregation, updates and variants of these. A number of constructions [6, 4] use the properties of hidden order groups to achieve constructions with attractive features such as constant size parameters or incremental aggregation but are concretely less efficient than pairing-based constructions.

The VC schemes based on bilinear groups made their way into offering an alternative to Merkle trees which are widely used in practice nowadays. Merkle trees are quite efficient and only need a transparent setup. They also offer natural time-memory tradeoffs due to their tree structure. Nevertheless, new vector commitments schemes with linear-size parameters are more expressive in terms of openings, have homomorphic properties, allow for efficient updates for the proofs and aggregation mechanisms.

Expressivity. VC were generalized by Libert et al. [21], who formalize the notion of functional commitments (FC). They construct vector commitments with openings to linear-forms of the vector based on the Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption over pairing groups. Later, Lai and Malavolta [20] introduce subvector openings and show applications to building succinct-arguments of knowledge (similar applications were shown by [4]) in the bilinear group setting. They also generalize the notion of SVCs to allow the prover to reveal arbitrary linear maps computed over the committed vector. Previously, only Functional VC for

⁹ E.g., the one used by ZCash. <https://z.cash> or and Filecoin [11]

single-output linear functions were proposed which did not account for provers that want to reveal multiple locations or function outputs of the committed vector in a concise way.

Updatability. Vector commitments that allow for updates are useful in applications such as stateless cryptocurrencies. A weak variant of updatability requires the algorithms that update the commitment and the opening to take as input an opening for the position in which the vector update occurs called *hints*. Recent RSA-based constructions are hint-updatable [4, 6]. Compared to hint updates, key-updates only need fixed update keys corresponding to the updated positions. Schemes based on bilinear groups require such fixed keys, and no extra information about the change made in the vector in order to update.

Aggregation. Vector Commitments with an additional aggregation property are very appealing for blockchain applications for their even shorter proofs of opening. Campanelli et al. [6] showed two constructions of incrementally aggregatable SVCs, that have constant-size parameters and work over groups of unknown order. Unfortunately, the practical efficiency of these constructions is still not sufficient for their deployment in real-world systems.

Gorbunov et al. [15] show how to extend the VC scheme of [22] to allow for cross-commitment aggregation. Like our constructions, they assume the Algebraic Group Model (AGM) [14] in bilinear groups and a random oracle. Their final SVC requires public parameters whose size is linear in the size of the committed vector, while cross-commitment aggregation allow for splitting up a long vector into shorter ones and simply aggregate the proofs. However, this approach allows only for one-hop aggregation, meaning that already aggregated proofs cannot be reused in further aggregations by external nodes.

Tomescu et al. [29] showed how to realize an *updatable* SVC with one-hop aggregation from bilinear groups. Their scheme has linear-sized public parameters, and it supports commitment updates, proof updates from a static linear-sized update key tied only to the updated position, in contrast with the dynamic update *hints* required by related works.

Maintainability. Apart from Merkle tree based Vector Commitments which are known to be maintainable, Srinivasan et. al. [28] show that the multilinear PST polynomial commitment [25] can be turned to a maintainable VC construction. Pre-computing all (single-position) opening proofs is done in quasilinear time (contrary to the trivial quadratic time) and updating all proofs after a (single position) vector update needs only logarithmic time. Contrary to Merkle tree based approaches, the scheme has *homomorphic* properties. Furthermore, due to its algebraic structure, it supports one-hop aggregation through generic means, namely, Inner Pairing Product Arguments [5], albeit with a concretely expensive proving computation.

2 Preliminaries

We denote the set of natural numbers by \mathbb{N} and let $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ be the computational security parameter. We denote the list of integer numbers between 1 and n as $[n]$. All the algorithms defined throughout this work are assumed to be probabilistic Turing machines that run in polynomial time (abbreviated as PPT). We say that a function is *negligible* (in λ), and we denote it by $\text{negl}(\lambda)$, if $\text{negl}(\lambda) = \Omega(\lambda^{-c})$ for any fixed constant $c > 1$.

Vectors. For m -dimensional vectors $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$, we denote the i -th entry by $a_i \in \mathbb{F}$. We use $\mathbf{e}_i \in \mathbb{F}^m$ to denote the vectors of the canonical basis, more concretely \mathbf{e}_i is the vector with a 1 in the i -th coordinate and 0's elsewhere. For vectors $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$, $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{F}^n$, we denote $\mathbf{a} \otimes \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{F}^{m \cdot n} = (a_1 \mathbf{b}, \dots, a_n \mathbf{b})$ the tensor product of the vectors.

Lagrange basis. Let $\mathbb{H} = \{\mathbf{h}_1, \dots, \mathbf{h}_m\}$ be a multiplicative group of size m in \mathbb{F} . We consider the set of Lagrange interpolation polynomials $\{\lambda_j(X)\}_{j=1}^m$ associated with \mathbb{H} , namely,

$$\lambda_j(X) = \prod_{i \neq j} \frac{X - \mathbf{h}_i}{\mathbf{h}_j - \mathbf{h}_i}.$$

Recall that $\sum_{j=1}^m \lambda_j(X) = 1$. Moreover, we define $t(X) = \prod_{j=1}^m (X - h_j)$ the vanishing polynomial. We will also consider $t_k(X) = \prod_{j \in J_k} (X - h_j)$, the vanishing polynomial of a subset $\{h_j\}_{j \in J_k} \subset \mathbb{H}$ and $t_{k^c}(X) = \prod_{j \notin J_k} (X - h_j)$.

For the multivariate case, recall that $\lambda_\sigma(X_\nu, \dots, X_1) = \prod_{j=1}^\nu \lambda_{\sigma_j}(X_j)$. Using these, we can write the vector of multivariate Lagrange as the tensor product $\lambda(X_\nu) \otimes \dots \otimes \lambda(X_1)$, where $\lambda(X)$ is the univariate Lagrange basis.

Bilinear Groups. A bilinear group is given by a description $\mathbf{gk} = (p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$ with additive notation such that p is prime, so $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}_p$ is a field. $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ are cyclic (additive) groups of prime order p . We use the notation $[a]_1, [b]_2, [c]_t$ for elements in $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T respectively. $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is a bilinear asymmetric map (pairing), which means that $\forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p, e([a]_1, [b]_2) := [ab]_t$. We implicitly have that $[1]_t := e([1]_1, [1]_2)$ generates \mathbb{G}_T . We use $[a]_{1,2}$ to refer to 2 group elements $[a]_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1, [a]_2 \in \mathbb{G}_2$. In our constructions, we denote by $\mathcal{G}(p)$ the algorithm that, given as input the prime value p , outputs a description $\mathbf{gk} = (p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e)$.

Algebraic Group Model (AGM). The algebraic group model [14] lies between the standard model and the stronger generic group model. In AGM, we consider only so-called algebraic adversaries. Such adversaries have direct access to group elements and, in particular, can use their bit representation, like in the standard model. However, these adversaries are assumed to output new group elements only by applying the group operation to received group elements (like in the generic group model). This requirement is formalized as follows: Suppose an adversary \mathcal{A} is given some group elements $[x_1]_1 \dots [x_m]_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1$. Then, for every new group element $[z]_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1$ that the adversary outputs, it must also output $z_1 \dots z_m \in \mathbb{F}$ such that $[z]_1 = \sum_{i=1}^m [z_i x_i]_1$.

Bilinear Strong Diffie Hellman Assumption. In the tree-based construction we rely on a q -type assumption, the Bilinear Strong Diffie Hellman assumption ((q_1, q_2) -BSDH) [3]. When $q_1 = q_2$, we simply call it q -BSDH Assumption. We present it next.

Definition 1. *The (q_1, q_2) -BSDH assumption holds relative to $\mathcal{G}(1^\lambda)$ if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , the following probability is negligible in λ .*

$$\Pr \left[(c, \frac{1}{(\tau-c)} e([1]_1, [1]_2)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{gk}, \{[\tau^i]_1\}_{i=0}^{q_1}, \{[\tau^i]_2\}_{i=0}^{q_2}) \mid \mathbf{gk} \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^\lambda); \tau \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p \right].$$

3 Definitions: Linear-map Vector Commitments

In the following, we define what we call Linear-map Vector Commitments (LVC) schemes. Notably, this definition has been introduced by Lai and Malavolta in [20] (except that there the name is *Linear Map Commitments*) to capture further functionalities of vector commitments, whose definition before only account for proofs of *position openings* (Vector Commitments) or more generally *subvector openings* (Sub-vector commitments) (See Appendix A for the formal definitions). We introduce the definition and security properties of LVC. Importantly, we do not consider the hiding property as for our applications all vectors are public.

Linear-map Vector Commitment A linear-map vector commitment scheme for function families $\mathcal{F} \subset \{f : \mathcal{M}^m \rightarrow \mathcal{M}^n\}$ is a tuple of PPT algorithms $(\text{LVC.KeyGen}, \text{LVC.Commit}, \text{LVC.Open}, \text{LVC.Vf})$ that work as follows:

LVC.KeyGen $(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}) \rightarrow (\text{prk}, \text{vrk})$: The setup algorithm takes the security parameter λ , a family of functions \mathcal{F} implicitly defining the message space \mathcal{M} , and the maximum vector length $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, and outputs a pair of keys (prk, vrk) .

LVC.Commit $(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}) \rightarrow (\text{C}, \text{aux})$: On input the proving key prk , and a vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_m) \in \mathcal{M}^m$, returns a commitment C and auxiliary information aux . This algorithm is *deterministic*.

LVC.Open $(\text{prk}, \text{aux}, f, \mathbf{y}) \rightarrow \pi_f$: Takes as input prk , the auxiliary information aux , a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$, and a claimed result $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{M}^n$. It outputs a proof π_f that $f(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{y}$.

$\text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, f, \mathbf{y}, \pi_f) \rightarrow 0/1$: Takes as input the verification key vrk , \mathbf{C} , function f , $\mathbf{y} \in \mathcal{M}^n$, and proof π_f . It accepts or rejects.

A LVC scheme must satisfy the following properties:

Definition 2 (LVC correctness). *An LVC scheme is perfectly correct if for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for any family of functions $\mathcal{F} \subset \{f : \mathcal{M}^m \rightarrow \mathcal{M}^n\}$ and any $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{M}^m$,*

$$\Pr \left[\text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, f, \mathbf{y}, \pi_f) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}) \\ (\mathbf{C}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}) \\ \pi_f \leftarrow \text{LVC.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}, f, \mathbf{y}) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

Definition 3 (LVC (strong) function binding). *A linear map commitment LVC satisfies strong function binding if, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all integers $K \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, and for any family of functions \mathcal{F} , the following probability is negligible in λ :*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \forall k \in [K] : \text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, f_k, \mathbf{y}_k, \pi_{f_k}) = 1 \\ \wedge \exists \mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{M}^m \text{ s. t. } \forall k \in [K] : f_k(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{y}_k \end{array} \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}) \\ (\mathbf{C}, \{f_k, \mathbf{y}_k, \pi_{f_k}\}_{k \in [K]}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \end{array} \right]$$

The definition above can be relaxed to hold only for *honestly-generated* commitments \mathbf{C} , raising to the *weak function binding* notion. In the weak definition, the adversary \mathcal{A} returns a vector \mathbf{v} while the commitment \mathbf{C} is computed via LVC.Commit . In this work, constructions are proven strong function binding.

3.1 Homomorphic Properties for LVC

Homomorphic Commitments. Linear-map vector commitment schemes that satisfy homomorphic commitments allow to combine commitments of two vectors into a single one of their sum (or any linear combination). Namely, for all λ , and $(\text{vrk}, \text{prk}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F})$, if $(\mathbf{C}_1, \text{aux}_1) \leftarrow \text{LVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}_1)$ and $(\mathbf{C}_2, \text{aux}_2) \leftarrow \text{LVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}_2)$, then $\tilde{\mathbf{C}} = (\alpha\mathbf{C}_1 + \beta\mathbf{C}_2)$ is a valid commitment to $\tilde{\mathbf{v}} = (\alpha\mathbf{v}_1 + \beta\mathbf{v}_2)$ for any $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{M}$.

In this work, we are particularly interested in LVC that also have *homomorphic proofs* for different functions applied to a committed vector and *homomorphic openings* for the same function applied to different initial vectors.

Homomorphic Proofs. An LVC scheme has *homomorphic proofs* if it allows recombine two proofs π_1, π_2 corresponding to linear maps f_1, f_2 into a new proof $\tilde{\pi}$ that opens to a linear combination of f_1 and f_2 applied to the same committed vector. Namely, for all λ , $\mathcal{F} \subset \{f : \mathcal{M}^m \rightarrow \mathcal{M}^n\}$ and all vectors $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{M}^m$, and $(\text{vrk}, \text{prk}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F})$, $(\mathbf{C}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v})$, if $\pi_1 \leftarrow \text{LVC.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}, f_1, \mathbf{y}_1)$ and $\pi_2 \leftarrow \text{LVC.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}, f_2, \mathbf{y}_2)$, then for all $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$\tilde{\pi} = (\alpha\pi_1 + \beta\pi_2) \text{ verifies } \text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, \tilde{f} = (\alpha f_1 + \beta f_2), \tilde{\mathbf{y}} = (\alpha\mathbf{y}_1 + \beta\mathbf{y}_2), \tilde{\pi}) = 1.$$

Homomorphic Openings. An LVC scheme has *homomorphic openings* if we can combine opening proofs for the same linear-map f applied to two different vectors \mathbf{v}_1 and \mathbf{v}_2 to obtain a new proof of opening $\tilde{\pi}$ that verifies with respect to the linear combination $\tilde{\mathbf{C}}$ of the two initial commitments $\mathbf{C}_1, \mathbf{C}_2$ and show the result of f applied to the linear combination of the vectors \mathbf{v}_1 and \mathbf{v}_2 .

More formally, for all λ , $\mathcal{F} \subset \{f : \mathcal{M}^m \rightarrow \mathcal{M}^n\}$, vectors $\mathbf{v}_1, \mathbf{v}_2 \in \mathcal{M}^m$, and $(\text{vrk}, \text{prk}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F})$, if $\pi_1 \leftarrow \text{LVC.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}_1, f, \mathbf{y}_1)$ and $\pi_2 \leftarrow \text{LVC.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}_2, f, \mathbf{y}_2)$, where $(\mathbf{C}_1, \text{aux}_1) \leftarrow \text{LVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}_1)$ and $(\mathbf{C}_2, \text{aux}_2) \leftarrow \text{LVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}_2)$, then for all $\alpha, \beta \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$\tilde{\pi} = (\alpha\pi_1 + \beta\pi_2) \text{ verifies } \text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \tilde{\mathbf{C}} = (\alpha\mathbf{C}_1 + \beta\mathbf{C}_2), f, \tilde{\mathbf{y}} = (\alpha\mathbf{y}_1 + \beta\mathbf{y}_2), \tilde{\pi}) = 1.$$

4 Generic Constructions from Homomorphic Proofs

Many natural schemes (such as [29, 15], PST commitments or our constructions in Section 5) have homomorphic proofs or openings. This motivates us to consider generic constructions that enhance any LVC scheme with homomorphic properties. We start by defining the notions of unbounded aggregation for same and cross-commitments and then we show how to add such properties to LVC schemes that have homomorphic proofs for the former and, additionally, homomorphic commitments for the latter.

4.1 New Notion: Unbounded Aggregation

The intuition for our definition is that, given t proofs, commitments or openings, we can aggregate them by performing a linear combination with random coefficients. Importantly, these coefficients have to be chosen after the claims are fixed and for that we rely on the RO model, as it is often the case for aggregation in the literature.

In our work, we go a step further and show how this procedure can be done over already aggregated proofs. Actually, aggregating *already aggregated* proofs consist on just sampling new coefficients and using them for fresh linear combinations. Importantly, the verifier needs to have access to the aggregation history: it has to recompute the coefficient corresponding to each initial proof π , which is the product of all the coefficients used in the aggregations it was involved in. Note that this also adds a small overhead to the verifier: it makes a linear (in the number of aggregation “hops”) number of hash computations.

Example for same-commitment aggregation: Consider vector \mathbf{v} committed in \mathbb{C} , functions f_1, f_2 and f_3 ; let π_1, π_2 and π_3 be proofs that $f_1(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{y}_1$, $f_2(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{y}_2$ and $f_3(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{y}_3$. An aggregated proof for $f_2(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{y}_2$, $f_3(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{y}_3$, would be $\pi_1^* = \pi_2 + \gamma_1 \pi_3$, for $\gamma_1 = \mathbf{H}(\mathbb{C}, \{(f_2, \mathbf{y}_2), (f_3, \mathbf{y}_3)\})$. In a second step, we can aggregate a proof that $f_1(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{y}_1$, by performing $\pi_2^* = \pi_1 + \gamma_2 \pi_1^*$, for $\gamma_2 = \mathbf{H}(\mathbb{C}, (f_1, \mathbf{y}_1), \gamma_1)$. At the verification step, the verifier would reconstruct the coefficients of each initial proof in π_2^* . For instance, $\delta_1 = 1$, $\delta_2 = \gamma_1 \gamma_2$, $\delta_3 = \gamma_2$. Then, the verifier can run the LVC.Vf algorithm to check whether $\pi_2^* = \pi_1 + \gamma_2 \pi_1^* = \pi_1 + \gamma_1 \gamma_2 \pi_2 + \gamma_2 \pi_3$ is a valid proof that function $f = f_1 + \gamma_1 \gamma_2 f_2 + \gamma_2 f_3$ evaluated at the vector committed in \mathbb{C} opens to $y = y_1 + \gamma_1 \gamma_2 y_2 + \gamma_2 y_3$. For this last step to work we need the homomorphic proof property and the verifier to have access to the aggregation “history”.

To describe our history of claims we move to *trees* of statements $\{f_j, \mathbf{y}_j\}_{j=1}^t$. In these trees, leaves are pairs of function–output (f, \mathbf{y}) . As in the usual case internal nodes are defined as an ordered list of subtrees. An empty history/tree is referred to as *null*. We denote trees using the syntax $T_{f, \mathbf{y}}$ and the operation that “merges” two subtrees in order adding a new root as “ \cdot ”. The following definition formalizes the above and will be useful in our construction. We remark that we include the commitment in each of the leaves of the trees $T_{f, \mathbf{y}}$. This does not increase the input size for cross-commitment aggregation where this information is necessary (for same-commitment aggregation the commitment is not necessary). This also allows to model more closely the “claims” for the cross-commitment case where each proof is for a statement $(\mathbb{C}, f, \mathbf{y})$.

Definition 4. *Given a tree T we associate to each of its internal nodes a hash label h defined so that $h(L \cdot R) := \mathbf{H}(\mathbb{C}, L, R)$. We then associate to each of the leaves in the tree a label*

$$\delta(\text{leaf}) := \prod_{i=1, \dots, t} h(x_i)^{r(x_i, \text{leaf})}$$

where the x_i -s are the internal nodes along the path from *leaf* to the root (root included and starting from the bottom), the predicate $r(x, \text{leaf})$ is 1 if *leaf* is a right child of x and 0 otherwise.

Remark 1 (Unbounded vs One-hop vs Incremental). Previous works have defined other types of aggregation. In one-hop aggregation (or batching) [4] aggregated proofs cannot be aggregated further. Incremental aggregation [6] does not have this limitation. The difference between the latter and our notion is that incremental aggregation does not require to keep track of the order in which the aggregation has been applied

(for verification or further aggregation). On the other hand, we do require to track order, but we argue that this is not an overhead in many settings. In particular, even incremental aggregators and verifiers need to know the claims related to the proofs being aggregated, albeit in no order. Adding a structure to the claims roughly adds a number of bits linear in the length of the opening for additional separators (see also examples on tree histories above).

