

Efficient Registration-Based Encryption

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Abstract

Registration-based encryption (RBE) was recently introduced as an alternative to identity-based encryption (IBE), to resolve the key-escrow problem: In RBE, the trusted authority is substituted with a weaker entity, called the key curator, who has no knowledge of any secret key. Users generate keys on their own and then publicly *register* their identities and their corresponding public keys to the key curator. RBE is a promising alternative to IBE, retaining many of its advantages while removing the key-escrow problem, the major drawback of IBE. Unfortunately, all existing constructions of RBE use cryptographic schemes in a non black-box way, which makes them prohibitively expensive. It has been estimated that the size of an RBE ciphertext would be in the order of terabytes (though no RBE has even been implemented).

In this work, we propose a new approach to construct RBE, from standard assumptions in bilinear groups. Our scheme is black-box and it is concretely highly efficient—a ciphertext is 914 bytes. To substantiate this claim, we implemented a prototype of our scheme and we show that it scales to *millions of users*. The public parameters of the scheme are on the order of kilobytes. The most expensive operation (registration) takes at most a handful of seconds, whereas the encryption and decryption runtimes are on the order of milliseconds. This is the first-ever implementation of an RBE scheme and demonstrates that the practical deployment of RBE is already possible with today’s hardware.

1 Introduction

Public-key encryption (PKE) [RSA78, DH76] is the cornerstone of secure communication: It allows Alice and Bob to privately exchange messages via a public channel, provided that they know each other’s public key. Enabling Alice to learn Bob’s public key (and vice versa) requires setting up a public key infrastructure (PKI) to certify the ownership of public keys. In practice, certification authorities are complex processes and PKI turns out to be a cumbersome and error-prone mechanism to implement.

To obviate these issues, Shamir [Sha84] proposed the notion of identity-based encryption (IBE), as an alternative to PKE with a simplified key management process: An IBE scheme allows Alice to encrypt her messages to Bob knowing just Bob’s identity, along with some additional public parameters. Bob can then decrypt Alice’s ciphertexts using an identity-specific secret key that he obtains from the key authority. Since the seminal work of Boneh and Franklin [BF01], IBE has seen tremendous progress with numerous new schemes being proposed over the years [Coc01, Wat05, Gen06, DG17]. In contrast, the practical deployment

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of IBE has been comparatively slow. Perhaps the main reason to hold back the widespread adoption of IBE is the so-called *key-escrow problem*: In an IBE scheme, the key authority can generate the secret key for any identity. This means that the key authority can decrypt *any message sent through the system*. This is not an acceptable compromise for many scenarios and has generated strong criticism against the notion [Rog15].

Recent works of Garg et al. [GHMR18, GHM⁺19] propose a new paradigm for handling key-escrow, where the authority does not hold *any secret information* and it is completely transparent. They put forward the notion of registration-based encryption (RBE), which we recall next.

Registration-Based Encryption. In an RBE system, there is a dedicated party, called the key curator (KC), that is responsible for maintaining the updated system parameters. Users can register to the system by contacting the KC and sending their public key and identity. In response, the KC updates the public parameters of the system and returns to the user some supplementary information, which we refer to as *the opening*, that is useful to decrypt ciphertexts. Note that this opening serves only a functional purpose and does not substitute the user’s secret key: In fact, it can be made public without affecting security. As public parameters change through the course of the system evolution, users will have to contact the KC to update their opening (i.e., the KC is also responsible for answering update queries). Importantly, we do not want to update every user’s key every time a new public key is registered, so the definition of RBE imposes some efficiency requirements on the frequency of the updates. Encryption and decryption work analogously as IBE: Given the public parameters and Bob’s identity, Alice can *non-interactively* encrypt a message for Bob. Bob, given his secret key and the opening, can at a later point in time decrypt Alice’s message. In terms of correctness, we require that decryption returns the correct message, provided that Bob registered his public key to the system prior to Alice computing her ciphertext. We also require that the size of the public parameters and the runtime of all algorithms is sublinear in the total number of registered users N . In terms of security, we require that encrypted messages must be hidden if no key was registered for the target identity, or if the key belongs to an honest party.

RBE can be thought of as a hybrid notion between IBE and a PKI: Similar to the PKI settings, RBE requires a KC to keep the parameters up to date and (additionally) to issue updates to users. However, it has the strong advantage of offering the *encryption with respect to identity* functionality, which is the main appeal of IBE. On the flip side, RBE shares some similarities with IBE, since the users have to contact the KC in order to obtain the opening. However, the crucial difference is that the opening is not sufficient to decrypt ciphertexts, without the user’s secret key. In other words, RBE does not suffer from the key escrow problem of IBE. As such, RBE is viewed as a promising alternative to the PKI architecture, without sacrificing the security of the users, also in contrast to PKI, in RBE the encryptor does not need to communicate with the PKI to obtain the user’s public keys in order to send an encrypted message.

Example Application. To exemplify the difference between RBE and PKI, consider a hypothetical scenario in which a whistle-blower wants to reveal some information to a journalist, but does not want to raise any suspicion. Querying a PKI to learn the journalist’s public key may leak that some leak is about to be released, and may alert authorities. On the other hand, using RBE, the whistle-blower could encrypt a message that only the journalist is able to decrypt by just knowing the public parameters (that he stores locally anyway), without the need to contact any external entity. Although one may envision augmenting the PKI with *oblivious access* to the public keys (e.g., via private information retrieval), RBE allows us to achieve this functionality *completely non-interactively* and more efficiently. We stress that this is just one example where RBE achieves better properties than PKI, and other applications of RBE were already described in prior works (see, e.g., [GHM⁺19]).

The Black-Box Barrier. While RBE is considered to be a promising theoretical notion for a candidate substitute of the PKI architecture, current constructions of RBE [GHMR18, GHM⁺19] are prohibitively expensive. While such schemes achieve asymptotically excellent parameters, the concrete numbers are still nowhere close to the realm of practicality. It has been estimated [CES21] that, for an RBE supporting 2 billion users, ciphertexts would be as large as 11 terabytes (improved to 4.5 terabytes in [CES21]). This

large overhead derives from the current construction paradigm of RBE, which is based on the garbled circuit tree of [CDG⁺17]. In more detail, known RBE constructions use cryptographic schemes in a *non black-box* manner, i.e., the scheme does not simply use cryptographic primitives in an input/output sense but rather needs access to their code. Traditionally, non black-box cryptographic schemes have been associated with prohibitive computational costs and a large body of literature in cryptography studies the possibility of constructing advanced primitives in a black-box way. We view known constructions of RBE as a manifestation of this phenomenon. Given the potential practical impact of this notion, the current state of affairs leaves open the following outstanding question:

Can we build efficient (and black-box) RBE?

We stress that a positive answer to the question above requires a conceptual rework of the current RBE construction paradigms, to circumvent the inefficiency barrier imposed by known (non black-box) constructions.

1.1 Our Results

We summarize our contributions below.

(i) Black-box RBE for Bounded Identity Sets. We propose a new method to construct RBE, which significantly departs from existing works. The resulting RBE scheme is black-box, and its security is based on well-studied assumptions over bilinear groups, namely the hardness of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem and the n -power Diffie-Hellman problem. The scheme is in the common reference string model and supports identities in the set $\{1, \dots, N\}$, for any polynomially bounded N . The common reference string and the public parameters consist of at most $O(\sqrt{N})$ group elements, whereas ciphertexts and public/secret keys are composed of $O(1)$ group elements. Consequently, the key registration runs in time $O(\sqrt{N})$, whereas encryption, decryption, and updates are very efficient, requiring only $O(1)$ group operations. During the entire life cycle of the system, each user will have received an update at most $O(\sqrt{N})$ -many times.

(ii) Extensions. Starting from the base RBE construction, we present several modifications that allow us to achieve a number of properties of interest.

- **Efficient Updates:** We show how to reduce the number of updates ever received by each user to $O(\log N)$, at the cost of increasing the size of the ciphertexts and of the public parameters by a multiplicative factor of $O(\log N)$.
- **Verifiability:** We describe an efficient procedure for the KC to prove that a certain public key was indeed registered in the public parameters [GV20]. The proof consists of a single group element and can be verified in time independent of N . We also show a method to prove the converse, i.e., that a public key was not registered, with essentially the same cost.
- **Anonymity:** We present a modification of our base scheme that achieves the desirable property of anonymity [GHM⁺19]. Loosely speaking, an RBE is anonymous if it is computationally hard to distinguish ciphertexts encrypted for any two distinct identities, unless one possesses the appropriate secret key.
- **CCA Security:** Finally, we define the notion of CCA security for RBE and discuss how a minor modification of our construction already satisfies this property.

(iii) Implementation. To demonstrate the practicality of our approach, we implemented prototypes of our base and efficient-update constructions. Here we report numbers for our efficient update construction. Without optimizing the code, we were able to scale our scheme to 10 million users on a personal computer. In this regime, our construction has a common reference string of size 1.04 MB and public parameters of size 2.8 MB. The size of a ciphertext encrypting a single group element will be at most 10.63 kB, and each update consists of a single group element (49 B). In terms of runtime, registering a public key takes 2.396 seconds on average, and encrypting and decrypting a ciphertext can be done in milliseconds.

1.2 Limitations and Discussion

We explicitly discuss some shortcomings of our construction, when compared with prior works [GHMR18, GHM⁺19, GV20]. First of all, our scheme has worse *asymptotic* parameters than prior RBE schemes where the size of the public parameters is poly-logarithmic in the size of the universe of users ($= N$). In contrast, our scheme achieves only a square root compression. We also note that in our construction the set of identities is $\{1, \dots, N\}$ and therefore polynomially bounded. Throughout the paper, whenever we refer to our scheme as RBE, we implicitly mean that the construction works for a polynomially bounded universe of identities $\{1, \dots, N\}$.

Furthermore, the KC has to store some *auxiliary information*, containing the openings of all users, that grows with $O(N\sqrt{N})$ in our base construction, and with $O(N \log N)$ in the version with efficient updates. In prior RBE schemes, the size of the auxiliary information was linear in N . We recall that the auxiliary information can be kept public and is only needed by the KC to issue updates correctly, but it is *not stored* by users.

Another important limitation is that our scheme requires a *structured* common reference string (i.e., a private-coin trusted setup), whereas prior work required only a *transparent* common reference string (i.e., a public-coin setup). Thus, our system must be initialized in a trusted manner, or via a multi-party computation (MPC) protocol. However, we stress that this operation needs to be done *once and for all*, and after that, the KC can operate fully transparently.

Overall, we believe that the above limitations do not substantially reduce the practical applicability of our approach. For concrete parameter settings, a square root compression leads to very noticeable savings. This was already advocated in [CES21], and it is further demonstrated by our prototype implementation. As for the trusted setup, MPC protocols to sample our common reference string exist [BGM17, NRBB22] and have been in fact run by the Zcash community [Bow18] to achieve precisely the same goal.¹

We also stress that polynomially bounded-sized identities can be sufficient in practical applications. As a concrete example, one could set the universe of identities to be the total set of phone numbers², and achieve the desired functionality of “encrypting with respect to the phone number of a user” (more on this later). Furthermore, our RBE can be used as a square root compressing mechanism of a PKI, by setting a counter in $\{1, \dots, N\}$ to each public key. On the other hand, bounded identities-RBE does not suffice for applications where identities should be arbitrarily large, such as email-based encryption.

Finally, the increase in the size of auxiliary input is modest, especially in the construction with efficient updates. As a concrete example, for $N = 10^7$ the size of the auxiliary information in our construction with efficient updates is upper bounded by $2N \log \sqrt{N} < 24 \cdot N$ group elements, which is not far from the information needed to be stored by a PKI (i.e., N public keys).

On Black-Box Cryptography. Contrary to prior works, our construction of RBE is completely black-box, i.e., the scheme only makes generic oracle-like calls to cryptographic primitives, and does not otherwise use their code. Specifically, our construction treats the underlying bilinear group generically, and makes only oracle calls to the corresponding group operations. As alluded to earlier, this feature is particularly important for two reasons: (i) Our scheme can be instantiated from any bilinear group, provided that it satisfies the appropriate hardness assumptions, and thus efficiency can benefit from further progress in the area. Furthermore, (ii) black-box schemes are typically much more concretely efficient, which is also empirically demonstrated by our prototype implementation.

