Cryptographic Protection of Random Access Memory: How Inconspicuous can Hardening Against the most Powerful Adversaries be?

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Abstract

For both cloud and client applications, the protection of the confidentiality and integrity of remotely processed information is an increasingly common feature request. To achieve this goal with reasonable costs in terms of memory overhead and performance penalty is also a very challenging endeavour. In turn, this usually leads to security posture compromises in products.

In this paper we review and evaluate the main technologies that have been proposed so far to address this problem, as well as some new techniques and combinations thereof. We systematise the treatment of protecting data in use by starting with models of the adversaries, thus allowing us to define different, yet consistent protection levels. As far as we are aware, for the first time we compare the impact on performance when the measured benchmark is the only running process or when it is just one task in an environment with heavy additional traffic, thus simulating a cloud server under full load.

To make just one example of our results: Using advanced techniques to compress counters can make it viable to store them on-chip – for instance by adding on-chip RAM that can be as small as to 1/256th of the off-chip RAM. This allows for implementations of memory protection providing full confidentiality, integrity and anti-replay protection with hitherto unattained penalties, especially in combination with the repurposing of ECC bits to store integrity tags. The performance penalty on a server with a saturated memory subsystem can thus be contained under 2% with a memory overhead of 1/256 and even under 1% with an overhead of 1/128.

Additionally, we discuss various cost/performance tradeoffs for less loaded use cases, such as for protected software modules on client devices.


Keywords: Memory Encryption, Memory Integrity.
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1 Introduction

With the ever growing availability and use of Computing as a Service (i.e. Cloud Computing) comes an increased need for guarantees of confidentiality and integrity of remotely processed information. Cloud tenants are becoming increasingly aware that their data can be compromised by attackers that can circumvent basic defences. The most common class of adversaries consists in other tenants running unprivileged malicious software on the same hardware. These can mount attacks based on software exploitation, and side channels ranging from cache contention [Hu92, Koc96, OST06] to micro-architectural features such as speculative execution. After the discovery of the Meltdown [LSG+18] and Spectre [KHF+19] class of attacks, too many papers followed to reasonably cite, so we refer the reader to the surveys [CBS+19, XS21]. Insider operators running privileged software represent another serious threat. Tenant data may be targeted by actors with access to the computing hardware, with the capability to perform physical side-channel attacks (see for instance the surveys [FGM+10, CA16]), or to directly compromise memory contents via cold-boot attacks [ISH+09, YADA17, WCJ+21], abuse of DMA channels [Fri16], or chip interposition [Kuh98, LJF+20].

Hardening the system software to prevent privilege escalation attacks is no longer considered sufficient, especially in light of the extreme complexity of modern system software stacks, for which one cannot have absolute reliance on countermeasures against software exploitation.

The same threats apply to client devices, where the compromised party may be the provider of banking, digital IDs, or gaming services. For these use cases, a compromise can lead to economic losses for the device owner or service providers. In the case of gaming, adversaries may be device owners involved in cheating or piracy. Banking applications and digital IDs need to be protected also against adversaries with temporary access to a device (that may have been left unattended).

This implies that technologies that go beyond basic Access Control (AC) need to be put in place to isolate processes, services, or VMs from each other and the host environment, including the physical environment. Apart from putting processing elements and memory in the same tamper-proof package, these technologies rely on cryptography. The choice of technologies depends on the adversaries considered during product development and range from memory encryption [Bes80, LTM+00, KFM05] to techniques that guarantee memory integrity [MVS00, SCG+03, GSC+03, SLGL04, YGZ05, YEP+06, SOD07, RCPS07, CL10, HS10, CRSP11, Gue16a, WUS+17, SNR+18b, JLK+23]. The latter range from tables of hashes of memory regions, to integrity trees that can detect any memory manipulation.

These structures can be roughly described as variations on the theme of Merkle trees [Mer87], with the root node protected on-chip.

During the last four decades these technologies have been steadily improved to the point that their performance and memory overheads have become sufficiently acceptable to justify commercial deployment. Still, some more expensive proposals such as SGX [MAB+13] ended up being deprecated on client CPUs because the above mentioned penalties quickly degenerated when used to protect large processes. Indeed, after Bastion [CL10], the development of cryptographic isolation methods nearly halted, ushering an era of research in AC based mechanisms, starting with H-SVM [JAS+15] and Hyperwall [SL12] – until the announcement of the cryptographic mechanisms to protect the SGX enclave page cache [Gue16a] set the research in motion once again.
Even restricting ourselves to cryptographic techniques, it is often hard to compare different technologies since any two papers in the field will almost never use the same benchmarking suite, memory subsystem, and cache sizes. Also, most benchmarks are performed on systems without memory bus contention. This is not realistic, as the main application for these technologies is cloud servers, on which hundreds of processes may contend for shared resources.

We systematise the comparison between various techniques and their combinations, including also some new ideas. We consider different models of the adversaries, thus allowing us to define multiple, yet consistent protection levels. The focus is solely on technologies that only require implementation inside the security perimeter of the System-on-a-Chip (SoC), using external untrusted memory. Our tests run under unloaded and fully loaded memory subsystems, the latter is approximated by running traffic generators alongside the chosen benchmarks.

The most striking result is that advanced counter compression makes it viable to store counters on a relatively small physically secure memory. This allows for implementations of memory protection with anti-replay (i.e. full integrity) achieving very low performance penalties, especially if ECC bits are repurposed to store integrity tags. Performance penalties smaller than 1\%, resp. 2\%, with a memory overhead of 1/128, resp. 1/256 can be attained even under heavy bus contention. We conjecture that similar performance penalties can be attained if a large system cache can be deployed instead. We also detail various trade-offs of performance penalty vs. resources if ECC memory is not available or including RAM in the SoC is not feasible.

The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2 we model the types of adversaries that want to compromise memory contents, and accordingly we define the levels of protection required to thwart these adversaries. Section 3 contains background material, including brief descriptions of the technologies that have been considered in our study or references thereto. In Section 4 we describe the new technologies that we add to the state to the art, the benchmarking environment, how we select the techniques we test in order to produce a clearly represented and understandable comparison. The results are reported and discussed in Section 5. In Section 6 we make practical recommendations for cloud and client use cases, and conclude with directions for future investigations.

