Abstract. A functional commitment (FC) scheme allows one to commit to a vector \( x \) and later produce a short opening proof of \((f, f(x))\) for any admissible function \( f \). The security of FC schemes, called evaluation binding, ensures that it is hard to open the commitment to the same function \( f \) and different outputs \( y \neq y' \). Unlike succinct non-interactive arguments (SNARG) which provide a stronger soundness guarantee but typically require non-falsifiable assumptions, the evaluation binding of FC schemes can often be based on falsifiable assumptions and is sufficient for certain applications such as constructing homomorphic signatures (HS). Since their inception, FC schemes supporting ever more expressive classes of functions have been proposed, with the state-of-the-art supporting low-degree polynomial maps.

In this work we construct the first FC schemes for circuits, based on either pairing-based or lattice-based falsifiable assumptions. Our FCs require to fix a-priori only the maximal width of the circuit to be evaluated, and have opening proofs whose size only depends on the depth of the circuit. We obtain our results in two steps. First, we introduce a new tool which we call chainable functional commitment (CFC), and show that CFCs for quadratic polynomial maps generically imply an FC for bounded-width circuits. Then, we show how to efficiently instantiate CFCs for quadratic polynomial maps over either pairing groups or lattices.

Using a recent transformation from FC to HS, we obtain the first pairing- and lattice-based constructions of HS for bounded-width, but unbounded-depth, circuits. Prior to this work, the only HS for general circuits is lattice-based and requires bounding the circuit depth at setup time.

1 Introduction

Commitment schemes allow a sender to commit to a message \( x \) in such a way that the message remains secret until the moment she decides to open the commitment and reveal it (hiding), and they allow the receiver to get convinced that the opened message is the same \( x \) originally used at commitment time (binding).

Today, commitments are a ubiquitous building block in cryptographic protocols, including digital signatures, zero-knowledge proofs and multiparty computation, to name a few. As applications become more and more sophisticated, the basic commitment functionality may fall short. One particular limitation is that the opening mechanism is all-or-nothing: either the sender opens in full the commitment and the receiver learns the whole message, or the receiver gets nothing. A more flexible and useful functionality would be to open the commitment to a function of the committed message, that is to reveal \( f(x) \) for some function \( f \).

This advanced commitment notion has been formalized by Libert, Ramanna and Yung who called this primitive Functional Commitments (FC) [LRY16]. The property that makes functional commitments unique (and nontrivial to realize) is succinctness: assuming that the message is a...
large vector $x$, then both the commitment and the openings should be short, e.g., polylogarithmic or constant in the size of $x$. The main security requirement of functional commitments is evaluation binding: no polynomially bounded adversary should be able to, validly, open the commitment to two different values $y \neq y'$ for the same $f$. Additionally, FCs can also be hiding and zero-knowledge (a commitment and possibly several openings should not reveal additional information about $x$).

Functional commitments are essentially a class of (commit-and-prove) succinct non-interactive arguments with a weaker security property, that is evaluation binding instead of soundness. The notion of evaluation binding is not necessarily a weakness but can also be a feature: it is a falsifiable security notion that makes FCs potentially realizable from falsifiable assumptions in the standard model (i.e., without random oracles), without contradicting the celebrated result of Gentry and Wichs about impossibility of SNARGs from falsifiable assumptions [GW11]. For this reason, functional commitments can be an attractive alternative to SNARGs for implementing succinct arguments in cryptographic protocols where evaluation binding is sufficient (notably, without carrying the need of non-falsifiable assumptions). Examples of this case include homomorphic signatures and verifiable databases as shown in [CFT22], as well as the numerous applications that employ vector commitments [CFM08, LY10, CF13] or polynomial commitments [KZG10] (two primitives that are a special case of the FC notion). An additional motivation for studying evaluation binding FCs is that they can provide a different approach to construct SNARKs since any evaluation binding FC can be compiled into a SNARK by adding a simpler SNARK proof of “I know $x$ that opens the commitment”.

Turning our focus to realizations of functional commitments, it is easy to construct an FC for arbitrary computations based on non-falsifiable assumptions by generating a succinct commitment to the input $x$ and a SNARK proof for the statement “$f(x) = y$ and $x$ opens the commitment correctly”. However, as discussed above, non-falsifiable assumptions are not known to be required for functional commitments and thus this solution is not satisfactory.

On the other hand, the state-of-the-art realizations of FCs from falsifiable assumptions encompass a limited set of functionalities that (besides the special cases of vector and polynomial commitments) include linear maps [LRY16, LM19], semi-sparse polynomials [LP20] and constant-degree polynomials [ACL+22, CFT22] (see Section 1.2 for a discussion on related work).

1.1 Our Contribution

In this paper, we propose the first constructions of Functional Commitments that support the evaluation of arbitrary arithmetic circuits\(^5\) and are based on falsifiable assumptions. In our FC schemes only the maximal width of the circuits has to be fixed at setup time. The size of the commitments is fully succinct in the input size; the size of opening proofs grows with the multiplicative depth $d_C$ of the evaluated circuit $C$, but is otherwise independent of the circuit’s size or the input length. Notably, our FC schemes provide an exponential improvement compared to previous FCs that could only support polynomials of degree $\delta = O(1)$ with an efficiency degrading exponentially in $\delta$ (as $O(n^\delta)$)\(^6\) [ACL+22, CFT22].

We design our FCs for circuits in two steps: (1) a generic construction of an FC for circuits based on a novel primitive that we call Chainable Functional Commitment (CFC), and (2) two

\(^5\) Looking ahead, our lattice-based instantiation supports arithmetic circuits over rings where wires carry values of bounded norm.

\(^6\) Note, when used for a circuit of depth $d$ these solutions may have efficiency doubly exponential in $d$ since in general $\delta \approx 2^d$. 

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realizations of CFCs, one based on bilinear pairings and one based on lattices. The pairing-based CFC relies on a new falsifiable assumption that we justify in the bilinear generic group model, while the lattice-based CFC relies on a slight extension of the $k$-MISIS assumption recently introduced in [ACL+22]. Using either one of these two CFC constructions (and considering a few tradeoffs of our generic construction), we obtain a variety of FC schemes; we summarize in Table 1 the most representative ones.

Our FC schemes enjoy additional properties that have useful applications. First, they are additively homomorphic, which as shown in [CFT22] makes the FC updatable and allows for building multi-input homomorphic signatures. Notably, using our new FC for circuits we obtain new realizations of homomorphic signatures that advance the state of the art (see slightly below for more details). Second, they present amortized efficient verification, which means that the verifier can precompute a verification key $vk_C$ associated to a circuit $C$ and use this key (an unbounded number of times) to verify openings for $C$ in time (asymptotically) faster than evaluating $C$. Third, our FC schemes can be trivially modified to have perfectly hiding commitments and they can be efficiently compiled into FCs that have zero-knowledge openings (i.e., an opening proof for $f(x)$ reveals no information about the committed $x$ beyond what is trivially leaked by the result). Both efficient verification and zero-knowledge openings are relevant in the construction of HS from FCs since, as showed in [CFT22], they imply the analogous properties of efficient verification [CFW14, GVW15] and context hiding [BF11] in the resulting HS schemes.

Finally, both our pairing-based and lattice-based FCs for circuits can yield a SNARK for arithmetic circuit satisfiability if one additionally makes an appropriate knowledge-type assumption. For the pairing-based FC the very same scheme (without any change) can be proven to be a SNARK for NP under a knowledge of exponent assumption. We find this “dual-mode” feature interesting as it is an example of a scheme where according to the strength of the taken assumption one obtains an accordingly strong level of security (i.e., non-falsifiable soundness under a non-falsifiable assumption, and (falsifiable) evaluation binding under a falsifiable assumption).

| FC scheme | Functions | $|pp|$ | $|com|$ | $|\pi|$ | AH |
|-----------|-----------|------|------|------|-----|
| [LRY16]   | linear maps | $\lambda n$ | $\lambda$ | $\lambda \ell$ | ✓   |
| [LM19]    | linear maps | $\lambda n$ | $\lambda$ | $\lambda$ | ✓   |
| [LP20]    | semi-sparse poly | $\lambda \mu$ | $\lambda \ell$ | $\lambda$ | –   |
| [ACL+22]  | const. deg. poly | $p(\lambda)(n^{26}+\ell)$ | $p(\lambda) \log n$ | $p(\lambda) \log^2 \ell n$ | ✓   |
| [CFT22]   | const. deg. poly | $\lambda \ell n^{26}$ | $\lambda \delta f$ | $\lambda \delta f$ | ✓   |

This work:

Corol. 1.1 (pair.) AC of width $\leq w$ | $\lambda w^5$ | $\lambda$ | $\lambda d_C^2$ | ✓   |
Corol. 1.3 (pair.) AC of size $\leq S$ | $\lambda S^5$ | $\lambda$ | $\lambda d_C$ | ✓   |
Corol. 2.2 (latt.) AC of width $\leq w$ | $p(\lambda) w^5$ | $p(\lambda) \log w$ | $p(\lambda) d_C \log^2 w$ | ✓   |

Table 1: Comparison of FC schemes from falsifiable assumptions for functions with $n$ inputs and $\ell$ outputs. Constants are omitted, e.g., $\lambda n$ means $O(\lambda n)$. For semi-sparse polynomials $\mu \geq n$ is a sparsity-dependent parameter (cf. [LP20]). For constant-degree polynomials $\delta f$ is the degree of the polynomial $f$ used in opening while $\delta$ is the maximum degree fixed at setup. AC means arithmetic circuits, $d_C$ the depth of the circuit $C$ used in opening, and note that $w \geq n, \ell$. AH means ‘additively homomorphic’; schemes meeting this property can be turned into multi-input homomorphic signatures.
Application to Homomorphic Signatures. Homomorphic signatures (HS) [JMSW02, BF11] allow a signer to sign a large dataset \( x \) in such a way that anyone, holding a signature on \( x \), can perform a computation \( f \) on this data and derive a signature \( \sigma_{f,y} \) on the output \( y = f(x) \). This signature vouches for the correctness of \( y \) as output of \( f \) on some legitimately signed data and is publicly verifiable given a verification key, a description of \( f \), and the result \( y \). The most expressive HS in the state of the art is the scheme of Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wichs [GVW15] that is based on lattices and supports circuits with bounded number of inputs \( n \) and bounded (polynomial) depth \( d \). In their scheme, the signature size grows polynomially with the depth of the evaluated circuit (precisely, as \( d^3 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) \)).

By applying a recently proposed transformation [CFT22], our new FCs for circuits yield new homomorphic signature schemes that support the same class of functions and succinctness as supported by the FC. Our new HS advance the state of the art; notably, we obtain:

- **The first HS for circuits based on pairings.** Previously existing HS based on pairings can capture at most circuits in \( \text{NC}^1 \) [KNYY19, CFT22] and need a bound on the circuit size. In contrast, our HS can evaluate circuits of any polynomial depth, achieving virtually the same capability of the lattice-based HS of [GVW15] and with better succinctness. We believe this result is interesting as it shows for the first time that we can build HS for circuits without the need of algebraic structures, such as lattices, that are notoriously powerful.

- **The first HS that do not require an a-priori bound on the depth.** The work of Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wichs [GVW15] left open the problem of constructing fully-homomorphic signatures, i.e., HS that can evaluate any computation in the class \( \text{P} \) without having to fix any bound at key generation time. In our new HS we do not need to fix a bound on the depth but we rather need a bound on the width of the circuits at key generation time. Although this result does not fully solve the open problem of realizing fully-homomorphic signatures, we believe that our schemes make one step ahead in this direction. Our observation is that dealing with a bound on the circuit’s depth is more difficult than dealing with a bound on the width. As evidence for this, we show a variant of our FC scheme (see Section 5.2) for which one can fix a bound \( n \) and support circuits of larger width \( O(n) \) with an \( O(1) \) increase in proof size. Therefore, while our solution needs a bound on the width, this is not strict, as opposed to the depth bound in the HS of [GVW15].

Like the scheme of [GVW15], our HS constructions support multi-input signing, have efficient (offline/online) verification and are context-hiding. As a drawback, our HS allow only a limited form of multi-hop evaluation, that is the ability of computing on already evaluated signatures. In our case, we can compose computations sequentially (i.e., given a signature \( \sigma_{f,y} \) for \( y = f(x) \) we can generate one for \( z = g(y) = g(f(x)) \)), while [GVW15] supports arbitrary compositions (e.g., given signatures for \( \{y_i = f_i(x)\}_i \), one can generate one for \( z = g(f_1(x), \ldots, f_n(x)) \)). On the other hand, for circuits with multiple outputs, the size of our signatures is independent of the output size, whereas in [GVW15] signatures grow linearly with the number of outputs.

Our Novel Tool: Chainable Functional Commitments. The key novelty that allows us to overcome the barrier in the state of the art and build the first FCs for circuit is the introduction and realization of chainable functional commitments (CFC) – a new primitive of potentially independent interest. In brief, a CFC is a functional commitment where one can “open” to committed outputs. More concretely, while a (basic) FC allows proving statements of the form “\( f(x) = y \)” for committed \( x \) and publicly known \( y \), a CFC allows generating a proof \( \pi_f \) that \( \text{com}_y \) is a commitment to
vector $y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$ for vectors $x_1, \ldots, x_m$, each independently committed in $com_1, \ldots, com_m$. In terms of security, CFCs must satisfy the analogue of evaluation binding, that is one cannot open the same input commitments $(com_1, \ldots, com_m)$ to two distinct output commitments $com_y \neq com'_y$ for the same $f$. Keeping outputs committed is what makes CFCs “chainable”, in the sense that committed outputs can serve as (committed) inputs for other openings. For instance, using the syntax above, one can compute an opening $\pi_g$ proving that $com_z$ is a commitment to $z = g(y)$. This way, the concatenation of $com_y, \pi_f, \pi_g$ yields a proof that $z = g(f(x_1, \ldots, x_m))$.

The introduction and realization of CFCs are in our opinion the main conceptual and technical contributions of this paper. From a conceptual point of view, the chaining functionality turns out to be a fundamental feature to tackle the challenge of supporting a computation as expressive as an arithmetic circuit. Indeed, we show that from a CFC for quadratic polynomial maps it is possible to construct a (C)FC for arithmetic circuits. From the technical point of view, we propose new techniques that depart from the ones of existing FCs for polynomials [ACL+22, CFT22] in that the latter only work when the output vector is known to the verifier and there is a single input commitment. We refer to Section 2 for an informal explanation of our techniques.

### 1.2 Related work

The idea of a commitment scheme where one can open to functions of the committed data was implicitly suggested by Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan and Wichs [GVW15], though their construction is not succinct as the commitment size is linear in the length of the vector. Libert, Ramanna and Yung [LRY16] were the first to formalize succinct functional commitments. They proposed a succinct FC for linear forms and showed applications of this primitive to polynomial commitments [KZG10] and accumulators. Recent works have extended FCs to support more expressive functions, including linear maps [LM19], semi-sparse polynomials [LP20], and constant-degree polynomials [ACL+22, CFT22]. Table 1 presents a comparison of these works with our results. Catalano, Fiore and Tucker [CFT22] also proposed an FC for monotone span programs, which only achieves a weaker notion of evaluation binding where the adversary must reveal the committed vector. Compared to these prior works, ours addresses the main question left open in the state of the art, which is to construct FCs from falsifiable assumptions for arbitrary computation.

A recent work close to this goal is that of Peikert, Pepin, and Sharp [PPS21] who proposed a lattice-based vector commitment and a companion scheme where one can open to circuit evaluations of the committed input. Their solution, however, is not a full-fledged FC as it works in a significantly weaker model where a trusted authority is assumed to generate, using a secret key, an opening key for each function for which the prover wants to release an opening. In contrast, our solutions only assume a one-time trusted setup after which anyone can compute commitments and openings to any admissible function.

### 2 A Technical Overview of Our Work

We construct our FCs for circuits in two main steps: (1) a generic construction of FC for circuits from CFCs for quadratic polynomial maps (Section 5), and (2) the realization of these CFCs based on either pairings (Section 6) or lattices (Section 7). Below we give an informal overview of these constructions.
FC for circuits from CFCs for quadratic functions. Our transform starts from the observation that the gates of an arithmetic circuit\footnote{In our model we assume wlog arithmetic circuits where every gate is a quadratic polynomial of unbounded fan-in.} can be partitioned into "levels" according to their multiplicative depth, i.e., level $h$ contains all the gates of multiplicative depth $h$ and level 0 contains the inputs. So, each output of level $h$, denoted by $x^{(h)}$, is computed by a quadratic polynomial taking inputs from previous levels $< h$, and the evaluation of a circuit $C$ of width $\leq n$ and depth $d$ can be described as the sequential evaluation of quadratic polynomial maps $f^{(h)} : \mathcal{X}^{nh} \to \mathcal{X}^n$ for $h = 1$ to $d$.

The basic idea of our generic FC is that, starting with a commitment $\text{com}_0$ to the inputs $x^{(0)}$, we can open it to $y = C(x^{(0)})$ in two steps. First, we commit to the outputs of every level. Second, we use the CFC opening functionality to prove that these values are computed correctly from values committed in previous levels. Slightly more in detail, at level $h$ we create a commitment $\text{com}_h$ to the outputs $x^{(h)} = f^{(h)}(x^{(0)}, \ldots, x^{(h-1)})$ and generate a CFC opening proof $\pi_h$ to show consistency w.r.t. commitments $\text{com}_0, \ldots, \text{com}_{h-1}$. Eventually, this strategy reaches the commitment $\text{com}_d$ of the last level that includes the outputs, which can be opened to $y$.

As one can see, this strategy makes our opening proofs grow with the depth of the circuit. However, if the CFC commitments and opening proofs are short (e.g., constant/logarithmic in their input size, that is the circuit’s width), then the FC openings keep only such dependence on the depth.

Our CFCs for Quadratic Functions. To build our CFCs we devise new commitment and opening techniques that capture a quadratic polynomial map $y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$ where each input is committed in $\text{com}_i$, and the output is committed too in $\text{com}_y$. Our techniques use similar ideas in the pairings and lattice setting. For the pairing setting we adopt the implicit notation for bilinear groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T$ of prime order $q$ by which $\langle x \rangle_s$ denotes the vector of group elements $(g_s^{x_1}, \ldots, g_s^{x_n}) \in \mathbb{G}_s^n$ for a fixed generator $g_s$. For the lattice setting, we let $\mathcal{R}$ be a cyclotomic ring and $q$ be a large enough rational prime such that a random element in $\mathcal{R}_q := \mathcal{R}/q\mathcal{R}$ is invertible with non-negligible probability.

Abstract Functionality. In our pairing-based CFC we define three commitment keys $[\alpha]_1$, $[\beta]_1$, and $[\gamma]_1$ in $\mathbb{G}_1^n$. A commitment of type $\alpha$ to a vector $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is computed à la Pedersen as a group element $X^{(\alpha)} = [\langle x, \alpha \rangle]_1$, commitments of type $\beta$ and $\gamma$ are defined analogously. In the lattice-based CFC the keys are random elements in $\mathcal{R}_q^n$ and commitments (of vectors $x$ with small entries) are similarly computed as $\langle x, \alpha \rangle \in \mathcal{R}_q$.

In our CFCs the commitments generated by $\text{Com}$ and used by $\text{Open}$ are only those of type $\alpha$, whereas commitments of type $\beta$ and $\gamma$ are used as auxiliary values in the opening proofs. In order to create a CFC opening to a quadratic polynomial, our main tool is a technique realizing the following functionality:

- $[(\alpha, \beta) \to \gamma]$-Quadratic opening: given $m$ pairs of commitments $\{X_i^{(\alpha)} = [\langle x_i, \alpha \rangle]_1, X_i^{(\beta)} = [\langle x_i, \beta \rangle]_1\}_{i=1\ldots m}$ and a commitment $Y^{(\gamma)} = [\langle y, \gamma \rangle]_1$ generate a succinct opening proof $\pi_f^{(\gamma)}$ that $y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$.

Before seeing how we generate this opening, we observe that $\pi_f^{(\gamma)}$ does not yet achieve our goal since it assumes the availability of both type-$\alpha$ and type-$\beta$ commitments on the inputs, and it only allows us to "move" to a type-$\gamma$ commitment of the output, preventing us from achieving chainability.

We solve both issues by designing two special cases of the functionality above:
- \([\alpha \rightarrow \beta]\)-Identity opening: given a type-\(\alpha\) commitment \(X^{(\alpha)} = [(x, \alpha)]\) show that a type-\(\beta\) commitment \(X^{(\beta)}\) commits to the same \(x\), i.e., \(X^{(\beta)} = [(x, \beta)]\);  
- \([\gamma \rightarrow \alpha]\)-Identity opening: given a type-\(\gamma\) commitment \(Y^{(\gamma)} = [(y, \gamma)]\) show that a type-\(\alpha\) commitment \(Y^{(\alpha)}\) commits to the same \(y\), i.e., \(Y^{(\alpha)} = [(y, \alpha)]\).

We use the identity opening mechanisms to “close the circle” in such a way to obtain a quadratic opening mechanism where all inputs and outputs are only type-\(\alpha\) commitments. To summarize, our CFC Open algorithm consists of the following steps: (i) Compute a type-\(\beta\) commitment \(X^{(\beta)}_i\) to each input along with an \([\alpha \rightarrow \beta]\)-Identity opening proof that \(X^{(\beta)}_i\) commits to the same \(x_i\) in \(X^{(\alpha)}_i\); (ii) Compute a type-\(\gamma\) commitment \(Y^{(\gamma)}\) to the result \(y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)\) and a \([\alpha, \beta \rightarrow \gamma]\)-Quadratic opening proof attesting the validity of \(y\) w.r.t. the input commitment pairs \((X^{(\alpha)}_i, X^{(\beta)}_i)\); (iii) Finally, use the \([\gamma \rightarrow \alpha]\)-identity opening to ensure that \(Y^{(\alpha)}\) is a commitment to the same \(y\) in the \(Y^{(\gamma)}\) computed in (ii).

**Our \([\alpha, \beta \rightarrow \gamma]\)-QUADRATIC OPENING METHOD.** We use the fact that a quadratic polynomial map \(f: X^{nm} \rightarrow X^n\) can be linearized via appropriately defined vector \(e\) and matrices \(F_i\) and \(G_{i,j}\) such that

\[
y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_m) = e + \sum_i F_i \cdot x_i + \sum_{i,j \geq 1} G_{i,j} \cdot (x_i \otimes x_j).
\]

In this overview, we only show how to produce an opening proof for a single quadratic term, i.e., to show that \(y_{i,j} = G_{i,j} \cdot (x_i \otimes x_j)\) given input commitments \(X^{(\alpha)}_i, X^{(\beta)}_i, X^{(\alpha)}_j, X^{(\beta)}_j\) and output \(Y^{(\gamma)}_{i,j}\). This is the core of our technique since the full opening for \(f\) is obtained by doing an additive aggregation of openings for all the terms in the sum. Opening to \(G_{i,j}\) is done in two main steps.

First, we compute a commitment to the tensor product \(x_i \otimes x_j\). In the lattice-based CFC, this easily follows from the ring structure of \(R_q\), and thus both prover and verifier can compute \(Z_{i,j} = X^{(\alpha)}_i \cdot X^{(\beta)}_j = [x_i \otimes x_j, \alpha \otimes \beta]\). In the pairing-based CFC, the prover computes this commitment and helps the verifier to check its correctness as follows. She computes the elements \(Z_{i,j} : = [(x_i \otimes x_j, \alpha \otimes \beta)]_1\) and \(X^{(2)}_i : = [(x_i, \alpha)]_2\), and the verifier checks \(e(X^{(\alpha)}_i, [1]_2) = e([1]_1, X^{(2)}_i)\) to test that \(X^{(2)}_i \in G_2\) encodes the same vector of \(X^{(\alpha)}_i \in G_1\), and \(e(Z_{i,j}, [1]_2) = e(X^{(\beta)}_j, X^{(2)}_i)\) to test that \(Z_{i,j} = [(x_i \otimes x_j, \alpha \otimes \beta)]_1\). To let the prover compute this, we add elements \([\alpha]_2\) and \([\alpha \otimes \beta]_1\) to the public parameters.