Application: Registration-Based Messaging. One immediate practical application of our construction is in messaging protocols for mobile phones. Here, phone numbers act as a “real-life hash function” mapping a user to a number, and are particularly suited for our approach:

¹In fact our trusted setup is even simpler: it *almost* lies in the ‘power-of-tau’ category, and would require only the first phase of the MPC protocol to run.

²A rough upper bound on the total number of existing phone numbers on earth is $N = 10^{10}$, which is within reach of our approach.

- Phone numbers naturally map users to integers $\{1, \dots, N\}$.
- There is an a priori bound on the total amount of phone numbers (approximately 10^{10}).

In this context, we envision using RBE as a drop-in replacement for the PKI, which is currently in use in group messaging protocols (e.g. see the MLS protocol [BBM⁺20]). This would reduce the trust needed in the PKI (which can be substituted with a transparent KC) and would enable users to communicate securely by simply knowing each other’s phone numbers. In terms of efficiency, our (unoptimized) prototype demonstrates that our scheme supports the average volume of users of such applications. For example, at the time of writing, the Signal messenger is estimated to have 40 million active users³, which is well within reach of our scheme.

We remark that secure messaging is a complex security ecosystem and it is currently the subject of intense research effort. We do not claim that RBE would solve all of the challenges of secure messaging, and integrating RBE in this environment requires careful analysis of the security/system tradeoffs. However, we view our work as opening the possibility of using this cryptographic primitive in real-world messaging protocols.

1.3 Related Work

The notion of RBE was proposed in [GHMR18] and was later extended with the notion of anonymity [GHM⁺19] and verifiability [GV20], and was also optimized in [CES21]. Later, [MQR22] showed a tradeoff between the size of the public parameter and the number of decryption updates in any RBE scheme, proving that any RBE scheme with public parameter size logarithmic in the number of users requires decryption updates also logarithmic in the number of users. All of these constructions follow roughly the same template and make non black-box usage of cryptographic primitives. While, asymptotically, previous constructions achieve essentially optimal efficiency, their concrete computational and storage costs are prohibitively high. We also mention that in [GHM⁺19] the authors also introduced the notion of timestamp RBE (T-RBE), as an intermediate abstraction. This is similar to the notion of RBE for bounded identity sets, as the users are indexed by timestamps in $\{1, \dots, N\}$. However, the crucial difference is that in T-RBE the time stamps (and therefore the identities of the users) need to register in increasing order, whereas in our RBE settings the parties can register *in any order*, therefore T-RBE is a weaker notion than RBE for bounded identity sets.

Prior to the introduction of RBE, various attempts had been made to mitigate the key-escrow problem of IBE, though none of which fully addressed it. Boneh and Franklin [BF01] first proposed the existence of multiple private key generator authorities, an idea which was later developed by follow-up works [CHSS02, PS08, KG10, LBD⁺04], which however only distributes the escrow problem among many parties instead of a single one. Goyal [Goy07] introduced and [GLSW08] further developed the notion of accountable IBE, in which the private key authority is made accountable, but still did not eliminate key-escrow. Chow [Cho09] and later Wei et al. [WQT18] used anonymous ciphertexts so that the authority cannot tell which ciphertext was encrypted for which identity, in combination with a large number of identities (so that a brute-force search is hard), which even so required that each identity generation had some guaranteed randomness. Finally, in [AP03] the intermediate notion of certificateless public-key cryptography was introduced, however here a party cannot encrypt solely with respect to the identity but needs some extra information.

Concurrent and Independent Work. A concurrent and independent work [HLWW22] also studies the notion of RBE in the black-box settings and presents a construction for bounded identity sets based on bilinear groups. Although superficially similar to our work, the scope of [HLWW22] is substantially different: whereas we focus on obtaining a *concretely efficient* construction of RBE, their main result is an attribute-based version of RBE, which we do not consider in this work. Furthermore, we highlight the following differences between the two approaches:

- Computational assumptions: The scheme in [HLWW22] is based on computational problems on *composite order* bilinear groups, whereas our scheme is in the more efficient prime order setting.

³[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_\(software\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signal_(software))

- Size of the common reference string: While both schemes have a structured setup, in our scheme the common reference string is sublinear in N , i.e., of size $O(\sqrt{N})$. On the other hand, the common reference string in [HLWW22] is of size $O(N^2)$ (ignoring extra factors in the security parameter).
- Efficient updates: The RBE construction in [HLWW22] has *weakly efficient* updates, where the cost of an update is sublinear in N on average but linear in N in the worst case. On the other hand, our construction achieves *strongly efficient* updates, where the computational cost of an update is $O(\log N)$ even in the worst case.
- Cost of registration: Registering each user has computational cost $O(N)$ in [HLWW22], while in our case it is $O(\sqrt{N})$ ($O(\sqrt{N} \log N)$ in our efficient updates variant).

While we cannot fairly compare the concrete efficiency of the two schemes (no implementation of [HLWW22] is available), the above differences suggest that our RBE scheme is significantly faster and it remains practically viable for larger values of N .

1.4 Technical Overview

We provide here a rough outline of the main technical steps of our approach to construct RBE. To put our work into context, we briefly recall the main ideas behind prior constructions of RBE.

Merkle-Hashing with Encryption. The main idea behind existing RBE constructions [GHMR18] is to design a special-purpose hash function that supports an “encryption” functionality. Specifically, the KC uses such a function to hash all key-identity pairs (pk, id) in a Merkle-tree and sets the root of the tree to be the public parameters pp of the RBE system. This additional encryption functionality allows anyone who knows the root of the hash (pp) to encrypt a message m with respect to an identity id . The resulting ciphertext can be decrypted by knowing (i) the pre-image of the hash and (ii) the secret key sk corresponding to pk . Observe that the KC is only responsible for correctly hashing all the public keys, but at no point in time is required to know any secret key. In fact, the pair (sk, pk) is sampled locally by the user associated with the identity id .

The main technical step of their approach is then how to build such a “hash with encryption”. This is realized using a special-purpose two-to-one hash (which can be constructed from a variety of assumptions) in conjunction with garbled circuits [Yao82]. This can be then turned into a hash for arbitrarily long messages via the standard Merkle tree construction and a chain of garbled circuits, where the last outputs an encryption of the message m under the public key pk that was hashed in the tree. Decryption requires knowing the root-to-leaf path to the corresponding public key in the Merkle tree, along with sk . Note that such root-to-leaf paths may change as new public keys are added to the tree, which is the reason why users need to receive updates. Asymptotically, they achieve RBE with close to optimal efficiency. Unfortunately, this comes at the cost of running expensive cryptographic operations inside garbled circuits.

Vector Commitments with Encryption. In this work, we take a different approach to bypass the use of heavy cryptographic non black-box primitives. Our main idea is to substitute Merkle trees with an *algebraic data structure* to accumulate the public keys: vector commitments [LY10, CF13] (VCs). VCs work analogously to Merkle trees, i.e., one can commit to a vector of elements so that at a later point one can selectively open any position of the vector. However, they offer an algebraic structure that enables more advanced properties, e.g., batch opening [BBF19, LM19], opening aggregation [CFG⁺20, GRWZ20, TAB⁺20] or functional opening [LRY16, LP20]. Our observation is that, once the verification of an opening is algebraic (e.g., a pairing operation), one can hope to directly encrypt a message with respect to this verification equation, thus avoiding the non-black-box tools.

More concretely, we make use of the [LY10] VC which works over bilinear groups. The commitment to a vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_N)$ is defined as $C = \prod_{i \in [N]} h_i^{x_i}$, whereas the opening value for position i is

$\Lambda_i = \prod_{j \neq i} (h_{N+1-i+j})^{x_j}$. To verify that x_i is the value at position i one checks if

$$e(C, h_{N+1-i}) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\Lambda_i, g) \cdot e(h_i^{x_i}, h_{N+1-i})$$

where $\{h_i\}_{i \in [2N] \setminus \{N+1\}}$ are part of the public parameters (henceforth referred to as the crs), g is a random generator and $h_i = g^{z^i}$ for a random z . It is binding under the q -Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption [BGW05], a well-established q -type (falsifiable) assumption over bilinear groups. To turn this into an RBE, we set the position i to be the identity of the user (implicitly we have N potential users), $\text{sk}_i = x_i$ to be the secret key, and $\text{pk}_i = h_i^{x_i}$ to be the public key. Then $C = \prod_{i \in [N]} \text{pk}_i$ is the public parameter that accumulates the keys of the users (this is the analog of the Merkle-tree root). Furthermore, Λ_i is the necessary *opening* a user should hold in order to be able to decrypt, provided by the KC.

Our goal is now to describe a procedure to generate a ciphertext ct that can be decrypted by knowing (i) the secret key x_i and (ii) the opening Λ_i that satisfies the above equation. On input a message m and an identity i , our encryption algorithm outputs (r is the encryption randomness):

$$\text{ct} = (e(C, h_{N+1-i})^r, g^r, e(h_i, h_{N+1-i})^r \cdot m).$$

If Λ_i is a valid opening, then we can derive that

$$e(h_i, h_{N+1-i})^r = (e(C, h_{N+1-i})^r e(\Lambda_i, g^r))^{x_i^{-1}}.$$

Therefore a user that knows x_i can decrypt the ciphertext by computing $e(h_i, h_{N+1-i})^r$ as indicated and dividing the third component to recover m . On the other hand, it can be shown that if either the secret key or the opening is missing, then the message m is hidden.

Amortizing the Public Parameters. Although encryption/decryption, as described, is performed very efficiently, the scheme as described is not yet a valid RBE. Observe that the $\text{crs} = \{h_i\}$ consists of $2N - 1$ group elements, where N is the number of users. Thus, this is even worse than the trivial scheme where the public parameters simply consist of the concatenation of all public keys! Our next observation is that the crs is reusable across different commitments, and can therefore be *amortized*. Specifically, we divide the users in blocks of size $n = O(\sqrt{N}) : \{1, \dots, n\}, \{n+1, \dots, 2n\}, \dots$. Then we create $B = N/n = O(\sqrt{N})$ vector commitments (C_1, C_2, \dots, C_B) , one for each block, using the same crs. Now the public parameters of the RBE consist of an $O(\sqrt{N})$ -sized crs and $O(\sqrt{N})$ number of commitments, therefore overall have size $O(\sqrt{N})$, sublinear on the number of users.

Extensions. The construction outlined above forms the basis for our template to construct RBE. We then show how to extend the scheme to lower the number of updates received by each user to $O(\log N)$ (Section 5.1), achieve anonymity (Section 5.3), verifiability (Section 5.2), and CCA security (Section 5.4). We refer the reader to the corresponding sections for more details.

2 Preliminaries

We denote by $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ the security parameter. We say that a function is negligible if it vanishes faster than any polynomial. Given a set S , we denote by $s \leftarrow S$ the uniform sampling from S . We say that an algorithm is PPT if it can be implemented by a probabilistic machine running in time polynomial in the security parameter. We denote by $[n]$ the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$.

2.1 Bilinear Groups

Let $\text{bg} := (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$ be a generator of a (symmetric) bilinear group generated by g of prime order p , with an efficiently computable pairing $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$. We recall a few well-known assumptions in bilinear groups.

Assumption 1 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman). Let \mathcal{BG} be a bilinear group generator. The bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem is hard for \mathcal{BG} if the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

$$(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e, g^x, g^y, g^z, e(g, g)^{xyz}) \approx (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e, g^x, g^y, g^z, e(g, g)^w)$$

where $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$ and $(x, y, z, w) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

It is going to be convenient for us to rephrase the above assumption as the hardness of distinguishing between the distributions, which can be easily reduced to the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption:

$$(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e, g^x, e(g, g)^y, e(g, g)^{xy}) \approx (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e, g^x, e(g, g)^y, e(g, g)^z).$$

Assumption 2 (n -Power Diffie-Hellman). Let \mathcal{BG} be a bilinear group generator. The n -power Diffie-Hellman problem is hard for \mathcal{BG} if the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

$$\begin{aligned} & \left(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e, \left\{ g^{x^i} \right\}_{i \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\}}, g^y, e(g, g)^{x^{n+1}y} \right) \\ & \approx \left(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e, \left\{ g^{x^i} \right\}_{i \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\}}, g^y, e(g, g)^z \right) \end{aligned}$$

where $(p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$ and $(x, y, z) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

Symmetric vs Asymmetric Pairings. Throughout this work, we describe our assumptions and our schemes using symmetric pairings. However, both the assumptions and the constructions are easily generalizable to the setting where only an asymmetric pairing $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is available. We chose to present our constructions in the symmetric settings for two reasons: (i) In terms of security, symmetric pairings are more general since one cannot rely on the hardness of mapping between the two source groups. This shows that our construction template is more robust, and remains secure even if there is an efficiently computable isomorphism between the two source groups. (ii) Symmetric pairings help avoiding overloading the reader with indices and allow for a more elegant presentation of the main ideas of the construction.