2 Systematisation of the problem

2.1 Definitions

The software-accessible volatile memory attached to a memory controller is viewed as an array of Cache Lines (CLs), i.e. equally sized and contiguous memory ranges adjacent to each other. A CL is the smallest unit that will be encrypted and possibly authenticated by the systems we consider in this study. By CL length we only consider that of a CL in the Last Level Cache (LLC), usually a System Cache (SC). The line lengths of upstream caches are ignored.

The integrity information associated with a CL is called an integrity tag. Commonly, it is a Message Authentication Code (MAC). If a scheme provides integrity it is understood that it associates an integrity tag with each CL. A scheme provides full integrity if it also prevents replay attacks.

An encryption or authentication function is said to provide spatial uniqueness when, if computed
on equal inputs, but written to different locations, it results in different outputs. This is achieved
by including the Physical Address (PA) of the encrypted or authenticated CL in the computation.

An encryption or authentication function provides temporal uniqueness (or: freshness) when
repeated writes of the same plaintext to the same location result in different outputs. This can be
achieved by associating a counter with each CL and including it in the computation of the function.

In what follows a mode (of operation) is a general purpose encryption mode of operation. A
Memory Encryption (ME) mode is understood to be an encryption mode of operation that has fixed
input lengths, plaintext and ciphertext having the same size as a CL, and no associated data.

With some abuse of language, we define an on-chip component as a physically secure block in
the same package as the processing elements.

2.2 Problem statement and adversarial models

To define what we mean by protection of the memory contents, we first assume that appropriate
AC policies are in place to stop unauthorised agents within the SoC. We then characterise the
adversaries by Adversarial Models (AMs) that depend on their type of access to the target devices
and their resources, i.e., essentially budget, as follows:

AM0 The adversary is capable of accessing data that is outside the security perimeter of the complete
system that contains the target components and on commonly accessible channels, such as
messages in transit or data in storage. This includes network access.

AM1 In addition to the capabilities of AM0, this adversary can only run software on the target
and manipulate external interfaces. Beside the exploitation of software vulnerabilities, this
adversary can mount RowHammer attacks [KDK+14, Mut19, MK20]. Integrity violation is
only a partial concern, as it can be arguably made less effective by deploying ME.

AM2 This adversary has physical access to the complete system that contains the target components,
including its internals. They have access to exposed interfaces and communication buses
but they do not have the capabilities to access on-chip communication interfaces. They only
perform passive attacks, for instance: side-channel analysis that requires close proximity,
contact or connection with the target device, and eavesdropping the content of external RAM,
either at run-time via memory bus probing, chip or module interposition, abuse of DMA
channels, or cold-boot attacks.

AM3 This adversary has the same level of access as AM2, but they will also perform active attacks,
such as blocking, corrupting or replaying memory transactions, or injecting new ones [KLR+20].
Examples of threats include [BBKN12, BR12, ZDC+12]. Because of the similarity of the
involved technologies, the required expertise beyond AM2 is minor, whereas tools may need
higher precision – these distinctions may be insufficient to distinguish the two models. Instead,
the difference in complexity and cost and of the countermeasures is a key distinguisher. Also,
active attacks are more easily detectable, as they may trigger repeated failures. Hence, an
adversary may just choose not to mount them, even if capable.

Within AM3, we distinguish two cases:
The adversary only corrupts individual memory locations; and

AM3.(ii) The adversary replaces memory contents together with any associated Metadata (MD).

AM4 This adversary, in addition to all of the above capabilities, can mount highly invasive attacks at the chip or package level that require considerable experience, resources, and time to succeed. The attacks this adversary can mount range from micro-probing attacks [Sko17] to actual chip reverse engineering and editing using a Focused Ion Beam Microscope [TJ09, SAFT16, HTLW21]. This adversary is out of scope for the research described in this paper.

The question that we answer in this study is: *What technologies are available to protect the contents of data-in-use in RAM against the adversaries defined above, and what are their memory overhead and performance costs?*

**Remark 2.1** Against adversaries of type AM0 the usual consensus is that no memory protection is necessary, even though attacks like Nethammer [LSR+20] can corrupt the memory of a target system without a single attacker-controlled line of code on it. Therefore, it can be argued that this model should be subsumed into AM1, and we accordingly shall not consider AM0 separately.

### 2.3 System level view of the technical solution

To answer the above question we introduce a HW block, which we call the *Memory Protection Engine (MPE)*. This is not a new idea: all cryptographic memory protection designs cited so far use such a block, usually called a *Memory Encryption Engine (MEE)*. Its placement in a SoC is depicted in Fig. 1 on the next page. It sits between the interconnect or a System Cache on one side, and a memory controller on the other side. The MPE can optionally have: caches, namely a *Counter Group (CG)* and a *Data Hash (DH)* cache; internal buffers (not depicted); and it may have access to a certain amount of on-chip DRAM. The memory protection technologies that we study in this paper are implemented in the MPE.

### 2.4 Protection levels

In light of the adversarial models defined above, we define the following protection levels:

L1 The memory is encrypted to defeat adversaries AM1 and AM2, except for adversaries that exploit memory access patterns or ciphertexts as a side channel. The encryption function provides spatial uniqueness. Temporal uniqueness and integrity verification are not provided.

L2 To thwart adversaries of type AM3.(i), CLs are encrypted and augmented with integrity tags. No freshness is provided. This will not thwart Adversary AM3.(ii).

L2+ CLs are encrypted and authenticated. Freshness information is provided and included in the encryption function.

L3 Additionally, full integrity is provided against AM3.(ii).
We combine the following types of technologies to implement these protection levels: (i) ME primitives and modes; (ii) Authentication primitives; (iii) Integrity and anti-replay structures; and (iv) Physical mechanisms to protect a relatively small amount of memory from tampering, such as including it in a tamper-proof package. The last solution would in principle work if applied to the entire RAM and without any performance penalty, but it is in general impractical.