The second step is the generation of a linear map opening that the vector \(y_{i,j}\) in the type-\(\gamma\) commitment \(Y^{(\gamma)}_{i,j}\) is the result of applying \(G_{i,j}\) to the vector committed in \(Z_{i,j}\). We compute this proof as follows. Let \(\Gamma_{i,j} = \sum_{k=1}^n G_{i,j,k} \cdot \frac{\gamma k}{\alpha \otimes \beta}\) be an encoding of the matrix \(G_{i,j}\) that should be computable by the verifier. Then we rely on the fact that

\[
(x_i \otimes x_j, \alpha \otimes \beta) \cdot \Gamma_{i,j} = (G_{i,j} \cdot (x_i \otimes x_j), \gamma) + \sum_{k, (h,l) \neq (h',l')} c_{k, h, l, h', l'} \cdot \frac{\gamma \alpha h' \beta l'}{\alpha h \beta l}\)

Namely \((x_i \otimes x_j, \alpha \otimes \beta) \cdot \Gamma_{i,j}\) can be split into the sum of a non-rational term that actually encodes the (commitment to the) result \((y_{i,j}, \gamma)\), and a linear combination of rational monomials whose coefficients can be efficiently computed given \(G_{i,j}, x_i\) and \(x_j\). So, we add to the public parameters information that allows the prover to prove such splitting.

In the pairings setting, we do this by including in the public parameters: elements \(\left\{\frac{\gamma k}{\alpha \otimes \beta} \cdot [1]_2\right\}_k\) in the group \(G_2\) that allow the verifier to compute the encoding \([\Gamma_{i,j}]_2\), and the elements \(\left\{\frac{\gamma k \alpha h' \beta l'}{\alpha h \beta l} \cdot [1]_{k, (h,l) \neq (h',l')}\right\}\)
thanks to which the prover computes \( \pi_{i,j}^{(y)} = \sum_{k, (h,l) \neq (h',l')} c_{k,h,l,h',l'} \cdot \frac{\eta \gamma_k \alpha_h \beta_l}{\alpha_{h'} \beta_{l'}} \). This way, the verifier can test equation (1) using pairings as

\[
eq e\left( Z_{i,j}^{(y)} \cdot \eta, 1 \right) \cdot e\left( \pi_{i,j}^{(y)}, [1] \right).
\] (2)

The security relies on the fact that the public parameters do not include any term \([\eta \gamma_k]_1\) in the group \(\mathbb{G}_1\). We define a falsifiable assumption distilling this property and prove the evaluation binding property of the CFC under this assumption.

In the lattice setting, we need to make an additional restriction that both the vectors \(x_1, \ldots, x_m\) and the coefficients of the polynomial map \(f\) are short. This implies that the coefficients \(c_{k,h,l,h',l'}\) in equation (1) are also short. With this restriction, we enable the proof of the split by adding to the public parameters short preimages of each ring element \(\frac{\gamma_k \alpha_h \beta_l}{\alpha_{h'} \beta_{l'}}\) and, crucially, no short preimage for ring elements \(\gamma_k\). This allows the prover to compute a short preimage \(\pi_{i,j}^{(y)}\) for the element \(\langle x_i \otimes x_j, \alpha \otimes \beta \rangle \cdot \Gamma_{i,j} - Y_{i,j}\gamma\), which the verifier can test.

### 3 Preliminaries

**Notation.** We denote by \(\mathbb{N}\) the set of natural numbers \(> 0\). We denote the security parameter by \(\lambda \in \mathbb{N}\). We call a function \(\epsilon\) **negligible**, denoted \(\epsilon(\lambda) = \text{negl}(\lambda)\), if \(\epsilon(\lambda) = O(\lambda^{-c})\) for every constant \(c > 0\), and call a function \(p(\lambda)\) **polynomial** if \(p(\lambda) = O(\lambda^c)\) for some constant \(c > 0\). We say that an algorithm is **probabilistic polynomial time** (PPT) if its running time is bounded by some \(p(\lambda) = \text{poly}(\lambda)\). For a finite set \(S\), \(x \leftarrow S\) denotes sampling \(x\) uniformly at random in \(S\). For an algorithm \(A\), we write \(y \leftarrow A(x)\) for the output of \(A\) on input \(x\). For a positive \(n \in \mathbb{N}\), \([n]\) is the set \(\{1, \ldots, n\}\). We denote vectors \(x\) and matrices \(M\) using bold fonts. For a ring \(\mathcal{R}\), given two vectors \(x, y \in \mathcal{R}^n\), \(z := (x \otimes y) \in \mathcal{R}^{n^2}\) denotes their Kronecker product (that is a vectorization of the outer product), i.e., \(\forall i, j \in [n]: z_{i+(j-1)n} = x_i y_j\).

### 3.1 Functional Commitments

In this section we give the definition of functional commitments (FC) for generic classes of functions, by generalizing the one given in [LRY16] for linear functions. For notational simplicity and without loss of generality, we give our definitions for functions that have \(n\) inputs and \(n\) outputs.

**Definition 1 (Functional Commitments).** Let \(\mathcal{X}\) be some domain and let \(\mathcal{F} \subseteq \{f : \mathcal{X}^n \to \mathcal{X}^n\}\) be a family of functions over \(\mathcal{X}\), with \(n\) inputs and \(n\) outputs. A functional commitment scheme for \(\mathcal{F}\) is a tuple of algorithms \(\text{FC} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Com}, \text{Open}, \text{Ver})\) that work as follows and that satisfy correctness and succinctness defined below.

\[\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{ck}\] on input the security parameter \(\lambda\) and the functions parameters \(n\), outputs a commitment key \(\text{ck}\).

\[\text{Com}(\text{ck}, x; r) \rightarrow (\text{com}, \text{aux})\] on input a vector \(x \in \mathcal{X}^n\) and (possibly) randomness \(r\), outputs a commitment \(\text{com}\) and related auxiliary information \(\text{aux}\).\(^8\)

\(^8\) In our constructions, we often omit \(r\) from the inputs; in such a case we assume either that \(r\) is randomly sampled or that the commitment algorithm is deterministic.
Open(ck, aux, f) → π on input an auxiliary information aux and a function f ∈ F, outputs an opening proof π.

Ver(ck, com, f, y, π) → b ∈ {0, 1} on input a commitment com, an opening proof π, a function f ∈ F and a value y ∈ X^n, accepts (b = 1) or rejects (b = 0).

**Correctness.** FC is correct if for any n ∈ N, all ck ← Setup(1^λ, 1^n), any f : X^n → X^n in the class F, and any x ∈ X^n, if (com, aux) ← Com(ck, x), then

Pr[Ver(ck, com, f, f(x), Open(ck, aux, f)) = 1] = 1.

**Succinctness.** Let us assume that the admissible functions can be partitioned as F = {F_κ}_{κ∈K}, and let s : N × K → N be a function. A functional commitment FC for F is said to be s(n, κ)-succinct if there exists a polynomial p(λ) = poly(λ) such that for any κ ∈ K, function f : X^n → X^n s.t. f ∈ F_κ, honestly generated commitment key ck ← Setup(1^λ, 1^n), vector x ∈ X^n, commitment (com, aux) ← Com(ck, x) and opening π ← Open(ck, aux, f), it holds that |com| ≤ p(λ) and |π| ≤ p(λ) · s(n, κ).

In order to model and compare different constructions, the notion of succinctness that we introduce is parametric with respect to a function s(n, κ) that depends on the input-output length n and some parameter κ of the evaluated function. In some cases we will express the function s using asymptotic notation. To give some examples, κ could be an integer expressing the depth/size of a circuit (and thus F_κ are all circuits of depth/size κ), the degree of a polynomial, or the running time of a Turing machine. Accordingly, K is a set that partitions the class of admissible functions, e.g., K = [D] if the admissible functions are all circuits of depth ≤ D, or K = N if one wants to capture circuits of any depth.

Generally, to make FC a nontrivial primitive, we are interested in s(n, κ)-succinct FCs where s(n, κ) is sublinear or constant in the input length n; in this case we call the FC succinct. On the other hand, we leave the possibility that s depends on the evaluated function, e.g., in our constructions for arithmetic circuits s depends on the depth of the evaluated circuit but not on its size and input/output length.

The security definition of FCs proposed in [LRY16] is called evaluation binding and says that a PPT adversary cannot open a commitment to two distinct outputs for the same function.

**Definition 2 (Evaluation Binding).** For any PPT adversary A, the following probability is negl(λ):

\[ \text{Adv}^{\text{EvBind}}_{A, FC}(\lambda) = \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{c} \text{Ver}(ck, com, f, y, \pi) = 1 \\ \land \ y \neq y' \land \ \text{Ver}(ck, com, f, y', \pi') = 1 \\ \text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \end{array} : \ (\text{com}, f, y, \pi, y', \pi') \leftarrow A(ck) \right] \]

For simplicity of presentation, in all our security definitions, we omit checking the domains of the elements returned by the adversary, e.g., that f ∈ F and y ∈ X^n etc.

In the following proposition we note that evaluation binding implies the classical binding notion.

**Proposition 1.** Let FC be an FC scheme satisfying evaluation binding. Then FC.Com is a computationally binding commitment scheme, namely any PPT adversary has probability negl(λ) of finding a tuple (x, r, x', r') such that x ≠ x' and Com(ck, x; r) = Com(ck, x'; r').
Proof. The proof is rather simple and works as follows. Consider an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) that returns \((x, r, x', r')\) such that \(x \neq x'\) and \(\text{Com}(ck, x; r) = \text{Com}(ck, x'; r')\) with non-negligible probability. Then we can use it to build an adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) that returns \((\text{com}, f, y, \pi, y', \pi')\) such that \(\text{Ver}(ck, \text{com}, f, y, \pi) = \text{Ver}(ck, \text{com}, f, y', \pi') = 1\) and \(y \neq y'\). To do so, \( \mathcal{B} \) runs \( \mathcal{A} \) and then looks for a function \( f \) such that \(y = f(x) \neq f(x') = y'\), and computes \((\text{com}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Com}(ck, x; r)\), \((\text{com}', \text{aux}') \leftarrow \text{Com}(ck, x'; r')\), \(\pi \leftarrow \text{Open}(ck, \text{aux}, f)\), and \(\pi' \leftarrow \text{Open}(ck, \text{aux}', f)\). By the correctness of FC, \( \pi \) and \( \pi' \) must verify for \( y \) and \( y' \) respectively, and for the same commitment \( \text{com} = \text{com}' \) (due to the break of binding by \( \mathcal{A} \)). Therefore, \( \mathcal{B} \)'s output is a valid attack against evaluation binding.

We also recall two security notions that are strictly stronger than evaluation binding. The first is strong evaluation binding, introduced in [LM19]. In this notion, the adversary outputs a commitment \( \text{com} \) and a collection of openings to one or several function-output pairs \( \{f_i, y_i\}_i \), and we say that it wins if these define an inconsistent system of equations (i.e., there is no valid \( x \) such that \( f_i(x) = y_i \) for all \( i \)). Then, we introduce the notion of knowledge extractability and prove that if an FC is knowledge extractable, then it also satisfies strong evaluation binding.

Definition 3 (Strong Evaluation Binding). For any PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \), the following advantage is \( \text{negl}(\lambda) \):

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{FC}}^{\text{EvBind}}(\lambda) = \text{Pr} \left[ \begin{array}{l}
\forall i \in [Q], \\
\text{Ver}(ck, \text{com}, f_i, y_i, \pi_i) = 1 : \\
\text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \\
\land \not\exists x \in X : f_i(x) = y_i \\
\end{array} \right]
\]

Definition 4 (FC Extractability). FC is knowledge extractable for an auxiliary input distribution \( \mathcal{Z} \) if for any polynomial time adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) there exists a PPT extractor \( \mathcal{E} \) such that the following advantage is \( \text{negl}(\lambda) \):

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{FC}}^{\text{ext}}(\lambda) = \text{Pr} \left[ \begin{array}{l}
\text{Ver}(ck, \text{com}, f, y, \pi) = 1 \\
\land (\text{com} \neq \text{com}') \\
\lor f(x) \neq y \\
\text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \\
\text{aux}_Z \leftarrow \mathcal{Z}(1^\lambda) \\
(\text{com}, f, y, \pi) \leftarrow (\mathcal{A})(\text{ck}, \text{aux}_Z) \\
(x; r) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\text{ck}, \text{aux}_Z) \\
(\text{com}', \text{aux}') \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x; r) \\
\end{array} \right]
\]

Proposition 2. Let FC be a knowledge extractable FC. Then, FC satisfies strong evaluation binding.

Proof. Let \( \mathcal{A} \) be an adversary against strong evaluation binding that on input \((\text{ck}, \text{aux}_Z)\) returns \((\text{com}, \{f_i, y_i, \pi_i\}_i)\) such that \(\forall i \in [Q], \text{Ver}(\text{ck}, \text{com}, f_i, y_i, \pi_i) = 1 \land \not\exists x \in X : f_i(x) = y_i\). We will show that if \( \mathcal{A} \) is a successful adversary then FC is not knowledge extractable.

We proceed by contradiction; assume that FC is knowledge extractable. We define \( Q \) adversaries \( \mathcal{B}_i(\text{ck}, \text{aux}_Z), \ldots, \mathcal{B}_Q(\text{ck}, \text{aux}_Z) \) against FC extractability as follows: \( \mathcal{B}_i \) runs \( \mathcal{A}(\text{ck}, \text{aux}_Z) \) and returns the \( i \)-th tuple \((\text{com}, f_i, y_i, \pi_i)\) from \( \mathcal{A} \)'s output. Notice that \( \mathcal{A} \) is a deterministic machine; nevertheless \( \mathcal{A} \) can take input randomness in \( \text{aux}_Z \). As FC is knowledge extractable, for every \( \mathcal{B}_i \) there exists an extractor \( \mathcal{E}_i(\text{ck}, \text{aux}_Z) \) that returns \( x_i; r_i \) such that (abusing notation) \( \text{com} \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x_i; r_i) \) and \( f_i(x_i) = y_i \).

We now distinguish two cases. First, suppose that \( x_i \neq x_j \) for some \( i, j \in [Q] \). Then, we have that \( \text{com} = \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x_i; r_i) = \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x_j; r_j) \), which is a contradiction as this breaks commitment
3.2 Additional properties of FCs

Here we define three extra properties of functional commitments that can be useful in applications.

Additive-homomorphic FCs. These are functional commitments where, given two commitments \( \text{com}_1 \) and \( \text{com}_2 \) to vectors \( x_1 \) and \( x_2 \) respectively, one can compute a commitment to \( x_1 + x_2 \).

Definition 5 (Additive-homomorphic FCs [CFT22]). Let FC be a functional commitment scheme where \( \mathcal{X} \) is a ring. Then FC is additive homomorphic if there exist deterministic algorithms \( \text{Add}(\text{ck}, \text{com}_1, \ldots, \text{com}_n) \rightarrow \text{com}, \text{Add}_\text{aux}(\text{ck}, \text{aux}_1, \ldots, \text{aux}_n) \rightarrow \text{aux} \) and \( \text{Add}_r(\text{ck}, r_1, \ldots, r_n) \rightarrow r \) such that for any \( x_i \in \mathcal{X} \) and \( (\text{com}_i, \text{aux}_i) \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x_i; r_i) \), if \( \text{com} \leftarrow \text{FC}.\text{Add}(\text{ck}, \text{com}_1, \ldots, \text{com}_n), \text{aux} \leftarrow \text{FC}.\text{Add}_\text{aux}(\text{ck}, \text{aux}_1, \ldots, \text{aux}_n) \), and \( r \leftarrow \text{FC}.\text{Add}_r(\text{ck}, r_1, \ldots, r_n) \), then \( (\text{com}, \text{aux}) = \text{Com}(\text{ck}, \sum_{i=1}^n x_i; r) \).

As shown in [CFT22], an additive-homomorphic FC can be used to construct multi-input homomorphic signatures, and it is also updatable.

Efficient Amortized Verification. A FC satisfying this property enables the verifier to precompute a verification key \( \text{vk}_f \) associated to the function \( f \), with which the verifier can check any opening for \( f \) in time asymptotically faster than executing \( f \). We introduce a general notion in which the efficient verification algorithm must be asymptotically faster than the standard verification algorithm.

Definition 6 (Amortized efficient verification). A functional commitment scheme FC for \( F \) has amortized efficient verification if there exist two additional algorithms \( \text{vk}_f \leftarrow \text{VerPrep}(\text{ck}, f) \) and \( b \leftarrow \text{EffVer}(\text{vk}_f, \text{com}, \text{y}, \pi) \) such that for any \( n = \text{poly}(\lambda) \), function \( f : \mathcal{X}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^n \) s.t. \( f \in F \), any honestly generated commitment key \( \text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \), vector \( x \in \mathcal{X}^n \), commitment \( (\text{com}, \text{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x) \) and opening \( \pi \leftarrow \text{Open}(\text{ck}, \text{aux}, f) \), it holds: (a) \( \text{EffVer}(\text{VerPrep}(\text{ck}, f), \text{com}, \text{y}, \pi) = \text{Ver}(\text{ck}, \text{com}, f, \text{y}, \pi) \), and (b) the running time of \( \text{EffVer} \) is \( o(T) \) where \( T = T(\lambda) \) is the running time of \( \text{Ver}(\text{ck}, \text{com}, f, \text{y}, \pi) \).

Hiding and Zero Knowledge. Intuitively, an FC is hiding if the commitments produced through \( \text{Com} \) are hiding, in the classical sense. For zero-knowledge, the goal is that the openings produced by \( \text{Open} \) should not reveal more information about the committed vector beyond what can be deduced from the output, i.e., that \( x \) is such that \( y = f(x) \).

We use the formal definitions introduced in [CFT22].

Definition 7 (Com-Hiding [CFT22]). A FC has perfectly (resp. statistically, computationally) hiding commitments if there are simulator algorithms \( \text{Sim} = (\text{Sim}_{\text{Setup}}, \text{Sim}_{\text{Com}}, \text{Sim}_{\text{Equiv}}) \) such that

- (i) \( \text{Sim}_{\text{Setup}} \) generates indistinguishable keys, along with a trapdoor, i.e., the distributions \( \{ \text{ck} : \text{ck} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \} \) and \( \{ \text{ck} : (\text{ck}, \text{td}) \leftarrow \text{Sim}_{\text{Setup}}(1^\lambda, n) \} \) are identical (resp. statistically, computationally indistinguishable).
(ii) for any vector $x \in \mathcal{X}^n$, keys $(ck, td) \leftarrow \text{Sim}_{\text{setup}}(1^\lambda, n)$, the following distributions are identical (resp. statistically, computationally indistinguishable):

$$\{\text{Com}(ck, x)\} \approx \{(\text{com}, aux) : (\text{com}, \tilde{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Sim}_{\text{com}}(td), aux \leftarrow \text{Sim}_{\text{equiv}}(td, \text{com}, \tilde{aux}, x)\}$$

**Definition 8 (Zero-knowledge openings).** An FC has perfect (resp. statistical, computational) zero-knowledge openings if there is a simulator $\text{Sim} = (\text{Sim}_{\text{setup}}, \text{Sim}_{\text{com}}, \text{Sim}_{\text{equiv}}, \text{Sim}_{\text{open}})$ such that

- (i) $\text{Sim}_{\text{setup}}$ generates indistinguishable keys, along with a trapdoor, i.e., the distributions $\{ck : ck \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)\}$ and $\{ck : (ck, td) \leftarrow \text{Sim}_{\text{setup}}(1^\lambda, n)\}$ are identical (resp. statistically, computationally indistinguishable).
- (ii) for any vector $x \in \mathcal{X}^n$, keys $(ck, td) \leftarrow \text{Sim}_{\text{setup}}(1^\lambda, n)$, functions $f_1, \ldots, f_Q \in \mathcal{F}$, and commitments $(\text{com}, aux) \leftarrow \text{Com}(ck, x)$ and $(\tilde{\text{com}}, \tilde{aux}) \leftarrow \text{Sim}_{\text{com}}(ck)$, the following two distributions are identical (resp. statistically, computationally indistinguishable):

$$\{\tilde{\text{com}}, \{\text{Sim}_{\text{open}}(td, \tilde{aux}, \text{com}, f_j, f_j(x(x)))\}_j^{Q=1}\} \approx \{\text{com}, \{\text{Open}(ck, aux, f_j)\}_j^{Q=1}\}$$

In the following theorem we state a simple result showing that an FC with hiding commitments (but not necessarily zero-knowledge openings) can be converted, via the use of a NIZK scheme, into one that also achieves zero-knowledge openings. The proof is straightforward and is omitted.

**Theorem 1.** Let FC be an FC scheme that satisfies com-hiding (Definition 7), and let $\Pi$ be a NIZK for the NP relation $R_{\text{FC}} = \{((ck, C, f, y); \pi) : \text{Ver}(ck, \text{com}, f, y, \pi) = 1\}$. Then there exists an FC scheme $\text{FC}^*$ for the same class of functions supported by FC that has com-hiding and zero-knowledge openings. Furthermore, if FC is additive-homomorphic, so is $\text{FC}^*$; if FC has efficient verification and $\Pi$ supports $R'_\text{FC} = \{(vk_f, C, y; \pi) : \text{EffVer}(vk_f, \text{com}, y, \pi) = 1\}$, then $\text{FC}^*$ has also efficient verification.

### 4 Chainable Functional Commitments

In this work, we introduce the notion of Chainable Functional Commitments (CFC), which is an extension of the FC primitive that allows one to “chain” multiple openings to different functions. Whereas a FC scheme can be used to prove that $y = f(x)$ for a committed $x$, a CFC scheme can be used to prove that $\text{com}_y$ is a commitment to $y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$ for independently committed $x_1, \ldots, x_m$. In particular, the fact that the output is also committed is what allows one to chain another opening. For example, one can prove that $\text{com}_z$ commits to $z = g(y)$, and thus the concatenation of the two openings constitutes a proof that $\text{com}_z$ commits to $z = g(f(x_1, \ldots, x_m))$. Furthermore, since $\text{Com}$ is binding (see Proposition 1), one can reveal the output $z$ and check that $\text{com}_z$ commits to $z$, recovering the notion of functional commitments.

**Definition 9 (Chainable Functional Commitments).** Let $\mathcal{X}$ be some domain, $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and let $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \{f : \mathcal{X}^m \rightarrow \mathcal{X}^n\}$ be a family of functions over $\mathcal{X}$ for any integer $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$. A chainable functional commitment scheme for $\mathcal{F}$ is a tuple of algorithms $\text{CFC} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Com}, \text{Open}, \text{Ver})$ that works as follows and that satisfies correctness and succinctness.

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{ck}$ on input the security parameter $\lambda$ and the vector length $n$, outputs a commitment key $\text{ck}$.
Com(ck, x; r) → (com, aux) on input a vector x ∈ X^n and (possibly) randomness r, outputs a commitment com and related auxiliary information aux.

Open(ck, (aux_i)i∈[m], aux_y, f) → π given auxiliary informations (aux_i)i∈[m], one for every committed input, and a function f ∈ F, returns an opening proof π.

Ver(ck, (com_i)i∈[m], com_y, f, π) → b ∈ {0, 1} on input commitments (com_i)i∈[m] to the m inputs and com_y to the output, an opening proof π, and a function f ∈ F, accepts (b = 1) or rejects (b = 0).