3 Definitions

Here we formally define RBE, and our definitions are taken almost in verbatim from [GHM⁺19]. Compared with [GHM⁺19], we modify the syntax of RBE to allow the key generation algorithm to take as input a common reference string crs . Furthermore, we fix a bound N on the size of the universe of users ahead of time. For notational convenience, we still refer to such primitive as an RBE, but we explicitly note that the scheme only supports *bounded identity sets*.

Definition 3.1 (Registration-Based Encryption (RBE)). Registration-based encryption for a universe of identities $\{1, \dots, N\}$ scheme consists of five PPT algorithms ($\text{Setup}, \text{Gen}, \text{Reg}, \text{Enc}, \text{Upd}, \text{Dec}$) working as follows. The Reg and Upd algorithms are performed by the key curator, which we call KC for short.

- **Setup.** $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, N) \rightarrow \text{crs}$: The setup algorithm Setup samples a common reference string crs once and for all at the beginning of the protocol.
- **Key Generation.** $\text{Gen}(\text{crs}) \rightarrow (\text{pk}, \text{sk})$: The randomized algorithm Gen takes as input the common reference string crs and outputs a pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk) . The key generation algorithm is run by any honest party locally who wants to register itself into the system.
- **Registration.** $\text{Reg}^{\text{aux}}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \text{pk}) \rightarrow \text{pp}'$: The deterministic algorithm Reg takes as input the common random sting crs , current public parameter pp , a registering identity id and a public key pk (supposedly for the identity id), and it outputs pp' as the updated public parameters. The Reg algorithm uses *read* and *write* oracle access to the auxiliary information aux which will be updated into aux' during the process of registration. (The system is initialized with public parameters pp and auxiliary information aux set to \perp .)

- **Encryption.** $\text{Enc}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, m) \rightarrow \text{ct}$: The randomized algorithm Enc takes as input the common random string crs , a public parameter pp , a recipient identity id , and a plaintext message m and outputs a ciphertext ct .
- **Update.** $\text{Upd}^{\text{aux}}(\text{pp}, \text{id}) \rightarrow \text{u}$: The deterministic algorithm Upd takes as input the current parameters pp stored at the KC, an identity id , and a public key pk . It has *read only* oracle access to aux and generates an update information u that can help id to decrypt its messages.
- **Decryption.** $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{u}, \text{ct}) \rightarrow m$: The deterministic decryption algorithm Dec takes as input a secret key sk , an update information u , and a ciphertext ct , and it outputs a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ or in $\{\perp, \text{GetUpd}\}$. The symbol \perp indicates a syntax error while GetUpd indicates that more recent update information (than u) might be needed for decryption.

Definition 3.2 (Completeness, compactness, and efficiency of RBE). For any interactive *computationally unbounded* adversary \mathcal{A} with polynomial query complexity, consider the following game $\text{EXP}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Comp}}(\lambda)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a challenger \mathcal{C} .

1. **Initialization.** \mathcal{C} sets $\text{pp} = \perp$, $\text{aux} = \perp$, $\text{u} = \perp$, $\mathcal{D} = \emptyset$, $\text{id}^* = \perp$, $t = 0$, and $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, and sends the sampled crs to \mathcal{A} .
2. Until \mathcal{A} continues (which is at most $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ steps), proceed as follows. At every iteration, \mathcal{A} chooses exactly one of the actions below to be performed.
 - (a) **Registering new (non-target) identity.** \mathcal{A} sends some $\text{id} \notin \mathcal{D}$ and pk in the support of the $\text{Gen}(\text{crs})$ algorithm, to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} registers (id, pk) by letting $\text{pp} := \text{Reg}^{\text{aux}}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \text{pk})$ and $\mathcal{D} := \mathcal{D} \cup \{\text{id}\}$.
 - (b) **Registering the target identity.** If $\text{id}^* \neq \perp$, skip this step. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} sends some $\text{id}^* \notin \mathcal{D}$ to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} then samples $(\text{pk}^*, \text{sk}^*) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{crs})$, updates $\text{pp} := \text{Reg}^{\text{aux}}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}^*, \text{pk}^*)$ and $\mathcal{D} := \mathcal{D} \cup \{\text{id}^*\}$, and sends pk^* to \mathcal{A} .
 - (c) **Encrypting for the target identity.** If $\text{id}^* = \perp$, then skip this step. Otherwise, \mathcal{C} sets $t := t + 1$. \mathcal{A} sends some $m_t \in \{0, 1\}^*$ to \mathcal{C} who sends back a corresponding ciphertext $\text{ct}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}^*, m_t)$ to \mathcal{A} .
 - (d) **Decryption by target identity.** \mathcal{A} sends a $j \in [t]$ to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} then lets $m'_j = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}^*, \text{u}, \text{ct}_j)$. If $m'_j = \text{GetUpd}$, then \mathcal{C} obtains the update $\text{u}^* = \text{Upd}^{\text{aux}}(\text{pp}, \text{id}^*)$ and then lets $m'_j = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}^*, \text{u}^*, \text{ct}_j)$.
3. The adversary \mathcal{A} wins the game if there is some $j \in [t]$ for which $m'_j \neq m_j$.

Let $Q \in \text{poly}$ be an upper bound on the number of queries issued by \mathcal{A} and let $\tilde{N} = |\mathcal{D}| \leq N$ at the end of the execution. We require the following properties to hold.

- **Completeness.** For all computationally unbounded \mathcal{A} , $\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins } \text{EXP}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Comp}}(\lambda)] = 0$.
- **Compactness of public parameters and updates.** For all queries $q \in [Q]$, let pp_q be the public parameters after the q -th query. Then $|\text{pp}|$ is sublinear in \tilde{N} . Moreover, for all $\text{id} \in \mathcal{D}$, the size of the corresponding update $|\text{u}_q|$ is also sublinear in \tilde{N} .
- **Efficiency of runtime of registration and update.** The running time of each invocation of Reg and Upd algorithms is sublinear in \tilde{N} .
- **Efficiency of the number of updates.** The total number of invocations of Upd for identity id^* in Step 2(d) of the game $\text{EXP}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Comp}}(\lambda)$ is sublinear in \tilde{N} .

Definition 3.3 (Security of RBE). For any interactive PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , consider the following game $\text{EXP}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda)$ between \mathcal{A} and a challenger \mathcal{C} .

1. **Initialization.** \mathcal{C} sets $\text{pp} = \perp$, $\text{aux} = \perp$, $\mathcal{D} = \emptyset$, $\text{id}^* = \perp$, $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and sends the sampled crs to \mathcal{A} .
2. Until \mathcal{A} continues (which is at most $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ steps), proceed as follows. At every iteration, \mathcal{A} chooses exactly one of the actions below to be performed.
 - (a) **Registering new (non-target) identity.** \mathcal{A} sends some $\text{id} \notin \mathcal{D}$ and pk to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} registers (id, pk) by letting $\text{pp} := \text{Reg}^{[\text{aux}]}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \text{pk})$ and $\mathcal{D} := \mathcal{D} \cup \{\text{id}\}$.
 - (b) **Registering the target identity.** If $\text{id}^* \neq \perp$, skip this step. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} sends some $\text{id}^* \notin \mathcal{D}$ to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} then samples $(\text{pk}^*, \text{sk}^*) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{crs})$, updates $\text{pp} := \text{Reg}^{[\text{aux}]}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}^*, \text{pk}^*)$, $\mathcal{D} := \mathcal{D} \cup \{\text{id}^*\}$, and sends pk^* to \mathcal{A} .
3. **Encrypting for the target identity.** \mathcal{A} sends some $\text{id} \notin \mathcal{D} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}$ and two messages (m_0, m_1) and \mathcal{C} generates $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, m_b)$, where $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a random bit, and sends ct to \mathcal{A} .
4. The adversary \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' and wins the game if $b = b'$.

We call an RBE scheme secure if there exists a negligible function negl such that for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} it holds that

$$|1/2 - \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins EXP}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{CPA}}(\lambda)]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

4 Our Base RBE Construction

4.1 Our Base Construction

Here we present our base RBE for bounded identity sets construction. We let N be the maximum number of users to be registered and we divide the N users into blocks of n and subsequently, we get $B := \lceil \frac{N}{n} \rceil$ number of blocks. We denote by \bar{i} the modular reduction $\bar{i} := (i \bmod n) + 1$, for any $i \in \mathbb{Z}$. As outlined in Section 1.4 the key curator (KC) has to manage B vector commitments, committing to the secret keys of the users, *without* knowing the secret keys. Each committed vector consists of n keys, thus overall $N = Bn$ keys are committed. That is, KC needs to maintain the commitments $C^{(1)}, \dots, C^{(B)}$ and up-to-date opening values for each user, $\Lambda_1, \dots, \Lambda_N$, so that any user can query her opening value. We will use the vector commitment from [LY10], where the commitments and the openings are of the form

$$C = \prod_{i \in [n]} h_i^{x_i} \text{ and } \Lambda_i = \prod_{j \neq i} (h_{n+1-i+j})^{x_j}$$

where $\{h_i\}_{i \in [2n] \setminus n+1}$ are part of the crs . It will be convenient to think of $i := \text{id}$ as the identity of the user and $x_i := \text{sk}_{\text{id}}$ as the user's secret key.

Overview. For simplicity, we illustrate how the algorithms operate over the commitment $C^{(1)}$ for identities in $\{1, \dots, n\}$, the general case follows by a straightforward generalization and it is formally described in Figure 1. The public key of the user id is set to $\text{pk}_{\text{id}} = (h_{\text{id}})^{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}$ and the commitment is simply the accumulation of all the public keys $C^{(1)} = \prod_{\text{id} \in [n]} \text{pk}_{\text{id}}$. However, once a user joins the system, we also have to update the opening information $\{\Lambda_{\text{id}}\}_{\text{id} \in [n]}$, since its computation includes the secret keys of all the other users in the block:

$$\Lambda_{\text{id}} = \prod_{\text{id}' \neq \text{id}} (h_{n+1-\text{id}+\text{id}'})^{\text{sk}_{\text{id}'}}.$$

We resolve this by letting the users compute locally all terms that are used for different openings. For example id computes $(h_{n+1-1+\text{id}})^{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}$ (used in Λ_1), $(h_{n+1-2+\text{id}})^{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}$ (used in Λ_2), and so on (excluding $(h_{n+1-\text{id}+\text{id}})^{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}$ that is used nowhere). We call these values *helping information* and denote them by

$$\xi = ((h_{\text{id}+n})^{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}, \dots, (h_{\text{id}+1})^{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}).$$

Setup($1^\lambda, n$) \rightarrow crs : generate a bilinear group $\mathbf{bg} := (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$ and sample $z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Sets $h_i = g^{z^i}$ for each $i \in [2n]$ and output

$$\text{crs} = (\mathbf{bg}, \{h_i\}_{i \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\}}).$$

Gen(crs, id) \rightarrow (pk, sk, ξ) : If $\text{id} \notin [N]$ output \perp . Otherwise, sample $x_{\text{id}} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, compute $\bar{\text{id}} = (\text{id} \bmod n) + 1$ and set

$$\text{pk} = (h_{\bar{\text{id}}})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \quad \text{sk} = x_{\text{id}}, \quad \xi = ((h_{\bar{\text{id}}+n})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \dots, (h_{2+n})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \emptyset, (h_n)^{x_{\text{id}}}, \dots, (h_{\bar{\text{id}}+1})^{x_{\text{id}}})$$

Reg^[aux](crs, pp, id, pk, ξ) \rightarrow pp' : The key curator proceeds as follows:

- If it is the first identity to be registered then initialize $\text{pp} = (1, \dots, 1) \in \mathbb{G}^B$ and $\text{aux} = (\{1\}, \dots, \{1\}) \in \mathbb{G}^N$.
- If $\text{id} \notin [N]$ output \perp .
- Check the correctness of ξ :

$$e(\text{pk}, h_n) = e(\xi_1, g) = \dots = e(\xi_{\bar{\text{id}}-1}, h_{\bar{\text{id}}-2}) = e(\xi_{\bar{\text{id}}+1}, h_{\bar{\text{id}}}) = \dots = e(\xi_n, h_{n-1})$$

where $\bar{\text{id}} = \text{id} \bmod n$. If the above doesn't hold output \perp .