**Remark 2.2** We only consider solutions that need the security perimeter to be no larger than the physical package of the SoC. Hence, “smart memory” [AN17] is out of scope. These have cryptographic logic in the memory chips to attest themselves to the memory controller – allowing them to communicate on a secured channel only with that memory controller, such as the CXL memory Integrity and Data Encryption (IDE) scheme [CXL19]. In order to properly address the threats they are meant to defend against, smart memories are very expensive. They must implement mutual attestation with the memory controllers, and include cryptographic engines in each memory chip, as putting the engines only on an on-board controller of the DIMM would not completely remove the risk of interposition. The countermeasures which are the subject of this paper require cryptographic engines only in the SoC.

However, smart memories are suitable for physically remote memories, to implement the communication between the local SoC and the remote storage. This way, the protected address space can be expanded beyond what the local MD would allow.

### 2.5 State of the Art

We now discuss the protection levels in some documented solutions. The Intel SGX MEE [Gue16a] and ELM [IMO+22] are L3 solutions. The Intel TDX Multi-Key Total Memory Engine with Integrity (MKTMEi) [Int21] is a L2/MirE solution, where MirE means MACs in repurposed ECC bits. We found no documentation on error correction in a TDX system, but the 28b MAC field size
suggests the use of four instances of a (255, 247) Hamming code truncated to (143, 135) to cover 128 bits and 7 bits of the MAC each — with the remaining 4 bits of the effective 576 in a CL for parity. Exactly this configuration is proposed in [YA18]. AMD’s SEV [KPW16] is a L1 solution. SYNERGY [SNR+18b] is a L3/MirE solution. CSI:Rowhammer [JLK+23] is a L2/MirE solution.

2.6 Cost indicators

It is not only important to know whether we have a solution to a problem: For real-world applications it is critical to know how expensive is the solution.

The two principal cost indicators are the performance penalty and the memory overhead. Area and power constraints restrict which solutions can be considered for viability, but relaxing these constraints can sometimes be justified in the presence of a strong market requirement. On the other hand, a solution that impacts performance or memory availability too heavily will face major acceptance hurdles. For this reason, we focus mainly on performance penalty and memory overhead.

3 Background

We present here a brief summary of the technologies we considered in the development of this paper.

3.1 Memory encryption primitives

We use block ciphers for ME – the long initial latency of stream ciphers making them unsuitable. In direct encryption, the block cipher is applied block-wise to the plaintext to generate the ciphertext. In One-Time Pad (OTP) encryption, the encryptions of successive values of a counter are XOR-ed block-wise to the plaintext – in cryptographic literature this is usually called a CountTeR mode (CTR) mode.

We only use block ciphers with a block size of 128 bits. The selected block ciphers are the AES [DR02] and the Tweakeable Block Cipher (TBC) QARMA [Ava17]. Other candidates (e.g. PRINCE [BCG+12]) have either similar latencies, are not tweakable or have a shorter block size.

3.2 Authentication primitives

Standard hash functions such as SHA-2 [NIS12] or SHA-3 [NIS15] can be turned into MACs but the resulting schemes are very slow and not parallelisable.

Encrypted Universal Hash Functions (UHF) [CW77, CW79] are a better choice. UHFs admit fully parallelisable constructions, such as multi-linear functions of the input computed over a binary Galois field, as used in SGX [Gue16b]. We note that if a cache is available for UHF-based MACs, then the cached values need not be encrypted: The universal hashes are encrypted only when evicted from the cache, and the cached hashes can be verified more efficiently.

TBC-based Parallel MACs (PMACs) [Rog04] are also used. PMACs are more expensive than encrypted UHFs because the text is first processed by encryptions instead of Galois multiplications, but they can be used for error detection and correction beside integrity, cf. [HS10, SNR+18b, JLK+23]. The computation of PMACs is depicted in Figs. 2 and 3 on the facing page – such
constructions can easily be made incremental, i.e. where upon a write only the part of the message that is changed needs recomputation. A variant for non-TBCs, called PXOR-MAC is detailed in [IMO+22].

We do not consider encrypted checksums of the plaintext. They are used in Rogaway’s Offset Codebook mode (OCB) mode [Rog04]. OCB requires freshness to be provided, in which case we use instead OTP encryption to reduce read latencies.

### 3.3 Modes of operation

For direct encryption, spatial uniqueness is achieved by using the PA as the cipher’s tweak. To achieve this with a non-TBC, we use it in Rogaway’s XOR, Encrypt, and XOR (XEX) construction [Rog04]. XEX is defined as $C_i = E_K(P_i \oplus M_i) \oplus M_i$. In other words, a tweak-derived mask is added to the input and the output of the cipher. The first mask $M_0$ is derived by encrypting the tweak, and the successive masks $M_i$ for $i \geq 1$ are obtained by multiplying the first mask by a fixed sequence of values. Using a single finite field element $\gamma$ we can put $M_i = \gamma^i \cdot M_0$. Apart from OCB [Rog04], a similar construction is used in the FLAT-ΘCB mode [IMO+22]. There, it is used with a truncated, OTP-encrypted checksum of the plaintext to define an Authenticated Encryption (AE) mode. PXOR-MAC is used to authenticate CGs to finally define the L3 scheme Encryption for Large Memory (ELM).

With a TBC, the PA (concatenated with freshness, if provided) of each block is used directly as the tweak, cf. Fig. 4, and the XEX construction is not needed.
In OTP encryption, with a TBC, counter and PA are used as tweak and text, respectively, cf. Fig. 5 on the preceding page, otherwise they are concatenated before encryption.

### 3.4 Memory integrity structures

A table of hashes or MACs suffices against memory corruption, but against replay one needs either to protect the table in on-chip memory or with a tree structure such as a Merkle Tree (MT) [Mer80]. MT nodes can be cached [GSC+03] to speed up verification.

If a counter-based encryption scheme is used, we can protect memory by recursively protecting just the counters as follows: a set of $a$ of counters and an embedded MAC form a node called a Counter Group (CG), which has the same size as a CL. Each CG has $a$ children, which can be either CLs of data in use, or child CGs. Each counter in a CG is associated with one child. The embedded MAC is computed on the $a$ counters and the parent counter. For data (leaf) nodes, the MAC is not embedded, and is stored in a table. Before a CG, or a data CL is evicted, its parent counter is first incremented and the CG’s or CL’s MAC is recomputed. Such a Counter Tree (CT) is used for instance in Intel’s SGX [Gue16a]. CTs are in fact just an in-memory reorganisation of Hall and Jutla’s Parallelisable Authentication Tree (PAT) [HJ05].

