Paper 2022/351
Formal Verification of Saber's Public-Key Encryption Scheme in EasyCrypt
Andreas Hülsing and Matthias Meijers and Pierre-Yves Strub
Abstract
In this work, we consider the formal verification of the public-key encryption scheme of Saber, one of the selected few post-quantum cipher suites currently considered for potential standardization. We formally verify this public-key encryption scheme's IND-CPA security and $\delta$-correctness properties, i.e., the properties required to transform the public-key encryption scheme into an IND-CCA2 secure and $\delta$-correct key encapsulation mechanism, in EasyCrypt. To this end, we initially devise hand-written proofs for these properties that are significantly more detailed and meticulous than the presently existing proofs. Subsequently, these hand-written proofs serve as a guideline for the formal verification. The results of this endeavor comprise hand-written and computer-verified proofs which demonstrate that Saber's public-key encryption scheme indeed satisfies the desired security and correctness properties.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- public-key cryptographypost-quantum cryptographyformal verificationSaberEasyCrypt
- Contact author(s)
- fv-saber-pke @ mmeijers com
- History
- 2023-01-13: last of 2 revisions
- 2022-03-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2022/351
- License
-
CC BY