Efficient Linkable Ring Signature from Vector Commitment inexplicably named Multratug

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Abstract In this paper we revise the idea of our previous work ‘Lin2-Xor lemma and Log-size Linkable Threshold Ring Signature’ and introduce another lemma, called Lin2-Choice, which extends the Lin2-Xor lemma. Using a membership proof protocol defined in the Lin2-Choice lemma, we create a compact general-purpose trusted-setup-free log-size linkable threshold ring signature called EFLRSL. The signature size is $2 \log_2(n+1) + 3l + 1$, where $n$ is the ring size and $l$ is the threshold. It is composed of several public coin arguments that are special honest verifier zero-knowledge and have computational witness-extended emulation. As the base building block which contributes most to the size, we use a black-box pivot argument that proves knowledge of a committed scalar vector. This makes our signature combinable with other proofs with further size reduction. Also, we present an extended version of the EFLRSL signature of size $2 \log_2(n+1+l+1) + 7l + 4$, aliased as Multratug, which simultaneously proves balance and allows for easy multiparty signing. All this takes place in a prime-order group without bilinear parings under the decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model. Both of our signatures are unforgeable w.r.t insider corruption and are also EU-CMA. They remain anonymous even for non-uniformly distributed and malformed keys, which makes it possible to use them as a log-size drop-in replacement for LSAG-based schemes.

Keywords: ring signature, linkable ring signature, log-size signature, threshold, anonymity, blockchain, hidden amounts, sum proof, zero-knowledge, unforgeability, non-frameability, witness-extended emulation.

1 INTRODUCTION

In the paper [26] we created a log-size linkable threshold ring signature based on the Lin2-Xor lemma, which we proved there. Now we want to know two things, namely, can we generalize the Lin2-Xor lemma using an arbitrary vector commitment argument that has computational witness-extended emulation (cWEE) and is special honest verifier zero-knowledge (sHVZK)? Also, can we get a linkable threshold ring signature out of it that is more efficient in size and verification time?

We answer both of these questions in the affirmative. Lin2-Choice lemma and its accompanying efficient ring signature we present herein seem to be useful findings. Our new ring signature keeps using the linking tag of the form $x^{-1} \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(xG)$, and also has a version with the linking tag form $x \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(xG)$, which is time-tested since the work by Liu, Wei, and Wong [20]. Although, both of these linking tags are indistinguishable from each other and from the independent uniform randomness [26, 11].

By vector commitment, or equivalently by commitment to a vector, we mean a weighted sum of a predefined set of orthogonal generators in a group that binds the corresponding weight vector. By vector commitment argument we mean a proof of knowledge of such a bound weight vector. Vector commitment argument is the pivotal unit for the other our arguments in this paper.

The signature we present, called EFLRSL, turns out to be extensible; we also introduce an extended version of it, called Multratug, which in addition to proving knowledge of signing keys also proves the sum of hidden amounts. By proof of the sum of hidden amounts, proof of balance for short, we mean that prover demonstrates a blinded commitment to some secret amount and proves that this secret amount is equal to the sum of those amounts which correspond to the actual signing keys and are also blinded. To construct the extended version of our signature we provide one more lemma, Lin2-2Choice, as we call it.

We will not repeat common words about signatures from the introduction of [26], they all remain valid. We will keep our presentation brief, considering that many detailed explanations can be taken from [26] as well as from the work of Benedikt Bünz et al. [6]. As another basic ingredient, we will now use what we think is an elegant way of turning a protocol into zero-knowledge by adding noise in a separate orthogonal dimension, which we found in the work of Heewon Chung et al. [8]. Although, this method of making a protocol zero-knowledge seems to have been introduced a bit earlier, e.g., in the work of Attema and Cramer [2].
Overall, in this paper we assume that a reader has an understanding of the works [6, 8, 26] and possesses an appropriate intuition, so we keep our descriptions and proofs concise, otherwise the paper would be too long. Moreover, since the methods of proving sHVZK and cWEE properties of protocols are already widely known, e.g., from [6, 8, 2], and the same for unforgeability, anonymity, and other properties of signatures, e.g., from [20, 13, 11, 22], we describe only the key points for our proofs, believing that they suffice to reconstruct all the details of interest.

1.1 MOTIVATION

Besides the two questions we have already outlined at the beginning, our motive in creating this paper is that we see no one among the most prominent log-size ring signatures available nowadays that is as universally applicable as the linear-size schemes originating from AOS [1] and LSAG [20]. Of course, we are considering only the portion of the large number of existing signatures that does not require trusted setups or curve pairings, and is under the types of Diffie-Hellman assumption.

By the universal applicability of a signature scheme we mean a possibility of using it, maybe with some additive modifications, for solving the following list of problems:

- regular anonymous 1-out-of-many signing,
- signing only once (linkable ring signature),
- simultaneous proof of balance (support of hidden amounts),
- \(l\)-out-of-\(n\) signing (threshold case, we use the word ‘threshold’ in this sense hereinafter and assume \(l \ll n\) for performance comparison; signature size is expected to be less than simply \(l\times\)1-out-of-many case size),
- the case when public keys are formed according to the CryptoNote [28] protocol rules (which are adopted in many blockchains these days),
- and also the most general case when public keys are not restricted by anything (e.g., can be generated ad hoc and be completely malformed, nevertheless the LSAG signature remains secure and anonymous with them).

In addition, it is desirable that a signature allows for easy implementation of multiparty signing operations, especially in the blockchain context (multisignature operations, described, e.g., in [14]).

After conducting a kind of pragmatic research, we found that the recently proposed linear-size CLSAG scheme [11], which generalizes and optimizes LSAG, solves all the listed problems except for the threshold case. So, we took CLSAG for reference and compared the applicability of the currently known top-performance log-size schemes with it; the results are collected in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Signature</th>
<th>Log-sz</th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Linkable</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Thresh.</th>
<th>Blockchain</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>MP*</th>
<th>MP**</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLSAG [11]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lelantus Spark [14]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Triptych [22]</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>RingCT3.0 [29]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omniring [18]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>DualRing-EC [30]</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* Many-out-of-many size with threshold \(l\) is asymptotically, for big \(n\) and \(l\), lower than \(1\)-out-of-many size times \(l\).

** Multiparty signing is easy to implement.

All of the considered schemes are log-size, except for the referenced CLSAG, and they all provide the functionality of a regular ring signature. They are roughly ordered by size in the table. Of course, their versions that implement additional check-marked properties contribute extra bytes to the sizes.

The most size and verification time efficient DualRing-EC signature [30] doesn’t have any linkable version by-design. Although, its security model requires only properly generated keys, a forgery for the contrary case is shown in Appendix Y.

All the other log-size signatures are linkable by-design, however, for each of them, linkability seems to can be eliminated in a trivial way (just for the sake of this comparison). All of them include balance proofs and are compatible with CryptoNote public keys, aka stealth addresses [28], of the form \(B + H_{\text{scalar}}(rA)\cdot G\). Only RingCT3.0 [29] and Omniring [18] substantially save signature space when several signers sign simultaneously. Triptych [22], RingCT3.0, and Omniring have linking tags of the form \(U/x\), where \(U\) is a predefined generator; this fact deanonymizes them in the general case, as we show in Appendix Z.
The fact of having private key \( x \) in the tag’s denominator also makes it hard to implement multisignature operations. Lelantus Spark [14] has its own subsystem that solves this problem, however, the entire scheme seems too narrowly tied to decentralized anonymous payments to be considered general (we compare to the general case for our pure interest, most of the top-performing schemes are claimed only as blockchain payment oriented).

Omniring has a version with linking tag form \( xH_{\text{point}}(xG) \), the same form is used in CLSAG. This tag is invulnerable to malformed keys and is multisignature-friendly, however the original Omniring paper [18] provides security model only for the less secure \( U/x \) tag. So, we have to assume that both versions of the scheme are bound to the CryptoNote stealth addresses regardless of the tag used. As confirmed by the Omniring authors, there is no claim that the scheme will be anonymous with malformed keys in the scenario described in Appendix Z, in which LSAG and CLSAG still remain to be.

So, our second motivation is to try to create a general-purpose scheme that covers all the properties specified in Table 1, as shown in Table 2, and is also close to the bottom of the table, i.e., is of a relatively good size for typical use cases.

Table 2: Applicability of our scheme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EFLRSL / Multiratug</th>
<th>Log-sz</th>
<th>Regular</th>
<th>Linkable</th>
<th>Balance</th>
<th>Thresh.</th>
<th>Blockchain</th>
<th>General</th>
<th>MP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

With all this, our main objective remains to determine what can be obtained from the Lin2-Choice and Lin2-2Choice lemma protocols presented in this paper, and how practical it would be. In the most elementary cryptographic group and with minimal additional means, i.e., using a compact vector commitment argument without even involving the inner product argument.

### 1.2 COMMITMENT TO VECTOR, VECTOR COMMITMENT, AND ITS ARGUMENT

Our pivotal protocol, which all proofs of membership and signatures in this paper ultimately refer to by calling it only once in the last step, is a vector commitment argument. Throughout this paper, by the vector commitment or by the commitment to a vector, we use these terms interchangeably, we mean a published element \( P \) such that \( P = (a, P) \), where \( P \) is a vector of orthogonal generators in a group, and \( a \) is a vector of scalar weights, typically large. Vector commitment argument, respectively, is an argument that proves knowledge of all the weights in \( a \) at once.

This is similar to the Sum Argument defined in [30], however our implementation is a bit different.

The term vector commitment is already used in the literature for a construction described, e.g., in [7, 19, 12], in relation to groups with bilinear pairings. On the contrary, we denote by this term a construction in a pairings-free group that can be thought of as an extremely simplified form of the construction from [7]. In favor of our notation is, for example, a similar construction in [4].

A blinded version of the vector commitment of the form \( P = (a, P) + \alpha H \), where \( H \) is orthogonal to \( P \), and \( \alpha \) is independently uniformly sampled, is commonly called as Pedersen vector commitment. It is defined in [6] as an extension to Pedersen commitment [23]. In our terminology, Pedersen vector commitment is a subset of the vector commitment. Both of the vector commitment and Pedersen vector commitment are binding, however only the latter is necessarily hiding, and the former becomes hiding only when blinded.

### 1.3 RELATED WORK

The closely resembling argument, in terms of its role in the larger scheme and its construction, is the compressed pivotal argument by Attema and Cramer in [2]. Our implementation of the vector commitment argument can be thought of as a subset case of this compressed pivot with the empty set of connected linear forms \( L \equiv \emptyset \). Further in their work, Attema and Cramer obtain results for \( L \neq \emptyset \). Meanwhile, we investigate the other direction from the point \( L \equiv \emptyset \) by studying what happens if the base set of orthogonal generators \( P \) varies with challenges.

For a prime-order group without bilinear pairings, historically there are two main methods of constructing trusted-setup-free log-size membership proofs and signatures in it. The first of them derives from the identification scheme and its variations by Groth and Kohlweiss [13], and the second comes from the inner product argument and subsequent proof for an arbitrary arithmetic circuit by Bünz et al. [6].

We have already outlined the recent efficient schemes in Table 1. Thus, Triptych [22] and Lelantus Spark [14] rely on the idea of Groth and Kohlweiss [13] by building on top of it. At the same time, RingCT3.0 [29] and Omniring [18] heavily employ the inner product argument by Bünz et al. [6]. Also, there exist a number of other discrete-log, prime-order, pairings-free, trusted-setup-free, log-size schemes and approaches, which we do not mention because of their lower efficiency compared to the top-performers [29, 18, 22, 14].

The DualRing-EC signature by Tsz Hon Yuen et al. [30] has a rather restrictive security model, nevertheless it advances an elegant idea of better compression. Although we do not use this idea directly, it has inspired us for an
optimized version of our vector commitment argument, which ended up being almost the same as the compressed pivot in [2] and having the strong security model.

An informal introduction to the topic of commitments and log-size arguments in a prime-order group, as well as a detailed explanation of the work [6] including an overview for the corresponding optimization techniques, such as multi-exponentiation and batch verification, can be found in the article by Adam Gibson [10].

Our previous paper [26] represents an approach based on an own identification scheme which is different from [13, 6]. Namely, in [26] we provide the early results of what can be obtained by building the ring $P$ of element pairs and ‘rotating’ them with challenges. However, the signature constructed in [26] is somewhat large in size. In the current paper, we will reinvent the idea of [26] immediately targeting many-out-of-many proofs and will obtain the much more efficient schemes this way. Nonetheless, now we will still use all the definitions of the signature properties, e.g., unforgeability, anonymity, non-frameability collected in [26].

Recent work by Russell W. F. Lai et al. [17] introduces a method of building succinct arguments for bilinear group arithmetic. The method relies on an enhanced commitment, which in addition to a scalar vector can contain group elements as witnesses to a system of generalized bilinear relations which is further compressed. The method is presented in a group with pairings and can be applied equally well in non-pairing groups, as shown in [16]. Possibility of constructing a variety of signatures using the bilinear group arithmetic also follows from [17].

The subsequent work by Thomas Attema et al. [3] takes a more efficient approach to constructing the bilinear group arithmetic relations while retaining the same type of the enhanced commitment. An efficient transparent setup threshold signature scheme (TSS) is built in [3], giving an idea of its applicability and size. Compared to our current work, first of all, in the TSS terminology ‘threshold’ means that $k$ signatures can be dynamically merged after creation, which is stronger than our ‘threshold’ that simply requires $l$ signing keys when creating a signature. Second, merged TSS size is independent of $k$, whereas our signatures have linear by $l$ sizes. Third, for large ring sizes $n$ the asymptote of TSS is at least $4[\log_2(n)]$, while the asymptote of our signatures is $2[\log_2(n)]$. Thus, TSS is more space efficient for big thresholds. Our region of interest, however, is low thresholds with large rings, and our signatures are more efficient within it.

### 1.4 CONTRIBUTION

This paper proposes the following novel efficient trusted-setup-free pairings-free DDH-based log-size schemes, including the concise general-purpose EFLRSL and blockchain-oriented balance-proof Multratug signatures.

They are based on an arbitrary vector commitment argument, which can be taken as a subset of the inner product argument from [6] to begin with. They use neither the full inner product argument from [6], nor a bilinear group arithmetic as in [17, 3], and are also based on the underlying proving system different from [13].

#### 1.4.1 LIN2-CHOICE LEMMA’S MEMBERSHIP PROOF

Lin2-Choice lemma is a generalization of the Lin2-Xor lemma [26] to the case of $n$ pairs of elements. Having a ring $P = \{P_i\}^{n+1}_{i=0}$ of $n$ orthogonal elements and a commitment $Z$ to an arbitrary element $P_x \in P$, using the Lin2-Choice lemma protocol it is possible to prove membership of $Z$ in $P$. This, itself, takes only 1 group elements and 1 scalar, to which the size of an externally employed vector commitment argument is added.

Thus, the lemma provides a concise 1-out-of-many membership proof. The design of the lemma protocol is quite simple. In addition, it easily extends into a many-out-of-many membership proof. Also, the external vector commitment argument can be shared with other protocols to save space.

We prove in detail that the lemma’s membership proof has computational witness-extended emulation (cWEE). We also informally show why it is special honest verifier zero-knowledge (shVZK), referring to the similar design in [2, 8] which is formally proved there.

#### 1.4.2 EFLRSL SIGNATURE

EFLRSL is a regular linkable threshold ring signature immediately derived from the many-out-of-many version of the Lin2-Choice lemma proof of membership, with size

$$2[\log_2(n + 1)] + 3l + 1.$$

This is a simplified version of our larger Multratug signature, without any balance proof or multiparty signing, with an uncomplicated design and linking tag (aka key image) form $x^{-1}H_{\text{point}}(xG)$.

Nevertheless, EFLRSL is general-purpose, that is, it suits for environments where keys can be generated by signers ad hoc and be arbitrarily malformed. For example, EFLRSL is appropriate for implementing whistleblowing or e-voting systems, for which LSAG [20] used to be chosen. Compared to the streamlined versions of the recent top-performance schemes listed in Table 1, EFLRSL appears to be by far the best sized simple general-purpose linkable ring signature, the respective comparison is shown in Table 10.
Since EFLRSL is based on a proof of membership which, according to the Lin2-Choice lemma, is shHVZK and has cWEE, the signature appears to be unforgeable and anonymous. We provide a proof sketch for this, mostly referring to the work in [20, 22, 11, 13, 26], where the situation is similar and the appropriate proof techniques are provided in detail.

1.4.3 LIN2-2CHOICE LEMMA’S MEMBERSHIP PROOF WITH ADDITIONAL ELEMENT

Lin2-2Choice lemma is an extended version of the Lin2-Choice lemma; its protocol comprises \( l \) instances of the Lin2-Choice lemma 1-out-of-many membership proof, each of them extended in such a way as to select a linear combination of exactly two elements of the ring instead of one. All together optimized.

It can be introduced by the following example. For the ring \( \mathbb{P} \cup \mathbb{V} = \{ p_i \}_{i=0}^{n-1} \cup \{ V_k \}_{k=0}^{l-1} \) of \((n+l)\) elements and a set of \( l \) commitments \( Z = \{ Z_k \}_{k=0}^{l-1} \), using the Lin2-2Choice lemma protocol it is possible to convince verifier that, for each \( Z_k \in Z \), there holds \( Z_k = p_k P_{x_k} + v_k V_k \) for some \( p_k, v_k, s_k \) known to prover. This takes only \( 2l \) group elements and \( l \) scalars, plus the size of an external vector commitment argument.

We prove in detail that this extended membership proof has cWEE, and also informally show it is shHVZK, referring to the similar design in [8]. The lemma’s protocol appears to be so generic that later on we use it to substitute linking tag \( x \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(\lambda G) \) for \( x^{-1} \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(\lambda G) \) in the Multratug signature.

1.4.4 HELPER ARGUMENT: RANDOM WEIGHTING FOR T-S TUPLES

Suppose we have two tuples, possibly blinded. Taking their inner products with a random scalar vector, we wonder: if these inner products are shown to be proportional to each other, does this prove that the tuples are elementwise and with the same factor proportional to each other? This question emerged in one of our proofs. We wonder: if these inner products are shown to be proportional to each other, does this prove that the tuples are elementwise and with the same factor proportional to each other? This question emerged in one of our proofs.

1.4.5 MULTRATUG SIGNATURE WITH BALANCE PROOF

Multratug is an universally applicable ring signature derived from the Lin2-2Choice lemma protocol. It simultaneously provides a proof of balance. Multratug has linking tag \( x \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(\lambda G) \) and also has all the properties check-marked in Table 2, its size is

\[
2[\log_2(n + l + 1)] + 7l + 4.
\]

We provide a proof sketch for its unforgeability and anonymity, and also prove correctness of its balance in detail.

Multratug expands the scope of EFLRSL by adding support for hidden amounts and multisignature operations. Multratug is suitable for blockchains. Since the multisignature operations are typically a must-have feature for contemporary blockchains, it makes sense to compare Multratug only with those signatures that allow them (column ‘MP’ in Table 1). The full comparison results are shown in Table 8 and in Table 9.

1.5 PREVIEW OF THE CORE PROTOCOLS

1.5.1 LIN2-CHOICE LEMMA’S MEMBERSHIP PROOF

For the orthogonal ring \( \mathbb{P} = \{ p_i \}_{i=0}^{n-1} \) and commitment \( Z \), the Lin2-Choice lemma protocol proves membership of \( Z \) in \( \mathbb{P} \). In a nutshell, it looks as the following game, although we simplify it for this preview.

At the start both of the prover and verifier have \( Z \) and \( P \). They jointly pick \( n \) helper generators \( Q = \{ Q_i \}_{i=0}^{n-1} \) such that all elements of \( \mathbb{P} \cup \mathbb{Q} \) are orthogonal to each other. The prover publishes an element \( F \). Then the verifier releases challenges \( c = \{ c_i \}_{i=0}^{n-1} \), and the prover replies with a scalar \( r \). Next, the verifier releases random \( \delta \). Finally, the prover convinces the verifier using an arbitrary vector commitment argument that the element \( Z \) defined as

\[
Z = Z + \delta r F
\]

is a weighted sum, with weights known to the prover, of elements from the set

\[
\{ P_i + \delta c_i Q_i \}_{i=0}^{n-1}.
\]

The involved vector commitment argument must be shHVZK and has to have cWEE. Also, note, the commitment \( Z \) and all elements published by prover are blinded, we omit showing the blinding components in this preview.

It turns out that the above game succeeds only if either there exists some nonzero scalar \( p \) known to the prover such that \( p^{-1} Z \in \mathbb{P} \), or if there holds \( Z = 0 \). The Lin2-Choice lemma guarantees this.
1.5.2 LIN2-2CHOICE LEMMA’S MEMBERSHIP PROOF

Compared to the Lin2-Choice lemma’s simplified game, one for the Lin2-2Choice lemma looks as follows. The former ring $P$ expands to $(n + l)$ entries by the second part $V = \{V_k\}_{k=0}^{n-1}$ together with the jointly picked helper generators $W = \{W_k\}_{k=0}^{n-1}$.

So, now at the start both of the prover and verifier have the ring $P \cup V$, the set of commitments $Z = \{Z_k\}_{k=0}^{n-1}$, and the set of helper generators $Q \cup W$ such that all elements of $P \cup V \cup Q \cup W$ are orthogonal to each other. The prover publishes $l$ element pairs $(F_k, E_k)$, $k \in [0 \ldots l - 1]$, the verifier releases random $c = (c_i)_{i=0}^{n+l-1}$, the prover replies with $l$ scalars $r_i$, $k \in [0 \ldots l - 1]$, the verifier releases random $\delta_1, \delta_2$. The prover convinces the verifier that, for each $k \in [0 \ldots l - 1]$, the element $\hat{Z}_k$ built as

$$\hat{Z}_k = Z_k + \delta_1 r_k F_k + \delta_2 c_n E_k$$

is a weighted sum, with weights known to the prover, of elements from the set

$$\{p_i + \delta_1 c_i Q_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \cup \{V_{i-n} + \delta_2 c_i W_{i-n}\}_{i=n}^{n+l-1}. \quad (1)$$

Moreover, for all $\hat{Z}_k$’s, the prover convinces the verifier of the above in one step by proving that the random sum

$$\sum_{k=0}^{l-1} \lambda_k \hat{Z}_k,$$

with sampled coefficients $\lambda_k$’s, is the weighted sum of elements from the set (1).

The Lin2-2Choice lemma guarantees this game completes successfully only if prover knows indices $s = \{s_k\}_{k=0}^{n-1}$ and scalar factors $p = \{p_k\}_{k=0}^{n-1}, \; v = \{v_k\}_{k=0}^{n-1}$ such that, for each $Z_k \in Z$, there holds

$$Z_k = p_k P_x + v_k V_k.$$

1.5.3 PIVOT: OPTIMIZED VECTOR COMMITMENT ARGUMENT

Our membership proofs invoke the pivotal vector commitment argument directly or indirectly as a black box. As our signatures are built on top of these membership proofs, to be able to prove they are unforgeable we require this black-boxed pivot to be complete, sHVZK, and to have cWEE. We put a preview of one of its possible implementations here, although any other implementation that proves the same having the same properties will do. Note, our pivot is conceptually similar to and can be understood as the compressed pivot with $L \equiv \varnothing$ in [2].

The idea is that initially we build a complete, sHVZK, and having cWEE linear-size Schnorr-like vector commitment argument that convinces verifier that given element $Y$ is a weighted sum, with weights known to the prover, of elements from the set $X = \{X_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1}$ such that all $X_i$’s are orthogonal to each other. It looks as follows. The prover publishes an element $T$ as the first message, the verifier issues a challenge $c$, the prover replies with a scalar vector $\tau$, the verifier checks that $(\tau, X) + c T = T$. This game comprises $n$ played in parallel Schnorr identification protocol games [24], for each $X_i \in X$. The fact that $Y$ and $T$ are necessarily weighted direct sums of $X$ implies all $n$ parallel games are independent of each other, otherwise the orthogonality of $X$ can be shown broken.

Next, for $n > 4$ in this game, instead of replying with $\tau$ the prover replies with a proof of knowledge of $\tau$, which takes only $2[\log_2(n)]$ elements if the reduction from [6] is used. This proof need not be sHVZK, as $\tau$ itself does already reveal nothing. Thus, we obtain a complete, sHVZK, and cWEE optimized vector commitment argument of size $2[\log_2(n)] + 1$.

When $Y$ is blinded, the blinding generator denoted as $H$ is orthogonal to $X$, we usually precompute it as a hash to curve $H_{\text{point}}$ of everything publicly visible at the moment. In this case, we implicitly append $H$ to $X$ in the above game. Thus, the size of the pivotal argument gets increased by one under the logarithm and becomes $2[\log_2(n + 1)] + 1$.

1.5.4 LINKABLE THRESHOLD RING SIGNATURE EFLRSL

Having a ring of public keys (addresses) $P = \{P_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1}$, for the first, we orthogonalize it into the orthogonal decoy set $(P + \zeta U)$, where $U = \{H_{\text{point}}(P_i)\}_{i=0}^{n-1}$ and $\zeta$ is random. The simple linkable ring signature for one actual signer EFLRSL1 is obtained by defining the key image as $I = x^{-1} H_{\text{point}}(x G)$, where $P_s = x G$ for some index $s \in [0 \ldots n - 1]$, and by applying the Lin2-Choice lemma’s membership proof to the commitment $Z = G + \zeta I$ in the above decoy set.

For $l$ instances of EFLRSL1 running in parallel over the same ring $P$, using random weights $l$ instances of the Lin2-Choice lemma’s membership proof easily merge into one. Thus, we obtain the linkable threshold ring signature EFLRSL, which makes only one call to the Lin2-Choice lemma’s membership proof.
1.5.5 MULTRATUG SIGNATURE WITH BALANCE PROOF

Suppose that the ring \( P \) of public keys (addresses) is complemented by the set of hidden (blinded) amounts \( A = \{A_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \) such that, for each index \( i \), the hidden amount \( A_i \in A \) is related to the address \( P_i \in P \). Also, suppose, a total hidden amount \( A^{\text{imp}} \) is given, and the balance with it should be proved.

We might subtract \( A^{\text{imp}} \) from each \( A_i \) and prove that for actual signer this difference contains only the blinding component, as it is done, e.g., in [22]. However, this would prevent us from creating an efficient threshold version of the signature. Therefore, we specify the set \( A^{\text{imp}} = \{A^{\text{imp}}_k\}_{k=0}^{l-1} \) of re-hidden (with re-randomized blinding factor) amounts corresponding to the actual signing indices and, simply put, add them to the end of the ring.

Since we already have in our disposal the Lin2-2Choice lemma’s extended membership proof, we adjust it a bit for our needs by making \( p = v \). This is achieved by adding a new orthogonal generator \( K = \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(Z, P, V, \ldots) \) to each element in \( P \), and subtracting \( K \) from each element in \( V \). Further we do not mention \( K \), and consider that our extended membership proof convinces verifier, for all \( Z_k \in Z \), that

\[
Z_k = p_k(P_{s_k} + V_k), \quad \text{where } s_k, p_k \text{ are known to prover.}
\]

So, the simplified game for Multratug is that at the start both of the prover and verifier have \( P, A, A^{\text{imp}} \), and the helper generators \( Q, W \) required by the Lin2-2Choice lemma protocol. It is impossible to ensure the orthogonality of regular addresses and hidden amounts taken from a blockchain, nevertheless, the orthogonality can easily be established by adding the corresponding hashes-to-group, e.g. as it is done using the hashes \( U \) in Section 1.5.4, we omit showing them in this preview.

After making the appropriate orthogonalization, for a randomly sampled \( \omega \), the prover and verifier have all elements in \( (P - \omega A) \cup \omega A^{\text{imp}} \cup Q \cup W \) orthogonal to each other. Letting, for each \( k \in \{0 \ldots l-1\} \), the commitment \( Z_k \) be equal to \( G \) and using the Lin2-2Choice lemma membership proof, the prover convinces the verifier that it knows \( s_k, p_k \) such that

\[
G = p_k((P_{s_k} - \omega A_{s_k}) + \omega A^{\text{imp}}_k).
\]

This equality splits into \( G = p_kP_{s_k} \) and \( A_{s_k} = A^{\text{imp}}_k \). Of course, we have omitted blinding components in this preview. We assume all elements in \( P \) are validated different from each other and nonzero here.