With the split counters optimisation [YEP+06] a group of $a$ counters is replaced by a group with one major counter and $a' > a$ smaller, minor counters, so that the two types of Counter Groups (CGs) have the same size. Each node (a data CL or a CG) is associated with a minor counter, and $a'$ sibling nodes share a major counter. A node’s freshness is the concatenation of the associated major and minor counters. The increased arity (for instance, from $a = 8$ to $a' = 64$) reduces both storage overhead for counters and tree depth. When a minor counter overflows, the common major counter is ticked, all minor counters in the group reset to zero, and all the sibling nodes refreshed: For data CLs this means that they are re-encrypted, and for both types of nodes the MACs need to be recomputed. Despite these Read-Modify-Write (RMW) operations, split counter trees represent a major performance improvement over non-split, i.e. monolithic, counters. We shall introduce also 3-was split counters, i.e. with major, middle, and minor counters.

For completeness’ sake, we mention also the Tamper-Evident Counter (TEC) tree [ECL+07]. It has a large memory overhead, and it requires a wide encryption mechanism (for instance, with 64B CLs and 64b addresses and counters, it needs a 640b wide block cipher) with a very high latency. This makes it unattractive for practical deployment.

In Table 1 on the next page we compare the memory overheads of various integrity trees. We assume that the size of a CG is a CL, also if tags are embedded, and a MAC can cover 1, 2, or 4 CLs. When multi-CL MACs are used, each CL is still encrypted individually and is associated with a monolithic or minor counter. Hence, evicting a CL from the LLC will not require the re-encryption of adjacent CLs.

### 3.5 Cryptographic parameters

In the choice of parameters such as key and MAC lengths, the fundamental difference between encryption and authentication is that the encryption parameters must provide long term confidentiality, whereas authentication needs only to deter an adversary, since a system that can monitor
Table 1: Memory Overhead of Various Types of Integrity Trees at 32b and 64b security levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of Tree</th>
<th>CL size: 64B</th>
<th>Overhead</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Merkle Tree with ( a = 4 ), resp. 8</td>
<td>( \ell_h = 64 ); ( n = 1 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 16</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_h = 32 ); ( n = 1 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 16</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_h = 32 ); ( n = 2 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 16</td>
<td>9.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_h = 32 ); ( n = 4 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 16</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monolithic CT with embedded MAC and ( \ell_c = \ell_h = 56 )</td>
<td>( \ell_H = 64 ); ( n = 1 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 7</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 1 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 7</td>
<td>12.9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 2 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 7</td>
<td>9.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 4 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 7</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Split CT with embedded MAC and ( \ell_c = \ell_h = 56 )</td>
<td>( \ell_H = 64 ); ( n = 1 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 6</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 1 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 6</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 2 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 6</td>
<td>9.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 4 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 6</td>
<td>7.45%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 1 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 3</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 2 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 3</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 4 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 3</td>
<td>9.79%</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 1 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 3</td>
<td>28.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 2 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 3</td>
<td>13.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>( \ell_H = 32 ); ( n = 4 ); ( a = 8 ), resp. 3</td>
<td>9.79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAT with ( a = 8 ), resp. ( a = 16 )</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEC tree with ( a = 8 ), resp. ( a = 16 )</td>
<td>42.9%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legend: \( L_{CL} \), \( \ell_H \), \( \ell_h \), \( \ell_c \), and \( \ell_c' \) are the bit lengths of a CL; a DH or MAC; of a hash value or MAC embedded in a CG; of a monolithic or major counter; and a minor counter, respectively. \( a \) is the arity of a CG, i.e. the number of its monolithic or minor counters; and \( n \) is the number of CLs a MAC covers.

unrecoverable integrity violations may detect unusual activity. Hence, we recommended that:

- Encryption keys should be at least 128b long. We note that even on a quantum computer, the complexity for a quantum computer assisted key search against AES-128 has a HW cost of \( 2^{84} \) quantum gates and a time complexity of \( 1.09 \cdot 2^{75} \) quantum cycles [JNRV20].
- Encryption block size must be at least 128b;
- For a pure MT the required hash length is 128b;
- Authentication keys shall be at least 128b long;
- Data MACs should be at least 32b long (28b in a MirE configuration); and
- Monolithic counters must be at least 56b long. The minimal aggregated length of a major and a minor counter (or major plus middle plus minor) is also 56b.

With these parameters, a successful replay attack on the memory of a L3 system with 64b data MACs would need both the counter and the MAC to be repeated, with time \( 2^{56} \times O(2^{64/2}) = O(2^{88}) \).


4 Setup of the study

4.1 Scope of the comparisons

Depending on the level, several variants of the involved technologies may be combined, which are summarised in the following list. The entries marked with † contain new contributions in this paper. Those marked with * describe variations not hitherto compared to each other.

- Use of the AES-128 or QARMA-128 ciphers;
- Size of the MACs (32b or 64b);*
- Counter trees: monolithic, 2-way split or 3-way split;†
- Various choices for the size of CG$ and DH$.
- Use of on-chip memory for hashes and/or counters;†
- Repurposing of ECC bits for data MAC storage;
- Synchronous or asynchronous integrity checking;
- Use of single MACs covering multiple CLs, with cached incremental hashing;†
- Arity variations in the CGs;
- We consider both 64B and 128B CLs;* and, finally
- We run the benchmarks as the only running tasks, and also when the memory subsystem is saturated.*

Remark 4.1 A new idea we adopt in our implementations applies to the cases where UHF-based MACs are stored in external RAM. Beside keeping them as DHs in their cache – which obviously also speeds up verification of cached DHs w.r.t. cached MACs – they are evicted in groups, which are encrypted directly. For instance, four 32b DHs are encrypted as a single 128b block. Corrupting one DH will corrupt all hashes in the group with high probability. This increases the detectability of any corruption, and with it both security and robustness of the system. If freshness is available, the minor counters associated with the DHs in the same block are grouped and concatenated to their common major counter (and, if implemented, also the middle one) to form a tweak.