Correctness. CFC is correct if for any n, m ∈ N, all ck ← Setup(1^λ, 1^n), any f : X^nm → X^n in the class F, and any set of vectors {x_i}i∈[m] such that x_i ∈ X^n, if (com_i, aux_i) ← Com(ck, x_i) for every i ∈ [m] and (com_y, aux_y) ← Com(ck, f(x_1, . . . , x_m)),

Pr [Ver(ck, (com_i)i∈[m], com_y, f, Open(ck, (aux_i)i∈[m], aux_y, f)) = 1] = 1.

Succinctness. Let F = {F_k}k∈K for some set K and let s : N × N × K be a function. A chainable functional commitment CFC is s(n, m, κ)-succinct if there exists a polynomial p(λ) = poly(λ) such that for any n, m and κ ∈ K, function f : X^nm → X^n, f ∈ F_k, honestly generated commitment key ck ← Setup(1^λ, 1^n), vectors x_i ∈ X^n and commitments (com_i, aux_i) ← Com(ck, x_i) for i ∈ [m], (com_y, aux_y) ← Com(ck, f(x_1, . . . , x_m)), and opening π ← Open(ck, (aux_i)i∈[m], aux_y, f), it holds that |com_i| ≤ p(λ) for every i ∈ [m] and |π| ≤ p(λ) · s(n, m, κ).

As in the case of FCs (Definition 1) we define succinctness in a parametric way, and we are interested in CFC constructions supporting non-trivial functions s(n, m, κ) that are sublinear or constant in n, m. We remark that in our definition of CFC the number of inputs m is not fixed at setup time.

Additive homomorphism and efficient verification. As for functional commitments, a CFC can also be additively homomorphic and have amortized efficient verification. We omit the formal definitions of these properties as they are analogous to Definition 5 and Definition 6 , respectively.

Definition 10 (Evaluation Binding). For any PPT adversary A, the following probability is negl(λ):

\[ \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{c} \text{Ver}(ck, (com_i)i∈[m], com_y, f, π) = 1 \\ \land \ com_y \neq com'_y \land \\ \text{Ver}(ck, (com_i)i∈[m], com'_y, f, π') = 1 \end{array} \right] : \begin{array}{c} \text{ck} ← \text{Setup}(1^λ, 1^n) \\ (com_i)i∈[m], f, com_y, π, com'_y, π' ← A(ck) \end{array} \]

As one can notice, the above notion of evaluation binding can only hold in the case when the output commitments com_y are generated deterministically. This is still enough for using CFCs to construct FCs with hiding commitments to inputs and zero-knowledge openings (thanks to Theorem 1). We leave the definition of CFCs with hiding output commitments for future work.

Below we introduce the definition of a knowledge extractable CFC.

Definition 11 (CFC Extractability). CFC is knowledge extractable for an auxiliary input distribution Z if for any polynomial time adversary A there exists an extractor E such that the following
probability is \( \negl(\lambda) \):

\[
\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Ver}(ck, (\text{com}_i)_{i \in [m]}, \text{com}_y, f, \pi) = 1 \\
\land (\exists i \in [m] : \text{com}_i \neq \text{com}'_i) \\
\lor \text{com}_y \neq \text{com}'_y \\
\lor f(x_1, \ldots, x_m) \neq y
\end{array} \right] \\
\exists \lambda \left[ \begin{array}{c}
ck \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \\
\text{aux}_x \leftarrow Z(1^\lambda)
\end{array} \right]
\]

\[
\left( (\text{com}_i)_{i \in [m]}, f, \text{com}_y, \pi \right) \leftarrow A(ck, \text{aux}_x)
\]

\[
((x_i; r_i)_{i \in [m]}(y; r_y)) \leftarrow E(ck, \text{aux}_x)
\]

\[
(\text{com}'_i, \text{aux}'_i) \leftarrow \text{Com}(ck, x_i; r_i)
\]

\[
(\text{com}'_y, \text{aux}'_y) \leftarrow \text{Com}(ck, y; r_y)
\]

5 FC for Circuits from CFC for Quadratic Polynomials

In this section we introduce a generic construction of a Functional Commitment scheme for arithmetic circuits of bounded width \( n \), from any Chainable Functional Commitment for quadratic functions over inputs of length \( n \).

Our construction relies on the observation that the gates of an arithmetic circuit can be partitioned in levels, so that the input wires of a gate at depth \( h \) are outputs from any previous level \( h' < h \). This way, the evaluation of the arithmetic circuit can be expressed as the sequential computation of several arithmetic circuits of multiplicative depth 1 (i.e., several quadratic polynomials), one for every level. The basic idea of our FC construction is to commit to the outputs of each level and then use the CFC opening functionality to certify that the committed outputs of level \( h \) are correctly computed from values in the commitments of previous levels, including the commitment of level 0 that is the commitment to the input. This step in which we connect the values from different levels is the one where we take advantage of the chaining feature of the CFC primitive.

Following the strategy outlined above, an opening proof for the resulting FC scheme must include one commitment to each level of the circuit, alongside a CFC opening for the quadratic polynomial corresponding to the level. In total, a proof is (roughly) composed by the aggregation of \( d \) CFC proofs, where \( d \) is the circuit depth. Thus, the proof size of our FC construction is at least linear in \( d \).

Circuit model and notation. Let \( \mathcal{R} \) be a commutative ring. We consider arithmetic circuits \( \mathcal{C} : \mathcal{R}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{R}^n \) where every gate is a quadratic polynomial with bounded coefficients. It is not hard to see that such a model captures the more common model of arithmetic circuits consisting of fan-in-2 gates that compute either addition or multiplication. More in detail, we model \( \mathcal{C} \) as a directed acyclic graph (DAG) where every node is either an input, an output or a gate, and input (resp. output) nodes have in-degree (resp. out-degree) 0. We partition the nodes in the DAG defined by \( \mathcal{C} \) in levels as follows. Level 0 contains all the input nodes. Let the depth of a gate \( g \) be the length of the longest path from any input to \( g \), in the DAG defined by the circuit. Then, for \( h \geq 1 \), we define level \( h \) as the subset of gates of depth \( h \). Note that any gate in level \( h \) has at least one input coming from a gate at level \( h - 1 \) (while other inputs may come from gates at any other previous level \( 0, \ldots, h - 2 \)). The depth of the circuit \( \mathcal{C} \), denoted \( d_\mathcal{C} \) (or simply \( d \) when clear from the context), is the number of levels of \( \mathcal{C} \). Finally, we assume that the last level \( d_\mathcal{C} \) also contains output nodes.\(^9\)

In this model, we define the width of \( \mathcal{C} \), denoted by \( n \), as the maximum number of nodes in any

\(^9\) This can be assumed without loss of generality. If we have an output \( x_i^{(h)} \) at level \( h < d \), we can introduce a linear gate at level \( d \) that takes \( x_i^{(h)} \) and some arbitrary \( x_j^{(d-1)} \) as input, and outputs \( x_k^{(d)} = x_i^{(h)} + 0 \cdot x_j^{(d-1)} \).
A vector of quadratic polynomials $\mathbf{f}$ computation done at a given level of a circuit can be expressed in a compact form as follows. Let $\mathbf{f}_k(\mathbf{x}) = f_k(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}, \ldots, \mathbf{x}^{(h-1)})$ where $f_k^h: \mathcal{R}^{nh} \to \mathcal{R}$ is a quadratic polynomial. We group all these $n$ polynomials $f_1^h, \ldots, f_n^h$ into the quadratic polynomial map $f^h: \mathcal{R}^{nh} \to \mathcal{R}^n$ such that $\mathbf{x}^h = f^h(\mathbf{x}^{(0)}, \ldots, \mathbf{x}^{(h-1)})$. We denote the operation that extracts these functions $\{f^h\}$ from $\mathcal{C}$ by $(f^{(1)}, \ldots, f^{(d)}) \leftarrow \text{Parse}(\mathcal{C})$.

**Quadratic functions.** As mentioned above, a gate in our circuit model computes a quadratic polynomial. Thus all the gates at a given level form a vector of $n$ quadratic polynomials that take up to $m$ vectors and output a single vector. We define this class of functions as

$$\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} = \{ f: \mathcal{R}^{nm} \to \mathcal{R}^n : f = (f_1, \ldots, f_n) \land \forall k \in [n], f_k \in \mathcal{R}[X_1^{(1)}, \ldots, X_n^{(m)}] \leq 2 \land m = \text{poly}(\lambda) \}.$$ 

A vector of quadratic polynomials $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}}$, $f: \mathbb{F}^{mn} \to \mathbb{F}^n$, such as those that represent the computation done at a given level of a circuit can be expressed in a compact form as follows. Let $f(\mathbf{x}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathbf{x}^{(m)}) = \mathbf{y}$. First, note that we can express each $f_k$ in $f = (f_1, \ldots, f_n)$ as an affine function

$$f_k(\mathbf{x}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathbf{x}^{(m)}) = e_k + \sum_{h \in [m]} \langle f_k^h, \mathbf{x}^{(h)} \rangle + \sum_{(h, h') \in [m] \times [m], h \leq h'} \langle g_k^{(h, h')}, \mathbf{x}^{(h)} \otimes \mathbf{x}^{(h')} \rangle$$

where each $f_k^h \in \mathcal{R}^n$ for $h \in [m]$ and $g_k^{(h, h')} \in \mathcal{R}^{n^2}$ for $(h, h') \in [m] \times [m], h \leq h'$. Note that this representation is not unique as $\mathbf{x}^{(h)} \otimes \mathbf{x}^{(h')}$ contains repeated entries but the parties involved in the scheme can make it unique by agreeing on placing zeros in appropriate entries of the $g_k^{(h, h')}$ vector.

Then, we define $d$ matrices $\mathbf{F}^{(h)} \in \mathcal{R}^{n \times n}$, $d(d + 1)/2$ matrices $\mathbf{G}^{(h, h')} \in \mathcal{R}^{n \times n^2}$, and a vector $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}^n$ as follows:

$$\mathbf{e} = \begin{pmatrix} e_1 \\ \vdots \\ e_n \end{pmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{F}^{(h)} = \begin{bmatrix} f_1^{(h)^\top} \\ \vdots \\ f_n^{(h)^\top} \end{bmatrix}, \quad \mathbf{G}^{(h, h')} = \begin{bmatrix} g_1^{(h, h')^\top} \\ \vdots \\ g_n^{(h, h')^\top} \end{bmatrix}$$

hence, we can represent our quadratic function as

$$f(\mathbf{x}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathbf{x}^{(m)}) = \mathbf{e} + \sum_{h \in [m]} \mathbf{F}^{(h)} \cdot \mathbf{x}^{(h)} + \sum_{(h, h') \in [m] \times [m], h \leq h'} \mathbf{G}^{(h, h')} \cdot (\mathbf{x}^{(h)} \otimes \mathbf{x}^{(h')}). \quad (3)$$

In an arbitrary circuit, the quadratic function $f^h$ at each level may depend on values from any previous level, i.e., all of $\mathbf{x}^{(0)}, \mathbf{x}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathbf{x}^{(h-1)}$. In many cases, however, the nodes at a given level may not have incoming edges from all levels above. In what follows we provide a few definitions useful to express such connectivity in a more precise way. This shall be useful later as the efficiency of our construction may depend on the actual degree of connection between levels in $\mathcal{C}$. We start by defining the notion of *support* for quadratic polynomials aiming to express on which (groups of) variables a polynomial depend, based on the compact representation in equation (3).
We define the linear support of \( f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} \), denoted \( \mathcal{S}_1(f) \subseteq [m] \), as the set of indices \( h \) where the linear part of \( f \) is nonzero with respect to any term \( X_i^{(h)} \). Formally,

\[
\mathcal{S}_1(f) := \{ h \in [m] : \mathbf{F}^{(h)} \neq \mathbf{0} \}.
\]

Analogously, we define the quadratic support of \( f \), denoted \( \mathcal{S}_2(f) \subseteq [m] \), as the indices \( h \) where \( f \) is nonzero with respect to any term \( X_i^{(h)} \cdot X_j^{(h')} \) for one or more \( h' \in [m] \). Formally,

\[
\mathcal{S}_2(f) := \{ h \in [m] : \exists h' \mathbf{G}^{(h,h')} \neq \mathbf{0} \}.
\]

We will also express the quadratic support using pairs of indices,

\[
\mathcal{S}_2^\otimes(f) := \{ (h, h') \in [m] \times [m] : h \leq h' \land \mathbf{G}^{(h,h')} \neq \mathbf{0} \}.
\]

Finally, we define the support of \( f \) as the union of its linear and quadratic supports, namely \( \mathcal{S}(f) = \mathcal{S}_1(f) \cup \mathcal{S}_2(f) \). By using the linear and quadratic supports, we can express polynomial functions in \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} \) as follows:

\[
f(x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(m)}) = e + \sum_{h \in \mathcal{S}_1(f)} \mathbf{F}^{(h)} \cdot x^{(h)} + \sum_{(h, h') \in \mathcal{S}_2^\otimes(f)} \mathbf{G}^{(h,h')} \cdot (x^{(h)} \otimes x^{(h')}). \tag{4}
\]

Consider a circuit \( \mathcal{C} \) and let \( (f^{(1)}, \ldots, f^{(d)}) \leftarrow \text{Parse}(\mathcal{C}) \). Then every function \( f^{(h)} \) can be expressed and computed using only the inputs in \( \mathcal{S}(f^{(h)}) \), namely \( f^{(h)}([x^{(h')}]_{h' \in \mathcal{S}(f^{(h)})}) = f^{(h)}(x^{(0)}, \ldots, x^{(h-1)}) \).

We call the number of inputs in the support of \( f^{(h)} \), namely \( |\mathcal{S}(f^{(h)})| \), the in-degree of level \( h \). We say that a circuit \( \mathcal{C} \) has in-degree \( t_\mathcal{C} \) if \( t_\mathcal{C} = \max_{h \in [d_\mathcal{C}]} |\mathcal{S}(f^{(h)})| \). We call \( \mathcal{C} \) a layered circuit if it has in-degree 1. Notice that for a layered circuit it holds that \( x^{(d)} = \mathcal{C}(x^{(0)}) \) where \( x^{(h)} = f^{(h)}(x^{(h-1)}) \) for all \( h = 1 \) to \( d \).

**Classes of circuits.** To properly define the succinctness and the functions supported by our FC construction, we parametrize the circuits according to three parameters, the depth, the in-degree, and the width. Let \( \mathcal{F}_{(d,t,w)} = \{ \mathcal{C} : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n : d_\mathcal{C} = d, t_\mathcal{C} = t, w_\mathcal{C} = w \} \), where \( d_\mathcal{C} \in \mathbb{N}, t_\mathcal{C} \leq d, w_\mathcal{C} \leq w \) are the depth, in-degree, and width of \( \mathcal{C} \), respectively. Then our FC scheme supports any arithmetic circuit of width at most \( n \), in the model described above. We denote this class by \( \mathcal{F}_n := \{ \mathcal{F}_{(d,t,w)} \}_{d \in \mathbb{N}, t \leq d, w \leq n} \).

**Construction.** In Figure 1 we present our FC construction for \( \mathcal{F}_n \). We assume, without loss of generality, that the auxiliary input aux generated by CFC.Com contains the committed input \( x \). In the protocol, we retrieve \( x \) from aux via a Parse function.

Our goal in this section is to prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 2.** Let CFC = (Setup, Com, Open, Ver) be a chainable functional commitment scheme for the class of functions \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} \). Then, the scheme FC in Figure 1 is an FC for the class \( \mathcal{F}_n \) of arithmetic circuits \( \mathcal{C} : \mathbb{R}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^n \) of width \( \leq n \).

Let \( \mathcal{K} \) be a partitioning of \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} \) such that CFC is \( s(n,m,\kappa) \)-succinct for \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} = \{ \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad},\kappa} \} \). Then FC is \( d \cdot (s_{\text{max}}(n,t) + 1) \)-succinct for the class \( \mathcal{F}_n = \{ \mathcal{F}_{(d,t,w)} \}_{d \in \mathbb{N}, t \leq d, w \leq n} \), where \( s_{\text{max}}(n,t) := \max_{\kappa \in \mathcal{K}} s(n,t,\kappa) \). Moreover, given an additively homomorphic and/or efficiently verifiable CFC, so is FC.
\textbf{Proof.} Correctness and additive homomorphism of FC follow immediately from the respective properties of CFC.

\textbf{Succinctness.} If CFC is \(s(n,m,\kappa)\)-succinct for the class of quadratic polynomials in \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad},\kappa}\}\), then FC is \(s'(n,(d,t))\)-succinct for \(\mathcal{F}_n = \{\mathcal{F}_{(d,t,n)}\}\) where \(s'(n,(d,t)) = d \cdot (s_{\text{max}}(n,t) + 1)\). Indeed, FC.Open produces \(d-1\) commitments \(\text{com}_h\) for \(h \in [d-1]\), each of them having size bounded by a fixed polynomial \(p(\lambda) = \text{poly}(\lambda)\). Besides, it generates \(d\) CFC evaluation proofs \(\pi_h\), each of them involving \(|S(f(h))| \leq t\) input commitments, and thus having size \(\leq p(\lambda) \cdot s(n,|S(f(h))|,\kappa) \leq p(\lambda) \cdot s_{\text{max}}(n,t)\). Hence, we can bound the size of an FC.Open proof by \(|\pi| \leq p(\lambda) \cdot d \cdot (s_{\text{max}}(n,t) + 1)\). A particularly relevant case is that for layered circuits we obtain \(|\pi| \leq p(\lambda) \cdot d \cdot (s_{\text{max}}(n,1) + 1)\).

\textbf{Efficient verification.} If CFC has amortized efficient verification (Definition 6), we can set FC.VerPrep(ck, f) to obtain \(\text{vk}_h \leftarrow \text{CFC.VerPrep}(ck, f(h))\) for \(h \in [d]\) and output \(\text{vk}_f := (\text{vk}_1, \ldots, \text{vk}_d)\). Then, FC.EffVer simply recomputes the commitment to the output \(\text{com}_d\) and runs CFC.EffVer for each circuit level. Let \(T_{\text{CFC}}\) be largest of the running times of CFC.Ver for all CFC instances in the FC construction, and let \(T_{\text{Com}}\) be the running time of CFC.Com. Then, the running time of FC.Ver is \(T_{\text{FC}} \leq d \cdot T_{\text{CFC}} + T_{\text{Com}}\). As the running time of CFC.EffVer is \(o(T_{\text{CFC}})\), the running time of FC.EffVer is \(d \cdot o(T_{\text{FC}}) + T_{\text{Com}}\), which is \(o(T_{\text{FC}})\) whenever \(T_{\text{Com}} = o(d \cdot T_{\text{CFC}})\). Usually, \(T_{\text{Com}} = \mathcal{O}(|\mathcal{C}|)\) (and in fact \(T_{\text{Com}} = \mathcal{O}(|\mathcal{C}|)\)) where \(|\mathcal{C}| \leq n\) is the length of the committed vector. Hence, in practice FC has amortized efficient verification unless \(d = \mathcal{O}(|\mathcal{C}|)\), a case in which the proof size also becomes very large. We remark that for both our pairing-based and lattice-based CFC instances, the running time of FC.EffVer is actually bounded by \(p(\lambda)(|y| + |p|)\) where \(p(\lambda) = \text{poly}(\lambda)\), which is optimal since the verifier at least needs to parse the proof and the output.

\textbf{Security.} In Lemma 1, we prove that if CFC is evaluation binding, then FC is evaluation binding. In Lemma 3, we show an analogous result for knowledge extractability (and therefore also for strong evaluation binding by Proposition 2).

We obtain a better succinctness by using a slightly different, yet general, circuit model. To keep the presentation of the main scheme more understandable, we present this optimization in Section

\begin{tabular}{|l|l|}
  \hline
  FC.Setup\(1^n, 1^n\) & FC.Com(ck, x) \\
  1: \textbf{return} CFC.Setup\(1^n, 1^n\) & 1: \textbf{return} CFC.Com(ck, x) \\
  \hline
  FC.Open(ck, aux, C) & FC.Ver(ck, com, \mathcal{C}, y, \pi) \\
  1: \(f(1), \ldots, f(d) \leftarrow \text{Parse}(C)\) & 1: \(f(1), \ldots, f(d) \leftarrow \text{Parse}(C)\), com_0 \leftarrow com \\
  2: \(x(0) \leftarrow \text{Parse}(\text{aux})\) & 2: \((\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_d, \text{com}_1, \ldots, \text{com}_{d-1}) \leftarrow \pi\) \\
  3: \textbf{for} \(h \in [d]:\) & \hspace{0.5cm} // Recompute commitment to output \\
   & 3: \text{com}_d \leftarrow \text{CFC.Com}(ck, y) \\
   & \hspace{0.5cm} // Verify all proofs \\
   & 4: \textbf{for} \(h \in [d]:\) \\
   & 5: \(b_h \leftarrow \text{CFC.Ver}(ck, (\text{com}_h')_{h' \in S(f(h))}, \text{com}_h, f(h), \pi_h)\) \\
   & \hspace{0.5cm} // Compute the opening for the level \\
   & 6: \textbf{return} \(b_1 \land \cdots \land b_d\) \\
  \hline
  \end{tabular}
5.2. The proof size reduction is specific to our CFC construction from pairings (see Section 6.5 for the resulting efficiency).

5.1 Proof of security

Lemma 1. If CFC is evaluation binding (Definition 10), then our FC construction for arbitrary circuits is also evaluation binding.

Proof. Consider an adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) who returns a tuple \((\text{com}, C, y, \pi, y', \pi')\) that breaks evaluation binding, and parse the proofs as follows

\[
\pi := (\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_d, \text{com}_1, \ldots, \text{com}_{d-1})
\]

\[
\pi' := (\pi'_1, \ldots, \pi'_d, \text{com}'_1, \ldots, \text{com}'_{d-1})
\]

We will show that, if both proofs \( \pi \) and \( \pi' \) verify for \( y \) and \( y' \) respectively, with \( y \neq y' \), then we can construct an adversary \( \mathcal{B} \) against the evaluation binding of the CFC. We construct \( \mathcal{B} \) as follows.

First, \( \mathcal{B} \) is given a commitment key \( \text{ck} \) and calls \( \mathcal{A}(\text{ck}) \) to obtain the output \((\text{com}, C, y, \pi, y', \pi')\). Then, \( \mathcal{B} \) obtains the commitments to the outputs \( \text{com}_y \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{ck}, y) \) and \( \text{com}_{y'} \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{ck}, y') \).

If \( \text{com}_y = \text{com}_{y'} \), then \( \mathcal{B} \) can break the binding property of the commitment (and hence evaluation binding due to Proposition 1), since \( \text{com}_y \) opens to different \( y \neq y' \).

Hence, let us assume \( \text{com}_y \neq \text{com}_{y'} \), and denote \( \text{com}_0 = \text{com}'_0 = \text{com} \). Then, look at both proofs produced by \( \mathcal{A} \) and set \( 1 \leq h^* \leq d \) to be the smallest index such that \( \text{com}_{h^*} \neq \text{com}'_{h^*} \) and \( \text{com}_h = \text{com}'_h \) for all \( h = 0 \) to \( h^* - 1 \). Notice that such index must exist since, at least, we have \( \text{com}_0 = \text{com}'_0 \) and \( \text{com}_d = \text{com}_y \neq \text{com}'_y = \text{com}'_d \).

Then, \( \mathcal{B} \) breaks evaluation binding of CFC by outputting \(((\text{com}_h)_{h \in S(f(h^*))}, f(h^*), \text{com}_{h^*}, \pi_{h^*}, \text{com}'_{h^*}, \pi'_{h^*})\).

5.2 Efficiency tradeoffs

In this section we describe optimization strategies for our FC construction. Our main goals are to reduce the proof size in many cases, and to support circuits of larger width than initially specified at setup time.