Thus, for all \( k \)'s, the equalities (2) prove knowledge of signing private keys at indices \( s_k \)'s, and also they prove that each \( A^{\text{imp}}_k \) is equal to \( A_{s_k} \) to the accuracy of blinding component. After that, it only remains to check that \( \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} A^{\text{imp}}_k = A^{\text{imp}} \) holds to the accuracy of blinding component, and the balance is proved.

In addition, the Multratug signature replaces the inherited from EFLRLSL key image \( x^{-1}\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(xG) \) with \( x\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(xG) \), using the same technique as for proving the equalities of hidden amounts to their re-hidden counterparts in \( A^{\text{imp}} \). Section 9.1.2 explains this in detail.

2 PRELIMINARIES

We first outline the definitions, assumptions, and methods that we borrow from the base works. Also, we specify the notation and base environment we use in this paper. Since we construct our signatures from many lesser protocols, we combine the latter under the name of underlying proving system.

2.1 DEFINITIONS AND BASE WORKS

2.1.1 CONTEXT

All our protocols, including the helpers schemes and signatures, perform for a prime-order group without bilinear pairings in a trustless environment under the decisional Diffie–Hellman (DDH) assumption in the random oracle model, as in [6]. All of our protocols are written as interactive, however, we always imply the existence of their non-interactive Fiat–Shamir counterparts not mentioning them.

All the context, namely, the common reference string, trustless setup, discrete logarithm (DL) relation and DDH assumptions, orthogonality, commitment binding and hiding, non-interactivity through Fiat-Shamir heuristic, perfect completeness (we call it simply completeness), argument of knowledge, special honest verifier zero-knowledge (sHVZK) and computational witness-extended emulation (cWEE) definitions and proof methods, which we use, are exactly the same as in [6, 8]. Taking them as already well known, we do not quote or explain them in detail to save space, instead referring simply to the fact that they correspond to and can be copied from [6].

2.1.2 COMMON WITH OUR PREVIOUS WORK

As a syntactic sugar we use the shorthands ‘‘∼’’, ‘‘lin’’, ‘‘ort’’ defined in [26], although they can be resolved and omitted. We use additive notation for exponentiation of group elements, as, e.g., in [22, 26]. We refer to [26] for
proving some few auxiliary statements, for example, to prove the statistical indistinguishability of each other for
the linking tags in the forms $x\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(xG)$ and $x^{-1}\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(xG)$.

In [26] we have collected the existing definitions of linkable ring signature, its variations and security models
from various sources; we use these definitions hereinafter, with the only one difference in that what in [26] is called
a generic linkable ring signature now we simply call a linkable ring signature.

2.1.3 RELATIONS AND UNIQUENESS OF WITNESS

We use the same method of proving soundness of our protocols as in [6]. Namely, for each of them, we prove
that it has cWEE for the corresponding polynomial-time-decidable relation denoted as $\mathcal{R}$. It should be observed
that while cWEE implies prover’s knowledge of $\mathcal{R}$’s witness, it does not guarantee that the witness is unique. We
use the term uniqueness in the same sense as [6, 26]. And, prover’s private input is always $\mathcal{R}$’s witness in this paper.

In most cases, as in [6], the uniqueness follows from the fact that witness contains an opening of some binding
commitment included in the statement in $\mathcal{R}$. When this is not the case or is not obvious, we prove uniqueness by
showing that knowing two different witnesses causes breaking the DL relation assumption.

2.2 NOTATION

Here is a list of basic notations and shorthands

- $G$ is a prime-order group, $\mathbb{F}_p$ is its corresponding scalar field.
- $\bar{\mathbb{F}}$ denotes a big prime chosen to be the order of the group $G$ and, respectively, of its scalar field $\mathbb{F}_p$.
- lowercase italic and lowercase Greek letters denote scalars in $\mathbb{F}_p$. Apostrophes, hats, and subscript indices
could be appended, e.g., $a, b_{12}, c', \zeta, x_k$. Also, lowercase italic and, sometimes, Greek letters denote
integers used as indices or limits, e.g., $n, i, j_1, s_k, x_\pi$, this usage is clear from context. Superscripts, e.g.,
$\epsilon^i$, denote scalar exponentiation.
- a special case is a lowercase italic letter with a bold superscript, such as $d^{\text{Assum}}$; it stands for the usual scalar
in $\mathbb{F}_p$, and the superscript in bold is purely explanatory.
- bold lowercase italic and bold lowercase Greek letters denote scalar vectors, e.g., $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}, \alpha$.
- bold lowercase Gothic letters denote scalar matrices, e.g., $\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}$.
- uppercase italic letters denote elements in $G$. Apostrophes, hats, and subscript indices can be appended, e.g.,
$A, B_{12}, D', P_{s_k}$. Multiplication syntax is used to denote element exponentiation by a scalar, e.g., $xG$.
- a special case is an uppercase italic letter with a bold superscript, such as $A^{\text{Assum}}$; it stands for the regular
element in $G$, and the superscript in bold is purely explanatory.
- bold uppercase italic letters denote element vectors, e.g., $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{P}$.
- $\bar{n}$ denotes a maximum number of elements in a ring.
- The zero element in $G$ and the zero scalar in $\mathbb{F}_p$ are denoted as $0$; it is clear from context which set $0$ belongs
to. A vector of $n$ zeros is denoted either as $\mathbf{0}^n$ or as $\{0\}^n$, both notations are equivalent.
- asterisk denotes that zero entries are excluded. That is, $\mathbb{F}_p^*$ means $\mathbb{F}_p$ without the scalar $0$, $G^*$ means $G$
without the element $0$. Substantially, for vectors, if $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_p^{\bar{n}}$, $\mathbf{P} \in G^{\bar{n}r}$, then $\mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{P}$ are assumed to contain
no zeros in any position.
- star denotes Klein star. For instance, $M \in \{0, 1\}^*$ means $M$ is a bitstring.
- $\mathcal{H}_{\text{scalar}}$ and $\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}$ are the ideal hash and hash to group (to curve) functions, respectively.
- $A = \text{lin}(\mathbf{B})$, where $\mathbf{B}$ is a non-empty vector of nonzero elements, means there is a known vector $\mathbf{x}$ such that
$A = \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{B} \rangle$. The syntactic sugar $A \sim B$ is equivalent to $A = \text{lin}(\{B\})$.
- $A \neq \text{lin}(\mathbf{B})$, where $\mathbf{B}$ is a non-empty vector of nonzero elements, means that weights in $A$’s representation
as a weighted sum of elements in $\mathbf{B}$ cannot be found. The sugar $A \sim B$ is equivalent to $A = \text{lin}(\{B\})$.
This is in accordance with the DL relation assumption [26]. If $S$ is a set of $\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}$ images on different
pre-images, then there always holds $\text{ort}(S)$. As an equivalent definition, $\text{ort}(S)$ actually means that, for each
element $E \in S$, no one in the system knows weights in $E$’s representation as a weighted sum of elements in $S \setminus \{E\}$. Note, if $S$ contains the zero element, then $\text{ort}(S)$ never holds.
- we say that all elements in $S$ are orthogonal to each other, iff $\text{ort}(S)$ holds. We emphasize this because
‘orthogonal to each other’ can be read as pairwise orthogonality, which certainly is a weaker property. Here
and elsewhere, by writing that elements in $S$ are orthogonal to each other we always imply the stronger
property, namely, that $\text{ort}(S)$ holds.
• nz(B) means a subset of B containing all nonzero elements found in B.
• access to vector and matrix items is performed using Python notation, as in [6]. Also, having a vector, say, A, we imply that A_i denotes i-th item of A, i.e., we imply that A_i is an alias of A[i] and therefore A_i = A[i]. Often we write explicitly ‘let A_i ← A[i]’, although the equality is already implied.
• appending an element into a vector is denoted by comma, e.g., \( \hat{X} ← [X, B] \) means that \( \hat{X} = [X_0, \ldots, X_{n-1}, B] \).
• when writing down our protocols we mix several assignment styles, they all are construed as the imperative assignment. That is, e.g., the expression ‘let \( x ← y \)’ means the same as ‘assign \( x = y \)’. Typically we use ‘let \( x ← y \)’ to indicate that \( x \) gets the value of \( y \) and both of them won’t change.
• as a rule, when we use the letter \( n \) to represent an integer, we assume that \( n \) is subject to an additional restriction, e.g., that \( n \) or \( (n + 1) \) is a power of 2. The exact body of this restriction is entirely determined by a concrete vector commitment argument in which this \( n \) is directly or indirectly used.
• everywhere \( \log_2(\ldots) \) is meant as its ceiling \( \lceil \log_2(\ldots) \rceil \), when used together with integers in formulas.

2.3 COMMONLY AVAILABLE INFORMATION

With the above notation all the commonly available to both of \( P \) and \( V \) information is shown in Figure 1. This information is also assumed to be accessible in all protocols hereinafter.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Common information</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• A big prime number ( \bar{p} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Definition of a finite scalar field ( \mathbb{F}_{\bar{p}} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Definition of a prime-order group ( G ) over ( \mathbb{F}_{\bar{p}} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• A generator ( G ) of the group ( G )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 1: Information available to each party

2.4 UNDERLYING PROVING SYSTEM

In this paper we construct a number of arguments and use them as building blocks for our signatures. For each of the arguments, we are interested in the three properties, namely, in completeness, sHVZK, and cWEE.

Completeness is seen from the code of the protocols, we do not dwell on it. The sHVZK property requires building a simulator in each case. Fortunately, almost (this ‘almost’ is due to a couple of easy exceptional cases outlined in Section 2.4.2) all of our arguments can be rendered zero-knowledge using the concise and currently widely known method presented, e.g., in the works of Attema et al.[2], Chung et al.[8]. Namely, each scalar in our protocol public transcripts is by-design masked with an independently and uniformly sampled summand, whereas each element \( E \) in the transcripts either is completely dependent or has the form

\[
E = X + \mu H,
\]

where \( X \) is the value component of the element \( E \). And, \( H \) is a blinding generator built in such a way as to be clearly orthogonal to everything else, \( \mu \) is always an independently and uniformly sampled scalar.

The intuition here is that the form (3) is Pedersen commitment [23, 6], which is perfectly hiding [6]. Thus, we refer to the work [8], where the public transcript have the same structure and the corresponding simulator is constructed. We will imply that for each of our protocols a simulator is built in the same way as in [8], and we will not build it explicitly.

For each of our arguments, we prove its cWEE property in detail by constructing an extractor that restores witness performing polynomial number of rewindings. For some elementary protocols, we instead refer to the works where detailed information about building their extractors can be found. For each of our extractors, we also prove that the obtained witness meets the corresponding protocol relation limits and is unique, otherwise the extractor breaks the DL relation assumption in a polynomial number of steps.

2.4.1 CONNECTION TO SIGNATURES

Thus, by the above, each of our signatures relies on a complete, sHVZK, and cWEE underlying proving system. Therefore, to establish unforgeability, anonymity, and other their properties we refer to the work in [20, 11, 26], where these properties are obtained from the sHVZK and cWEE properties of the undrlying proving systems for the signatures with key images \( x \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(xG) \) or \( x^{-1} \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(xG) \).
2.4.2 EXCEPTIONAL SHVZK CASES

We have the only two exceptional sHVZK protocols which do not follow the form (3) for their public transcript elements. Anyway, their sHVZK can be easily established. The first of them is the two-element Schnorr-like scheme in Figure 2, which splits into two Schnorr-id protocols and, hence, can be proven sHVZK by combining outputs of two Schnorr-id simulators.

The second one is the optimized version of our pivot vector commitment argument in Figure 27, previewed in Section 1.5.3. It is sHVZK since its first message \( T \) is the sum of elements, each randomized according to the Schnorr-id scheme. At the same time, the scalar vector \( \tau \) it needs not to be hidden. That is, the argument is already sHVZK with open \( \tau \), and the replacement of \( \tau \) with its proof of knowledge does not revoke the sHVZK property of the entire argument.

As another way of proving the above, it suffices to recall the argument in Figure 27 is a subset case (with minor differences which do not affect core properties) of the compressed pivot in [2]. Hence, proof of sHVZK for the argument in Figure 27 can be borrowed from [2]. Moreover, the argument in Figure 2 is a subset case of the argument in Figure 27, therefore for both of our exceptional sHVZK cases we can simply refer to the proof in [2].

2.5 INFORMAL INTERPRETATION

Proving the cWEE property for each protocol is a necessary and one of the difficult steps when designing a cryptosystem under the DL assumption. However, to create a protocol when it doesn’t already exist, neither the cWEE property definition nor sHVZK gives an idea of what it should look like. Fortunately, we can use the following metaphor when constructing the protocols we need. This metaphor allows us to guess what those protocols might be for which we are likely to have a chance to prove that they have cWEE.

The metaphor is that all elements in \( G \) can be thought of as vectors of an infinite-dimensional linear space with countable base \( \mathcal{U} \) over \( \mathbb{F}_p \). A set of orthogonal elements in a protocol corresponds to a set of linearly independent vectors in \( \mathcal{U} \) which determine a linear subspace in it. Note, others vectors of the protocol are not assumed as belonging to this subspace by default. Addition and multiplication by a scalar in \( \mathcal{U} \) are the same as in \( G \). Calculating the dot product between two vectors in \( \mathcal{U} \) is assumed hard, which corresponds to the DL assumption in \( G \). This metaphor allows for a geometrical interpretation of the protocols.

For example, the well-known Schnorr-id scheme can be interpreted as the following game in \( \mathcal{U} \). For two given vectors \( G \) and \( Y \), prover \( P \) must convince verifier \( V \) that \( Y \) is collinear to \( G \). Note that \( V \) itself cannot check whether this is the case by taking the dot product between \( G \) and \( Y \). So, \( P \) publishes some vector \( T \), then \( V \) issues a challenge \( c \) and \( P \) replies with the factor \( r \) such that \( rG = T - cY \), thus showing that the vector \( (T - cY) \) is collinear to \( G \). As \( c \) is random, this convinces \( V \) that both of \( T \) and \( Y \) are collinear to \( G \).

As another example, consider the simplest case of the reduction by Bünz et al. [6], where \( P \) proves that given \( Y \) belongs to the plane of \( X_0 \) and \( X_1 \) by demonstrating some \( L \) and \( R \) such that \( \hat{Y} = Y + \epsilon^2 L + \epsilon^{-2} R \) holds for a random \( \epsilon \), and also, for \( \hat{Y} \) it is shown that it belongs the plane of \( X_0 \) and \( X_1 \). It is easy to see that the vector \((\epsilon^2 L + \epsilon^{-2} R)\) is randomly placed in the plane of vectors \( L \) and \( R \). Therefore, if \( Y \) does not belong to the same plane, then \( \hat{Y} \) will not be in any predetermined plane. However, as defined right above, it is shown that \( \hat{Y} \) belongs to the predetermined plane which is of \( X_0 \) and \( X_1 \). So \( Y \) belongs to the plane of \( L \) and \( R \), and hence \( \hat{Y} \) belongs to it too. However, \( \hat{Y} \) belongs to the plane of \( X_0 \) and \( X_1 \), which means that \( Y, L, R \) also belong to the plane of \( X_0 \) and \( X_1 \).

Since this is an informal method, we will not mention it further in the text, except for a few informal explanations. And, of course, we do not use it in the formal proofs. Anyway, keeping this metaphor in mind can be helpful in understanding our arguments.

3 ELEMENTARY PROTOCOLS

We begin with the simple protocols, each representing an argument of knowledge for the corresponding basic relation. We will use these arguments later in our lemmas and signatures. Although, generally speaking, they can be used independently or as the parts of other systems. And, concrete implementations of those in Section 3.1.1 and Section 3.1.2 are not decisive; other implementations will do, as long as they prove the same relations and are complete, sHVZK, and have cWEE.

Some of the relations given below clearly can be interpreted as definitions of binding commitments, and we call their respective elements commitments. For most of them, the binding property follows directly from binding of Pedersen vector commitment [6]. In any case, for all of our arguments their relations have unique witnesses, as we have already pointed out in Section 2.1.3.

As for hiding, we do not require it by default; the sHVZK property of the corresponding arguments suffices for our needs. Anyway, hiding for our commitments follows from hiding of Pedersen vector commitment when scalar factors of the binding generator, usually denoted as \( H \), are independently and uniformly sampled.
3.1 OVERVIEW

3.1.1 TWO ELEMENT COMMITMENT

The first helper protocol is a two-element commitment argument. We denote it as

$\text{zk2ElemComm}(X, H, Y; x, h).$

In this notation, the elements $X, H, Y$ are common input for prover and verifier. And the scalar pair $x, h$ is a prover private input, it is the witness known only to the prover. The protocol $\text{zk2ElemComm}$ is an argument for the relation

$$\mathcal{R} = \{ X, H \in G^*, Y \in G; x, h \in \mathbb{F}_p | Y = xX + hH \},$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

where $X$ and $H$ are orthogonal to each other.

We require $\text{zk2ElemComm}$ to be sHVZK and to have cWEE. Additionally, we require the witness $(x, h)$ of the relation (4) to be proved unique, which fortunately is trivial. In Figure 2 we provide an uncomplicated implementation of this argument.

Overall, $\text{zk2ElemComm}$ convinces verifier that prover knows an unique representation of the element $Y$ as a weighted sum of the orthogonal generators $X$ and $H$ with weights known to the prover. We implement it as a two-generator extension of the Schnorr identification scheme. Its size is one element in $G$ and two scalars in $\mathbb{F}_p$.

The element $Y$ above can be regarded as a commitment that binds its opening $(x, h)$. When $h$ is sampled independently and uniformly, $Y$ becomes hiding as Pedersen commitment. Notable, the $\text{zk2ElemComm}$ protocol itself remains sHVZK for any distribution of $h$, including $h = 0$.

3.1.2 BASIC VECTOR COMMITMENT

Vector commitment argument, which will be playing a pivotal role in our paper, is

$\text{zkVC}_n(X, H, Y; a, \alpha).$

It proves knowledge of an unique witness for the relation

$$\mathcal{R} = \{ X \in G^{n*}, H \in G^*, Y \in G; a \in \mathbb{F}_p^n, \alpha \in \mathbb{F}_p | Y = \langle a, X \rangle + \alpha H \},$$  \hspace{1cm} (5)

where all generators in the set $X \cup \{H\}$ are orthogonal to each other.

Thus, $\text{zkVC}_n$ convinces verifier that prover knows $n + 1$ weights, namely, $a$ and $\alpha$, in the decomposition of $Y$ by the generators $X \cup \{H\}$. The generator $H$ together with its corresponding weight $\alpha$ is used here to turn the protocol into zero-knowledge, as in [8].

Our implementation of $\text{zkVC}_n$ in Figure 3 is based on the inner product argument implementation from [6], which is provided for the following relation there

$$\mathcal{R} = \{ G, H \in G^{n*}, U, P \in G; a, b \in \mathbb{F}_p^n | P = \langle a, G \rangle + \langle b, H \rangle + \langle a, b \rangle U \}. $$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

We modify this relation and the implementation from [6] the next way. First, since we do not actually need the inner product argument, just only its vector commitment part, we zero out the vector $b$ in the relation (6). Thus, the inner product $(a, b)$ becomes equal to zero everywhere. This leaves only the vector commitment argument, i.e., only the argument for the relation

$$\mathcal{R} = \{ G \in G^{n*}, P \in G; a \in \mathbb{F}_p^n | P = \langle a, G \rangle \}. $$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

Second, we append the zero-knowledge property to this argument not the way it is done in [6], instead we append it in a straigher way, as in [8]. Namely, we respectively add the blinding summands $\alpha H$, $\beta H$, and $\gamma H$ to the vector commitment $P$ and to all the $L$ and $R$ elements transmitted during the reduction in [6]. The secret blinding factors $\beta, \gamma$ are sampled independently and uniformly from $\mathbb{F}_p^*$ by $P$; the blinding generator $H$ is chosen to be orthogonal, hence all the transmitted $L$’s and $R$’s appear to be indistinguishable from random noise. We rename the vector $G$ and the commitment $P$ in the relation (7) as $X$ and $Y$ in the relation (5), respectively. The blinding summand $\alpha H$ is taken into account in the relation (5).

Third, for the case $n = 1$ we use our own Schnorr-like sHVZK and cWEE protocol, which is different from sub-protocols used in [6] and [8]. Namely, we use $\text{zk2ElemComm}$ instead, and this does not alter the properties of the entire $\text{zkVC}_n$ protocol.

In sum, our implementation of $\text{zkVC}_n$ is shown in Figure 3. It has the same properties as the implementation of the inner product argument in [6] with $b = 0^n$, plus it is sHVZK and, of course, it remains to be having cWEE.
Compared to the implementations in [6, 8], our zkVCₜ contains no inner product proof. It provides only the proof of knowledge of the opening \((a, α)\) to the vector commitment \(Y\).

This zkVCₜ has size of \(2\lceil \log_2(n) \rceil + 1\) elements in \(G\) and 2 scalar in \(F_p\). Here and elsewhere, when using this implementation we consider \(n\) is a power of 2. Although, as we have already mentioned, our protocols will not be generally bound to a particular realization of zkVCₜ and, hence, when we use its optimized version defined in Section 10 this requirement for \(n\) changes.

### 3.1.3 RANDOM WEIGHTING FOR 3-TUPLES

Another auxiliary argument, 

\[
\text{zk3ElemRW}(P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E; a, α, β, γ)
\]

shown in Figure 4, connects a triplet of orthogonal elements \((P, Q, R)\) with a triplet of arbitrary elements \((Z, F, E)\). One of the two elements \(Q\) and \(R\) in the triplet \((P, Q, R)\) can be zero, in which case the other two elements of the triplet must remain orthogonal to each other. So, the protocol \text{zk3ElemRW} is an argument for the following relation

\[
\mathcal{R} = \begin{cases} 
P \in G^*, Q, R \in G, H \in G^*, Z, F, E \in G; 
\text{ } & Z = aP + aH \land F = aQ + βH \land \  
\text{ } & E = aR + γH 
\end{cases}, \tag{8}
\]

where all the nonzero elements in the set \(\{P, Q, R, H\}\) are required to be orthogonal to each other, which is denoted as \(\text{ort}(nz(P, Q, R, H))\). Also, at least one of \(Q\) and \(R\) must be nonzero, which is denoted as \((Q + R) \in G^*\).

The implementation of \text{zk3ElemRW} is as follows. \(\mathcal{V}\) samples two challenges \(δ₁\) and \(δ₂\), and both \(\mathcal{P}\) and \(\mathcal{V}\) build the sums \(X\) and \(Y\) using these challenges. Also, \(\mathcal{P}\) builds the total blinding factor \(\hat{α}\)

\[
X = P + δ₁Q + δ₂R, \quad Y = Z + δ₁F + δ₂E, \quad \hat{α} = α + δ₁β + δ₂γ.
\]

As the second step, \(\mathcal{P}\) proves to \(\mathcal{V}\) using an arbitrary external complete, shHVZK, and having cWEE argument that \(Y\) is a weighted sum of \(X\) and \(H\) with some known to the prover weights. In the proof of Theorem 3, we will show that this suffices to extract witness for the relation (8).

Using the shorthands defined in [26] we can also say, that in the second step of zk3ElemRW a proof that \(Y = \text{lin}(X, H)\) holds for \(\mathcal{P}\) is somehow obtained. We will often omit everything connected with \(H\) as a technical blinding detail, so writing down this shortly as \(Y \sim X\) (to the accuracy of \(H\)).

The cWEE property of zk3ElemRW can be proved the same way as it is done for the RandomWeighting-WEE lemma protocol in [26]. Also, in the proof of Theorem 3 we consider the extreme case, when one of the elements \(Q\) or \(R\) is zero, an show it is not problematic.

### 3.1.4 SIMMETRIC VECTOR COMMITMENT

We also need an argument to convince verifier that several, e.g., two or three, vector commitments share the same known to the prover weights, with the only exclusion for blinding factors which are not shared. That is, we need an argument

\[
\text{zkSVC}_{3,n}(P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E; a, α, β, γ)
\]

shown in Figure 5 for the following relation

\[
\mathcal{R} = \begin{cases} 
P \in G^n, Q, R \in G^n, H \in G^*, Z, F, E \in G; 
\text{ } & Z = \langle a, P \rangle + αH \land F = \langle a, Q \rangle + βH \land \  
\text{ } & E = \langle a, R \rangle + γH 
\end{cases}, \tag{9}
\]

where all nonzero elements from the set \(P \cup Q \cup R \cup \{H\}\) are orthogonal to each other, which is denoted as \(\text{ort}(P \cup nz(Q) \cup nz(R) \cup \{H\})\), and where for any index \(i \in [0 \ldots n-1]\) at least one of two elements \(Q_{\lfloor i \rfloor}\) and \(R_{\lfloor i \rfloor}\) is nonzero, which is denoted as \((Q + R) \in G^*\).

The relation (9) asserts that the three different vector commitments \(Z, F, E\) are sort of ‘symmetrical’ to each other due to their common weights \(a\), which apply to the three different bases \(P, Q, R\), respectively. Note, that we require all elements in \(P\) to be nonzero, while vectors \(Q\) and \(R\) are allowed to contain zero elements, provided that for each index there is at least one nonzero element at that index in them. This condition is similar to the restriction \((Q + R) \in G^*\) imposed by the relation (8) to \((P, Q, R)\) in Section 3.1.3.
Using random weights similar to the way they are used in Section 3.1.3, we reduce the argument \( zkSVC_{3,n} \) to the vector commitment argument \( zkVC_n \). Namely, for random \( \delta_1 \) and \( \delta_2 \) we construct

\[
X = P + \delta_1 Q + \delta_2 R, \\
Y = Z + \delta_1 F + \delta_2 E, \\
\hat{\alpha} = \alpha + \delta_1 \beta + \delta_2 \gamma,
\]

and call

\( zkVC_n(X, H, Y; a, \hat{\alpha}) \).

After \( zkVC_n \) successful completion, as a result, we see that by this \( n \) instances of the protocol \( zk3ElemRW \) have been successfully performed, for all the indices \( i \in [0 \ldots n - 1] \). This means that the relation (8) is fulfilled for each triple \( (P_i, Q_i, R_i) \) and \( (Z_{P_i}, F_{Q_i}, E_{R_i}) \) and, therefore, the relation in question (9) is fulfilled. We say that a relation is fulfilled (or proved) as a synonym for the fact that witness of this relation is shown to be extractable in polynomial time.

In the above, \( Z_{P_i} \) denotes \( P_i \)'s component in a decomposition of \( Z \) by the base \( P \), the same for \( F_{Q_i} \), \( E_{R_i} \). We have implicitly assumed that \( Z, F, E \) are weighted direct sums of \( P, Q, R \), respectively, with weights known to prover. Of course, upon successful completion of \( zkSVC_{3,n} \), verifier is also convinced of this. Otherwise the protocol witness extractor would be able to break the DL relation assumption.

Finally, the witness in the relation (9) is unique, since the pair \( (a, \alpha) \) is bound as opening of the Pedersen vector commitment \( Z \) over \( P \cup \{ H \} \), and the same for \( ([a_i | Q_i \in nz(Q)], \beta) \) and \( ([a_i | R_i \in nz(R)], \gamma) \) as openings of \( F, E \) over \( nz(Q) \cup \{ H \} \) and \( nz(R) \cup \{ H \} \), respectively.

### 3.2 FORMAL PRESENTATION

#### 3.2.1 TWO ELEMENT COMMITMENT

Theorem 1: For two nonzero elements \( X, H \in G^* \) such that they are orthogonal to each other, for an element \( Y \in G \), the protocol \( zk2ElemComm \) in Figure 2 is a complete, shHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (4) with unique witness.

Proof: Appendix A.

