Abstract—Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have emerged as a viable and cost-effective method for device authentication and key generation. Recently, CMOS image sensors have been exploited as PUF for hardware fingerprinting in mobile devices. As CMOS image sensors are readily available in modern devices such as smartphones, laptops etc., it eliminates the need for additional hardware for implementing a PUF structure. In ISIC2014, an authentication protocol has been proposed to generate PUF signatures using a CMOS image sensor by leveraging the fixed pattern noise (FPN) of certain pixel values. This makes the PUF candidate an interesting target for adversarial attacks. In this work, we testify that a simple sorting attack and a win-rate (WR) based sorting attack can be launched in this architecture to predict the PUF response for given a challenge. We also propose a modified authentication protocol as a countermeasure to make it resilient against simple sorting and WR sorting attacks. The proposed work reduces the accuracy of prediction due to simple and WR sorting attacks by approximately 14% compared to existing approach.

Index Terms—CMOS Image Sensor, PUF, Hardware Security, Sorting Attack.

I. INTRODUCTION

In the current decade, the number of subscriptions to cellphone devices has escalated worldwide because of their wide usability in modern-day life [1]. However, the growth of the cellphone industry has also opened up opportunities for black marketing for adversaries. An adversary may introduce counterfeit, refurbished mobile phones in the supply chain [2] to earn illegal revenue or to sabotage brand value. Because of these counterfeited and refurbished mobile phones, the global market share of genuine mobile phones has been massively affected. Hence, it is vital to ensure the authenticity of cellphone devices and discern their fake counterparts to protect both the revenue and brand value of the original vendors. Physically unclonable functions (PUFs) have emerged as a promising solution to provide a unique signature of each manufactured chip or device. In the CMOS image sensor-based PUF, an inherent imperfection in the image sensor manufacturing process is leveraged to generate unique signatures.

In ISIC2014, Cao et al. [3] employed a CMOS image sensor-based PUF for smartphone identification. In this approach, fixed pattern noise (FPN) present in an image sensor was exploited to generate a reliable and unique signature for the identification of smartphones. The term FPN [4] is defined as the variations in output values of pixels under uniform illumination. These pixel output variations across the sensor incur due to mismatch in the device and interconnect parameters. In 2021, Yamada et. al. [5] first highlighted two adversarial attacks viz. simple sorting and column FPN attacks on CMOS image sensor PUF. In simple sorting attack list of pixel output order is generated by sorting raw pixel output using collected CRPS, whereas a column FPN attack uses the column FPN property of the raw pixels to facilitate the attack. In the column FPN attack, a win-rate (WR) function is used to compute the win-rate of the pixels at known challenges (addresses) [5]. A win-rate indicates how many times a pixel output value is greater than the other pixel values among the known CRPs. Further, a column average of the win rate of the pixels in each column is computed. Next, these column averages become the basis of sorting. However, in this paper, we have shown that a much simpler attack that simply uses win-rate function can be applied to perform the sorting among the known addresses. This simple win-rate based sorting attack is capable to provide similar accuracy as the column FPN attack. The sorting attacks make the device authentication using CMOS image sensor-based PUF weak. Hence, it demands attention to develop a strong device authentication protocol using CMOS PUF that is resilient against both sorting attacks.

Our major contributions to this paper are as follows:

- We testified that the existing CMOS image sensor PUF-based authentication protocol is susceptible to a simple sorting attack and win-rate based sorting attack.
- We implemented both simple and win-rate based sorting attacks on existing CMOS image sensor PUF (ISIC2014) and estimated the prediction accuracy to be 86% and 87.5% respectively.
- We propose a new authentication protocol based on mean and modulo function to offer a countermeasure against the simple sorting and win-rate based sorting attacks.
- The proposed PUF authentication protocol reduced the accuracy of prediction against simple sorting attack and win-rate based sorting attack to approximate 72% and 73.5% respectively.