When we consider unbounded-aggregatable LVC, we assume `KeyGen` outputs additional parameters for aggregations in `pp`. The aggregation algorithm will follow this syntax¹⁰:

$$\text{LVC.Agg}(\text{pp}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, \pi, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi') \rightarrow \pi^*$$

We subsequently modify the syntax for the verification algorithm in an (unbounded) aggregatable LVC as follows:

$$\text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}} \dots T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi^*) \rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$$

with $T_{f,\mathbf{y}}$ replacing f, \mathbf{y} .

We require the following correctness property and that function binding still holds.

Definition 5 (Unbounded Aggregation Correctness). For any $T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}$ and any π, π' :

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, \pi) = 1 \wedge \\ \text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi') = 1) \Rightarrow \\ \text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}} \dots T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi^*) = 1 \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}, \text{pp}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}) \\ (\text{C}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}) \\ \pi^* \leftarrow \text{LVC.Agg}(\text{pp}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, \pi, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi') \end{array} \right] = 1$$

Definition 6 (Unbounded Aggregation Function Binding). For any $T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}$ the following probability is negligible in λ :

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}} \dots T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi^*) = 1 \\ \wedge \nexists \mathbf{a} \text{ s.t. } f(\mathbf{a}) = \mathbf{y} \wedge f'(\mathbf{a}) = \mathbf{y}' \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}, \text{pp}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}) \\ (\text{C}, \pi^*, T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{pp}, \text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \end{array} \right]$$

Definition: Cross-Commitment Aggregation. Unbounded aggregation can be performed across different commitments as well. This property is called *Cross-commitment Aggregation* and makes sense when we have a set of commitments C'_1, \dots, C'_t that we want to open at one or more maps f , as it allows to compute a succinct proof of opening for linear-maps from different vectors committed separately. Below we show our syntax which directly expands on our same-commitment aggregation described above. Function binding and correctness are also straightforward to expand. We let $T_{f,\mathbf{y}}$ include our commitments in the leaves (see also next section).

Cross-commitment aggregation:

$$\text{LVC.CrossAgg}(\text{pp}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, \pi, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi') \rightarrow \pi^*$$

Cross-commitment verification:

$$\text{LVC.CrossVfy}(\text{vrk}, (C'_j)_j, T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, \pi^*) \rightarrow 0/1$$

4.2 Unbounded Aggregation for LVC

We now describe unbounded aggregation algorithms for *any* LVC scheme that satisfies the homomorphic properties of Section 3.1.

$\text{LVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}) \rightarrow (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}, \text{pp}, \{\text{upk}_j\}_{j=1}^m)$: Additionally generate the description of a hash function $H(\cdot)$ and set it as `pp`.

¹⁰ The algorithms can be generalized for more proofs. Proof size remains the same, also for cross-commitment aggregation.

- LVC.Agg(pp, $T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, \pi, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi'$) $\rightarrow \pi^*$:
- Compute $\gamma = \text{H}(\mathbf{C}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'})$
 - Output $\pi^* = \pi + \gamma\pi'$
- LVC.Vf(vrk, $\mathbf{C}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}} \therefore T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi^*$) $\rightarrow b$
- Return $b \leftarrow \text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, f^*, y^*, \pi^*)$ where:
- let $\text{leaf}_1, \dots, \text{leaf}_\ell$ be all the leaves in $T_{f,\mathbf{y}} \therefore T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}$.
 - recall each leaf_i is of the form $(\mathbf{C}, f_i, \mathbf{y}_i)$
 - For each i let $\delta_i := \delta(\text{leaf}_i)$ be the value defined as in Definition 4.

$$f^* := \sum_i \delta_i f_i \quad y^* := \sum_i \delta_i \mathbf{y}_i$$

Theorem 1. *When applied to a function binding LVC scheme with homomorphic proofs, (LVC.Agg, LVC.Vf) satisfies Unbounded Aggregation Correctness (as in Def. 5) and Function Binding (Def. 6) in the ROM.*

Proof. Correctness follows by inspection, using the fact that the LVC satisfies homomorphic proof, so we omit it.

For function binding, let $(\mathbf{C}, \pi^*, T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'})$ be an output of \mathcal{A} such that $\text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, T_{f,\mathbf{y}} \therefore T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi^*) = 1$. By construction this implies $\text{IP.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, \sum_i \delta_i f_i, \sum_i \delta_i \mathbf{y}_i, \pi^*) = 1$. Because IP is function binding, except with negligible probability, there exists a vector \mathbf{a} such that $f(\mathbf{a}) = \mathbf{y}$, for $\mathbf{y} = \sum_i \delta_i \mathbf{y}_i$, $f(\mathbf{X}) = \sum_i \delta_i f_i(\mathbf{X})$ then there exists \mathbf{a} such that $\sum_{i=1}^t \delta_i f_i(\mathbf{a}) = \sum_{i=1}^t \delta_i \mathbf{y}_i$.

Since H is a random oracle, the coefficients δ_i do not depend on \mathbf{y}_i, f_i . And by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, except with probability r/\mathbb{F} , $f_i(\mathbf{a}) = \mathbf{y}_i$ for all i , which concludes the proof. \square

Cross-Commitment Aggregation for LVC. For the case of cross-commitment aggregation, we proceed similarly but we also need to homomorphically operate on the commitments (recall that hashing on trees implicitly hashes the commitments too since we include them there).

LVC.CrossAgg(pp, $T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, \pi, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi'$) $\rightarrow \pi^*$:

- Compute $\gamma = \text{H}(T_{f,\mathbf{y}}, T_{f',\mathbf{y}'})$
- Output $\pi^* = \pi + \gamma\pi'$

LVC.CrossVfy(vrk, $(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{C}', T_{f,\mathbf{y}} \therefore T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}, \pi^*) \rightarrow b$

- let $\text{leaf}_1, \dots, \text{leaf}_\ell$ be all the leaves in $T_{f,\mathbf{y}} \therefore T_{f',\mathbf{y}'}$. We add to each leaf leaf_i and additional subindex j that refers to which commitment the proof in leaf_{ij} corresponds to. Note that we still consider ℓ leaves.
- each leaf_{ij} is of the form $(\mathbf{C}_j, f_i, \mathbf{y}_i)$
- For each i let $\delta_{ij} := \delta(\text{leaf}_{ij})$ be the value defined as in Definition 4.
- Compute

$$f_j^* := \sum_i \delta_{ij} f_i \quad y_j^* := \sum_i \delta_{ij} \mathbf{y}_i$$

- Return 1 iff $b_j = 1$ for all $b_j \leftarrow \text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}_j, f_j^*, y_j^*, \pi^*)$.

Efficiency. For our constructions, the verification equations for computing $b_i = \text{IP.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}^*, f^*, y^*, \pi^*)$ are two pairing equations where the elements in the right side can be aggregated, and thus the verifier performs only $\ell + 1$ pairings.

Security. The security of this augmented construction follows analogously to that for same-commitment aggregation, with the additional requirement for the LVC scheme to have homomorphic commitments and openings.

4.3 From Inner-Products to Arbitrary Linear-Maps

In this section we show we can obtain LVC schemes for any family of functions $\mathcal{F} \subset \{f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n\}$ starting from simpler constructions that have homomorphic proofs and openings.

Our starting point are LVC schemes for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}} = \{f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}\}$, or inner-product VC schemes, that we will denote as $\text{IP} = (\text{IP.KeyGen}, \text{IP.Commit}, \text{IP.Open}, \text{IP.Vf})$. All this algorithms work as the ones for LVC, except that instead of $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}_{m,p}}$, they use the vector $\mathbf{f} \in \mathbb{F}_p^m$ so that $f(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{f} \cdot \mathbf{v}$.

We can write the linear-map $f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$ as $f = (f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n)$, where each f_i is an inner product function. If the IP scheme has homomorphic proofs, and we set π_i to be the proof that $f_i(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{f}_i \cdot \mathbf{v} = y_i$, an aggregation of $\{\pi_i\}_{i=1}^n$ is a proof of the statement $f(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{y}$. Later, in the following section, we show two possible constructions of IP vector commitments schemes that can be used to instantiate the framework in this section.

An IP aggregation algorithm for one-hop aggregation¹¹ of proofs works as follows:

IP.Agg($\text{pp}, \{\mathbf{f}_i, y_i\}_{i=1}^n, \pi = (\pi_i)_{i=1}^n$) $\rightarrow \pi'$:
 Parse $\text{pp} = \text{H}$, where H is a hash function, compute $\gamma = \text{H}(\text{C}, \{\mathbf{f}_i, y_i\}_{i=1}^n)$
 Output $\pi' = \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma^{i-1} \pi_i$
IP.VfAgg($\text{vrk}, \text{C}, \{\mathbf{f}_i, y_i\}_{i=1}^n, \pi'$) $\rightarrow b$:
 Compute $\gamma = \text{H}(\text{C}, \{\mathbf{f}_i, y_i\}_{i=1}^n)$, $\mathbf{f}' = \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma^{i-1} \mathbf{f}_i$, $y' = \sum_{i=1}^n \gamma^{i-1} y_i$
 Output $b \leftarrow \text{IP.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}, \mathbf{f}', y', \pi')$.

Using **IP.Agg**, we present an alternative way of computing concise proofs of LVC for more general functions $f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$, based on aggregation.

LVC.KeyGen($1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}$) $\rightarrow (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}, \text{pp})$:

1. Run $(\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{IP.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}})$
2. Generate aggregation parameters $\text{pp} = \text{H}$ (a hash function).
3. Output $(\text{prk}, \text{vrk}, \text{pp})$.

LVC.Commit(prk, \mathbf{v}) $\rightarrow (\text{C}, \text{aux})$:

1. Run $(\text{C}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{IP.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v})$
2. Output (C, aux)

LVC.Open($\text{prk}, \text{pp}, \text{aux}, f, \mathbf{y}$) $\rightarrow \pi$:

1. Parse $f = (f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n)$ and $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$. Consider \mathbf{f}_i as the vector representing inner-product function f_i .
2. Run $\pi_i \leftarrow \text{IP.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}, \mathbf{f}_i, y_i)$ for $i \in [n]$
3. Output $\pi \leftarrow \text{IP.Agg}(\text{pp}, \{\pi_i\}_{i=1}^n)$

LVC.VfAgg($\text{vrk}, \text{pp}, \text{C}, f, \mathbf{y}, \pi$) $\rightarrow b$:

1. Parse $f = (f_1, f_2, \dots, f_n)$ and $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$. Consider \mathbf{f}_i as the vector representing inner-product function f_i .
2. Output $b \leftarrow \text{IP.VfAgg}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}, \{\mathbf{f}_i, y_i\}_{i=1}^n, \pi)$

4.4 Updability for LVC

We consider updatability as an extra property of the LVC scheme. The KeyGen algorithm additionally computes the update keys, while two extra algorithms are defined as follows:

LVC.UpdCom($\text{upk}, \text{C}, j, \delta$) $\rightarrow \text{C}'$: takes as input C, a position $j \in [m]$, update key upk , and a constant $\delta \in \mathcal{M}$.

It outputs C' as a commitment for $\mathbf{v}' = \mathbf{v} + \delta \mathbf{e}_j$ ¹².

LVC.UpdOpen($\text{upk}, j, \delta, f, \mathbf{y}, \pi$) $\rightarrow \pi'$: Takes as input upk , j , δ , a function f , a valid opening pair (\mathbf{y}, π) for f and outputs a proof π' for the new opening $\mathbf{y}' = f(\mathbf{v} + \delta \mathbf{e}_j)$.

Update correctness. Let $(\text{prk}, \text{vrk}, \text{upk}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F})$, and let $(\text{C}, j, f, \mathbf{y}, \pi)$ be a tuple such that $\text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}, f, \mathbf{y}, \pi) = 1$. Then LVC satisfies update correctness if for any $\delta \in \mathcal{M}$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{LVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}', f, \mathbf{y}', \pi') = 1 \\ \wedge \mathbf{y}' = \mathbf{y} + \delta f(\mathbf{e}_j) \end{array} \mid \begin{array}{l} \text{C}' \leftarrow \text{LVC.UpdCom}(\text{upk}_j, \text{C}, j, \delta) \\ \pi' \leftarrow \text{LVC.UpdOpen}(\text{upk}_j, j, \delta, f, \mathbf{y}, \pi) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

¹¹ Naturally, this can be seen as a particular case of unbounded aggregation.

¹² This notion can be generalized to more than one position.

Updates for IP. We present a generic construction of the updatability algorithms for inner-product schemes. We state that even though algorithms can be generalized to LVC for arbitrary functions, for ease of exposition we only present it for inner-product openings, rather than generic linear-maps.

It is easy to see that commitments can be updated when one value of the vector changes by simply applying the linear-homomorphic property of the underlying IP scheme. Given C such that $(C, \mathbf{aux}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v})$, when position t of the vector changes, i.e. $\mathbf{v}' = \mathbf{v} + \delta \mathbf{e}_t$ we can compute a commitment to the new vector \mathbf{v}' as $C' = (C + \hat{C})$ where $(\hat{C}, \mathbf{aux}) \leftarrow \text{LVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{e}_t)$ is given as an update key.

Moreover, it is possible to update existing proofs using the homomorphic openings property of the IP scheme: when position t of the vector changes as above, to update a prior proof we simply add to π a proof $\hat{\pi}$ corresponding to the opening of $f(\delta \mathbf{e}_t)$. The resulting $\pi' = \pi + \hat{\pi}$ corresponds to the opening of the sum $f(\mathbf{v}') = f(\mathbf{v}) + \delta f(\mathbf{e}_t)$ with respect to the updated commitment $C' = C + \hat{C}$.

We extend IP arguments to satisfy updatability by asking the IP.KeyGen algorithm to additionally generate updatable keys and introduce IP.UpdCom and IP.UpdOpen that work the following way;

IP.KeyGen($1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}}$) \rightarrow (prk, vrk, $\{\text{upk}_j\}_{j=1}^m$):

1. Additionally generate public update keys upk:
2. Set $\pi_{u_{ij}} \leftarrow \text{IP.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}_j, \mathbf{e}_i, u_{ij} = \mathbf{e}_i \cdot \mathbf{e}_j)$, $\forall i, j \in [m]$
3. Define $\text{upk}_j = \{\pi_{u_{ij}}\}_{i=1}^m$ for all $j \in [m]$
4. Output (prk, vrk, $\{\text{upk}_i\}_{i=1}^m$).

IP.UpdCom(prk, C, t, δ) \rightarrow C' :

1. Set $\hat{C} \leftarrow \text{IP.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{e}_t)$.
2. Output $C' = C + \delta \hat{C}$.

IP.UpdOpen($\text{upk}_t, t, \delta, C, \mathbf{f}, y, \pi$) \rightarrow π' :

1. Parse $\text{upk}_t = \{\pi_{u_{it}}\}_{i=1}^m$
2. Compute $\hat{\pi} = \sum_{i=1}^m f_i \pi_{u_{it}}$
3. Set $\pi' = \pi + \delta \hat{\pi}$ as proof for $y' = y + \mathbf{f} \cdot \delta \mathbf{e}_t$
4. Output π' .

Theorem 2. *If IP satisfies function binding and has homomorphic commitments and openings, the extension above satisfies update correctness.*

Proof. The proof follows directly by the definition of homomorphic proof and IP.UpdCom, IP.UpdOpen.

5 Constructions for Inner-Pairing VC

In this section, we present two constructions of LVC for inner products, that is, for functions $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}} = \{f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}\}$. We denote as IP = (IP.KeyGen, IP.Commit, IP.Open, IP.Vf) a vector commitment scheme with inner product openings. All the algorithms work as the ones for LVC, except that they take as inputs the vector of coefficients of the linear function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}}$, $f(\mathbf{v}) = \mathbf{f} \cdot \mathbf{v}$, i.e. use the vector $\mathbf{f} \in \mathbb{F}_p^m$.

The first one is in the monomial basis and the other based on the univariate sumcheck of [2, 26] that considers vectors encoded as polynomials in the Lagrange basis. We prove they are indeed linear vector commitment arguments with homomorphic proofs and openings. Therefore, they can be used as a starting point to obtain further aggregation properties as shown in Section 4.1 and, in particular, lead to two different more generic linear-map vector commitment schemes.

5.1 Monomial Basis

For the first scheme, we consider vectors $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ encoded as a polynomial in the monomial basis, that is as $a(X) = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1}$.

IP.KeyGen($1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}}$) \rightarrow (prk, vrk):

Generate group description $\mathbf{gk} = (p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(p)$

Sample $\tau \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$

Output $\text{prk} = (\{[\tau^i]_{1,2}\}_{i=0}^{m-1})$, $\text{vrk} = ([\tau^{m-1}]_1, \{[\tau^i]_2\}_{i=0}^m)$.

IP.Commit(prk, \mathbf{a}) \rightarrow (\mathbf{C}_a , aux): Compute $\mathbf{C}_a = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i [\tau^{i-1}]_1$ and output (\mathbf{C}_a , \mathbf{a}).

IP.Open(prk, aux, \mathbf{b} , y) \rightarrow π :

Find $R(X), H(X)$ such that $\deg(R) < m - 1$ and

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i X^{m-i} \right) - y X^{m-1} = R(X) + X^m H(X).$$

Define $\hat{R}(X) = XR(X)$

Output $\pi = ([R(\tau)]_1, [H(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}(\tau)]_1)$.

IP.Vf(vrk, \mathbf{C}_a , \mathbf{b} , y , π) \rightarrow 0/1: Compute $\mathbf{C}_b = \sum_{i=1}^m b_i [\tau^{m-i}]_1$, parse $\pi = ([R]_1, [H]_1, [\hat{R}]_1)$ and output 1 if and only if

$$e(\mathbf{C}_a, \mathbf{C}_b) - e(y[\tau^{m-1}]_1, [1]_2) = e([R]_1, [1]_2) + e([H]_1, [\tau^m]_2) \text{ and}$$

$$e([R]_1, [\tau]_2) = e([\hat{R}]_1, [1]_2).$$

Remark 2. The second verification equation is meant to ensure that $[R]_1$ is the evaluation at τ of a polynomial of degree at most $m - 2$. Note that it is important for security that only $m - 1$ powers of τ are available to the adversary in \mathbb{G}_1 , otherwise the second equation does not guarantee that the degree is at most $m - 2$. Importantly, even though we present our construction using a srs with powers of τ up to $m - 1$ in \mathbb{G}_1 and m in \mathbb{G}_2 , it can easily be adapted for a bigger srs and, in particular, existing trusted setups where the same powers of τ are available in both groups are enough. For the second check, if $m + k$ powers of τ are given in \mathbb{G}_1 , $\hat{R}(X)$ should be defined as $X^{k+2}R(X)$.

We implement this construction for single positions and compare it with individual position openings in Merkle tree-based vector commitments in Appendix 7.1.

Theorem 3. *The construction above satisfies Completeness, Homomorphic Proofs and Homomorphic Openings.*

Proof. Completeness follows from simple inspection.