Overview: Section 3.1.1.

```
\[
zk2ElemComm(X, H, Y; x, h)
\]
Relation \( R = \{ X, H \in G^*, Y \in G; x, h \in F_p \mid Y = xX + hH \} \)  // (4)
\( P \)'s input : \( (X, H, Y; x, h) \)
\( V \)'s input : \( (X, H, Y) \)
\( P \)'s output: none
\( V \)'s output: \text{Accept or Reject}
\( P \) computes \( T = \phi X + \psi H \)
\( V \) returns \text{Accept} iff the following holds
\[
T \equiv \tau X + \eta H + cY
\]

Figure 2: Zero-knowledge argument for two element commitment relation
### 3.2.2 BASIC VECTOR COMMITMENT

**Theorem 2:**
For $n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $n$ is a power of 2, for a vector of nonzero elements $X \in G^n$, for a nonzero element $H \in G^*$ such that there holds $\text{ort}(X \cup \{H\})$, for an element $Y \in G$, the protocol $zkVC_n$ in Figure 3 is a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (5) with unique witness.

**Proof:** Appendix B.

**Overview:** Section 3.1.2.

$$zkVC_n(X, H; a, \alpha)$$

Relation $R = \{X \in G^n, H \in G^*, Y \in G; a \in Fpn, \alpha \in Fp | Y = \langle a, X \rangle + \alpha H \} \quad // (5)$

$X, H$ in $R$ satisfy $\text{ort}(X \cup \{H\})$, $n$ is a power of 2 everytime.

$P$'s input : $(X, H, Y; a, \alpha)$

$V$'s input : $(X, H, Y)$

$P$'s output : none

$V$'s output: Accept or Reject

if $n > 1$ then

$P \rightarrow V$ \[ L, R \]

$V \rightarrow P$ \[ e \]

$P$ and $V$ compute $\hat{X} = e^{-1}X_{[\hat{a}]} + eX_{[\hat{a}]}$

$\hat{Y} = Y + e^2L + e^{-2}R$

$P$ computes $\hat{a} = e\hat{a}_{[\hat{a}]} + e^{-1}a_{[\hat{a}]}$

$\hat{a} = \alpha + e^2\beta + e^{-2}\gamma$

$P$ and $V$ run $zkVC_{\hat{a}}(\hat{X}, H, \hat{Y}; \hat{a}, \hat{\alpha})$ // run recursively until $n=1$

else \[ n=1 \]

$P$ and $V$ let $X_0 \leftarrow X_{[0]}$

and run $zk2ElemComm(X_0, H, Y; a_0, \alpha)$

endif

Figure 3: Zero-knowledge argument for vector commitment relation

### 3.2.3 RANDOM WEIGHTING FOR 3-TUPLES

**Theorem 3:**
For a nonzero element $P \in G^*$, for a pair of elements $Q, R \in G$, for a nonzero element $H \in G^*$ such that there holds $\text{ort}(nz(P, Q, R, H))$ and at least one of the two elements $Q, R$ is nonzero, the protocol $zk3ElemRW$ in Figure 4 is a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (8) with unique witness.

**Proof:** Appendix C.

**Overview:** 3.1.3.
3.1.4. Proof: Appendix D. For the relation (9) with unique witness.

\[\begin{align*}
Z, F, E &\in G^* & a, a, \beta, \gamma &\in F^{1}_P \\
\end{align*}\]

\[
P \in G^n, Q, R \in G, H \in G^n, Z, F, E \in G; \\
a, a, \beta, \gamma \in F^{1}_P
\]

Theorem 4:

3.2.4 SIMMETRIC VECTOR COMMITMENT

\[
(Q + n) \in R \in G \\
\]

Relation \( R = \) \[
\begin{align*}
P \in G^n, Q, R \in G^n, &H \in G^n, Z, F, E \in G; \\
a, a, \beta, \gamma &\in F^{1}_P
\end{align*}\]

\[
\ll P, Q, R, H \text{ in } R \text{ satisfy } \text{ort}(nz(P, Q, R, H)) \text{ and } (Q + R) \in G^n
\]

\( P \)'s input: \((P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E; a, \alpha, \beta, \gamma)\)

\( \forall \)'s input: \((P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E)\)

\( P \)'s output: none

\( \forall \)'s output: \textit{Accept or Reject}

\[
\begin{align*}
&P \\
&\delta_1, \delta_2 \leftarrow F^{1}_P \\
&\delta_1, \delta_2 \\
&P \text{ computes } \hat{\alpha} = a + \delta_1 \beta + \delta_2 \gamma \\
&P \text{ and } \forall \text{ compute } X = P + \delta_1 Q + \delta_2 R \\
&\quad Y = Z + \delta_1 F + \delta_2 E \\
&\text{ and run any complete, sHVZK, and cWEE protocol that convinces } \forall \text{ that} \\
&\text{the pair } (a, \hat{\alpha}) \text{ is known to } P \text{ witness of the relation (4), that is,} \\
&\text{that } X \text{ and } Y \text{ are connected as } Y = aX + \hat{\alpha}H
\end{align*}\]

Figure 4: Zero-knowledge argument for two 3-tuples proportional to each other

3.2.4 SIMMETRIC VECTOR COMMITMENT

Theorem 4:

For \( n \in \mathbb{N}^* \), for a vector of nonzero elements \( P \in G^n \), and for a vector of elements \( Q, R \in G^n \) such that \((Q + R) \in G^n \), for a nonzero element \( H \in G^n \) such that there holds \( \text{ort}(P \cup nz(Q) \cup nz(R) \cup \{H\}) \), for three elements \( Z, F, E \in G \), the protocol \( \text{zk SVC}_{3,n} \) in Figure 5 is a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (9) with unique witness.

\[\begin{align*}
\text{zk SVC}_{3,n}(P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E; a, \alpha, \beta, \gamma)
\end{align*}\]

\[
\begin{align*}
P \in G^n, Q, R \in G^n, &H \in G^n, Z, F, E \in G; \\
a, a, \beta, \gamma &\in F^{1}_P
\end{align*}\]

\[
\ll P, Q, R, H \text{ in } R \text{ satisfy } \text{ort}(P \cup nz(Q) \cup nz(R) \cup \{H\}) \text{ and } (Q + R) \in G^n
\]

\( P \)'s input: \((P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E; a, \alpha, \beta, \gamma)\)

\( \forall \)'s input: \((P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E)\)

\( P \)'s output: none

\( \forall \)'s output: \textit{Accept or Reject}

\[
\begin{align*}
&P \\
&\delta_1, \delta_2 \leftarrow F^{1}_P \\
&\delta_1, \delta_2 \\
&P \text{ computes } \hat{\alpha} = a + \delta_1 \beta + \delta_2 \gamma \\
&P \text{ and } \forall \text{ compute } X = P + \delta_1 Q + \delta_2 R \\
&\quad Y = Z + \delta_1 F + \delta_2 E \\
&\text{ and run } \text{zk SVC}_{3,n}(X, H, Y; a, \hat{\alpha}) \text{, or run any other complete, sHVZK, and cWEE} \\
&\text{protocol for the relation (5)}
\end{align*}\]

Figure 5: Zero-knowledge argument for 3 vector commitments with shared weights
As a subset case of the zkSVC_{3,n} protocol in Figure 5, we define the zkSVC_{2,n} protocol in Figure 6 for \( R = 0^n \), requiring for it that all elements in \( Q \) be nonzero.

\[
\text{zkSVC}_{2,n}(P, Q, H, P, Q; a, \alpha, \beta) = \text{zkSVC}_{3,n}(P, Q, 0^n, H, Z, F; 0; a, \alpha, \beta, 0)
\]

// where \( P, Q \in G^n; \ H \in G^*; \ Z, F \in G; \ a \in \mathbb{F}_p^*; \ \alpha, \beta, \gamma \in \mathbb{F}_p \)

Figure 6: Zero-knowledge argument for 2 vector commitments with shared weights

### 4 LIN2-CHOICE LEMMA

In this section we present the Lin2-Choice lemma featuring the zkLin2Choice\(_n\) one-out-of-many proof of membership, which we will use later to create the ring signatures.

#### 4.1 OVERVIEW

In [26] we proved the Lin2-Xor lemma which, informally, allows one to select a pair of elements from two pairs of elements, i.e., it provides an argument for the relation

\[
\mathcal{R} = \{ P, Q \in G^{2s}; Z \in G^*; s \in \{0 \ldots 1\}, p, q \in \mathbb{F}_p \mid Z = pP_s + qQ_s \}.
\]

where all generators in \( \mathbf{P} \cup \mathbf{Q} \) are orthogonal to each other.

Also, in [26], by successive application of the Lin2-Xor lemma \( \log_2(n) \) times we proved the Lin2-Selector lemma, which allows to select one pair of elements from \( n \) pairs of elements. That is, it provides an argument for the relation

\[
\mathcal{R} = \{ P, Q \in G^{ns}; Z \in G^*; s \in \{0 \ldots n-1\}, p, q \in \mathbb{F}_p \mid Z = pP_s + qQ_s \}.
\]

However, after some consideration we concluded, that instead of proving the relation (11) with the Lin2-Selector lemma protocol it would be better to prove it directly, as if the Lin2-Xor lemma were applied to \( n \) pairs of elements at once while making an auxiliary call to some external vector commitment argument. This way is more efficient in size, and also leaves more room for verification complexity optimizations.

Intuition here is that in the first round of the Lin2-Xor lemma protocol both of the prover and verifier multiply one element in each of the two original pairs \((P_0, Q_0)\) and \((P_1, Q_1)\) by a random challenge, so that each of these two pairs becomes a compound element with its own random ‘rotation’. Namely, they become

\[
(P_0 + c_0 Q_0) \quad \text{and} \quad (P_1 + c_1 Q_1).
\]

Here we use the notation and indexing from [26].

In the second round of the Lin2-Xor protocol, the prover and verifier play a sub-protocol convincing the verifier that the element \((Z + r_1 H_1)\) in [26] is a linear combination of the two compound elements (12) which carry their random ‘rotations’ \( c_0 \) and \( c_1 \). It then turns out that this linear combination can be only one-hot, otherwise the DL relation assumption would be broken.

In fact, since \( P_0, Q_0, P_1, Q_1, Z, H_1 \) are fixed from the beginning, and as they are orthogonal to each other, the element \((Z + r_1 H_1)\) has at most one ‘degree of freedom’ parameterized by \( r_1 \). At the same time, each of the elements (12) has exactly one degree of freedom defined by the parameters \( c_0 \) and \( c_1 \), respectively. Hence, if both of the coefficients \( a, b \) in the linear combination

\[
Z + r_1 H_1 = a(P_0 + c_0 Q_0) + b(P_1 + c_1 Q_1)
\]

are not equal to zero, then the right-hand side of the equality (13), which has two ‘degrees of freedom’ with the random parameters \( c_0 \) and \( c_1 \), is balanced by one ‘degree of freedom’ of the left-hand side with the controlled parameter \( r_1 \). This is impossible without breaking orthogonality of \( P_0, Q_0, P_1, Q_1 \), which proves that the vector of two coefficients \( a, b \) is one-hot. Although, we have missed the case \( a = b = 0 \) here, we will discuss it a bit later.

In line with this intuition, we can take \( n \) pairs of elements and turn them into \( n \) compound elements with random ‘rotations’ in the first round. After that, in the second round, we can prove that \((Z + r_1 H_1)\) is a linear combination of these \( n \) compound elements. As a result, exactly the same way as for the linear combination (13), we obtain that the compound element \((Z + r_1 H_1)\) with one ‘degree of freedom’ controlled by \( r_1 \) must balance out \( n \) ‘degrees
of freedom' of a weighted sum comprising \( n \) compound elements of the form \( P_i + c_i Q_i \). That is, the following equality must hold

\[
Z + r_1 H_1 = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i (P_i + c_i Q_i).
\]

(14)

However, this is possible only if the vector of coefficients \( a = \{a_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \) is one-hot. Beware, we have missed the edge case of \( a = 0^n \) here. Thus, we have obtained an argument for the relation (11) as the two-round game, where in the first round \( r_1 \) is chosen in response to \( n \) challenges \( \{c_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \), and in the second round the protocol

\[
zkVC_n\left( \{P_i + c_i Q_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1}, H, Z + r_1 H_1 ; a, a \right)
\]
is played. Here \( H_1 \) is fixed as in [26], \( H \) is an independent orthogonal blinding generator, \( a \) is the blinding factor, and \( a \) is one-hot.

Also, as the vector \( Q \) carries only a technical role in the relation (11), in [26] we get rid of \( Q \), by adding a proof of that \( q = 0 \) everywhere in the signatures. Now we will include a proof of \( q = 0 \) in our current argument. With all this in mind, the Lin2-Choice lemma protocol (Theorem 5) provides the protocol

\[
zkLin2Choice_n(P, Q, H, Z; s, p, a)
\]

shown in Figure 7, which is shHZK, has cWEE, and is an argument for the following relation

\[
\mathcal{R} = \left\{ P, Q \in G^n, H \in G^*, Z \in G; s \in [0 \ldots n - 1], p, a \in \mathbb{F}_p^* \mid Z = p P_s + a H \right\},
\]

(15)

where all elements in \( P, Q, H \) are orthogonal, i.e., \( \text{ort}(P \cup Q \cup \{H\}) \) holds.

Thus, our Lin2-Choice lemma allows to choose exactly one element from the orthogonal element set \( P \in G^n \). Addressing the details, with a simultaneous proof of \( q = 0 \), the Lin2-Choice lemma protocol \( zkLin2Choice_n \) for the relation (15) looks as follows

- The first \( P \)'s message is an element \( F \) which plays the same role as \( H_1 \) in [26]. Thus, after the first message, both of \( P \) and \( V \) have the elements \( Z \) and \( F \).
- All \( n \) elements in \( Q \) are multiplied by the challenges \( \{c_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \), thus \( P \) and \( V \) obtain the vector \( \hat{Q} = \{c_i Q_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \).
- \( P \) replies with \( r \), which plays the same role as \( r_1 \) in [26].
- \( P \) and \( V \) play \( zkSVC_{2,n}(P, \hat{Q}, H, Z, r F ; a, a, r \beta) \), where \( a \) is one-hot, \( H \) is an orthogonal blinding generator, \( a \) and \( \beta \) are blinding factors of \( Z \) and \( F \) respectively.

In this protocol, we can see that if \( a \) has more than one hot entry, then \( zkSVC_{2,n} \) will not complete successfully for the same reason as the equality (14) will not hold for such \( a \). To be precise, the following equality is checked inside \( zkSVC_{2,n} \), and it guarantees \( a \) is one-hot

\[
Z + \delta_1 r F = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i (P_i + \delta_1 c_i Q_i).
\]

(16)

In addition to this, if \( zkSVC_{2,n} \) completes successfully, then \( Z \)'s decomposition by the input generators cannot contain elements from \( Q \), as \( zkSVC_{2,n} \) guarantees \( Z = \lim(P \cup \{H\}) \).

Now it is a time to discuss the missed edge cases that are about completely zero weights in the linear combinations. The case \( a = b = 0 \) for the equality (13) is settled in [26] by some extra checks. Extra checks would also resolve the edge case for the equality (14), however we do not use it at all. Our current Lin2-Choice lemma protocol \( zkLin2Choice_n \) resorts to the equality (16) instead, which has the additional random factor \( \delta_1 \), making any extra checks unnecessary. Actually, if \( a = 0^n \) in the equality (16), then there holds

\[
Z + \delta_1 r F = 0,
\]

where \( \delta_1 \) is sampled knowing \( Z, F, r \); this proves without any extra checks that \( Z \) is equal to zero. To be precise, recalling all the above equalities are written to the accuracy of \( H \) component, \( Z \) is proved having only the blinding component in this case. Thus, the edge case \( a = 0^n \) in the equality (16) naturally corresponds to the case \( p = 0 \) in the relation (15).
4.2 FORMAL PRESENTATION

**Theorem 5** (Lin2-Choice lemma):
For \( n \in \mathbb{N}^* \), for two vectors of nonzero elements \( P, Q \in \mathbb{G}^n \), for a nonzero element \( H \in \mathbb{G}^* \) such that there holds \( \text{ort}(P \cup Q \cup \{H\}) \), for an element \( Z \in \mathbb{G} \), the protocol \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_n \) in Figure 7 is a complete, shHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (15) with unique witness.

**Proof:** Appendix E.

**Overview:** Section 4.1.

For the protocol \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_n \) in Figure 7, we consider \((p, \alpha)\) as a witness, with the auxiliary index \( s \) always recoverable from \((p \neq 0, \alpha)\) in a polynomial time. For \( p = 0 \), the index \( s \) is undefined.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{zkLin2Choice}_n(P, Q, H, Z; s, p, \alpha) & \\
\text{Relation } R &= \{ P, Q \in \mathbb{G}^n; H \in \mathbb{G}^*; Z \in \mathbb{G}; s \in [0 \ldots n-1], p, \alpha \in \mathbb{F}_p \} \\
& \quad \text{Z = } pP_s + aH \quad \text{// (15)} \\
\end{align*}
\]

\( \mathcal{P}'s \) input : \( (P, Q, H, Z; s, p, \alpha) \)

\( \mathcal{V}'s \) input : \((P, Q, H, Z)\)

\( \mathcal{P}'s \) output: none

\( \mathcal{V}'s \) output: Accept or Reject

- \( \mathcal{P} \): \( q, \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^* \) and assigns
  - if \( p = 0 \) then \( q = 0 \) endif
  - \( F = qQ_s + \beta H \)

- \( \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \): \( F \)

- \( \mathcal{V} \): \( c \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^* \)

- \( \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P} \): \( c \)

- \( \mathcal{P} \) and \( \mathcal{V} \) compute \( \hat{Q} = c \circ Q \)

- \( \mathcal{P} \): takes scalar \( c_s \) at index \( s \) in \( c \), that is, lets \( c_s \leftarrow c|_s \).
  - samples \( r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^* \)
  - assigns
    - if \( p \neq 0 \) then \( r = c_s p/q \) endif
    - \( \hat{\beta} = r \beta \)
  - and lets \( a = \begin{cases} a_s = p & \text{if is } p \text{ at } s \text{'th position in one-hot } a \text{ (or, if } p = 0 \text{, then } a = 0^n) \\ a_i = 0 \text{ for all } i \in [0 \ldots n-1], i \neq s \end{cases} \)

- \( \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \): \( r \)

- \( \mathcal{P} \) and \( \mathcal{V} \) let \( \hat{F} \leftarrow rF \)
  - and run \( \text{zkSVC}_2,n(P, \hat{Q}, H, Z; \hat{F}; a, \alpha, \hat{\beta}) \)

---

5 LINKABLE RING SIGNATURE FOR ONE ACTUAL SIGNER

An immediate practical result of the Lin2-Choice lemma is the linkable ring signature for one signer described in this section.

5.1 ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS

To create the signature we extend the common information in Figure 1 with the information in Figure 8. It supplies both of the prover and verifier with identical definitions of the scalar hash \( H_{\text{scalar}} \) and hash-to-group \( H_{\text{point}} \) functions, as well as with a common set of orthogonal generators \( G \).
The random oracle is modeled with the scalar hash $H_{\text{scalar}}$. The hash-to-group (-to-curve) function $H_{\text{point}}$ is supposed to generate brand new orthogonal elements. The predefined set of orthogonal generators $G$ is used in all signature instances, thus reducing verification time when they are verified in a batch.

All public keys used in the signatures can be known to all participants, and there are no additional restrictions on them. That is, as shown in Figure 9, we do not impose any rules on public keys.

### 5.2 OVERVIEW

Using the argument zkLin2Choice$_n$ for the relation (15), we construct a ring signature, calling it EFLRS1 (Efficient linkable ring signature for 1 actual signer). Its interactive scheme is shown in Figure 10, EFLRS1.SignAndVerify$_{1,n}(M, P, s, x)$.

By the ring we mean a set of $n \geq 1$ public keys

$$P = \{P_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1}. \quad (17)$$

Our signature convinces verifier that signer knows a scalar $x$ such that the equality $P_s = xG$ holds for some $s \in [0\ldots n - 1]$. There is no assumption about the public keys in $P$, except for all they must be different and nonzero which can be easily checked by verifier. Other than that, they can all be regarded as maliciously chosen.

By the decoy set, technically called so, we mean a set of $n$ pairs of the form

$$\{(P_i + \zeta H_{\text{point}}(P_i), Q_i)\}_{i=0}^{n-1}, \quad (18)$$

where $\zeta$ is a random weight. The set $Q$ of size $n$ contains auxiliary orthogonal generators that can be prepared in advance, provided that $H_{\text{point}}$ always generates elements which are orthogonal to $Q$.

Prover publishes key image $I$ defined as

$$I = x^{-1}H_{\text{point}}(P_s), \quad (19)$$

where $x$ is a private key for the public key $P_s \in P$ such that there holds $P_s = xG$. Note, the random $\zeta$ used in the decoy set above and in $Z$ below is sampled after $I$ is published.

Both of the prover and verifier define $Z$ for the relation (15) as

$$Z = G + \zeta I \quad (20)$$

and sample the blinding generator $H$ as to be orthogonal to all the other used generators. As follows from the definition (20), $Z$ necessarily contains nonzero value component which excludes the case $p = 0$ in the relation (15).
To obtain the signature, it remains to call the protocol of the Lin2-Choice lemma as follows

\[ \text{zkLin2Choice}_n\left(\{P_i + \zeta \mathcal{H}\text{point}(P_i)\}_{i=0}^{n-1}, Q, H, G + \zeta I, s, x^{-1}, 0\right). \]  

(21)

It results in the signature of size \(2\lceil\log_2(n)\rceil + 6\). When calculating this size, we assume that bitwise representation of an element from \(G\) takes as much space as bitwise representation of a scalar from \(\mathbb{F}_p\). We count all elements and scalars transmitted from prover to verifier, including the key image \(I\) and ignoring the ring of public keys \(\{P_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1}\), which is assumed to be known beforehand to both of the prover and verifier.

Also, recalling that a signature is supposed to sign an input message \(M\), we imply using the well-known method of binding it to \(M\), which is described, e.g., in [13]. Namely, we assume that our signature’s random oracle depends on the input message, and thus the entire series of random values in each of our signatures is bound to \(M\).

5.3 FORMAL PRESENTATION

Theorem 6:
For \(n \in \mathbb{N}^*\), for a vector of nonzero elements \(P \in G^{n^*}\) which is considered as a ring of public keys, the protocol EFLRS1 in Figure 10 is a linkable ring signature with the following properties
1. perfect correctness,
2. existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message / public key attackers,
3. unforgeability w.r.t. insider corruption,
4. anonymity,
5. anonymity w.r.t. chosen public key attackers,
6. linkability,
7. non-frameability,
8. and non-frameability w.r.t. chosen public key attackers.

Proof: Appendix F.

Overview: Section 5.2.

EFLRS1.SignAndVerify\_1,n(M, P, s, x)

\[ \mathcal{P}'s \text{ input: } (M \in \{0, 1\}^*, P \in G^{n^*}; s \in [0 \ldots n-1], x \in \mathbb{F}_p^*) \]

\[ \mathcal{V}'s \text{ input: } (M \in \{0, 1\}^*, P \in G^{n^*}) \]

\[ \mathcal{P}'s \text{ output: } \text{Signature} \quad \text{// signature is a list of all } \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \text{ messages from this and nested protocols} \]

\[ \mathcal{V}'s \text{ output: Accept or Reject} \]

\[ \mathcal{P}: \text{ lets } P_s \leftarrow P[s], \]

\[ \text{assert } x \neq 0 \]

\[ \text{lets } p \leftarrow x^{-1} \]

\[ \text{lets } I \leftarrow p \mathcal{H}\text{point}(P_s) \]

\[ \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}: I \]

\[ \mathcal{V}: \epsilon, \zeta \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^* \]

\[ \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}: \epsilon, \zeta \]

\[ \mathcal{P} \text{ and } \mathcal{V}: \text{ assert all elements in } P \text{ are nonzero and different} \]

\[ \text{let } U \leftarrow (\mathcal{H}\text{point}(P_1))_{i=0}^{n-1}, H \leftarrow \mathcal{H}\text{point}(\epsilon) \quad \text{// thus, or((H, G, P, U, Z, I)) holds} \]

\[ \text{compute } \hat{P} = P + \zeta U \]

\[ Z = G + \zeta I, \]

\[ \text{and run } \text{zkLin2Choice}_n(\hat{P}, G_{[n]}, H, Z; s, p, 0) \]

Figure 10: EFLRS1 signing and verification

In the signature schemes we always imply presence of one more procedure, \Link, although we do not specify it explicitly. It is constructed trivially, as a comparison of key images \(I\), just as in [20, 11, 26].
5.4 SIZE AND VERIFICATION COMPLEXITY

When the protocol EFLRS1.SignAndVerify\(_{1,n}\) in Figure 10 runs, the series of nested subprotocols is executed up to calling zk2ElemComm, as shown in the top box in Figure 11. As a result, assuming that verifier postpones all calculations on its side until the end of the message exchange, the verifier has only to check one expanded equality shown in Figure 11.

\[
\text{SignAndVerify}_{1,n} \rightarrow \text{zkLin2Choice}_{n} \rightarrow \text{zkSVC}_{2,n} \rightarrow \text{zkVC}_{n} \rightarrow \text{zk2ElemComm}
\]

// Function bitAtPos\((i,j)\) returns j-th bit of binary representation of i
\[
e \left( G + \xi I + \delta_1 rF + \sum_{j=0}^{\log_2(n) - 1} (e_j^2 L_j + e_j^{-2} R_j) \right) + \eta H - T + \tau \left( \prod_{j=0}^{n-1} e_j^{2 \text{bitAtPos}(i,j)-1} \right) (P_i + \zeta U_i + \delta_1 c_j G_j) = 0
\]

Figure 11: Unfolded equality for EFLRS1, verifier checks it

Table 3 shows the size and verification complexity of a batch of \( l \) EFLRS1 signatures that are created using a common ring of \( n \) public keys. We consider \( l \) signatures in order to compare their summary size and complexity against a threshold variant presented later on in this paper. To see the size and verification complexity of single signature, simply let \( l = 1 \).

To verify the batch, verifier combines \( l \) instances of the equality in Figure 11 together using random weighting. As in [6, 8, 26], the verifier computes all the scalar weights with scalar-scalar multiplications, which are assumed consuming negligibly time, and then performs the single multi-exponentiation according to Figure 11.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \text{EFLRS1} ) signature size and verification complexity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Size</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( l \lfloor 2 \log_2(n) \rfloor + 6 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6 LINKABLE THRESHOLD RING SIGNATURE

To create a threshold version of the EFLRS1 signature, we will define an auxiliary protocol zk\( \text{MVVC}_{l,n} \) that proves the same as \( l \) instances of zk\( \text{VC}_{n} \) prove. Then, by running in parallel \( l \) instances of zkLin2Choice\(_{n}\) and by substituting one zk\( \text{MVVC}_{l,n} \) call for \( l \) nested in them calls of zk\( \text{VC}_{n} \), we will get a many-out-of-many proof of membership, from which we will create the linkable threshold ring signature, calling it EFLRSL.

6.1 OVERVIEW

6.1.1 MULTIPLE VECTOR COMMITMENTS

To obtain the many-out-of-many proof, we need one more helper zero-knowledge argument, namely, a proof of multiple vector commitments

\[
zk\text{MVVC}_{l,n}(X, H, Y; a, \alpha),
\]

that, for a given element vector \( Y \in G^l \), proves that every \( Y_i \in Y \) is a vector commitment over the vector of orthogonal generators \( X \cup \{ H \} \in G^{n*} \times G^* \) with weights known to prover. It is shown in Figure 12, zk\( \text{MVVC}_{l,n} \) is an argument for the relation

\[
\mathcal{R} = \{ X \in G^{n*}, H \in G^*, Y \in G^l; a \in F_p^{l \times n}, \alpha \in F_p^l \mid Y = a \cdot X + \alpha \cdot H \}.
\]

The relation (22) is a union of \( l \) instances of the relation (5). The structure of the zk\( \text{MVVC}_{l,n} \) protocol is quite simple. All \( l \) elements in the vector \( Y \) are combined into one element \( Y \) with random weights. Then, the argument zk\( \text{VC}_{n} \) proves that \( Y \) is a vector commitment over the generators \( X \cup \{ H \} \), thus convincing verifier that, due to the random weights, every \( Y_i \in Y \) is a vector commitment over \( X \cup \{ H \} \).

This way we obtain a proof for a set of vector commitments at the price (space) of one vector commitment proof. A similar construction can be found in [3]. This effect, where multiplication by random weights yields multiple proofs for the price of one, propagates to the other relations, such as (23), (34). Although, of course, this effect itself, as well as its propagation, must be formally proven, which we do onward.
6.1.2 MANY-OUT-OF-MANY PROOF

According to the relation (22), the protocol \(zk\text{MVC}_{l,n}\) proves the same as \(l\) \(zk\text{VC}_n\) protocols prove. Using it, in Figure 13 we construct an efficient many-out-of-many proof of membership

\[
zk\text{Lin2mChoice}_{n,l}(P, Q, H, Z; s, p, \alpha),
\]

which is an argument for the relation

\[
\mathcal{R} = \left\{ P, Q \in \mathbb{G}_1^*, H \in \mathbb{G}_1^*, Z \in \mathbb{G}_1^l; \forall k \in [0 \ldots l - 1] : \right.
\]

\[
Z_k = p_k P_{n_k} + \alpha_k H \bigg\},
\]

(23)

where \(P, Q, H\) satisfy \(\text{ort}(P \cup Q \cup \{H\})\).