II. BACKGROUND ON CMOS IMAGE SENSOR PUF

We first present the circuit design and operations of 3T-active pixel sensor (APS), then we illustrate the CMOS image sensor design and how it can be leveraged to act as a PUF.
II. CIRCUIT DESIGN AND OPERATIONS OF A 3T CMOS IMAGE SENSOR

A. Circuit Design and Operations of a 3T CMOS Image Sensor

A typical 3T-APS [6] and column readout & bypass circuit is depicted in Fig. 1. A pixel cell is composed of the following: (i) a photo-diode \( D_P \) (ii) a select transistor \( M_{sel} \) (iii) a reset transistor \( M_{rs} \) and (iv) a source follower readout transistor \( M_{sf} \). Upon switching the \( M_{rs} \) on, the reset voltage \( V_{DP} \) of the photo-diode \( D_P \) is given as follows [3]:

\[
V_{DP} = V_{dd} - V_{th,rs} + V_{kt}
\]

where, \( V_{th,rs} \) and \( V_{kt} \) indicate the reset transistor’s threshold voltage and the thermal noise, respectively, and \( V_{dd} \) is supply voltage. The voltage \( V_{kt} \) contributes to the main random noise due to the reset operation.

Further, once \( M_{rs} \) is switched off, \( V_{DP} \) discharges due to flow of the photo-current \( I_p \) under the incident light (forming a dark current). Next, the select transistor \( M_{sel} \) is switched on after an exposure period \( t \). The following equation is used to calculate the pixel’s output voltage \( V_O \) [3]:

\[
V_O = V_{dd} - V_{th,rs} + V_{kt} - V_{th,sf} - \frac{I_p \times t}{C_{DP}}
\]

where, \( C_{DP} \) and \( V_{th,sf} \) represent the photo-diode junction capacitance and threshold voltage of \( M_{sf} \) respectively. It is noteworthy that the following factors contribute to the variations in the pixel output values: (i) differences in photo-diode size (ii) variations in threshold voltages of \( M_{RS} \) and \( M_{SF} \) (iii) capacitance. The variation in pixel output values is also referred to as FPN.

Further, a column-level correlated double sampling (CDS) and bypass circuit for pixel value readout is shown in Fig. 1. This column readout circuit reads the pixel output value and feeds it to an analog-to-digital converter (ADC) to obtain the corresponding digital value. The readout circuit can be enabled to act in two different modes: (i) regular sensing mode and (ii) PUF mode. A particular mode is enabled using a CDS circuit and a bypass transistor \( M_B \). In the regular sensing mode, the bypass transistor is turned off and the CDS circuit is enabled to read the pixel voltage. Since the FPN adversely impacts the image quality, the CDS is employed as a noise-cancelling circuit to suppress FPN. Next, we discuss how to use the column readout circuit in the PUF mode and generate challenge-response pairs (CRPs) for device authentication.

B. CMOS Image Sensor as A PUF

To use a CMOS image sensor as a PUF, the desirable impact of FPN for the formation of random and unique PUF response needs to be retained. Since the CDS can decrease the randomness by diminishing the required effect of FPN, it is bypassed through an additionally inserted parallel bypass transistor \( M_B \) as shown in Fig. 1. Then, the output voltage of pixel during reset \( (V_{rst}) \) is directly measured. The \( V_{rst} \) can be calculated by subtracting the threshold voltage \( V_{th,sf} \) of \( M_{sf} \) from (1) [3]. The \( V_{rst} \) value of every pixel is scanned out to read a complete image and stored in the memory in digital form. Thus, we obtain a “reset image (RI)”. The uniqueness in the pattern of each pixel array is obtained due to the variations in \( V_{rst} \). The variation in \( V_{rst} \) is contributed by the variations in \( V_{th,rs} \) and \( V_{th,sf} \).