A refined circuit model. Our first optimization strategy consists of introducing a variant of our circuit model which leads to an important reduction of the proof size when our pairing-based CFC from Section 5 is applied. The new circuit model differs from the previous model in that here every quadratic monomial of every polynomial gate \( f_k^{(h)} \) at level \( h \) is assumed to take at least one of its inputs from level \( h - 1 \). In particular, the quadratic term of functions \( f_k^{(h)}(x^{(0)}, \ldots, x^{(h-1)}) \) is a linear combination of all products of variables \( x_i^{(h-1)} \cdot x_j^{(h')}, \forall i, j \in [n] \), at levels \( h - 1 \) and \( h' \) such that \( 0 \leq h' \leq h - 1 \).

It is not hard to see that this circuit model also generalizes the standard arithmetic circuit model with fan-in 2 additive or multiplicative gates. Note that unbounded fan-in additions can still be done at a single gate. Multiplicative gates at level \( h \) always take one of their inputs from level \( h - 1 \) due to how levels are defined, hence the gates in the new model also generalize these. We denote the class of functions in the levels of the new circuit model by \( F_{\text{level}} \subseteq F_{\text{quad}} \), that we define as

\[
F_{\text{level}} = \{ f \in F_{\text{quad}} : \mathcal{S}_2^\oplus(f) \subseteq \{(h', m) \in [m] \times \{m\}\}\}.
\]
Note that we can extend any parametrization $F_{\text{quad}} = \{ F_{\text{quad},k} \}$ to $F_{\text{level}} = \{ F_{\text{level},k} \}$ by setting $F_{\text{level},k} := F_{\text{level}} \cap F_{\text{quad},k}$. The main advantage of this new model is that for any $f \in F_{\text{level}}$, $|S_2^h(f)| \leq m$, instead of being $\leq n^2$ in the more general case in which gates are arbitrary quadratic polynomials. When switching to this model, it is sufficient to instantiate our FC construction with a CFC scheme that only supports quadratic functions in $F_{\text{level}}$ and not all $F_{\text{quad}}$. We will see that this results in a notable reduction of the proof size of our pairing-based CFC in Section 6.

**Reducing proof size.** Assume that we want to evaluate a circuit $C$ of width $w$ and depth $d$ that is densely interconnected (i.e. the in-degree $t = \mathcal{O}(d)$) when our commitment key $ck$ supports circuits of width up to $n > w$. We present an optimization that reduces the proof size of our FC scheme.

**Proposition 3.** Let CFC be a $s(n,m,k)$-succinct CFC for $F_{\text{level}} = \{ F_{\text{level},k} \}$ (resp. for $F_{\text{quad}} = \{ F_{\text{quad},k} \}$), and let $F_n = \{ F_{d,t,w} \}$ be the class of circuits parametrized by depth $d$, in-degree $t$, and width $w \leq n$. Then, we can construct a $s'(n,(d,t,w))$-succinct FC scheme FC where $s'(n,(d,t,w)) = d \cdot (s_{\max}(n,dw/n) + 1)$.

In particular, for circuits of bounded size $|C| = d \cdot w \leq n$, the proof size is the same as for layered circuits, namely $s'(n,(d,t,w)) = d \cdot (s_{\max}(n,1) + 1)$.

**Proof.** The construction of the optimized FC scheme consists in reshaping the original input circuit $C$ into an equivalent semi-layered (i.e., $t \ll d$) circuit $C'$ of depth $d$ and width bounded by $n$. The FC scheme is then identical to the scheme in Figure 1. In fact, as FC needs to support circuits of any width $w \leq n$, FC.Setup$(\lambda,n)$ outputs $ck \leftarrow$ CFC.Setup$(\lambda,1^n)$.

Let $r = \lceil n/w \rceil$. For each level $h$ of $C$ with values $x^{(h)}$, we construct level $h$ in circuit $C'$ with values $z^{(h)}$ as described below.

- Let $z^{(0)} := x$. For $h = 1, \ldots, r-1$, set $z^{(h)} := x^{(0)} \|| x^{(1)} \|| \cdots \|| x^{(h)}$ as the concatenation of variables from previous levels. Then, define the wiring in $C'$ by introducing relay gates between levels, such that $x^{(0)}$ is copied to levels $h = 1, \ldots, r - 1$, $x^{(1)}$ is copied to levels $h = 2, \ldots, r - 1$, etc. Note that, up to level $r$, $C'$ is the equivalent of $C$ as a layered circuit.
- At level $r$, set $z^{(r)} := x^{(r)}$. Note that $z^{(r)}$ only depends on inputs at level $r - 1$ in $C'$, since all $x^{(0)}, \ldots, x^{(r-1)}$ are duplicated at level $z^{(r-1)}$.
- For levels $h = r + 1, \ldots, 2r - 1$, expand again as $z^{(h)} := x^{(r)} \|| x^{(r+1)} \|| \cdots \|| x^{(h)}$. Note that values at level $h$ depend only on levels $r - 1$ and $h - 1$, as $z^{(r-1)}$ contains all values from levels $0$ to $r - 1$ in $C$.
- Repeat the steps above, bootstrapping the circuit at levels $2r, 3r, \ldots, d$.

The functions $f^{(1)}, \ldots, f^{(d)}$ that describe the levels of $C'$ are such that level $h$ has in-degree $|S(f^{(h)})| = \lfloor h/r \rfloor$. Hence, if the CFC is $s(n,m,k)$-succinct for $F_{\text{level}} = \{ F_{\text{level},k} \}$ (resp. for $F_{\text{quad}} = \{ F_{\text{quad},k} \}$) then the proof size of the FC scheme for $C'$ becomes

$$|\pi| = \sum_{h=0}^{d-1} s(n,\lfloor h/r \rfloor,\kappa) + 1 \leq d \cdot (s_{\max}(n,\lceil d/r \rceil) + 1).$$

Note that the parameters can be tuned in a per-level basis, allowing for more succinct proofs in practice or when the initial in-degree is low.

**Supporting circuits of arbitrary width.** Suppose that the parameters of the FC scheme are set up for circuits of bounded width $n$, and that we want to evaluate a circuit $C$ of width $w > n$. The following result shows that this is possible at the cost of increasing the proof size.
Proposition 4. Let CFC be a $s(n, m, \kappa)$-succinct for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{level}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{level}, n}\}$ (resp. for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}, n}\}$). Let FC be our construction in Figure 1 for the class of circuits $\mathcal{F}_n = \{\mathcal{F}_{(d,t,w)}\}$ of bounded width $w \leq n$. Then, we can construct an FC scheme $\tilde{\text{FC}}$ for $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_{(d,t,w)}\}$ for any $w \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\text{FC.Setup}(1^\lambda) = \text{FC.Setup}(1^\lambda, n)$ where the proof size is $|\pi| \leq d \cdot \lceil w/n \rceil \cdot (s_{\max}(n, t \cdot \lceil w/n \rceil) + 1)$.

Proof. We describe FC in two steps. First, we introduce a circuit transformation from the original $\mathcal{C}$ to an equivalent $\mathcal{C}'$ of width $n$ and larger depth. Then, we describe the $\tilde{\text{FC}}.\text{Com}$, $\tilde{\text{FC}}.\text{Open}$ and $\tilde{\text{FC}}.\text{Ver}$ algorithms. We can construct $\mathcal{C}'$ as follows:

- Let $r = \lceil w/n \rceil$. For each level $x^{(h)}$, $h = 0, \ldots, d$ of $\mathcal{C}$, define sub-levels $z^{(h,s)}$ with indices $(h, 1), \ldots, (h, r)$ in $\mathcal{C}'$ as the natural split of $x^{(h)}$ in $r$ blocks, i.e., $z^{(h,s)} = (x_{(s-1)n}^{(h)}, x_{(s-1)n+1}^{(h)}, \ldots, x_{sn-1}^{(h)})$ for $s \in [r]$.
- For each level function $f^{(h)} : R^m \rightarrow R^n$ corresponding to $\mathcal{C}$, let $m' = m \cdot r$ and define $r$ functions $g^{(h,s)} : R^{m'n} \rightarrow R^n$ for $s \in [r]$ such that $g^{(h,s)}(z^{(0,1)}, \ldots, z^{(h-1, r)}) = z^{(h,s)}$. Note that these functions can be built from a restriction of $f^{(h)}$ to a subset of its outputs.

The commit algorithm $\tilde{\text{FC}}.\text{Com}(\text{ck}, x)$ partitions the input $x \in \mathcal{R}^w$ in $r$ blocks $x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(r)}$ of size $n$ as described above, obtains $(\text{com}(s), \text{aux}(s)) \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x^{(s)})$. It outputs $\tilde{\text{com}} = (\text{com}(1), \ldots, \text{com}(r))$ and $\text{aux} = (\text{aux}(1), \ldots, \text{aux}(r))$.

The opening algorithm $\tilde{\text{FC}}.\text{Open}(\text{ck}, \text{aux}, \mathcal{C})$ works as follows:

- Obtain $\mathcal{C}'$ from $\mathcal{C}$ as presented above, parse $(z^{(0,1)}, \ldots, z^{(r,r)}) \leftarrow \text{Parse(\text{aux})}$, and compute $\mathcal{C}'(z^{(0,1)}, \ldots, z^{(r,r)})$ and all the intermediate values $z^{(h,s)}$ for $h \in [d]$ and $s \in [r]$.
- Commit to each $z^{(h,s)}$ as $(\text{com}(h,s), \text{aux}(h,s)) \leftarrow \text{FCFC}(\text{ck}, z^{(h,s)})$ for $h \in [d - 1]$ and $s \in [r]$.
- Compute the opening proofs for all functions, $\forall h \in [d], s \in [r] : \pi^{(h,s)} \leftarrow \text{FCFC}.\text{Open}(\text{ck}, (\text{aux}(h', s'))_{h' \in S(f^{(h)}), s' \in [r]}, g^{(h,s)})$.
- Return $\tilde{\pi} = (\pi^{(h,s)}, \text{com}(h,s))_{h \in [d], s \in [r]}$.

The verification algorithm $\tilde{\text{FC}}.\text{Ver}(\text{ck}, \tilde{\text{com}}, f, y, \tilde{\pi})$ first computes $r$ commitments to the output $z^{(d,s)} \leftarrow \text{Com}(y^{(s)})$ for $s \in [r]$ and then verifies all opening proofs.

Overall, if the CFC is $s(n, m, \kappa)$-succinct for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{level}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{level}, n}\}$ (resp. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}, n}\}$), and the original circuit $\mathcal{C} \in \mathcal{F}_{(d,t,w)}$ (i.e., the in-degree of $\mathcal{C}$ is bounded by $t$), then the proof size of the FC scheme for $\mathcal{C}'$ becomes

$$|\pi| = (d - 1)r + r \cdot \sum_{h=0}^{d-1} s(n, h, r, \kappa) \leq d \cdot (s_{\max}(n, t r) + 1).$$

5.3 Extractability

Theorem 3. If CFC is a knowledge extractable CFC, then our FC in Figure 1 is knowledge extractable.

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against FC extractability (Definition 4) with respect to an auxiliary input distribution $Z$. On input $\text{ck}$, $\mathcal{A}$ returns $(\text{com}, f, y, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{ck})$ such that $\text{FCFC}.\text{Ver}(\text{ck}, \text{com}, f, y, \pi) =$
1. Our goal is to construct an extractor $E_A$ for FC and argue that it is successful with overwhelming probability. The intuition of the proof is that we can use $A$ to create an adversary $B$ against CFC extractability (Definition 11) with respect to the same input distribution $Z$. Then, we use the extractor $E_B$ for CFC to build $E_A$. We describe $B$ and $E_A$ in Figure 2.

Let $(\text{com}, \text{com}_1, \pi_1, f^{(1)})$ be the output of $B$. It follows that $B$ is a valid adversary against CFC extractability and that $\text{Ver}(\text{ck}, \text{com}, f^{(1)}, \text{com}_1, \pi_1) = 1$. As CFC is knowledge extractable, there exists an extractor $E_B$ that returns $x, x^{(1)}$ such that

$$\Pr[\text{com} = \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x) \land \text{com}_1 = \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x^{(1)}) \land f^{(1)}(x) = x^{(1)}] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Next, we show that the extractor $E_A$ for FC succeeds with overwhelming probability, i.e., that

$$\Pr[\text{com} \neq \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x) \lor f(x) \neq y] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

For the first clause, we have that $\Pr[\text{com} \neq \text{Com}(\text{ck}, x)] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ as otherwise the extractor $E_B$ is not successful (and $B$ wins with non-negligible probability). For the second clause, we can recompute $y' := f(x)$. If $f(x) \neq y$, then we can break evaluation binding of FC by creating an honest proof $\pi' \leftarrow \text{FC.Open}(\text{ck}, x, f)$ and outputting $(\text{com}, f, \pi, y, \pi', y')$. Hence, $\Pr[f(x) \neq y] = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ and the result follows by the union bound.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$B(\text{ck, aux}_Z)$</th>
<th>$E_A(\text{ck, aux}_Z)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: $(\text{com}, f, y, \pi) \leftarrow A(\text{ck, aux}_Z)$</td>
<td>1: $(x, x^{(1)}) \leftarrow E_B(\text{ck, aux}_Z)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: $(f^{(1)}, \ldots, f^{(d)}) \leftarrow \text{Parse}(f)$</td>
<td>2: return $x$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: $(\pi_1, \ldots, \pi_d, \text{com}<em>1, \ldots, \text{com}</em>{d-1}) \leftarrow \text{Parse}(\pi)$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: return $(\text{com}, \text{com}_1, \pi_1, f^{(1)})$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2: Adversary $B$ and extractor $E_A$ for the proof of Theorem 3.

6 Paring-based CFC for Quadratic Functions

We present our construction of a chainable functional commitment for quadratic functions based on pairings. With our CFC, one can commit to a set of vectors $x_1, \ldots x_m$ of length $n$ and then open the commitment to a quadratic function $f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$, for any $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$. The opening proofs of our scheme are quadratic in the number $m$ of input vectors, but constant in the (possibly padded) length $n$ of each input vector and of the output. Security is proven in the standard model based on a new falsifiable assumption that we justify in the generic bilinear group model. In Section 6.5 we discuss the FCs for circuits that we obtain by applying the generic transform of Section 5 to this pairing-based CFC.

We present our CFC with deterministic commitments and openings. We detail how to make our commitments perfectly com-hiding in Section 6.8. We note that the FCs for circuits obtained from the com-hiding CFC are also com-hiding, and their openings can be made zero-knowledge by applying Theorem 1, which we can efficiently instantiate using, e.g., the Groth-Sahai [GS08] NIZK.
6.1 Preliminaries on Bilinear Groups and Assumption

A bilinear group generator \( B\mathcal{G}(1^\lambda) \) is an algorithm that returns \( \text{bgp} := (q, \mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2, \mathcal{G}_T, e, g_1, g_2) \), where \( \mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2, \mathcal{G}_T \) are groups of prime order \( q \), \( g_1 \in \mathcal{G}_1 \) and \( g_2 \in \mathcal{G}_2 \) are fixed generators, and \( e: \mathcal{G}_1 \times \mathcal{G}_2 \to \mathcal{G}_T \) is an efficiently computable, non-degenerate, bilinear map. In our work we use Type-3 groups in which it is assumed that there is no efficiently computable isomorphism between \( \mathcal{G}_1 \) and \( \mathcal{G}_2 \). We use the bracket notation of \([\text{EHK}+13]\) for group elements: for \( s \in \{1, 2, T\} \) and \( x \in \mathbb{Z}_q \), \([x]_s \) denotes \( g_s^x \in \mathcal{G}_s \). We use additive notation for \( \mathcal{G}_1 \) and \( \mathcal{G}_2 \) and multiplicative notation for \( \mathcal{G}_T \). We note that given an element \([x]_s \in \mathcal{G}_s \), for \( s = 1, 2 \), and a scalar \( a \), one can efficiently compute \( a \cdot [x] = [ax] = g_s^{ax} \in \mathcal{G}_s \); given group elements \([a]_1 \in \mathcal{G}_1 \) and \([b]_2 \in \mathcal{G}_2 \), one can efficiently compute \([ab]_T = e([a]_1, [b]_2)\).

We prove that our construction satisfies evaluation binding under a new falsifiable assumption, called \( \text{HintedKernel (HiKer)} \), that we justify in the generic group model (see Appendix A). The name of the assumption comes from its similarity with the KerMDH assumption of \([\text{MRV}16]\) which for matrices \([A]_2 \) from certain (random) distributions asks the adversary to find a nonzero vector \( [z]_1 \) such that \( A[z] = 0 \). In our case the adversary is challenged to find a nonzero \([u, v]_1 \) such that \( w\eta + v = 0 \), when given \([1, \eta]_2 \) but also other group elements, the “hints”, that depend on \( \eta \) and other random variables.

**Definition 12** (n-HiKer Assumption). Let \( \text{bgp} = (q, \mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2, \mathcal{G}_T, e, g_1, g_2) \) be a bilinear group setting, let \( n \in \mathbb{N} \) and let \( \mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_2 \) be the following two sets of Laurent monomials in \( \mathbb{Z}_q[S_1, T_1, \ldots, S_n, T_n, H] \):

\[
\mathcal{G}_1(S, T, H) := \{S_i, T_i\}_{i \in [n]} \cup \{S_i \cdot T_j\}_{i, j \in [n]} \cup \left\{ \frac{H \cdot S_i S_j}{S_i} \right\}_{i, j' \in [n]} \cup \left\{ \frac{H \cdot S_i T_j}{S_i} \right\}_{i, j' \in [n]} \cup \left\{ \frac{H \cdot T_i T_j}{S_i} \right\}_{i, j' \in [n]}
\]

\[
\mathcal{G}_2(S, T, H) := \{H\} \cup \{S_i\}_{i \in [n]} \cup \left\{ \frac{H \cdot S_i}{S_i} \right\}_{i \in [n]} \cup \left\{ \frac{H \cdot T_i}{S_i} \right\}_{i \in [n]} \cup \left\{ \frac{H}{S_i T_j} \right\}_{i, j \in [n]}
\]

The n-HiedKernel (n-HiKer) assumption holds if for every \( n = \text{poly}(\lambda) \) and any PPT \( \mathcal{A} \), the following advantage is negligible:

\[
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^n-\text{HiKer}(\lambda) = \Pr \left[ (U, V) \neq (1, 1)_{\mathcal{G}_1} \land e(U, [\eta]_2) = e(V, [1]_2) \mid (U, V) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{bgp}, [\mathcal{G}_1(\sigma, \tau, \eta)]_2, [\mathcal{G}_2(\sigma, \tau, \eta)]_2) \right]
\]

where the probability is over the random choices of \( \sigma, \tau, \eta \) and \( \mathcal{A} \)'s random coins.

6.2 Our CFC Construction

As defined in the previous section we express \( f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} \) through a set of matrices \( \mathbf{F}^{(h)} \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times n} \) and \( \mathbf{G}^{(h, h')} \in \mathbb{F}^{n \times n^2} \), and a vector \( \mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{F}^n \) such that

\[
f(x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(m)}) = e + \sum_{h \in S_1} \mathbf{F}^{(h)} : x^{(h)} + \sum_{(h, h') \in S_2} \mathbf{G}^{(h, h')} \cdot (x^{(h)} \otimes x^{(h')})
\]

For the sake of defining the succinctness of our CFC we parametrize the class \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} \) by the size of the quadratic support of \( f \). Formally, let \( \mathcal{K} = \{0, 1, \ldots, m(m+1)/2\} \). Then we partition \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} \) as \( \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}, \kappa}\}_{\kappa \in \mathcal{K}} \) where each \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}, \kappa} = \{f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} : S_2^\circ(f) = \kappa\} \). Note that the parametrization extends naturally to the class \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{level}} \) as described in Section 5. Due to the definition of \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{level}} \), in that case we have at most \( m \) partitions, i.e., \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{level}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{level}, \kappa}\}_{\kappa = 0}^m \).
Setup$(1^\lambda, n)$ Let $n \geq 1$ be an integer representing the width of each of the inputs of the functions to be computed at opening time. Generate a bilinear group description $bgp := (q, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, g_1, g_2) \leftarrow BG(1^\lambda)$, and let $F := \mathbb{Z}_q$.

Next, sample random $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_n^\lambda$, $\eta_\alpha, \eta_\beta, \eta_\gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$, and output

$$\text{ck} := \left( \begin{bmatrix} \langle \alpha \rangle_1, \langle \alpha \rangle_2, \langle \beta \rangle_1, \langle \gamma \rangle_1, \langle \alpha \otimes \beta \rangle_1, \langle \eta_\alpha \rangle_2, \langle \eta_\beta \rangle_2, \langle \eta_\gamma \rangle_2 \end{bmatrix} \right).$$

$$\text{Com}(\text{ck}, \text{x}) \text{ output com := } [\langle \text{x}, \alpha \rangle]_1 \text{ and aux = x.}$$

Open$(\text{ck}, (\text{aux})_{i \in [m]}, f) \rightarrow \pi$ Let $F^{(h)} \in F^{n \times n}$ for $h \in S_1(f)$, $G^{(h,h')} \in F^{n \times n^2}$ for $(h, h') \in S_2(f)$, and $e \in \mathbb{F}_n^\lambda$ be the matrices and vectors associated to $f : \mathbb{F}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n$. The opening algorithm computes the output $y = f(x^{(1)}, \ldots, x^{(m)})$ and proceeds as follows.

- For every $h \in S_2(f)$: compute $X_h^{(2)} := [(\langle x^{(h)}, \alpha \rangle)_2, X_h^{(\beta)} := [(\langle x^{(h)}, \beta \rangle)_1$, which are commitments to $x^{(h)}$ under $\alpha$ in $G_2$ and under $\beta$ in $G_1$, resp.

- For every $h \in S_2(f)$: compute a linear map opening proof for the identity function, to show that $X_h$ and $X_h^{(\beta)}$ open to the same value:

$$\pi_h^{(\beta)} := \sum_{i,j \in [n]} x^{(h)}_{i \cdot j} \cdot \left[ \frac{\eta_i \beta_j \alpha_{i \cdot j}}{\alpha_i} \right]_1$$

- For every pair of inputs $x^{(h)}, x^{(h')}$ such that $(h, h') \in S_2^\otimes(f)$, compute a commitment to their tensor products as follows:

$$Z_{h,h'} := \sum_{i,j \in [n]} x^{(h)}_i x^{(h')}_{j \cdot k} \cdot [\alpha_i \beta_j]_1 = [(x^{(h)} \otimes x^{(h')}, \alpha \otimes \beta)]_1.$$

- Compute a linear map opening proof to show that the vector $y$ satisfies equation (5), with respect to all the inputs $x^{(h)}$ committed in $X_h$, and the inputs $x^{(h)} \otimes x^{(h')}$ committed in $Z_{h,h'}$:

$$\pi^{(\gamma)} := \sum_{h \in S_1(f)} \sum_{i,i',k \in [n]} F_{k,i}^{(h)} \cdot x^{(h')}_{i \cdot k} \cdot \frac{\eta_i \gamma_k \alpha_{i \cdot j}}{\alpha_i}_1 + \sum_{(h, h') \in S_2^\otimes(f)} \sum_{i,i',j' \in [n]} G_{k,i,j}^{(h,h')} \cdot x^{(h')}_{i \cdot j'} \cdot \frac{\eta_i \gamma_k \alpha_{i \cdot j} \beta_{j'}}{\alpha_i \beta_j}_1$$

Note that $\pi^{(\gamma)}$ is in fact a proof for the vector $y - t$; the linear shift will be addressed by the verifier in equation (11).

- Commit to the output $y$ under $\gamma$ by computing $Y^{(\gamma)} := [(y, \gamma)]_1$. Then, compute a linear map opening proof for the identity function, to show that $Y^{(\gamma)}$ and the commitment to the output $\text{com}_y \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{ck}, y)$ (which is under $\alpha$) open to the same value:

$$\pi^{(\alpha)} := \sum_{i,i' \in [n]} y_{i \cdot i'} \cdot \left[ \frac{\eta_i \alpha_{i \cdot j} \gamma_{i \cdot j'}}{\gamma_i} \right]_1$$

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\- Return $\pi := \{(X_h^{(2)}, h, \pi_h) \in S_2(f), (Z_{h,h'}) \in S_2^\otimes(f), Y^{(\gamma)}, \pi^{(\alpha)}, \pi^{(\gamma)}\}$.