The many-out-of-many proof of membership \(zk\text{Lin2mChoice}_{n,l}\) in Figure 13 proves the same as \(l\) concurrent instances of the one-out-of-many proof of membership \(zk\text{Lin2Choice}_n\) in Figure 7 prove, at the price of one instance.

All these \(l\) concurrent instances of \(zk\text{Lin2Choice}_n\) are considered invoking all their nested sub-protocols simultaneously. We depict this as the following invocation stack

\[
l \times zk\text{Lin2Choice}_n \leftarrow l \times zk\text{SVC}_{2,n} \leftarrow l \times zk\text{VC}_n.
\]

(24)

Since each of these \(l\) running instances of \(zk\text{Lin2Choice}_n\) is completely independent of the others, we let all the challenges be shared between them, provided that the random oracle which generates the challenges takes into account all the filled in parts of the common transcript.

The final \(l \times zk\text{VC}_n\) calls on the invocation stack (24) are made only for the sake of proving that each of \(l\) vector commitments, namely, each element of the set

\[
\{Z_k + \delta k F_k\}_{k=0}^l,
\]

is constructed over the common set of orthogonal generators

\[
\{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_l\}. \]

Hence, we can replace all these \(l \times zk\text{VC}_n\) calls, which altogether prove \(l\) instances of the relation (5), with one call to \(zk\text{MVC}_{l,n}\), which proves the relation (22). After that, the invocation stack (24) starts to look as

\[
l \times zk\text{Lin2Choice}_n \leftarrow l \times zk\text{SVC}_{2,n} \leftarrow zk\text{MVC}_{l,n}.
\]

6.1.3 SIGNATURE EFLRSL

The EFLRS1 signature in Figure 10 boils down to the game in which prover builds a key image \(I\) of type (19), then publishes it, and then verifier sends the challenge \(\zeta\). After that, using the one-out-of-many proof of membership \(zk\text{Lin2Choice}_n\) the prover convinces the verifier that \(Z\) built by the formula (20) belongs to the decoy set built by the formula (18), namely, to the set of pairs

\[
(P + \zeta U, Q), \quad \text{where } U = \{(H_{\text{point}}(P_i))_{i=0}^{n-1}\}.
\]

Now, suppose that prover publishes a vector of \(l\) key images of type (19) each

\[
I = \{I_k\}_{k=0}^{l-1},
\]

which correspond to \(l\) different indices \(s = \{s_k\}_{k=0}^{l-1}\). We call \(s\) actual signing indices or, equivalently, actual signers in the ring. The corresponding signing private keys \(x = \{x_k\}_{k=0}^{l-1}\) are assumed to be known to the prover. Taking a randomly sampled \(\zeta\) both of the prover and verifier construct \(l\) values of \(Z\) by the formula (20), i.e., they construct the vector

\[
Z = \{Z_k\}_{k=0}^{l-1} = \{G\}_{k=0}^l + \zeta I = \{G + \zeta I_k\}_{k=0}^{l-1}.
\]

And, also, they build a decoy set by the formula (18). After that, as the last step, they play the \(zk\text{Lin2Choice}_n\) one-out-of-many proof protocol \(l\) times, for the same decoy set and for each \(Z_k, k \in [0 \ldots l - 1]\). We depict this as

\[
l \times zk\text{Lin2Choice}_n.
\]

As shown in Section 6.1.2, instead of playing the one-out-of-many proof protocol \(l\) times, they can play as well the many-out-of-many proof protocol \(zk\text{Lin2mChoice}_{n,l}\) once. By doing so, they obtain a threshold version of the signature, which we call EFLRSL (Efficient linkable ring signature for \(l\) actual signers). Its scheme

\[
EFLRSL.\text{SignAndVerify}_{l,n}(M, P, s, x)
\]

is shown in Figure 14. Its size is \(2 \lceil \log_2(n) \rceil + 3l + 3\). The key image vector \(\{I_k\}_{k=0}^{l-1}\) is counted in the calculation. The ring \(P\) is, as usual, assumed to be known beforehand for both of the prover and verifier.
6.2 FORMAL PRESENTATION

6.2.1 MULTIPLE VECTOR COMMITMENTS

Theorem 7:
For \( n, l \in \mathbb{N}^* \), for a vector of nonzero elements \( X \in G^{n^*} \), for a nonzero element \( H \in G^* \) such that there holds \( \text{ort}(X \cup \{H\}) \), for a vector of elements \( Y \in G^l \), the protocol \( \text{zk\nVC}_{l, n} \) in Figure 12 is a complete, \( \text{shVZK} \) argument having \( c\text{WEE} \) for the relation (22) with unique witness.

Proof: 
Appendix H.
Overview: Section 6.1.1.

Figure 12: Zero-knowledge argument for multiple vector commitments

6.2.2 MANY-OUT-OF-MANY PROOF

Theorem 8:
For \( n \in \mathbb{N}^* \), for two vectors of nonzero elements \( P, Q \in G^{n^*} \), for a nonzero element \( H \in G^* \) such that there holds \( \text{ort}(P \cup Q \cup \{H\}) \), for a vector of elements \( Z \in G^l \), the protocol \( \text{zkLin2mChoice}_{n, l} \) in Figure 13 is a complete, \( \text{shVZK} \) argument having \( c\text{WEE} \) for the relation (23) with unique witness.

Proof: 
Appendix I.
Overview: Section 6.1.2.

By the same reason as for the protocol \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_{n} \) in Figure 7, we consider \((p, \alpha)\) as a witness for the protocol \( \text{zkLin2mChoice}_{n, l} \) in Figure 13. The auxiliary indices \( s \) are recoverable from the witness in a polynomial time.
Relation $\mathcal{R} = \{ \{P, Q, s, p, \alpha\} : \forall k \in [0 \ldots l-1] : Z_k = p_k P s_k + \alpha_k H \}$  

// $P, Q, H$ in $\mathcal{R}$ satisfy $\text{ort}(P \cup Q \cup \{H\})$.

$P$’s input : $(P, Q, H, Z, s, p, \alpha)$
$V$’s input : $(P, Q, H, Z)$
$P$’s output: none
$V$’s output: Accept or Reject

$P$ and $V$ allocate $\hat{X} \in G^n, Y \in G^l, a \in F_p^{\times n}, \hat{a} \in \bar{F}_p^l$, and run the following block, depicted as foreach, in $l$ parallel threads (with shared challenges), using common $\hat{X}, Y, a, \hat{a}$

**foreach** $k \in [0 \ldots l-1]$ // execute in parallel

let $(Z_k, s_k, p_k, \alpha_k) \leftarrow \text{zkLin2Choice}_n(P, Q, H, Z_k; s_k, p_k, \alpha_k)$,

run $\text{zkLin2Choice}_n(P, Q, H, Z_k; s_k, p_k, \alpha_k)$ without calling nested $\text{zkVC}_n(X, H, Y; a, \hat{a})$ in it, instead assign $\hat{X} = X$ // $X$ is the same in all threads

$Y[k] = Y$
$a[k] = a$
$\hat{a}[k] = \hat{a}$.

**endforeach**

run $\text{zkVC}_l,n(\hat{X}, H, Y; a, \hat{a})$

Figure 13: Zero-knowledge argument for multiple element choice relation

6.2.3 SIGNATURE EFLRSL

**Theorem 9:**
For $n, l \in \mathbb{N}^*$ such that $l \leq n$, for a vector of nonzero elements $P \in G^n$ which is considered as a ring of public keys, the protocol EFLRSL in Figure 14 is a linkable threshold ring signature with the following properties

1. perfect correctness,
2. existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message / public key attackers,
3. unforgeability w.r.t. insider corruption,
4. anonymity,
5. anonymity w.r.t. chosen public key attackers,
6. linkability,
7. non-frameability,
8. non-frameability w.r.t. chosen public key attackers.

**Proof:** Appendix K.
Overview: Section 6.1.3.
6.3 SIZE AND COMPLEXITY

The only equality, that verifier has to check in order to verify authenticity of the EFLRSL signature, is shown in Figure 15. The signature size and verification complexity are provided in Table 4.

![Figure 14: EFLRSL signing and verification](image)

![Figure 15: Unfolded equality for EFLRSL, verifier checks it](image)

**Table 4: EFLRSL signature size and verification complexity**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Verification complexity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EFLRSL</td>
<td>$2\log_2(n) + 3l + 3$</td>
<td>$\text{mexp} \ (3n + 2\log_2(n) + 2l + 3) + (n + 1)H_{pt}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Optimized size is shown in Table 7.

Comparing Table 4 and Table 3, we may observe that the threshold variant of the signature is asymptotically $l$
The vectors
As usual, we account for blinding and for zero factors. Also, for second chosen element to be anonymous, however we want its weight to remain securely hidden.

question

\[ Z \]

7.1.1 SIMPLIFIED LIN2-2CHOICE LEMMA

7.1 OVERVIEW

proof represented by the Lin2-2Choice lemma (Theorem 12) protocol in Figure 18.

transition from \( \text{zkLin2Choice} \) (Theorem 10) will prove its properties as a one-out-of-many proof with an additional element. Next, like with the second element. We will introduce such an extension in Figure 16, and in the Simplified Lin2-2Choice lemma (1-out-of-many membership proof) with an additional element we mean an argument about the element in these four vectors are orthogonal to each other. The vectors \( \mathbf{P} \) and \( \mathbf{V} \) are assumed to be orthogonal.

\[ Z \] is public.

The protocol \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_{n,m}(\mathbf{P}, Q, V, W, H, Z, t; s, p, v, \alpha) \) in Figure 16 is such an argument. Formally, it convinces verifier that prover knows witness \((s, p, v, \alpha)\) for the relation

\[
\begin{align*}
\left\{ P, Q \in G^n, V, W \in G^m, H \in G^*, Z \in G, t \in \{0, \ldots, m-1\}; 
\begin{array}{l}
s \in \{0, \ldots, n-1\}, p, v, \alpha \in \mathbb{F}_p \\
Z = pP_s + vV_t + \alpha H
\end{array}
\right. 
\end{align*}
\]

(25)

As usual, we account for blinding and for zero factors. Also, for \( V_t \in V \) we hide only its factor \( v \), not its index \( t \).

The vectors \( \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{Q} \in G^n, \mathbf{V}, \mathbf{W} \in G^m \) in (25) are the common prover and verifier input. All \( 2(n + m) \) elements in these four vectors are orthogonal to each other. The vectors \( \mathbf{Q} \) and \( \mathbf{W} \) are for technical purposes, while the vectors \( \mathbf{P} \) and \( \mathbf{V} \) are used to compose the element \( Z = pP_s + vV_t \), where \( s, p, v \) are secret, and \( t \) is public.

Naturally, in the case \( m = 0, V = W = 0 \), \( Z = 0 \), the protocol \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_{n,m} \) turns into the regular 1-out-of-many membership proof \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_n \) provided by the Lin2-Choice lemma in Section 4.

The protocol \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_{n,m} \) is constructed from \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_n \) as follows.

- \( \mathbf{P} \) hands over the following pair of elements to \( \mathbf{V} \), instead of the single element \( F \) in \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_n \)

\[ F \quad \text{and} \quad E. \]

(26)

- \( \mathbf{V} \) generates a set of \( n + m \) challenges \( \{C_i\}_{i=0}^{n+m-1} \).

- \( \mathbf{P} \) and \( \mathbf{V} \) construct a decoy set comprising two parts, of total size \( n + m \). The first part of the decoy set, of size \( n \), contains the following triplets

\[
((P_t, c_tQ_t, 0))_{i=0}^{n-1},
\]

(27)

whereas the second one, which is new, of size \( m \), contains the following triplets

\[
((V_t, 0, c_mW_t))_{i=0}^{m-1}.
\]

(28)

- \( \mathbf{P} \) replies with the scalar \( r \), as in \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_n \), and then the following two elements are constructed

\[ RF, c_nE. \]

(29)

- As the last step, \( \mathbf{P} \) and \( \mathbf{V} \) play \( \text{zkSVC}_{3,(n+m)} \), instead of \( \text{zkSVC}_{2,n} \), and thus \( \mathbf{V} \) gets convinced that \( \mathbf{P} \) knows weights for the following decompositions

\[
\begin{align*}
Z &= \text{lin}(P, V) \\
F &= \text{lin}(Q) \\
E &= \text{lin}(W)
\end{align*}
\]

(30)
Here we omit mentioning blinding with $H$, which is always implied performed before transmitting elements from prover to verifier.

An informal explanation of the zkLin22sChoice$_{n,m}$ protocol is that considering the triplet of elements

$$(Z, rF, c_{n+1}E)$$

we prove with zkSVC$_{(n+m)}$, that the first, second, and third elements of the triplet (31) are linear combinations with the same coefficients of $n + m$ elements of, respectively, the first, second, and third dimensions of the decoy set composed of the parts (27) and (28). We observe that thereby all the steps of the zkLin2Choice$_{e}$ and zkLin2Choice$_{m}$ protocols are actually performed for $Z$’s ‘projections’ on $P$ and on $V$, respectively. That is, we observe that

$$Z = Z_P + Z_V, \text{ where } Z_P = \text{lin}(P), \ Z_V = \text{lin}(V).$$

Thus, we come to the conclusion that all the steps of the Lin2-Choice lemma protocol have been performed for

- $Z_P$ and the first part of the decoy set comprising $n$ triples (27). The actual index $s$ remains hidden because the response $r$ is randomized, as in the Lin2-Choice lemma protocol.

- $Z_V$ and the second part of the decoy set comprising $m$ triples (28). The actual index $t$ in this part is not hidden because the implied ‘reply’ $c_{n+1}$ clearly reveals it. Nevertheless, this does not wreck the Lin2-Choice lemma argument, just makes it non-zero-knowledge by $t$.

Hence, by the Lin2-Choice lemma, verifier is convinced that the following holds for prover

$$\begin{align*}
Z_P &\sim P_s, \text{ where } s \text{ is secret} \\
Z_V &\sim V_t, \text{ where } t \text{ is public}
\end{align*}$$

and therefore $Z = pP_s + vV_t$ for some $p$ and $v$ known to the prover.

### 7.1.2 MULTIPLE SIMMETRIC VECTOR COMMITMENTS

We need one more auxiliary zero-knowledge argument, it is shown in Figure 17,

$$\text{zkMSVC}_{l,3,n}(P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E; a, a', \beta, \gamma),$$

which proves the same as $l$ simultaneously played instances of the zkSVC$_{3,n}$ argument (Figure 5) prove. Namely, this is an argument for the following relation

$$\mathcal{R} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
P \in G^{n}, Q \in G^{n}, H \in G^{*}, Z, F, E \in G^{l}, \\
a \in F_{\bar{p}}^{l}, \alpha, \beta, \gamma \in F_{\bar{p}}^{l}
\end{array} \right\} \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
Z = a \cdot P + a \cdot H \land \\
F = a \cdot Q + \beta \cdot H \land \\
E = a \cdot R + \gamma \cdot H
\end{array} \right\},$$

where all generators $P, Q, R, H$ are orthogonal to each other. This relation is $l$ instances of the relation (9) merged together. The other surrounding conditions for it are the same as for (9).

We implement the zkMSVC$_{l,3,n}$ by merging $l$ instances of zkSVC$_{3,n}$ together using the shared random scalars $\delta_1$ and $\delta_2$. The following two vectors are built with these random scalars

$$\begin{align*}
X &= P + \delta_1Q + \delta_2R \\
Y &= Z + \delta_1F + \delta_2E.
\end{align*}$$

Then, instead of invoking zkVC$_n(X, H, Y; a_{[j,.]}, \alpha_j + \delta_1\beta_j + \delta_2\gamma_j)$ for each $j \in [0 \ldots l-1]$, we invoke the zkMSVC$_{l,n}$ protocol (Figure 12) for $X, Y$. Thus, we get a proof for the relation (34) at the price (i.e., size) of one protocol zkVC$_{l,n}$ call and, therefore, at the price of one zkVC$_n$ call.

### 7.1.3 LIN2-CHOICE LEMMA

Now we can construct the protocol in Figure 18,

$$\text{zkLin2Choice}_{l,n,m}(P, Q, V, W, H, Z; s, p, v, \alpha),$$

and prove the Lin2-Choice lemma which states that zkLin2Choice$_{l,n,m}$ is an argument for the relation

$$\mathcal{R} = \left\{ \begin{array}{l}
P, Q \in G^{n}, V, W \in G^{m}, H \in G^{*}, Z \in G^{l}; \\
s \in [0 \ldots n - 1], p, v, \alpha \in F_{\bar{p}}^{l}, \\
\forall k \in [0 \ldots l - 1]: \\
Z_k = p_kP_{s_k} + v_kV_k + a_kH
\end{array} \right\},$$

where the generators $P, Q, V, W, H$ are orthogonal to each other and $l < m.$
The relation (35) is essentially the relation (25) repeated for the first \( l \) elements of the decoy set's second part (28). Having such a correspondence between the relations (35) and (25), the \( \text{zkLin22Choice}_{n,m} \) protocol is \( l \) instances of the protocol \( \text{zkLin22sChoice}_{n,m} \) run in parallel, with the only one refinement which follows.

The refinement is that all the \( l \) instances of the \( \text{zkLin22sChoice}_{n,m} \) protocol are played in sync and independently of each other (except for the common challenges, as for EFLRSL in Section 6.1.3) up to the last step, where \( l \) instances of \( \text{zkSVC}_{3,n} \) are called. All these \( l \) calls of \( \text{zkSVC}_{3,n} \), are, in turn, replaced with one call to \( \text{zkMSVC}_{3,n} \), which gives significant reduction in the transcript size.

### 7.2 FORMAL PRESENTATION

#### 7.2.1 SIMPLIFIED LIN2-2CHOICE LEMMA

**Theorem 10:**

For \( n, m \in \mathbb{N}^* \), for four vectors of nonzero elements \( P, Q \in G^{n,*}, V, W \in G^{m,*} \), for a nonzero element \( H \in G^* \) such that there holds \( \text{ort}(P \cup Q \cup V \cup W \cup \{H\}) \), for an element \( Z \in G \), the protocol \( \text{zkLin22sChoice}_{n,m} \) in Figure 16 is a complete, sHVZK argument having \( c\text{WEE} \) for the relation (25) with unique witness.

**Proof:** Appendix L.

Overview: Section 7.1.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \text{zkLin22sChoice}_{n,m}(P, Q, V, W, H, Z, t; s, p, v, \alpha) )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Relation ( R = { P, Q \in G^{n,<em>}, V, W \in G^{m,</em>}, H \in G^*, Z \in G, t \in [0...m-1]; } )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( Z = pP_s + vV_t + \alpha H )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{zkLin22Choice} ) callsof ( l, n, m ) are called</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All these ( l ) calls of ( \text{zkSVC}<em>{3,n} ), are, in turn, replaced with one call to ( \text{zkMSVC}</em>{3,n} ), which gives significant reduction in the transcript size.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 16:** Simplified Lin2-2Choice lemma protocol, zero-knowledge argument for two-element choice relation

---

28
Similar to the protocol zkLin2Choice, in Figure 7 we consider \((p, v, \alpha)\) as a witness for the protocol zkLin2Choice\(_{n,m}\) in Figure 16. The auxiliary index \(s\) is recoverable from the witness in a polynomial time.

### 7.2.2 Multiple Symmetric Vector Commitments

To advance from the one-out-of-many proof to the many-out-of-many one, in Figure 17 we define a helper protocol.

**Theorem 11:**
For \(n, l \in \mathbb{N}^+\), for a vector of nonzero elements \(P \in \mathbb{G}^n\), and for a pair of vectors of elements \(Q, R \in \mathbb{G}^n\) such that \((Q + R) \in \mathbb{G}^n\), for a nonzero element \(H \in \mathbb{G}^n\), for four vectors of elements \(Z, F, E \in \mathbb{G}^1\), the protocol \(\text{zkMSVC}_{l,3,n}\) in Figure 17 is a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (34) with unique witness.

**Proof:** Appendix M.

Overview: Section 7.1.2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation (\mathcal{R} = {(P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E; a, \alpha, \beta, \gamma)} )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(P \in \mathbb{G}^n), (Q, R \in \mathbb{G}^n), (H \in \mathbb{G}^n), (Z, F, E \in \mathbb{G}^1); (a \in \mathbb{F}_p^\times), (\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in \mathbb{F}_p)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Z = a \cdot P + \alpha \cdot H \wedge F = a \cdot Q + \beta \cdot H \wedge E = a \cdot R + \gamma \cdot H)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If \(P, Q, R, H \in \mathbb{R}\) satisfy \(\text{ort}(P \cup \text{nz}(Q) \cup \text{nz}(R) \cup \{H\})\) and \((Q + R) \in \mathbb{G}^n\)

\(P\)'s input : \((P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E; a, \alpha, \beta, \gamma)\)

\(V\)'s input : \((P, Q, R, H, Z, F, E)\)

\(V\)'s output: none

\(V\)'s output: Accept or Reject

\[\begin{align*}
\delta_1, \delta_2 & \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^* \\
\hat{\alpha} & = \alpha + \delta_1 \beta + \delta_2 \gamma \\
\hat{\alpha} \text{ computes } & \hat{X} = P + \delta_1 Q + \delta_2 R \\
\hat{Y} = Z + \delta_1 F + \delta_2 E \\
& \text{and run } \text{zkMSVC}_{l,3,n}(\hat{X}, H, Y; a, \hat{\alpha})
\end{align*}\]

Figure 17: Zero-knowledge argument for multiple 3-vector commitments with shared weights

### 7.2.3 Lin2-Choice Lemma. Multiple Two-Element Choices

**Theorem 12** (Lin2-Choice lemma): For \(n, m, l \in \mathbb{N}^+\) such that \(l \leq m\), for four vectors of nonzero elements \(P, Q, V, W \in \mathbb{G}^n\), for a nonzero element \(H \in \mathbb{G}^n\), for a vector of elements \(Z \in \mathbb{G}^1\), the protocol zkLin2Choice\(_{l,n,m}\) in Figure 18 is a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (35) with unique witness.

**Proof:** Appendix N.

Overview: Section 7.1.3.

Like for the protocol zkLin2Choice\(_n\) in Figure 7 we consider \((p, v, \alpha)\) as a witness for the protocol zkLin2Choice\(_{l,n,m}\) in Figure 18. The auxiliary indices \(s\) are recoverable from the witness in a polynomial time.
8 SIGNATURE EFLRSLWB WITH BALANCE PROOF

Now we are going to append a proof of the balance to the EFLRSL signature described in Section 6.2.3. We assume that each public key in the signature ring has an associated hidden amount in the form of Pedersen commitment [23]. When prover signs, it knows the signing indices and thus knows those commitments associated with them. The sum of their openings, namely, the sum of the respective amounts, is to be equal to another amount, which is hidden in another commitment known beforehand to both of the prover and verifier. We will make the prover providing a zero-knowledge proof of this balance along with the signature.

Figure 18: Lin2-2Choice lemma protocol, zero-knowledge argument for multiple two-element choices relation
8.1 ADDITIONAL DEFINITIONS

Let there be two additional predefined group generators $B, D$, and let a ring be composed of $n$ pairs

\[
\{(P_i, A_i)\}_{i=0}^{n-1}, \text{ where } P = \{P_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1} \land A = \{A_i\}_{i=0}^{n-1}.
\] (36)

In the honest case we assume the following two assertions hold, for each $i \in [0 \ldots n-1]$, with the scalars $p_i, b_i, d_i$ known to at least one player in the system

\[
P_i = g_i G, \quad A_i = b_i B + d_i D.
\] (37)

(38)

In general, as usual, we assume the case is dishonest, i.e., the equalities (38) and (37) may not hold and, moreover, some or all $P_i$‘s and $A_i$‘s in the ring may be adversarially chosen. Nonetheless, hereinafter we will assume that for all $A_i$‘s in the ring there already exist some validated proofs of the decomposition (38) in the system. These proofs can, for instance, be supplied along with other signatures that introduce these $A_i$‘s into the system. In the case of blockchain, this means that validators must verify them along with transaction signatures.

With the above precondition, in the worst case, the involved $P_i$‘s may have adversarially chosen $g_i$‘s or may have an unknown relation to $G$, whereas $A_i$‘s may have only adversarially chosen $b_i$‘s and $d_i$‘s, with the form (38) kept unchanged.

In Figure 19 we summarize the above definition of how the hidden amounts are represented in the system.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Hidden amounts} \\
\text{• Each public key } P \text{ is accompanied by a hidden amount } A \text{ in the system. Each ring has the form (36).} \\
\text{• Each hidden amount } A \text{ in a ring is assumed having the decomposition (38) by the predefined generators } B, D, \text{ i.e.,} \\
A = bB + dD,
\end{align*}
\]

where $b$ is the amount and $d$ is the amount’s blinding factor. That is, it is assumed that, as soon as $A$ is included in the ring, there already exists an available valid proof of the decomposition (38) for it in the system.

Figure 19: Hidden amounts seen to all parties

We also need to supplement the common information available to all parties according to Figure 1 and Figure 8 with an extended set of predefined orthogonal generators, and to update the $H_{\text{point}}$ function again as in Figure 20 so that it respects orthogonality of the additional generators.

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Updated common information} \\
\text{• A couple of generators } B, D \in G^* \text{ and the enlarged vector } G = \{G_0, G_1, G_2, \ldots, G_{2^n-1}\} \in G^{2^n} \\
\text{such that, for any set } H \text{ of } H_{\text{point}} \text{ images on different pre-images, there holds ort}(H \cup \{G, B, D\} \cup G). \\
\text{• } H_{\text{point}} : \{0, 1\}^* \to G^* \text{ is updated in such a way, so that the above ort}(H \cup \{G, B, D\} \cup G) \text{ holds.}
\end{align*}
\]

Figure 20: Updated common information available to each party

8.2 OVERVIEW

8.2.1 SIGNATURE EFLRSLWB

Efficient linkable threshold ring signature EFLRSLWB (Efficient linkable ring signature for $l$ actual signers with balance proof) is shown in Figure 21. Here is an informal introduction to how it works.

Having a ring of the form (36), prover publishes $l$ key images which correspond to the actually signing indices $s \in [0 \ldots n-1]^l$

\[
I = \{I_k\}_{k=0}^{l-1} = \{s_k^{-1}H_{\text{point}}(P_{s_k})\}_{k=0}^{l-1}.
\] (39)

Also, it publishes an element $A_{\text{sum}}$ and declares that, to the accuracy of a summand which is proportional to the hidden amount blinding generator $D$ (meaning a factor of $D$ is known to the prover), there holds

\[
A_{\text{sum}} = \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} A_{s_k}.
\] (40)
Next, prover and verifier play the following game. They choose an orthogonal blinding generator $H$ as a hash to group of everything they have in common, and the prover publishes vector $A^\text{imp}$ of $l$ hidden amounts, which correspond to the actual signing keys and are additionally blinded with $H$, i.e.,

$$A^\text{imp} = \{A_{sk} + \mu_k H\}_{k=0}^{l-1}, \text{ where } \mu_k \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^*.$$  

(41)

Then, the prover publishes a set of $l$ what we call ‘pseudo key images’ $J$, which are constructed as follows

$$J = \{x_k^{-1}H_{\text{point}}(H, A^\text{imp}_k) + v_k H\}_{k=0}^{l-1}, \text{ where } v_k \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^*.$$

(42)

The term ‘pseudo key image’ comes from the fact that each $J_k$ is structurally similar to $I_k$, except for that $I_k$ takes $H_{\text{point}}$ of $P_{sk}$, whereas $J_k$ takes $H_{\text{point}}$ of $(H, A^\text{imp}_k)$ and is additionally blinded. Apparently, $J_k$ cannot be used in the role of the real key image $I_k$ for linking actual signers, as $J_k$ is not unique due to the blinding. Note, that all $I_k$’s are published before $H$ is generated, so they are orthogonal to $H$ even in the dishonest case.

In addition to this, prover and verifier generate one more orthogonal generator, $K$, as a hash to group of everything they have in common after $J$ is published.

Now, using random weights $\zeta, \omega, \chi$ prover and verifier define the following three vectors

$$X = P - (K)^n + \zeta (H_{\text{point}}(P_i))_{i=0}^{n-1} - \omega A,$$

(43)

$$V = \{K\}^l + \omega A^\text{imp} + \chi (H_{\text{point}}(H, A^\text{imp}_k))_{k=0}^{l-1},$$

(44)

$$Z = \{G\}^l + \zeta I + \chi J,$$

(45)

and make a call to the Lin2-2Choice lemma protocol for them, as follows

$$\text{zkLin22Choice}_{l,n,l}(X, Q, V, W, H, Z; s, x^{-1}, x^{-1}, a_H),$$

(46)

where $Q, W$ are auxiliary orthogonal generators prepared in advance. Here all elements in $Q, W$ are also orthogonal to the elements in $X$ (43) and in $V$ (44); this is because of $H_{\text{point}}$ is defined in such a way that all its images are orthogonal to the predefined $Q, W$. The vector $a_H$ comprises the summary weights accumulated by the corresponding $H$ components within the protocol.

When the call (46) successfully completes, by Theorem 12 (Lin2-2Choice lemma) verifier is convinced that, for each $k \in \{0 \ldots l-1\}$, prover knows a scalar pair $(p_k, v_k)$ such that there holds, to the accuracy of $H$ component