The challenge-response pair (CRP) generation algorithm [3] for the CMOS image sensor PUF-based authentication is explained as follows. The main crux is to compare the reset voltages of two pixels to obtain each response bit. For a challenge(address) \( Ch \), the pixel value \( X_{Ch} \) in the image “RI” is obtained to provide a stable response bit. An n-bit challenge \( Ch \) is used to initialize a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) counter. The n-bit LFSR counter generates another challenge (address) \( Ch' \) by shifting \( Ch \) in \( N (N < 2^{n-1}) \) clock cycles. Further, the \( X'_{Ch} \) pixel value is retrieved and compared with \( X_{Ch} \). The output bit is either 0 or 1 depending on whether the pixel value is larger. The produced bit is regarded as stable if the absolute value of \( X_{Ch} - X_{Ch'} \) is greater than a preset threshold \( X_Z \). If this absolute value is less than or equal to \( X_Z \), a new stable pair of pixels will be formed by changing the LFSR’s content by one clock cycle. This process is performed until the whole pixel array is traversed. However, the above-mentioned device authentication protocol using COMS image sensor PUF is vulnerable to simple sorting and win-rate based sorting attacks. In the next section, we discuss them in detail.

III. SORTING ATTACK ON CMOS IMAGE SENSOR PUF

In this section, we describe two adversarial attacks that are capable of predicting the PUF response given a challenge with considerable accuracy. In this attack model, we assume that the attacker knows the CRP generation algorithm and is capable of eavesdrop some CRPs of a CMOS image sensor-based PUF to conduct the simple sorting attack and win-rate based sorting attack. In the CMOS image sensor PUF, two pixels are compared to obtain a PUF response bit and the same pixels can contribute to producing multiple responses. Due to this reason, the attacker can exploit the same pixel to obtain or relate multiple responses and the PUF becomes susceptible to sorting attacks.
A. Simple Sorting Attack

A simple sorting attack exploits the transitive relation among the known CRPs. In this attack, pixel addresses (challenges) are sorted in order of the pixel output values as illustrated in Fig. 2. First, the attacker randomizes the order of the list of pixel outputs $X_{i,j}$. Now, the attacker searches CRPs for transitive pairings in collected CRPs. For example, for the challenge $X(2,1)$ and $X(3,3)$, if the response is 0, it implies that $X(2,1) > X(3,3)$ is true. Further, for the challenge $X(2,1)$ and $X(1,1)$, if the response is 1, it implies that $X(2,1) > X(1,1)$ is false. As $X(2,1)$ is common in both CRPs, this leads to the conclusion that $X(3,3) < X(2,1) < X(1,1)$. Hence these pixel addresses are swapped in the list to be in the order and the pair $X(3,3)$, $X(1,1)$ with response 1 is added to the list of known CRPs. This process is repeated for all collected CRPs until the pixel output list is sorted. It enables the attacker to guess an unknown response to a fresh challenge based on the ordered list of raw pixel variants.

B. Win-Rate Based Sorting Attack

In this attack, the pixel addresses are sorted based on the value of the win rate among the known CRPs. A win rate of a pixel is defined as $W = \frac{W}{W+L}$, where $W$ and $L$ indicate the number of times the pixel value is greater (win situation) and lesser respectively than other pixels values in the collected CRPs. Whereas, $T$ indicates the number of times the respective pixel address is used in the collected CRPs. Thereby, in the collected CRPs, pixel challenges (addresses) are swapped to sort them based on their win rates. Fig. 3 depicts the process for the scenario when the number of pixels is 4x4. Let us assume that the collected CRPs use $X(2,0)$ three times, with two responses of 0 and one of 1. This implies that the $X(2,0)$ is two times greater (i.e. $W=2$) and one time lesser (i.e. $L=1$). Hence, the win rate is calculated to be $W = \frac{2}{3}$ and labeled on the $X(2,0)$. Once the win rate for all the challenges (pixel addresses) in the collected CRPs is computed, the addresses are sorted in the increasing order of their win rates. Here, a pixel having a higher win-rate indicates that the pixel value is greater than most of the other pixel values in the collected CRPs. Further, as indicated in Fig. 3, a simple sorting may be applied to sort the pixel addresses with same win rate. Thus, the obtained sorted array of pixel addresses helps to predict the PUF responses for unknown challenges and breaks the PUF. This vulnerability of the CMOS image sensor PUF motivated us to propose a new CRP generation algorithm to mitigate both the sorting attacks and make device authentication stronger.

REFERENCES