- Otherwise, parse $\text{pp} = (C^{(1)}, \dots, C^{(B)})$, compute $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}}{n} \rceil$ and set $C'^{(k)} \leftarrow C^{(k)} \cdot \text{pk}$, the rest remain the same $C'^{(j)} = C^{(j)}$ for each $j \in [B] \setminus \{k\}$. Output

$$\text{pp}' = (C'^{(1)}, \dots, C'^{(B)})$$

- Parse $\text{aux} = (L_1, \dots, L_N)$ and for each $j \in \{(k-1)n+1, \dots, (k-1)n+n\} \setminus \{\text{id}\}$ parse $L_j = \{\Lambda_{j,1}, \dots, \Lambda_{j,\ell}\}$. Set $L_j = L_j \cup \{\Lambda_{j,\ell+1} = \Lambda_{j,\ell} \cdot \xi_j\}$, while the rest remain the same.

Enc(crs, pp, id, m) \rightarrow ct : On input $m \in \mathbb{G}_T$, let $\bar{\text{id}} = \text{id} \bmod n$ and $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}}{n} \rceil$. Sample $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and compute:

$$\text{ct} = (\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \text{ct}_2, \text{ct}_3) = (C^{(k)}, e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r, g^r, e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r \cdot m).$$

Upd^[aux](pp, id) \rightarrow u : parse $\text{aux} = (L_1, \dots, L_N)$ and output L_{id} .

Dec(sk, u, ct) \rightarrow m or GetUpd : Parse $u = \{\Lambda_1, \dots, \Lambda_\ell\}$, if there exists no $i \in [\ell]$ such that $e(\text{ct}_0, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}}) = e(\Lambda_i, g) \cdot e((h_{\bar{\text{id}}})^{\text{sk}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})$, then output GetUpd.⁴ Otherwise let i be such index and return

$$\frac{\text{ct}_3}{(e(\Lambda_i, \text{ct}_2)^{-1} \cdot \text{ct}_1)^{\text{sk}^{-1}}}.$$

Figure 1: Our main RBE construction.

When a new user $\text{id} \in [n]$ registers, it sends her pk_{id} and $\xi = (\xi_1, \dots, \xi_n)$ to the KC. Then the KC first checks the correctness of the helping information (using pairings) and updates the corresponding commitment as $C^{(1)} \leftarrow C^{(1)} \cdot \text{pk}_{\text{id}}$ and all the corresponding openings in the cluster as $\Lambda_{\text{id}'} \leftarrow \Lambda_{\text{id}'} \cdot \xi_{\text{id}'}$ for each $\text{id}' \in [n] \setminus \{\text{id}\}$. Afterwards, KC can delete ξ .

Furthermore, we note that a user needs to keep track of all the openings throughout the evolution of the system. That is because a ciphertext may have been encrypted with respect to any instance of the public parameters (thus any $C^{(1)}$). Therefore the KC (and the user) should maintain a list of openings $L_{\text{id}} = \{\Lambda_{\text{id},1}, \dots, \Lambda_{\text{id},\ell}\}$, instead of a single opening, that correspond to all the opening values changes that have occurred until this point. Concretely, ℓ is the number of users that have registered in this block so far and $\Lambda_{\text{id},j}$ is the corresponding openings. It follows that $\ell \leq n$.

Encryption and decryption are done (as described in Section 1.4) with respect to the verification equation of the vector commitment. This is accompanied by a mechanism to make the user aware of the fact that the opening of the vector commitment is outdated. In that case, the user simply requests an update from the KC.

Correctness. We can prove the correctness for party id with key pair $(\text{sk}_{\text{id}}, \text{pk}_{\text{id}})$ by expanding the above equation. For notational convenience, we assume that $\text{id} \in [n]$ and thus the corresponding commitment is $C^{(1)}$. Additionally, we assume that all n identities are registered under this commitment, hence $C^{(1)} = \prod_{i \in [n]} h_i^{\text{sk}_i}$. Consequently, the corresponding update for id is $\Lambda = \prod_{i \in [n] \setminus \{\text{id}\}} \xi_{i,\text{id}}$. We can then write:

$$\begin{aligned}
& \frac{\text{ct}_3}{(e(\Lambda, \text{ct}_2)^{-1} \cdot \text{ct}_1)^{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}^{-1}}} \\
&= \frac{e(h_{\text{id}}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r \cdot m}{(e(\Lambda, g^r)^{-1} \cdot e(C^{(1)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r)^{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}^{-1}}} \\
&= \frac{e(h_{\text{id}}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r \cdot m}{e(\prod_{i \in [n] \setminus \{\text{id}\}} \xi_{i,\text{id}}, g^r)^{\frac{-r}{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}} \cdot e(\prod_{i \in [n]} h_i^{\text{sk}_i}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^{\frac{r}{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}}} \\
&= \frac{e(h_{\text{id}}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r \cdot m}{\prod_{i \in [n] \setminus \{\text{id}\}} e(\xi_{i,\text{id}}, g)^{\frac{-r}{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}} \cdot \prod_{i \in [n]} e(h_i^{\text{sk}_i}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^{\frac{r}{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}}} \\
&= \frac{m}{\prod_{i \in [n] \setminus \{\text{id}\}} e(h_{i+n-\text{id}+1}^{\text{sk}_i}, g)^{\frac{-r}{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}} \cdot e(h_i^{\text{sk}_i}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^{\frac{r}{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}}} \\
&= \frac{m}{\prod_{i \in [n] \setminus \{\text{id}\}} e(g^{z^{i+n-\text{id}+1} \text{sk}_i}, g)^{\frac{-r}{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}} \cdot e(g^{z^i \text{sk}_i}, g^{z^{n+1-\text{id}}})^{\frac{r}{\text{sk}_{\text{id}}}}} \\
&= m.
\end{aligned}$$

The scheme is also multiplicatively homomorphic over \mathbb{G}_T , where the homomorphic operation can be computed by multiplying two ciphertexts component-wise.

4.2 Efficiency

Setting the parameter as $n = B = \sqrt{N}$ optimizes the public information a user should store: Both crs and pp are $O(\sqrt{N})$ group elements. Below we provide an efficiency analysis adopting this choice, $n = \sqrt{N}$. However, we stress that alternative options, that optimize different aspects of the system, can always be considered. Here we give an asymptotic efficiency analysis, parametrized by the number of users N , and we show a comparison with prior works in Table 1.

Regarding the computational complexity, generating the crs requires $O(\sqrt{N})$ group exponentiations and is only done once at the system setup. Similarly, the key generation of a user takes $O(\sqrt{N})$ group exponentiations, and is only executed once by each user. Registration of a user by the KC takes $O(\sqrt{N})$ pairing checks

	Setup	Gen	Reg	Enc	Upd	Dec	#Upd	Prove	Verify
[GHMR18, §4]	1	1	$\log M$	$\log M$	$\log M$	$\log M$	$\log M$	–	–
[GHM ⁺ 19, CES21]	1	1	$\log^2 M$	$\log^2 M$	$\log M$	$\log^2 M$	$\log M$	–	–
[GV20]	1	1	$\log^2 M$	$\log^2 M$	$\log M$	$\log M$	$\log M$	$\log^2 M$	$\log^2 M$
Sec. 4	\sqrt{N}	\sqrt{N}	\sqrt{N}	1	1	1	\sqrt{N}	1	1
Sec. 5.1	\sqrt{N}	\sqrt{N}	$\sqrt{N} \log N$	$\log N$	$\log N$	$\log N$	$\log N$	$\log N$	$\log N$

	crs	pp	aux	pk	sk	ct	u	π
[GHMR18, §4],[GHM ⁺ 19]	–	$\log M$	M	1	1	$\log M$	$\log M$	–
[CES21]	1	$\log M$	M	1	1	$\log M$	$\log M$	–
[GV20]	1	$\log M$	M	1	1	$\log M$	$\log M$	$\log^2 M$
Sec. 4	\sqrt{N}	\sqrt{N}	$M\sqrt{N}$	1	1	1	\sqrt{N}	1
Sec. 5.1	\sqrt{N}	$\sqrt{N} \log N$	$N \log N$	1	1	$\log N$	$\log N$	$\log N$

Table 1: Comparison of worst-case asymptotic complexities of this work and previous works. The parameter sizes of our scheme are given in number of group elements, so we omit factors of λ . M denotes the number of registered users, and N the capacity of the system. The cost of the **Prove** and **Verify** algorithms refer to both membership and non-membership proofs. The time complexities for our efficient variant are for the worst case.

and then 1 group multiplication to compute the new **pp** and $O(\sqrt{N})$ group multiplications to update the **aux**. Finally, **Enc**, **Dec**, and **Upd** are very efficient requiring $O(1)$ -many group operations.⁵

As for the storage requirements, the **crs** and the **pp** stored by the KC and the users are both $O(\sqrt{N})$ group elements, while **pk** and **sk** are 1 group and field element respectively.⁶ The **aux** stored by the Key Curator consists of at most $O(N^{3/2})$ group elements, $O(\sqrt{N})$ corresponding to each participating user. More specifically, if M users are registered then $|\mathbf{aux}| = O(M\sqrt{N})$ in the worst-case. Each user needs to make up to $O(\sqrt{N})$ **Upd**-queries to the KC and store the update information **u** of size $O(\sqrt{N})$. In Section 5.1 we show a variant of our construction that reduces both these to $O(\log N)$ and the **aux** of the KC to $|\mathbf{aux}| = O(N \log N)$, at the cost of having public parameters of size $|\mathbf{pp}| = O(\sqrt{N} \log N)$ instead. Finally any ciphertext consists of 2 \mathbb{G} -elements and 2 \mathbb{G}_T -elements.

We also remark that the total number of users in the system is determined by the parameter N , which is chosen ahead of time and fixed throughout the life of the system. However, we stress that N is not a hard bound: if at some point in time, the total amount of identities exceeds N , nothing prevents one from appending new commitments to the public parameters to increase the identity bound (say from N to $2N$). That is, one does not have to re-initialize the system, even if the identity bound is exceeded.

4.3 Security

In the following, we state and prove our main security theorem.

Theorem 4.1 (Security). *If the bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the n -Power Diffie-Hellman assumptions hold for \mathcal{BG} , then the scheme as described above satisfies RBE security.*

Proof. In the following, we consider an adversary having registered N' arbitrary identities, $0 \leq N' \leq N$, i.e. $|\mathcal{D}| = N'$. The target identity $\text{id}^* \notin \mathcal{D}$ chosen by the adversary \mathcal{A} may or may not be registered by the challenger \mathcal{C} , according to the definition. In concrete:

⁴In a slight abuse of notation, we assume that the algorithm is also given id as input.

⁵For **Dec** we assume that the decrypter knows the correct opening for a given ciphertext, which is naturally the case if the user is up-to-date and the ciphertext recent. Otherwise, its worse-case complexity is bounded by $O(\sqrt{N})$ (base construction) or by $O(\log N)$ (efficient updates).

⁶The helping information ξ is generated by the user once during the registration. It does not need to later be stored either by the KC or the user.

- (Step 1) The challenger \mathcal{C} first samples a common reference string, $\text{crs} = (\text{bg}, \{g^{z^i}\}_{i \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\}})$ and performs the initialization.
- (Step 2) Until \mathcal{A} exits step 2 of the security definition \mathcal{C} registers the identities chosen by \mathcal{A} . At the end, N' identities have been registered.

Let $\mathcal{D} = \{\text{id}_1, \dots, \text{id}_{N'}\}$ be the registered identities, observe that for each $\text{id} \in \mathcal{D}$ the challenger receives pk, ξ such that:

$$\begin{aligned} e(\text{pk}, h_n) &= e(\xi_1, g) = \dots = e(\xi_{\bar{\text{id}}-1}, h_{\bar{\text{id}}-2}) = \\ &= e(\xi_{\bar{\text{id}}+1}, h_{\bar{\text{id}}}) = \dots = e(\xi_n, h_{n-1}). \end{aligned}$$

Since the order of the group, p is prime (thus the group is cyclic), we can write $\text{pk} = (h_{\bar{\text{id}}})^{x_{\text{id}}}$, for some $x_{\text{id}} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Then $\xi_j = (h_{\bar{\text{id}}+n-(j-1)})^{x_{\text{id}}}$.