$$Z_k = p_k X_{sk} + v_k V_k.$$

(47)

Inserting (43), (44), (45) into (47) the verifier obtains

$$G + \zeta I_k + \chi J_k = p_k (P_{sk} - K + \zeta H_{\text{point}}(P_{sk}) - \omega A_{sk}) + v_k (K + \omega A^\text{imp}_k + \chi H_{\text{point}}(H, A^\text{imp}_k)),$$

(48)

which immediately yields $p_k = v_k$, as otherwise the $H_{\text{point}}$ image $K$ gets decomposed by the components of its pre-image. By reducing (48), the verifier gets

$$G + \zeta I_k + \chi J_k = p_k (P_{sk} + \zeta H_{\text{point}}(P_{sk}) + \chi H_{\text{point}}(H, A^\text{imp}_k)) + p_k (\omega A^\text{imp}_k - \omega A_{sk}).$$

(49)

Since $H_{\text{point}}(H, A^\text{imp}_k)$ is orthogonal to everything else in the right-hand side of (49) and since at least $P_{sk}$ in it is nonzero, by Theorem 3 verifier gets convinced that the following hold for some known to the prover scalar $p_k$, to the accuracy of $H$ component which is for blinding,

$$\begin{align*}
G &= p_k P_{sk} \\
I_k &= p_k H_{\text{point}}(P_{sk}) \\
J_k &= p_k H_{\text{point}}(H, A^\text{imp}_k) \\
A_{sk} &= A^\text{imp}.
\end{align*}$$

(50a), (50b), (50c), (50d)

The equalities (50a), (50b) are strict, as all elements in them are included into the pre-image of $H$. Thus, they convince verifier that the signing is correct and the linking tag is valid. At the same time, (50d) convinces verifier that $A^\text{imp}_k$ is the hidden amount corresponding to the signing key, to the accuracy of $H$.

Keeping in mind there exist $l$ equalities (50d) for all actually signing keys in $s$, after the call to

$$\text{zk2ElemComm}(D, H, A^\text{imp} = \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} A^\text{imp}_k; \ldots),$$

(51)
the verifier is convinced that $A^\text{sum}$ is a sum of all the hidden amounts $\{A_{s_k}\}_{k=0}^{l-1}$ corresponding to the signing keys, to the accuracy of a linear by $H$ and $D$ component. Moreover, as $A^\text{sum}$ and $A \supseteq \{A_{s_k}\}_{k=0}^{l-1}$ are in the pre-image of $H$, the call (51) convinces the verifier in the stronger assertion, namely, that $A^\text{sum}$ is a sum of $\{A_{s_k}\}_{k=0}^{l-1}$ to the accuracy of only $D$ component.

Thus, the verifier is convinced that the signature is correct and also that there holds, to the accuracy of $D$, the equality (40). This is all it gets from the signature.

8.2.2 IMMEDIATE IMPLICATION

The verifier then proceeds from the system properties in Figure 19, as follows. Recalling that, according to Figure 19, there exists a proof of the decomposition (38) for each element in $A$, having checked that these proofs are already verified in the system it makes sure that $A$ contains some hidden amounts, and not anything else. Namely, it gets convinced that there holds

$$\{A_{s_k}\}_{k=0}^{l-1} = \{b_{s_k}B + d_{s_k}D\}_{k=0}^{l-1} \subseteq A,$$  \hspace{1cm} (52)

From the decompositions (52) and from the proved equality (40), it gets convinced that

$$A^\text{sum} = b^\text{sum}B + d^\text{sum}D,$$  \hspace{1cm} (53)

Finally, from (53), (52), (40) it gets convinced that

$$b^\text{sum} = \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} b_{s_k},$$  \hspace{1cm} (54)

Thus, by verifying the EFLRSLWB signature and by making sure that the corresponding proofs of the form (38) for all the hidden amounts in the signature ring have already been checked, the verifier gets convinced that prover knows signing private keys, and also that the sum of the corresponding hidden amounts is balanced with the given hidden amount $A^\text{sum}$, to the accuracy of blinding with $D$.

8.3 FORMAL PRESENTATION

Theorem 13:

For $n, l \in \mathbb{N}^*$ such that $l \leq n$, for a vector of nonzero elements $P \in G^n$, together with a vector of elements $A \in G^n$ which are considered a ring of (public key, hidden amount) pairs, for an element $A^\text{sum}$, for a nonzero element $D$ which is considered as a blinding generator for hidden amounts, the protocol in Figure 21 is a linkable threshold ring signature with the following properties:

1. perfect correctness,
2. existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message / public key attackers,
3. unforgeability w.r.t. insider corruption,
4. anonymity,
5. anonymity w.r.t. chosen public key attackers,
6. linkability,
7. non-frameability,
8. non-frameability w.r.t. chosen public key attackers,
9. it is a proof of that $A^\text{sum}$ is a sum of $A$’s of the actual signing keys, to the accuracy of the blinding component proportional to $D$.

Proof: Appendix P.

Overview: Section 8.2.1.

Note, Theorem 13 doesn’t impose any requirement on elements of the vector $A$ and on $A^\text{sum}$, i.e., there is no assumption like (38) about their decompositions. At the same time, it’s easy to see that if the property 9) holds, then the proof of balance (54) immediately follows from the proofs of the decomposition (38) for all $A_k \in A$.

Therefore, if the proofs of the decomposition (38) for all $A_k \in A$ are obtained by any means prior or after EFLRSLWB is created, and also if all of them are successfully verified, then the proof of the balance (54) is thus obtained.
\[ \text{EFLRSLWB: SignAndVerify}_{I,n}(M, P, A, A^{\text{num}}, D; s, x, d^{\text{Asum}}) \]

\( \mathcal{P} \)'s input : \((M \in \{0,1\}^*, P \in G_{1}^n, A \in G_n, A^{\text{num}} \in G, D \in G^*, s \in \{0 \ldots n-1\}^l, x \in \hat{F}_{p}^l, d^{\text{Asum}} \in \hat{F}_{p}\)  

\( \mathcal{V} \)'s input : \((M \in \{0,1\}^*, P \in G_{1}^n, A \in G_n, A^{\text{num}} \in G, D \in G^*)\)

\( \mathcal{P} \)'s output: Signature  // signature is a list of all \( \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V} \) messages from this and nested protocols  

\( \mathcal{V} \)'s output: Accept or Reject

\( \mathcal{P} \) and \( \mathcal{V} \) assert all elements in \( P \) are nonzero and different  

let \( U \leftarrow \{ H_{\text{point}}(P_{[i]}) \}_{i=0}^{n-1} \)

\( \mathcal{P} \) allocates \( I \in G_{1}^s, p \in F_{p}^l \) .

initializes

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{foreach } k \in [0 \ldots l - 1] & \quad \text{assert } x_{[k]} \neq 0 \\
\quad P_{[k]} &= \hat{x}_{[k]} \\
\quad \text{lets } (s_k, p_k) &\leftarrow (s_{[k]}, P_{[k]}) \ , \\
\quad I_{[k]} &= p_k U_{[s_k]} \quad \text{// vector } I \text{ is filled in here} \\
\end{align*}
\]

endforeach

\( \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V} \) I

\( \mathcal{V} \) assert all elements in \( I \) are nonzero and different  // \( \mathcal{V} \) makes sure there is no zero \( I \) and no signer signing twice  

\( \epsilon \leftarrow s F_{p}^l \)

\( \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P} \) \( \epsilon \)

\( \mathcal{P} \) and \( \mathcal{V} \) let \( H \leftarrow H_{\text{point}}(\epsilon) \)  // thus, \( H \) is orthogonal to all known so far elements, i.e., ort(\( H, G, P, A, U, I, A^{\text{num}}, D \))

\( \mathcal{P} \) allocates \( A^{\text{imp}} \in G_{1}^s, \alpha \in F_{p}^l \) .

initializes

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{foreach } k \in [0 \ldots l - 1] & \quad \text{lets } \mu_k \leftarrow \mu_{[k]} \ , \\
\quad A^{\text{imp}}_{[k]} &= A_{[s_k]} + \mu_k \ H \quad \text{// } A^{\text{imp}} \text{ is filled in, amounts get double blinded (with } D \text{ and with } H) \\
\quad \alpha_{[k]} &= p_k \mu_k \quad \text{// } \alpha \text{ is initialized here, it contains reduced } A^{\text{imp}} \text{’s second blinding factors} \\
\end{align*}
\]

endforeach

\( \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V} \) \( A^{\text{imp}} \)

\( \mathcal{P} \) and \( \mathcal{V} \) let \( \hat{U} \leftarrow \{ H_{\text{point}}(H, A_{[k]}^{\text{imp}}) \}_{k=0}^{l-1} \)

\( \mathcal{P} \) lets \( J \leftarrow \{ p_k \hat{U}_{[k]} + u_k H \}_{k=0}^{l-1} \)  // vector \( J \) is initialized here, it contains ‘pseudo key images’ built using \( \hat{U} \)

\( \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V} \) \( J \)

\( \mathcal{V} \) assert all elements in \( A^{\text{imp}}, J \) are nonzero and different  // \( \mathcal{V} \) makes sure \( \hat{U} \) is orthogonal and there is no zero \( J \)

\( \hat{e}, \hat{\zeta}, \omega, \chi \leftarrow F_{p}^l \)

\( \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P} \) \( \hat{e}, \hat{\zeta}, \omega, \chi \)

\( \mathcal{P} \) and \( \mathcal{V} \) let \( K \leftarrow H_{\text{point}}(\hat{e}) \)  // thus, ort(\( K, H, G, P, A, U, I, A^{\text{num}}, A^{\text{imp}}, \hat{U}, J \)) holds

allocate \( X \in G_{1}^s, V, Z \in G_{1}^l, S \in G \) ,

assign \( X = P - \{ K \}, V = \hat{U} + \omega A, \quad Z = \{ G \} \, x + \hat{\zeta} I + \chi J \)

assign \( S = A^{\text{num}} - \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} A^{\text{imp}}_{[k]} \)

run zk2ElemComm(\( D, H, S; a^{\text{Asum}} - \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} \mu_k \))

run zkLin22Choice_{I,n,l}(X, G_{[1]}^{[n]}, V, G_{[n(n+1)]}, H, Z, s, p, -\omega \alpha + \chi u)

Figure 21: EFLRSLWB signing and verification
8.4 SIZE AND COMPLEXITY

To verify the EFLRSWLB signature, 'V needs only to check the equalities (*) and (***) in Figure 22. By combining the equalities (*) and (***) with random weights and then using the multi-exponentiation technique, 'V performs the verification in the time shown in Table 5, where signature size is also shown.

![Figure 22: EFLRSWLB unfolded equality, verifier checks it](image)

Table 5: EFLRSWLB signature size and verification complexity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Verification complexity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EFLRSWLB</td>
<td>$2\left[\log_2(n+1)\right] + 6l + 6$</td>
<td>$\text{mexp}(4n + 2\log_2(n+1) + 7l + 7) + (n + l + 2)H_{pt}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

9 SIGNATURE MULTRATUG

The signature EFLRSWLB has key image $\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(P)/x$ with private key $x$ in the denominator. In some applications it is desirable to have key image in a linear form by private key. This form, namely, the form $x\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(P)$, is used in the LSAQ [20], CLSAG [11], CryptoNote [28] schemes. Consequently, the multiparty signing operations can be easily implemented for them.

Now we will move $x$ from the denominator to the numerator in the EFLRSWLB’s key image. Thus we will obtain a version of the EFLRSWLB signature with key image $x\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(P)$, called EFLRSWBLI (Efficient linkable ring signature with balance proof and linear key image) and aliased as Multratug.

Our idea of this $x$’s movement is quite simple and does not require any new steps in the protocol, just only a few modifications to it, which are outlined below. Although, for the first, we will have to generalize Theorem 3, which is about 3-element tuples, to element tuples of greater length to prove that this movement of $x$ is correct.

9.1 OVERVIEW

9.1.1 RANDOM WEIGHTING FOR T-S-TUPLES

Suppose, we have two tuples $T, D$, of $(t + s + 1)$ elements each, we call them as t-s-tuples, such that

$$T = (P, Q_0, Q_1, \ldots, Q_{t-1}, S_0, S_1, \ldots, S_{s-1}) \quad (55)$$

$$D = (Z, F_0, F_1, \ldots, F_{t-1}, 0, 0, \ldots) \quad (56)$$

where $P \in G^*$, $Q \in G'$, $S \in G^*$, $Z \in G$, $F \in G'$, for some $t > 0$, $s > 0$. The structure of these tuples is as follows. The element $Z$ corresponds to the element $P$, the elements in $F$ correspond to the elements with the same indices in $Q$, and $s$ zeros correspond to the elements in $S$.

Now, we sample a random scalar vector $\xi$ of length $(t + s + 1)$ and build the inner products of our tuples with
this scalar vector $\xi$. Namely, we build $X, Y$ such that
\begin{align}
X = \langle \xi, T \rangle &= P + \xi_1 Q_0 + \xi_2 Q_1 + \cdots + \xi_{r+1} S_0 + \xi_{r+2} S_1 + \cdots, \\
Y = \langle \xi, D \rangle &= Z + \xi_1 F_0 + \xi_2 F_1 + \cdots,
\end{align}
where $\xi = [1, \delta_0, \delta_1, \ldots, \delta_{i-1}, \sigma_0, \sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_{k-1}]$. (59)

Without limiting generality, we let the first element of the random vector $\xi$ be equal to 1.

In addition to the above, suppose we have a complete, $s$HVZK, and having $c$WEE argument that convinces a verifier that $Y \sim X$ to the accuracy of $H$ component. Here $H$ is assumed as a blinding generator chosen in such a way as to be orthogonal to all the elements in $T$, except for maybe those in their set $S$. The question is what we can say about $T$ and $D$ under these conditions.

Theorem 14 answers this question so that as long as $Q$ contains at least one nonzero element and $P$ is orthogonal to $T \setminus \{P\}$, there necessarily exists an unique factor $a$ known to prover that connects all the corresponding element pairs in $T$ and $D$. The following relation (60), protocol $zkTElementRW_{s}$ $(P, Q, S, H, Z)$ in Figure 23, and Theorem 14, formalize the game and sufficient conditions for the existence of such an unique factor.

\begin{align}
\begin{dcases}
P \in G^*, Q \in G^*, S \in G^*, H \in G^*, Z \in G, F \in G^*; \\
a, \alpha \in F_p, \beta \in \hat{F}_p, \gamma \in \hat{F}_p
\end{dcases}
\begin{array}{cl}
Z = aP + aH \land \\
F = aQ + \beta H \land \\
\{0\}^t = aS + \gamma H
\end{array}
\end{align}

### 9.1.2 Multratug: Moving X to the Numerator

Our idea of this $x$’s movement is about building $X, V, Z$ in Figure 21 a bit differently, as follows. So, instead of the key image vector $I = \{x_k^{-1}U_{s_k}\}_{k=0}^{l-1}$ in Figure 21, prover builds a vector of the linear key images $I$ as
\begin{equation}
I = \{x_k U_{s_k} \}_{k=0}^{l-1}.
\end{equation}

Then, the prover builds a blinded copy of the corresponding subset of $U$ as
\begin{equation}
U^{\text{imp}} = \{U_{s_k} \}_{k=0}^{l-1} + \hat{\mu} H,
\end{equation}
and sends it to verifier together with $A^{\text{imp}}$. The vector $U^{\text{imp}}$ (along with $A^{\text{imp}}$) gets into the pre-images of all the hashes that are generated in the protocol from this moment on.

Finally, using the vectors $\hat{I}, U^{\text{imp}},$ and an additional random scalar $\theta$, both of the prover and verifier build $X, V, Z$ as
\begin{align}
X &= P - (K)^n + \xi U - \omega A, \\
V &= (K)^t + \omega A^{\text{imp}} - \xi \hat{U} + \chi \hat{\mu} H, \\
Z &= (G)^t + \theta U^{\text{imp}} + \chi J.
\end{align}

Then they proceed with executing the protocol to the completion. Of course, the prover adjusts the total blinding factor at the private input of $zkLin2Choice_{s,r,t}$ with respect to the new $\hat{\mu}$ sampled in (62).

Since $X, V, Z$ are now defined by (63), (64), (65) instead of (43), (44), (45), by Theorem 12 (Lin2-2Choice lemma) the verifier obtains $l$ following equalities, instead of $l$ equalities (49), for each $k \in \{0, \ldots, l-1\},$ to the accuracy of $H$ component
\begin{equation}
G + \theta U^{\text{imp}} + \chi J = p_k (P_{s_k} + \theta \hat{I}_{k} + \chi \hat{\mu}_{k}) + p_k (\omega A^{\text{imp}}_{s_k} - \omega A_{s_k} + \xi U_{s_k} - \xi U^{\text{imp}}_{s_k}), \quad \text{where } p_k = x_k^{-1}.
\end{equation}

By Theorem 14, from (66) the verifier gets convinced that the following system of equalities holds, for each $k$, to the accuracy of $H$ component, this is explained in detail in Appendix T
\begin{align}
G &= p_k P_{s_k} \\
U_{s_k} &= U^{\text{imp}} \\
U_{s_k} &= p_k \hat{I}_{k} \\
J_{k} &= p_k \hat{U}_{k} \\
A_{s_k} &= A^{\text{imp}}_{s_k}.
\end{align}

From (67a) and (67c), which are strict (have zero $H$ component, as $H$ is a hash image of all their elements), the verifier gets convinced that the signing is correct and that the linear linking tags are valid, respectively. The balance proof and all the other points of the Theorem 13 proof remain the same as for EFLRSLWB with the former linking tag. Thus, the transition to the linear linking tag is performed, with all the EFLRSLWB properties moved unaffected to Multratug.
9.2 FORMAL PRESENTATION

9.2.1 RANDOM WEIGHTING FOR T-S-TUPLES

Theorem 14 (Random weighting for t-s-tuples):
For \( t \in \mathbb{N}^* \), \( s \in \mathbb{N} \), for two nonzero elements \( P, H \in G^* \), for two element vectors \( Q \in G^t \), \( S \in G^s \) such that there holds \( nz(Q) \neq \emptyset \) and \( P \neq \text{lin}(nz(Q) \cup \{H\}) \) \land H = \text{lin}(nz(Q) \cup \{P\}) \), the protocol \( \text{zkTElemRW}_{t,s} \) in Figure 23 is a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (60) with unique witness.

Proof: is in Appendix Q.

Overview: Section 9.1.1.

Figure 23: Random weighting for two t-s-tuples

Note, the premise of Theorem 14 introduces a couple of preconditions in the form \( A \neq \text{lin}(B) \) which easily implements as \( A = H_{\text{point}}(B) \). This form of precondition is weaker than \( \text{ort}(\{A\} \cup B) \) which is a shorthand of the DL relation assumption [6] for \( \{A\} \cup B \). Thus, a theorem having the precondition \( A \neq \text{lin}(B) \) is stronger than a theorem with the precondition \( \text{ort}(\{A\} \cup B) \).

Since we do not have a separate assumption for premises in the form \( A \neq \text{lin}(B) \), only for those in the form \( \text{ort}(C) \), here is a rule for how the first form translates to the second. If \( \text{ort}(B) \) holds, then \( A \neq \text{lin}(B) \) is equivalent to \( \text{ort}(\{A\} \cup B) \) and thus the translation is done. Otherwise, if \( \text{ort}(B) \) does not hold, then there exists a set \( B' \subseteq B \) together with some coefficients known to prove such that \( \text{ort}(B') \land \forall B \in B : B = \text{lin}(B') \). Thus, \( A \neq \text{lin}(B) \) translates to \( \text{ort}(\{A\} \cup B) \) in this case. Having defined such a translation, we have shown that the theorem holds under the DL relation assumption.

9.2.2 SIGNATURE MULTRATUG

Theorem 15:
The scheme in Figure 24 obtained from the scheme in Figure 21 by appending the element vector \( \mathbf{U}^{\text{imp}} \) and substituting the new key image vector \( \mathbf{I} \) for the vector \( \mathbf{I} \) in it, as shown in Figure 24, is a linkable threshold ring signature retaining the properties 1...9) of the scheme in Figure 21 listed in Theorem 13.

Proof: is in Appendix U.

Thus, we have created the Multratug signature scheme and proved that it has all the properties shown in Table 2.
\[ \mathcal{P} \text{ and } \mathcal{V} \]
assert all elements in \( P \) are nonzero and different

\[
\begin{align*}
\& \text{let } U \leftarrow \{ H_{\text{point}}(P_i) \}_{i=0}^{n-1} \\
\& \text{\( \mathcal{P} \): allocates } I \in \mathbb{G}^l, \ p \in \mathbb{F}_p^l. \\
\& \text{initialize} \\
\& \quad \text{foreach } k \in [0, \ldots, l-1] \\
\& \quad \quad \text{assert } x_k \neq 0 \\
\& \quad \quad P[k] = x_k \hat{I} \\
\& \quad \quad \text{let } (s_k, p_k) \leftarrow (s_k, P[k]), \\
\& \quad \quad \hat{I}[k] = x_k U[s_k] \quad \text{// vector } \hat{I} \text{ is filled here} \\
\end{align*}
\]
endforeach

\[ \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \]

\[ \hat{I} \]

\[ \mathcal{V} \]
assert all elements in \( \hat{I} \) are nonzero and different \quad // \( \mathcal{V} \) makes sure there is no zero \( I \) and no signer signing twice

\[ \epsilon \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^l \]

\[ \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P} \]
\[ \epsilon \]

\[ \mathcal{P} \text{ and } \mathcal{V} \]
let \( H \leftarrow H_{\text{point}}(\epsilon) \quad // \text{thus, } H \text{ is orthogonal to all known so far elements, i.e., } \text{ort}(H, G, P, A, U, I, A_{\text{temp}}, D) \)

\[ \mathcal{P} \]
\[ \mu, \mu, \nu \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^l, \quad \text{allocates } A_{\text{imp}}, U_{\text{imp}} \in \mathbb{G}^l, \ \alpha, \hat{\alpha} \in \mathbb{F}_p^l, \]

\[ \text{initialize} \\
\& \quad \text{foreach } k \in [0, \ldots, l-1] \\
\& \quad \quad \text{let } (\mu_k, \hat{\mu}_k) \leftarrow (\mu[k], \hat{\mu}[k]). \\
\& \quad \quad A_{\text{imp}}[k] = A[x_k] + \mu_k H \quad \text{// } A_{\text{imp}} \text{ is filled in, amounts get double blinded (with } D \text{ and with } H) \\
\& \quad \quad \alpha[k] = p_k \mu_k \quad \text{// } \alpha \text{ is initialized here, it contains reduced } A_{\text{imp}}'s \text{ second blinding factors} \\
\& \quad \quad U_{\text{imp}}[k] = U[x_k] + \hat{\mu}_k H \quad \text{// } U_{\text{imp}} \text{ is filled in, } U \text{ is get blinded with } H \\
\& \quad \quad \hat{\alpha}[k] = p_k \hat{\mu}_k \quad \text{// } \hat{\alpha} \text{ is initialized here, it contains reduced } U_{\text{imp}}'s \text{ blinding factors} \\
\]
endforeach

\[ \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \]
\[ A_{\text{imp}}, U_{\text{imp}} \]

\[ \mathcal{P} \text{ and } \mathcal{V} \]
let \( \hat{U} \leftarrow \{ H_{\text{point}}(H, U_{\text{imp}}, A_{\text{imp}}[k]) \}_{k=0}^{l-1} \)

\[ \mathcal{P} \]
\[ \text{let } J \leftarrow \{ p_k \hat{U}[k] + u_k H \}_{k=0}^{l-1} \quad // \text{vector } J \text{ is initialized here, it contains } ' \text{pseudo key images}' \text{ built using } \hat{U} \]

\[ \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V} \]
\[ J \]

\[ \mathcal{V} \]
assert all elements in \( A_{\text{imp}}, J \) are nonzero and different \quad // \( \mathcal{V} \) makes sure \( \hat{U} \) is orthogonal and there is no zero \( J \)

\[ \hat{\epsilon}, \hat{\zeta}, \omega, \chi, \theta \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^l \]

\[ \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P} \]
\[ \hat{\epsilon}, \hat{\zeta}, \omega, \chi, \theta \]

\[ \mathcal{P} \text{ and } \mathcal{V} \]
let \( K \leftarrow H_{\text{point}}(\hat{\epsilon}) \quad // \text{thus, } \text{ort}(K, H, G, P, A, U, I, A_{\text{temp}}, \hat{U}, J) \) holds

\[ \text{allocate } X \in \mathbb{G}^n, V, Z \in \mathbb{G}^l, S \in \mathbb{G}, \]

\[ \text{assign } X = P - \{ K \}^n + \zeta U - \omega A, \quad V = \{ K \}^l + \omega A_{\text{imp}} - \zeta U_{\text{imp}} + \hat{\theta} \hat{U} + \chi \hat{U}, \]

\[ Z = \{ G \}^l + \theta U_{\text{imp}} + \chi J \]

\[ \text{assign } S = A_{\text{temp}} - \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} A_{\text{imp}}[k] \]

\[ \text{run } zk2\text{ElemComm}(D, H, S; \ A_{\text{temp}}, \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} \mu_k) \]
\[ \text{run } zk\text{lin2Choice}_{t,n,l}(X, G_{[n]}, V, G_{[\{n+1\}]}, H, Z; s, p, \ -\omega \alpha + \zeta \hat{\alpha} + \theta \hat{\mu} + \chi v) \]

Figure 24: Multratug with \( \hat{I} = x H_{\text{point}}(P) \) signing and verification
9.3 SIZE AND COMPLEXITY

The size of Multratug increases by \( l \) compared to EFLRSLWB because of the appended vector \( U_{tmp} \). Also, for the same reason, its verification complexity increases by \( l \) under the multi-exponent. The substitution of \( \hat{I} \) for \( I \) affects neither the size nor complexity. The totals are shown in Table 6.

| Table 6: Multratug signature size and verification complexity |
|-----------------|-----------------|
| **Size**        | **Verification complexity** |
| Multratug        | \( 2\lfloor \log_2(n + l) \rfloor + 7l + 6 \) | \( mexp(4n + 2\log_2(n + l) + 8l + f) + (n + l + 2)H_{pl} \) |

* Optimized size is shown in Table 7.

10 BETTER ARGUMENT FOR VECTOR COMMITMENT

The implementation of our pivotal vector commitment argument \( zkVC_n \) in Figure 3 is not decisive. We will now present a shorter implementation of it, called \( zkVC_{\text{opt}}^{opt} \), with the same properties of completeness, sHVZK, and cWEE. This our implementation utilizes the same ideas as the compressed pivot implementation in [2].

10.1 OVERVIEW

The idea is that, for any \( n \geq 1 \), it is always possible to construct an sHVZK and having cWEE custom Schnorr-like protocol of size \( n + 1 \), that proves a commitment \( Y \) is a weighted sum of \( n \) orthogonal generators \( X \) with weights known to the prover.

In this protocol, prover sends an element \( T \) as the first message. Then, verifier challenges with random scalar \( c \), and the prover replies with \( n \) scalars \( \tau \) by which the orthogonal generators \( X \) are then multiplied. The final check is the same as for the Schnorr id protocol, the only difference is that now the inner product \( \langle \tau, X \rangle \) is taken instead of the basic generator multiplied by the scalar replied in the Schnorr id scheme.

However, it is excessive to transmit all \( n \) scalars in \( \tau \); a proof of their knowledge would suffice. Moreover, this proof does not have to be sHVZK, a complete argument having cWEE would be enough.

10.2 FORMAL PRESENTATION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Relation:  ( \mathcal{R} = { X \in \mathbb{G}^n, Y \in \mathbb{G}; x \in \mathbb{F}^n \bar{p} \mid Y = \langle x, X \rangle } )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>// ( X ) in ( \mathcal{R} ) satisfies ( \text{ort}(X) ) .</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P )'s input :  ( (X, Y; x) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( V )'s input :  ( (X, Y) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P )'s output : none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( V )'s output:  Accept or Reject</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
P \quad \phi \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^{n*} \quad \text{and computes} \quad T = \langle \phi, X \rangle
\]

\[
P \rightarrow V \quad T
\]

\[
V \quad c \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^{n*}
\]

\[
V \rightarrow P \quad c
\]

\[
P \quad \text{computes} \quad \tau = \phi - cx
\]

\[
P \rightarrow V \quad \tau
\]

\[
V \quad \text{return} \quad \text{Accept if the following holds} \quad T - cx \overset{?}{=} \langle \tau, X \rangle
\]

Figure 25: Zero-knowledge argument for \( n \) element commitment relation
For the first, we define the protocol $\text{zkNElemComm}_n$ in Figure 25. Its design looks Schnorr-like. This protocol is an argument for the relation

$$R = \{ X \in G^n, Y \in G; \ x \in \mathbb{F}_p^n \ | \ Y = \langle x, X \rangle \}.$$  (68)

The relation (68) is actually the relation (7) with the items renamed and, at the same time, is the relation (5) with the blinding generator $H$ moved to the vector $X$.

The $\text{zkNElemComm}_n$ protocol properties are specified in the next theorem. Note that, for $n = 2$, $\text{zkNElemComm}_2$ is equivalent to $\text{zk2ElemComm}$ in Figure 2.

**Theorem 16:**
For $n \in \mathbb{N}^*$, for a vector of nonzero elements $X \in G^n$ such that there holds $\text{ort}(X)$, for an element $Y \in G$, the protocol $\text{zkNElemComm}_n$ in Figure 25 is a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (68) with unique witness.

**Proof:** is in Appendix V.

For the second, in Figure 26 we define a log-size vector commitment argument $\text{argVC}_n$ for the same relation (68). We do use the blinding generator $H$ neither in $\text{zkNElemComm}_n$ nor in $\text{argVC}_n$. Also, note that $\text{zkNElemComm}_n$ is sHVZK, whereas $\text{argVC}_n$ is not. The properties of $\text{argVC}_n$ are specified in the following theorem.

**Theorem 17:**
For $n \in \mathbb{N}^*$ such that $n$ is a power of 2, for a vector of nonzero elements $X \in G^n$ such that there holds $\text{ort}(X)$, for an element $Y \in G$, the protocol $\text{argVC}_n$ in Figure 26 is a complete argument having cWEE for the relation (68) with unique witness.

**Proof:** is in Appendix W.