Homomorphic Proofs. Let $y_b = \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b}$, $y_c = \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{c}$, $\pi_b \leftarrow \text{IP.Prove}(\text{srs}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, y_b)$ and $\pi_c \leftarrow \text{IP.Prove}(\text{srs}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}, y_c)$, where $\pi_b = ([R_b(\tau)]_1, [H_b(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}_b(\tau)]_1)$, $\pi_c = ([R_c(\tau)]_1, [H_c(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}_c(\tau)]_1)$ are such that

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i X^{m-i} \right) - y_b X^{m-1} = R_b(X) + X^m H_b(X),$$

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i X^{m-i} \right) - y_c X^{m-1} = R_c(X) + X^m H_c(X),$$

$$\text{and } \hat{R}_b(X) = XR_b(X), \hat{R}_c(X) = XR_c(X).$$

In order to compute a proof that $\mathbf{a} \cdot (\alpha \mathbf{b} + \beta \mathbf{c}) = \alpha y_b + \beta y_c$, the prover proceeds as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\alpha \sum_{i=1}^m b_i X^{m-i} + \beta \sum_{i=1}^m c_i X^{m-i} \right) = \\ & = \alpha \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i X^{m-i} \right) + \beta \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i X^{m-i} \right) \\ & = \alpha (y_b X^{m-1} + R_b(X) + X^m H_b(X)) + \beta (y_c X^{m-1} + R_c(X) + X^m H_c(X)) \\ & = (\alpha y_b + \beta y_c) X^{m-1} + (\alpha R_b(X) + \beta R_c(X)) + X^m (\alpha H_b(X) + \beta H_c(X)), \end{aligned}$$

and therefore for $y = \alpha y_b + \beta y_c$ it outputs $\pi = ([R(\tau)]_1, [H(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}(\tau)]_1)$ where $R(X) = \alpha R_b(X) + \beta R_c(X)$, $H(X) = \alpha H_b(X) + \beta H_c(X)$ and $\hat{R}(X) = XR(X) = \alpha XR_b(X) + \beta XR_c(X) = \alpha \hat{R}_b(X) + \beta \hat{R}_c(X)$, i.e., $\pi = \alpha \pi_b + \beta \pi_c$.

Homomorphic Openings. The proof for homomorphic openings work analogous as the previous case. Indeed, for $y_a = \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{c}$, $y_b = \mathbf{b} \cdot \mathbf{c}$ and $\pi_a \leftarrow \text{IP.Prove}(\text{srs}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, y_a)$, $\pi_c \leftarrow \text{IP.Prove}(\text{srs}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{b}, y_c)$, $\pi_a = ([R_a(\tau)]_1, [H_a(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}_a(\tau)]_1)$, $\pi_c = ([R_c(\tau)]_1, [H_c(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}_c(\tau)]_1)$, it is enough to see that:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\alpha \sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} + \beta \sum_{i=1}^m c_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i X^{m-i} \right) \\ &= \alpha (y_a X^{m-1} + R_a(X) + X^m H_a(X)) + \beta (y_c X^{m-1} + R_c(X) + X^m H_c(X)) \\ &= (\alpha y_a + \beta y_c) X^{m-1} + (\alpha R_a(X) + \beta R_c(X)) + X^m (\alpha H_a(X) + \beta H_c(X)), \end{aligned}$$

and the rest of the proof is the same as the one for homomorphic openings. \square

Theorem 4. *The construction above satisfies Strong Function Binding in the AGM under the $(m-1, m)$ -BSDH Assumption.*

Proof. Consider an adversary \mathcal{A} that given $(\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{IP.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F})$ is able to generate a commitment and K proofs $(\mathbf{C}_a, \{\mathbf{b}_k, y_k, \pi_{b_k}\}_{k \in [K]}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{prk}, \text{vrk})$ such that $\forall k \in [K] : \text{IP.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}_a, \mathbf{b}_k, y_k, \pi_{b_k}) = 1$ and there is no $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ s. t. $\forall k \in [K] : \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b}_k = y_k$. Without loss of generality, we can consider $K = 2$: adversary \mathcal{A} outputs $((\mathbf{b}, y_b, \pi_b), (\mathbf{c}, y_c, \pi_c)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{prk}, \text{vrk})$.

For commitment \mathbf{C}_a and proofs $\pi_b = ([R_b]_1, [H_b]_1, [\hat{R}_b]_1)$ and $\pi_c = ([R_c]_1, [H_c]_1, [\hat{R}_c]_1)$ we have that in the AGM there exists polynomials $a(X), H_b(X), R_b(X), \hat{R}_b(X)$ and $H_c(X), R_c(X), \hat{R}_c(X)$ of degree up to $m-1$ such that $\mathbf{C}_a = [a(\tau)]_1$, $[R_b]_1 = [R_b(\tau)]_1$, $[H_b]_1 = [H_b(\tau)]_1$, $[\hat{R}_b]_1 = [\hat{R}_b(\tau)]_1$ and $[R_c]_1 = [R_c(\tau)]_1$, $[H_c]_1 = [H_c(\tau)]_1$, $[\hat{R}_c]_1 = [\hat{R}_c(\tau)]_1$.

The second verification equation in our IP scheme assures that, except in the case where τ is a root for the polynomial $R(X)X - \hat{R}(X)$ which happens with probability $m/|\mathbb{F}|$, $R(X)X = \hat{R}(X)$. We can then assume the latter is the case and since $\deg(\hat{R}_b), \deg(\hat{R}_c) \leq m-1$, we have $\deg(R_b), \deg(R_c) \leq m-2$.

Note also that as $\deg(a) \leq m-1$, there exists a vector $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ such that $a(X) = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1}$. Then, from the first verification equation in both of the proofs π_b and π_c we have that the following two polynomials have a common root in τ :

$$P_b(X) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i X^{m-i} \right) - y_b X^{m-1} - R_b(X) + X^m H_b(X).$$

$$P_c(X) = \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i X^{m-i} \right) - y_c X^{m-1} - R_c(X) + X^m H_c(X).$$

We first argue that at least one of the polynomials $P_b(X)$ or $P_c(X)$ is not the zero polynomial. Let us suppose both $P_b(X)$ and $P_c(X)$ are zero polynomials. Because $\deg(R_b), \deg(R_c) < m-1$ and $\deg(X^m H_b(X)), \deg(X^m H_c(X)) > m-1$, we have that the coefficient for X^{m-1} in polynomial $P_b(X)$ is $\sum_{i=1}^m a_i b_i - y_b = 0$. Same holds for the coefficient of X^{m-1} in polynomial $P_c(X)$: $\sum_{i=1}^m a_i c_i - y_c = 0$. This means that there exists a vector \mathbf{a} such that $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b} = y_b \wedge \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{c} = y_c$, contradicting the initial assumption that the adversary \mathcal{A} breaks the strong functional binding.

Consider now that the non-zero polynomial is $P_b(X)$. Then, since τ is one of the roots of this polynomial, we can solve the discrete logarithm problem and extract τ from the exponent of $[P_b(\tau)]_1$.

To extend the proof to the case where we give $m+k$ powers of τ in \mathbb{G}_1 in the prk : We will have a degree check that insures that polynomials $R(X)$ are still of maximum degree $m-2$ and instead of extracting a vector $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$, we get $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^{m+k+1}$ and thus $a(X) = \sum_{i=1}^{m+k+1} a_i X^{i-1}$. Still, the coefficient for the power X^{m-1} is $\tilde{\mathbf{a}} \cdot \mathbf{b}$, for $\tilde{\mathbf{a}} = (a_i)_{i=1}^m$, so the proof follows in the same way. \square

Updates Without Keys. In the case of our first construction in 5.1, we remark that we do not need any additional update keys added to the setup. Indeed, the update key is made by proofs of inner products between cannonic vectors $\mathbf{e}_i \cdot \mathbf{e}_i = 1$ or $\mathbf{e}_i \cdot \mathbf{e}_j = 0$. In our construction for encodings in the monomial basis, a proof that $\mathbf{e}_i \cdot \mathbf{e}_i = 1$ consists on $R(X) = H(X) = 0$. On the other hand, to prove that $\mathbf{e}_i \cdot \mathbf{e}_j = 0$ for $i \neq j$ the proof is (the evaluation in the group of) either $R(X) = X^{m+i-j}$ if $j > i$, or $H(X) = X^{i-j}$ if $i > j$. As such powers of τ are already included in prk , $\text{upk} = \emptyset$.

5.2 Lagrange Basis

In this second scheme, for a Lagrange basis $\{\lambda_i(X)\}_{i=1}^m$ over a multiplicative group $\mathbb{H} = \{\mathbf{h}_1, \dots, \mathbf{h}_m\}$ of size m in \mathbb{F} we encode a vector $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ as a polynomial $a(X) = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X)$.

The construction uses few properties of Lagrange basis over multiplicative groups that we would like to remind before formally presenting our scheme. When \mathbb{H} is a multiplicative subgroup, $\lambda_i(0) = m^{-1}$ for all $i \in [m]$. Moreover, if $\mathbb{H} = \{\mathbf{h}_i\}_{i=1}^m$ consists oof the roots of unity of order m , then $\lambda_i(\mathbf{h}_i) = 1$ and $\lambda_i(\mathbf{h}_j) = 0$ for $i \neq j$ and for the vanishing polynomial $t(X) = \prod_{i=1}^m (X - \mathbf{h}_i)$ we have that

$$\lambda_i(X)\lambda_j(X) \equiv 0 \pmod{t(X)}, \quad \lambda_i(X)^2 \equiv \lambda_i(X) \pmod{t(X)}.$$

The construction below, presented in [26], exploits these properties in the proof of openings for inner-products:

IP.KeyGen($1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}_{\mathbb{P}_m}$) \rightarrow (prk, vrk):

Generate group description $\mathbf{gk} = (p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(p)$

Define multiplicative group $\mathbb{H} = \{\mathbf{h}_1, \dots, \mathbf{h}_m\}$ in \mathbb{F}

Compute Lagrange polynomials $\{\lambda_j(X)\}_{j=1}^m$ over \mathbb{H} .

Sample $\tau \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$

Output $\text{prk} = (\{[\tau^i]_{1,2}\}_{i=1}^m, \{[\lambda_i(\tau)]_1\}_{i=1}^m, [\tau^m]_2)$ and $\text{vrk} = ([1]_{1,2}, \{[\tau^i]_2, [\lambda_i(\tau)]_2\}_{i=1}^m)$.

IP.Commit(prk, \mathbf{a}) \rightarrow (\mathbf{C}_a, aux): Compute $\mathbf{C}_a = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i [\lambda_i(\tau)]_1$ and output $(\mathbf{C}_a, \mathbf{a})$.

IP.Open($\text{prk}, \text{aux}, \mathbf{b}, y$) \rightarrow π :

Find $R(X), H(X)$ such that $\deg(R) < m - 1$ and

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i \lambda_i(X) \right) - m^{-1}y = XR(X) + t(X)H(X)$$

Define $\hat{R}(X) = XR(X)$ and output $\pi = ([R(\tau)]_1, [H(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}(\tau)]_1)$.

IP.Vf($\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}_a, \mathbf{b}, y, \pi$) \rightarrow 0/1 : Calculate $\mathbf{C}_b = \sum_{i=1}^m b_i [\lambda_i(\tau)]_2$

Parse $\pi = ([R]_1, [H]_1, [\hat{R}]_1)$ and output 1 if and only if

$$e(\mathbf{C}_a, \mathbf{C}_b) - e(m^{-1}y[1]_1, [1]_2) = e([R]_1, [1]_2) + e([H]_1, [t(\tau)]_2), \text{ and}$$

$$e([R]_1, [\tau]_2) = e([\hat{R}]_1, [1]_2).$$

We omit the proof of completeness as it can be found in [26]. Still, since there it is presented as an NIZK argument for inner-product relations as opposite to LVC scheme as considered in this paper, we prove Strong Function Binding and homomorphic proofs and openings below.

Theorem 5. *The construction above has Homomorphic Proofs and Openings.*

Proof. Completeness follows from simple inspection.

Homomorphic Proofs. Let $y_b = \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b}$, $y_c = \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{c}$, $\pi_b \leftarrow \text{IP.Prove}(\text{srs}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, y_b)$ and $\pi_c \leftarrow \text{IP.Prove}(\text{srs}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{c}, y_c)$, where $\pi_b = ([R_b(\tau)]_1, [H_b(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}_b(\tau)]_1)$, $\pi_c = ([R_c(\tau)]_1, [H_c(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}_c(\tau)]_1)$ are such that

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i \lambda_i(X) \right) - m^{-1}y_b = XR_b(X) + t(X)H_b(X),$$

$$\left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i \lambda_i(X) \right) - m^{-1} y_c = X R_c(X) + t(X) H_c(X),$$

$$\text{and } \hat{R}_b(X) = X R_b(X), \hat{R}_c(X) = X R_c(X).$$

In order to compute a proof that $\mathbf{a} \cdot (\alpha \mathbf{b} + \beta \mathbf{c}) = \alpha y_b + \beta y_c$, the prover proceeds as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\alpha \sum_{i=1}^m b_i \lambda_i(X) + \beta \sum_{i=1}^m c_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \\ &= \alpha \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i \lambda_i(X) \right) + \beta \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \\ &= \alpha (m^{-1} y_b + X R_b(X) + t(X) H_b(X)) + \beta (m^{-1} y_c + X R_c(X) + t(X) H_c(X)) \\ &= m^{-1} (\alpha y_b + \beta y_c) + X (\alpha R_b(X) + \beta R_c(X)) + t(X) (\alpha H_b(X) + \beta H_c(X)), \end{aligned}$$

and therefore for $y = \alpha y_b + \beta y_c$ it outputs $\pi = ([R(\tau)]_1, [H(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}(\tau)]_1)$ where $R(X) = \alpha R_b(X) + \beta R_c(X)$, $H(X) = \alpha H_b(X) + \beta H_c(X)$ and $\hat{R}(X) = X R(X) = \alpha X R_b(X) + \beta X R_c(X) = \alpha \hat{R}_b(X) + \beta \hat{R}_c(X)$, i.e., $\pi = \alpha \pi_b + \beta \pi_c$.

Homomorphic Openings. The proof for homomorphic openings work analogous as the previous case. Indeed, for $y_a = \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{c}$, $y_b = \mathbf{b} \cdot \mathbf{c}$ and $\pi_a \leftarrow \text{IP.Prove}(\text{srs}, \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, y_a)$, $\pi_c \leftarrow \text{IP.Prove}(\text{srs}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{b}, y_c)$, it is enough to see that:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(\alpha \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) + \beta \sum_{i=1}^m c_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \\ &= \alpha \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i \lambda_i(X) \right) + \beta \left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \\ &= \alpha (m^{-1} y_a + X R_a(X) + t(X) H_a(X)) + \beta (m^{-1} y_c + X R_c(X) + t(X) H_c(X)) \\ &= m^{-1} (\alpha y_a + \beta y_c) + X (\alpha R_a(X) + \beta R_c(X)) + t(X) (\alpha H_a(X) + \beta H_c(X)), \end{aligned}$$

and the rest of the proof is the same as the one for homomorphic openings. \square

Theorem 6. *The construction above satisfies Strong Function Binding in the AGM under the $(m-1, m)$ -BSDH Assumption.*

Proof. Consider an adversary \mathcal{A} that given $(\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{IP.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}_{\text{IP}})$ is able to generate a commitment and K proofs $(\mathbf{C}_a, \{\mathbf{b}_k, y_k, \pi_{b_k}\}_{k \in [K]}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{prk}, \text{vrk})$ such that $\forall k \in [K] : \text{IP.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}_a, \mathbf{b}_k, y_k, \pi_{b_k}) = 1$ and there is no $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ s. t. $\forall k \in [K] : \mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b}_k = y_k$. Without loss of generality, we can consider $K = 2$: adversary \mathcal{A} outputs $((\mathbf{b}, y_b, \pi_b), (\mathbf{c}, y_c, \pi_c)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{prk}, \text{vrk})$.

For commitment \mathbf{C}_a and proofs $\pi_b = ([R_b]_1, [H_b]_1, [\hat{R}_b]_1)$ and $\pi_c = ([R_c]_1, [H_c]_1, [\hat{R}_c]_1)$ we have that the AGM extractor outputs polynomials $a(X)$, $H_b(X)$, $R_b(X)$, $\hat{R}_b(X)$ and $H_c(X)$, $R_c(X)$, $\hat{R}_c(X)$ of degree up to $m-1$ such that $\mathbf{C}_a = [a(\tau)]_1$, $[R_b]_1 = [R_b(\tau)]_1$, $[H_b]_1 = [H_b(\tau)]_1$, $[\hat{R}_b]_1 = [\hat{R}_b(\tau)]_1$ and $[R_c]_1 = [R_c(\tau)]_1$, $[H_c]_1 = [H_c(\tau)]_1$, $[\hat{R}_c]_1 = [\hat{R}_c(\tau)]_1$.

As in the proof of Thm. 4, the second verification equation in our IP scheme assures that, except with probability $m/|\mathbb{F}|$, we have that $\deg(\hat{R}_b), \deg(\hat{R}_c) \leq m-1$, so $\deg(R_b), \deg(R_c) \leq m-2$.

Note also that as $\deg(a) \leq m-1$, there exists a vector $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ such that $a(X) = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1}$. Then, from the first verification equation in both of the proofs π_b and π_c we have that the following two polynomials have a common root in τ :

$$\begin{aligned} P_b(X) &= \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i X^{m-i} \right) - m^{-1} y_b - X R_b(X) + t(X) H_b(X). \\ P_c(X) &= \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i X^{i-1} \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i X^{m-i} \right) - m^{-1} y_c - X R_c(X) + t(X) H_c(X). \end{aligned}$$

We first argue that at least one of the polynomials $P_b(X)$ or $P_c(X)$ is not the zero polynomial. Let us suppose both $P_b(X)$ and $P_c(X)$ are zero polynomials. Because $\deg(R_b), \deg(R_c) < m - 1$ and

$$\begin{aligned} \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i \lambda_i(X) \right) &\equiv \sum_{i=1}^m a_i b_i \lambda_i(X) \pmod{t(X)}, \\ \left(\sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) \right) \left(\sum_{i=1}^m c_i \lambda_i(X) \right) &\equiv \sum_{i=1}^m a_i c_i \lambda_i(X) \pmod{t(X)}, \end{aligned}$$

$\sum_{i=1}^m a_i b_i \lambda_i(X) - m^{-1} y_b = X R_b(X)$, which implies $\sum_{i=1}^m a_i b_i \lambda_i(0) - m^{-1} y_b = 0$. Same reasoning leads to $\sum_{i=1}^m a_i c_i \lambda_i(0) - m^{-1} y_c = 0$. As \mathbb{H} is a multiplicative subgroup, $\lambda_i(0) = m^{-1}$ for all $i \in [m]$ and thus $\sum_{i=1}^m a_i b_i = y_b$ and $\sum_{i=1}^m a_i c_i = y_c$. Namely, there exists \mathbf{a} such that $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b} = y_b$ and $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{c} = y_c$ contradicting the initial claim that adversary \mathcal{A} is successful.

Consider now that the non-zero polynomial is $P_b(X)$. Then, since τ is one of the roots of this polynomial, we can solve the discrete logarithm problem and extract τ from the exponent of $[P_b(\tau)]_1$.