- (Step 3) Encrypting the target identity we get a ciphertext $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}^*, m_b)$. Concretely:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}^*})^r, g^r, e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}^*}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}^*})^r \cdot m_b \right)$$

Next, in order to prove the security of our construction we define the following sequence of games:
Game₀: This is the original game of RBE security described above. Here:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}^*})^r, g^r, e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}^*}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}^*})^r \cdot m_b \right)$$

where $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}^*}{n} \rceil$, $\bar{\text{id}}^* = \text{id}^* \bmod n$.

It will be useful to recall the structure of $C^{(k)}$:

1. Case 1: if id^* was registered by \mathcal{C} then

$$C^{(k)} = (h_{\bar{\text{id}}^*})^{x_{\text{id}^*}} \prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} (h_{\bar{i}})^{x_i}$$

where $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}^*}{n} \rceil$ and $\mathcal{D}^{(k)} = \mathcal{D} \cap \{\text{id}\}_{\text{id}=(k-1)n+1}^{(k-1)n+n}$. Consequently:

$$\begin{aligned} e\left(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}^*}\right)^r &= e\left((h_{\bar{\text{id}}^*})^{x_{\text{id}^*}} \cdot \prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} (h_{\bar{i}})^{x_i}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}^*}\right)^r \\ &= e\left((h_{\bar{\text{id}}^*})^{x_{\text{id}^*}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}^*}\right)^r \cdot \\ &\quad \cdot \prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} e\left((h_{\bar{i}})^{x_i}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}^*}\right)^r \\ &= e(g, g)^{z^{n+1} r x_{\text{id}^*}} \prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} e(g, g)^{z^{\bar{i}+n+1-\bar{\text{id}}^*} x_i r} \\ &= e(g, g)^{z^{n+1} r x_{\text{id}^*}} \prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} e\left(g^{z^{\bar{i}+n-(\bar{\text{id}}^*-1)} x_i}, g^r\right) \\ &= e(g, g)^{z^{n+1} r x_{\text{id}^*}} e\left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} \xi_{i, \bar{\text{id}}^*}, g^r\right) \end{aligned}$$

2. Case 2: if id^* was not registered then:⁷

$$C^{(k)} = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} (h_{\bar{i}})^{x_i}$$

⁷We note that $\setminus \{\text{id}^*\}$ in the product is written for emphasis, since $\mathcal{D}^{(k)}$ doesn't include it anyway.

where $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}^*}{n} \rceil$ and $\mathcal{D}^{(k)} = \mathcal{D} \cap \{\text{id}\}_{\text{id}=(k-1)n+1}^{(k-1)n+n}$ and similarly to the previous case:

$$e\left(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}^*}\right)^r = \prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} e(\xi_{i, \text{id}^*}, g^r)$$

Game₁: Is the same as Game₀, except for step 3 (the encryption step); we change the ciphertext according to the two cases below:

1. Case 1: if \mathcal{A} chooses to register id^* we set the ciphertext:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct}_0 &= C^{(k)}, \\ \text{ct}_1 &= e(g, g)^{s \cdot x_{\text{id}^*}} e\left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} \xi_{i, \text{id}^*}, g^r\right) \\ \text{ct}_2 &= g^r, \quad \text{ct}_3 = e(g, g)^s m_b \end{aligned}$$

for a random $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

2. Case 2: if \mathcal{A} chooses not to register id^* then we set:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct}_0 &= C^{(k)}, \quad \text{ct}_1 = e\left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} \xi_{i, \text{id}^*}, g^r\right) \\ \text{ct}_2 &= g^r, \quad \text{ct}_3 = e(g, g)^s m_b \end{aligned}$$

for a random $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

In both cases, the distributions induced by Game₀ and Game₁ are computationally indistinguishable assuming the n -power Diffie-Hellman assumption: according to the assumption $e(h_{\text{id}^*}, h_{n+1-\text{id}^*})^r = e(g, g)^{z^{n+1}r} \approx e(g, g)^s$ (given $\{h_i = g^{z^i}\}_{i \in [2n] \setminus \{n+1\}}$ and $\text{ct}_2 = g^r$). Therefore, for case 1 ct_0, ct_2 are identical to the ones in Game₀ and ct_1 and ct_3 computationally indistinguishable, while for case 2 $\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \text{ct}_2$ identical and ct_3 computationally indistinguishable.

Game₂: Again, is the same to Game₁ except for step 3 and we have two cases:

1. Case 1: if \mathcal{A} chooses to register id^* we set the ciphertext:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct}_0 &= C^{(k)}, \quad \text{ct}_1 = e(g, g)^w e\left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} \xi_{i, \text{id}^*}, g^r\right) \\ \text{ct}_2 &= g^r, \quad \text{ct}_3 = e(g, g)^s m_b \end{aligned}$$

for random $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

2. Case 2: if \mathcal{A} chooses not to register id^* then the ciphertext is identical to the one of Game₁, case 2:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct}_0 &= C^{(k)}, \quad \text{ct}_1 = e\left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}} \xi_{i, \text{id}^*}, g^r\right) \\ \text{ct}_2 &= g^r, \quad \text{ct}_3 = e(g, g)^s m_b \end{aligned}$$

for a random $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.

In case 2, the distributions of Game₁ and Game₂ are identical. On the other hand, for case 1, the two distributions are computationally indistinguishable by the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption: $e(g, g)^{s \cdot x_{\text{id}^*}} \approx e(g, g)^w$. The proof is concluded by observing that in game 2, the $e(g, g)^s \cdot m_b$ is perfectly indistinguishable from a random element $M \in \mathbb{G}_T$, thus the probability of the adversary to win is exactly $1/2$. \square




Figure 2: Merge of the commitments triggered by the registration of $\text{id} = 4$. $C(I)$ denotes a commitment containing identities in the set I , whereas $\xi_I^{(i)}$ denotes the auxiliary information of the i -th party corresponding to $C(I)$.

5 Extensions

We discuss a few extensions to our main construction and we describe their efficiency tradeoffs.

5.1 More Efficient Updates

Here we describe a modified version of our scheme to make the updates more efficient and also decrease the size of the auxiliary information that is required to be stored on the KC side. To ease the understanding of the extension, we restate some of the notations compared to our construction in Figure 1. Let $t = \log(n)$; in our extension, we will run t parallel instances of the scheme and we denote the public parameters of each instance by $\text{pp} = \{\text{pp}_1, \dots, \text{pp}_t\}$. Similar to the construction in Figure 1, each pp_i consists of commitments $(C_i^{(1)}, \dots, C_i^{(B)})$. Throughout the construction, we will maintain the invariant that no identity id is registered under both pp_i and pp_j at any time, for any $i \neq j$. We will additionally maintain a global auxiliary information $\text{aux} = (L_1, \dots, L_N)$, along with an auxiliary variable $\alpha_i^{(j)}$ associated with the commitment $C_i^{(j)}$.

To avoid notation clutter, in the following description we will only consider identities in the range $\{1, \dots, n\}$. This allows us to only consider the first component $C_i^{(1)}$ of each commitment, and we consequently suppress the superscript denoting $C_i^{(1)} = C_i$ and $\alpha_i^{(1)} = \alpha_i$. This is without loss of generality since other indices outside of this set are mapped to different commitments.

Registration. Whenever an identity $\text{id} \in [n]$ with $(\text{pk}_{\text{id}}, \xi_{\text{id}})$ wants to register, the KC checks the correctness of ξ_{id} (same as in Figure 1), parses the commitments (C_1, \dots, C_t) , and finds the largest index i such that $C_i \neq 1$. Then it sets $C_{i+1} = \text{pk}_{\text{id}}$ and $\alpha_{i+1} = \xi_{\text{id}}$. It then invokes the **Merge** subroutine to recursively update the public parameters and the auxiliary information. In a nutshell, the **Merge** subroutine maintains the invariant that the i -th commitment always has *at least* twice as many keys as the $(i+1)$ -th commitment. A pictorial description is shown in Figure 2 and the pseudocode is shown below.

Merge^[aux, α_i, α_{i+1}](C_i, C_{i+1}) :

- Let $J_i \subseteq [n]$ be the set of identities contained in C_i , and let $J_{i+1} \subseteq [n]$ be the set of identities contained in C_{i+1} .
- If $i = 0$ or $|J_i| \neq |J_{i+1}|$, then return \perp .
- Update $C_i = C_i \cdot C_{i+1}$ and $C_{i+1} = 1$.
- Parse $\text{aux} = (L_1, \dots, L_n)$.
- For all $j \in J_i$ parse $L_j = (\Lambda_{j,1}, \dots, \Lambda_{j,\ell})$ and update $L_j \cup \{\Lambda_{j,\ell+1} = \alpha_{i,j}\}$.
- For all $j \in J_{i+1}$ parse $L_j = (\Lambda_{j,1}, \dots, \Lambda_{j,\ell})$ and update $L_j \cup \{\Lambda_{j,\ell+1} = \alpha_{i+1,j}\}$.
- Compute $\alpha_i = \alpha_i \circ \alpha_{i+1}$, where \circ denotes the component-wise product of the two vectors of group elements.
- Call **Merge**^[aux, α_{i-1}, α_i](C_{i-1}, C_i).

Encryption and Decryption. To encrypt a message m with respect to an identity $\text{id} \in [n]$, the encrypter computes

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct} &= \{\text{ct}_i\}_{i \in [t]} \\ &= \{C_i, e(C_i, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^{r_i}, g^{r_i}, e(h_{\text{id}}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^{r_i} m\}_{i \in [t]} \end{aligned}$$

that is, the encryption is done in parallel with respect to all commitments (C_1, \dots, C_t) . This way, as long as the decrypter knows the opening for *any* of the commitments, the decryption algorithm is successful. The security of the scheme can be shown by a standard hybrid argument.

Number of Updates. We claim that the total number of updates any identity id will receive will be at most $\log(n)$. The intuition behind this is quite simple, since updates must be issued only when two commitments are merged and therefore it suffices to establish that $t \leq \log(n)$. Since the size of a merged commitment doubles, this operation can happen at most $\log(n)$ times before the number of identities loaded in a commitment equals n . More formally, let $|J_i|$ and $|J_{i+1}|$ be the number of identities in C_i and C_{i+1} , respectively. By definition, the Merge subroutine is only effective when $|J_i| = |J_{i+1}|$ (else it returns \perp), resulting in a commitment with $2|J_i|$ identities. Therefore for each $i \in [t]$ we have $|J_i| = 2^{t-i}$ at the end of the Merge subroutine. Since at most n identities are contained in each block, we have that

$$\sum_{i \in [t]} 2^{t-i} = \sum_{i \in [t]} |J_i| \leq n$$

which in turn implies that $t \leq \log(n)$.

Runtime Analysis. In the following analysis, we ignore factors in the security parameter (such as the size of individual group elements) and we only consider the dependence of the algorithms with respect to the number of users. For the registration algorithm, the runtime of each recursive call is dominated by the component-product of α_i and α_i , which computes n group operations. Since there are at most t -many recursive calls, we can bound the total runtime by $O(n \cdot t) = O(\sqrt{N} \log N)$. The update algorithm sends at most t group elements to the receiver and thus its runtime is bounded by $O(\log N)$.

Space Analysis. Since we run t parallel instances of the public parameters, this variant introduces a multiplicative factor in $t \leq \log(n)$ and thus the size of the public parameter is bounded by $\sqrt{N} \log \sqrt{N}$. As for the auxiliary information, we have to bound the size of aux as well as the size of $\alpha_i^{(j)}$. As argued above, each user receives at most $\log(n)$ -many updates in its lifespan, so the size of aux is bounded by $N \log(n) = N \log \sqrt{N}$. On the other hand, the size of each $\alpha_i^{(j)}$ is exactly $n - 1$ and does not change throughout the execution of the protocol. In total, their size is $(n - 1)Bt \leq N \log \sqrt{N}$, thus we can bound the total size of the auxiliary information by $O(N \log N)$.

5.2 Verifiability

In the following we discuss how to augment the construction in Section 4.1 with verifiability. Verifiable RBE [GV20] allows one to obtain a proof of registration (membership proof) or a proof of non-registration (non-membership proof) of an identity. In terms of efficiency, we require that both the proofs π and the runtime of the verification algorithm are *sublinear* in the size of the statement. The syntax of the definition of verifiable RBE is taken from [GV20].

Definition 5.1 (Verifiable RBE). A verifiable RBE is an RBE scheme that is augmented with the PPT algorithms (MProve, MVerify, NMProve, NMVerify) defined as follows.