\textbf{Ver}$(\mathbf{ck}, (\mathbf{com}_i)_{i \in [n]}, \mathbf{com}_y, f, \pi) \rightarrow b \in \{0, 1\}$ Parse the proof $\pi$ as above and set $X_h := \mathbf{com}_h$. Output 1 if all the following checks pass and 0 otherwise:

\- Verify the linear map commitment proof that both $X_h^{(\beta)}, X_h$ commit to the same value in different sets of parameters:

$$\forall h \in S_2(f) : e(X_h, [1]_2) = e([1], X_h^{(2)})$$

(6)

\- Verify the linear map commitment proofs that both $X_h^{(\beta)}, X_h$ commit to the same value in different sets of parameters:

$$\forall h \in S_2(f) : e\left(X_h, \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[\frac{\eta_i \beta_i}{\alpha_i}\right]_2\right) = e\left(\pi_h^{(\beta)}, [1]_2\right) e\left(X_h^{(\beta)}, [\eta_\beta]_2\right)$$

(7)

\- Verify the linear map commitment proof that both $\mathbf{com}_y, Y^{(\gamma)}$ commit to the same value in different sets of parameters:

$$e\left(Y^{(\gamma)}, \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[\frac{\eta_i \alpha_i}{\gamma_i}\right]_2\right) = e\left(\pi^{(\alpha)}, [1]_2\right) e\left(\mathbf{com}_y, [\eta_\alpha]_2\right)$$

(9)

\- Verify the linear map commitment proof to check that, intuitively, $Y^{(\gamma)}$ is a commitment under $\gamma$ to the output of $f$, computed from the inputs committed in $X_h$ and $Z_{h,h'}$. To this end, compute the encoding of the matrices $\text{F}^{(h)}$ for $h \in S_1(f), \text{G}^{(h,h')} \text{ for } (h, h') \in S_2^\otimes(f)$ and the vector $e$ as follows. Let $\Theta = [\langle e, \beta \rangle]_1$ and

$$\Phi_h := \sum_{i,k \in [n]} F^{(h)}_{k,i} \left[\eta_i \gamma_k \alpha_i \right]_2, \quad \Gamma_{h,h'} := \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} G^{(h,h')}_{k,i,j} \left[\eta_i \gamma_k \alpha_i \beta_j \right]_2$$

(10)

and then verify that

$$\prod_{h \in S_1(f)} e(X_h, \Phi_h) \prod_{(h,h') \in S_2^\otimes(f)} e(Z_{h,h'}, \Gamma_{h,h'}) = e\left(\pi^{(\alpha)}, [1]_2\right) e\left(Y^{(\gamma)} \cdot \Theta^{-1}, [\eta_\gamma]_2\right).$$

(11)

\textbf{Theorem 4.} Assume that the $n$-HiKer assumption holds for a bilinear group setting generated by $B^G$. Then the construction $\text{CFC}$ described above is an evaluation binding $\text{CFC}$ scheme for the class $\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}}$ of quadratic functions over any $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ vectors of length $\leq n$, that has efficient verification and is additively homomorphic. Considering the partitioning of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{quad},k}\}_{k=0}^{m(m+1)/2}$, 

\text{CFC} is $s(n, m, \kappa)$-succinct for $s(n, m, \kappa) = (\kappa + 3m + 3)$. Furthermore, when executed on the class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\text{level}} \subset \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}}$ introduced in Section 5.2 and partitioned as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{level}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{level},k}\}_{k=0}^m$, then $\text{CFC}$ is $(4\kappa + 3)$-succinct.

In the following sections we prove the theorem.
6.3 Correctness

To prove correctness, consider honestly generated input commitments $X_h = \langle x^{(h)}, \alpha \rangle \in [m]$ and an honestly generated opening

$$\pi := \left( \{ X_h^{(2)}, X_h^{(\beta)}, \pi_h^{(\beta)} \}_{h \in S_1(f)}, \{ Z_{h,h'} \}_{(h,h') \in S_2^\ast(f)}, Y^{(\gamma)}, \pi^{(\alpha)}, \pi^{(\gamma)} \right)$$

for a quadratic function $f$ represented by the matrices $e, F^{(h)}, G^{(h', h')}$ for $h \in S_1(f)$ and $(h, h') \in S_2^\ast(f)$.

The correctness of equations (6) and (8) follows easily by construction since

$$e(X_h, [1]_2) = e\left( \left[ \left( x^{(h)}, \alpha \right) \right]_1, [1]_2 \right) = e\left( [1]_1, \left[ \left( x^{(h)}, \alpha \right) \right]_2 \right) = e\left( [1]_1, x_h^{(2)} \right),$$

$$e(Z_{h,h'}, [1]_2) = e\left( \left[ \left( x^{(h)} \otimes x^{(h')}, \alpha \otimes \beta \right) \right]_1, [1]_2 \right) = e\left( \sum_{i,j \in [n]} x_i^{(h)} x_j^{(h')} \alpha_i \beta_j \right)_1, [1]_2)$$

$$= e\left( \left[ \left( x^{(h')}, \beta \right) \right]_1, \left[ \left( x^{(h)}, \alpha \right) \right]_2 \right) = e\left( X_{h'}^{(\beta)}, X_h^{(2)} \right).$$

The correctness of equation (7) can be seen as follows. Given $h \in S_2(f)$, we have that

$$e\left( X_h, \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[ \frac{\eta \beta \beta_i}{\alpha_i} \right]_2 \right) = \left[ \left( \sum_{i \in [n]} x_i^{(h)} \alpha_i \right), \left( \sum_{i \in [n]} \eta \beta \beta_i \right) \right] = \left[ \sum_{i,i' \in [n]} x_i^{(h)} \eta \beta \beta_i \alpha_i \right]_T$$

$$= \left[ \sum_{i,i' \in [n]} \frac{x_i^{(h)} \eta \beta \beta_i \alpha_i}{\alpha_i} + \sum_{i \in [n]} x_i^{(h)} \beta_i \eta \beta \right]_T$$

$$= e\left( \pi_h^{(\beta)}, [1]_2 \right) e\left( X_h^{(\beta)}, [\eta \beta]_2 \right).$$

Similarly, for equation (9) we have that

$$e\left( Y^{(\gamma)}, \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[ \frac{\eta \alpha \alpha_i}{\gamma_i} \right]_2 \right) = \left[ \left( \sum_{i \in [n]} y_i \gamma_i \right), \left( \sum_{i \in [n]} \eta \alpha \alpha_i \right) \right] = \left[ \sum_{i,i' \in [n]} y_i \gamma_i \eta \alpha \alpha_i \right]_T$$

$$= \left[ \sum_{i,i' \in [n]} \frac{y_i \eta \alpha \alpha_i \gamma_i \gamma_i}{\gamma_i} + \sum_{i \in [n]} y_i \alpha_i \eta \alpha \right]_T$$

$$= e\left( \pi^{(\alpha)}, [1]_2 \right) e\left( \text{com}_y, [\eta \alpha]_2 \right).$$

Finally, the correctness of equation (11) can be proven in an analogous way. First of all, we expand the pairing coefficients on the LHS in $G_T$,
\[ e(X_h, \Phi_h) = \left[ \sum_{k \in [n]} \left( \sum_{i \in [n]} F^{(h)}_{k,i} \cdot x_i^{(h)} \right) \eta \gamma k + \sum_{i, i', k=1 \atop i \neq i'}^{n} F^{(h)}_{k,i} \cdot x_{i'}^{(h)} \cdot \eta \gamma k \alpha_{i'} \right] T \]

\[ e(Z_{h,h'}, \Gamma_{h,h'}) = \left[ \sum_{k \in [n]} \left( \sum_{i, j \in [n]} G^{(h,h')}_{k,(i,j)} \cdot x_i^{(h)} x_j^{(h')} \right) \eta \gamma k + \sum_{i, j, i', j', k \in [n] \atop (i,j) \neq (i',j')} G^{(h,h')}_{k,(i,j)} \cdot x_i^{(h)} x_{j'}^{(h')} \cdot \eta \gamma k \alpha_{i'} \beta_{j'} \right] T \]

By using the identities above and equation (5), we have

\[
\prod_{h \in S_1(f)} e(X_h, \Phi_h) \cdot \prod_{(h,h') \in S_2^0(f)} e(Z_{h,h'}, \Gamma_{h,h'}) = \left[ \sum_{k \in [n]} F^{(h)}_{k,i} \cdot x_i^{(h)} \cdot \eta \gamma k + \sum_{(h,h') \in S_2^0(f)} G^{(h,h')}_{k,(i,j)} \cdot x_i^{(h)} x_j^{(h')} \cdot \eta \gamma k \right] T 
\]

\[
= \left[ \sum_{k \in [n]} \left( y_k - e_k \right) \eta \gamma k \right] T e\left( \pi^{(\gamma)}[1]_2 \right) 
\]

Note that from the equations above it also follows that CFC is additively homomorphic.

### 6.4 Succinctness

An opening proof \( \pi \) to a given function \( f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}, \kappa} \) includes \( |S_2^0(f)| = \kappa \) commitments to tensored inputs \( \tilde{X}_{h,h'} \), and the triples of elements \( \{ X^{(2)}_h, X^{(2)}_{h'}, \pi^{(2)}_h \}_{h \in S_2(f)} \), which are \( 3|S_2(f)| \) group elements. Finally, \( \pi \) includes three additional group elements \( Y^{(\gamma)}, \pi^{(\alpha)}, \pi^{(\gamma)} \). Hence, the proof consists of \( \kappa + 3|S_2(f)| + 3 \) group elements, and essentially ranges from \( \mathcal{O}(1) \) (in fact \( \pi \) has only 3 elements if \( f \) is a linear function) to \( \mathcal{O}(m^2) \) depending on the quadratic support of \( f \). Precisely, considering a fixed polynomial \( p(\lambda) \) that upper bounds the size of a group element from \( G_1 \) or \( G_2 \), our CFC is \( \mathcal{O}(\kappa) \)-succinct.

When the CFC is executed on functions from the class \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{level}} = \{ \mathcal{F}_{\text{level}, \kappa} \} \) introduced in Section 5.2 we have that \( |S_2(f)| = \kappa \leq m \). In this case a CFC opening contains \( 4\kappa + 3 \) group elements and our CFC is also \( \mathcal{O}(m) \)-succinct.

### 6.5 Resulting Instantiations of FC for circuits

We summarize the FC schemes that result from instantiating our generic construction of Section 5 with our pairing-based CFC.
Corollary 1. Assume that the $n$-HiKer assumption holds for $BG$. Then the following statements hold:

1. There exists an FC scheme for the class $\mathcal{F}_n = \{F_{(d,t,w)}\}$ of arithmetic circuits of width $w \leq n$ that is $O(d \cdot t)$-succinct. In particular, the FC is $O(d^2)$-succinct for an arbitrary arithmetic circuit of multiplicative depth $d$, and is $O(d)$-succinct for a layered arithmetic circuit of multiplicative depth $d$.

2. There exists an FC scheme for the class $\mathcal{F}_n = \{F_{(d,t,w)}\}$ of arithmetic circuits of width $w \leq n$ that is $O(d^2 \cdot w \cdot n^{-1})$-succinct.

3. There exists an FC scheme for the class of arithmetic circuits of size $\leq S$, that is $O(d)$-succinct where $d$ is the multiplicative depth of the circuit.

4. For any $w_0 \geq 2$, there exists an FC scheme for the class $\mathcal{F} = \{F_{(d,t,w)}\}$ of circuits of arbitrary width $w > w_0$ that is $O(d \cdot t \cdot (w/w_0)^2)$-succinct.

Proof. Consider the FC construction in Section 5 instantiated with our pairing-based CFC for quadratic functions. More precisely, we consider arithmetic circuits following the model described in Section 5.2 which allows us to use CFC only with quadratic functions in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{level}}$. The statements of the corollary can be obtained by combining the following observations.

1. For arbitrary circuits, note that the in-degree $t$ of the circuit upper bounds the number $m$ of inputs used in the CFC, and thus an FC proof consists of $d$ CFC proofs, which makes a total of $4dt + 3d$ group elements. $O(d^2)$-succinctness for arbitrary arithmetic circuits follows from the fact that an arbitrary arithmetic circuit of depth $d$ may have in-degree up to $d$, while $O(d)$-succinctness for layered circuits follows from the in-degree being 1 in such circuits.

2. The statement follows from the transformation that we present in Proposition 3.

3. To see this statement, let us consider the folklore transformation from arbitrary to layered arithmetic circuits (which is a special case of the transformation in Proposition 3). If one starts from a circuit $C$ of width $n$ and depth $d$, the circuit $C'$ resulting from this transformation has the same depth, but width $\leq n \cdot d$, which is upper bounded by the circuit size $S$.

4. The statement follows directly from Proposition 4, where $w_0$ is the maximum width supported by the parameters of the given FC.

6.6 Proof of security

Consider an adversary $A$ who returns a tuple $((\text{com}_h)_{h \in [m]}, \text{com}_y, f, \pi, \tilde{\pi})$ that breaks evaluation binding, set $X_h := \text{com}_h$, and parse the proofs as follows

$$\pi := \left\{ X_h^{(2)}, X_h^{(\beta)}, \pi_h^{(\beta)} \right\}_{h \in S_2(f)}, \left\{ Z_{h,h'} \right\}_{(h,h') \in S_2^\ast(f)}, Y^{(\gamma)}, \tilde{\pi}^{(\alpha)} \right\}$$

$$\tilde{\pi} := \left\{ \tilde{X}_h^{(2)}, \tilde{X}_h^{(\beta)}, \tilde{\pi}_h^{(\beta)} \right\}_{h \in S_2(f)}, \left\{ \tilde{Z}_{h,h'} \right\}_{(h,h') \in S_2^\ast(f)}, \tilde{Y}^{(\gamma)}, \tilde{\pi}^{(\alpha)}, \tilde{\pi}^{(\gamma)} \right\}$$

Recall that by definition of evaluation binding, if $A$’s attack is successful, both proofs must verify for the same function $f$, the same input commitments $X_h$ for $h \in [m]$, and for different output commitments $\text{com}_y \neq \text{com}_y$.

The intuition of the proof is that $A$ can cheat in three possible ways, for which we define three events $E_1, E_2, E_3$ as follows:

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− $E_1$ is the event that $Y^{(\gamma)} = \bar{Y}^{(\gamma)}$. As $\text{com}_y \neq \text{com}_y$, this implies an evaluation binding break in the linear map commitment proof in equation (9).

− $E_2$ is the event that $E_1$ does not happen (i.e., $Y^{(\gamma)} \neq \bar{Y}^{(\gamma)}$) and that $X^{(\beta)} h^* \neq \bar{X}^{(\beta)} h^*$ for some $h^* \in S_2(f)$. This means that the proofs $\pi^{(\beta)} h^*, \bar{\pi}^{(\beta)} h^*$ open the commitment $\text{com}_h$ to two different output commitments for the identity function, which breaks evaluation binding in equation (7).

− $E_3$ is the event that neither $E_1$ nor $E_2$ occur. In this case, we will show that evaluation binding breaks in equation (11).

For any of these events, we will use $\mathcal{A}$’s output to break the $n$-HiKer assumption if this is embedded into $\text{ck}$. For this embedding, $\mathcal{B}$ makes a guess $\hat{s} \in \{0, 1\}$ such that $\hat{s} = 0$ corresponds to a guess that event $E_1$ occurs while $\hat{s} = 1$ corresponds to a guess that either $E_2$ or $E_3$ will occur. This $\hat{s}$ is perfectly hidden to $\mathcal{A}$.

Next we describe how to build $\mathcal{B}$ out of $\mathcal{A}$.

**Commitment key generation.** Let $\mathcal{B}$ be an adversary against the $n$-HiKer assumption. $\mathcal{B}$ uniformly samples a value $\hat{s} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and simulates $\text{ck}$ as follows.

**Case $\hat{s} = 0$.** $\mathcal{B}$ samples $\alpha, \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^n, \eta_\beta, \eta_\gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$ and implicitly sets $\gamma := \sigma$ and $\eta_\alpha := \eta$ from the input of the assumption. It is easy to see that this implicit setting allows $\mathcal{B}$ to compute all the elements in the first row of $\text{ck}$, namely:

$$[\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \alpha \otimes \beta]_1, [\alpha, \eta_\alpha, \eta_\beta, \eta_\gamma]_2$$

We show how $\mathcal{B}$ can simulate the remaining elements in the second and third rows of $\text{ck}$ starting from the inputs from the $n$-HiKer assumption as follows:

$$\forall i, i' \in [n], i \neq i': \begin{bmatrix} \eta \sigma_i \gamma_i' \\ \sigma_i \end{bmatrix}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \eta_i \alpha_i \gamma_i \\ \sigma_i \end{bmatrix}_1$$

$$\forall i, j, j', k \in [n]: (i, j) \neq (i', j'): \begin{bmatrix} \eta \sigma_i \alpha_{i'} \beta_{j'} \\ \alpha_{i'} \beta_{j'} \end{bmatrix}_1 = \begin{bmatrix} \eta_i \gamma_i \alpha_{i'} \beta_{j'} \\ \alpha_{i'} \beta_{j'} \end{bmatrix}_1$$

$$\forall i \in [n]: \begin{bmatrix} \eta \sigma_i \\ \sigma_i \end{bmatrix}_2 = \begin{bmatrix} \eta_i \alpha_i \\ \sigma_i \end{bmatrix}_2$$

$$\forall i, k \in [n]: \begin{bmatrix} \eta \alpha_i \\ \alpha_i \end{bmatrix}_2 = \begin{bmatrix} \eta_i \gamma_i \\ \alpha_i \end{bmatrix}_2$$

$$\forall i, j, k \in [n]: \begin{bmatrix} \eta \sigma_i \gamma_{i} \\ \sigma_i \gamma_{i} \end{bmatrix}_2 = \begin{bmatrix} \eta_i \gamma_i \alpha_i \alpha_i \beta_{j'} \\ \alpha_i \beta_{j'} \end{bmatrix}_2$$

As one can notice, in this case of $\hat{s} = 0$ we embed in the commitment key only a subset of the elements of the assumption. This means that the reduction for adversaries causing event $E_1$ can actually be done based on a weaker version of the assumption which includes only the subset of the elements that we need for this case.
Case $s = 1$. $B$ samples $\eta_\alpha, r_\beta, r_\gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$ and $\gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^n$ and implicitly sets $\alpha := \sigma, \beta := \pi, \eta_\beta := r_\beta \cdot \eta, \eta_\gamma := r_\gamma \cdot \eta$. As for the case of $s = 0$, it is easy to see that this implicit setting allows $B$ to compute all the elements in the first row of $ck$, namely $[\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \alpha \otimes \beta], [\alpha, \eta_\alpha, \eta_\beta, \eta_\gamma]$.  

Next, we show how $B$ can simulate the remaining elements in the second and third rows of $ck$ starting from the inputs from the $n$-HiKer assumption as follows:

$$\forall i, i' \in [n], i \neq i' : \quad \frac{\eta_\alpha \gamma_\nu}{\gamma_i} \left[\sigma_i\right]_1 = \left[\frac{\eta_\alpha \gamma_i \gamma_\nu}{\gamma_i}\right]_1$$

$$r_\beta \left[\eta_\nu \sigma_{i\nu} \sigma_i\right]_1 = \left[\frac{\eta_\beta \gamma_i \sigma_{i\nu}}{\alpha_i}\right]_1$$

$$\forall i, j, i', j' \in [n] : (i, j) \neq (i', j') : r_\gamma \gamma_k \left[\eta_\nu \sigma_{i\nu} \sigma_i\right]_1 = \left[\frac{\eta_\gamma \gamma_k \sigma_{i\nu} \sigma_{j\nu}}{\alpha_i \beta_j}\right]_1$$

$$\forall i \in [n] : \quad \frac{\eta_\alpha}{\gamma_i} \left[\sigma_i\right]_2 = \left[\frac{\eta_\alpha \gamma_i}{\gamma_i}\right]_2$$

$$r_\beta \left[\eta_\nu \sigma_{i\nu} \sigma_i\right]_2 = \left[\frac{\eta_\beta \gamma_i \sigma_{i\nu}}{\alpha_i}\right]_2$$

$$\forall i, k \in [n] : \quad r_\gamma \gamma_k \left[\frac{\eta_\nu}{\sigma_{i\nu}} \sigma_i\right]_2 = \left[\frac{\eta_\gamma \gamma_k}{\alpha_i}\right]_2$$

$$\forall i, j, k \in [n] : \quad r_\gamma \gamma_k \left[\frac{\eta_\nu}{\sigma_{i\nu} \sigma_{j\nu}} \sigma_i\right]_2 = \left[\frac{\eta_\gamma \gamma_k}{\alpha_i \beta_j}\right]_2$$

**Execution of $A$.** Once having generated $ck$ as described above, $B$ runs $A(ck)$, receives the output $((\text{com}_h)_{h \in [m]}, \text{com}_y, f, \pi, \text{com}_y, \tilde{\pi})$ and parses the proofs as before. Notice that $ck$ is perfectly distributed as the one generated by $\text{Setup}$ and thus the value $s$ is perfectly hidden to $A$.

The reduction proceeds differently according to the output produced by $A$, that we split in the events $E_1, E_2, E_3$ as defined above.

**$E_1$ occurs:** If $s \neq 0$, then $B$ aborts. Otherwise it proceeds as follows. Recall that in this case we have that as $Y^{(\gamma)} = \tilde{Y}^{(\gamma)}$, then $\pi^{(\alpha)}, \tilde{\pi}^{(\alpha)}$ open to different $\text{com}_y, \text{com}_y$. Therefore, by equation (9) we have that

$$e \left(\pi^{(\alpha)}, [1]_2\right) \cdot e \left(\text{com}_y, [\eta_\alpha]_2\right) = e \left(Y^{(\gamma)}, \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[\eta_\alpha \gamma_i \left[\sigma_i\right]_2\right]_2\right) = e \left(\tilde{\pi}^{(\alpha)}, [1]_2\right) \cdot e \left(\text{com}_y, [\eta_\alpha]_2\right)$$

Then, $B$ returns $(U, V)$ such that

$$U := \text{com}_y / \text{com}_y, \quad V := \pi^{(\alpha)}, \tilde{\pi}^{(\alpha)}.$$

If $B$ did not abort, then $s = 0$. Thus, $\eta_\alpha = \eta$ and $e(U, [\eta]_2) = e(V, [1]_2)$.

**$E_2$ occurs:** If $s \neq 1$, then $B$ aborts. Otherwise, let $h^*$ be some index such that $X^{(\beta)}_{h^*} \neq \tilde{X}^{(\beta)}_{h^*}$; note that $h^*$ must exist by definition of event $E_2$. Similarly as before, from equation (7) we have that

$$e \left(\pi^{(\beta)}_{h^*}, [1]_2\right) \cdot e \left(X^{(\beta)}_{h^*}, [\eta_\beta]_2\right) = e \left(X^{(\beta)}_{h^*}, \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[\eta_\beta \gamma_i \left[\sigma_i\right]_2\right]_2\right) = e \left(\tilde{\pi}^{(\beta)}_{h^*}, [1]_2\right) \cdot e \left(\tilde{X}^{(\beta)}_{h^*}, [\eta_\beta]_2\right).$$
Then, \( B \) returns \((U, V)\) such that
\[
U := (\bar{X}_h(\beta) / X_h(\beta))^{r_\beta}, \quad V := \pi_h(\beta) / \bar{\pi}_h(\beta).
\]

If \( B \) did not abort, then \( \hat{s} = 1 \). Thus, \( \eta_\beta = r_\beta \cdot \eta \) and \( e(U, [\eta]_2) = e(V, [1]_2) \).