```
argVC_n(X, Y; x)
Relation R = \{ X \in G^n, Y \in G; \ x \in \mathbb{F}_p^n \ | \ Y = \langle x, X \rangle \} // (68)
// X in R satisfies ort(X), n is a power of 2 everytime.
P’s input : (X, Y; x)
V’s input : (X, Y)
P’s output: none
V’s output: Accept or Reject
if n > 4 then
    \[ P \] lets \hat{n} \leftarrow n/2 and computes \[ L = \langle x[\hat{n}], X[\hat{n}] \rangle \]
    \[ R = \langle x[\hat{n}], X[\hat{n}] \rangle \]
    \[ P \rightarrow V \] L, R
    \[ V \] e \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_p^+
    \[ V \rightarrow P \] e
    \[ P \text{ and } V \] compute \[ \hat{X} = e^{-1}x[\hat{n}] + eX[\hat{n}] \]
    \[ \hat{Y} = Y + e^2L + e^{-2}R \]
    \[ P \] computes \[ \hat{x} = ex[\hat{n}] + e^{-1}x[\hat{n}] \]
    \[ P \text{ and } V \] run argVC_\hat{n}(\hat{X}, \hat{Y}; \hat{x}) // run recursively until n=4
else
    // n < 4
    \[ P \rightarrow V \] x
    \[ V \] returns Accept iff the following holds
    \[ Y = \langle x, X \rangle \]
endif
```

Figure 26: Efficient argument for vector commitment

Third, we combine $\text{zkNElemComm}_n$ with $\text{argVC}_n$ into the single proof, as follows.
Relation $\mathcal{R} = \{ (X, H, Y; a, \alpha) \in \mathbb{G}_p^n \times \mathbb{G}_p^* \mid Y = (a, X) + aH \} // (5)$

// $X$, $H$ in $\mathcal{R}$ satisfy $\text{ort}(X \cup \{H\})$, and also $(n + 1)$ is a power of 2 everytime.

$\mathcal{P}$'s input : $(X, H, Y; a, \alpha)$

$\mathcal{V}$'s input : $(X, H, Y)$

$\mathcal{P}$'s output : none

$\mathcal{V}$'s output: $\text{Accept or Reject}$

$\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ let $\hat{X} \leftarrow [X, H]$

$\mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}$ $\phi \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_p^{(n+1)*}$, lets $\hat{\mathbf{x}} \leftarrow [x, \alpha]$, and computes $T = (\phi, \hat{X})$

$\mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$ $c \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_p^*$

$\mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$ $c$

$\mathcal{P}$ computes $\tau = \phi - c\hat{\mathbf{x}}$

$\mathcal{P}$ and $\mathcal{V}$ run $\argVC_{n+1}(\hat{X}, T - cY; \tau)$

Figure 27: Efficient zero-knowledge argument for vector commitment

Theorem 18:

For a nonzero element $H \in \mathbb{G}^*$, for $n \in \mathbb{N}^*$ such that $(n + 1)$ is a power of 2, for a vector of nonzero elements $X \in \mathbb{G}^n$ such that there holds $\text{ort}(X \cup \{H\})$, for an element $Y \in \mathbb{G}$, the protocol $\text{zkVC}_{opt}^n$ in Figure 27 is a complete, $sHVZK$ argument having $cWEE$ for the relation $(5)$ with unique witness.

Proof: is in Appendix X.

10.3 SIZES AND COMPLEXITIES

As a result, we obtain the argument $\text{zkVC}_{opt}^n$ of size $2\lceil \log_2(n + 1) \rceil + 1$. We replace $\text{zkVC}_n$ with $\text{zkVC}_{opt}^n$ in Multratug and EFLRSL. After this replacement, new sizes of the signatures are shown in Table 7. Their verification times do not change much, so we do not recalculate them. For comparison, the former sizes and times are in Table 4 and Table 6. Also, from now on we require $(n + l + 1)$ and $(n + 1)$ to be powers of 2, respectively.

Table 7: Optimized characteristics of the Multratug and EFLRSL schemes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Verification complexity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multratug</td>
<td>$2\lceil \log_2(n + l + 1) \rceil + 7l + 4$</td>
<td>$\text{mexp(4n} + 8l + \ldots) + (n + l + 2)\text{H}_{pt}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFLRSL</td>
<td>$2\lceil \log_2(n + 1) \rceil + 3l + 1$</td>
<td>$\text{mexp(3n} + 2l + \ldots) + (n + 1)\text{H}_{pt}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

... Insignificant summands are omitted.

11 APPLICATIONS

11.1 SIGNATURE IN BLOCKCHAIN

Suppose, Multratug is used to sign transactions in an UTXO blockchain like, e.g., [21, 28]. Suppose, the blockchain public keys, hidden amounts, hash functions, and predefined generators follow the rules in Figures 1, 8, 19, 20. There is nothing unusual in these requirements for a blockchain. Besides this, the blockchain does not have to follow the CryptoNote rules for stealth addresses [28], although it can.

For every transaction, its sender $\mathcal{P}$ performs as follows.

- Picks from the ledger $n$ pairs of the form $(P, A)$, which become transaction inputs, and makes the ring (36) of them.

- Generates and places into the transaction $m$ pairs of the form $(P, A)$, which become the transaction outputs. For convenience, it considers all $m$ hidden amounts $A$ of these outputs as the vector $A^\text{out}$. Note, knowing the
actual signing ring keys and their corresponding hidden amounts, $P$ distributes the value parts of elements in $A^{\text{out}}$ in such a way as to be in balance with the signing amounts in the ring.

- Let $A^{\text{sum}} = \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} A_k^{\text{out}}$.
- Knowing the actual signing ring keys, let their indices be in the vector $s$, it signs the transaction with the Multratug signature.
- $P$ proves ranges of all elements in $A^{\text{out}}$, for example, using the aggregate range proof from [8] which is combinable with Multratug, as shown in Section 12.3.
- Proves that each $A_k^{\text{out}} \in A^{\text{out}}$ has the decomposition (38) with known to $P$ coefficients. Notably, if the ranges of elements in $A^{\text{out}}$ are already proved by the protocols from [6, 8], then for all $A_k^{\text{out}} \in A^{\text{out}}$ their decompositions (38) are proved by this.

Thus, the transaction contains the proofs of the form (38) for all of the output hidden amounts in $A^{\text{out}}$. Also, the transaction contains Multratug which provides the proof of that $\sum_{k=0}^{m-1} A_k^{\text{out}}$ is equal to the sum $\sum_{k=0}^{l-1} A_{s_k}$ of all hidden amounts related to the signing indices $s$, to the accuracy of $D$.

Taking into account that all $A_{s_k}$'s are a subset of all hidden amounts $A$ in the ring, and the latter are assumed already verified having the form (38), it follows that the sum of amounts corresponding to the actual signing keys is equal to the sum of the output amounts, i.e.,

$$\sum_{k=0}^{l-1} b_{s_k} = \sum_{k=0}^{m-1} b_k^{\text{out}}.$$ 

At the same time, the same Multratug proves that $P$ knows private keys for the actual signing public keys at the ring indices in $s$. Multratug also provides key images $I$'s, thus blocking reuse of those public keys that actually have signed the signature.

11.2 REGULAR RING SIGNATURE

EFLRSL is a simple linkable threshold ring signature which, in terms of Table 2, has Log-sz, Regular, Linkable, Thresh., General properties check-marked. Consequently, EFLRSL can be used in a wide range of cryptographic systems and scenarios, including electronic voting or whistleblowing described, e.g., in [20].

As for an not-linkable version of EFLRSL, it can be easily constructed by blinding the EFLRSL key images. To blind the key images it suffices to exclude them from the arguments of $H_{\text{point}}$ call that creates the blinding generator $H$, and to add random $H$ components to them.

12 IMPROVEMENTS

12.1 USING RING OF SIZE $N \cdot L$

It is possible to slightly reduce the size of the Multratug scheme by not using the Lin2-2Choice lemma and instead by growing the ring $l$ times as to comprise $l$ replicas of itself, each for its hidden amount $A_k^{\text{tmp}}$. In this case, after the appropriate optimizations, the signature size would be

$$2 \log_2(nl) + 5l + O(1).$$

However, we still prefer the version with the Lin2-2Choice lemma, since not using it implies that the ring grows to $nl$ size. This would require to add more generators to keep all the ring elements linearly independent of each other and, hence, will correspondingly increase $l$ times the verification time.

12.2 BATCH VERIFICATION

Multratug signature batch verification can be performed by checking only one equality, by combining the equalities (*) and (**) in Figure 22 of all signatures in a batch using random weighting. Of course, the equality (*) slightly changes when $zkVC_{\text{opt}}$ is used in place of $zkVC_n$, this is a minor detail and we do not show the change here.

In any case, for batches, the asymptotic verification complexity by ring size $n$ decreases from $4n$ to $3n$ under the multi-exponent. This happens due to the fact that all the Multratug signature batch instances use the same vector of predefined generators $G$. The same can be stated about EFLRSL, referring to Figure 15 and finding there a reduction from $3n$ to $2n$ under the multi-exponent.
12.3 COMBINING WITH OTHER PROOFS

Multratug relies on the pivotal vector commitment argument and is independent of implementation of the pivot. Consequently, Multratug can be combined with any other proof which uses the vector commitment argument. For instance, it can be combined with the inner product argument implemented according to [6] or [8].

In this way, Multratug can be combined with the single or aggregate range proofs from [8], and they will share the component responsible for the sum

$$\log_2((n+p^{\text{rangeproof}})-1) \sum_{j=0}^{n-1} (e_j^2 L_j + e_j^{-2} R_j),$$

where $n^{\text{rangeproof}}$ is equal to bitsize of the range times number of proofs aggregated.

12.4 DOWNGRADING TO U/X KEY IMAGE

In the case of using the signature in a blockchain confined to the stealth address format of CryptoNote [28], it is possible to replace the key image form $x^{-1} H_{\text{point}}(xG)$ with the form $x^{-1} U$, where $U$ is a predefined orthogonal generator. This is to be performed for the EFLRSLWB version of the signature defined in Section 8.

Of course, such a replacement would require expanding the vector $G$ of predefined orthogonal generators so as to use them instead of $H_{\text{point}}(P_i)$’s in the ring. The size of the signature will not change after that. However, the batch verification time will be significantly reduced.

12.5 MULTIPLE HIDDEN AMOUNTS PER ACCOUNT

In the context of a blockchain, particularly in the scenario described in Section 11.1, as well as in other cases, we can consider a setup where several hidden amounts are associated with a public key, instead of one. To be precise, we can assume that for each $i$-th address (37) in the ring, $i \in [0 \ldots n-1]$, instead of the hidden amount $A_i$ defined by the formula (38) there are $u$ hidden amounts $\{A_{ij}\}_{j=0}^{u-1}$ defined by the following formula

$$A_{ij} = b_{ij}B_j + d_{ij}D. \quad (69)$$

According to this new formula (69) which replaces (38), now, for each signing index $s_k$, $k \in [0 \ldots l-1]$, prover $P$ is required to know $u$ amounts $\{b_{s_k,j}\}_{j=0}^{u-1}$ along with $u$ blinding factors $\{d_{s_k,j}\}_{j=0}^{u-1}$. Also, according to (69), now there are $u$ orthogonal generators $\{B_j\}_{j=0}^{u-1}$ instead of the single generator $B$ in the system, so the common information in Figure 20 is assumed extended with them. Each $j$-th hidden amount is encoded with the corresponding generator $B_j$. The blinding generator $D$ remains intact and is used for all of the amounts.

To conclude the setup, each of the output hidden amounts $A \in A^{\text{out}}$ is replaced with $u$ new hidden amounts of the form (69), with $i \in [0 \ldots m-1]$, $j \in [0 \ldots u-1]$ for them. It is assumed that some external range proofs are provided for all of the output hidden amounts as well.

With this setup, the signature Multratug needs no modification to convince $V$ that $u$ balances are kept. Just all $u$ hidden amounts of each address are convolved back into single element $A_i$, as follows,

$$A_i = \sum_{j=0}^{u-1} b_{ij}B_j + \sum_{j=0}^{u-1} d_{ij}D,$$

and the same is for the output hidden amounts. After that, the signature Multratug is released for them. It is easy to see that, since for each $j$ the amount $b_{ij}$ is encoded with the corresponding orthogonal generator $B_j$, the amounts for different $j$’s do not intermix. Thus, all $u$ balances get proved at the price of one, as in Table 7.

13 COMPARISON

We compare our optimized Multratug and EFLRSL signatures (Table 7) with the best performing ones listed in Table 1, namely, with Lelantus Spark [14], Omniring [18], RingCT3.0 [29], Tripych [22], and DualRing-EC [30], taking linear-size CLSAG [11] for the base.

We distinguish two gradations of scheme anonymity inherently bound to the two key image (linking tag) forms used. In general, if a scheme has a key image or another public element in the form $x^{-1} U$, then it has lower anonymity unless a compensatory restriction is imposed on the keys. Key images in the forms $x^{-1} H_{\text{point}}(P)$ and $x H_{\text{point}}(P)$ are stronger and entail no key restrictions, however, it is still required that the scheme has no other public elements in the form $x^{-1} U$. More on this in Appendix Z.
13.1 FOR MULTTRATUG

The signatures with balance proofs are compared in Table 8. Notation is as follows. $H_{ac}$ is the time of taking a scalar hash, it is omitted when its multiplier is logarithmic or less. $H_{pt}$ is the time of taking a hash to curve, $mexp(N)$ is the time of multi-exponentiation of $N$ summands.

The schemes with ‘Any keys=Yes’ operate with arbitrary keys; those with ‘Any keys=No’ require special key format, e.g., as in [28]. Our signature receives ‘Any keys=Yes’, as according to Theorem 15 and, hence, according to Theorem 6 it has the EU_CMA/CPA, anonymity w.r.t. CPA, non-frameability w.r.t. CPA properties.

Lelantus Spark [14] has key image $x^{-1}U$, nevertheless, according to the original paper it has a subsystem that facilitates multi-party signing, so we set ‘MP=Yes’ for it. The other schemes receive ‘MP=Yes’ only if their key images are linear by $x$. Also, for Lelantus Spark, we only count the size of its parallel 1-out-of-many proof from the section ‘7 Efficiency’ in [14], so its actual size may have a few extra bytes.

For this comparison, we exclude key images together with input/output accounts which occupy the same space for all schemes. Also, we do not include the output range proofs assuming they are separated into distinct units, although according to Section 12.3 our scheme effectively integrates with them, as does Omniring [18].

Batch verification time, which is explained for our scheme in Section 12.2, is generally 25%...50% less for all log-size schemes due to common generators merging, we do not show it. Verification complexities of the schemes with the key images $x^{-1}H_{point}(P)$ or $x H_{point}(P)$ have an additional summand of roughly $nH_{pt}$, which reflects the fact that $H_{point}$ must be called at least once for every public key in the ring.

Multtratug is represented by its version with optimized vector commitment argument, with characteristics taken from Table 7; we have subtracted $l$ from its size, since the key images are not counted. The CLSAG, Triptych, and Lelantus Spark schemes have no threshold versions, hence, to compare them with those having threshold ones, their sizes in Table 8 are to be multiplied by $l$. RingCT3.0 size is taken from the corresponding paper [29]. The same is for Omniring, its size is taken from the section ‘6.3 Performance Comparison’ of [18]. Note, according to its paper, Omniring has $O \log_2(nl + \ldots)$ size, whereas in the section ‘D Comparison with Omniring’ in [29] it reads as $O \log_2(n + \ldots)$, we hold to the first one.

According to Table 8, if the ring size is, say, $n = 2^5\ldots2^{10}$ and the number of inputs is limited to, say, $l \leq 5$, which is [29, 18, 22], Multtratug looks performing on par with the best schemes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Verification complexity</th>
<th>Key image</th>
<th>Any keys</th>
<th>MP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLSAG</td>
<td>$n + 2$</td>
<td>$(n + 2)H_{ac} + 2n mexp(3) + nH_{pt}$</td>
<td>$x H_{point}(P)$</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triptych</td>
<td>$3\log_2(n) + 8$</td>
<td>$mexp(2n + )$</td>
<td>$x^{-1}U$</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lelantus Spark</td>
<td>$3\log_2(n) + 5$</td>
<td>$mexp(2n + )$</td>
<td>$x^{-1}U$</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RingCT3.0</td>
<td>$2\log_2(nl) + 17$</td>
<td>$mexp(2n + ) + mexp(l + 1)$</td>
<td>$x^{-1}U$</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omniring</td>
<td>$2\log_2(nl + n + 3l + 3) + 9$</td>
<td>$mexp(2n + )$</td>
<td>$x^{-1}U$</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omniring</td>
<td>$2\log_2(nl + n + 3l + 3) + 9$</td>
<td>$mexp(4n + 8l + ) + (n + l + 2)H_{pt}$</td>
<td>$x H_{point}(P)$</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multtratug</td>
<td>$2\log_2(nl + l + 1) + 6l + 4$</td>
<td>$mexp(4n + 8l + ) + (n + l + 2)H_{pt}$</td>
<td>$x H_{point}(P)$</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Authors did not specify any optimized threshold version, assuming it takes up $l$ times the size.
** Scheme version with linear linking tag, Section 9, and optimized vector commitment argument, Section 10.3.
*** Authors did not specify formula, we assume the quantity is average in its class, about the same as for the version with $x^{-1}U$.
... Insignificant summands are omitted.

As for applicability, we should probably only consider signatures that allow for easy signing by multiple parties, since this seems to be a must-have attribute for a modern blockchain. Therefore, only Lelantus Spark, Omniring version with $x H_{point}(P)$, and our signature are to be compared. Table 9 shows their sizes (excluding key images and range proofs) in bytes computed in the mentioned above region of interest. We assume an element in $G$ and a scalar in $\mathbb{F}_p$ take 32 bytes each.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>$l = 1$</th>
<th>$l = 2$</th>
<th>$l = 3$</th>
<th>$l = 4$</th>
<th>$l = 5$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$n = 2^5$</td>
<td>$n = 2^{10}$</td>
<td>$n = 2^5$</td>
<td>$n = 2^{10}$</td>
<td>$n = 2^5$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lelantus Spark</td>
<td>640</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>1120</td>
<td>2080</td>
<td>3040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omniring</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>736</td>
<td>1056</td>
<td>1088</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multtratug</td>
<td>672</td>
<td>992</td>
<td>864</td>
<td>1184</td>
<td>1056</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notably, Multtratug is the only log-size signature with balance proof of all the listed, which is applicable in blockchains as well as in other environments where keys do not stick to the [28] rules, are allowed to be generated ad-hoc and malformed as, e.g., in [20, 21, 11].
13.2 FOR EFLRSL

In Table 10 we compare the simplest versions, which are the ring signatures with one actual signer. So, we take our EFLRSL signature for \( l = 1 \) with the optimized vector commitment argument (Table 7). We also include in the comparison the DualRing-EC [30] signature which, according to the survey in [30], is the shortest known so far. For this comparison, we don’t distinguish between the regular ring signatures and the linkable ones. When both versions are available, we take the regular one, in this case the linkable version usually takes up one more element of space. The sizes of DualRing-EC and streamlined versions of RingCT3.0, Omniring are taken from ‘Table 1: \( O(\log n) \)-size DL-based ring signature schemes for \( n \) public keys . . . ’ in [30].

According to Table 10, for large rings such that \( \lceil \log_2 (n+1) \rceil = \lceil \log_2 (n) \rceil \) almost everytime, both the DualRing-EC and EFLRSL signatures have the shortest size. However, EFLRSL has a stronger security model, which is explained in Appendix Y. Thus, it turns out that the EFLRSL signature for \( l = 1 \) is the shortest known to date of signatures for environments in which malformed keys are allowed.

Table 10: Comparison of DL-based ring signatures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Size</th>
<th>Verification complexity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CLSAG</td>
<td>( n + 1 )</td>
<td>( nH_{sc} + \text{mexp}(2) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RingCT3.0</td>
<td>( 2 \lceil \log_2 (n) \rceil + 14 )</td>
<td>( \text{mexp}(2n + . . .) + . . . )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Omniring</td>
<td>( 2 \lceil \log_2 (n + 2) \rceil + 9 )</td>
<td>( \text{mexp}(2n l + . . .) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFLRSL*</td>
<td>( 2 \lceil \log_2 (n + 1) \rceil + 4 )</td>
<td>( \text{mexp}(3n + . . .) + (n + 1)H_{pt} )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DualRing-EC**</td>
<td>( 2 \lceil \log_2 (n) \rceil + 4 )</td>
<td>( \text{mexp}(n + . . .) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\* Only linkable version of the ring signature is available.
\** See comments in Appendix Y.
\ldots Insignificant summands are omitted.

14 CONCLUSION

In this paper we presented two novel efficient membership proofs in a prime-order group without bilinear pairings, under the DDH assumption. In the lemmas called Lin2-Choice and Lin2-2Choice we proved these membership proofs are complete, special honest verifier zero-knowledge, and have computational witness-extended emulation.

Using these membership proofs we created a trusted-setup-free, pairings-free, DDH-based log-size linkable threshold ring signature with balance proof called Multratug. To illustrate, for a ring of \( 2^{10} \) addresses with associated hidden amounts, and for 5 actually signing keys in it, Multratug occupies less than 2KBytes of space, as shown in Table 9.

In addition to quite a moderate size and built-in balance proof, our signature makes it easy to implement multi-party signing operations with it. Thus, it can be used for signing confidential transactions in a modern blockchain.

Multratug can operate securely with any addresses, not only with those which follow the CryptoNote stealth address paradigm. This trait along with the above properties makes Multratug applicable to various cryptographic systems, including and not limited to blockchains. Therefore, Multratug may serve as a log-size drop-in replacement for the well-known linear-size LSAG scheme and its extensions.

Our survey has shown that among the existing log-size schemes, for large rings and medium thresholds, only a version of the Omniring scheme comprises almost the same wide set of useful features (Table 1, Table 2) at the minimal size (Table 8). However, the Multratug scheme is better secured against malformed keys.

Apart from blockchains, for the case if a cryptographic system requires neither a balance proof nor the other additional properties from a signature, just the minimal possible size and a security model strong enough to accept ad hoc generated and malformed keys, we provide a streamlined version of our signature called EFLRSL. It is the most compact signature with a strong security model to date (Table 10), as far as we can find.

It should be noted that since our membership proofs, and hence our signatures, rely on the simplest vector commitment argument (using the definition in Section 1.2), they effectively combine with other arguments, such as range proofs, to further reduce the overall size of the proof.

The design of our membership proofs and signatures is modular. We compose them from elementary protocols, and for each one we prove that it is special honest verifier zero-knowledge and has computational witness-extended emulation. We represent in full detail the crucial parts of our proofs, for the other parts we provide the sketches and refer to the appropriate works where the necessary details can be found.
Because of the modular design, it is sufficient to check all the blocks individually in order to understand and verify our schemes. Along the way, some of these elementary protocols, such as the random weighting for t-s-tuples argument that we provide here, are far from trivial and may have an independent value.

Although signatures and other cryptographic solutions using additional or more complex assumptions such as bilinear pairings may give better performance, we think that the efficient signatures constructed for the simplest prime-order group herein may be interesting in two aspects. First, they show in purely theoretical terms how much can be achieved on the simplest foundation. Second, just as the Bulletproofs protocol originally formulated for a prime-order group was later instantiated in a post-quantum setup using lattice hardness assumptions, we have some hope that something similar can be done for our protocols in the future.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

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REFERENCES

A PROOF OF 2-ELEMENT COMMITMENT

Proof: [Theorem 1] Completeness of the protocol can easily be seen from its code. Also, in the case if $T$ is a direct weighted sum of $\{X, H\}$, then the protocol splits into two independent Schnorr identification schemes [24] with the same challenge. Thus, if this is the case, then the sHVZK and cWEE properties of the protocol in Figure 2 are proved the same way as for the Schnorr id scheme.

Suppose this is not the case, i.e., prover sends $T$ without knowing its relation to $\{X, H\}$ or, in other words, having $T \neq \text{lin}(X, H)$. Then, for the prover, if it has $Y = \text{lin}(X, H)$, then after successful completion of the protocol it has $T = \text{lin}(X, H)$, which contradicts to the supposition. Otherwise, if there holds $Y = \neq \text{lin}(X, H)$, then by rewinding the protocol and excluding $T$ it obtains $Y = \text{lin}(X, H)$, which is a contradiction again.

Thus, the sHVZK and cWEE properties of the protocol are proved. They also can be proved the same way as for the other Schnorr-like protocols in [2, 5, 8, 26].

Uniqueness of the witness $(x, h)$ follows from the fact that $Y$ is a Pedersen commitment, which is binding [6].

47
B PROOF OF VECTOR COMMITMENT

Proof: [Theorem 2] The zkVCₙ protocol in Figure 3 is a modified subset version of the Bulletproofs logarithmic inner product argument from [6]. There are following three modifications to it