Remark 4.2 We assume that all algorithms are parallelised wherever possible, i.e. that sufficiently many copies of the building blocks are instantiated to attain the lowest possible latency on the whole scheme. This is not a significant restriction in our study: as we shall see, the fastest L2 and L3 schemes use OTP encryption and have low sensitivity to the latency of the encryption and authentication primitives (for instance, the performances of the variants with AES and QARMA are quite close). Hence, their performance even on pipelined implementations would be similar.

4.2 Technologies used for each level

We list the technologies used to implement the protection levels defined in Section 2.4 on page 6.

L1 If AES-128 is the chosen encryption primitive, a CL is encrypted using the XEX construction, with the PA as the tweak. If QARMA-128 is chosen, it is used in Tweaked ECB mode as in Fig. 4 on page 9, with the PA as tweak.
L2 The same encryption modes are used for L1. Hashing is done by a multi-linear (ML) UHF at 32 or 64 bits. The hashes are encrypted block-wise when they are evicted from the DH$ in CL worth groups. For the security and reliability implications, cf. Remark 4.1 on the facing page.

L2+ This level provides freshness over L2. A counter based OTP encryption mode is used with both AES and QARMA. We recall that this level does not offer protection against active adversaries with access to the memory bus if both counters or MACs are in off-chip memory. Thus, we do not feed the freshness to the MAC function.

L3 CLs are encrypted as in L2+, except for ELM, which uses FLAT-OCB. Full integrity is achieved by including the counters in the tag computation and preventing the adversary from tampering with the CGs. Thus, an adversary may still be able to replace a CL and its MAC, but not its counter(s). This is achieved by either using an integrity tree, or by storing CGs in an in-package tamper proof DRAM (a Static Random Access Memory (SRAM) would be too large).

oCC on-Chip Counters, assumed to be MPE private, hence outside adversarial control. Applied to L2+ it gives an L3 level of protection, provided that the freshness is included in the tag computation.

MirE MACs in repurposed ECC bits. This eliminates the need to reserve memory for the MACs, and only memory for counters needs to be allocated (which, with oCC, is on-chip). This also reduced the overall number of memory writes and reads. Note that MACs are still accessible to a HW capable adversary. Hence, freshness information, if available, must enter the MAC computation. Following [JLK+23], the tag is computed using QARMA$5\cdot64\cdot\sigma_0$. Note that not all the ECC bits need to be repurposed for a MAC: they may contain both a shorter ECC and a MAC.

Remark 4.3 MirE raises the question of the performance impact of using ECC memory. Because of extra processing in the DRAM controller, there are penalties which, in actual benchmarks, are reported as smaller than 0.5% [Bac14]. On servers, schemes that do not repurpose the ECC bits will still be using them for error detection and correction, so memory access time will not vary. In all other cases, we consider the impact of ECC vs. non-ECC on memory access time to be so small as to not significant change the performance relative to baseline. Hence, we do not take into account ECC memory as a separate configuration.

4.3 Benchmarking environment and methodology

It would be impractical to implement several thousands of combinations of technologies in silicon for the purpose of evaluating them. A solution to this problem lies in prototyping, i.e. the creation of an approximate implementation of the desired features that can thus be tested, and benchmarked. Very accurate models can be created even without implementing all details. For instance, the latencies of cryptographic primitives can be derived from actual implementations and inserted as delays into the simulation.
The prototypes used in this paper are built in the gem5 simulator [BBB+11, LAA+20]. gem5 allows engineers to build software versions of hardware components typically included in computer systems. gem5 also helps abstract away the interfaces between components, which can thus be combined programmatically and configured at run-time. It includes approximate timing models for several common CPU cores.

We simulate our prototypes in gem5 [BBB+11]. The CPU is modelled around an Arm Cortex A72 core, with a 2GHz CPU frequency and a 1GHz system frequency. The CPU cache hierarchy includes L1-I (48KiB, LRU replacement policy, 3-way set associative, 1 cycle latency) and L1-D (32KiB, LRU replacement policy, 2-way, 1 cycle latency) caches, and a L2 unified cache (1MiB, tree-PLRU replacement policy, 16-way, 5 cycles latency). The memory is 16GiB DRAM as dual-rank DDR4 DIMMs. The MPE-private caches are 4-way set associative with a LRU replacement policy.

We assume that the SoC is implemented in a 7nm process. Thus, we can re-use the latencies from [Ava17], for instance a latency of 15.76ns for a pipelined implementation of AES-128, of 4.8ns for QARMA11-128-σ1 and 2.2ns for QARMA5-64-σ0. This latency of QARMA5-64-σ0 is also used in [JLK+23].

We benchmark using the SPEC2006 suite [Hen06]. Simulations of hardware systems via software models such as gem5 have lengthy execution times even for short workloads. As shown in [San14], a typical SPEC benchmark could take around a month to run, making it infeasible for rapid prototyping and analysis. We instead select 10 representative regions of each benchmark, called SimPoints [SPHCo2], of 30 million instructions each, which are then weighted and combined.

4.4 Description of the plan of simulations

Comparing tens of thousands of different configurations is not only unfeasible in HW, but it would take too long also in a simulated environment, not to speak of the difficulties of properly presenting the data. For this reason, we have planned a tour through the jungle of combinations, in various stages, each stage resulting in a selection from the schemes tested in the previous stages, to be compared to each other with added variability in some parameter not yet varied. Stage number n is abbreviated as Sn.

We use shorthands to describe the various configurations:

\[ \text{Level} / \{\text{additional technologies}\} / \text{Cipher} / \text{CL length} / \text{MAC length} \]

where the optional field additional technologies may include mono (for monolithic counters), split (counters), oCC, or MirE. The default CL length is 64B, except when indicated or when the CGs are on chip, in which case it is always 128B. The default MAC length is 56–64b. \{Intel\} TDX is equivalent to L2/AES/MirE, \{Intel\} SGX to L2/AES/mono, and \{AMD\} SME to L1. oCC always implies split. The shorthand L3/oCC is used to denote the combination of L2+ with oCC. L3 without oCC denotes a full integrity capable scheme based on an integrity tree and neither counters nor hashes on-chip, unless otherwise specified.