- $\text{MProve}^{\text{[aux]}}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \text{pk}) \rightarrow \pi$: The membership proof algorithm MProve takes as input the common random sting crs , current public parameter pp , an identity id , and a public key pk and it outputs a membership proof π that certifies that id was registered in pp .

- $MVerify(crs, pp, id, pk, \pi) \rightarrow 0/1$: The membership verification algorithm $MVerify$ takes as input the common random sting crs , current public parameter pp , an identity id , a public key pk , and a proof π and it outputs a bit $\{0, 1\}$ denoting acceptance or rejection.
- $NMProve^{[aux]}(crs, pp, id) \rightarrow \pi$: The membership proof algorithm $NMProve$ takes as input the common random sting crs , current public parameter pp , and an identity id and it outputs a membership proof π that certifies that id was not registered in pp .
- $NMVerify(crs, pp, id, \pi) \rightarrow 0/1$: The non membership verification algorithm $NMVerify$ takes as input the common random sting crs , current public parameter pp , an identity id , and a proof π and it outputs a bit $\{0, 1\}$ denoting acceptance or rejection.

We refer the reader to [GV20] for definitions of completeness. In terms of efficiency, we require that both the proofs π and the runtime of the verification algorithm are *sublinear* in the size of the statement. Below we recall the formal definitions for soundness for both membership and non-membership proofs from [GV20].

Definition 5.2 (Membership Soundness). A verifiable RBE satisfies membership soundness if there exists a negligible function negl such that for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} it holds that the advantage in the following experiment is negligibly close to $1/2$:

- $crs \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $(pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(crs)$
- $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$
- $(pp, id, \pi, m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(crs, pk)$
- $ct \leftarrow \text{Enc}(crs, pp, id, m_b)$
- The adversary wins if:

$$\mathcal{A}(ct) = b \text{ and } MVerify(crs, pp, id, pk, \pi) = 1.$$

Definition 5.3 (Non Membership Soundness). A verifiable RBE satisfies non-membership soundness if there exists a negligible function negl such that for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} it holds that the advantage in the following experiment is negligibly close to $1/2$:

- $crs \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$
- $(pp, id, \pi, m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(crs)$
- $ct \leftarrow \text{Enc}(crs, pp, id, m_b)$
- The adversary wins if:

$$\mathcal{A}(ct) = b \text{ and } NMVerify(crs, pp, id, \pi) = 1.$$

Algorithms. We describe the algorithms here. In fact, we show that the opening Λ_{id} is already a valid membership/non-membership proof for the public key of id .

$MProve^{[aux]}(crs, pp, id, pk) \rightarrow \pi$: Parse $aux = (L_1, \dots, L_N)$ and let Λ_{id} be the last (most up to date) element of L_{id} . Return $\pi = \Lambda_{id}$.

$MVerify(crs, pp, id, pk, \pi) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$: Let $k = \lceil \frac{id}{n} \rceil$ and parse $pp = (C^{(1)}, \dots, C^{(B)})$. Accept if

$$e\left(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-id}\right) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\pi, g) \cdot e(pk, h_{n+1-id}).$$

$\text{NMProve}^{\text{[aux]}}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}) \rightarrow \pi : (\text{Same as MProve})$

$\text{NMVerify}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \pi) \rightarrow \{0, 1\} : \text{Let } k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}}{n} \rceil \text{ and parse } \text{pp} = (C^{(1)}, \dots, C^{(B)}). \text{ Accept if}$

$$e\left(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}}\right) \stackrel{?}{=} e(\pi, g).$$

In terms of efficiency, both membership and non-membership proofs consist of a single group element and the verification runtime is independent of N . Thus, the scheme satisfies verifier efficiency and proof succinctness.

Security Analysis. We state the main theorem in the following and we prove the two properties separately.

Theorem 5.1 (Soundness). *If the bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the n -Power Diffie-Hellman assumptions hold for \mathcal{BG} , then the scheme as described above satisfies membership and non-membership soundness.*

Proof: Membership Soundness. We consider a sequence of games starting from the original Membership Soundness game of Definition 5.2. Each game induces a distribution for the output ciphertext; we will argue that the final distribution of ct is exactly $1/2$ and thus by a standard hybrid argument we will conclude that the initial Membership Soundness game is negligibly close to $1/2$. In the following $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}}{n} \rceil$.

Game₀: This is the original game of Membership Soundness. The challenger samples $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, a key-pair $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{crs})$ according to the RBE algorithms and a random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and sends (crs, pk) to the adversary \mathcal{A} . The adversary on input (crs, pk) outputs $(\text{pp}, \text{id}, \pi, m_0, m_1)$. Then a ciphertext of message m_b is computed $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, m_b)$. Here:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r, g^r, e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r m_b \right)$$

and the adversary is admissible if $\text{MVerify}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \text{pk}, \pi) = 1$:

$$e\left(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}}\right) = e(\pi, g) \cdot e(\text{pk}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})$$

where pp is parsed as $(C^{(1)}, \dots, C^{(B)})$.⁸

Game₁: The game is the same to **Game₀** except for the ciphertext computation. We change the way the second element of the ciphertext is computed. Namely, we set:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(\pi, g^r) \cdot e(\text{pk}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r, g^r, e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r \cdot m_b \right)$$

Note that, since π correctly verifies, $\text{MVerify}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \text{pk}, \pi) = 1$, we have

$$e(\pi, g^r) \cdot e(\text{pk}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r = e(\pi, g)^r \cdot e(\text{pk}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r = e\left(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}}\right)^r$$

and thus the two distributions are identical.

Game₂: Here we change again the way the second element of the ciphertext is computed. Namely, we set:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(\pi, g^r) \cdot e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^{r \cdot \text{sk}}, g^r, e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r \cdot m_b \right).$$

To see that the two distributions are identical, note that in the RBE construction $\text{pk} = h_{\bar{\text{id}}}^{\text{sk}}$ (note that pk, sk were honestly generated by the challenger) and thus:

$$e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^{r \cdot \text{sk}} = e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}}^{\text{sk}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r = e(\text{pk}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^r$$

Game₃: In this hybrid, we compute the ciphertext as:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(\pi, g^r) \cdot e(g, g)^{s \cdot \text{sk}}, g^r, e(g, g)^s \cdot m_b \right)$$

where $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ is a random field element. By the n -Power Diffie-Hellman assumption $e(h_{\text{id}}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r = e(g, g)^{z^{n+1} \cdot r} \approx e(g, g)^s$, therefore the distributions of ct in Game_2 and Game_3 are computationally indistinguishable.

Game₄: In this hybrid, we compute the ciphertext as:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(\pi, g^r) \cdot e(g, g)^w, g^r, e(g, g)^s \cdot m_b \right)$$

where $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Again, by the bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption $e(g, g)^{s \cdot \text{sk}} \approx e(g, g)^w$, thus the distributions induced by Game_3 and Game_4 are computationally indistinguishable. The proof is concluded by observing that $e(g, g)^s \cdot m_b$ is uniformly distributed in \mathbb{G}_T , so the adversary has a probability of success exactly $1/2$. \square

Proof: Non-Membership Soundness. We consider the following sequence of hybrid games. In the following $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}}{n} \rceil$.

Game₀: This is the original game of Non-Membership Soundness. The challenger samples $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ according to the RBE algorithm and a random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and sends crs to the adversary \mathcal{A} . The adversary on input crs outputs $(\text{pp}, \text{id}, \pi, m_0, m_1)$. Then a ciphertext of message m_b is computed $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, m_b)$. Here:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r, g^r, e(h_{\text{id}}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r m_b \right)$$

and the adversary is admissible if $\text{NMVerify}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \pi) = 1$:

$$e\left(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}}\right) = e(\pi, g)$$

where pp is parsed as $(C^{(1)}, \dots, C^{(B)})$.⁸

Game₁: Here we change the way the second element of the ciphertext is computed. Namely, we set:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(\pi, g^r), g^r, e(h_{\text{id}}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r \cdot m_b \right).$$

Observe that, since the proof π correctly verifies

$$e(\pi, g^r) = e(\pi, g)^r = e\left(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}}\right)^r$$

thus the two distributions are identical.

Game₂: In this hybrid, we compute the ciphertext as:

$$\text{ct} = \left(C^{(k)}, e(\pi, g^r), g^r, e(g, g)^s \cdot m_b \right)$$

where $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. By the n -Powers Diffie-Hellman assumption $e(h_{\text{id}}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r = e(g, g)^{z^{n+1} \cdot r} \approx e(g, g)^s$, therefore the distributions of Game_1 and Game_2 are computationally indistinguishable. The proof is concluded by observing that $e(h_{\text{id}}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^s \cdot m_b$ is uniformly distributed in \mathbb{G}_T , so the adversary has probability of success exactly $1/2$. \square

5.3 Anonymity

We present a (slight) variant of our scheme of Section 4.1 that is additionally anonymous, namely, where the ciphertexts hide the identity of the decrypter. Intuitively, there are two reasons why our original scheme is not anonymous.

⁸If $k > B$ the adversary is considered non-admissible.

Firstly, in order for the decrypter to identify if her update information u is outdated (and thus needs to query the KC for `Upd`), we include the up-to-date $C^{(k)}$ in the ciphertext. Then the decrypter can directly check if Λ_ℓ verifies with respect to $C^{(k)}$. This clearly (partially) breaks anonymity, since the ‘block’ k in which the user lies is leaked. We resolve this by including in the ciphertext a hiding commitment of the message m instead, $c = \text{Com}(m; o)$, together with an encryption of the randomness o , in place of $C^{(k)}$. If u is up-to-date then the two ciphertexts are decrypted normally and c opens to m with randomness o , $c = \text{Com}(m; o)$. If not, then u is outdated and the user calls `GetUpd`.

Secondly, an adversary controlling all the users registered in a cluster k^* can, by using their secret keys and g^r , identify if the part $e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}})^r$ of ciphertext for identity id is containing $C^{(k^*)}$, in case id is not registered yet. Intuitively this is because the adversary knows *all* the secret keys in $C^{(k^*)} = \prod_i h_i^{\text{sk}_i}$ (since id hasn’t registered yet). To resolve this we initialize all $C^{(i)}$ with a dummy public key in an extra position $n + 1$, $R = h_{n+1}^t$, generated in the setup phase. Being generated in the setup phase, no adversary knows the corresponding secret.

Definition. Here we formally define the anonymity notion for RBE schemes. We note that the definition is taken from [GHM⁺19] with some minor changes.

Definition 5.4 (Anonymous RBE). An anonymous RBE scheme has the same syntax as that of an RBE scheme, with PPT algorithms (`Gen`, `Reg`, `Enc`, `Upd`, `Dec`). It satisfies the properties of completeness, compactness and efficiency as a RBE scheme and has the following stronger notion of security: For any interactive PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , consider the game $\text{EXP}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Anon}}(\lambda)$ between \mathcal{A} and a challenger \mathcal{C} as follows.

1. **Initialization.** \mathcal{C} sets $\text{pp} = \perp$, $\text{aux} = \perp$, $\mathcal{D} = \emptyset$, $\text{id}_0 = \perp$, $\text{id}_1 = \perp$, $t = 0$, $\text{crs} \leftarrow U_{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ and sends the sampled crs to \mathcal{A} .
2. Until \mathcal{A} continues (which is at most $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ steps), proceed as follows. At every iteration, \mathcal{A} can perform exactly one of the following actions.
 - (a) **Registering new (non-target) identity.** \mathcal{A} sends some $\text{id} \notin \mathcal{D}$ and pk to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} registers (id, pk) by getting $\text{pp} = \text{Reg}^{\text{aux}}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, (\text{id}, \text{pk}))$ and lets $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D} \cup \{\text{id}\}$.
 - (b) **Registering new target identity pair.** If id_0 or id_1 was chosen by \mathcal{A} already (i.e., $\text{id}_0 \neq \perp$ or $\text{id}_1 \neq \perp$), skip this step. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} sends challenges $\text{id}_0, \text{id}_1 \notin \mathcal{D}$ to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} first samples $(\text{pk}_0, \text{sk}_0) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, registers id_0 by setting $\text{pp} = \text{Reg}^{\text{aux}}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, (\text{id}_0, \text{pk}_0))$ and then samples $(\text{pk}_1, \text{sk}_1) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, registers id_1 by setting $\text{pp} = \text{Reg}^{\text{aux}}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, (\text{id}_1, \text{pk}_1))$. Next, \mathcal{C} lets $\mathcal{D} = \mathcal{D} \cup \{\text{id}_0, \text{id}_1\}$ and sends pk_0, pk_1 to \mathcal{A} .
3. **Encrypting for the challenge identity.** \mathcal{A} sends some $(\text{id}_0^*, \text{id}_1^*) \notin \mathcal{D} \setminus \{\text{id}_0, \text{id}_1\}$ and two messages (m_0, m_1) and \mathcal{C} generates $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}_b, m_b)$, where $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a random bit, and sends ct to \mathcal{A} .
4. The adversary \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' and wins the game if $b' = b$.