To extend the proof to the case where we give $m+k$ powers of τ in \mathbb{G}_1 in the **prk**: we can extract a vector $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^{m+k+1}$ and set $a(X) = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(X) + X^m a'(X)$ for $\deg(a') = k$. Then, $(\sum_{i=1}^m b_i \lambda_i(X)) X^m a'(X)$, if not zero, is contained in $H(X)$. Indeed, as its degree is $2m+k+1$ even when taking modulus $t(X)$, it cannot be contained in $R(X)$. Then, even when $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{F}^m$, the inner product is proven as $\tilde{\mathbf{a}} \cdot \mathbf{b}$ for $\tilde{\mathbf{a}} = (a_i)_{i=1}^m$. \square

Updatability with Short Keys In this construction, a proof that $\mathbf{e}_i \cdot \mathbf{e}_i = 1$ is the encoding in a group of the polynomial $R_i(\tau)$, for $R_i(X) = (\lambda_i(X) - 1)/X$. On the other hand, the proof that $\mathbf{e}_i \cdot \mathbf{e}_j = 0$ for $i \neq j$ is $[H(\tau)]_1$, for $H(X) = ((\lambda_i(X)\lambda_j(X))/t(X))$. Including the evaluation of all these polynomials in **upk** would require a **srs** of quadratic size. Still, as noted in [29],

$$\frac{\lambda_i(X)\lambda_j(X)}{t(X)} = \frac{t(X)}{(X - \mathbf{h}_i)(X - \mathbf{h}_j)},$$

and can be computed as

$$\frac{1}{\mathbf{h}_i - \mathbf{h}_j} \left(\frac{t(X)}{X - \mathbf{h}_i} + \frac{t(X)}{X - \mathbf{h}_j} \right).$$

Therefore, it is enough to include in **upk** the evaluations of $(\lambda_i(X) - 1)/X$ for the proofs of same position and then the evaluations of $\{t(X)/(X - \mathbf{h}_i)\}_{i=1}^m$, so the verifier can reconstruct the one of $\lambda_i(X)\lambda_j(X)/t(X)$ from there, requiring only $2m$ elements instead of m^2 .

6 Subvector Openings

In this section, we present schemes for VC with Subvector Openings (SVC), starting from the constructions of Section 5. Instead of using Def. 8, we will consider SVC as a special case of LVC. The class of functions that open a set of positions $I = \{i_1, \dots, i_n\}$ of a committed vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ is given by the linear-map f_I with

$$f_I : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n, \quad f_I(\mathbf{v}) = (\mathbf{e}_{i_1} \cdot \mathbf{v}, \dots, \mathbf{e}_{i_n} \cdot \mathbf{v})$$

where for each $k \in [n]$, \mathbf{e}_{i_k} is the i_k th vector of the canonical basis \mathbb{F}^m .

Naturally, for a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^m$, we can construct proofs of openings of subvectors $\mathbf{v}_I = (v_i)_{i \in I}$ by aggregating different inner product proofs for vectors \mathbf{e}_{i_k} for $i_k \in I$ using the techniques in Section 4.1. We refer to these aggregated proofs as *non-native* subvector openings, given that they require a random oracle and in particular, are no longer algebraic and homomorphic. As opposed to them, we call *native* subvector opening, a scheme that is algebraic and homomorphic.

In what follows, we improve on Subvector Openings in some special scenarios, achieving native aggregation for new schemes and reducing the verifier complexity in existing ones.

6.1 Special Subset Native Openings for the Monomial Basis

For the construction of Section 5.1, we introduce native subvector openings for subsets with consecutive position $I = \{i, i+1, \dots, i+k\}$. That is, for $\tilde{\mathbf{c}} = (c_i)_{i \in I}$ such that there exist $\mathbf{u}_1, \mathbf{u}_2$ with $\mathbf{c} = (\mathbf{u}_1, \tilde{\mathbf{c}}, \mathbf{u}_2)$. To prove an opening of $\tilde{\mathbf{c}}$, we only need commitments to $R(X) = \sum_{s=1}^{i-1} c_i X^{m-i+s-1}$ and $H(X) = \sum_{i=i+k+1}^m c_{m-i+s+1} X^{s-1}$, which are shifted-encodings of $\mathbf{u}_1, \mathbf{u}_2$. The verifier checks that $\deg(R) < m-1$, computes $\tilde{C}(X) = \sum_{s=i}^{i+k} \tilde{c}_s X^{s-i}$ and $\tilde{C} = [\tilde{C}(\tau)]_1$ and checks whether $e(\mathbf{C} - \tilde{\mathbf{C}}, [\tau^{m-i}]_1) = e([\mathbf{R}]_1, [1]_2) + e([\mathbf{H}]_1, [\tau^{m+k}]_2)$.

Note that, given individual proofs of openings as in Section 5.1, that is, $[R_s(\tau)]_1, [H_s(\tau)]_1$ such that $C(X)X^{m-s} - c_s X^{m-1} = R_s(X) + X^m H_s(X)$ and $\deg(R_s) < m-1$, for the commitments defined above we have $[R]_1 = [R_i(\tau)]_1$ and $[H]_1 = [H_{i+k}(\tau)]_1$, that is, proofs can be aggregated at no cost for the prover.

We implement this scheme and compare it with opening consecutive positions, or ranges, using Merkle trees in Section 7.2.

6.2 Any Subset Non-native Openings for the Monomial Basis

For the LVC scheme of Section 5.1, the techniques of Section 4.1 allow us to redefine the `Open` and `Vf` algorithms to work for an arbitrary subset of positions $I \subset [m]$. More specifically, the prover will simply run `IP.Open(prk, aux, eik, v)` for $k = 1, \dots, n$ to obtain (v_{i_k}, π_{i_k}) and π_{i_k} a proof of correct computation of v_{i_k} . Then, use the random oracle to sample a randomness $\gamma \in \mathbb{F}$ and output $\pi_I = \sum_{k=1}^n \gamma^{k-1} \pi_{i_k}$.

The verifier will receive $\pi_I = ([R]_1, [H]_1, [\hat{R}]_1)$, compute $y = \sum_{k=1}^n \gamma^{k-1} v_{i_k}$, and check as before $e([\mathbf{R}]_1, [\tau]_2) = e([\hat{\mathbf{R}}]_1, [1]_2)$ and

$$e\left(\mathbf{C}, \sum_{k=1}^n \gamma^{k-1} [\tau^{m-i_k}]_2\right) - e(y[\tau^{m-1}]_1, [1]_2) = e([\mathbf{R}]_1, [1]_2) + e([\mathbf{H}]_1, [\tau^m]_2).$$

Note that verifier's work is dominated by the computation of $\sum_{k=1}^n \gamma^{k-1} [\tau^{m-i_k}]_2$, so we analyze for which sets $I \subset [m]$ this computation can be cheaper than $|I| \mathbb{G}_2$ -exponentiations. Without loss of generality, we can re-assign $\gamma^{k-1} \rightarrow \gamma^{m-i_k}$, and thus our verifier now needs to compute $\sum_{k=1}^n [(\gamma X)^{m-i_k}]_2 = \sum_{i \in I} [(\gamma X)^{m-i}]_2$.

Now, note that if $I_{k,s,n} \subset [m]$ is an arithmetic progression, i.e. it is such that for a given ratio s , a starting power k and a number n of desired elements, $I_{k,s,n} = \{k, s+k, \dots, (n-1)s+k\}$, then

$$\sum_{i \in I_{k,s,n}} (\gamma X)^{m-i} = (\gamma X)^k \frac{1 - (\gamma X)^n}{1 - (\gamma X)^s}.$$

This reduces the work of the verifier to compute $\sum_{i \in I_{k,s,n}} (\gamma X)^{m-i}$ to constant. Note that the verifier cannot compute $(1 - (\gamma X)^s)^{-1}$, so we multiply all the terms of the equation by $1 - (\gamma X)^s$. I.e, the verifier computes $y = \sum_{i \in I_{k,s,n}} \gamma^{m-i} y_i$ and checks whether

$$\begin{aligned} e([C]_1, \gamma^k [\tau^k]_2 - \gamma^{k+n} [\tau^{k+n}]_2) - e([\tau^{m-1}]_1 y - [\tau^{n+s-1}]_1 \gamma^s y, [1]_2) \\ = e([\mathbf{R}]_1, 1 - \gamma^s [\tau^s]_2) + e([\mathbf{H}]_1, [\tau^n]_2 - \gamma^s [\tau^{n+s}]_2). \end{aligned}$$

6.3 Any Subset Openings from Lagrange Basis

Native. In the Lagrange Basis, one can use the native subset openings of [29]. There, the verifier needs to compute computation the vanishing polynomial $t_I(X) = \prod_{i \in I} (X - h_i)$ (we recall `SVC.Open` and `SVC.Vf` algorithms in Appendix C). To reduce verifier's work we focus on those subsets $I \subset [m]$ such that $t_I(X)$ can be calculated in less than $|I|$ computations. One answer to this question comes from cosets. That is, given $\mathbb{H} = \{1, \omega, \omega^2, \dots, \omega^{m-1}\}$ group of roots of unity where $m = 2^n$, let \mathbb{H}_k be the subgroup of order 2^k of \mathbb{H} , where k goes from 0 to n . Then, for each $0 \leq s < 2^{n/k}$ we can construct the coset $I = \omega^s \mathbb{H}_k$, whose vanishing polynomial is $t_I(X) = X^{2^k} - (\omega^s)^{2^k}$. Verifier accepts if and only if $e(\mathbf{C} - \tilde{\mathbf{C}}, [1]_2) = e([\mathbf{H}]_1, [x^{2^k}]_2 - \omega^{s2^k})$.

Non-native. Given that the native subvector opening procedure above works for arbitrary subsets $I \subset [m]$, we don't consider aggregation of individual positions. The latter makes sense only when applying a linear function to the new subset. That is, when the verifier is given $C_{f,I}$, claimed to be a commitment to $\mathbf{f} \cdot \mathbf{c}_I$, for some linear function \mathbf{f} applied to the vector $\mathbf{c}_I = (c_i)_{i \in I}$.

7 Implementation and Experimental Evaluation for LVC

We implement our monomial basis construction in Rust on top of the `paired` library¹³ and is available on Github¹⁴. In this section we experimentally evaluate different features of our monomial-basis construction. In particular we investigate and provide estimates for the following questions:

- For which set sizes can we expect proving time in our construction to be more efficient than that in SNARKs over Merkle Trees?
- How beneficial is for proving time our range opening?
- How much can verification time benefit from special subset opening?




Fig. 1: Proving time in our scheme with monomial basis vs SNARKs for Merkle trees opening. Plot is in log-scale.

7.1 Comparison with SNARKs over Merkle Trees

We show our comparison in Fig. 1. We compare to Merkle trees instantiated with both Poseidon hash [16] and with SHA256. The underlying proof system used here is Groth16 [17] in its `libsnark` implementation¹⁵.

We estimate our construction to have more efficient proving time for vectors up to approximately 2^{18} , where SNARKs over Poseidon are of similar efficiency. Our construction is more efficient than SNARKs for SHA-based Merkle trees for larger vectors. We point out that while Poseidon is a highly SNARK-friendly hash function it is slower than SHA when executed “natively” and it has received little cryptanalytic scrutiny so far.

¹³ <https://github.com/filecoin-project/paired>

¹⁴ Our code is available at <https://github.com/matteocam/lvc-mon-rust>.

¹⁵ <https://github.com/scipr-lab/libsnark>

Our proving time has a steeper growth than that of the SNARKs. This is a direct consequence of the following: our proving consists of multiexponentiations roughly linear in the size of the vector; SNARKs over Merkle trees, on the other hand, are still Merkle tree openings and thus logarithmic in the vector size despite their larger hidden constants.

The diagram shows proving time for a single opening only. Our scheme performs better than MT+Poseidon hashes for vectors of size up to 2^{18} , while we do better than Merkle Trees with SHA256 for vector of size up to 2^{25} .

7.2 Proving Time for Special Subsets

The results of this comparison are in Fig. 2. We compare the proving time of our subvector opening for a range of positions of Section 6.1 to range position opening through a SNARK (again Groth16) over Merkle trees with the Poseidon hash function. For the latter, we make use of the fact that a range opening in a Merkle tree can often be significantly optimized by opening an “upper path” only once and then opening a whole subtree stemming from that upper path and corresponding to the whole range¹⁶.

Except for very small ranges, Merkle trees perform worse. The savings are of a few order of magnitudes even for moderately sized ranges. The reason for this is the virtually constant proving time in our range subset compared to the one for SNARKs which roughly grows linearly with it (our proving time actually decreases with the range size, but in the diagram we just consider the proving time for the most expensive case). We performed similar evaluations for different set sizes and find little difference in the patterns.




Fig. 2: Proving time for range queries in our scheme with monomial basis vs SNARKs for Merkle trees with Poseidon in a vector of size 2^{20} . Plot is in log-scale.

7.3 Verification for Any Subsets

The results of this comparison are summarized in Fig. 3. We compare our verifier for an aggregated subset opening in Section 6.2 with that in Pointproofs [15]. Our estimates indicate that our verifier can be twice as fast as that in Pointproofs for appropriately large opening subsets. See Fig. 3. We describe the costs of

¹⁶ Consider for example the opening of range $1, \dots, 256 = 2^8$ in a tree with 2^{20} leaves. We can first open the leftmost path of depth 12 ($20 - 8$) and then open the whole subtree of depth 8 stemming from there.




Fig. 3: Verification cost for subset opening. Costs are independent of original vector size. Plot is in log-scale.

these verifier reducing all other operations to their corresponding costs in $|G_1|$. For this we use the thorough conversions documented in [?, Table 2]. All our costs refer to an instantiation with BLS12-381.

Cost of the Pointproofs verifier opening a subset $|I|$:

$$2|\text{ML}| + 1|\text{FE}| + 1|G_1| + |I|(|F| + |G_2|) + c(|G_1| + |G_T|)$$

Cost of our verifier in Section 6.2:

$$6|\text{ML}| + 2|\text{FE}| + |I||F| + c'(|G_1| + |G_2|)$$

Above ML and FE correspond respectively to Miller Loop and Final Exponentiation for the pairing. Field operations refer to multiplications. The constants c, c' are small enough to be ignored in our figure. We estimate the cost of a field operation as approximately $\frac{1}{8}$ of a G_1 operation¹⁷.

Our construction has an initially higher cost which is soon compensated as the subset size increases. This is due to the more expensive G_2 operation that dominate in Pointproofs. Our verification achieves a speedup of approximately $16\times$ in this cost model. The maximum subset size we show in the plot is also roughly the parameter at which the ratio between the two verification times converges, i.e., the multiplicative speedup of our construction does not increase for larger subsets.

We stress that our goal here is to give an indication of the fact that our approach can be useful. Concrete speedups would be highly dependent on the implementation of algebraic primitives and on the curve as well as other optimizations we have not considered in the analysis above.

Further Details on Evaluation

All the curve operations are instantiated over curve BLS12-381 [?]. Our timings for SNARKs over Merkle trees are (generous) lower bounds extrapolated from [?, Figure 5]. All our benchmarks refer to executions run single-threaded on Amazon EC2 using r5.8xlarge instances (248GB of memory).

¹⁷ A point addition in G_1 costs at least 4 field multiplications and 5 squarings (cost of point doubling for Jacobian coordinates in short Weierstrass). With a squaring at 0.8 field multiplication we can approximate $8|F| \approx 1|G_1|$. <https://www.hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g12o/auto-shortw-jacobian.html>

8 Maintainable Vector Commitment Schemes

8.1 Multivariate Case

One of the key points of vector commitment schemes that allow to speedup subvector openings is the ability to pre-compute and store individual openings and later aggregate them to create subvector openings without incurring linear amount of computations each time.

In constructions such as the ones presented in Section 5, the proof of opening of one position involves *all* other elements in the vector. That is, the polynomials committed to create the proof have coefficients that involve all the values of the committed vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^m$. As a consequence, prover work is linear in the size of \mathbf{v} (as it has to evaluate polynomials of degree m).

In this section, we present a solution for more efficient openings for individual positions that is maintainable. The intuition is the following: we divide the vector \mathbf{v} in small chunks $\{\mathbf{v}_j\} \in \mathbb{F}^k$. We then arrange these chunks in a tree as follows: each chunk corresponds to a leaf of the tree and each node is a succinct representation of its children. The root of the tree is the committed value. An opening proof only involves the elements in the path of the root to the leaf containing the position to be opened. That is, if we want to open value a in position i of $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^{k \cdot m'}$, we prove that (1) c_j is the leaf that contains the commitment to the j chunk containing i and (2) c_j opens to a in the position corresponding to i . The former part can be pre-computed and efficiently maintained, with a storage cost linear in m' , while the latter involves operations that are linear in k .

This results in a construction with the following memory/time trade-off: for any $k, m' \in \mathbb{N}$ with $m = k \cdot m'$, any opening can be computed in time *independent of m'* after pre-computing and storing $O_\lambda(m')$ values (independent of k). Furthermore, a relaxed *maintainability* notion is satisfied: all stored values can be pre-computed efficiently (in quasi linear time in m) and updated in $\log m'$ time.

Our starting point is the PST polynomial commitment [5]. We first show how to directly use its low degree variant (instead of the multilinear one used in [28]) to reduce proof size by a constant factor. Second, we modify this construction by composing it with any other algebraic¹⁸ vector commitment scheme to achieve maximum flexibility in time/memory trade-offs. We review the PST polynomial commitment and describe the core techniques to use it as a maintainable vector commitment in App. D.

Tree structure. We can directly exploit the tree structure of the PST commitment scheme to pre-compute all proofs in quasi-linear time and simply hand them when needed. While this can be beneficial in some cases, it is an “extreme” approach. One might be willing to store *some* values and do *some* computation during opening of a position.

To achieve the flexible memory/time trade-off, we exploit the same tree-like structure, but instead of having the vector values in the leaves of the tree, we replace them with vector commitments using an arbitrary algebraic vector commitment scheme LVC. Concretely, the leaves contain elements $[\mathbf{r}]_1 \cdot \mathbf{v}_j$, where $[\mathbf{r}]_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1^k$ is the commitment key of LVC. To open a position of \mathbf{v} , we use the PST approach to reach corresponding leaf j , and then the opening algorithm of VC on \mathbf{v}_j . The tree part can be efficiently pre-computed (memory resources) while the leaf part is opened on-demand (time resources).

We demonstrate the tree structure of our construction in app. D. For simplicity, we consider $\Sigma = \{0, 1\}$ as the interpolating set. Each node can be consider as a succinct representation of the vectors encoded in the leafs of the sub-tree having the node as a root.

The tree has a similar structure to Verkle trees. Each node can be considered as a succinct “commitment” to its children and proving involves (in some sense) sending this “commitments” and evidence they are well formed. The difference with Verkle trees is that the “commitment” does not satisfy a binding notion; indeed there are efficient ways to express each node in more than one ways by manipulating group elements.

Note that the root of the tree depends on the elements $\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{r}$. Viewing both $\boldsymbol{\tau} = (\tau_\nu, \dots, \tau_1)$ and $\mathbf{r} = (r_k, \dots, r_1)$ as formal variables \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R} , we can treat the root node (the commitment) as an evaluation of a

¹⁸ We call algebraic, any (vector) commitment scheme where the commit algorithm works by simply setting $[c]_1 = [\mathbf{r}]_1 \cdot \mathbf{v}$, where $[\mathbf{r}]_1$ is the commitment key and \mathbf{v} is the message to be committed.

polynomial. Now, note that this polynomial corresponds to the interpolation of the elements of the leaves in Σ^ν . Thus, the aforementioned polynomial is

$$p(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}) = \boldsymbol{\lambda}(\mathbf{X}) \cdot (\mathbf{R} \cdot \mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{R} \cdot \mathbf{v}_{\ell^\nu}) = (\boldsymbol{\lambda}(\mathbf{X}) \otimes \mathbf{R}) \cdot \mathbf{v}$$

The prover can still evaluate one by one the variables X_ν, \dots, X_1 at $\sigma_\nu, \dots, \sigma_1$ -as it would do in the simple PST case- and end up with a polynomial $q(\mathbf{R}) = p(\boldsymbol{\sigma}, \mathbf{R}) = \mathbf{R} \cdot \mathbf{v}_j$. To ensure that q does not contain any X_j variable, we also include a low degree test in the proof. The evaluation of the latter polynomial at $[\mathbf{r}]_1$ corresponds to the leaf commitment at position $\boldsymbol{\sigma}$ and can be opened by employing the Open algorithm of the leaf commitment scheme with key $[\mathbf{r}]_1$.