S1 We start with the state of the art and some variations. We compare AMD SME (i.e. L1/AES), L1/QARMA, L2/AES, Intel TDX (i.e. L2/AES/MirE), L2/QARMA, L2/QARMA/MirE, L2+/QARMA, and ELM with both monolithic and split counters, SGX, L3/QARMA/split – all with and without a DHS if not fixed by the manufacturer’s architecture.
We also compare 32b vs. 64b MACs in selected cases.

For SGX, hash encryption is OTP as described by Intel. We use this method also for SGX’s split counters variant (L3/AES/split), and in any L3 scheme where the published architecture prescribes its use. In all other cases, data MACs are 32b long and directly encrypted in groups of four.

ELM follows [IMO+22] except when QARMA is used, in which case the XOR and Encrypt (XE) constructions are replaced by simply feeding nonces and separation fields as the tweak to QARMA, as well as using QARMA$_{5-64}$-$\sigma_0$ to generate the OTPs to encrypt the tags.

For schemes with freshness, the CG$ is 64KiB as in SGX, to level the comparisons.

These principles apply to every successive stage as well, except where explicitly indicated.

From now on, MACs are 32 bits long, directly encrypted in groups of four, except where SGX is benchmarked, the MirE technology is used, or otherwise explicitly indicated.

**S2** For L2, L2+, and L3 only, we study the impact of the sizes of the two MPE caches. The possible sizes of the DH$ are 4KiB, 16KiB, and 64KiB. The possible sizes of the CG$ are 16KiB, 64KiB, 256KiB, and 1MiB. This simulation set uses QARMA only for encryption, as the AES results are nearly identical.

Starting with Stage 3, the MPE has a 16KiB DH$ and a 256KiB CG$. Levels L2+ and L3 use split counters, except when explicitly indicated otherwise, or with SGX.

**S3** Consider 64B and 128B CLs for L2, L2+, and L3. A CG and a CL have the same size.

**S4** We compare synchronous to asynchronous verification for L2, L2+, and L3.

**S5** We analyse the use of on-chip memory in full integrity schemes. As the MAC/DH memory overhead is larger than that of the CGs, we do not consider the case where the DHs are on-chip and the counters off-chip.

Since these variants together with the ones in the next stage are amongst the most promising ones in terms of performance, we run them with both AES and QARMA.

**S6** We consider here the impact that repurposing the ECC bits for tags bears on performance. We compare L2, L2+, L3, and L3/oCC schemes with and without MirE. We measure the impact for both 64B and 128B CLs if counters are off-chip, and only 128B CLs with oCC. If MACs are stored in the ECC tag bits, we need no DH$, and the MACs are computed as PMACs.

In this stage we test for the first time 3-way split high-arity 128B CGs. The minor counters in the 256-ary CGs cannot be longer than 3b, and the major counter does not need to be larger than 64b, so this allows us to fit 32 6b middle counters. The purpose of fitting middle counters is to keep the amount of RMWs under control, therefore we shall also run the tests without the middle counters in order to measure their actual effect. The 3-way split CGs we use are:

- 128B CLs and CGs with: 128 7b minor, 8 8b middle, and 1 64b (49b) major counters;
- This results in a memory overhead of 1/128.
128B CLs and CGs with: 256 3b minor, 32 6b middle, and 1 64b (55b) major counters; This results in a memory overhead of 1/256.

**Remark 4.4** In [YA18] and [SNR18a] “delta encoded” split counters with rebasing are used to reduce the amount of RMWs, together with methods to accommodate a limited number of larger minor counters in a CG. In both papers, the reduction in RMW overhead seems smaller than when using our 3-way split CGs (cf. Stage 9), so we do not consider these optimisations.

The next, and last three stages are some off-path branching to verify missing and corner cases.

**S7** We want to show what can be optimised storage-wise when when cannot store MACs in the ECC bits or on-chip. MACs are thus stored off-chip, but MACs computed incrementally over multiple CL can be used to reduce their memory footprint [ASC19]. This makes sense only when we have already chosen to use 128B CLs, as these already halve MD storage requirements. We test L2, L2+, L3, and L3/oCC, with a MAC covering 1, 2, or 4 CLs. These runs are performed only with QARMA-128 as the encryption cipher, since the performance differences are caused only by the increased memory traffic, and therefore we can expect that performance with the AES will follow the same pattern.

**S8** We select some combinations from the above and show all individual benchmarks in the suite:
- AMD SEV (L1/AES), and L1/QARMA, with 64B CLs;
- Intel TDX/64B CLs (i.e. L2/AES/MirE);
- L2/QARMA/64B CLs/64b MACs and L2/QARMA/64B CLs/MirE;
- Intel SGX (i.e. L3/AES/56b MACs);
- L3/QARMA/split/128B CLs/32b MACs;
- L3/QARMA/oCC/32b MACs, with 128- and 256-ary 3-way split CGs; and
- L3/QARMA/oCC/MirE, with the same types of CGs.

**S9** In this stage we compare the performance of an MPE with a hypothetical one where the RMW operations have zero costs, i.e. they are instantaneous. This is achieved by simply skipping them. Such an experiment is possible because the simulated MPE does not actually perform cryptographic operations, simulating instead their timing delays. This gives an upper bound on the actual time spent performing RMW operations. The selected combinations are the last five of S8, L3 schemes with split counters, i.e. the only ones in S8 with RMWs. For the schemes with 3-way split counters, we also report the performance with 2-way split counters by omitting the middle counters, to show the gains brought by the 3-way splitting (which, as far as we are aware, have not been reported before).

### 4.5 Unloaded vs. loaded systems

All stages described above are first run on an *unloaded* system, where benchmarking is the only running task.