**E3 occurs:** If \( \hat{s} \neq 1 \), then \( B \) aborts. Otherwise, \( B \) proceeds as follows. First, note that since \( E_1 \) and \( E_2 \) did not occur, then \( Y(\gamma) = \bar{Y}(\gamma) \) and \( X_h(\beta) = \bar{X}_h(\beta) \) for every \( h \in S_2(f) \). Also, by equation (6) and by the non-degeneracy of the pairing, we have
\[
e(X_h, [1]_2) = e([1]_1, X_h(2)) = e([1]_1, \bar{X}_h(2)) \quad \text{which implies that} \quad X_h(2) = \bar{X}_h(2).
\]

From the equality above we can use equation (8) to also conclude that \( Z_{h,h'} = \bar{Z}_{h,h'} \) for all \((h, h') \in S^\otimes_2(f)\). Then, since both proofs satisfy equation (11), we have
\[
e\left(\pi(\gamma), [1]_2\right) e\left(Y(\gamma) \cdot \Theta^{-1}, [\eta_\gamma]_2\right) = \prod_{h \in S_1(f)} e(X_h, \Phi_h) \cdot \prod_{(h, h') \in S^\otimes_2(f)} e(Z_{h,h'}, \Gamma_{h,h'})
\[
= e\left(\bar{\pi}(\gamma), [1]_2\right) e\left(\bar{Y}(\gamma) \cdot \Theta^{-1}, [\eta_\gamma]_2\right).
\]

The reduction returns \((U, V)\) computed as follows:
\[
U := (\bar{Y}(\gamma) / Y(\gamma))^{r_\gamma}, \quad V := \pi(\gamma) / \bar{\pi}(\gamma).
\]

If \( B \) did not abort, then \( \hat{s} = 1 \) and \( \eta_\gamma = r_\gamma \cdot \eta \). Thus, \( e(U, [\eta]_2) = e(V, [1]_2) \). Since \( \hat{s} \) is perfectly hidden \( B \) aborts with probability \( 1/2 \). Hence, if \( A \) is successful with probability \( \epsilon \), then \( B \) breaks the assumption with probability \( \epsilon/2 \).

### 6.7 Efficient verification

Our chainable functional commitment scheme CFC supports amortized efficient verification. We define the algorithms **VerPrep** and **EffVer** below, following Definition 6.

**VerPrep(ck, f)** Parse \( ck \) and compute the encodings \( \Theta, \Phi_h, \Gamma_{h,h'} \) of \( f \) as done in the CFC.Ver algorithm following equation (10). Also, compute the encodings in equations (7) and (9), \( \Psi(\beta) = \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[ \frac{\eta_i h}{\alpha_i} \right]_2 \) and \( \Psi(\alpha) = \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[ \frac{\eta_i \alpha_i}{\gamma_i} \right]_2 \).

Output \( \text{vk}_f := \{ (\Theta, \Phi_h, \Gamma_{h,h'})_{(h,h') \in S^\otimes_2(f)}, \Psi(\alpha), \Psi(\beta) \} \).

**EffVer(vk_f, (com_h))_{h \in [m]}, \text{com}_\pi, \pi** Parse \( \text{vk}_f, \pi \) and carry out all the pairing checks in the Ver algorithm, i.e., verify equations (6), (7), (8), (9), (11).

Following the description of succinctness in Section 6.4, given any \( f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}, \kappa} \) then **EffVer** needs to parse a proof that has \( \mathcal{O}(\kappa) \) group elements. Then, it verifies \( \omega \leq \kappa \) pairing checks in equations (6) and (7), \( \kappa \) checks in equation (8), a single check in equation (7), and a single check involving \( \kappa + \omega \) products in equation (11). Assuming that the running time of each pairing computation is bounded by some polynomial \( p(\lambda) = \text{poly}(\lambda) \), the running time of **EffVer** is therefore \( \mathcal{O}(p(\lambda) \cdot |\kappa|) = \mathcal{O}(p(\lambda) \cdot |\pi|) \), which is essentially optimal.
6.8 Commitment hiding

Our CFC construction can be made perfectly com-hiding (Definition 7) by adding randomness to the commitment. We describe the transformation $\text{CFC} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Com}, \text{Open}, \text{Ver})$ below.

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ Output $\tilde{ck} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{n+1})$.

$\text{Com}(\tilde{ck}, x)$ Let $r \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}$. Output $(\text{com}, \text{aux})$ where $\text{com} \leftarrow \text{Com}(\tilde{ck}, x) + r \cdot [\alpha_{n+1}]_1$ and $\text{aux} = (x, r)$.

$\text{Open}(\tilde{ck}, (\text{aux})_{i \in [m]}, f)$ Let $\text{aux}_i = (x(i), r(i))$. Output $\text{Open}(\tilde{ck}, (\text{aux})_{i \in [m]}, f')$ where $f' = (f, 0)$.

$\text{Ver}(\tilde{ck}, (\text{com})_{i \in [m]}, \text{com}_y, f, \pi)$ Output $\text{Ver}(\tilde{ck}, (\text{com})_{i \in [m]}, \text{com}_y, f, \pi)$.

For the above scheme, it is easy to construct a simulator $\text{Sim}$ as follows.

$\text{Sim}_{\text{Setup}}(1^\lambda, n)$ Sample $\alpha \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}^{n+1}$ and generate $\hat{ck}$ as in $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, n+1)$, sampling additional field elements when necessary. Output $(\hat{ck}, \text{td})$ where $\text{td} = \alpha$.

$\text{Sim}_{\text{Com}}(\text{td})$ Sample $r \leftarrow_R \mathbb{F}$ and output $(\text{com}, \text{aux})$ where $\text{com} = r \cdot [\alpha_{n+1}]_1$ and $\text{aux} = (0, r)$.

$\text{Sim}_{\text{Equiv}}(\text{td}, \text{com}, \text{aux}, x)$ The algorithm uses the field elements in $\alpha$ to find a value $r' \in \mathbb{F}$ such that $\text{com} = \text{Com}(x, r')$. It simply obtains the solution $r'$ of the linear equation $\langle x, \alpha \rangle + \alpha_{n+1} r' = \alpha_{n+1} r$ and outputs $\text{aux} = (x, r')$.

7 Lattice-based CFC for Quadratic Functions

In this section, we present a lattice-based construction of a CFC for quadratic functions. Our construction can be seen as a lattice-analogue of the pairing-based scheme presented in Section 6 obtained via a slight generalisation of the translation technique in [ACL+22].

7.1 Lattice Preliminaries

Let $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[\zeta]$, where $\zeta$ is a fixed primitive $m$-th root of unity, be the ring of integers of the $m$-th cyclotomic field of degree $d = \varphi(m)$, where elements are represented by their coefficient embedding $x = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} x_i \cdot \zeta^i$. If $m$ is a prime-power (resp. power of 2), we call $\mathcal{R}$ a prime-power (resp. power-of-two) cyclotomic ring. For the rest of this section we will assume that $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

For $x \in \mathcal{R}$, write $\|x\| := \max_{i=0}^{d-1} |x_i|$ for the infinity norm induced on $\mathcal{R}$ by $\mathbb{Z}$. The norm generalises naturally to vectors $u = (u_1, \ldots, u_n) \in \mathcal{R}^n$, with $\|u\| := \max_{i=1}^{n} |u_i|$. For $q \in \mathbb{N}$, write $\mathcal{R}_q := \mathcal{R}/q\mathcal{R}$. We always assume that $q$ is a (rational) prime. By a slight abuse of notation, we identify $\mathcal{R}_q$ with its balanced representation, i.e. if $x = \sum_{i=0}^{d-1} x_i \cdot \zeta^i \in \mathcal{R}_q$ then $|x_i| \leq q/2$ for all $i$.

The ring expansion factor $\gamma_\mathcal{R}$ of $\mathcal{R}$ is defined as $\gamma_\mathcal{R} := \max_{a,b \in \mathcal{R}} \frac{\|a-b\|}{\|a\| \cdot \|b\|}$. It is known [AL21] that if $\mathcal{R}$ is a prime-power cyclotomic ring then $\gamma_\mathcal{R} \leq 2 \cdot d$, and if $\mathcal{R}$ is a power-of-two cyclotomic ring then $\gamma_\mathcal{R} \leq d$.

Lattice Trapdoors. We will make use of the following standard algorithms (e.g. [GPV08, MP12, GM18]) associated to lattice trapdoors and their properties for sufficiently large “leftover hash lemma parameter” $\text{lhl}(R, \eta, q, \beta) = O(\eta \log q)$:
\(- (A, \text{td}_A) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(R, 1^n, 1^\ell, q, \beta)\): The trapdoor generation algorithm generates a matrix \(A \in R^{n \times \ell}_q\) along with a trapdoor \(\text{td}_A\). It is assumed that \((\eta, \ell, q, \beta)\) are implicitly specified by \(\text{td}_A\). When \(\ell \geq \text{hl}(R, \eta, q, \beta)\), the distribution of \(A\) is within \(\text{negl}(\lambda)\) statistical distance of \(U(R^{n \times \ell}_q)\).

\(- u \leftarrow \text{SampD}(R, 1^n, 1^\ell, q, \beta')\): The domain sampling algorithm samples a vector \(u \in R^{\ell}\) with norm \(\|u\| \leq \beta'\). When \(\beta' \geq \beta\) and \(\ell \geq \text{hl}(R, \eta, q, \beta)\), then the distribution of \((A, A \cdot u \mod q)\) for a uniformly random \(A \in R^{n \times \ell}_q\) is within \(\text{negl}(\lambda)\) statistical distance of \(U(R^{n \times \ell}_q \times R^{n}_q)\).

\(- u \leftarrow \text{SampPre}(\text{td}_A, v, \beta')\): The preimage sampling algorithm inputs a vector \(v \in R^n\) and outputs a vector \(u \in R^\ell\). If the parameters \((\eta, \ell, q, \beta)\) of \(\text{td}_A\) satisfy \(\beta' \geq \beta\) and \(\ell \geq \text{hl}(R, \eta, q, \beta)\), then \(u\) and \(v\) satisfy \(A \cdot u = v \mod q\) and \(\|u\| \leq \beta'\). Furthermore, \(u\) is within \(\text{negl}(\lambda)\) statistical distance to \(u \leftarrow \text{SampD}(R, 1^n, 1^\ell, q, \beta')\) conditioned on \(A \cdot u = v \mod q\).

**Hardness Assumptions.** The \(k\)-\(M\)-\(ISIS\) assumption family was recently introduced in [ACL+22] as a natural extension of the standard short integer solution (\(SIS\)) assumption and a natural lattice-analogue of a certain class of pairing-based assumptions. The \(k\)-\(M\)-\(ISIS\) assumption family was accompanied by a translation technique outlined in [ACL+22] for translating pairing-based schemes and assumptions to their lattice-analogues.

For instance, a certain \(k\)-\(M\)-\(ISIS\) assumption could be parametrised by a set \(G\) of monomials. It states that even when given short preimages \(u_g\) satisfying \(A \cdot u_g = t \cdot g(v) \mod q\) for all \(g \in G\), it is hard to find a short non-zero preimage \(u^*\) satisfying \(A \cdot u^* = 0 \mod q\).

Applying the translation technique in [ACL+22] to the pairing-based assumption (Definition 12) which underlies the security of the pairing-based CFC construction, we encounter an obstacle that there is no translation for the term \([\eta]_2\) in the challenge relation \(e(U, [\eta]_2) = e(V, [1])\).

To overcome the above obstacle, in the following, we introduce (a special case of) a generalisation of the \(k\)-\(M\)-\(ISIS\) assumption which we call the twin-\(k\)-\(M\)-\(ISIS\) assumption. In a nutshell, instead of a single set \(G\) of monomials, we now have two (or in general more) sets \(G_A\) and \(G_B\) of non-overlapping monomials. The twin-\(k\)-\(M\)-\(ISIS\) assumption states that even when given short preimages \(u_g\) satisfying \(A \cdot u_g = t \cdot g(v) \mod q\) for all \(g \in G_A\) and short preimages \(w_g\) satisfying \(B \cdot w_g = t \cdot g(v) \mod q\) for all \(g \in G_B\), it is hard to find a short non-zero preimage \((u^*, w^*)\) satisfying \(A \cdot u^* + B \cdot w^* = 0 \mod q\). We stress that the non-overlapping requirement of \(G_A\) and \(G_B\) is crucial, for otherwise \((u_g, -w_g)\) would be a trivial solution for any \(g \in G_A \cap G_B\). Other than this trivial attack (which is ruled out), it could be verified that the (failed) attack strategies discussed in [ACL+22] against the \(k\)-\(M\)-\(ISIS\) assumption also fail against the twin-\(k\)-\(M\)-\(ISIS\) assumption.

**Definition 13 (Twin-\(k\)-\(M\)-\(ISIS\) Assumption).** Let \(\ell, \eta \in \mathbb{N}\), \(q\) be a rational prime, \(\beta, \beta^* \in \mathbb{R}^+\),

\[
G_A := \left\{ \frac{X_j}{X_i} \cdot \bar{X}_k \right\}_{i, j, k \in [n], i \neq j} \cup \left\{ \frac{X_j}{X_i} \cdot \bar{X}_k \right\}_{i, j, k \in [n], i \neq j} \cup \left\{ \frac{X_j \cdot X_j'}{X_i} \cdot \bar{X}_k \right\}_{i, j, j', k \in [n], i \neq j, j' \neq j}
\]

\[
G_B := \{ \bar{X}_k, \bar{X}_k \}_{k \in [n]} \text{ and } G := G_A \cup G_B. \text{ For } \eta, \ell \in \mathbb{N}, g \in G, A \in R^{n \times \ell}_q, B \in R^{n \times \ell}_q, t \in (R^\times_q)^n, \text{ and } v, \bar{v}, \bar{v} \in (R^\times)^n, \text{ let } D_{g, A, t, v, \bar{v}, \bar{v}} \text{ and } D_{g, B, t, v, \bar{v}, \bar{v}} \text{ be distributions over}
\]

\[
\left\{ u_g \in R^\ell : A \cdot u_g = t \cdot g(v, \bar{v}, \bar{v}) \mod q, \|u_g\| \leq \beta \right\} \text{ and }
\]

\[
\left\{ w_g \in R^\ell : B \cdot w_g = t \cdot g(v, \bar{v}, \bar{v}) \mod q, \|w_g\| \leq \beta \right\}
\]
respectively. Let

\[ D_A := \left\{ D_{g,A,t,v,\bar{v}} : \eta, \ell \in \mathbb{N}, g \in G_A, A \in R_q^{\eta \times \ell}, v, \bar{v} \in (R^x)^n \right\} \]  
\[ D_B := \left\{ D_{g,B,t,v,\bar{v}} : \eta, \ell \in \mathbb{N}, g \in G_B, B \in R_q^{\eta \times \ell}, v, \bar{v} \in (R^x)^n \right\} \]

be the families of these distributions. Write \( pp := (R_q, \eta, \ell, n, G_A, G_B, D_A, D_B, \beta, \beta^*) \). The \( k-M-ISIS_{pp} \) assumption states that for any PPT adversary \( A \) we have \( \text{Adv}_{pp,A}^{k-m-isis}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \), where

\[
\text{Adv}_{pp,A}^{k-m-isis}(\lambda) := \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{c} A \cdot u^* + B \cdot w^* \equiv 0 \mod q \\ 0 \leq \| (u^*, w^*) \| \leq \beta^* \end{array} \right] \]

Next, we recall (a special case) of the knowledge \( k-M-ISIS \) assumption introduced in [ACL+22].

**Definition 14 (Knowledge \( k-M-ISIS \) Assumption).** Adopt the notation from Definition 13, but let \( G := \{ X_i : i \in [n] \} \) and \( pp := (R_q, \eta, \ell, n, G, D, \alpha^*, \beta, \beta^*) \) where \( \alpha^* \in \mathbb{R}^+ \) and \( \eta > 1 \). The knowledge \( k-M-ISIS_{pp} \) assumption for an auxiliary input distribution \( Z \) states that for any polynomial-time adversary \( A \) there exists a PPT extractor \( E_A \) such that \( \text{Adv}_{pp,A}^{k-m-isis}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \), where

\[
\text{Adv}_{pp,A}^{k-m-isis}(\lambda) := \Pr \left[ \begin{array}{c} A \cdot u \equiv t \cdot c \mod q \\ \| u \| \leq \beta^* \\ \left( c \equiv \sum_{g \in G} x_g \cdot g(v) \mod q \right) \wedge \left( \left\| (x_g)_{g \in G} \right\| \leq \alpha^* \right) \end{array} \right] \]

where the notation \( (A\|E_A) \) means that \( A \) and \( E_A \) are run on the same input including the randomness, and \( (c, u) \) and \( (x_g)_{g \in G} \) are the outputs of \( A \) and \( E_A \) respectively.

### 7.2 Construction

In the following, we construct a lattice-based chainable functional commitment scheme. Our construction is parametrised by a ring \( R \), dimensions \( \eta, \ell \), modulus \( q \), norm bound \( \beta \), an input length \( n \), and the number of inputs \( m \). Before describing the construction, we first introduce the following shorthands and notation.

For a quadratic polynomial map \( f : (R^n)^m \rightarrow R^n \), we express \( f(x_1, \ldots, x_m) \) similarly to previous sections,

\[
f(x_1, \ldots, x_m) = e + \sum_{h \in S_1(f)} F_h \cdot x_h + \sum_{(h, h') \in S_2(f)} G_{h, h'} \cdot (x_h \otimes x_{h'})
\]

for some \( G_{h, h'} \in R^{n \times n^2}, F_h \in R^{n \times n}, \) and \( e \in R^n \).
Different from the pairing-based construction, our lattice-based construction is additionally parametrised by a norm bound $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^+$. We assume that messages $x$ and each coefficient of any quadratic polynomial map $f$ to be opened have norm at most $\alpha$, and $f$ is such that for any $x_1, \ldots, x_m$ of norm at most $\alpha$, it holds that $\|f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)\| \leq \alpha$.

For a vector $v \in (\mathbb{R}_q^\times)^n$, denote its component-wise inverse by $v^\dagger := (v_i^{-1})_{i=1}^n$. Define $Z_v := v^\dagger \cdot v^\top - I = (z_{i,j})_{i,j}$ where

$$
  z_{i,j} = \begin{cases} 0 & i = j \\ v_i^{-1} \cdot v_j & i \neq j \end{cases}.
$$

We are now ready to describe the construction as follows.

\textbf{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)

- Sample trapdoorred matrices $(A, td_A), (B, td_B) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(\mathcal{R}, 1^\lambda, 1^\ell, q, \beta)$.
- Sample submodule generator $t \leftarrow \$ (\mathbb{R}_q^\times)^n$.
- Sample commitment key vectors $v, \bar{v}, \check{v} \leftarrow \$ \mathbb{R}_q^n$.
- Sample a short preimage $u_g \leftarrow \text{SampPre}(td_A, t \cdot g(v, \bar{v}, \check{v}) \mod q)$ for each $g \in \mathcal{G}_A$, where

$$
\mathcal{G}_A := \left\{ \frac{X_j}{X_i} \cdot \bar{X}_k \right\}_{i,j,k \in [n], i \neq j} \cup \left\{ \frac{X_i}{X_j} \cdot \check{X}_k \right\}_{i,j,k \in [n], i \neq j} \cup \left\{ \frac{\check{X}_j}{X_i} \cdot \check{X}_k \right\}_{i,j,k \in [n], i \neq j}.
$$

- Sample a short preimage $w_g \leftarrow \text{SampPre}(td_B, t \cdot g(v, \bar{v}, \check{v}) \mod q)$ for each $g \in \mathcal{G}_B$, where

$$
\mathcal{G}_B := \{ \check{X}_k, \bar{X}_k \}_{k \in [n]}.
$$

- Output $\text{ck} := (A, B, t, v, \bar{v}, \check{v}, (u_g)_{g \in \mathcal{G}_A}, (w_g)_{g \in \mathcal{G}_B})$.

\textbf{Com}(ck, x)

- Compute $c := \langle v, x \rangle \mod q$.
- Output $\text{com} = c$ and $\text{aux} = x$.

\textbf{Open}(ck, (aux_h)_{h \in [m]}, f)

- Parse $aux_h$ as $x_h$ for all $h \in [m]$ and let $y := f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$.
- Compute $v_1 := \text{vec}(Z_v) \otimes \check{v}$ and $v_2 := \text{vec}((I + Z_v) \otimes (I + Z_v) - I) \otimes \bar{v}$.
- Pack the preimages vectors given in the public parameters as columns of the following matrices:
- $U_i$ such that $A \cdot U_i = t \cdot v_i^\top \mod q$ for $i \in [2]$.
  
  For example, for $i = 1$, the first few columns of the R.H.S. of the equation are of the form

$$
  t \cdot v_1^\top = t \cdot (0, \frac{v_1}{v_2}, \bar{v}_1, \frac{v_1}{v_3}, \bar{v}_1, \ldots).
$$

Notice that each column is either $0 \in \mathbb{R}_q^n$, for which $0 \in \mathbb{R}_q^\ell$ is a trivial preimage, or of the form $t \cdot \frac{v_{i,j}}{v_1} \cdot \bar{v}_k$ for some $i, j, k \in [n]$ with $i \neq j$, for which a preimage is given in ck.

- $U$ such that $A \cdot U = t \cdot \bar{v}^\top \cdot Z_v \mod q$.
- $\bar{U}$ such that $A \cdot \bar{U} = t \cdot \bar{v}^\top \cdot Z_v \mod q$.
- $W$ such that $B \cdot W = t \cdot \bar{v}^\top \mod q$.
- $\bar{W}$ such that $B \cdot \bar{W} = t \cdot \check{v}^\top \mod q$.
- Compute $u := \sum_{h \in S_1(f)} U_1 \cdot \text{vec}(x_h^\top \otimes F_h) + \sum_{(h, h') \in S_2(f)} U_2 \cdot \text{vec}((x_h^\top \otimes x_{h'}^\top) \otimes G_{h,h'}).$
- Compute $\bar{u}_0 := U \cdot y$ and $\check{w}_0 := W \cdot y$. 

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- Compute \( \tilde{u}_h := \tilde{U} \cdot x_h \) and \( \tilde{w}_h := \tilde{W} \cdot x_h \) for \( h \in S_2(f) \).
- Output \((u, \tilde{u}_0, \tilde{w}_0, (\tilde{u}_h, \tilde{w}_h))_{h \in S_2(f)}\).
- Define \( \text{Ver}(ck, (\text{com}_h)_{h \in [m], \text{com}_0, f, \pi}) \)
  
  \[
  := \tilde{v}^T \cdot \left( \sum_{(h,h') \in S_2(f)} G_{h,h'} \cdot (v^\dagger \otimes \tilde{v}^\dagger) \cdot C_h \cdot C_{h'} + \sum_{h \in S_1(f)} F_h \cdot v^\dagger \cdot C_h + \mathbf{e}^T \right).
  \]
- Define \( \tilde{\text{id}}(C) := \tilde{v}^T \cdot v^\dagger \cdot C \) and \( \text{id}(C) := \tilde{v}^T \cdot v^\dagger \).
- For \( h \in [m] \setminus S_2(f) \), set \( \tilde{c}_h = 0 \).
- Check if there exists (unique) \( \tilde{c}_0 \) such that \( B \cdot \tilde{w}_0 = t \cdot \tilde{c}_0 \) mod \( q \).
- Check if there exists (unique) \( \tilde{c}_h \) such that \( B \cdot \tilde{w}_h = t \cdot \tilde{c}_h \) mod \( q \) for \( h \in S_2(f) \).
- Check if \( A \cdot u = t \cdot (\hat{f}(c_1, \ldots, c_m, \tilde{c}_1, \ldots, \tilde{c}_m) - \tilde{c}_0) \) mod \( q \) and \( \|u\| \leq \beta^* \).
- Check if \( A \cdot \tilde{u}_h = t \cdot (\hat{f}(c_h) - \tilde{c}_h) \) mod \( q \) and \( \|\tilde{u}_h\| \leq \beta^* \) for \( h \in S_2(f) \).
- Accept, i.e. output 1, if all checks pass. Otherwise, output 0.