- The inner product argument described in [6] has no sHVZK property, we append this property to it the same way as this is done in [8], namely, by adding a blinding component to all transmitted elements. We omit providing a proof of sHVZK for our zkVCₙ protocol here; it is identical to the sHVZK proof in [8].

- With the above modification, the zkVCₙ protocol in Figure 3 is a subset case, namely \( b = 0^n \), of the inner product argument from [6] for the relation (6). Thus, our protocol is an argument for the relation (5).

- For the case \( n = 1 \) in zkVCₙ we use the custom zero-knowledge zk2ElemComm protocol, which is complete, sHVZK, and has cWEE by Theorem 1.

Each of the above three modifications clearly does not override the completeness and cWEE properties of the Bulletproofs logarithmic inner product argument. Also, the first modification adds the sHVZK property. Thus, our protocol zkVCₙ in Figure 3 is a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (5).

Uniqueness of the witness \((a, \alpha)\) follows from the fact that \( Y \) is a Pedersen vector commitment, which is binding.

C PROOF OF 3-TUPLE RANDOM WEIGHTING

Proof: [Theorem 3] The completeness and sHVZK properties of the zk3ElemRW protocol in Figure 4 follow from the fact that zk3ElemRW adds nothing to transcript of a protocol called in the last step, which in its turn is complete and sHVZK by the premise.

cWEE property of the zk3ElemRW protocol is also easy to establish, we do not provide a detailed proof here to save space, only the following sketch.

First, as the blinding generator \( H \) is orthogonal to all other generators by the premise, components proportional to \( H \) of all participating elements can be considered separately and be omitted in the main consideration. For the related to \( H \) part of witness of the sub-protocol called in the last step, it is enough to calculate the factor \( \hat{\alpha} \) as

\[
\hat{\alpha} = \alpha + \delta_1 \beta + \delta_2 \gamma.
\]

Second, witness extraction can be accomplished in the well-known way, e.g., as in the proof of the RandomWeighting-WEE lemma in [26].

Third, to ascertain that the witness \( a \) has only one possible value in this protocol, we can write \( Z, F, E \) as

\[
\begin{align*}
Z &= z_P P + z_Q Q + z_R R \\
F &= f_P P + f_Q Q + f_R R \\
E &= e_P P + e_Q Q + e_R R
\end{align*}
\]  

(70)

since it is clear that, when \( H \) is already excluded from the consideration, the elements \( Z, F, E \) cannot have components beyond the linear span of \( P, Q, R \) without breaking the DL assumption. Inserting the decomposition (70) into the equality \( Y = a X \), we obtain

\[
\text{rank} \left( \begin{pmatrix}
1 & \delta_1 \\
z_P + \delta_1 f_P + \delta_2 e_P & z_Q + \delta_1 f_Q + \delta_2 e_Q \\
z_R + \delta_1 f_R + \delta_2 e_R
\end{pmatrix}
\right) < 2,
\]

(71)

which immediately yields the sought relation, namely, that for some unique witness \( a \) there holds, to the accuracy of \( H \) components,

\[
\begin{align*}
Z &= a P \\
F &= a Q \\
E &= a R
\end{align*}
\]

Also, from the condition (71) it can be understood why we are demanding \( P \neq 0 \land (Q \neq 0 \lor R \neq 0) \).

D PROOF OF SIMMETRIC VECTOR COMMITMENT

Proof: [Theorem 4] The protocol zkSVC₃,ₙ in Figure 5 adds nothing to transcript of a complete, sHVZK, and cWEE protocol called in the last step of it (it can be, say, zkVCₙ), thus inheriting the sHVZK property from the latter. Completeness of the protocol zkSVC₃,ₙ is trivial. cWEE property of the protocol is easy to establish, the sketch follows.
First of all, we exclude $H$ from all considerations for the same reason as in Appendix C. Then, because of orthogonality of all nonzero elements in $P \cup Q \cup R$, each of the elements $Z, F$, and $E$ decomposes into a weighted direct sum of $P, Q, R$, respectively. Therefore, to prove the cWEE property of zkSVC$_{3,n}$ it suffices to prove cWEE for zkSVC$_{3,1}$.

In its turn, zkSVC$_{3,1}$ is equivalent to the protocol zk3ElemRW in Figure 4, hence zkSVC$_{3,1}$ has cWEE by Theorem 3. Thus we obtain cWEE for zkSVC$_{3,n}$.

Uniqueness of the witness $(a, \alpha, \beta, \gamma)$ follows from the fact that each of $Z, F, E$ is a Pedersen vector commitment, which is binding.

### E PROOF OF LIN2-CHOICE LEMMA

**Proof:** [Theorem 5] Completeness and sHVZK of the zkLin2Choice$_n$ protocol in Figure 7 are trivial. We exclude $H$ from all considerations for the same reason as in Appendix C.

Let’s prove the cWEE property of the protocol. In the last step of zkLin2Choice$_n$, there is a call to

$$zkSVC_{3,n}(P, c \circ Q, H, Z, rF; a, \alpha, \beta),$$

and hence by Theorem 4 there holds the relation

$$\begin{align*}
Z &= \langle a, P \rangle \\
rF &= \langle a, c \circ Q \rangle
\end{align*}$$

(72)

where $a \in F^n$ is extracted by the zkSVC$_{3,n}$ protocol extractor.

Thus, if $a$ contains only one nonzero scalar, say, under index $j$, then the sought witness $p$ is extracted together with the index $s$, namely, $p = a_j, s = j$. If $a = \{0\}^n$ is the case, then the witness $p$ is extracted as zero, the index $s$ has no meaning.

Let’s show that a cannot contain more than one nonzero scalar, otherwise the zkLin2Choice$_n$ protocol extractor is able to break the DL assumption. Suppose that $a$ contains at least two nonzeros, $a_j$ and $a_k$, under the indices $j$ and $k$ such that $j \neq k$. Writing out $Z$ and $rF$ as weighted direct sums of $P$ and $Q$, respectively, according to the equalities (72) we see that by unwinding the zkSVC$_{3,n}$ call the extractor obtains $a$ such that the following two equalities hold for known $Z, F, c, r, a$

$$Z = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i P_i,$$

(73)

$$rF = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i c_i Q_i,$$

(74)

where $r \neq 0$, otherwise the equality (74) would immediately produce a contradiction with ort$(Q)$.

Let the extractor unwind to the point where the challenges $c$ were generated, and resumes obtaining new $c', r', a'$. Thus, there holds $r' \neq 0$ due to the equality (74). Also, recalling ort$(P)$, there holds $a' = a$ due to the equality (73). By excluding $F$ from the equality (74) the extractor obtains

$$0 = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i \left(\frac{c_i}{r} - \frac{c_i'}{r'}\right)Q_i,$$

(75)

Since ort$(Q)$ holds, all weights of $Q_i$’s in the equality (75) must be zero, otherwise the extractor breaks the DL assumption.

According to our supposition, $a_j \neq 0$ and $a_k \neq 0$, so we write out two equations for the weights of $Q_j$ and $Q_k$

$$\begin{align*}
0 &= \frac{c_j}{r} - \frac{c_j'}{r'} \\
0 &= \frac{c_k}{r} - \frac{c_k'}{r'}
\end{align*}$$

(76)

where we have already performed division by nonzero $a_j$ and $a_k$. As $r \neq 0$ and $r' \neq 0$, the system (76) reduces to

$$\frac{c_k}{c_k'} = \frac{c_j}{c_j'},$$

(77)

which holds only with negligible probability. Therefore, if there is more than one nonzero element in $a$, then the extractor with overwhelming probability obtains one or more nonzero weights of $Q_i$’s in the equality (75). Thus,
under our supposition, the extractor breaks the DL assumption by expressing $Q_j$ through the elements of $Q \setminus \{Q_j\}$, hence our supposition is incorrect.

By this we have proved that the PPT extractor with overwhelming probability finds witness for the relation (15) and, thus, the protocol zkLin2Choice$_n$ has cWEE.

As for uniqueness of witness $(p, a)$, it trivially follows from subtracting two different decompositions of $Z$ from each other and, thus, breaking the DL relation assumption.

**F SIGNATURE EFLRS1**

**Proof:** [Theorem 6] As follows from Figure 10, EFLRS1 is a linkable ring signature by definition (we assume the EFLRS1 Link method is defined the usual way by matching key images, e.g., as in [20]).

All the listed properties 1 . . . 8) of the EFLRS1 signature are proved by well-known methods, such as in [20, 11, 13, 26], which rely on the key image of the form of $x^\pm 1 \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(P)$ and on completeness, shVZK, and cWEE of the underlying proving system. We do not describe these proofs here due to their volume; instead, we refer the interested reader to the referenced papers.

Anyway, as an example, here is a proof sketch of the property 2). Definition of the existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message / public key attackers is provided in [20], it is also can be taken from [26]. In this sketch, for the sake of simplicity we combine the approaches introduced in [20, 13]. We will build a PPT master algorithm $M$ that breaks the DL assumption by calling a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that forges EFLRS1.

Let $L$ be a list of public keys of which each key is generated according to the description in [20] or, equivalently, according to the definition in [26]. Neither $M$ nor $\mathcal{A}$ knows any of private keys for $L$. First of all, $M$ substitutes a new implementation for $\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}$, which for an input element $L$ samples a random $r$ and returns $rL$. This new $\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}$ implementation memorizes the sampled $r$’s and, thus, remains deterministic and indistinguishable from the original $\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}$ outside $M$.

Second, $M$ simulates the signing oracle $SO$ the following way. For an input ring $L \subset L$, it uniformly picks an index $\pi$ and simulates signing with $L_\pi$. Without knowing private key $x_\pi$ such that $L_\pi = x_\pi G$, it constructs key image as $l = rG$ using $r$ memorized by $\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}$ for $L_\pi$. Thus, the zkLin2Choice$_n$ call (21) at the end of the simulated EFLRS1 takes the form

$$\text{zkLin2Choice}_n((L_i + \xi \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(L_i))_{i=0}^{1}, G_{[\langle x \rangle]}, H, G + \xi rG; \pi, \ldots, 0).$$

Since zkLin2Choice$_n$ is sHVZK by Theorem 5, $M$ builds a simulated transcript of it with back patching $\mathcal{H}_{\text{scalar}}$. Namely, without knowing $x_\pi$, $M$ uniformly samples the random oracle replies to be used as known-in-advance challenges in the signature simulation and feeds them to $SO$. The latter builds corresponding random oracle queries using the fed replies and patches $\mathcal{H}_{\text{scalar}}$ so that it returns these replies in response to the built queries. As a result, the simulated signature gets indistinguishable from a real one.

Then, $M$ feeds $L, SO, \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}$, and $\mathcal{H}_{\text{scalar}}$ to $\mathcal{A}$, letting the latter produce forgeries whose rings are not spotted in calls to $SO$. Finally, starting with an arbitrary successfully forged transcript, $M$ unwinds and forks it the necessary amount of times, thus building a transcript tree with successful forgeries as leaves. Since zkLin2Choice$_n$ has cWEE by Theorem 5, from this transcript tree $M$ restores witness $x_\pi$ that breaks the DL assumption for one of the public keys in $L$.

That’s the sketch. It misses the non-trivial part a full proof should possess that is about the implication from $\mathcal{A}$’s non-negligible probability of generating successful forgeries to $M$’s non-negligible ability of building the forged transcript tree or a dynamic equivalent of it. Formal methods of proving this implication can be found, e.g., in [20, 13]. Besides, here is the following brief intuition for this in Appendix G.

**G MASTER CAPABLE OF BUILDING FORGED TREE**

Suppose, $\mathcal{A}$ produces forgeries with a non-negligible probability and, nevertheless, $M$ has only a negligible probability of successfully building the forged tree. Then $M$ is always able to start a new tree with a new forgery generated by $\mathcal{A}$, however it never succeeds in obtaining the necessary amount of successful leaves from $\mathcal{A}$. This means that since $M$ rewinds, forks, and resumes $\mathcal{A}$, at some point of this process $M$ always gets stuck in the situation that it has a successfully built subtree with forged leaves for the first fork with some challenges generated at that point, yet for one of its subsequent forks with other challenges from the same point $M$ cannot complete building a forged subtree anymore.

This situation would not be possible if these forks were identical and completely independent, only reading different random tapes. Indeed, if they were, they would be indistinguishable from each other and, therefore, would have equal probabilities of success. However they are not, as being identical they still share the same instances of $SO$ and simulated $\mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}, \mathcal{H}_{\text{scalar}}$. Now we will demonstrate how to convert $SO, \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}, \mathcal{H}_{\text{scalar}}$ to such a
form that the forks become identical to each other. Thus we will informally prove that $M$ does not fall into the above situation, and hence our assumption is not true, which means that $M$ has a non-negligible probability of constructing the complete forged tree.

Apparently, the simulated $H_{\text{point}}$ is not a problem, as it is indistinguishable from the stateless deterministic function, and hence it can be kept as is. The only problem is $H_{\text{scalar}}$, which is back patched for some queries occurred in $SO$. To make $H_{\text{scalar}}$ look stateless deterministic, let it crash when an attempt is made to back patch it for a query it has already been called with before. This makes $H_{\text{scalar}}$ indistinguishable from a deterministic stateless function, unless it crashes. With this modification, the first executed fork of $\mathcal{A}$ always has a greater or equal chance of success than the subsequent forks, as the latter may crash when trying to patch queries made by the first one; if they do not crash, then all of them succeed in building their forged subtrees.

So, to avoid these crashes, let’s make the following change to $SO$. Let $SO$ check each time before applying back patch to $H_{\text{scalar}}$ for a query to see if it will crash. If so, let $SO$ uniformly resample the challenges and build the query again. The queries are linearly challenge-dependent, so the uniform challenge resampling changes the query as if the latter were resampled uniformly. Therefore, it would take no more than a polynomial number of resamplings to avoid the crashes at all. Thus, we have shown that $M$ is capable of constructing a complete forged tree as soon as $\mathcal{A}$ produces forgeries with non-negligible probability.

### H PROOF OF MULTIPLE VECTOR COMMITMENTS

**Proof:** [Theorem 7] As can be seen from Figure 12, the protocol zkMVC$_{I,n}$ adds nothing to the transcript of the protocol zkVC$_n$, thus inheriting the shHVZK property. Completeness of the protocol zkMVC$_{I,n}$ is clear. Let’s prove the cWEE property of the protocol.

This time, to show an example, we will not exclude the generator $X$ obtained in the last step of zkLin2mChoice call in the last step of zkLin2mChoice protocol extractor, which exists by Theorem 5, as $\mathcal{A}$ produces forgeries with non-negligible probability.

The extractor repeats the unwinding $l$ times with re-sampled challenges $\xi$. This way the equality (78) repeated $l$ times turns into a matrix equation with random matrix of size $l \times l$, from which the extractor recovers each $i$-th column $\hat{a}_{[i,:]}$, $i \in [0 \ldots n]$ of the matrix $\hat{a}$. Thus, the extractor recovers the sought witness $\hat{a}$.

As for uniqueness of the witness $(a, \alpha)$, it trivially follows from subtracting two different decompositions of $Y$ from each other and, thus, breaking the DL relation assumption.

### I PROOF OF THE PROPERTIES OF MANY-OUT-OF-MANY PROOF

**Proof:** [Theorem 8] Completeness and shHVZK of the zkLin2mChoice$_{n,I}$ protocol in Figure 13 are clear from its design. Let’s prove the cWEE property of the protocol. We will consider $H$ this time.

First, extractor uses the zkMVC$_I$ protocol extractor, which exists by Theorem 7, and restores witness $(a, \hat{a})$ from the zkMVC$_I$ call in the last step of zkLin2mChoice$_{n,I}$. After that, for every $k \in [0 \ldots l - 1]$, it assigns

$$(a, \hat{a}) \leftarrow (a_{[k]}, \hat{a}_{[k]})$$

and proceeds with the extraction using the zkLin2Choice$_n$ protocol extractor, which exists by Theorem 5, as though the values of $a, \hat{a}$ were obtained from zkVC$_n$ in the last step of zkLin2Choice$_n$. This way the extractor obtains witness $(p, \alpha)$, and maps it to $k$-th positions in $p$ and $\alpha$, respectively.

We have shown how the extractor restores witness $(p, \alpha)$ for the relation (23) and, hence, the zkLin2mChoice$_{n,I}$ protocol has cWEE.

Uniqueness of the witness $(p, \alpha)$ immediately follows from uniqueness of the witness $(p, \alpha)$ for the protocol zkLin2Choice$_n$ in Figure 7, which is by Theorem 5.
J SIGNATURE EFLRSL FOR \( L=1 \)

As can be seen from Figure 14, for \( l = 1 \), the EFLRSL protocol is equivalent to the EFLRS1 protocol in Figure 10, with the variables and calls renamed. The overwhelmingly nonzero multiplier \( \xi_0 \), which is applied simultaneously to the commitment and witness in the nested \( \text{zkVC}_n \) call, doesn’t distort the equivalence. Thus, by Theorem 6, for \( l = 1 \), all the properties listed in Theorem 9 hold.

K SIGNATURE EFLRSL FOR \( L \geq 1 \)

Proof: [Theorem 9] A proof for the case \( l = 1 \) is provided in Appendix J.

The EFLRSL protocol is a linkable threshold ring signature by-design, this can be seen from Figure 14. We assume the EFLRSL.Link method is defined the usual way, i.e., by matching key images.

All of the listed in Theorem 9 properties of the EFLRSL signature can be proved by assuming that any of them does not hold and reducing to the case of \( l = 1 \), that is, by inferring a contradiction to what has already been proved in Appendix J. The key image form \( x^{±k} \cdot H_{\text{point}}(P) \) along with the completeness, \( \text{shHVZK} \), and \( \text{cWEE} \) properties of the underlying proving system make the reduction to the \( l = 1 \) case possible.

As an alternative method, it is also possible to prove the listed properties with the notion of non-slanderability using the techniques provided in [27, 11, 15], which we do not describe here due to their volume.

L PROOF OF SIMPLIFIED LIN2-2CHOICE LEMMA

Proof: [Theorem 10] Completeness and \( \text{shHVZK} \) properties of the \( \text{zkLin22sChoice}_{e,m} \) protocol in Figure 16 are clear. We exclude \( H \) from the consideration for the same reason as in Appendix C.

Let’s prove the protocol \( \text{cWEE} \) property. In the last step of \( \text{zkLin22sChoice}_{e,m} \) there is a call to

\[
\text{zkSVC}_{3,n}\left(\left[\begin{array}{c} P \\ V \end{array}\right], \left[\begin{array}{c} c_{[n]} \circ Q \\ 0^m \end{array}\right], 0^n, H, Z, rF, c_{n+t}E; a, \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \tilde{\gamma}\right),
\]

and hence by Theorem 4 there holds the relation

\[
\begin{align*}
Z &= \langle a_{[n]}, P \rangle + \langle a_{[n]}, V \rangle \\
rF &= \langle a_{[n]}, c_{[n]} \circ Q \rangle \\
c_{n+t}E &= \langle a_{[n]}, c_{[n]} \circ W \rangle
\end{align*}
\]

(79)

with the witness \( a \in \mathbb{F}_{p}^{n+m} \) restored by witness extractor of the \( \text{zkSVC}_{3,n} \) protocol.

Due to \( \text{ort}(P, V, Q, W) \), having \( Z = Z_P + Z_V \) according to the formula (32), the system (79) splits into two subsystems

\[
\begin{align*}
Z_P &= \langle a_{[n]}, P \rangle \\
rF &= \langle a_{[n]}, c_{[n]} \circ Q \rangle \\
Z_V &= \langle a_{[n]}, V \rangle \\
c_{n+t}E &= \langle a_{[n]}, c_{[n]} \circ W \rangle
\end{align*}
\]

(80)

Each of the systems (80), (81) is similar to the system (72) and, therefore, by applying to each of them the same reasoning as in the proof of the \( \text{cWEE} \) property of the Lin2-Choice lemma in Appendix E, we obtain the following two equalities, respectively

\[
\begin{align*}
Z_P &= pP_s, \\
Z_V &= vV_{s+s},
\end{align*}
\]

(82)

(83)

where \( p \) and \( v \) are scalars known to prover, and \( s, \tilde{s} \) are indices also known to it. (If \( p = 0 \) or \( v = 0 \), then respectively \( s \) or \( \tilde{s} \) is undefined.)

One more detail, when obtaining the equality (82) from the subsystem (80), we take \( r \) as a response to the challenges \( c_{[n]} \), whereas obtaining the equality (83) from the subsystem (81), we take \( c_{n+t} \) as the response to the challenges \( c_{[n]} \).

If \( v \neq 0 \) and \( \tilde{s} 
eq t \), then the extractor breaks the DL assumption by establishing a linear relationship between at least two different elements from the orthogonal set \( \mathbb{R} \), hence we let \( \tilde{s} = t \) for \( v \neq 0 \) and write the equality (83) as

\[
Z_V = vV_{s+t}.
\]

(84)
Now, recalling that $Z$ decomposes into the sum $Z = Z_p + Z_V$ by the formula (32) which is discussed in Section 7.1.1, the extractor comes to the conclusion that the restored by the formulas (82), (84) values of $(p, v, s)$ are the sought witnesses for the relation (25). Thus, we have proved the cWEE property of zkLin22sChoice$_{n,m}$.

As for uniqueness of witness $(p, v, α)$, it trivially follows from subtracting two different decompositions of $Z$ from each other and, thus, breaking the DL relation assumption.

**M PROOF OF MULTIPLE SIMMETRIC VECTOR COMMITMENTS**

**Proof:** [Theorem 11] As can be seen from Figure 17, the zkMSVC$_{t,3,n}$ protocol adds nothing to the transcript of the zkMSVC$_{t,n}$ protocol, thus inheriting the sHVZK property. Completeness of the zkMSVC$_{t,3,n}$ protocol is clear from Figure 17. We exclude $H$ from all considerations for the same reason as in Appendix C.

Let’s prove the cWEE property of the protocol. Having unwound the zkMSVC$_{t,n}$ call, extractor obtains a matrix $α ∈ E^{3×n}$ such that according to the relation (22)

$$Y = α ∗ X.$$  (85)

Thus, for each element $Y_j = Y_{[j]}, j ∈ [0...l − 1]$, and for the corresponding row $α_{[j,:]}$ of the matrix $α$, there holds

$$Y_j = α_{[j,:]} ∗ X.$$  (86)

At the same time, due to the equalities (86), the zkMSVC$_{t,n}$ protocol can be viewed as $l$ independent, except for the common challenges $(δ₁, δ₂)$, instances of the zkSVC$_{n}$ protocol. Therefore, by Theorem 4, the restored by the extractor matrix $α$ is the sought witness.

Uniqueness of the witness is due to the same reasons as in Appendix H.

**N PROOF OF LIN2-2CHOICE LEMMA**

**Proof:** [Theorem 12] Completeness and sHVZK of the protocol zkLin22Choice$_{t,n,m}$ in Figure 18 are clear. Particularly, note that the vectors $F$ and $E$ do not reveal any information since their elements are blinded with $H$. We further exclude $H$ from all considerations for the same reason as in Appendix C.

Let’s prove the protocol cWEE property. In the last step of zkLin22Choice$_{t,n,m}$ there is a call to

$$zkMSVC_{t,3,(n+m)} \left( [\begin{array}{l} P \\ V \end{array}], [\begin{array}{l} c_{[n]} ∗ Q \\ 0^m \end{array}], [\begin{array}{l} 0^n \\ c_{[n]} ∗ W \end{array}], H, Z, r ∗ F, c_{[n:(n+l)]} ∗ E; α, α', β, γ \right),$$

and hence, by Theorem 11, there holds the following system of equalities

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} Z = α ∗ \left[ \begin{array}{l} P \\ V \end{array} \right], \\ r ∗ F = α ∗ \left[ \begin{array}{l} c_{[n]} ∗ Q \\ 0^m \end{array} \right], \\ c_{[n:(n+l)]} ∗ E = α ∗ \left[ \begin{array}{l} 0^n \\ c_{[n]} ∗ W \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right.$$  (87)

where the matrix $α ∈ E^{l×(n+m)}$ is the witness restored by the zkMSVC$_{t,3,(n+m)}$ protocol extractor.

Furthermore, the system (87) is $l$ systems of the form (79), with proper renaming. For each row $α_{[t,:]}, t ∈ [0...l − 1]$ of the matrix $α$. Namely, the system (87) is the following $l$ systems

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} Z_t = α_{[t,:]} ∗ \left[ \begin{array}{l} P \\ V \end{array} \right], \\ r_t F_t = α_{[t,:]} ∗ \left[ \begin{array}{l} c_{[n]} ∗ Q \end{array} \right], \\ c_{n+t} E_t = α_{[t,:]} ∗ \left[ \begin{array}{l} c_{[n]} ∗ W \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right.$$  (88)

for each $t ∈ [0...l − 1]$.

The zkLin22Choice$_{t,n,m}$ protocol in Figure 18 comprises, up to the point of calling zkMSVC$_{t,3,(n+m)}$ and with the appropriate renaming, $l$ parallel instances of the protocol zkLin22sChoice$_{n,m}$ from Figure 16. Hence, given $l$ parallel systems (88) for $t ∈ [0...l − 1]$, the extractor performs $l$ times, for each $t$, the same calculations as in Appendix L. This way it obtains $l$ witnesses $(p_t, v_t, s_t), t ∈ [0...l − 1]$ for $l$ instances of the relation (25). That is, for each extracted tuple $(p_t, v_t, s_t)$ there holds

$$Z_t = p_t P_s + v_t \gamma.$$  (89)
that means witnesses for the relation (35) are found and, hence, cWEE property of the zkLin2Choice_{l,n,m} protocol is proven.

Uniqueness of the witness is due to the same reasons as in Appendix L.

O PROOF OF CLAIM ABOUT LIN2-2CHOICE PROTOCOL CALL

Proof: [Claim 1] By Theorem 12, the call

zkLin2Choice_{l,n,l}((X, G_{[n]}, V, G_{[n:(n+l)]}), H, Z, . . . )

in the last step of the EFLRSLWB scheme in Figure 21 proves the relation (35). That is, it has an extractor that restores unique witness for the relation.

Let’s demonstrate that this call also proves that v = p in the relation (35), where X, V, Z are defined according to the EFLRSLWB scheme. Copying their definitions from Figure 21 here

\[ X = P - \{K\}^n + \zeta U - \omega A, \]
\[ V = \{K\}^l + \omega A^{imp} + \chi \hat{U}, \]
\[ Z = (G)^l + \zeta I + \chi J. \]

Suppose the opposite, i.e., that for some k \( \in \{0 \ldots l - 1\} \) there holds \( v_k \neq p_k \). Then the zkLin2Choice_{l,n,m} protocol witness extractor extracts \( v, p \) and, for some index \( s_k \), according to the relation (35) there holds

\[ G + \zeta I_k + \chi J_k = p_k(P_{s_k} - K + \zeta U_{s_k} - \omega A_{s_k}) + v_k(K + \omega A^{imp}_k + \chi \hat{U}_k). \] (90)

Note that we omit showing the H component for the same reason as in Appendix C. However, it is always implied present, and the factor of H is implied extracted by the extractor for this and for the following equalities. Method of this extraction is straightforward.

By moving the K component to the left-hand side of the (90) equality, the extractor gets