We then want an upper bound for the performance degradation in a fully *loaded* system, with up to hundreds of processes running on dozens of processing elements, all sharing the bandwidth of
the memory subsystem, such as in a cloud server. It is very lengthy to run that many processes in a simulation. We instead inject synthetic traffic upstream of the MPE, but after the L2 cache. This traffic amounts to 9GiB/s. It is obtained from the measurements reported in Fig. 6 and it corresponds to the point where the latency of the memory subsystem just starts to diverge for a SGX-like L3 MPE covering the entire memory, while handling mostly linear traffic. We assume that MAC verification is synchronous because, following the discussion of the benchmark runs in the next section, this will be the most likely implementation. The simulated traffic is a mix of linear and random accesses. We do not add a L3 cache to the system, in order to simulate the extreme situation where the latter has been completely swamped by the additional traffic.

The results of all the runs are reported and discussed in the next section.

5 Results and discussion

We now analyse the results of the selected test runs.

5.1 Unloaded systems

Changing CL length from 64B to 128B in our simulated system slows down the system by 1% on our benchmarks. Runs are compared to the baseline with the same CL length.

- For S1 (see Fig. 7 on page 19) we note that:
  - If implemented in a plain way, the performance penalty of lower levels of protection is smaller than the performance penalty of the higher ones.
  - L1 and L2 schemes have worse performance with the AES w.r.t. QARMA because of the higher latency of the former cipher. This holds also for L3 because the OTP generation,
while it can be performed in parallel with a memory fetch, still increases write latency to
the point that its effect becomes noticeable.
– Split counter trees are superior to monolithic trees in memory overhead (see Table 1 on
page 11) and performance.
– A small DH$ has a marginal effect on performance.
– ELM has a higher performance penalty than SGX, having the encryption primitive on
the critical path.
– As expected, using 64b MACs results in slightly worse performance than using 32b MACs.

• S2 results (see Fig. 8 on the facing page) confirm the expected significant performance gains
with larger MPE caches. The CG$ having a higher effect than the DH$.

• S3 (the results are combined with those of S4 in Fig. 9 on page 20) proves that the impact of
memory protection is comparable across systems with 64B CLs and systems with 128B CLs.
Note that taking into account the effect of 128B CLs, the performance of a memory protected
128B CL system is slightly slower than that of a memory protected 64B CL system. However,
switching to 128B CLs halves the footprint of MD (cf. Table 1 on page 11).

• S4 results (see Fig. 9 on page 20) suggest that asynchronous MAC verification does not
significantly improve performance.

• S5 results (see Fig. 10 on page 20) show, as expected, that relieving the contention on the
memory bus between data and MD reduces performance penalties.

• S6 (see Fig. 11 on page 20) proves that combining oCC and MirE provides the highest protection
level at very low performance costs. Middle counters are necessary to get the best performance
out of very high arity CGs.

• S7 (see Fig. 12 on page 20) shows that while multiple-CL MACs effectively reduce memory
overheads, this comes at a significant performance price. L2+ and L3 performance is nearly
identical, because in L3 the lowest CG level have very bad locality properties, whereas higher
levels behave progressively better.

We have not implemented CL compression [TSB18] to store a MAC in the CL with the
data if the latter can be sufficiently compressed, reducing the amount of memory accesses.
Following [TSB18], we estimate that the performance penalties may thus be roughly halved.

• S8: The performance of the individual SPEC2006 benchmarks (Figs. 19 to 26 on pages 31–
33) shows a few expected results, namely that some programs such as gcc g23, gcc s04,
mcf, libquantum, and xalancbmk suffer significantly more than average under every MPE
configuration. Other programs are affected in a significant way only when there is traffic
expansion, for instance bzip z chicken and bzip z liberty. Increasing integrity tree arity by
split counters is instrumental in reducing the penalties, but it is only with 3-way oCC and
MirE that penalties are consistently smaller than 5%.

• S9 results are in Figs. 23 to 26 on pages 32–33. Note that Fig. 24 on page 32 has separate bars
for 128-ary and 256-ary CGs, but a single bar for overheads while skipping RMWs because
in this case CG arity is uninfluential. We notice that the impact of RMWs is not always negligible. Using 2-way split counters with 3b minors (L3/QARMA/ocCC/MirE with 256-ary CGs) carries a significant performance penalty, but the use of middle counters brings the performance close to the ideal one with “free” RMWs.

Figure 7: S1/unloaded: Comparison of base levels and state of the art

5.2 Loaded systems

Without memory protection, our benchmarks run 16.5% slower on a loaded system with 64B CLs than on an unloaded system; If CLs are 128B long, they run 12.2% slower than on the unloaded system. Changing CL length from 64B to 128B makes the system 2.7% faster.

• For S1 on a loaded system (see Fig. 13 on page 21) we observe that L1 schemes perform better than the other levels, as expected. Similarly to the unloaded case, the use of split counters reduces the performance penalty by a factor of roughly 3 with respect to monolithic counters; and a small DH$ offers only a minimal improvement.

• S2 (see Fig. 14 on page 21) shows a difference w.r.t. the loaded system case: larger MPE caches seem less effective.
- **S3** results (combined with **S4** in Fig. 15 on page 22) indicate that the MPE performance is often worse with 128B CLs.

- **S4** (see Fig. 15 on page 22) shows that in the loaded case asynchronous verification brings a significant speedup. Indeed, as the memory bus approaches saturation, decoupling decryption and MAC verification logics allows for better scheduling of otherwise idle MPE resources.

- **S5** (see Fig. 16 on page 22) goes against the intuition that using longer CLs should perform better because of reduced MD traffic. In fact, the less fine grained caching with 128B CLs increases overall data traffic and with it a higher performance penalty in a bandwidth bound system. In the 128B case, asynchronous verification better offsets this penalty, because there are fewer MACs to verify, fetch and cache. This is an important difference w.r.t. the unloaded case. Because of this and the fact that **AES** and **QARMA** results are nearly identical, the data presented in Fig. 16 on page 22 differs from Fig. 10. With all MD on chip performance is close to the baseline.
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- **S6** results (see Fig. 17 on the next page) finally show that nearly negligible performance penalties on a loaded system can be achieved by storing the CGs on-chip and the MACs in the ECC bits. Similarly to the unloaded case, the use of middle counters halves the performance penalties associated with the 256-ary tree. The resulting schemes perform even better than L1 direct encryption because the effect of latency of the cipher on the critical path is amplified with a saturated memory subsystem.

- **S7** (see Fig. 18 on the following page) shows that multiple-CL MACs offers increasingly worse performance also in the loaded case.