**Theorem 5.** Let \( \ell \geq \text{hl}(\mathcal{R}, \eta, q, \beta) \) and \( \beta^* \geq 2 \cdot n^4 \cdot m^2 \cdot \alpha^3 \cdot \beta \cdot \gamma^3 \), and assume that the twin-\( k \)-\( 
\mathcal{M} \)-ISIS_{\mathcal{R}_q,n,l,n,\mathcal{G}_A,\mathcal{G}_B,\mathcal{D}_A,\mathcal{D}_B,\beta,\beta^* \) assumption holds, where \( \mathcal{D}_A \) and \( \mathcal{D}_B \) are distributions such that

\[
\mathcal{D}_{g,A,t,v,\bar{v},\tilde{v}} = \left\{ u_g \leftarrow \text{Samp}(\mathcal{R}, 1^\beta, 1^\ell, q, \beta) \mid A \cdot u_g = t \cdot g(v, \bar{v}, \tilde{v}) \mod q \right\}
\]

for all \( g \in \mathcal{G}_A, A \in \mathcal{R}^{n \times \ell}_q, t \in (\mathcal{R}^\times_q)^n, v, \bar{v}, \tilde{v} \in \mathcal{R}^n_q \) and

\[
\mathcal{D}_{g,B,t,v,\bar{v},\tilde{v}} = \left\{ w_g \leftarrow \text{Samp}(\mathcal{R}, 1^\beta, 1^\ell, q, \beta) \mid B \cdot w_g = t \cdot g(v, \bar{v}, \tilde{v}) \mod q \right\}
\]

for all \( g \in \mathcal{G}_B, B \in \mathcal{R}^{n \times \ell}_q, t \in (\mathcal{R}^\times_q)^n, v, \bar{v}, \tilde{v} \in \mathcal{R}^n_q \). Then, the construction CFC described above is an evaluation binding CFC for the class \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} \) of quadratic functions over any \( m \leq m \) vectors of length \( \leq n \), has efficient verification, and is (almost) additively homomorphic. For a function \( f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{quad}} \), the proof size of CFC is \( |\pi| = |S_2(f)| \cdot \log^2(m \cdot n) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) \), and for the class \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{level}} = \{ \mathcal{F}_{\text{level}, \kappa} \} \), our CFC is \( s(n, m, \kappa) \)-succinct where \( s(n, m, \kappa) = \kappa \cdot \log^2(m \cdot n) \). Furthermore, by setting \( m = \lambda^{\omega(1)} \) the CFC supports quadratic functions over any \( m = \text{poly}(\lambda) \) vectors and is \( \kappa \cdot \log^2(n) \)-succinct.

In the following sections we prove the theorem.

### 7.3 Correctness

To prove correctness, we first state a claim which abstracts away most of the tedious calculations. The claim is proven in Appendix C.

**Claim.** Let \( f(x_1, \ldots, x_m) = y \). For \( h \in S(f) \), let \( c_h = \langle v, x_h \rangle \) mod \( q \). For \( h \in S_2(f) \), let \( \tilde{c}_h = \langle v, x_h \rangle \) mod \( q \). For \( h \in [m] \setminus S_2(f) \), let \( \tilde{c}_h = 0 \). Let \( c_0 = \langle v, y \rangle \) mod \( q \) and \( \tilde{c}_0 = \langle \bar{v}, y \rangle \) mod \( q \). Let \( v_2 = \text{vec}((I + Z_v) \otimes (I + Z_{\bar{v}}) - I) \otimes \bar{v} \) and \( v_1 = \text{vec}(Z_v) \otimes \bar{v} \). It holds that

\[
\hat{f}(c_1, \ldots, c_m, \tilde{c}_1, \ldots, \tilde{c}_m) - \tilde{c}_0 = \sum_{(h,h') \in S_2(f)} v_2^\dagger \cdot \text{vec}(x_h^\dagger \otimes x_{h'}^\dagger \otimes G_{h,h'}) + \sum_{h \in S_1(f)} v_1^\dagger \cdot \text{vec}(x_h^\dagger \otimes F_h),
\]

\[
\hat{\tilde{\text{id}}}(c_0) - \tilde{c}_0 = \bar{v}^T \cdot Z_v \cdot y, \quad \text{and}
\]

\[
\hat{id}(c_h) - \tilde{c}_h = v^T \cdot Z_v \cdot y \quad \text{for all } h \in S_2(f).
\]
Recall that
\[ u = \sum_{(h, h') \in S_2(f)} U_2 \cdot \text{vec}(x_h^T \otimes x_{h'}^T \otimes G_{h, h'}) + \sum_{h \in S_1(f)} U_1 \cdot \text{vec}(x_h^T \otimes F_h), \]
\[ \hat{u}_0 = \hat{U} \cdot y, \text{ and} \]
\[ \hat{u}_h = \hat{U} \cdot x_h \text{ for } h \in S_2(f) \]
are computed using \((U_2, U_1, \hat{U}, \hat{U})\) satisfying
\[ A \cdot u = t \cdot v_h^T \bmod q, \]
\[ A \cdot u_0 = t \cdot (i \hat{d}(c_0) - \tilde{c}_0) \bmod q, \text{ and} \]
\[ A \cdot u_h = t \cdot (i \hat{d}(c_h) - \tilde{c}_h) \bmod q \text{ for all } h \in S_2(f). \]

It follows that
\[ \|u\| \leq n^4 \cdot S_2^\beta(f) \cdot \alpha^3 \cdot \beta \cdot \gamma_R \cdot n^3 \cdot S_1(f) \cdot \alpha^2 \cdot \beta \cdot \gamma_R < \beta^*, \]
\[ \|u\|_0 \leq n \cdot \alpha \cdot \beta \cdot \gamma_R < \beta^*, \text{ and} \]
\[ \|u\|_h \leq n \cdot \alpha \cdot \beta \cdot \gamma_R < \beta^* \forall h \in S_2(f) \]

Additive homomorphism. As is common in the lattice setting, our construction is almost additively homomorphic in the following sense: Although the commitment function \(x \mapsto \langle v, x \rangle \bmod q\) is a linear function, the bounded-norm restriction on messages could be violated since \(\|x\| \leq \alpha\) and \(\|x'\| \leq \alpha\) in general do not imply \(\|x + x'\| \leq \alpha\). As such, correctness is only guaranteed after homomorphic evaluation if \(\|x + x'\| \leq \alpha\).

### 7.4 Succinctness

We measure the succinctness of our construction. A commitment consists of a single \(R_q\) element. An opening proof consists of \(2S_2(f) + 3\) vectors in \(R^\ell\) each of norm at most \(\beta^*\). Setting \(\ell = \log(R, \eta, q, \beta) = \log q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)\) for the guarantees of lattice trapdoor algorithms, \(\beta^* = 2 \cdot n^4 \cdot m^2 \cdot \alpha^3 \cdot \beta \cdot \gamma_R^3 = n^4 \cdot m^2 \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)\) so that correctness holds, and \(q = \beta^* \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)\) to be large enough so that the twin-\(k\)-\(M\)-\text{ISIS} assumption plausibly holds, a commitment can be described with \(\log q \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) = (\log n + \log m) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)\) bits, while an opening proof for a function \(f \in F_{\text{quad}}\) can be described with \((2 |S_2(f)| + 3) \cdot \ell \cdot \log \beta^* \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) = |S_2(f)| \cdot \log^2(m \cdot n) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)\) bits. Note that for \(f \in F_{\text{level}}\), then \(|S_2(f)| = |S_2^\beta(f)| = \kappa\). Hence, our CFC is \(s(n, m, \kappa)\)-succinct for the class \(F_{\text{level}} = \{F_{\text{level}, \kappa}\}\), where \(s(n, m, \kappa) = \kappa \cdot \log^2(m \cdot n)\).
Remark 1 (Removing the dependence on $m$). According to the choice of parameters above, commitments and openings have a logarithmic dependence on the number of inputs $m$ (in addition to the input length $n$). More importantly, for correctness to hold, one should fix $q$ depending on the largest $m$ to be supported. This is a limitation, especially when plugging this CFC in the FC transformation as there $m$ is in the worst case the depth of the circuit. However, since the dependence is only logarithmic we can actually set $\beta^* = 2 \cdot n^4 \cdot \tilde{m}^2 \cdot \alpha^3 \cdot \beta \cdot \gamma_R^2$ where $\tilde{m} = \lambda^{\omega(1)}$ is superpolynomial in the security parameter, in such a way that correctness holds for any $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$. This change makes $q = \lambda^{\omega(1)}$ (a choice that does not affect the plausibility of the assumption according to the analysis of [ACL+22]) and makes the CFC scheme $\kappa \cdot \log^2(n)$-succinct.

7.5 Resulting Instantiations of FC for Circuits

As in the previous section, we summarize the concrete FC schemes that result from instantiating our generic construction of Section 5 with our lattice-based CFC.

Corollary 2. Assume that all the conditions of Theorem 5 are satisfied. Then the following statements hold:

1. There exists an FC scheme for the class $\mathcal{F}_n = \{\mathcal{F}_{(d,t,w)}\}$ of arithmetic circuits of width $w$ bounded by $\leq n$ and in-degree bounded by $\leq t_{\text{max}}$ that is $O(d \cdot \log^2(t_{\text{max}} \cdot n))$-succinct.
2. Using the choice of parameters of Remark 1, there exists an FC scheme for $\mathcal{F}_n = \{\mathcal{F}_{(d,t,w)}\}$ of width $w \leq n$ that is $O(d)$-succinct.
3. For any $w_0 \geq 2$, there exists an FC scheme for the class $\mathcal{F} = \{\mathcal{F}_{(d,t,w)}\}$ of circuits of arbitrary width $w > w_0$ that is $O(d \cdot (w/w_0)^2)$-succinct.

Case (1) follows by observing that in the FC construction from CFCs the number of CFC inputs is bounded by the in-degree of the admissible circuits. In case (1) we fix a concrete $m = t_{\text{max}}$ in the choice of $q = \beta^* \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ while in points (2)–(3) we consider the parameters choice of Remark 1 that let us support any in-degree $t = \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

As opposed to our pairing-based construction, the linear dependency on the depth does not follow from a black-box application of our FC from CFC construction. In fact, Theorem 2 gives a proof size of $O(d \cdot t \cdot \log^2(t_{\text{max}} \cdot n))$. We can suppress the $t$ factor by noticing that, for each circuit layer $h$, the same vectors $(\tilde{u}_h, \tilde{w}_h)$ are included in the openings at every layer $h'$ such that $h \in S_B(f(h'))$. The result follows by including them only once in the FC opening proof.

We observe that the resulting lattice-based FC schemes yield shorter proofs (with respect to circuit depth) than their pairing-based counterparts. This feature can be seen as a natural consequence of the additional capability to perform computations over encrypted (in this case, committed) data that lattices provide. Indeed, in our pairing-based construction, the prover needs to provide $O(d \cdot t)$ commitments $X_{h,h'}$ to the tensor product of every pair of layers in the circuit. This is avoided in our lattice-based scheme, as the verifier can multiply commitments $C_h \cdot C_{h'}$ by herself.

7.6 Proof of Security

Suppose there exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against evaluation binding of the CFC construction, we construct a PPT algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ for the twin-$k$-$M$-ISIS problem as follows.

Given a twin-$k$-$M$-ISIS instance $ck$, $\mathcal{B}$ passes $ck$ to $\mathcal{A}$. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ returns some input commitments $(c_h)_{h \in [m]}$, a quadratic function $f$, two output commitments $c_0$ and $c_0'$, and two opening
proofs $\pi$ and $\pi'$, where $\pi = (u, u_0, w_0, (\hat{u}_h, \hat{w}_h)_{h \in S(f)})$ and $\pi' = (u', \hat{u}'_0, \hat{w}'_0, (\hat{u}'_h, \hat{w}'_h)_{h \in S(f)})$. By our assumption on $A$, with non-negligible probability, $\pi$ (and analogously $\pi'$) satisfies the following
\[
A \cdot u = t \cdot (f(c_1, \ldots, c_m, \hat{c}_1, \ldots, \hat{c}_m) - \hat{c}_0) \mod q,
\]
\[
A \cdot u_0 = t \cdot (\hat{id}(c_0) - \hat{c}_0) \mod q,
\]
\[
A \cdot \hat{u}_h = t \cdot (\hat{id}(ch) - \hat{c}_h) \mod q \text{ for all } h \in S_2(f),
\]
where $B \cdot \hat{w}_0 = t \cdot \hat{c}_0 \mod q$ and $B \cdot \hat{w}_h = t \cdot \hat{c}_h \mod q$.

Suppose $(\hat{u}_0, \hat{w}_0) \neq (\hat{u}'_0, \hat{w}'_0)$, then $(u_0 - u'_0, w_0 - w'_0)$ would be a non-zero vector satisfying
\[
A \cdot (u_0 - u'_0) + B \cdot (w_0 - w'_0) = 0 \mod q \quad \text{and} \quad \| (u_0 - u'_0, w_0 - w'_0) \| \leq 2\beta^*.
\]

Our algorithm $B$ can therefore output $(u_0 - u'_0, w_0 - w'_0)$ as a solution to the twin-$k$-$M$-ISIS instance. A similar conclusion holds when $(\hat{u}_h, \hat{w}_h) \neq (\hat{u}'_h, \hat{w}'_h)$ for any $h \in S_2(f)$.

Next, suppose $(\hat{u}_0, \hat{w}_0) = (\hat{u}'_0, \hat{w}'_0)$ and $(\hat{u}_h, \hat{w}_h) = (\hat{u}'_h, \hat{w}'_h)$ for all $h \in S_2(f)$. It follows that $\hat{c}_0 = \hat{c}'_0$ and $\hat{c}_h = \hat{c}'_h$ for all $h \in S_2(f)$, which implies that $u - u'$ is a non-zero vector satisfying
\[
A \cdot (u - u') = 0 \mod q \quad \text{and} \quad \| u - u' \| \leq 2\beta^*.
\]

Our algorithm $B$ can therefore output $(u - u', 0)$ as a solution to the twin-$k$-$M$-ISIS instance.

### 7.7 Extractability

To achieve extractability, the transformation introduced in [ACL+22] based on the knowledge $k$-$M$-ISIS assumption can be applied. In the following, we briefly recall the transformation.

We define a new setup algorithm which additionally samples a knowledge $k$-$M$-ISIS instance with a common $v$. More concretely, the new setup samples an extra trapdoored matrix $A$, an extra submodule generator $t$, along with short preimages $\hat{u}_i$ satisfying $A \hat{u}_i = t \cdot v_i \mod q$ for $i \in [n]$. As in the original setup, the trapdoor for $A$ is discarded while all other materials are published as part of the commitment key.

Next, we modify the opening and verification algorithms accordingly, i.e. an opening proof now additionally consists of the short preimages $\hat{u}_i$ satisfying $A \hat{u}_i = t \cdot c_i \mod q$, which will be checked by the new verification algorithm.

The extractability of the modified scheme follows from the evaluation binding property of the base scheme and the knowledge $k$-$M$-ISIS assumption. The proof strategy is as follows. Suppose an adversary outputs some commitments $c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_m$ and a valid opening proof $\pi$ for a function $f$. We construct an extractor which runs the knowledge $k$-$M$-ISIS extractor to extract the messages $x_1, \ldots, x_m$ committed under $c_1, \ldots, c_m$ and then outputs $x_1, \ldots, x_m$ along with $y := f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$.

By construction, we have $\text{Com}(x_h) = c_h$ for all $i \in [m]$ and $f(x_1, \ldots, x_m) = y$. It remains to show that $\text{Com}(y) = c_0$. Suppose not, then $\text{Com}(y) = c'_0 \neq c_0$. Then for $\pi' = \text{Open}(ck, (x_h)_{h \in [m]}, f)$, by the correctness of the CFC, it should hold that $\text{Ver}(ck, (c_h)_{h \in [m]}, c'_0, f, \pi') = 1$. This, however, violates the evaluation binding of the base CFC scheme.

### 7.8 Efficient Verification

Our CFC construction also supports amortized efficient verification. We observe that in our construction the $\text{Vf}$ algorithm can be split into an offline preprocessing step and an online verification step:
VerPrep(ck, f): Compute the polynomials \( \hat{f}, \tilde{id}, \) and \( \hat{id}, \) and output \( vk_f := (A, B, t, \hat{f}, \hat{id}, \hat{id}). \)

EffVer(vk_f, (com_h)_{h \in [m]}, com_0, \pi): Perform all the checks described in \( \mathcal{V}_f. \)

Clearly, the runtime of EffVer is \((S^\circ_2(f) + S_1(f)) \cdot \log q \cdot \text{poly} \leq m^2 \cdot \log(m \cdot n) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda), \) which is logarithmic in \( n. \)

### 7.9 Commitment Hiding

Commitment hiding can be achieved by extending the dimension of the input vector and dedicating some entries for commitment randomness. We outline such a transformation in the following.

First, we modify the setup so that the vectors \( v, \bar{v}, \vec{v} \) are now sampled from \( \mathcal{R}^{n+\ell}. \) The sets \( \mathcal{G}_A \) and \( \mathcal{G}_B \) of monomials are adjusted accordingly. To commit to \( x \in \mathcal{R}^n, \) sample a uniformly random vector \( r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}^\ell \) with \( \|r\| \leq \alpha, \) and compute \( c := \left\langle v, \begin{pmatrix} x \\ r \end{pmatrix} \right\rangle \mod q. \) Opening and verifying are almost identical as in the base scheme, except that \( f \) is treated as a polynomial on \( (x_1, r_1, \ldots, x_m, r_m) \) but with zero coefficients for all terms involving any entry of \( (r_1, \ldots, r_m). \) It can be verified that the modified scheme retains correctness and evaluation binding. For \( \ell \geq \log (\mathcal{R}, n, q, \beta), \) which we anyway need for correctness, commitment hiding is immediate from the leftover hash lemma.

To make the verification more friendly to zero-knowledge arguments, we need to make one more minor change to the scheme: The opening algorithm additionally includes the commitments \((\bar{c}_0, (\bar{c}_h)_{h \in S_2(f)})\) in an opening proof. This makes the verification NIZK-friendly, since it boils down to proving the following SIS relations in zero-knowledge: There exists \((u, \bar{u}_0, \bar{w}_0, (\bar{u}_h, \bar{w}_h)_{h \in S_2(f)}) \in (\mathcal{R}^\ell)^{2S_2(f)+3}\) such that

\[
\begin{align*}
A \cdot u &= t \cdot (\hat{f}(c_1, \ldots, c_m, \bar{c}_1, \ldots, \bar{c}_m) - \bar{c}_0) \mod q &\land&\|u\| \leq \beta^* \\
A \cdot \bar{u}_0 &= t \cdot (\hat{id}(\bar{c}_0) - \bar{c}_0) \mod q &\land&\|\bar{u}_0\| \leq \beta^* \\
A \cdot \bar{u}_h &= t \cdot (\hat{id}(\bar{c}_h) - \bar{c}_h) \mod q &\land&\|\bar{u}_h\| \leq \beta^* &\forall h \in S_2(f) \\
B \cdot \bar{w}_0 &= t \cdot \bar{c}_0 &\land&\|\bar{w}_0\| \leq \beta^* \\
B \cdot \bar{w}_h &= t \cdot \bar{c}_h \mod q &\land&\|\bar{w}_h\| \leq \beta^* &\forall h \in S_2(f).
\end{align*}
\]

By slightly adjusting the parameters of the \( k-M-\text{ISIS} \) assumption, the scheme remains evaluation binding even if the NIZK argument can only guarantee that the norm of the witness is bounded by some \( \beta^{**} > \beta^* \) (although the prover has a witness of norm bounded by \( \beta^* \)). This allows to use efficient NIZK (e.g., [Lyu09]) for proving SIS relations with relaxed soundness.

### 8 Conclusions

In this work, we present the first constructions of functional commitments for circuits based on falsifiable assumptions. Our results leave some open questions for future work. The first one concerns the current need of fixing a bound on the maximal width of the circuits at setup time. Constructing an FC whose setup procedure only depends on the input size, or ideally on no bound, would be a remarkable result that would also imply fully-homomorphic signatures. Another interesting direction is to construct functional commitments with more succinct opening proofs, e.g., sublinear in the circuit depth. Finally, we believe that there is room for improvement towards the design of FC schemes that rely on simpler, or more standard, cryptographic assumptions.
References


A Analysis of the HiKer assumption in the generic bilinear group model

Lemma 2. The $n$-HiKer assumption holds in the generic bilinear group model.

Proof. First of all, note that the assumption is equivalent to an assumption without rational terms. Indeed, for a uniformly sampled $\eta'$, consider the assumption above where $\eta = \eta' \prod_{i,j \in [n]} \sigma_i t_j$.

The intuition is that since the solution $(U, V)$ satisfies the equation $e(U, [\eta]_2) = e(V, [1]_2)$ then it must be of the form $(U, V) = [u, \eta u]_1$ for some $u$. However, if we look at the input of the adversary in $G_1$, there is no pair of elements in the linear span of $[1, \eta]_1$. Note also that elements in $G_2$ cannot be used by a GGM extractor as $bgp$ is a Type-III bilinear group setting. A detailed proof follows.

More formally, let $A$ be an adversary that on input $(bgp, \Omega)$ outputs two elements $U, V \in G_1$ such that $e(U, [\eta]_2) = e(V, [1]_2)$. Then, the GGM extractor must output two polynomials $p_u(S, T, H), p_v(S, T, H)$ with coefficients $u_0, u_{\sigma,i}, u_{\tau,i}, u_{i,j}, u_{i',i'}, u_{i,j,i',j'}$ and $v_0, v_{\sigma,i}, v_{\tau,i}, v_{i,j}, v_{i',i'}, v_{i,j,i',j'}$ such that:

\[
0 = p_u(S, T, H) + p_v(S, T, H) = u_0 H + v_0 + \sum_i [(u_{\sigma,i} S_i + u_{\tau,i} T_i)H + v_{\sigma,i} S_i + v_{\tau,i} T_i] + \sum_{i,j} [u_{i,j} S_j T_j H + v_{i,j} S_j T_j]
\]

\[
+ \sum_{i,i' \in [n]} \left[u_{i,i'} H^2 T_i S_{i'} T_j S_i + v_{i,i'} H T_i S_{i'} T_j S_i \right] + \sum_{i,j,i',i'' \in [n]} \left[u_{i,j,i',i''} H^2 S_{i'} T_{i''} T_j S_i + v_{i,j,i',i''} H S_{i'} T_{i''} T_j S_i \right].
\]

Due to the equivalence mentioned above, we can effectively do a change of variable $H \mapsto HA$ where $A = \prod_{i,j \in [n]} S_i T_j$ and reorganize the expression as a polynomial in $H$,

\[
\left[v_0 + \sum_{i \in [n]} (v_{\sigma,i} S_i + v_{\tau,i} T_i) + \sum_{i,j \in [n]} v_{i,j} S_j T_j \right]
\]

\[
+ \left[u_0 + \sum_{i \in [n]} (u_{\sigma,i} S_i + u_{\tau,i} T_i) + \sum_{i,j \in [n]} u_{i,j} S_j T_j + \sum_{i,i' \in [n]} u_{i,i'} T_i S_{i'} S_i + \sum_{i,j,i',i'' \in [n]} u_{i,j,i',i''} S_{i'} T_{i''} S_i T_j \right] A H
\]

\[
+ \left[\sum_{i,j,i',i'' \in [n]} u_{i,j,i',i''} S_{i'} T_{i''} S_i T_j + \sum_{i,i' \in [n], i \neq i'} u_{i,i'} T_i S_{i'} S_i \right] A^2 H^2.
\]

For the above to equal the zero polynomial in $H$, all terms must cancel. We analyze the constant, linear, and quadratic terms separately. Note that as all fractions are multiplied by $A = \prod_{i,j \in [n]} S_i T_j$, all denominators vanish.
– The constant term does not include cross-terms, so all monomials are linearly independent and the expression cancels only if \( v_0 = v_{\sigma,i} = v_{\tau,i} = v_{i,j} = 0 \).

