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Paper 2022/196

Generalising Fault Attacks to Genus Two Isogeny Cryptosystems

Ariana Goh and Chu-Wee Lim and Yan Bo Ti

Abstract

In this paper we generalise Ti's fault attack and the loop abort fault attacks on supersingular isogeny cryptosystems (genus one) to genus two. Genus two isogeny based cryptosystems are generalisations of its genus one counterpart, as such, attacks on the the latter are believed to generalise to the former. Fault attacks on supersingular elliptic curve isogeny cryptography has been shown to be practical. We show in this paper that fault attacks continue to be practical in genus two, albeit with a few additional traces required.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
isogeny-based cryptographyfault attack
Contact author(s)
ari gzh @ gmail com,lchuwee @ dso org sg,yanbo ti @ gmail com
History
2022-10-25: last of 3 revisions
2022-02-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2022/196
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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