Construction. First, we introduce some notation. Let $\Sigma \subseteq \mathbb{F}$ denote the interpolating set. Given $\boldsymbol{\sigma} = (\sigma_\nu, \dots, \sigma_1) \in \Sigma^\nu$, we denote $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{|i} = (\sigma_\nu, \dots, \sigma_i) \in \Sigma^{\nu-i+1}$. For $\mathbf{v} = (\mathbf{v}_\boldsymbol{\sigma})_{\boldsymbol{\sigma} \in \Sigma^\nu}$ with $\mathbf{v}_\boldsymbol{\sigma} \in \mathbb{F}^k$ and $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_1 \in \Sigma^i$ we denote with $\mathbf{v}_{k, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_1}$ the vector $(\mathbf{v}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}_1, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_2})_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}_2 \in \Sigma^{\nu-i}}$, that is, the concatenation of vectors \mathbf{v}_j whose m -ary representation of the index j is prefixed with $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_1$. Finally, we denote with $\tau_{\nu, \ell}$ the ν -variate monomial basis of individual degree less than ν evaluated at τ_ν, \dots, τ_1 . In all cases, we omit the subscript when it is clear from the context.

We present the construction next. While our aim is individual position openings, the construction supports a bigger family of functions: linear forms¹⁹ applied to one of the k -sized chunks of the vector. Concretely, let $\mathcal{F}_{p,k} \subseteq \{f : \mathbb{F}^k \rightarrow \mathbb{F}\}$ be the family of linear forms supported by the leaf commitment scheme. We define the ℓ, ν -extended family as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Ext}_{\ell, \nu} \mathcal{F}_{p,k} = \{f : \mathbb{F}^{k \cdot \ell^\nu} \rightarrow \mathbb{F} \mid \exists f' \in \mathcal{F}_{p,k}, i \in \{1, \dots, \ell^\nu\} \text{ s.t.} \\ \forall \mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_{\ell^\nu} \in \mathbb{F}^k : f(\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_{\ell^\nu}) = f'(\mathbf{v}_i)\} \end{aligned}$$

Our construction is a linear vector commitment MVTTree for the family $\text{Ext}_{\ell, \nu} \mathcal{F}_{p,k}$, that uses as a black box an algebraic linear vector commitment scheme LVC' for the family $\mathcal{F}_{p,k}$.

MVTTree.KeyGen($1^\lambda, \text{Ext}_{\ell, \nu} \mathcal{F}_{p,k}$) \rightarrow (prk, vrk):

1. (prk' = $[\mathbf{r}]_1$, vrk') \leftarrow LVC'.KeyGen($1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}_{p,k}$)
2. Let $\boldsymbol{\lambda}(X)$ be the vector of Lagrange polynomials associated to Σ .
3. $\tau_\nu, \dots, \tau_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$
4. Output prk = (prk', $[\boldsymbol{\lambda}]_1 = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}(\tau_\nu) \otimes \dots \otimes \boldsymbol{\lambda}(\tau_1) \otimes \mathbf{r}]_1, [\boldsymbol{\tau} \otimes \mathbf{r}]_1$),
vrk = (vrk', $[\tau_\nu]_2, \dots, [\tau_1]_2, [\tau_\nu^{\ell-1} \dots \tau_1^{\ell-1}]_2$)
upk = ($\{[\boldsymbol{\lambda}(\tau_j) \otimes \dots \otimes \boldsymbol{\lambda}(\tau_1) \otimes \mathbf{r}]_1\}_{j=\nu-1}^1$),

MVTTree.Commit(prk, \mathbf{v}) \rightarrow (C, aux):

1. For all $\boldsymbol{\sigma} \in \Sigma^\nu$: compute $(C_\boldsymbol{\sigma}, \text{aux}_\boldsymbol{\sigma}) \leftarrow$ LVC'.Commit(prk', $\mathbf{v}_\boldsymbol{\sigma}$)
2. Compute $C = [p(\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{r})]_1 = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}]_1 \cdot \mathbf{v}$
3. Output C, aux = ($\{\text{aux}_\boldsymbol{\sigma}\}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma} \in \Sigma^\nu}, \mathbf{v}$)

MVTTree.Open(prk, aux, f, \mathbf{y}) \rightarrow π :

1. Let $f(\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_{\ell^\nu}) = f'(\mathbf{v}_i)$ for $f' \in \mathcal{F}_{p,k}$ and $i = (\boldsymbol{\sigma})_\ell$ in ℓ -ary.
2. Consider $\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{r}$ as formal variables $\mathbf{X} = (X_\nu, \dots, X_1), \mathbf{R} = (R_k, \dots, R_1)$.
3. Denote $p_{\nu+1}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}) = p(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}) = (\boldsymbol{\lambda}(\mathbf{X}) \otimes \mathbf{R}) \cdot \mathbf{v}$
4. For all $\nu \geq j \geq 1$:
Compute $p_j(X_{j-1}, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R}) = \boldsymbol{\lambda}(X_{j-1}, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R}) \cdot \mathbf{v}_{\boldsymbol{\sigma}_{|j}}$
Compute $H_j(X_j, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R})$ as

$$H_j(X_j, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R}) = \frac{p_{j+1}(X_j, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R}) - p_j(X_{j-1}, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R})}{(X_j - \sigma_j)}$$

Compute group element $[H_j]_1 = [H_j(\tau_j, \dots, \tau_1, \mathbf{r})]_1$

¹⁹ We use linear forms for simplicity, one could also consider general linear functions.

5. Compute $\hat{\mathbf{C}}_\sigma = [\tau_\nu^{\ell-1} \dots \tau_1^{\ell-1} \cdot \mathbf{r}]_1 \cdot \mathbf{v}_\sigma$
 6. Compute $\pi' \leftarrow \text{LVC}'.\text{Open}(\text{prk}', \text{aux}_\sigma, f', \mathbf{y})$
 7. Output $\pi = ([H_\nu]_1, \dots, [H_1]_1, \mathbf{C}_\sigma, \hat{\mathbf{C}}_\sigma, \pi')$
- MVTree.Vf(vrk, C, f, y, pi) \rightarrow 0/1:
1. Let $f(\mathbf{v}_1, \dots, \mathbf{v}_{\ell^\nu}) = f'(\mathbf{v}_i)$ for $f' \in \mathcal{F}_{p,k}$ and $i = (\sigma)_\ell$ in ℓ -ary.
 2. $b_{\text{Path}} \leftarrow e(\mathbf{C} - \mathbf{C}_\sigma, [1]_2) = \sum_{j=1}^\nu e([H_j]_1, [\tau_j - \sigma_j]_2)$
 3. $b_{\text{LD-Test}} \leftarrow e(\mathbf{C}_\sigma, [\tau_\nu^{\ell-1} \dots \tau_1^{\ell-1}]_2) = e(\hat{\mathbf{C}}_\sigma, [1]_2)$
 4. $b_{\text{Leaf}} \leftarrow \text{LVC}'.\text{Vf}(\text{vrk}', \mathbf{C}_\sigma, f', \mathbf{y}, \pi')$
 5. Output $b_{\text{Path}} \wedge b_{\text{LD-Test}} \wedge b_{\text{Leaf}}$

We omit explicitly describing the update algorithm. Instead, we demonstrate in Thm. 8 how to efficiently update all proofs after modifying a position in the committed vector.

We summarize the properties of the construction in the following theorems.

Theorem 7. *Let LVC' be an algebraic vector commitment scheme that satisfies completeness, homomorphic openings and weak function binding for a function family $\mathcal{F}_{p,k}$. Then, MVTree satisfies (1) completeness, (2) Homomorphic Openings and (3) strong function binding for $\text{Ext}_{\ell^\nu}\text{-}\mathcal{F}_{p,k}$ in the AGM under the $(\ell-1)\cdot\nu$ -BSDH assumption.*

Proof.

Completeness. Consider an honest execution of MVTree.Open. Let $y = f(\mathbf{v}) = f'(\mathbf{v}_i)$ for some $i = (\sigma)_\ell$. Also, by construction, the low degree test always succeeds. It remains to show that the first test outputs 1.

Let $p_{\nu+1}(X_\nu, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R}) = p(X_\nu, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R})$ be the polynomial $(\lambda(\mathbf{X}) \otimes \mathbf{R})^\top \mathbf{v}$. Next, consider the polynomial equations that the polynomials H_j are constructed to satisfy:

$$p_{j+1}(X_j, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R}) - p_j(X_{j-1}, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R}) = H_j(X_j, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R})(X_j - h_j)$$

Summing all these equation for $1 \leq j \leq \nu$ gives

$$p_{\nu+1}(X_\nu, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R}) - p_1 = \sum_{j=1}^\nu H_j(X_j, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R})(X_j - h_j)$$

and note that this corresponds to the verification equation. Thus, the first test passes. Finally, note that all the monomials involved these polynomials are included in the commitment key $\lambda(\tau_\nu, \dots, \tau_1) \otimes \mathbf{r}$, so the prover can encode these in \mathbb{G}_1 .

Function Binding. First, we prove a claim stating that we can extract an opening of a leaf commitment in the AGM.

Claim. Let $\pi = ([H_\nu]_1, \dots, [H_1]_1, \mathbf{C}_\sigma, \hat{\mathbf{C}}_\sigma, \pi')$ be an accepting proof. Then, for all algebraic adversaries \mathcal{A} outputting accepting proofs, there exists an extractor that outputs opening of \mathbf{C}_σ w.r.t. key \mathbf{r} in the AGM.

Proof. Since we work in the AGM, we can extract coefficients $\hat{\mathbf{a}}, \mathbf{a}$ of polynomials $\hat{C}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}), C(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R})$ with degree less than $\ell - 1$ in X_ν, \dots, X_1 such that $[\hat{C}(\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{r})]_1 = \hat{\mathbf{C}}$ and $[C(\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{r})]_1 = \mathbf{C}$. By the low degree test, either $\hat{C}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}) = C(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}) \cdot X_\nu^{\ell-1} \dots X_1^{\ell-1}$ holds or $\hat{\mathbf{a}} \cdot (\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{r}) = \mathbf{a}(\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{r}) \cdot \tau_\nu^{\ell-1} \dots \tau_1^{\ell-1}$ holds and we find a non-trivial discrete logarithm relations of the elements of the commitment key. Assume the latter event did not happen. For this polynomial relation to hold with polynomial of degree less than $\ell - 1$ in X_ν, \dots, X_1 , only the coefficients involving \mathbf{R} are non-zero, in which case we extract a leaf commitment opening. Now, either this holds or the adversary successfully computed a non-zero polynomial $p(\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{X}) = \hat{C}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}) - C(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}) \cdot X_\nu^{\ell-1} \dots X_1^{\ell-1}$ that has a root in $(\boldsymbol{\tau}, \mathbf{r})$ which happens with negligible probability.

Now, consider two opening/proof pairs $\mathbf{C}_\sigma, f_d, \mathbf{y}_d, \pi_d$ for $d \in \{1, 2\}$. Note the only way that the functions are inconsistent is if $f_1(\mathbf{v}) = f'_1(\mathbf{v}_i)$ and $f_2(\mathbf{v}) = f'_2(\mathbf{v}_i)$ for the same index i .

Let $f_1(\mathbf{v}) = f'_1(\mathbf{v}_i)$ and $f_2(\mathbf{v}) = f'_2(\mathbf{v}_i)$ for the same $i = (\boldsymbol{\sigma})_\ell$. We consider two cases. First, assume that $C_{1,\boldsymbol{\sigma}} = C_{2,\boldsymbol{\sigma}} = C_\sigma$. By the fact that the low-degree test passes, we can extract an opening \mathbf{v}_σ for this commitment except with negligible probability. Then, by the last verification test we have

$$\text{LVC}'.\text{Vf}(\mathbf{vk}', C_\sigma, f'_1, \mathbf{y}_1, \pi'_1) = \text{LVC}'.\text{Vf}(\mathbf{vk}', C_\sigma, f'_2, \mathbf{y}_2, \pi'_2) = 1$$

Noting that the openings for f'_1, f'_2 are inconsistent if the openings for f_1, f_2 are inconsistent, we conclude that we have solved a strong function binding challenge for LVC' . Indeed, we have a commitment C_σ with a valid opening \mathbf{v}_σ that f'^1 -opens to \mathbf{y}^1 and f'^2 -opens to \mathbf{y}^2 for some inconsistent values since f^1, \mathbf{y}_1 and f^2, \mathbf{y}_2 are inconsistent.

Next, consider the case where $C_{1,\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \neq C_{2,\boldsymbol{\sigma}}$. We show that, in this case, an winning adversary can be used to break BSDH assumption. The reduction works as follows: on input $[1]_{1,2}, [\tau]_{1,2}, \dots, [\tau^{(\ell-1)\cdot\nu}]_{1,2}$, sample a key for MVTTree in the following way:

- Guess index $i = (\boldsymbol{\sigma})_\ell$.
- Sample $(\mathbf{pk}' = [\mathbf{r}]_1, \mathbf{vk}') \leftarrow \text{LVC}'.\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{F}_{p,k})$ along with the discrete logarithms of $[\mathbf{r}]_1$ ²⁰
- for all $1 \leq j \leq \nu$ set $[\tau_j]_1 = [\rho_j \tau + \sigma_j]_1$ for random ρ_j .
- Compute the encodings of the multivariate Lagrange and monomial polynomials $[\boldsymbol{\lambda}(\tau_\nu, \dots, \tau_1)]_1, [\boldsymbol{\tau}]_1$ and $[\tau_\nu]_2, \dots, [\tau_1]_2, [\tau_\nu^{\ell-1} \cdot \tau_\nu^{\ell-1}]_2$. Note that this step is efficient since any element $\lambda_\sigma(\tau_1, \dots, \tau_\nu)$ and in $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ is a polynomial of total degree at most $(\ell - 1) \cdot \nu$ on variables $\tau_j = \rho_j \tau$ so it can be computed using the ν powers of τ .
- Compute the proving commitment key by computing $\mathbf{r} \otimes [\boldsymbol{\lambda}(\tau_\nu, \dots, \tau_1)]_1$.

First, we argue that the commitment key is correctly distributed. Indeed, we evaluate the multivariate Lagrange and monomial polynomials on a random point since $\tau, \rho_\nu, \dots, \rho_1$ are uniformly distributed, and we compute \mathbf{r} honestly.

Next, assume that the guess of index i was correct (which happens with $1/\ell^\nu = m/k$ probability) and that the verifying proofs contain $C_{1,\boldsymbol{\sigma}} \neq C_{2,\boldsymbol{\sigma}}$. By the fact that the low-degree test passes, we get two valid openings $\mathbf{v}_{1,\boldsymbol{\sigma}}, \mathbf{v}_{2,\boldsymbol{\sigma}}$ for these commitments w.r.t. the key $[\mathbf{r}]_1$. Since we know \mathbf{r} in the field, we can compute the discrete logarithms of these elements: specifically,

$$(C_{1,\boldsymbol{\sigma}}, C_{2,\boldsymbol{\sigma}}) = (\mathbf{r}^\top \mathbf{v}_{1,\boldsymbol{\sigma}}, \mathbf{r}^\top \mathbf{v}_{2,\boldsymbol{\sigma}})$$

To simplify notation, denote these values $v, v' \in \mathbb{F}$ respectively and note that $v \neq v'$.

By the first verification test, the following equations holds:

$$e([C - v]_1, [1]_2) = \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} e([H_j]_1, [\tau_j - \sigma_j]_2), e([C - v']_1, [1]_2) = \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} e([H'_j]_1, [\tau_j - \sigma_j]_2)$$

Subtracting and setting $z_j = H_i - H'_i$ gives

$$\begin{aligned} e([v' - v]_1, [1]_2) &= \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} e([z_j]_1, [\tau_j - \sigma_j]_2) \Leftrightarrow e([v' - v]_1, [1]_2) = \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} e([z_j]_1, \rho_j [\tau]_2) \Leftrightarrow \\ (v' - v) \cdot e([1]_1, [1]_2) &= \tau \cdot e\left(\sum_{j=1}^{\nu} \rho_j [z_j]_1, [1]_2\right) \Leftrightarrow \\ \tau^{-1} \cdot e([1]_1, [1]_2) &= (v' - v)^{-1} \cdot e\left(\sum_{j=1}^{\nu} \rho_j [z_j]_1, [1]_2\right) \Leftrightarrow \\ e([\tau^{-1}]_1, [1]_2) &= \cdot e\left((v' - v)^{-1} \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} \rho_j [z_j]_1, [1]_2\right) \end{aligned}$$

²⁰ We implicitly assume here that the distribution of the key generation algorithm is witness samplable. This is always the case for all distribution of interest.

so by the final equation

$$\frac{1}{\tau^{-1}}e([1]_1, [1]_1) = (v' - v)^{-1} \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} \rho_j [z_j]_1$$

Therefore, $\left(0, (v' - v)^{-1}e(\sum_{j=1}^{\nu} \rho_j [z_j]_1, [1]_2)\right)$ is a solution to the BSDH challenge.

Homomorphic Proofs. Let $(C_1, f, \mathbf{y}_1, \pi_1)$, $(C_2, f, \mathbf{y}_2, \pi_2)$ be accepting statement-proof pairs with respect to some key \mathbf{vk} . We show that for all $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{F}$, the statement-proof pair $(C, f, \mathbf{y}, \pi) = (\alpha C_1 + \beta C_2, f, \alpha \mathbf{y}_1 + \beta \mathbf{y}_2, \alpha \pi_1 + \beta \pi_2)$ is also accepting. Let

$$\begin{aligned} \pi &= (\alpha[H_{\nu,1}]_1 + \beta[H_{\nu,2}]_1, \dots, \alpha[H_{1,1}]_1 + \beta[H_{1,2}]_1, \\ &\quad \alpha C_{1,\sigma} + \beta C_{2,\sigma}, \alpha \hat{C}_{1,\sigma} + \beta \hat{C}_{2,\sigma}, \alpha \pi'_1 + \beta \pi'_2) \end{aligned}$$

be the combined proof. First, note that for the function f' and $\sigma \in \Sigma^{\nu}$ corresponding to f , the second verification test $\text{LVC}' \cdot \forall f(\mathbf{vk}', \alpha C_{1,\sigma} + \beta C_{2,\sigma}, f', \alpha \mathbf{y}_1 + \beta \mathbf{y}_2, \alpha \pi'_1 + \beta \pi'_2)$ outputs 1 by the homomorphic openings property of LVC' . For the first test, we have

$$\begin{aligned} e(C - C_{\sigma}, [1]_2) &= e(\alpha C_1 + \beta C_2 - \alpha C_{1,\sigma} - \beta C_{2,\sigma}, [1]_2) \\ &= \alpha \cdot e(C_1 - C_{1,\sigma}, [1]_2) + \beta \cdot e(C_2 - C_{2,\sigma}, [1]_2) \\ &= \alpha \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} e([H_{j,1}]_1, [\tau_j - \sigma_j]_2) + \beta \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} e([H_{j,2}]_1, [\tau_j - \sigma_j]_2) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} e(\alpha[H_{j,1}]_1 + \beta[H_{j,2}]_1, [\tau_j - \sigma_j]_2) = \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} e([H_j]_1, [\tau_j - \sigma_j]_2) \end{aligned}$$

Similarly, for the low degree test we have

$$\begin{aligned} e(\hat{C}_{\sigma}, [1]_2) &= e(\alpha \hat{C}_{1,\sigma} + \beta \hat{C}_{2,\sigma}, [1]_2) = \alpha \cdot e(\hat{C}_{1,\sigma}, [1]_2) + \beta \cdot e(\hat{C}_{2,\sigma}, [1]_2) \\ &= \alpha \cdot e(C_{1,\sigma}, [\tau_{\nu}^{\ell-1} \dots \tau_1^{\ell-1}]_2) + \beta \cdot e(C_{2,\sigma}, [\tau_{\nu}^{\ell-1} \dots \tau_1^{\ell-1}]_2) \\ &= e(\alpha C_{1,\sigma} + \beta C_{2,\sigma}, [\tau_{\nu}^{\ell-1} \dots \tau_1^{\ell-1}]_2) = e(C_{\sigma}, [\tau_{\nu}^{\ell-1} \dots \tau_1^{\ell-1}]_2) \end{aligned}$$

□

Thus, the new statement/proof pair passes all verification tests.