We call an RBE scheme anonymous if there exists a negligible function negl such that for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} it holds that $|1/2 - \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins } \text{EXP}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{Anon}}(\lambda)]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Construction. Our full construction is on Figure 3. For generality we use `Com` as a black-box; the reader can think of it as an ElGamal commitment.⁹ For ease of presentation we highlight the differences with the original construction with blue color.

Correctness. Correctness is similar to the one of the original construction. We, additionally, argue that, under the Binding property of the commitment scheme, $c = \text{Com}(m'; o')$ iff Λ_ℓ is up-to-date: if it is up-to-date then $m = m'$ and $r = r'$, if not then $m \neq m'$ and $r = r'$ (unless with negligible probability) and $c = \text{Com}(m; r) \neq \text{Com}(m'; r')$ (from the Binding property of `Com`).

⁹In case of domain mismatch we assume a collision-resistant hash function being applied to m and/or o .

Setup($1^\lambda, n$) \rightarrow crs : generate a bilinear group $\text{bg} := (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$ and sample $z \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Sets $h_i = g^{z^i}$ for each $i \in [2(n+1)]$. Furthermore, sample $t \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and compute $R = (h_{n+1})^t$ and $\Xi = ((h_{2n+2})^t, \dots, (h_{n+3})^t, \emptyset)$. Output

$$\text{crs} = (\text{bg}, \{h_i\}_{i \in [2(n+1)] \setminus \{n+2\}}, R, \{\Xi_i\}_{i \in [n]}).$$

Gen(crs, id) \rightarrow (pk, sk, ξ) : If id $\notin [N]$ output \perp . Otherwise, sample $x_{\text{id}} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, compute $\bar{\text{id}} = \text{id} \bmod n$ and set

$$\text{pk} = (h_{\bar{\text{id}}})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \quad \text{sk} = x_{\text{id}}, \quad \xi = ((h_{\bar{\text{id}}+n})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \dots, (h_{2+n})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \emptyset, (h_n)^{x_{\text{id}}}, \dots, (h_{\bar{\text{id}}+1})^{x_{\text{id}}})$$

Reg^[aux](crs, pp, id, pk, ξ) \rightarrow pp' : The key curator proceeds as follows:

- If it is the first identity to be registered then initialize $\text{pp} = (R, \dots, R) \in \mathbb{G}^B$ and $\text{aux} = (\{\Xi_1\}, \dots, \{\Xi_n\}, \dots, \{\Xi_1\}, \dots, \{\Xi_n\}) \in \mathbb{G}^N$.
- If id $\notin [N]$ output \perp .
- Check the correctness of ξ :

$$e(\text{pk}, h_n) = e(\xi_1, g) = \dots = e(\xi_{\bar{\text{id}}-1}, h_{\bar{\text{id}}-2}) = e(\xi_{\bar{\text{id}}+1}, h_{\bar{\text{id}}}) = \dots = e(\xi_n, h_{n-1}).$$

If the above doesn't hold output \perp .

- Otherwise, parse $\text{pp} = (C^{(1)}, \dots, C^{(B)})$, compute $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}}{n} \rceil$ and set $C'^{(k)} \leftarrow C^{(k)} \cdot \text{pk}$, the rest remain the same $C'^{(j)} = C^{(j)}$ for each $j \in [B] \setminus \{k\}$. Output

$$\text{pp}' = (C'^{(1)}, \dots, C'^{(B)})$$

- Parse $\text{aux} = (L_1, \dots, L_N)$ and for each $j \in \{(k-1)n+1, \dots, (k-1)n+n\} \setminus \{\text{id}\}$ parse $L_j = \{\Lambda_{j,1}, \dots, \Lambda_{j,\ell}\}$. Set $L_j = L_j \cup \{\Lambda_{j,\ell+1} = \Lambda_{j,\ell} \cdot \xi_j\}$, while the rest remain the same.

Enc(crs, pp, id, m) \rightarrow ct : On input $m \in \mathbb{G}_T$, let $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}}{n} \rceil$. Sample $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $o \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$ and compute:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct} &= (\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \text{ct}_2, \text{ct}_3, \text{ct}_4, \text{ct}_5, \text{ct}_6) \\ &= \left(\text{Com}(m; o), e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^{r_1}, g^{r_1}, e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^{r_1} m, e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^{r_2}, g^{r_2}, e(h_{\bar{\text{id}}}, h_{n+1-\bar{\text{id}}})^{r_2} o \right) \end{aligned}$$

Upd^{aux}(pp, id) \rightarrow u : parse $\text{aux} = (L_1, \dots, L_N)$ and output L_{id} .

Dec(sk, u, ct) \rightarrow m or GetUpd : Parse $u = \{\Lambda_1, \dots, \Lambda_\ell\}$ and for each $i \in [\ell]$ compute

$$m'_i = \frac{\text{ct}_3}{(e(\Lambda_i, \text{ct}_2)^{-1} \cdot \text{ct}_1)^{\text{sk}^{-1}}} \quad \text{and} \quad o'_i = \frac{\text{ct}_6}{(e(\Lambda_i, \text{ct}_5)^{-1} \cdot \text{ct}_4)^{\text{sk}^{-1}}}$$

If the exist no i such that $\text{Com}(m'_i; o'_i) \neq \text{ct}_0$ then output GetUpd, otherwise output m'_i .

Figure 3: Our Anonymous RBE construction variant.

Anonymity. We state and prove the following theorem.

Theorem 5.2 (Anonymity). *If the bilinear Diffie-Hellman and the n -Power Diffie-Hellman assumptions*

hold for \mathcal{BG} , then the scheme as described above satisfies anonymity.

Proof. The proof follows along the lines of the argument of our main theorem, so here we provide a sketch, only highlighting the differences in the game-hops.

Game₀: Is the original game of Anonymous RBE security. Here:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct} = & \left(\text{Com}(m_b; o), e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^{r_1}, g^{r_1}, e(h_{\text{id}_b^*}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^{r_1} m_b, \right. \\ & \left. e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^{r_2}, g^{r_2}, e(h_{\text{id}_b^*}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^{r_2} o \right) \end{aligned}$$

Game₁: As a first step we switch to a game with a random value committed instead of m_b .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct} = & \left(\text{Com}(m^*; o^*), e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^{r_1}, g^{r_1}, e(h_{\text{id}_b^*}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^{r_1} m_b, \right. \\ & \left. e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^{r_2}, g^{r_2}, e(h_{\text{id}_b^*}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^{r_2} o \right) \end{aligned}$$

for random $m^* \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_T$, $o^* \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$. From the hiding property of the commitment scheme Com , the games 0 and 1 are indistinguishable.

From here the proof in the case 1, the case where \mathcal{A} chooses to register id_b^* , is identical to the original proof. Hence we omit this case and focus on case 2, where the adversary \mathcal{A} chooses not to register id_b^* .

Game₂: Here we compute:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct}_0 &= \text{Com}(m^*; o^*), \\ \text{ct}_1 &= e(g, g)^{s_1 \cdot t} e \left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)}} \xi_{i, \text{id}_b^*}, g^{r_1} \right), \text{ct}_2 = g^{r_1}, \\ \text{ct}_3 &= e(g, g)^{s_1} m_b, \\ \text{ct}_4 &= e(g, g)^{s_2 \cdot t} e \left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)}} \xi_{i, \text{id}_b^*}, g^{r_2} \right), \\ \text{ct}_5 &= g^{r_2}, \text{ct}_6 = e(g, g)^{s_2} o \end{aligned}$$

for random $m^* \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_T$, $o^* \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$, $s_1, s_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. The distributions induced by Game_0 and Game_1 are computationally indistinguishable assuming the n -power Diffie-Hellman assumption. To see why this holds observe that $C^{(k)} = (h_{n+1})^t \prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)}} (h_{\bar{i}})^{x_i}$ from which we get that $e(C^{(k)}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^r = e(g, g)^{z^{n+2} r t} \cdot e \left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)}} \xi_{i, \text{id}_b^*}, g^r \right)$ (see the original proof for a similar argument) and $e(h_{\text{id}_b^*}, h_{n+1-\text{id}_b^*})^r = e(g, g)^{z^{n+2} r}$.

Game₃: Here we compute:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{ct}_0 &= \text{Com}(m^*; o^*), \\ \text{ct}_1 &= e(g, g)^{w_1} e \left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)}} \xi_{i, \text{id}_b^*}, g^{r_1} \right), \text{ct}_2 = g^{r_1} \\ \text{ct}_3 &= e(g, g)^{s_1} m_b, \\ \text{ct}_4 &= e(g, g)^{w_2} e \left(\prod_{i \in \mathcal{D}^{(k)}} \xi_{i, \text{id}_b^*}, g^{r_2} \right) \\ \text{ct}_5 &= g^{r_2}, \quad \text{ct}_6 = e(g, g)^{s_2} o \end{aligned}$$

for random $m^* \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_T$, $o^* \leftarrow \mathcal{O}$, $s_1, s_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, $w_1, w_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. The distributions of games 2 and 3 are computationally indistinguishable by the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. To conclude the proof note that the distribution of Game_3 is perfectly indistinguishable from a random one. \square

5.4 CCA Security

The standard CCA security notion for encryption schemes captures the fact that an adversary may be able to obtain decryptions for ciphertexts of her choice and demands that even in this case she should not be able to distinguish between encrypted messages. In the following, we state the notion of security under chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for RBE.

Definition 5.5 (CCA Security of RBE). For any interactive PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , consider the following game $\text{EXP}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{CCA}}(\lambda)$ between \mathcal{A} and a challenger \mathcal{C} .

1. **Initialization.** \mathcal{C} sets $\text{pp} = \perp$, $\text{aux} = \perp$, $\mathcal{D} = \emptyset$, $\text{id}^* = \perp$, $\text{crs} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and sends the sampled crs to \mathcal{A} .
2. Until \mathcal{A} continues (which is at most $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ steps), proceed as follows. At every iteration, \mathcal{A} chooses exactly one of the actions below to be performed.
 - (a) **Registering new (non-target) identity.** \mathcal{A} sends some $\text{id} \notin \mathcal{D}$ and pk to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} registers (id, pk) by letting $\text{pp} := \text{Reg}^{[\text{aux}]}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \text{pk})$ and $\mathcal{D} := \mathcal{D} \cup \{\text{id}\}$.
 - (b) **Registering the target identity.** If $\text{id}^* \neq \perp$, skip this step. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} sends some $\text{id}^* \notin \mathcal{D}$ to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} then samples $(\text{pk}^*, \text{sk}^*) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\text{crs})$, updates $\text{pp} := \text{Reg}^{[\text{aux}]}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}^*, \text{pk}^*)$, $\mathcal{D} := \mathcal{D} \cup \{\text{id}^*\}$, and sends pk^* to \mathcal{A} .
 - (c) **Decryption by target identity** If $\text{id}^* = \perp$, skip this step. Otherwise, \mathcal{A} sends some ciphertext ct to \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} then lets $m = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}^*, \text{u}, \text{ct})$. If $m = \text{GetUpd}$, then \mathcal{C} obtains the update $\text{u}^* = \text{Upd}^{\text{aux}}(\text{pp}, \text{id}^*)$ and then returns $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}^*, \text{u}^*, \text{ct}_j)$.
3. **Encrypting for the target identity.** \mathcal{A} sends some $\text{id} \notin \mathcal{D} \setminus \{\text{id}^*\}$ and two messages (m_0, m_1) and \mathcal{C} generates $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, m_b)$, where $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a random bit, and sends ct^* to \mathcal{A} .
4. The adversary \mathcal{A} can continue querying the decryption oracle on ciphertexts not equal to ct^* . At some point \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' and wins the game if $b = b'$.