- **S8** (see Figs. 27 to 34 on pages 33–36) results are similar to the unloaded case, but amplified. In particular, the performance penalties are consistently low only with oCC and MirE.

- **S9** results are given in Figs. 31 to 34 on pages 35–36. The results look similar to the unloaded case, but the magnitude of the penalties and the proportion of time spent in L3/QARMA/oCC/MirE with 256-ary CGs doing RMWs are larger. This suggests that techniques to reduce RMWs, such as skipping them for data in the LLC and marked as dirty may have some effect on loaded systems. However, even in this case the penalties with 256-ary, 3-way split CGs are smaller than with a direct encryption L2/AES/64B CLs/MirE scheme as in TDX.
6 Conclusions

We performed a thorough survey and evaluation of techniques for the cryptographic protection of in-use memory contents. This included the state of the art, some new technologies, and hitherto not considered combinations thereof. By doing this, we also answer two implicit open questions in [IMO\textsuperscript{+}22, VII.A] regarding the performance of ELM with more lightweight primitives in place of the AES.

We also unified the evaluation of different protection levels, selected according to adversarial models.

This results in a vast set of mutually independent choices, for each of which different types of hardening may be deployed, with correspondingly different prices in term of performance penalty, memory overhead, and hardware cost. The lack of an absolute metric to combine these three costs in a single rating makes it challenging to provide recommendations that may be suitable for different applications. Therefore, the extensive set of benchmarking runs we document should be used as a
guidance for further investigations. This said, we can provide rough indications for some use cases.

For simplicity, let us restrict to L3 memory protection.

We first consider the use case of cloud computing. Server SoCs are expensive: they may contain dozens of cores, have multiple memory channels and can easily address hundreds of GiBs of physical memory. Because of the very high total system costs, we have an argument for OTP encryption with CGs in on-chip DRAM in the amount of $1/128\text{th}$ or $1/256\text{th}$ of the external memory. The additional cost for CG storage would be relatively minor, but, combined with the re-use of ECC bits for MAC storage, it would enable the highest level of memory protection at a lower performance impact than currently deployed schemes without anti-replay protection. It would also be likely less expensive than basing the protection of local memory on the cxl\_memory IDE.

However, it can also be argued that the budget for a large amount of on-chip memory should rather be spent on large SCs, from which the whole system benefits, with CGs getting a similar cache hit rate as in the unloaded case. It appears reasonable that with suitably scaled-up SCs, and multiple interleaved memory channels, a L3/MirE system running the various SPEC2006 tasks concurrently on separate cores should show the overall performance of an unloaded system running a single task. Even for HPC jobs such as large linear algebra problems, with vectors or matrices that would not even fit in, say, 32MiB worth of SC, in many cases the corresponding CGs could still fit in the SC, suggesting to dynamically partition the SC between system and MPE.

For client devices, MirE is often not applicable, as their memories usually lack ECC bits. However, for use cases such as security modules and business oriented containers, memory bus saturation is an exceptional event, often caused by a single application. In this case, we expect performance penalties in line with the most demanding tasks benchmarked on unloaded systems, and we recommend the use of high arity split counter trees with counters either on-chip or in a dynamically allocated carveout together with the MACs.

The main takeaway from our study is that nearly-transparent strong memory protection is possible with current technology. It is also achievable for use cases where only a few processes need to be protected, such as banking, content delivery, and software licensing modules, whereas the rest of the traffic bypasses the MPE.

We further observe that data structures and the organisation of integrity trees play a larger role in determining overall performance than the chosen cryptographic primitives – including the case of a bandwidth bound system, where the data structures have a direct impact on the traffic expansion.

Future work includes upstreaming our MPE framework into gem5. This will allow interested parties to perform simulations tailored to their specific use cases. A further promising research direction is the development of strategies to reduce the impact of RMWs in some schemes, such as L3/oCC/MirE with 256-ary CGs, where in corner cases the performance penalty can exceed 5\%, even thought the weighted average of all benchmarks remains under 2\%. Finally, it should be confirmed whether the use of very large system caches or MPE private caches could bring performance penalties on a loaded system down to unloaded system levels.

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References


A Selected full benchmark results

We collect here the detailed benchmarking results for the unloaded and loaded S8 and S9 runs.

Figure 19: S8/unloaded: AMD SEV (i.e. L1/AES/64B CLs) vs. L1/QARMA/64B CLs

Figure 20: S8/unloaded: L2/AES/28-32b MACs/64B CLs

Figure 21: S8/unloaded: L2/QARMA/64B CLs/32b MACs
Figure 22: S8/unloaded: Intel SGX/64B CLs (L3/AES/56b MACs/64B CLs)

Figure 23: S8 and S9/unloaded: L3/QARMA/split/128B CLs/32b MACs – runs with and without RMWs

Figure 24: S8 and S9/unloaded: L3/QARMA/oCC/32b MACs – runs with and without RMWs
Figure 25: S8 and S9/unloaded: L3/MirE/QARMA/oCC/128-ary – runs with 3-way and 2-way split counters, and with no RMWs

Figure 26: S8 and S9/unloaded: L3/MirE/QARMA/oCC/256-ary – runs with 3-way and 2-way split counters, and with no RMWs

Figure 27: S8loaded: AMD SEV (i.e. L1/AES/64B CLs) vs. L1/QARMA/64B CLs
Figure 28: S8/loaded: L2/AES/28-32b MACs/64B CLs

Figure 29: S8/loaded: L2/QARMA/64B CLs/32b MACs

Figure 30: S8/loaded: Intel SGX/64B CLs (L3/AES/56b MACs)
Figure 31: S8 and S9/loaded: L3/QARMA/split/128B CLs/32b MACs – runs with and without RMWs

Figure 32: S8 and S9/loaded: L3/QARMA/oCC/32b MACs – runs with and without RMWs

Figure 33: S8 and S9/loaded: L3/MirE/QARMA/oCC/128-ary – runs with 3-way and 2-way split counters, and with no RMWs
Figure 34: $S_8$ and $S_9$/loaded: L3//MirE/QARMA/oCC/256-ary – runs with 3-way and 2-way split counters, and with no RMWs