Remark 3. Note that in the function binding proof, we only use the AGM to extract openings for the leaf commitments but not for the tree part of the construction. The latter is sound under falsifiable assumptions.

Theorem 8. Consider construction $\overline{\text{MVTREE}}$ and let $\pi^{\sigma} = ([H_{\nu}^{\sigma}]_1, \dots, [H_1^{\sigma}]_1, C_{\sigma}, \hat{C}_{\sigma}, \pi'_{\sigma})$ be some proof of opening for a leaf commitment in position σ written in ℓ -ary.

Then, computing all partial proofs $\left\{([H_{\nu}^{\sigma}]_2, \dots, [H_1^{\sigma}]_1, C_{\sigma}, \hat{C}_{\sigma})\right\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma^{\nu}}$ can be done in $O_{\lambda}(k \cdot \nu \cdot \ell^{\nu}) = O_{\lambda}(\nu \cdot m)$ time and storing them needs $O_{\lambda}(\ell^{\nu}) = O_{\lambda}(m/k)$ space. Furthermore, if we update C by adding δ in some position i^* , we can update all partial proofs in time $O_{\lambda}(\nu)$.

Proof.

Pre-computing partial proofs. Let $p(X_{\nu}, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R})$ be the polynomial encoding of \mathbf{v} w.r.t. Σ^{ν} and consider the evaluation of polynomials $p_{\sigma_1}(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}) = p(\sigma_1, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R})$ arranged in a tree: the root is the polynomial $p(X_{\nu}, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R})$ and the children of a node in level j are $\{p_{\sigma_{\nu}, \dots, \sigma_j}(\sigma, X_{j-2}, \dots, X_1, \mathbf{R})\}_{\sigma \in \Sigma^j}$. Computing all proofs corresponds to computing a divisor polynomial for each node that asserts that the node is consistent with its parent node, plus some constant work for computing each leaf commitment along with its low degree proof. Assuming $\ell = O(1)$, each divisor polynomial proof can be computed in time linear in the total degree of $p_{\sigma_{\nu}, \dots, \sigma_j}$. A simple counting argument is enough to conclude the proof. In level j of the tree, we need to

compute ℓ^j proofs, each for a polynomial of total degree $k \cdot \ell^{\nu-j}$. Thus, for each level of the tree, we need time linear in $k \cdot \ell^\nu = m$. Having ν levels, the total time is $O_\lambda(m \cdot \nu)$. For the space requirements, it is enough to note that the tree has $O(m)$ nodes, and we associate one group element to each.

Updating all partial proofs. The updatability property follows directly by the homomorphic opening property of the construction. We focus on the computation needed for updating all stored proofs. The strategy is to consider the new commitment as $C' = C + \hat{C}$ where \hat{C} is a commitment to the vector $\delta \cdot \mathbf{e}_{i^*}$, where σ denotes leaf corresponding to i^* . We claim that (1) we can compute all proofs for \hat{C} in logarithmic time and (2) all but $O(\nu)$ proof elements are 0. By these two facts the claim follows since we can combine all the non-zero proof elements of \hat{C} with the corresponding elements of C .

The commitment \hat{C} corresponds to a polynomial of the form $p(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{R}) = \delta \cdot \lambda_\sigma(\mathbf{X}) \cdot R_j$. All polynomials labeling nodes in the tree are 0 apart from the ones being in the path from the root to the leaf containing i^* . Such a node always has the zero polynomial nodes as descendants, and the proof corresponding to each is 0 since $0 = 0 \cdot (X_j - \sigma_j)$. The proof polynomials for the rest $\ell \cdot \nu$ nodes can be computed in constant time each and each can be encoded to the group in constant time since each involves a unique commitment key element. \square

8.2 Efficiency of the Multivariate Construction

Efficiency. We only consider the case where $\ell = O(1)$. First, let's focus on the time needed to compute $[H_j]_1$. One can simply write the polynomial $p_j - p_{j-1}$ as a polynomial in $1, X_j, \dots, X_j^{\ell-1}$ with polynomial coefficients in the other variables. Then, we can use standard (univariate) polynomial division to divide each term with $X_j - \sigma_j$ in constant time. To encode it in the group, it is enough to note that the total degree of each term is $k \cdot \ell^{j-1}$, so we need to perform ℓ multi-exponentiations of this size totaling in $O(k \cdot \ell^j)$ operations.

That said, we demonstrate the efficiency of the construction. The commitment key consists of linear in m group elements. Opening needs $O(k \cdot \ell^j)$ operations for each iteration, totaling in $O(k \cdot \ell^\nu)$ time. By inspection of the construction, proofs size is $\log_\ell(m/k) + 2 + |\pi'|$, where π' is the size of an opening of the leaf commitment. Finally, verification consists of (1) a $\log_\ell(m/k)$ -size pairing product equation, (2) a low degree test involving constant operations and (3) a verification of an opening of a leaf commitment.

Remark 4 (On aggregation). The first two verification tests are pairing product equations. Assuming the leaf commitment verification is also a pairing product equation, one can use inner pairing products [5] to aggregate many such equations as done in [28] and, thus, achieve one-hop cross commitment aggregation. While the aggregated proof size decreases exponentially, this comes at the cost of a significant overhead for the prover due to the need to work in the target group. Reducing the proof size from $\log_2 m$ to roughly $\log_\ell(m/k)$ (assuming constant size/verification for leaf commitment opening) can make aggregation significantly cheaper for the prover.

8.3 Univariate Maintainable Vector Commitments

In this section, we give an optimized construction that achieves the same memory-time tradeoffs for the prover that the scheme in Section 8.1, but for univariate polynomials with the same variable at each level. For that, we rely on the q -BSDH assumption for $q = m - 1$, while we only needed $q = O(\log m)$ for the multivariate case. On the other hand, this construction is limited to binary trees since it leverages the fact that the cardinal of the set of roots of unity is a power of 2.

For vectors of size m , we offer the following trade-off: for any ν, κ , such that $m = 2^{\nu+\kappa+1}$, one can derive openings of size $\nu + 4$ group elements. The prover can pre-compute and store $2^\nu - 1$ proofs, and then compute proofs by performing $O(\kappa 2^\kappa)$ group operations. We show also how to compute all proofs with $O(\nu m)$ group operations (plus $O(m(\nu + \kappa))$ field operations). The proofs are maintainable, as an update in a position requires recomputing $O(\nu)$ proofs. One interesting feature is that the trusted setup depends only on m (the powers of τ) and not of ν, κ , so the right tradeoff can be decided on the fly.

Notation and some facts about roots of unity. Before we explain how to arrange the proofs in a tree, we recall some preliminaries about roots of unity. Throughout this section, $m = 2^{\nu+\kappa+1}$ and $\mathbb{H} \subset \mathbb{F}$ is a set of roots of unity of size m . Elements of \mathbb{H} will be indexed as powers of some fixed primitive m th root of unity ω .

It will be convenient to remember that the set of roots of unity of size $r = \frac{m}{2^i}$ is $\mathbb{H}_r = \{1, \omega^{2^i}, (\omega^{2^i})^2, \dots, (\omega^{2^i})^{r-1}\}$ and the associated vanishing polynomial is $X^r - 1$. Further, for any i , $0 \leq i \leq \nu + \kappa + 1$, \mathbb{H} can be divided into cosets of \mathbb{H}_r of the form $\omega^s \mathbb{H}_r = \{\omega^s, \omega^{s+2^i}, \dots, \omega^{s+(r-1)2^i}\}$, for $0 \leq s < 2^i$. The vanishing polynomial associated to $\omega^s \mathbb{H}_r$ is $X^r - (\omega^s)^r$.

High Level Description. Consider a tree of commitments to a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ build as follows. The root of the tree is a commitment $\mathbf{C} = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}]_1 \mathbf{v}$, where $\boldsymbol{\lambda} = ([\lambda_1(\tau)]_1, \dots, [\lambda_m(\tau)]_1)$, and the polynomials $\{\lambda_j(X)\}$ are the Lagrange basis interpolation polynomials for \mathbb{H} . The two children will be $\mathbf{C}_0 = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}_0]_1 \mathbf{v}_0$ and $\mathbf{C}_1 = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}_1]_1 \mathbf{v}_1$, which are commitments to \mathbf{v}_0 and \mathbf{v}_1 with keys $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_0$ and $\boldsymbol{\lambda}_1$ of half the size. The two children of \mathbf{C}_0 will be $\mathbf{C}_{00} = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{10}]_1 \mathbf{v}_{10}$, $\mathbf{C}_{10} = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}_{01}]_1 \mathbf{v}_{01}$ and so on. The leaves are commitments $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}}$, $\mathbf{b} = (b_\nu, \dots, b_0) \in \{0, 1\}^{\nu+1}$ to vectors of size 2^κ . For any leaf index $\mathbf{b} = (b_\nu, \dots, b_0)$, we denote $\mathbf{b}_{|j} = (b_j \dots b_0)$ the suffix²¹ of size j . Note that $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}$ for $j = 0, \dots, \nu - 1$ denotes all the commitments from the root to the leaf $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}}$.

The division into vectors of half the size is done according to the least significant bit of the binary representation of the index, b_0 . At the first level, there will be two vectors $\mathbf{v}_0, \mathbf{v}_1$ of size $m/2$ containing all positions of \mathbf{v} with suffix b_0 . At the next level, there will be four vectors $\mathbf{v}_{00}, \mathbf{v}_{01}, \mathbf{v}_{10}, \mathbf{v}_{11}$ of size $m/4$, and $\mathbf{v}_{b_1 b_0}$ indicates all the positions of \mathbf{v} (in the natural order) that have as suffix $b_1 b_0$ and so on.

The division into commitment keys of half the size will follow a similar pattern. At level 1, roots of unity will be split into \mathbb{H}^0 and \mathbb{H}^1 , according to the least significant bit of the binary representation of the index of the root, i.e. \mathbb{H}^0 consists of all even and \mathbb{H}^1 all odd powers of ω . In particular, \mathbb{H}^0 are the roots of unity of size $m/2$, and $\mathbb{H}^0 = \omega \mathbb{H}^1$. At level 2, the commitment keys will be associated to $\mathbb{H}^{00}, \mathbb{H}^{01}, \mathbb{H}^{10}, \mathbb{H}^{11}$ and by the same reasoning, \mathbb{H}^{00} are the roots of unity of size $m/4$, $\mathbb{H}^{10} = \omega^2 \mathbb{H}^{00}$, $\mathbb{H}^{01} = \omega \mathbb{H}^{00}$ and $\mathbb{H}^{11} = \omega^3 \mathbb{H}^{00}$. More generally, we note that for any $0 \leq j \leq \nu$ and any string $(b_j, \dots, b_0) \in \{0, 1\}^{j+1}$, $\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} = \omega^s \mathbb{H}_r$, for $s = \sum_{i=0}^j b_i 2^i$ and $r = \frac{m}{2^{j+1}}$.

The Lagrange basis polynomials associated to the interpolation set $\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}$ with the natural order is $\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(X) = (\lambda_1^{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(X), \dots, \lambda_r^{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(X))$ and the commitment key for node $\mathbf{b}_{|j}$ is $\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(\tau)]_1$. The vanishing polynomial associated to $\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}$ will be denoted $t_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(X)$.

As in the multivariate case, the idea is to open the root commitment to a leaf, and then open the commitment to the leaf using the IP argument for the Lagrange basis of Section 5 or the construction of Tomescu et al. [29]. Since at the leaf level the commitment is w.r.t to the key $\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{b}}}$ for some \mathbf{b} , we need to argue that these constructions work for cosets of roots of unity (and with the same efficiency). We prove this in App. D.3.

The construction leverages the fact that vanishing and Lagrange polynomials corresponding to cosets of roots of unity are sparse, so we minimize precomputation, storage and verifier work. More in detail, because of the way subsets are chosen, there is a simple relation between the parent and the children nodes. As an illustration, observe that if $c(X) = \boldsymbol{\lambda}(X) \mathbf{v}$, $c_b(X) = \boldsymbol{\lambda}^b(X) \mathbf{v}_b$,

$$c(X) = \frac{1}{2} (c_0(X) t_1(X) - c_1(X) t_0(X)). \quad (1)$$

Indeed, observe that evaluating at \mathbb{H}^0 , the second term in the right hand side disappears, while $t_1(\eta) = 2$ for any $\eta \in \mathbb{H}^0$, so both sides take the same value at \mathbb{H}_0 , and similarly for \mathbb{H}_1 . Given that the polynomials

²¹ Note that this notation is different than the one we used in the multivariate case. In the latter case, this notation denoted prefixes while here it denotes suffixes. We do this because in each case the corresponding notation makes presentation easier.

in both sides have the same degree, they are equal. Further, we can rewrite equation (1) as:

$$\begin{aligned} c(X) &= \frac{c_0(X) - c_1(X)}{2} X^{\frac{m}{2}} + \frac{c_0(X) + c_1(X)}{2} = \\ &= \frac{c_0(X) - c_1(X)}{2} t_0(X) + c_0(X) = \frac{c_0(X) - c_1(X)}{2} t_1(X) + c_1(X) \end{aligned}$$

Evaluating at τ gives a relation between C, C_0, C_1 . More generally, if $K_{b_j \dots b_0} = 2\omega^{(\sum_{i=0}^j b_i 2^i) \frac{m}{2^{j+2}}}$, the following relations hold for any $j = 0, \dots, \nu$:

$$C_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} = K_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} (C_{0\mathbf{b}_{|j}} [t_{1\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(\tau)]_1 - C_{1\mathbf{b}_{|j}} [t_{0\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(\tau)]_1) \quad (2)$$

$$= K_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} (C_{0\mathbf{b}_{|j}} - C_{1\mathbf{b}_{|j}}) \tau^{\frac{m}{2^{j+1}}} + K_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} (C_{0\mathbf{b}_{|j}} + C_{1\mathbf{b}_{|j}}) \quad (3)$$

$$= K_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} (C_{0\mathbf{b}_{|j}} - C_{1\mathbf{b}_{|j}}) [t_{1\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(\tau)]_1 + C_{1\mathbf{b}_{|j}} \quad (4)$$

$$= K_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} (C_{0\mathbf{b}_{|j}} - C_{1\mathbf{b}_{|j}}) [t_{0\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(\tau)]_1 + C_{0\mathbf{b}_{|j}}. \quad (5)$$

Equation (2) generalizes the previous examples and gives the basic relation between the parent and the children nodes. The other equations come from rearranging the expression. Expression (3) will be useful to argue how to compute all commitments in the tree efficiently from bottom to top.

To open C to a certain leaf commitment $C_{\mathbf{b}}$, the idea is to implicitly show from root to leaf that $C_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} - C_{\mathbf{b}_{|j+1}}$ agree in $\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{b}_{|j+1}}$. This is proven by showing that their difference is divisible by $t_{(1-b_{j+1})\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(X)$. Equations (4,5) give the exact expression for the quotient, i.e. it shows that, defining $H_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} = K_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} (C_{0\mathbf{b}_{|j}} - C_{1\mathbf{b}_{|j}})$, one can write $C_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} - C_{\mathbf{b}_{|j+1}} = [H_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} t_{\mathbf{b}_{|j+1}}(\tau)]_1$. If $H = (C_0 - C_1)/2$, going iteratively from the root replacing the commitments in the path of the leaf one gets:

$$C(X) = H t_{b_0}(X) + C_{b_0} = H \cdot t_{b_0}(X) + H_{b_0} \cdot t_{b_1 b_0}(X) + C_{b_0 b_1} = \dots \quad (6)$$

$$= H t_{b_0}(X) + \sum_{i=0}^{\nu} H_{\mathbf{b}_{|i}} \cdot t_{\mathbf{b}_{|i+1}}(X) + C_{\mathbf{b}}. \quad (7)$$

To open $C = [C(\tau)]_1$ to $C_{\mathbf{b}}$, the prover will send the verifier commitments to the $H(X)$ s polynomials in this expression. For soundness, the general idea is that if we think of $C, C_{\mathbf{b}}$ as polynomials evaluated at τ , they must agree on the set $\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{b}}$ since all the other terms in the expression evaluate to 0 in this coset. Note that the “tree opening” does not guarantee that the prover can construct a single $C_{\mathbf{b}}$ that verifies the proof (in fact, it is easy to randomize the values). However, the proof together with the inner product opening (or a field element opening for the leaf if $\kappa = 0$) is sufficient: the “tree part” of the proof implies that $C, C_{\mathbf{b}}$ as polynomials agree in $\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{b}}$ and the inner product that $C_{\mathbf{b}}$ has the right degree.

Scheme Description. Formally, we present an LVC commitment scheme that works for the function family²²:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Ext}_{\nu\text{-}\mathcal{F}_{p,2^\kappa}} &= \{f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}, m = 2^{\kappa+\nu+1} \mid \exists \mathbf{f} \in \mathbb{F}^{2^\kappa}, \mathbf{b} \in \{0, 1\}^{\nu+1} \text{ s.t.} \\ &\quad \forall \mathbf{v}_{0\dots 0}, \dots, \mathbf{v}_{1\dots 1} \in \mathbb{F}^{2^\kappa} : f(\mathbf{v}_{0\dots 0}, \dots, \mathbf{v}_{1\dots 1}) = \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{b}} \cdot \mathbf{f}\} \end{aligned}$$

Algorithms `UVTree.KeyGen` and `UVTree.Commit(pk, v) → (C, aux)` are the same as the Lagrange basis construction of Section 5 and are omitted. The commitment to \mathbf{v} is $C = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}]_1 \mathbf{v}$ together with the auxiliary input information `aux`. Note that step 4. of the open algorithm is `IP.Open` from Sec. 5.2.