We call an RBE scheme secure if there exists a negligible function negl such that for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} it holds that

$$|1/2 - \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins } \text{EXP}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{CCA}}(\lambda)]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We sketch how our scheme can be transformed into a CCA-secure one. First, we observe that the procedure to determine whether the user's opening is up to date depends only on $h_{\text{id}}^{\text{sk}} = \text{pk}$, which is public information. It follows that this check is publicly computable and therefore does not leak any further information about the secret key. It remains to show how to modify the scheme to answer decryption queries. There are many generic transformations available in the literature, and the most efficient is the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [FO99], where the encryption algorithm is defined as

$$\text{Enc}(\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, r; H_1(r, m)), H_2(r) \oplus m$$

where (H_1, H_2) are two hash functions modeled as random oracles and r is a random string. Since this is a standard transformation, we omit the formal analysis and we refer the reader to [FO99] for further details.

5.5 Efficient RBE from the BDH assumption

We show an efficient construction of RBE secure under the plain Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption, i.e., not based on a q -type assumption. The construction is in the same spirit as the one of Section 4.1, but is instead based on the [CF13] vector commitment (which is secure under the standard CDH assumption). The scheme is slightly less efficient than our main construction. The overhead comes from the fact that the [CF13] VC has quadratic parameters, thus (after applying the square root trick) the parameters are still linear in the

number of users. Fortunately, the linear-sized part of the parameters (denoted as crs) is not needed to be stored by the users, but solely by the KC.¹⁰

We denote the parameters that the user should store by crs_{user} , and as will be apparent in the construction they have size $O(n)$ (instead of $O(N)$). The scheme is described in Figure 4.

Security To see why the scheme is secure under the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) assumption observe that $\text{ct}_3 = e(h_i, h_i)^r m = e(g, g)^{r \cdot z^2} m$. Under the BDH assumption, $e(g, g)^{r \cdot z^2}$ is indistinguishable from $e(g, g)^s$, for a random $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$.¹¹

6 Implementation and Benchmarks

We implemented a Python prototype¹² of both efficient update and basic RBE constructions described in Section 5.1 and Section 4.1. For efficiency, we used asymmetric pairings instead of symmetric pairings in our prototype. To accommodate asymmetric pairings, the construction is modified slightly to have two copies of the CRS (one in \mathbb{G}_1 and one in \mathbb{G}_2); all other elements (commitments and auxiliary information) are left in \mathbb{G}_1 , and ct_2 is set to g_2^r (where g_2 is the generator of \mathbb{G}_2).

Group Operations. For the choice of pairings, we used the BLS12-381 elliptic curve via the `petrelc` [LG22] Python wrapper around RELIC [AGM⁺20]: each element in $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ is represented with 49, 97, and 384 bytes, respectively. On our machine, exponentiation in \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 takes an average of 0.13 and 0.18 milliseconds, respectively, and each pairing evaluation takes 0.68 milliseconds.

Storage. In the base RBE implementation, the sizes of pk, sk , and ct encrypting a single group element from \mathbb{G}_T are constant: 49, 32, and 914 bytes, respectively. The size of each update that users will receive during the decryption is also constant at 49 bytes. In the RBE with efficient updates, the sizes of pk, sk are constant at 49 and 32 bytes, respectively. However, the size of ct for the encryption of a single \mathbb{G}_T element will increase by a factor of $\log \sqrt{N}$ in the worst case. Throughout the lifetime of the system each user will have to receive a total of \sqrt{N} (base construction) or $\log \sqrt{N}$ (efficient update construction) updates, each 49 bytes.

Benchmarks. The runtime of each algorithm and size of the parameters are plotted for increasing values of N in Figure 5. The benchmarking for an RBE system of N users is performed in the following way: first, the crs is generated for the parameter N and the databases to store pp and aux are created, then $n = \sqrt{N}$ identities $\text{id}_1, \dots, \text{id}_n$, where $\text{id}_i \in [n]$ for all $i \in [n]$, are registered in random order. Notice that all these parties will register under a single commitment in the public parameter, and without loss of generality, we take the first commitment. The registration times are taken as an average over the n identities. We then encrypt to each of the n identities at a random time after their registration, and decrypt at a random time after encryption. This mirrors the completeness game in Definition 3.2. Therefore, the encryption, decryption, and update times are also averages over n .

In the base construction, we allow the encrypter to include the time-stamp of the encryption in the ciphertext, which allows the decryption algorithm to directly use the appropriate opening and decrypt the ciphertext in constant time. In efficient construction, the decrypter has to check $t \leq \lceil \log n \rceil$ updates in order to find the correct one.

We also remark that since the registration/encryption/decryption of each commitment can be done in parallel and independently of the other commitments, registering all the users in the same commitment

¹⁰Each user needs to download the linear-sized parameters once at the registration phase and then delete it.

¹¹In fact, this is a square-variant of the BDH assumption, but can be reduced to the plain BDH. Analogous reductions for CDH and its square-variant can be found in the literature [BDZ03, MW96].

¹²<https://github.com/ahmadrezarahimi/efficientRBE>

Setup($1^\lambda, n$) \rightarrow ($\text{crs}, \text{crs}_{KC}$): generate a bilinear group $\text{bg} := (p, \mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, g, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$ and sample $\{z_i\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*$. Set $h_i = g^{z_i}$ for each $i \in [n]$, $H_{i,j} = g^{z_i z_j}$ for each $i, j \in [n]$ and output

$$\text{crs} = (\text{bg}, \{h_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{H_{i,j}\}_{i,j \in [n], i \neq j}) \quad \text{and} \quad \text{crs}_{\text{user}} = (\text{bg}, \{h_i\}_{i \in [n]})$$

Gen(crs, id) \rightarrow ($\text{pk}, \text{sk}, \xi$): If $\text{id} \notin [N]$ output \perp . Otherwise, sample $x_{\text{id}} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, compute $\bar{\text{id}} = \text{id} \bmod n$ and set

$$\text{pk} = (h_{\bar{\text{id}}})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \quad \text{sk} = x_{\text{id}}, \quad \xi = ((H_{1,\bar{\text{id}}})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \dots, (H_{\bar{\text{id}}-1,\bar{\text{id}}})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \emptyset, (H_{\bar{\text{id}}+1,\bar{\text{id}}})^{x_{\text{id}}}, \dots, (H_{n,\bar{\text{id}}})^{x_{\text{id}}})$$

Reg^[aux]($\text{crs}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, \text{pk}, \xi$) \rightarrow pp' : The key curator proceeds as follows:

- If it is the first identity to be registered then initialize $\text{pp} = (1, \dots, 1) \in \mathbb{G}^B$ and $\text{aux} = (\{1\}, \dots, \{1\}) \in \mathbb{G}^N$.
- If $\text{id} \notin [N]$ output \perp .
- Check the correctness of ξ :

$$e(\text{pk}, h_1) = e(\xi_1, g), \dots, e(\text{pk}, h_{\bar{\text{id}}-1}) = e(\xi_{\bar{\text{id}}-1}, g), e(\text{pk}, h_{\bar{\text{id}}+1}) = e(\xi_{\bar{\text{id}}+1}, g), \dots, e(\text{pk}, h_n) = e(\xi_n, g)$$

where $\bar{\text{id}} = \text{id} \bmod n$. If the above doesn't hold output \perp .

- Otherwise, parse $\text{pp} = (C^{(1)}, \dots, C^{(B)})$, compute $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}}{n} \rceil$ and set $C'^{(k)} \leftarrow C^{(k)} \cdot \text{pk}$, the rest remain the same $C'^{(j)} = C^{(j)}$ for each $j \in [B] \setminus \{k\}$. Output

$$\text{pp}' = (C'^{(1)}, \dots, C'^{(B)})$$

- Parse $\text{aux} = (L_1, \dots, L_N)$ and for each $j \in \{(k-1)n+1, \dots, (k-1)n+n\} \setminus \{\text{id}\}$ parse $L_j = \{\Lambda_{j,1}, \dots, \Lambda_{j,\ell}\}$. Set $L_j = L_j \cup \{\Lambda_{j,\ell+1} = \Lambda_{j,\ell} \cdot \xi_j\}$, while the rest remain the same.

Enc($\text{crs}_{\text{user}}, \text{pp}, \text{id}, m$) \rightarrow ct : On input $m \in \mathbb{G}_T$, let $\bar{\text{id}} = \text{id} \bmod n$ and $k = \lceil \frac{\text{id}}{n} \rceil$. Sample $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and compute:

$$\text{ct} = (\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \text{ct}_2, \text{ct}_3) = (C^{(k)}, e(C^{(k)}, h_i)^r, g^r, e(h_i, h_i)^r \cdot m).$$

Upd^{aux}(pp, id) \rightarrow u : parse $\text{aux} = (L_1, \dots, L_N)$ and output L_{id} .

Dec($\text{sk}, \text{u}, \text{ct}$) \rightarrow m **or** **GetUpd**: Parse $\text{u} = \{\Lambda_1, \dots, \Lambda_\ell\}$, if there exists no $i \in [\ell]$ such that $e(\text{ct}_0, h_i) \neq e(\text{u}, g) \cdot e((h_i)^{\text{sk}}, h_i)$ then output **GetUpd**. Otherwise return

$$\frac{\text{ct}_3}{(e(\Lambda_i, \text{ct}_2)^{-1} \cdot \text{ct}_1)^{\text{sk}^{-1}}}.$$

Figure 4: Our RBE construction from the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption.




Figure 5: Plots of the benchmarks for our basic and efficient constructions given in Table 2. As expected, the plotted data closely follow the asymptotics given in Table 1, with a few exceptions: (1) the efficient `Setup` numbers are higher in our implementation because in addition to generating the CRS, we create databases to store `pp` and `aux` as part of this step; (2) the efficient `Reg` numbers are comparable to the base construction because they reflect average-case performance of the two algorithms (which in the efficient case is much better than the worst-case performance of the algorithm); and (3) our base construction’s `Upd` implementation is not constant because when retrieving the list of updates from the database, we parse each update from its binary form to its \mathbb{G}_1 representation.

is the worst case in terms of runtime, and hence this can reduce the runtime of each algorithm by a factor of `#Threads` on the machine. We emphasize that our implementation did not use any optimization or parallelization, and the algorithms ran on a single thread. The benchmarks were conducted on a personal computer with an Intel Core i7-10700 3.8GHz CPU and 128GB of RAM running Ubuntu 22.04.1 LTS with kernel 5.15.0-58-generic. In Table 2 we report the measurements for our benchmarks plotted in Figure 5.

N	Time (s)						Size			
	Setup	Gen	Reg	Enc	Upd	Dec	crs	pp	aux	ct
10K	0.0831	0.00966	0.0865	0.00217	0.00191	0.00316	41 kB	16 kB	57.8 MB	914 B
100K	0.215	0.0311	0.245	0.00219	0.00582	0.00321	115 kB	29 kB	1.9 GB	914 B
1M	0.722	0.0965	0.732	0.00217	0.0177	0.00316	336 kB	66 kB	59.3 GB	914 B
10M	1.961	0.308	2.297	0.00219	0.0568	0.00320	1.0 MB	188 kB	1.9 TB	914 B

N	Time (s)						Size			
	Setup	Gen	Reg	Enc	Upd	Dec	crs	pp	aux	ct
10K	0.156	0.00999	0.0940	0.0125	0.000461	0.130	41 kB	106 kB	9.2 MB	6.07 kB
100K	0.366	0.0314	0.256	0.0160	0.000555	0.219	115 kB	258 kB	119.6 MB	7.59 kB
1M	1.521	0.0988	0.758	0.0179	0.000636	0.281	336 kB	716 kB	1.3 GB	9.11 kB
10M	10.880	0.319	2.396	0.0214	0.000766	0.402	1.0 MB	2.6 MB	16.3 GB	10.63 kB

Table 2: Benchmarks for our basic construction (top) and the construction with efficient updates (bottom). The sizes of `crs`, `pp`, `aux` are simulated with a SQLite database for the full system capacity N . The sizes of `pp`, `aux`, `ct` are given for the worst case (see discussion in text); the sizes of `pk`, `sk` are constant at 49 B and 32 B, respectively.

7 Conclusions and Open Problems

In this work, we proposed a new method for constructing RBE. The resulting RBE scheme is black-box, practically efficient, and its security is based on standard assumptions over bilinear groups. For the first time, we show that RBE can be implemented in systems scaling to millions of users. Our work opens the doors to the practical deployment of RBE, and we hope it will inspire researchers to explore new applications and build new systems based on RBE. On the theoretical side, our work leaves open the problem of matching the asymptotics of previous RBE constructions [GHMR18, GHM⁺19], without resorting to non black-box use of cryptography. Another interesting direction is to construct an efficient RBE with a public-coin (a.k.a. transparent) setup.

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