– The linear term is formed by pairwise distinct monomials which are all independent; no allowed choice of indices \( i, j, i', j' \) or \( i, i' \) produces a monomial in the linear span of any others. In particular, note that variables in \( T_i S_{i'} / S_i \) only cancel for \( i = i' \) which is not in the sum. Also, the denominator of \( S_j T_{j'} / S_j T_j \) only cancels if \( (i, j) = (i', j') \) which is also not in the sum.

– For the quadratic term, we reason analogously to conclude that all terms are independent.

It follows that all coefficients of \( p_u(S, T, H) \) and \( p_v(S, T, H) \) must be zero, so \( p_u = p_v = 0 \) and the assumption holds.

**B Knowledge Extractability of the pairing-based CFC for Quadratic Functions**

In this section, we prove that the pairing-based CFC for quadratic functions of Section 6 is knowledge extractable (hence strong evaluation binding by Proposition 2) under an extractability (non-falsifiable) assumption that we define below. This result implies that CFC can be seen as a SNARK for quadratic polynomial maps. In particular, its use with a single input can be used to prove arithmetic circuit satisfiability, and thus it is a (commit-and-prove) SNARK for NP with constant-size proofs.

**Extractability assumption.** First of all, we introduce our extractability assumption which is a slight extension of classical knowledge-of-exponent assumptions in bilinear groups. The intuition is that if the adversary produces two group elements in \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) that share the same discrete logarithm, then it must know coefficients that explain both elements as a linear combination of (a subset of) its inputs that have the same representation in \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \). Note that our assumption can only hold in type-III bilinear groups, as for type-I and type-II groups there exists an efficient map \( \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_1 \).

**Definition 15 (Assumption 1).** Let \( \text{bgp} = (q, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, g_1, g_2) \) be a bilinear group setting and let \( Z \) be a PPT auxiliary input generator. The assumption holds for \( \text{bgp} \) and \( Z \) if, for every \( n = \text{poly}(\lambda) \) and any polynomial-time \( A \), given \( \Omega(\sigma) := \left( [\sigma_1], [\sigma_2], \left\{ \left[ \frac{\sigma_i}{\sigma_j} \right] \right\}_{i, i' \in [n]}, \left\{ \left[ \frac{1}{\sigma_i} \right] \right\}_{i \in [n]} \right) \), then there exists a polynomial-time extractor \( \mathcal{E} \) such that

\[
\Pr \left[ \begin{array}{c}
e(U, [1]) = e([1], V) \\
\land U \neq [x_0 + (x, \sigma)]_1 \\
(U, V) \leftarrow A(\text{bgp}, \Omega; \text{aux}_Z)
\end{array} : \begin{array}{c}
\text{aux}_Z \leftarrow Z(\Omega) \\
(x_0, \{x_i\}_{i=1}^n) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\text{bgp}, \Omega; \text{aux}_Z)
\end{array} \right) = \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

where the probability is taken over the choice of \( \sigma \in \mathbb{F}_n \) and the random coins of \( Z \).

We now describe the auxiliary generators \( Z \) for which we can argue (in the generic group model) that Assumption 1 holds. We say that a PPT input generator \( Z \) is admissible if, on input \( \Omega(\sigma) \), outputs a set \( \text{aux}_Z \) of group elements in \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \) such that:

– There exists no pair of elements \( A \in G_1, B \in G_2 \) in the linear span of \( \Omega \cup \text{aux}_Z \), except for linear combinations of \( [\sigma_1], [\sigma_2] \) and the group generators \([1], [1]_2 \), such that \( e(A, [1]) = e([1], B) \).

– All elements provided in \( \text{aux}_Z \) can be independently generated from the input of the assumption \( \Omega \) and from the random coins of \( Z \).
Our CFC Auxiliary input generator. In order to show extractability of CFC, we define an input generator $Z_{CFC}$ that, on input $\Omega$, outputs a set $\text{aux}_Z$ which has an identical distribution to a commitment key $ck$ of the CFC. $Z_{CFC}$ proceeds as follows. First, it samples $\beta, \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^n$ and $\eta_\alpha, \eta_\beta, \eta_\gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}$ and the conditions specified above on $x$. Then, it generates all parameters as follows, implicitly setting $\alpha := \sigma$:

$$\text{aux}_Z := \left( (\sigma_1), (\sigma_2), \beta [1], \gamma [1], (\sigma_1) \otimes \beta, \eta_\alpha [1], \eta_\beta [1], \eta_\gamma [1] \right)$$

Clearly, the distribution of $\text{aux}_Z$, given a random generation of $\Omega$, is identical to $ck \leftarrow \text{CFC.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ and the conditions specified above on $Z$ hold.

Extending our HiKer assumption. Our extractability proof requires a second assumption which is an extension of the Hinted Kernel assumption introduced in 12. We define it below.

Definition 16 (Assumption 2). Let $\text{bgp} = (q, G_1, G_2, G_T, e, g_1, g_2)$ be a bilinear group setting, let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and let $G_1, G_2$ be the following two sets of Laurent monomials in $\mathbb{Z}[S_1, T_1, \ldots, S_n, T_n, H]$:

$$G_1(S, T, H) := \{ S_i, T_i \}_{i \in [n]} \cup \{ S_i \cdot T_j \}_{i,j \in [n]} \cup \left\{ \frac{H \cdot T_i \cdot S_j}{S_i} \right\}_{i \neq j} \cup \left\{ \frac{H \cdot S_i \cdot T_j}{S_i \cdot T_j} \right\}_{(i,j) \neq (i', j')},$$

$$G_2(S, T, H) := \{ H \} \cup \{ S_i \}_{i \in [n]} \cup \left\{ \frac{H \cdot T_i}{S_i} \right\}_{i \in [n]} \cup \left\{ \frac{H}{S_i} \right\}_{i,j \in [n]}.$$

The assumption holds if for every $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and any PPT $A$, the following advantage is negligible

$$\Pr \left[ (U, V) \neq (1, 1)_{G_1} \wedge e(U, [\eta]_2) \cdot e(V, [\gamma]_2) = \prod_i e(W_i, [\frac{\eta_\alpha}{\alpha}]_2) \bigg| (U, V, \{ W_i \}_{i \in [n]}, \eta_\alpha, \eta_\beta, \eta_\gamma) \right] \
$$

where the probability is over the random choices of $\sigma, \tau, \eta$ and $A$’s random coins.

The HiKer assumption is a special case of Assumption 2 in which every $W_i = [0]$.

The extractability proof. We are now ready to state and prove the extractability of our pairing-based CFC for quadratic functions. The broad idea of the proof is that, given a valid CFC proof $\pi$ for $f$, we can use the extractor of Assumption 1 to obtain coefficients $x_1, \ldots, x_m$ and values $x_{0,1}, \ldots, x_{0,m}$ such that the commitments to the inputs are of the form $\text{com}_i = [\langle x_i, \alpha \rangle]_1 + [x_{0,i}]_1$ for every $i \in [m]$. Besides, using Assumption 2, we can assert that all $x_{0,i} = 0$ with overwhelming probability. This implies that the commitments $\text{com}_i$ are correctly distributed as $\text{com}_i = [\langle x_i, \alpha \rangle]_1$ and that we can extract the committed inputs $x_i$. Finally, we show that $\text{com}_y$ must be a commitment to $y = f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$ as otherwise we break evaluation binding.

Theorem 6. Assuming Assumption 1 for the input generator $Z_{CFC}$ described above, and Assumption 2, the pairing-based CFC scheme of Section 6 is knowledge extractable.
Proof. Let $A$ be a deterministic, polynomial-time adversary against CFC extractability. On input $(ck, aux_Z)$ for some auxiliary input $aux_Z \leftarrow Z$, $A$ outputs $(com_i)_{i \in [m], f, com_y, \pi}$ such that $Ver(ck, (com_i)_{i \in [m]}, com_y, f, \pi) = 1$. Our goal is to show that we can construct an extractor $E_A$ that on input $(ck, aux_Z)$ returns vectors $x_1, \ldots, x_m, y$ such that the advantage of $A$ in the extractability game is

$$\Pr\left[\begin{array}{l}
\forall (\exists i \in [m] : com_i \neq \text{Com}(ck, x_i) \\
\lor com_y \neq \text{Com}(ck, y) \\
\lor f(x_1, \ldots, x_m) \neq y
\end{array}\right] = \negl(\lambda).$$

First of all, we show how to construct $E_A$. We define $m$ adversaries $B_0^{(j)}$ for $j \in [m]$ against Assumption 1 in Figure 3. $B_0^{(j)}$ takes $\Omega, aux_Z$ as input, where $aux_Z$ is generated by $Z_{CFC}(\Omega)$ as explained before, and includes all the elements of a valid $ck$ for the CFC scheme that are consistent with $\Omega$. We define $E_A$ in Figure 3.

In the rest of the proof, we show that the extractor succeeds except with negligible probability. Consider the pair $(A, E_A)$ and their outputs, and let $Win$ be the event in which $(A, E_A)$ win the CFC extractability game. We will reduce $(A, E_A)$ to an adversary $B$ against Assumption 2 to show that $Pr[Win] \leq \negl(\lambda)$. The adversary $B$ will embed the input of the assumption into a simulated commitment key $ck$ (we detail this procedure below), then run $(A||E_A)(ck)$ and parse its output $((com_i)_{i \in [m]}, f, com_y, \pi)$ and $(x_1, \ldots, x_m, y)$. Depending on such output, we distinguish between the following (nested) events:

- Event $BadExt$ as the event in which $com_j \neq [(x_j, \alpha)]_1 + [x_{0,j}]_1$ for some $j \in [m]$ and $x_{0,j}$.
- Event $BadCom$ as the event in which $BadExt$ does not occur and $x_{0,j} \neq 0$ for some $j \in [m]$.
- Event $BadY$ as the event in which $com_y \neq \text{Com}(ck, f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$ and $BadCom$ (and hence also $BadExt$) does not occur.

First of all, we bound the probability of the adversary winning given a bad extraction, $Pr[Win \land BadExt]$.

**Event $BadExt$.** The output of each $B_0^{(j)}$, which corresponds to the vectors extracted by $E_A$, is $(com_j, X_j^{(2)})$ in the proof $\pi$. Also, by the pairing checks in the CFC $Ver$ algorithm, these satisfy $e(com_j, [1]_2) = e([1], X_j^{(2)})$. As $ck$ is perfectly distributed, the output of $E_A$ satisfies that $com_i \neq [(x_i, \alpha)]_1 + [x_{0,i}]_1$ for some $x_{0,i}$, and for every $i$, unless any of the extractors $E_B^{(j)}$ fails. By Assumption 1, this occurs with negligible probability, so by the union bound we have

$$Pr[Win \land BadExt] \leq \sum_{i=1}^{m} Pr[com_i \neq [(x_i, \alpha)]_1 + [x_{0,i}]_1] \leq m \cdot \epsilon_{Ass1} = \negl(\lambda).$$

Note that

$$Pr[Win] \leq Pr[Win \land BadExt] + Pr[Win \land \neg BadExt]$$

Next, we will bound $Pr[Win \land \neg BadExt]$ by showing a reduction to Assumption 2.

**Commitment key generation.** Based on the events above, $B$ makes a secret guess $\hat{b} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. Intuitively, $\hat{b} = 1$ corresponds to event $BadCom$, and a subcase of event $BadY$, whereas $\hat{b} = 0$ corresponds to a different subcase of $BadY$. Then, $B$ simulates $ck$ depending on $\hat{b}$:

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If \( \hat{b} = 0 \), then \( \mathcal{B} \) receives the input of the assumption and generates \( \text{ck} \) exactly as in the case \( \hat{s} = 0 \) of the proof of evaluation binding for CFC. Namely, it samples \( \alpha, \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^n, \eta_{\beta}, \eta_{\gamma} \leftarrow \mathbb{F} \) and implicitly sets \( \gamma := \sigma \) and \( \eta_{\alpha} := \eta \) from the input of the assumption. Then, it simulates the remaining terms in \( \text{ck} \) accordingly.

If \( \hat{b} = 1 \), then \( \mathcal{B} \) proceeds as in the case \( \hat{s} = 1 \) of the proof of evaluation binding for CFC. Namely, \( \mathcal{B} \) samples \( \eta_{\alpha}, r_{\beta}, r_{\gamma} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}, \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^m \) and implicitly sets \( \alpha := \sigma, \beta := \tau, \eta_{\beta} := r_{\beta} \cdot \eta, \eta_{\gamma} := r_{\gamma} \cdot \eta \). Later, it simulates \( \text{ck} \) accordingly.

Next, \( \mathcal{B} \) runs \((\mathcal{A}||\mathcal{E}_A)(\text{ck})\) and parses the output as detailed before. The reduction proceeds differently depending on the events above.

**Event BadCom.** If \( \hat{b} \neq 1 \), then \( \mathcal{B} \) aborts. We analyze the probability that \( \text{Win} \land \text{BadCom} \) occurs given that \( \text{BadExt} \) does not occur. By \( \neg \text{BadExt} \), there exist values \( x_{0,i} \) such that \( X_i = \text{com}_i = [(x_i, \alpha)]_1 + [x_{0,i}]_1 \) for all \( i \in [m] \). By the occurrence of \( \text{BadCom} \) there must be an index \( h \) such that \( x_{0,h} \neq 0 \). Using the fact that the proof produced by the adversary correctly verifies, we have that for such \( h \) the following pairing identity (from the \( \alpha \rightarrow \beta \) conversion) holds:

\[
e \left( \langle x_h, \alpha \rangle \right)_1 + [x_{0,h}]_1, \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[ \frac{\eta_{\beta i}}{\alpha_i} \right] \right)_2 = e \left( \pi^{(\beta)}_h, [1]_2 \right) e \left( X^{(\beta)}_h, [\eta_{\beta}]_2 \right)\]

Let \( \mathcal{B} \) compute \( \tilde{X}_h = [(x_h, \alpha)]_1 \) and \( \tilde{X}^{(\beta)}_h = [(x_h, \beta)]_1 \). Furthermore, \( \mathcal{B} \) computes an honest identity proof \( \tilde{\pi}^{(\beta)}_h \) to show that \( \tilde{X}_h \) and \( \tilde{X}^{(\beta)}_h \) commit to the same value (i.e., for an \( \alpha \rightarrow \beta \) conversion). Then, we can write the pairing identity as follows

\[
e \left( \tilde{X}_h, S \right) \cdot e ([x_{0,h}]_1, S) = e \left( \pi^{(\beta)}_h, [1]_2 \right) e \left( X^{(\beta)}_h, [\eta_{\beta}]_2 \right)\]

\[
e \left( \tilde{\pi}^{(\beta)}_h, [1]_1 \right) \cdot e \left( \tilde{X}^{(\beta)}_h, [\eta_{\beta}]_2 \right) \cdot e ([x_{0,h}]_1, S) = e \left( \tilde{\pi}^{(\beta)}_h, [1]_2 \right) e \left( X^{(\beta)}_h, [\eta_{\beta}]_2 \right)\]

where the second equality follows by the correctness of \( \tilde{\pi}^{(\beta)}_h \). Also, for brevity, we let \( S = \sum_{i \in [m]} \left[ \frac{\eta_{\beta i}}{\alpha_i} \right]_2 \).

Moving terms to the right-hand side, we have:

\[
e ([x_{0,h}]_1, S) = x_{0,h} \left[ \sum_{i \in [n]} \left[ \frac{\eta_{\beta i}}{\alpha_i} \right] \right]_T = e \left( \frac{\pi^{(\beta)}_h}{\tilde{\pi}^{(\beta)}_h}, [1]_2 \right) e \left( X^{(\beta)}_h / \tilde{X}^{(\beta)}_h, [\eta_{\beta}]_2 \right)\]

Then, \( \mathcal{B} \) outputs \((U, V, \{W_i\}_{i \in [m]})\) such that \( U := (X^{(\beta)}_h / \tilde{X}^{(\beta)}_h)^T \), \( V := \pi^{(\beta)}_h / \tilde{\pi}^{(\beta)}_h \), and \( W_i = r_{\beta} \cdot [x_{0,h}]_1 \) for every \( i \in [n] \). By the ck simulation procedure \( \eta_{\beta} = r_{\beta} \cdot \eta \), therefore we have that \( e(U, [\eta]_2) \cdot e(V, [1]_2) = \prod_i e(W_i, S) \) breaking Assumption 2.

**Event BadY:**) We will turn \( \mathcal{A} \) into an adversary against Assumption 2. As an intermediate step, we define a subroutine \( \mathcal{B}^* \) that, on input \( \text{ck} \) and access to \((\mathcal{A}||\mathcal{E}_A)\) outputs a tuple \(((\text{com})_i)_{i \in [m]}, f, \text{com}_y, \pi, \text{com}'_y, \pi')\) against evaluation binding.

We build \( \mathcal{B}^* \) from \( \mathcal{A} \) as follows. First, \( \mathcal{B}^* \) calls \((\mathcal{A}||\mathcal{E}_A)(\text{ck})\), parses their output as before, and computes \( y' = f(x_1, \ldots, x_m) \). Then, \( \mathcal{B}^* \) calculates \( \text{com}'_y \leftarrow \text{Com}(\text{ck}, y) \) and outputs

\[((\text{com})_i)_{i \in [m]}, f, \text{com}_y, \pi, \text{com}'_y, \pi')\]
where $\pi'$ is an honestly generated proof $\pi' \leftarrow \text{CFC.\text{Open}}(ck, (aux_i)_{i \in [m]}, y, f)$.

Now, we show that if BadY occurs, then $B^*$ breaks evaluation binding. First, note that since BadCom does not occur, we know that $\text{com}_i = \text{Com}(ck, x_i)$ for every $i \in [m]$. If $y = y'$, then as $A$ wins it must be the case that $\text{com}_y \neq \text{Com}(ck, y) = \text{com}'_y$. Otherwise, if $y \neq y'$, then we have that $\text{com}_y \neq \text{com}'_y$ (as the commitment is binding). In both cases, we break evaluation binding by opening to two different commitments via a honest opening proof $\pi'$ to $\text{com}'_y$.

Finally, we define $B$ as follows. After embedding the assumption on $ck$ based on the choice of $b$, $B$ uses the output of $(A||E_A)$ to build $B^*(ck)$ as an adversary against evaluation binding. Then, it proceeds exactly as in the evaluation binding proof, aborting or not depending whether the output of $B^*(ck)$ is consistent with the guess $b$. Hence, if $B^*$ succeeds with probability $\varepsilon$, then $B$ breaks the HiKer assumption with probability $\varepsilon/2$.

We conclude the proof by noting that, since Assumption 2 implies the HiKer assumption, then

$$\Pr[\text{Win} | \text{BadExt}] \leq 2 \cdot \varepsilon_{\text{Ass2}} = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$B_0^{(j)}(\Omega, \text{aux}_Z)$</th>
<th>$E_A(ck, \text{aux}_Z)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1: $ck \leftarrow \text{aux}_Z$</td>
<td>1: for $j \in [m]$ :</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2: $(\text{com}<em>i)</em>{i \in [m]}, f, \text{com}_y, \pi) \leftarrow A(ck, \text{aux}_Z)$</td>
<td>2: $(U, V) \leftarrow B_0^{(j)}(\Omega, \text{aux}_Z)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3: $(X_i, X_i^{(2)})_{i \in [m]} \leftarrow \text{Parse}(\pi)$</td>
<td>3: $(x_j, x_{0,j}) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_A^{(j)}(\Omega, \text{aux}_Z)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4: return $(X_j, X_j^{(2)})$</td>
<td>4: $y \leftarrow f(x_1, \ldots, x_m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5: return $(x_1, \ldots, x_m, y)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 3: Adversaries $B_0^{(j)}$ and extractor $E_A$ for the proof of Theorem 6. Note that, for $\text{aux}_Z \leftarrow \mathcal{Z}_{\text{CFC}}(\Omega)$, we have that $\Omega \subseteq \text{aux}_Z$.

C Proof of Claim in correctness of lattice-based CFC

The proof of the claim relies on the following fact about Kronecker products and vectorisation.

**Lemma 3.** Let $L, Z$ be matrices and $v, x$ be vectors of compatible dimensions so that the product $v^T \cdot L \cdot Z \cdot x$ is well-defined. It holds that

$$v^T \cdot L \cdot Z \cdot x = (\text{vec}(Z)^T \otimes v^T) \cdot \text{vec}(x^T \otimes L).$$

**Proof.** The proof involves repeated applications of the identities $\text{vec}(ABC) = (C^T \otimes A) \cdot \text{vec}(B)$ and $\text{vec}(x) = x$. We observe the following:

$$v^T \cdot L \cdot Z \cdot x = v^T \cdot \text{vec}(L \cdot Z \cdot x) = v^T \cdot (x^T \otimes L) \cdot \text{vec}(Z) = \text{vec}(v^T \cdot (x^T \otimes L) \cdot \text{vec}(Z)) = (\text{vec}(Z)^T \otimes v^T) \cdot \text{vec}(x^T \otimes L).$$

$\square$

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We are now ready to prove the claim in the correctness proof. We prove it by directly calculating

\[
\hat{f}(c_1, \ldots, c_m, \tilde{c}_1, \ldots, \tilde{c}_m)
= \vec{v}^T \cdot \left( \sum_{h, h' \in [m]} G_{h, h'} \cdot (v^\dagger \otimes \tilde{v}^\dagger) \cdot c_h \cdot \tilde{c}_{h'} + \sum_{i \in [m]} F_h \cdot v^\dagger \cdot c_h + e \right)
= \vec{v}^T \cdot \left( \sum_{h, h' \in [m]} G_{h, h'} \cdot (v^\dagger \otimes \tilde{v}^\dagger) \cdot (v^T \otimes \tilde{v}^T) \cdot (x_h \otimes x_{h'}) + \sum_{i \in [m]} F_h \cdot v^\dagger \cdot v^T \cdot x_h + e \right)
= \vec{v}^T \cdot \left( \sum_{h, h' \in [m]} G_{h, h'} \cdot ((v^\dagger \cdot v^T) \otimes (\tilde{v}^\dagger \cdot \tilde{v}^T)) \cdot (x_h \otimes x_{h'}) + \sum_{i \in [m]} F_h \cdot (I + Z_v) \cdot x_h + e \right)
= \vec{c}_0 + \vec{v}^T \cdot \left( \sum_{h, h' \in [m]} G_{h, h'} \cdot ((I + Z_v) \otimes (I + Z_{\tilde{v}})) \cdot (x_h \otimes x_{h'}) \right)
\quad + \vec{v}^T \cdot \sum_{i \in [m]} (I + Z_v) \cdot (I + Z_{\tilde{v}}) \cdot x_h
= \vec{c}_0 + \vec{v}^T \cdot \vec{v}^\dagger \cdot v^T \cdot (I + Z_v) \cdot y
= \vec{c}_0 + \vec{v}^T \cdot Z_v \cdot y,
\]
where the last equality follows from Lemma 3.

\[
\tilde{id}(c_0) = \vec{v}^T \cdot v^\dagger \cdot v^T \cdot y = \vec{v}^T \cdot (I + Z_v) \cdot y = \vec{c}_0 + \vec{v}^T \cdot Z_v \cdot y, \quad \text{and} \quad \hat{id}(c_0) = \vec{v}^T \cdot v^\dagger \cdot v^T \cdot y = \vec{v}^T \cdot (I + Z_v) \cdot y = \vec{c}_0 + \vec{v}^T \cdot Z_v \cdot y.
\]