`UVTree.Open(pk, b, aux, f, y) → π:`

1. Let $f(\mathbf{v}_{0\dots 0}, \dots, \mathbf{v}_{1\dots 1}) = \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{b}} \cdot \mathbf{f}$ for $\mathbf{f} \in \mathbb{F}^{2^\kappa}$ and some $\mathbf{b} = (b_\nu, \dots, b_0)$.
2. For any $0 \leq j \leq \nu$, compute $C_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} = [\boldsymbol{\lambda}^{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}]_1 \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}$.
3. Compute $[H]_1 = (C_0 - C_1)/2$, and for any $0 \leq j \leq \nu - 1$, compute $K_{b_{|j}} = 2\omega^{(\sum_{i=0}^j b_i 2^i) \frac{m}{2^{j+2}}}$. Then define $[H_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}]_1 = K_{b_{|j}} (C_{0b_{|j} \dots b_0} - C_{1b_{|j} \dots b_0})$.

²² Similarly to the multivariate case, we can also consider general linear functions.

4. Find $R(X), H_{\mathbf{b}}(X), \hat{R}(X)$ such that if

$$(\lambda^{\mathbf{b}_{|j+1}}(X) \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}) \left(\sum_{i=1}^{2^\kappa} f_i \lambda_i^{\mathbf{b}}(X) \right) - ym^{-1} = XR(X) + H_{\mathbf{b}}(X)t_{\mathbf{b}}(X).$$

Define $\hat{R}(X) = X^{m-1-2^\kappa} R(X)$.²³

5. Output $([H_{b_0}]_1, \dots, [H_{\mathbf{b}_{|\nu-1}}]_1, [H_{\mathbf{b}}(\tau)]_1, [R(\tau)]_1, [\hat{R}(\tau)]_1, [\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}}]_1)$.

UVTree.Vf(vk, C, f, y, π) → 0/1:

1. Use the vector representation \mathbf{f} of f and compute $\mathbf{C}_f = \sum_{i=1}^{2^\kappa} f_i [\lambda_i^{\mathbf{b}}(\tau)]_2$.
2. Check that

$$e(\mathbf{C} - \mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}}, 1) = e([H]_1, [t_{b_0}(\tau)]_2) + \sum_{i=0}^{\nu-1} e([H_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}]_1, [t_{\mathbf{b}_{|j+1}}(\tau)]_2) \quad (8)$$

$$e(\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}}, \mathbf{C}_f) - e(m^{-1}y[1]_1, [1]_2) = e([R]_1, [1]_2) + e([H_{\mathbf{b}}]_1, [t_{\mathbf{b}}(\tau)]_2) \quad (9)$$

$$e([R]_1, [\tau^{m-1-2^\kappa}]_2) = e([\hat{R}]_1, [1]_2) \quad (10)$$

Alternatively, if $m = 2^{\nu+1}$, the scheme supports individual openings only and the IP commitment is not used but instead $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{b}} = y$. To save online verifier work one can preprocess λ^δ , for any $\delta \in \{0, 1\}^\nu$ (m elements).

Completeness follows from the high level description of the scheme. For the simple case, where the tree is used to open individual position we prove soundness under standard assumptions in the following theorem.

Theorem 9. *When $m = 2^{\nu+1}$, the scheme is secure under the $(m-1)$ -BSDH assumption.*

Proof. Given an instance of the $(m-1)$ -BSDH Assumption, generate the parameters and give them to the adversary.

When it comes up with two different y, y' and accepting proofs $(\{[H]_1, [H_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}]_1\}_{j=0}^{\nu-1})$, $(\{[H']_1, [H'_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}]_1\}_{j=0}^{\nu-1})$, the challenger can obtain by subtracting the verification equations:

$$e((y - y')[1]_1, [1]_2) = e([H - H']_1, [t_{b_0}(\tau)]_2) + \sum_{i=0}^{\nu-1} e([H_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} - H'_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}]_1, [t_{\mathbf{b}_{|j+1}}(\tau)]_2). \quad (11)$$

Let $p_j(X) = (t_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(X))/(X - \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{b}})$. This is a polynomial of degree less than $m-1$ since $\mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{b}}$ is a root of $t_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}(X)$ for any $0 \leq j \leq \nu$. $[p_j]_1 = [p_j(\tau)]_1$ can be constructed from the powers of τ in \mathbb{G}_1 . Substituting in Eq. 11 and rearranging terms, we can compute,

$$\left[\frac{1}{\tau - \mathbf{h}_{\mathbf{b}}} \right]_T = (y - y')^{-1} \left(e([H - H']_1, [p_0]_2) + \sum_{i=0}^{\nu-1} e([H_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}} - H'_{\mathbf{b}_{|j}}]_1, [p_{j+1}]_2) \right),$$

breaking the $(m-1)$ -BSDH Assumption.

When $\kappa > 0$ and one uses the IP argument for the leaf commitments, the proof is in the AGM and is based on the intuition mentioned before that the “tree part” of the proof guarantees that \mathbf{C} and $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}}$ agree on $\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{b}}$, while the IP part guarantees that $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{b}}$ is of the right degree, so it guarantees uniqueness of $\mathbf{c}_{\mathbf{b}}$. Finally, the IP soundness allows to complete the reasoning.

Maintainability. Naive computation of all partial proofs takes time $O(m \log^2 m)$ but this can be reduced to time $O(m \log m)$ computing some values at the leafs and traversing the tree from leaf to root to compute the rest of the values using expression (3).

²³ We assume as in Section 5 that at most $m-1$ powers of τ are in the SRS in group \mathbb{G}_1 . The degree check is meant to ensure that $R(X)$ is of degree at most $2^\kappa - 2$.

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A Vector Commitment Definitions

In this section we provide the classical definitions of vector commitments (VC), introduced by Catalano and Fiore [7], and subvector commitments (SVC), as in [4, 20], that are particular cases of Linear-map Vector Commitments (LVC).

Definition 7 (Vector Commitment). *A vector commitment for vectors from the message space \mathcal{M} is a tuple of PPT algorithms (KeyGen, Commit, Open, Vf) that work as follows:*

VC.KeyGen($1^\lambda, \mathcal{M}, m$) \rightarrow prk, vrk: *On input the security parameter λ , the message space \mathcal{M} for the vectors and the maximum vector length m ²⁴. It returns a proving key prk that includes \mathcal{M} , and a verification key vrk.*

VC.Commit(prk, \mathbf{v}) \rightarrow (C, aux): *Takes prk and a vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_m) \in \mathcal{M}^m$, and returns a commitment C and auxiliary information aux.*

VC.Open(prk, aux, i, v_i) \rightarrow π_i : *On input prk, aux, an index $i \in [n]$, and a value v_i , it outputs a proof π_i that the value v_i is at position i .*

VC.Vf(vrk, C, i, v, π_i) \rightarrow $b \in \{0, 1\}$: *On input vrk, C, $i \in [m]$, a value $v \in \mathcal{M}$ and π_i , it outputs 1 if the proof verifies and 0 otherwise.*

Perfect Correctness A VC scheme is *perfectly correct* if, for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any vector length $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, any index $i \in [n]$, and any $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{M}^m$, we have:

$$\Pr \left[\text{VC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \text{C}, i, v_i, \pi_i) = 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{VC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{M}, m) \\ (\text{C}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{VC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}) \\ \pi_i \leftarrow \text{VC.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}, i, v_i) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

²⁴ Some schemes are *unbounded*: they ignore m since they can commit to vectors of any length $\text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Strong Position Binding A VC scheme satisfies *strong position binding* if, for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any vector length $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{VC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, i, v, \pi) = 1 \\ \wedge \text{VC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, i, v', \pi') = 1 \\ \wedge v \neq v' \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{VC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{M}, m) \\ (\mathbf{C}, i, (v, \pi), (v', \pi')) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Weak Position Binding If we relax the definition above to hold only for *honestly-generated* commitments \mathbf{C} , we obtain a *weak position binding* notion. In other words, for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any vector length $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{VC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, i, v, \pi) = 1 \\ \wedge \text{VC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, i, v', \pi') = 1 \\ \wedge y \neq y' \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{VC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{M}) \\ (\mathbf{v}, i, v, \pi, v', \pi') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \\ (\mathbf{C}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{VC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}) \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Definition 8 (Sub-Vector Commitment). A *Sub-Vector Commitment* scheme is a VC scheme that opens subsets rather than positions. It consists on algorithms $(\text{SVC.KeyGen}, \text{SVC.Commit}, \text{SVC.Open}, \text{SVC.Vf})$ that work as follows:

$\text{SVC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{M}, m) \rightarrow \text{prk}, \text{vrk}$: Takes the security parameter λ , the message space \mathcal{M} for the vectors elements and the maximum vector length m . It outputs a proving key prk and verification key vrk .

$\text{SVC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}) \rightarrow (\mathbf{C}, \text{aux})$: On prk and a vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, v_2 \dots, v_m) \in \mathcal{M}^m$, returns a commitment \mathbf{C} and auxiliary information aux .

$\text{SVC.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}, I, \mathbf{v}_I) \rightarrow \pi_I$: Takes as input prk , aux , a set of index $I \subset [m]$ and values $\mathbf{v}_I = \{v_i\}_{i \in I}$ and outputs a proof π_I that v_i is the value in position i , for all $i \in I$.

$\text{SVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, I, \mathbf{y}, \pi_I) \rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$: Takes as input vrk , \mathbf{C} , I , a vector $\mathbf{y} = \{y_i\}_{i \in I}$ and π_I . It outputs 1 for accept or 0 for reject.

SVC correctness An SVC scheme is *perfectly correct* if, for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any vector length $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, any index set $I \subset [m]$, and any $\mathbf{v} \in \mathcal{M}^m$,

$$\Pr \left[\text{SVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, I, \mathbf{v}_I, \pi_I) = 1 \middle| \begin{array}{l} (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{VC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{M}, m) \\ (\mathbf{C}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{VC.Commit}(\text{prk}, \mathbf{v}) \\ \pi_I \leftarrow \text{SVC.Open}(\text{prk}, \text{aux}, I, \mathbf{v}_I) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

SVC binding. Binding captures the impossibility of creating inconsistent openings for subvectors. An SVC scheme satisfies *strong position binding* if, for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any vector length $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$,

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{SVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, I, \mathbf{y}, \pi_I) = 1 \wedge \\ \text{SVC.Vf}(\text{vrk}, \mathbf{C}, J, \mathbf{y}', \pi_J) = 1 \\ \wedge \exists i \in I \cap J \text{ s.t. } y_i \neq y'_i \end{array} \middle| \begin{array}{l} (\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \leftarrow \text{VC.KeyGen}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{M}, m) \\ \left(\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{C}, I, J, \\ \mathbf{y}, \pi_I, \mathbf{y}', \pi_J \end{array} \right) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{prk}, \text{vrk}) \end{array} \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Weak Position Binding is considering the definition above to hold only for *honestly-generated* commitments \mathbf{C} computed via SVC.Commit .

B Vector Commitment Applications

Here we describe in more detail some of the applications of our work and their specific requirements.

B.1 Verifiable Databases

Vector commitments are a solution for the problem of outsourcing storage to untrusted parties. In the verifiable database (VDB) setting, a client owns a database D and wishes to outsource the storage of D to a server while keeping the ability to query and update the database. The security goal is to prevent an untrusted server from tampering with the database and cheat on the query outcomes that it provides to the client. A good solution should enable the client to run efficiently once the outsourcing has been performed. Furthermore, the communication and running time of the query and update protocols should not depend on the total size of the database.

The basic problem of integrity of outsourced data can be easily solved by using the celebrated Merkle tree construction [23]. It consists in hashing the data using a tree structure in which the leaves are the blocks of D and every internal node is the hash of its two child nodes; the root of this tree is the so-called Merkle hash (digest) of D . To use Merkle trees to solve the outsourced storage problem, the client can compute the Merkle tree and store only the root. When the client wants to retrieve the k -th record D_k , the server responds with the data and a logarithmic-size path consisting of the nodes from D_k until the root, and the client can then verify the authenticity of D_k in logarithmic time by recomputing a hashed value using the path and check it against the stored digest (Merkle root). The security of this construction can be reduced to the collision resistance of the hash function [23]. In terms of efficiency, the communication complexity of this protocol is $O(\log n)$.

While Merkle trees solution is asymptotically better than resending the entire database, Vector Commitments allow to improve the communication complexity beyond logarithmic and to add important properties such as updatability or functional openings.

B.2 Stateless Cryptocurrency

One of an important decentralised applications of vector commitments is in distributed ledger-based payment systems, known as cryptocurrencies. The best-known examples of cryptocurrency largely used today are Bitcoin, Ethereum, or Zcash to name a few. Such a system, utilises a blockchain in order to post and record peer-to-peer payment transactions. This translates into an ordered log of transactions, in other words an append-only public ledger, that is replicated across nodes in the network. We will call such nodes that store and check the transactions log *validators*, as opposed to simple cryptocurrency users who only store their account balances. The validators are essential to reach consensus on what is the current state of the public ledger.

Unfortunately, there is a bottleneck: verifying the validity of a transaction requires querying the entire ledger to obtain the latest state of the account balances. However, maintaining the entire ledger increases the memory requirements and reduces the number of possible validators.

To reduce the amount of storage required of validators, there have been solutions [4, 8] based on vector commitments. Instead of storing the entire ledger state, the validators can keep commitments to vectors representing the state. Using vector commitments properties, validators with a commitment to the ledger state can still validate transactions sent by users by checking opening proofs against the commitment. More concretely, the users will send their account balance values and a proof that this is consistent with respect to the commitments stored by the validators. After the transaction is accepted, the validators should be able to update the commitment to the old state to a commitment to the new state that includes the changes made by the transaction. If the vector commitment scheme has small commitment sizes, short proofs, efficient opening computation and allow for updates, then such a solution provides the best trade-off between storage, bandwidth, and computation.

We call such a solution a *stateless cryptocurrency*, i.e. a system where neither validators nor cryptocurrency users need to store the full ledger state. While the stateless cryptocurrencies overcome the storage overhead when performing transaction validation, they increase network communication because of extra opening proofs added to each transaction payload. To minimise communication in the transactions, an important feature of vector commitments is aggregation. Using aggregation to "pack" together multiple opening

proofs for a batch of transactions into a single constant-size proof allows a significant improvement in the communication.

Another important property for applications to stateless cryptocurrencies is *maintainability*. This guarantees that re-proving an opening about the new state requires less time than computing it from scratch, which would make all previous computations useless. Instead, the individual proofs are initially computed and *stored* and *efficiently updated* after each state transition. Collective updates or maintainability saves computational resources since computing a single proof needs linear time while updating *all proofs* needs sublinear (e.g. logarithmic time).

To summarize, in order to provide the best trade-off between storage, bandwidth, and computation in stateless cryptocurrency application, the following properties are required from a VC scheme:

Short Commitment: validators store only a commitment to the ledger state.

Short Opening Proofs: to submit a transaction, users will send their account balance values and a proof that this is consistent with respect to the commitments stored by the validators.

Efficient Verification: to validate transactions, validators check opening proofs against the commitment.

Updatability: after the transaction is accepted, the validators should be able to update the commitment to the old state to a commitment to the new state that includes the changes made by the transaction.

Aggregation: to minimise communication in the transactions, some nodes can "pack" together multiple opening proofs for a batch of transactions into a single small proof.

Maintainability: to save proving time at each update, maintaining all the proofs up to date should be possible in sublinear time each time the state changes.

B.3 Proof of Space

Proof-of-Space (PoS) is an eco-friendly alternative to proof-of-work (PoW) in blockchain-based consensus mechanisms that does not consume its resource (space vs. energy), but rather reuses it. A PoS, was introduced in [10] and further studied in [27, 1, 13]. It is an interactive protocol between a prover and a verifier that allows to check if the prover is storing intactly a file (data) that uses a specified amount of disk space. The protocol must have compact communication relative to the prover's space requirements and efficient verification. A PoS is persistent if repeated audits force the prover to permanently store the file over a period of time.

Proof of Space protocols consist of two main steps:

- **Initialization** (Setup phase): On public input \mathbf{v} , an *advice* \mathbf{a} (e.g., vector of random data) of size m is created and committed to in \mathcal{C} . The advice is stored by the prover, while the verifier knows only the commitment \mathcal{C} to the advice.
- **Execution** (Audit phase): The verifier sends a challenge, for example asking the prover to open some positions in the advice and the prover responds. The verifier outputs accept if they are convinced that the prover stores the advice. This phase can be repeated many times.

We require that the verifier is highly efficient in both phases, whereas the prover is highly efficient in the execution phase if they are honest and had stored the data as expected. Otherwise, if the prover deleted parts of the file, regenerating the advice in order to pass the audit phase should be more costly (in time or computation cost) than just storing the file. A PoS can be run non-interactively using a public blockchain to perform the Setup and the Audit phase of the protocol described above. Provers and verifiers will post their challenge-response in the blockchain and this should be publicly verifiable.

Publicly Verifiable Proof of Space. A classical publicly verifiable PoS is based on Merkle trees and random spot-checks. A drawback of this construction is that proofs grow with the number of spotchecks (and the size of the tree) and become undesirably large to be stored in a blockchain. While these checks can be compressed through a SNARK (Succinct Non-interactive Argument of Knowledge) [17], this still require hundreds of GB of RAM and tens of minutes compared to our vector commitment solution.

For a construction of PoS based on vector commitments, the prover (miner) uses a VC to commit to a file (seen as a vector of blocks); then at every audit the verifier chooses a challenge by picking a set of many randomly chosen positions, and the prover responds by sending the subvector and an opening proof. The soundness property of a PoS scheme requires that for any prover that convinces the verifier that it is storing the file, there exists an algorithm called the extractor that interacts with the prover and extracts the file.

A vector commitment construction with openings for subvectors immediately implies a publicly-verifiable proof of storage.

Finally, our tree-based constructions allows reduced proving costs in the audit phase of PoS by instead using some extra memory to store proofs. A prover can efficiently pre-compute and store proofs and simply serve them on demand. Since memory is expensive, however, it is not optimal to store all the proofs. Our construction is flexible: a prover only stores *partial proofs* to reduce computation. Importantly, the part of the proof that is computed on the fly has constant size and therefore the proof size only depends on the amount of memory dedicated by the prover. Finally, our proofs can be aggregated using standard techniques [5]. The smaller proof size translates to a cheaper aggregation cost.

B.4 Compiling SNARKs from Vector Commitments

Our LVC schemes can be used to construct new efficient Succinct Non-interactive Arguments of Knowledge (SNARKs) with constant-size opening. Following up on the approach pioneered by Kilian [19] and Micali [24], recent works [4, 20] show that we can construct SNARKs based on probabilistically checkable proofs (PCPs) or interactive oracle proofs (IOPs) by plugging in vector commitments with subvector openings.

In an IOP the prover sends multiple proof oracles to a verifier. The verifier uses these oracles to query a small subsets of the proof in order to decide acceptance or rejection. Recent practical instantiations of proof systems from IOPs use Merkle trees as a vector commitment. While Merkle trees do not require a trusted setup, these schemes have two significant drawbacks for the two above applications: first, position openings are not constant size, and second, the openings of several positions cannot be compressed into a single constant size proof (i.e. it does not support aggregation or subvector openings). LVC with subvector openings are a perfect candidate to instantiate IOP-based SNARKs.

Replacing Merkle trees with a vector commitment, Lai and Malavolta [20] obtain a SNARK where the proof consists of 3 field elements and 2 group elements. Using the same blueprint, we can use LVC to match the same proof size as theirs and improve the trusted setup by making it compatible with other widely deployed proof systems. On the other hand, the construction in [20] (last row in their Table 2) requires a trusted setup with a “gap” in the powers of exponent.

B.5 Applications of Range Openings

One of the features of our monomial-basis construction is to have efficient range openings. These arguably have several natural applications.

In several protocols involving queries, it is common to perform some type of “caching” optimizations. For example, an HTTP client can perform *prefetching*²⁵ and receive from a server not only the values of interest but other related values that could potentially be queried in the near future (e.g., values in a neighboring range of the queried values). Our range-based queries can be used in similar setting whenever we need to query a resource whose digest consists of a vector commitment.

C Native SVC in [29]

For a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^m$ and a subset $I \subset [m]$, the subvector opening scheme of Tomescu et. al. ([29]) consists on algorithms (SVC.KeyGen, SVC.Commit, SVC.Open, SVC.Vf) such that SVC.KeyGen, SVC.Commit behave as IP.KeyGen, IP.Commit in the construction of Section 5.2 and the other two as follows:

²⁵ https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/Link_prefetching_FAQ

SVC.Open(prk, aux, I , $\tilde{\mathbf{c}}$) $\rightarrow \pi_I$: Compute $\tilde{C}(X) = \sum_{i \in I} \tilde{c}_i \mu_i(X)$, where $\{\mu_i(X)\}$ are the Lagrange interpolation polynomials of the set $\{\mathbf{h}_i\}_{i \in I}$, and find $H(X)$ such that for $t_I(X) = \prod_{i \in I} (X - \mathbf{h}_i)$,

$$C(X) - \tilde{C}(X) = t_I(X)H(X).$$

Output $\pi_I = (\tilde{\mathbf{C}} = [\tilde{C}(\tau)]_1, [H]_1 = [H(\tau)]_1)$.

SVC.Vf(vrk, \mathbf{C} , I , $\tilde{\mathbf{c}}$, π_I) $\rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$: Compute $[t_I]_2 = [t_I(\tau)]_2$ and output 1 if and only if

$$e(\mathbf{C} - \tilde{\mathbf{C}}, [1]_2) = e([H]_1, [t_I]_2).$$

D Complementary material of section 8.

D.1 PST polynomial commitment

The PST polynomial commitment allows to commit to ν -variate polynomials of individual degrees less than ℓ . The core idea of the construction lies in the fact that for every $p(\mathbf{X}) \in \mathbb{F}[X_\nu, \dots, X_1]$ and $\mathbf{x} = (x_\nu, \dots, x_1) \in \mathbb{F}^\nu$, $p(\mathbf{x}) = y$ if and only if there exist polynomials $H_\nu(\mathbf{X}), \dots, H_1(\mathbf{X})$ such that

$$p(\mathbf{X}) - y = \sum_{j=1}^{\nu} H_j(\mathbf{X}) \cdot (X_j - x_j)$$

where the proof polynomials $H_j(\mathbf{X})$ are efficiently computable.

Using standard techniques to encode monomials in a cryptographically secure bilinear group (encode setting $\mathbf{X} = \boldsymbol{\tau}$ and publishing all the monomials $[\tau_\nu^{d_\nu} \dots \tau_1^{d_1}]_1$ and $[\boldsymbol{\tau}]_2$) the exponents of results in a polynomial commitment with proof of size roughly ν group elements.

Srinivasan et. al. [28] observe that computing all polynomial evaluations and proofs for a committed ν -variate multilinear polynomial in the hypercube $\{0, 1\}^\nu$ can be done in quasi-linear time in the dimension of the vector, instead of the trivial quadratic time. By encoding a vector as the corresponding interpolating polynomial in $\{0, 1\}^\nu$, we get a vector commitment with quasi-linear time for pre-computing all proofs. Furthermore, the homomorphic properties along with the tensor structure of multivariate polynomials allow to efficiently (in logarithmic time) update all proofs after a position update. Thus, the resulting construction is a *maintainable* vector commitment scheme.

We extend these techniques to construct a multi-variate vector commitment scheme with the same properties while reducing proof size. Specifically, we observe that evaluating all openings in any set of the form Σ^ν for small ν has lower amortized cost than computing the evaluations individually. Using Σ of size ℓ instead of 2 -or equivalently using a low degree instead of a multilinear encoding- results in smaller proof size. Concretely, the proof size depends on the dimension of the hypercube. Setting $\ell = O(1)$ to avoid a blowup in the prover's computation results in proof size roughly $\log_\ell m$ instead of $\log_2 m$, reducing the proof size by a constant factor.

We next describe the high level idea of the construction. First, fix an alphabet $\Sigma \subseteq \mathbb{F}$ of size ℓ and consider the hypercube Σ^ν . Assume (w.l.o.g.) $\Sigma = \{0, \dots, \ell - 1\}$ so that we can encode indices of vectors in ℓ -ary.

Now, we can encode a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}^\nu$ by considering the (unique) low degree interpolating polynomial $p(\mathbf{X})$ of \mathbf{v} , that is, the ν -variate polynomial of individual degree less than ℓ such that for all $\boldsymbol{\sigma} \in \Sigma^\nu$, $p(\boldsymbol{\sigma}) = v_\sigma$. This corresponds to position i with ℓ -ary representation $(\boldsymbol{\sigma})_\ell$. Computing all opening proofs corresponds to evaluating and proving evaluations of $p(\mathbf{X})$ in the hypercube Σ^ν . To compute these evaluations in quasi-linear (instead of quadratic) time we rely on the following lemma which is implicit in the computation of the $H_j(\mathbf{X})$ polynomials of PST.

Lemma 1. *Let $\Sigma \subseteq \mathbb{F}$ be a subset of \mathbb{F} . Also, let $p(X_\nu, \dots, X_1) \in \mathbb{F}[X_\nu, \dots, X_1]$ be a polynomial in ν variables and $p_\sigma(X_{\nu-1}, \dots, X_1) \in \mathbb{F}[X_{\nu-1}, \dots, X_1]$ be a polynomial in $\nu - 1$ variables. Then, for all $\sigma \in \Sigma$, $p(\sigma, X_{\nu-1}, \dots, X_1) = p_\sigma(X_{\nu-1}, \dots, X_1)$ iff there exist a polynomial $H(X_\nu, \dots, X_1)$ such that*

$$p(X_\nu, \dots, X_1) - p_\sigma(X_{\nu-1}, \dots, X_1) = H(X_\nu, \dots, X_1)(X_\nu - \sigma) \quad (12)$$

To open the polynomial at $\sigma = (\sigma_\nu, \dots, \sigma_1) \in \Sigma^\nu$, the prover can compute the polynomials $p(\sigma_\nu, X_{\nu-1}, \dots, X_1), \dots, p(\sigma_\nu, \dots, \sigma_1)$ and compute “proof” polynomials $H_\nu(\mathbf{X}), \dots, H_1(\mathbf{X})$. That is, for $1 \leq j \leq \nu$ the following equations hold:

$$p(\sigma_{|j+1}, X_j, \dots, X_1) - p(\sigma_{|j+1}, \sigma_j, X_{j-1}, \dots, X_1) = H_j(\mathbf{X})(X_j - \sigma_j)$$

Summing all the ν claims, we derive the PST verification equation. Note that the polynomial $H_j(\mathbf{X})$ is *independent* of the variables X_ν, \dots, X_{j+1} . Hence, each iteration is cheaper than the previous one.

The interesting part is that proofs for different positions *share elements*. Consider a polynomial $H(\mathbf{X})$ asserting $p(\sigma, X_\nu, \dots, X_1) - p_\sigma(X_{\nu-1}, \dots, X_1)$. This element will be part of the proof for all elements $\sigma \in \Sigma^\nu$ whose first component is $\sigma_\nu = \sigma$. We utilize this fact to get a smaller amortized cost for evaluating all “proof” polynomials in the hypercube.

The tensor structure of the multivariate polynomial allows to express the openings in the hypercube as a tree. Each node of the tree corresponds to a partial evaluation of p . A proof polynomial H is associated with each of them. We demonstrate this in Fig. 4.




Fig. 4: Tree structure for polynomials in 3 variables with individual degree at most 3. The dimension of the committed vectors with these parameters is $4^3 = 64$. We follow the path until we reach the leaves prefixed with (1, 2). Note that each polynomial is an encoding of the leaves of the sub-tree it defines.

Finally, when using the Lagrange basis to encode polynomials, the interpolating polynomial $p(\mathbf{X})$ corresponding to \mathbf{v} becomes $\lambda(X_\nu, \dots, X_1) \cdot \mathbf{v}$. Furthermore, each node of the tree is of the form $\lambda(X_i, \dots, X_1) \cdot \mathbf{v}'$ where \mathbf{v}' is the subvector of \mathbf{v} corresponding to the leaf descendants of the node.

Finally, we demonstrate the new tree structure of the commitment after we modify the leaf elements with committed values.

D.2 Completeness of UVTree construction.

To prove completeness of the UVTree construction, we start by proving the fundamental relation between parent and children nodes.

Lemma 2. *With the notation introduced in section 8.3,*

$$\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}_j} = K_{\mathbf{b}_j} (\mathbf{C}_{0\mathbf{b}_j} [t_{1\mathbf{b}_j}(\tau)]_1 - \mathbf{C}_{1\mathbf{b}_j} [t_{0\mathbf{b}_j}(\tau)]_1) \quad (13)$$

$$= K_{\mathbf{b}_j} (\mathbf{C}_{0\mathbf{b}_j} - \mathbf{C}_{1\mathbf{b}_j}) \tau^{\frac{m}{2j+1}} + K_{\mathbf{b}_j} (\mathbf{C}_{0\mathbf{b}_j} + \mathbf{C}_{1\mathbf{b}_j}) \quad (14)$$

$$= K_{\mathbf{b}_j} (\mathbf{C}_{0\mathbf{b}_j} - \mathbf{C}_{1\mathbf{b}_j}) [t_{1\mathbf{b}_j}(\tau)]_1 + \mathbf{C}_{1\mathbf{b}_j} \quad (15)$$

$$= K_{\mathbf{b}_j} (\mathbf{C}_{0\mathbf{b}_j} - \mathbf{C}_{1\mathbf{b}_j}) [t_{0\mathbf{b}_j}(\tau)]_1 + \mathbf{C}_{0\mathbf{b}_j}. \quad (16)$$




Fig. 5: Demonstration of the tree structure of a commitment. Leaf nodes are commitments to k -dimensional vectors for an arbitrary vector commitment scheme. Each node is a commitment to its children under a Lagrange based key. The message space of the scheme is $k \cdot 2^3$.

Proof. Consider the relation as the evaluations of polynomials in formal variable X . We will show that the above relation holds as a polynomial identity. The polynomial associated to $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}_j}$ has degree $\frac{m}{2^{j+1}} - 1$, and so do the polynomials in the right hand side. Therefore, to show the identity holds we just need to see that the two polynomials coincide in $\mathbb{H}^{0\mathbf{b}_j} \cup \mathbb{H}^{1\mathbf{b}_j}$, which is a set of size $\frac{m}{2^{j+1}}$. If we evaluate at $\eta \in \mathbb{H}^{0\mathbf{b}_j}$,

$$t_{1\mathbf{b}_j}(\eta) = K_{\mathbf{b}_j}$$

and

$$t_{0\mathbf{b}_j}(\eta) = -K_{\mathbf{b}_j}$$

which concludes the proof, as by definition, $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}_j}$ and $\mathbf{C}_{v\mathbf{b}_j}$ take the same value in the proof.

Next we show completeness of UVTree construction.

Theorem 10. *Construction UVTree is complete.*

Proof. Consider an honest execution of Open algorithm. The last two steps verify. Indeed, for the second test, it is enough to note that $\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}}$ is a commitment to a vector \mathbf{b} such that $\mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{b}} \cdot \mathbf{f} = y$ and the verification equation is a test for asserting this inner product. The third equation follows by construction. It remains to show that the first test passes as well.

By the above lemma we have that for all $0 \leq j \leq \nu - 1$

$$\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}_j} = K_{\mathbf{b}_j} (\mathbf{C}_{0\mathbf{b}_j} - \mathbf{C}_{1\mathbf{b}_j}) t_{b_{j+1}\mathbf{b}_j}(\tau) + \mathbf{C}_{b_{j+1}\mathbf{b}_j} = H_{|\mathbf{b}_j} t_{b_{j+1}\mathbf{b}_j}(\tau) + \mathbf{C}_{b_{j+1}\mathbf{b}_j}$$

or equivalently

$$\mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}_j} - \mathbf{C}_{b_{j+1}\mathbf{b}_j} = H_{\mathbf{b}_j} t_{\mathbf{b}_{j+1}}(\tau)$$

Also, by construction,

$$\mathbf{C} - \mathbf{C}_{b_0} = H t_{b_0}(\tau)$$

Summing all these equation we get

$$\mathbf{C} - \mathbf{C}_{\mathbf{b}} = H t_0(\tau) + \sum_{j=0}^{\nu-1} H_{\mathbf{b}_j} t_{\mathbf{b}_{j+1}}(\tau)$$

which corresponds to the first verification test.

The $(m-1, m)$ -discrete logarithm assumption states it is find to compute the discrete logarithm of some element when $m-1$ powers are given in \mathbb{G}_1 and m in \mathbb{G}_2 .

Theorem 11. *In the AGM, the construction is sound under the $(m-1, m)$ -discrete logarithm assumption and the $(m-1, m)$ -strong BDH Assumption.*

Proof. (sketch) Since the adversary is algebraic, there exist coefficients $a_i \in \mathbb{F}^{m-1}$ that can be extracted from the adversary and such that $C_{\mathbf{b}} = \sum_{i=1}^m a_i \lambda_i(\tau)$. That is, $C_{\mathbf{b}}$ is a polynomial of degree at most $m-1$ (the powers in the SRS) evaluated at τ , and similarly for the other terms of the proof. For the reasons argued before, C and $C_{\mathbf{b}}$ must correspond to the evaluation of two polynomials that agree on $t^{\mathbb{H}^{\mathbf{b}}}$. On the other hand, because of the degree check either $C_{\mathbf{b}}$ is the evaluation in τ of some polynomial of degree at most $2^\kappa - 1$ or there is some non-trivial relation between powers of τ in the group that allows to recover the break the discrete logarithm assumption.

Maintanability As mentioned, naive computation of all partial proofs takes time $O(m \log^2 m)$

However, one can do better: using FFT compute the 2^κ coefficients of $C_{\mathbf{b}}(X) = \lambda^{\mathbb{H}}(X) \mathbf{v}_{\mathbf{b}}$ in the monomial basis ($O(2^{\nu+1} \cdot \kappa 2^\kappa)$ field operations) and traverse the tree from leaf to root to compute the rest of the values. Using this basis, each level can be computed using $O(m)$ operations. As an illustration, having $C_0(X), C_1(X)$ in the monomial basis, we can compute $[H]_1, C$ by computing $C(X) = \frac{1}{2}(C_0(X) - C_1(X))X^{\frac{m}{2}} + \frac{1}{2}(C_0(X) + C_1(X))$; encoding them in \mathbb{G}_1 using roughly m operations. In total, we need $O(m \log m)$ field and group operations. Updating all proofs needs $O(\nu)$ operations. It works as in the multivariate case, exploiting that a commitment to δe_i has only $O(\nu)$ non-zero proof elements.

D.3 Lagrange basis IP for Cosets of Roots of Unity

We argue the construction of Section 5.2 of IP vector commitments using the Lagrange basis can be implemented when using a coset of size $r = \frac{m}{2^i}$ that we denote $\omega^s \mathbb{H}_r = \{\omega^s, \omega^{s+2^i}, \dots, \omega^{s+(r-1)2^i}\}$, for $0 \leq s < 2^i$ as interpolation set, instead of the group of roots of unity \mathbb{H} .

Claim 1. For all $i = 1, \dots, 2^k$, the j th Lagrange interpolation polynomial of set $\omega^s \mathbb{H}_r$ is

$$\lambda_j^{s,r}(X) = \frac{\omega^{(j-1)2^i}}{r\omega^{s(r-1)}} \frac{X^r - \omega^{sr}}{X - \omega^{s+(j-1)2^i}}$$

Proof. Note that $X^r - \omega^{sr}$ is the vanishing polynomial of $\omega^s \mathbb{H}_r$. Indeed, it has degree r and for every $\omega^{s+(j-1)2^i}$ we have

$$(\omega^{s+(j-1)2^i})^r - \omega^{sr} = (\omega^{sr}(\omega^{(j-1)2^i})^r) - \omega^{sr} = \omega^{sr} - \omega^{sr} = 0.$$

Thus,

$$X^r - \omega^{sr} = \prod_{k=1}^r (X - \omega^{s+(k-1)2^i}) \text{ and } \frac{X^r - \omega^{sr}}{X - \omega^{s+(j-1)2^i}} = \prod_{k \neq j}^r (X - \omega^{s+(k-1)2^i}).$$

Then,

$$\lambda_j^{s,r}(X) = \frac{\omega^{(j-1)2^i}}{r\omega^{s(r-1)}} \frac{X^r - \omega^{sr}}{X - \omega^{s+(j-1)2^i}} = \frac{\omega^{(j-1)2^i}}{r\omega^{s(r-1)}} \prod_{k \neq j}^r (X - \omega^{s+(k-1)2^i}).$$

It is clear from the above that $\lambda_j^{s,k}(\omega^{s+(k-1)2^i})$ for all $k \neq j$, now

$$\begin{aligned} \lambda_j^{s,k}(\omega^{s+(j-1)2^i}) &= \frac{\omega^{(j-1)2^i}}{r\omega^{s(r-1)}} \prod_{k \neq j}^r (\omega^{s+(j-1)2^i} - \omega^{s+(k-1)2^i}) \\ &= \frac{\omega^{(j-1)2^i}}{r\omega^{s(r-1)}} \omega^{s(r-1)} \prod_{k \neq j}^r (\omega^{(j-1)2^i} - \omega^{(k-1)2^i}) \\ &= \frac{\omega^{(j-1)2^i}}{r} \prod_{k \neq j}^r (\omega^{(j-1)2^i} - \omega^{(k-1)2^i}) \end{aligned}$$

Since \mathbb{H}_r is a group of roots of unity, $\frac{\omega^{(j-1)2^i}}{r} \prod_{k \neq j}^r (\omega^{(j-1)2^i} - \omega^{(k-1)2^i})$ is the Lagrange polynomial corresponding to $\omega^{(j-1)2^i}$, evaluated at the same point and thus the equation above equals 1. That is $\lambda_j^{s,k}(X)$ is a polynomial of degree $r-1$ such that vanishes at all elements in $\omega^s \mathbb{H}_r$ except for $\omega^{s+(j-1)2^i}$ where it takes value 1 and we conclude it is the j th Lagrange polynomial of $\omega^s \mathbb{H}_r$. \square

Claim 2. $\lambda_j^{s,k}(0) = -r$.

Proof. Recall that as \mathbb{H}_r is a set of roots of unity of size r , all its Lagrange polynomials take value $-r$ when evaluated in 0. Then,

$$\lambda_j^{s,r}(0) = \frac{\omega^{(j-1)2^i}}{r\omega^{s(r-1)}} \prod_{k \neq j}^r (0 - \omega^{s+(k-1)2^i}) = \frac{\omega^{(j-1)2^i}}{r\omega^{s(r-1)}} \omega^{s(r-1)} \prod_{k \neq j}^r (0 - \omega^{(k-1)2^i}).$$

equals the j th Lagrange polynomial of \mathbb{H}_r evaluated in zero. \square

Thus, we conclude that the inner product construction of Section 5.2 works when the Lagrange basis is chosen using any coset $\omega^s \mathbb{H}_k$ of a subgroup of roots of unity \mathbb{H}_r of size r .