\[ (p_k - v_k)K = -G - \zeta I_k - \chi J_k + p_k(P_{s_k} + \zeta U_{s_k} - \omega A_{s_k}) + v_k(\omega A^{imp}_k + \chi \hat{U}_k), \] (91)

that is, it expresses K as a linear combination (91) of G, I_k, J_k, P_{s_k}, U_{s_k}, A_{s_k}, A^{imp}_k, \hat{U}_k, H. However, according to the EFLRSLWB scheme, all these elements are a part of the pre-image of K and, hence, K is orthogonal to all of them. Thus, under the supposition v ≠ p the extractor breaks the DL assumption, which is impossible. Therefore, the supposition is incorrect and there holds

\[ v = p. \] (92)

Using the equality (92), the equality (90) rewrites as

\[ G + \zeta I_k + \chi J_k = p_k(P_{s_k} + \zeta U_{s_k} + \chi \hat{U}_k + \omega(A^{imp}_k - A_{s_k})). \] (93)

Note that in the equality (93) the following holds for p_k’s

\[ p_k \neq 0 \quad \text{for each } k \in \{0 \ldots l - 1\}. \] (94)

In fact, \( p_k = 0 \) for some k requires that the left-hand side of the equality (93) be equal to zero, however the left-hand side contains nonzero element G alongside with the randomly weighted elements I_k, J_k, and, hence, there is only negligible probability for it to be equal to zero. The implicit presence of H component in the equality (93) does not change the case; if the assertion (94) does not hold then the extractor breaks the DL assumption.

All elements in the right-hand part of the relation (93), namely, \( P_{s_k}, U_{s_k}, A^{imp}_k, A_{s_k}, H, \) are in the pre-image of \( \hat{U}_k \). Thus, \( \hat{U}_k \) is orthogonal to all of them and, hence, due to the random weighting by \( \chi \), to the accuracy of H, the following equality holds

\[ G + \zeta I_k = p_k(P_{s_k} + \zeta U_{s_k} + \omega(A^{imp}_k - A_{s_k})). \] (95)

In other words, the equality (95) follows from the equality (93) by Theorem 3, where the triplets are taken as

\[ (P_{s_k} + \zeta U_{s_k} + \omega(A^{imp}_k - A_{s_k}), \hat{U}_k, 0) \quad \text{and} \quad (G + \zeta I_k, J_k, 0). \]

Suppose that \( (A^{imp}_k - A_{s_k}) \neq 0 \). By unwinding and resuming the zkLin2Choice_{l,n,l} call with different \( \omega' \) the extractor obtains different \( p_k' \) and, by subtracting two instances of the equality (95) from each other, obtains

\[ 0 = p_k(P_{s_k} + \zeta U_{s_k} + \omega(A^{imp}_k - A_{s_k})) - p_k'(P_{s_k} + \zeta U_{s_k} + \omega'(A^{imp}_k - A_{s_k})). \]
which rewrites as
\[
(p'_{k} - p_{k})(P_{s_{k}} + \zeta U_{s_{k}}) = (p_{k} \omega - p'_{k} \omega')(A^{\text{imp}}_{k} - A_{s_{k}}). \tag{96}
\]
Due to the orthogonality of \(P_{s_{k}}\) and \(U_{s_{k}}\) in the EFLRS\(\text{LWB}\) scheme, there holds
\[
(P_{s_{k}} + \zeta U_{s_{k}}) \neq 0.
\]
If \(p'_{k} = p_{k}\), the left-hand side of the equality (96) is zero and, hence, \(\omega' = \omega\) that holds only with negligible probability. So, with overwhelming probability \(p'_{k} \neq p_{k}\) and the extractor divides the equality (96) by \((p'_{k} - p_{k})\), calculating scalar factor \(a\) as follows
\[
P_{s_{k}} + \zeta U_{s_{k}} = a (A^{\text{imp}}_{k} - A_{s_{k}}), \quad \text{where} \quad a = \frac{p_{k} \omega - p'_{k} \omega'}{p'_{k} - p_{k}}. \tag{97}
\]
Unwinding and resuming the zkLin22Choice\(_{t,n,l}\) call with different \(\zeta'\) a couple of times, the extractor calculates factor \(a'\) such that
\[
P_{s_{k}} + \zeta' U_{s_{k}} = a' (A^{\text{imp}}_{k} - A_{s_{k}}). \tag{98}
\]
By subtracting the equality (97) from the equality (98) and dividing by \((\zeta' - \zeta)\), which is nonzero with overwhelming probability, the extractor obtains
\[
U_{s_{k}} = \frac{a' - a}{\zeta' - \zeta} (A^{\text{imp}}_{k} - A_{s_{k}}). \tag{99}
\]
Also, it obtains from the equalities (97) and (99)
\[
P_{s_{k}} = \left( a - \frac{a' - a}{\zeta' - \zeta} \right) (A^{\text{imp}}_{k} - A_{s_{k}}). \tag{100}
\]
After that, as \(U_{s_{k}} \neq 0\) and, hence, \((a' - a) \neq 0\) in the equality (99), the extractor expresses \((A^{\text{imp}}_{k} - A_{s_{k}})\) through \(P_{s_{k}}\) in (99) and inserts \((A^{\text{imp}}_{k} - A_{s_{k}})\) into the equality (100), thus obtaining
\[
P_{s_{k}} = \left( a - \frac{a' - a}{\zeta' - \zeta} \right) \zeta' - \zeta U_{s_{k}}. \tag{101}
\]
Recalling \(P_{s_{k}}\) and \(U_{s_{k}}\) are orthogonal to each other, the extractor breaks the DL assumption with the equality (101); thus the supposition is wrong and there holds
\[
A^{\text{imp}}_{k} = A_{s_{k}}. \tag{102}
\]
In accordance with the equality (102), the equality (95) which is obtained by the extractor after unwinding the zkLin22Choice\(_{t,n,l}\) call, rewrites as
\[
G + \zeta \bar{I}_{k} = p_{k}(P_{s_{k}} + \zeta U_{s_{k}}), \tag{103}
\]
where \(p_{k}\) is known to the extractor. Thus, the zkLin22Choice\(_{t,n,l}\) call is an argument having cWEE property for the relation (104). The witness \(p_{k}\) is unique, as the opposite breaks the DL assumption between \(P_{s_{k}}\) and \(U_{s_{k}} = \mathcal{H}_{\text{point}}(P_{s_{k}})\) in the equality (103).

At the same time, according to the obtained by the extractor equality (102), the same zkLin22Choice\(_{t,n,l}\) call is an argument having cWEE for the relation (105) for the same \(s_{k}\), which implies the same \(s\) for the both relations. Completeness and sHVZK of the zkLin22Choice\(_{t,n,l}\) call follow from Theorem 12.

Uniqueness of \(\alpha\) and \(\beta\) is trivially seen, as the opposite breaks the DL relation assumption. Claim 1 is proven.

**P SIGNATURE EFLRS\(\text{LWB}\) FOR \(L \geq 1\)**

**Proof:** [Theorem 13] We first make the following claim.

**Claim 1:**

The call to zkLin22Choice\(_{t,n,l}\) in the last step of the EFLRS\(\text{LWB}\) scheme in Figure 21 is a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation (23) with appropriate input renaming, i.e., for the relation
\[
\mathcal{R} = \left\{ (P + \zeta U), G_{[i,n]} \in G^{n^{*}}, H \in G^{*}, ((G)^{l} + \zeta I) \in G^{l}; \quad s \in \{0 \ldots n-1\}, \ p, \alpha \in F_{p}^{l}, \quad \forall k \in \{0 \ldots l-1\}; \quad G + \zeta \bar{I}_{k} = p_{k}(P_{s_{k}} + \zeta U_{s_{k}}) + \alpha_{k} H \right\} \tag{104}
\]
with unique witness \((p, \alpha)\), and is also a complete, sHVZK argument having cWEE for the relation
\[
\mathcal{R}' = \left\{ A \in G^{n}, A^{\text{imp}} \in G^{l}, H \in G^{*}; \quad s \in \{0 \ldots n-1\}^{l}, \ p, \beta \in F_{p}^{l}, \quad \forall k \in \{0 \ldots l-1\}; \quad A^{\text{imp}} = A_{s_{k}} + \beta_{k} H \right\} \tag{105}
\]
with unique witness \(\beta\), such that the private input \(s\) is common for both relations (104) and (105).
Proof: is in Appendix O.

Note that the vectors \( A^{\text{tmp}} \) and \( J \) in Figure 21 are indistinguishable from white noise, because all their elements contain independent blinding components with randomized factors from, respectively, \( \mu \) and \( \nu \).

The Claim 1 asserts that in the last step of the EFLRSLWB scheme there is a call to the complete, sHVZK, and having cWEE proving system \( \text{zkLin2Choice}_{e_{n,t}} \) that produces a proof of the relation (104), which is actually the relation (23) with proper renaming. Also, as we can see in Figure 21, all previous steps of the EFLRSLWB scheme do all the play of the EFLRSL scheme from Figure 14 up to the proof of the relation (23). As for the vectors \( A^{\text{tmp}} \) and \( J \) which are all indistinguishable from white noise, they can be discarded as uninfluential when considering the relation (104). Thus, we see that the EFLRSLWB scheme is the EFLRSL scheme with the substituted underlying proving system, which is also complete, sHVZK, and having cWEE.

Therefore, the EFLRSLWB scheme is a linkable threshold ring signature with the properties 1...8), which hold due to exactly the same reasons as the properties 1...8) of the EFRLSL scheme in Theorem 9.

The property 9) comes as a result of calling \( \text{zk2ElemComm} \) in the last step of the EFLRSLWB scheme. By Theorem 1 there holds

\[
A^{\text{sum}} = \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} A^{\text{tmp}}[k] + f_H H + f_D D, \quad (106)
\]

where \( f_H, f_D \) are scalars known to prover. At the same time, by Claim 1 according to the relation (105), the equality (106) unfolds as

\[
A^{\text{sum}} = \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} A_{s_k} + \left( f_H + \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} \beta_k \right) H + f_D D. \quad (107)
\]

Recalling that according to the EFLRSLWB scheme the generator \( H \) is an \( \mathcal{H} \) point image of the \( A^{\text{sum}}, A, D \) elements, the equality (107) reduces to

\[
A^{\text{sum}} = \sum_{k=0}^{l-1} A_{s_k} + f_D D, \quad (110)
\]

which is exactly what the property 9) is. Theorem 13 is proven.

Q PROOF OF RANDOM WEIGHTING FOR T-S-TUPLES

Proof: [Theorem 14] Completeness and sHVZK properties of the \( \text{zkTElemRW}_{t,s} \) protocol are trivially seen from Figure 23. Turning to the cWEE property, we start with the following claim.

Claim 2:

Under the conditions of Theorem 14, if a PPT witness extractor for the protocol \( \text{zkTElemRW}_{t,s} \) in Figure 23 extracts two different values of the factor \( a \) in the relation \( Y = aX + \hat{\alpha}H \) for two different random challenge sets \( (\delta, \sigma) \) in the last step of the protocol, then a PPT algorithm that breaks the DL relation assumption can be constructed.

Proof: is in Appendix R.

Having the Claim 2 proved, let’s construct a witness extractor for \( \text{zkTElemRW}_{t,s} \). The extractor restores the factors \( (a, \hat{\alpha}) \) in the equality

\[
Y = aX + \hat{\alpha}H \quad \text{in Figure 23}. \quad (108)
\]

According to Figure 23, the equality (108) itself represents the relation (4) with the renamed entries. To accomplish the extraction, the extractor uses the cWEE property of the protocol that proves the relation (4) in the last step of \( \text{zkTElemRW}_{t,s} \). Namely, it uses another witness extractor which extracts witness for (4).

By inserting into the equality (108) \( X, Y \) defined a step above in Figure 23 and moving \( aX \) to the left-hand side, the extractor obtains

\[
(Z - aP) + (\delta, F - aQ) - (\sigma, aS) = \hat{\alpha}H. \quad (109)
\]

By unwinding and running the \( \text{zkTElemRW}_{t,s} \) protocol \( t + s \) more times with different \( \delta, \sigma \), the extractor gets, in sum, \((t + s + 1)\) equalities of type (109), which have common \( Z, P, F, Q, S, H, a \) and different \( \delta, \sigma, \hat{\alpha} \). The factor \( a \) is common to all of them, as the opposite breaks the DL relation assumption by Claim 2. The extractor writes down all these \((t + s + 1)\) equalities in a matrix form, as follows,

\[
a \cdot B = \hat{\alpha}H. \quad (110)
\]
where

\[
a = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & \delta_{0,0} & \ldots & \delta_{(t-1),0} & \sigma_{0,0} & \ldots & \sigma_{(s-1),0} \\
1 & \delta_{0,1} & \ldots & \delta_{(t-1),1} & \sigma_{0,1} & \ldots & \sigma_{(s-1),1} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
1 & \delta_{0,(t+s)} & \ldots & \delta_{(t-1),(t+s)} & \sigma_{0,(t+s)} & \ldots & \sigma_{(s-1),(t+s)}
\end{bmatrix}
\]

\[
B = \begin{bmatrix}
Z - aP \\
F_0 - aQ_0 \\
\vdots \\
F_{t-1} - aQ_{t-1} \\
-aS_0 \\
\vdots \\
-aS_{s-1}
\end{bmatrix}, \quad \hat{a} = \begin{bmatrix}
\hat{a}_0 \\
\hat{a}_1 \\
\vdots \\
\hat{a}_{t+s}
\end{bmatrix}
\] (111)

Then, it solves the matrix equation (110) for B. Taking into account that a is composed of uniformly random scalars together with the first column of 1’s and, hence, with overwhelming probability det(a) \neq 0, it expresses each element of B as H multiplied by a corresponding scalar from the vector \( a^{-1} \cdot \hat{a} \)

\[
B = a^{-1} \cdot \hat{a}H.
\] (112)

Now, let us show that the witness a in the relation (60), which is fed at P’s private input, is equal to the factor a restored for the equality (108), which is just found by the extractor and used in the definition of B in (111). Suppose the opposite, then here is an algorithm that breaks the DL relation assumption, it looks as follows.

It honestly runs zkTElemRW_\text{pr}, s knowing the input a, a, b, \gamma, which is the witness for the relation (60). Then, it extracts a different a for the equality (108). Then, the breaker algorithm takes the equality for the first element of B in (112) and the equality for Z in (60). Eliminating Z from the both, keeping in mind the multipliers of P are different in them, the breaker expresses P through H and, thus, breaks the premise P = lin(nz(Q) \cup nz(S) \cup \{H\}).

Thus, we have proved the witness a found by the extractor is the sought witness part a for the relation (60). Finally, it is easy to see how the extractor can restore the blinding factor a, b, \gamma component of the witness in (60). That is, it puts the \((t + s + 1)\) blinding factors a, b, \gamma together into a vector and calculates them from (112), (111), (60) as

\[
\begin{bmatrix}
\alpha \\
\beta_0 \\
\vdots \\
\beta_{t-1} \\
\gamma_0 \\
\vdots \\
\gamma_{s-1}
\end{bmatrix} = a^{-1} \cdot \hat{a}.
\]

We have built an extractor that finds the witness (a, a, b, \gamma) for the relation (60). Uniqueness of a is already proved by Claim 2. Uniqueness of a, b, \gamma is trivial, as the opposite breaks the DL assumption. Thus, Theorem 14 is proved.

**R PROOF OF CLAIM ABOUT THE SAME FACTOR**

**Proof:** [Claim 2] This proof is going to be a bit nontrivial, so, for the first, let’s understand how the witness a in the equality (108) extracted in the last step of the protocol zkTElemRW_\text{pr}, s in Figure 23 depends on the challenges. We keep in mind a is a witness for the relation (4) which is represented by the equality (108).

For convenience, we rewrite the equality (108) in the matrix form, as follows, using the formulas (55), (56), (57), (58), (59), assuming \( \xi \) is a row vector, and T, D are column vectors

\[
\xi \cdot D = a \xi \cdot T + \hat{a}H. \quad \text{Note, this equality represents the relation (4).} \] (113)

Let the extractor perform \((t + s + 1)\) rewinding and, thus, let it have \((t + s + 1)\) instances of the relation (113) for \((t + s + 1)\) instances of the challenge vector \( \xi \). The extractor puts these \((t + s + 1)\) instances of \( \xi \) into the matrix

\[
a = \begin{bmatrix}
\xi_0 \\
\xi_1 \\
\xi_2 \\
\vdots \\
\xi_{(t+s)}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
\xi_0 \\
\xi_1 \\
\xi_2 \\
\vdots \\
\xi_{(t+s)}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix}
1 & \delta_{0,0} & \ldots & \delta_{(t-1),0} & \sigma_{0,0} & \ldots & \sigma_{(s-1),0} \\
1 & \delta_{0,1} & \ldots & \delta_{(t-1),1} & \sigma_{0,1} & \ldots & \sigma_{(s-1),1} \\
\vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\
1 & \delta_{0,(t+s)} & \ldots & \delta_{(t-1),(t+s)} & \sigma_{0,(t+s)} & \ldots & \sigma_{(s-1),(t+s)}
\end{bmatrix}.
\] (114)
Since \( a \) is a random matrix, with overwhelming probability there holds \( \det(a) \neq 0 \) and, thus, \( a \) is a basis in the \((t + s + 1)\)-dimensional scalar vector challenge space. Also, let the extractor map the corresponding \((t + s + 1)\) witness pairs \((a, \hat{a})\) extracted in the last step of the protocol into the following two vectors

\[
a = \begin{bmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ a_2 \\ \vdots \\ a_{t+s}
\end{bmatrix}, \quad \hat{a} = \begin{bmatrix} \hat{a}_0 \\ \hat{a}_1 \\ \hat{a}_2 \\ \vdots \\ \hat{a}_{t+s}
\end{bmatrix}, \tag{115}
\]

and rewrite \((t + s + 1)\) instances of the equality (113) for these vectors in the matrix form, as follows,

\[
a \cdot D = \text{diag}(a) \cdot a \cdot T + \hat{a} H , \quad \text{where} \quad \text{diag}(a) = \begin{bmatrix} a_0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & \cdots & a_{t+s}
\end{bmatrix}. \tag{116}
\]

Let the extractor rewind one more time and obtain \((a', \hat{a}')\) for a new challenge vector \( \xi' \). The matrix \( a \) is a basis in the challenge space, so \( \xi' \) decomposes by it. Denote the corresponding row vector of weights as \( b \) such that

\[
\xi' = b \cdot a . \tag{117}
\]

Next, multiplying the decomposition (117) by \( D \) and unfolding both sides of it using the formulas (113) and (116), respectively, the extractor obtains the following equality

\[
(a' \xi' - b \cdot \text{diag}(a) \cdot a) \cdot T = (b \cdot \hat{a} - \hat{a}') H . \tag{118}
\]

Recalling that by the definition (55) \( T \) is a column vector of \( \{P \} \cup Q \cup S \), the equality (118) takes on the meaning of a decomposition of 0 into a weighted sum of \( \{P \} \cup Q \cup S \cup \{H\} \) with known to the extractor weights. In the case if the weight of \( P \) in (118) is nonzero, the extractor obtains weights for the decomposition \( P = \text{lin}(nz(Q)) \cup nz(S) \cup \{H\} \), which contradicts to the premise of the Theorem 14.

Namely, if the weight of \( P \) in (118) is nonzero, then the extractor has a known decomposition of \( P \) by \( Q \cup S \cup \{H\} \) and thus breaks the DL relation assumption. Therefore, the weight of \( P \) in (118) must be zero. The extractor calculates it from (118) using (114), (59), (115) as

\[
0 = a' - \langle b, a \rangle .
\]

This way, the extractor obtains the following transformation rule for the witness \( a \) depending on the challenge vector \( \xi' \)

\[
a' = \langle b, a \rangle , \quad \text{where} \quad b = \xi' \cdot a^{-1} . \tag{119}
\]

Note, the vector \( b \) in the rule (119), as well as in the formulas (117), (118), meets the condition \( \langle b, \{1\}^{t+s+1} \rangle = 1 \), which guarantees that \( 1 \) is always at the first position in \( \xi' \).

To sum up, the rule (119) states the following. If the extractor already has a challenge space base defined by matrix \( a \), and if it also has the corresponding witnesses collected in vector \( a \), then, for any new random vector \( \xi' \), value of the newly extracted witness \( a' \) is equal to the value defined by the formula (119). Otherwise, if the extractor gets a value for \( a' \) other than (119), then it breaks the DL relation assumption.

Now, let the extractor perform \((t + s + 1)\) more rew windings and, thus, let it obtain another challenge space base

\[
c = \begin{bmatrix} \xi'_0 \\ \xi'_1 \\ \xi'_2 \\ \vdots \\ \xi'_{t+s}
\end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & \delta_0' & \cdots & \delta_{(t-1),0}' & \sigma_{0,0}' & \cdots & \sigma_{(s-1),0}' \\ 1 & \delta_0' & \cdots & \delta_{(t-1),1}' & \sigma_{0,1}' & \cdots & \sigma_{(s-1),1}' \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ 1 & \delta_0' & \cdots & \delta_{(t-1),(t+s)}' & \sigma_{0,(t+s)}' & \cdots & \sigma_{(s-1),(t+s)}'
\end{bmatrix}. \tag{120}
\]

Note, the equality (113) holds as well for the new \((t + s + 1)\) instances of the challenge vector \( \xi' \) written as rows of the matrix \( c \). By this, the transition matrix between the bases \( a \) and \( c \) is

\[
b = \begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ \vdots \\ b_{t+s}
\end{bmatrix} = c \cdot a^{-1} , \quad \text{where each row} \ b_i \ \text{is a weight vector of} \ \xi'_i \ \text{’s decomposition by} \ \xi_i \ \text{’s}. \tag{121}
\]
Note that for $b$ there always holds \( \{1\}^{t+s+1} = b \cdot \{1\}^{t+s+1} \), as the first columns in $a$ and $c$ are equal to $\{1\}^{t+s+1}$.

Apparently, as $c$ is a random matrix, with overwhelming probability there holds $\det(c) \neq 0$ and, hence, $\det(b) \neq 0$. And, by the definition (121), there holds $c = b \cdot a$. The witness transformation rule (119) written in the matrix form for the base vectors in $c$ becomes

$$a' = b \cdot a, \text{ where } b = c \cdot a^{-1}. \quad (122)$$

Looking closer at $b$ and $a$ we make the following three simple claims about their items distributions. Hereinafter, for any two scalar sets $x$ and $y$, we say $x$ is considered in isolation of $y$ if neither direct nor indirect dependencies or correlates of $y$, except for maybe $x$ itself, are involved in the consideration of $x$.

**Claim 3:**
For any two random bases $a$ and $c$ defined by the formulas (114) and (120), respectively, with all their items picked independently and uniformly at random, except for the items in the first columns which are 1’s, the transition matrix $b$ defined by (121) and considered in isolation of $c$ has the following two properties for its items

- a) all items in $b$ are distributed uniformly
- b) for each row $b_i \in b$, there are $(t + s)$ independent items and one dependent item in it. The dependency is determined by the equality

$$\langle b_i, \{1\}^{t+s+1} \rangle = 1. \quad (123)$$

**Proof:** is in Appendix S.1.

**Claim 4:**
If the extractor knows two randomly sampled challenge vectors $\xi, \xi \xi$ along with the corresponding witnesses $\hat{a}, \hat{a}$ such that $\xi \neq \xi, \hat{a} \neq \hat{a}$, and the equality (113) holds for them, then, for any new random base $a$ constructed by the formula (114), the corresponding witness vector $a$ built by (115) and considered in isolation of $a$ has all witnesses in it distributed independently and uniformly.

**Proof:** is in Appendix S.2.

**Claim 5:**
For any arithmetic expression which contains only $a$ built by (115) and $b$ built by (121), all the scalars in $a$ and $b$ can be viewed as distributed independently and uniformly, except for the scalars in the first column of $b$ which are completely dependent and are determined by the equality (123).

**Proof:** is in Appendix S.3.

Now, by reverting to the equality (118) and rewriting it for each $\xi_i \in c$, the extractor obtains the following matrix equation

$$\left( \text{diag}(a') \cdot c - b \cdot \text{diag}(a) \cdot a \right) \cdot T = \left( b \cdot \hat{a} - \hat{a}' \right) H. \quad (124)$$

Using the definitions of $b$ (121) and $a'$ (122), the extractor rewrites (124) as

$$\left( \text{diag}(b \cdot a) \cdot b - b \cdot \text{diag}(a) \right) \cdot a \cdot T = \left( b \cdot \hat{a} - \hat{a}' \right) H. \quad (125)$$

All the entries on both sides of the matrix equation (125) are known to the extractor, so it may wish to express the vector column $T$ (55) through $H$ by solving (125) as a linear system. However, all the weights of $P \in T$ are equal to zero in the linear system (125) due to the same reason as for the transformation rule (119). In fact, the matrix within the brackets on the left-hand side of (125), let’s call it $s$,

$$s = \text{diag}(b \cdot a) \cdot b - b \cdot \text{diag}(a), \quad (126)$$

has the non-empty kernel. Namely, there exists at least one nonzero vector, $\{1\}^{t+s+1}$, such that

$$s \cdot \{1\}^{t+s+1} = \{0\}^{t+s+1}. \quad (127)$$

Thus, $\det(s) = 0$ and, hence, $\det(s \cdot a) = 0$, which means the matrix equation (125) cannot be resolved for $T$ by taking $(s \cdot a)^{-1}$. Anyway, the matrix $s$ (126) contains $b$ and $a$ only, which makes Claim 5 applicable to it; so the extractor is going to use $s$ in a different way, as follows.

Since finding $P$ from (125) is not possible due to $\det(s \cdot a) = 0$ (the underlying reason is that this would mean $P \sim H$, which would break the DL relation assumption), the extractor constructs the following truncated version of
(125). It removes \( P \) from \( T \) which is at the first position there, thus leaving the truncated vector column

\[
\tilde{T} = \begin{bmatrix}
Q_0 \\
\vdots \\
Q_{t-1} \\
S_0 \\
\vdots \\
S_{s-1}
\end{bmatrix}.
\] (127)

Also, it removes the first column of the matrix \((s \cdot a)\) which is of zeros (it contains the weights of \( P \), all of which are zeros), denoting the resulting \((t + s) \times (t + s + 1)\) matrix as \( m \). The extractor calculates the column vector of \((t + s + 1)\) scalars on the right-hand side of (125) as

\[
h = \begin{bmatrix}
h_0 \\
h_1 \\
\vdots \\
h_{t+s}
\end{bmatrix} = \left( b \cdot \hat{a} - \hat{a}' \right).
\] (128)

Finally, the truncated version of (125) takes the form of

\[
m \cdot \tilde{T} = h H.
\] (129)

We make the following claim about \( m \).

**Claim 6:**

The \((t + s) \times (t + s + 1)\) matrix \( m \), which is constructed by removal of the first column from the matrix \((s \cdot a)\) where \( a \) is defined by (114) and \( s \) is defined by (126), with overwhelming probability has rank \((t + s)\).

**Proof:** is in Appendix S.4.

Once \( m \) has rank \((t + s)\), according to Claim 6, it has at least one submatrix of rank \((t + s)\). As there are only \((t + s + 1)\) submatrices of size \((t + s) \times (t + s)\) in \( m \), the extractor finds the one with rank \((t + s)\) among them, denote it as \( r \), by simply iterating and checking that the determinant is nonzero.

Let the found \((t + s) \times (t + s)\) submatrix \( r \) of rank \((t + s)\) be \( m \) with \( r \)th row removed, with \( r \in \{0 \ldots t + s\} \) found by the extractor. The extractor removes \( r \)th item from \( h \) (128) as well, denoting the reduced vector as \( \hat{h} \).

Thus, it obtains the equation

\[
r \cdot \tilde{T} = \hat{h} H,
\] (130)

where \( \det(r) \neq 0 \).

The extractor solves (130) for \( \tilde{T} \)

\[
\tilde{T} = r^{-1} \cdot \hat{h} H
\] (131)

and, hence, it has every \( Q_j \in \tilde{T}, j \in \{0 \ldots t - 1\} \), expressed as \( H \) multiplied by a known scalar, which breaks the DL relation assumption. Namely, according to Theorem 14 premise, there is at least one nonzero \( Q_j \) for some \( j \in \{0 \ldots t - 1\} \), and also there holds \( H = \text{lin}(\text{nz}(Q) \cup \{P\}) \), however, according to (131), the extractor has found a scalar such that \( Q_j \sim H \).

Thus, under the premise of Claim 2, we have built an algorithm that breaks the DL relation assumption. The Claim 2 is proved.

**S SAME FACTOR SUBCLAIM PROOFS**

**S.1 SCALAR DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE TRANSITION MATRIX B**

**Proof:** [Claim 3] The property a) is trivial. The property b) follows from the fact that \( \det(a^{-1}) \neq 0 \), both of \( a \) and \( a^{-1} \) are completely independent of \( c \), and, hence, \((t + s)\) independent randomnesses in \( \xi'_j \in c \) map one-to-one to \((t + s + 1)\) randomnesses in \( b_i \) by the formula \( b_i = \xi'_j \cdot a^{-1} \), with the additional constraint \( \langle b_i, \{1\}^{t+s+1} \rangle = 1 \) which follows from the equality to 1 of all items in the first columns of \( a \) and \( c \).
S.2 SCALAR DISTRIBUTIONS IN THE WITNESS VECTOR A

Proof: [Claim 4] Before sampling the base $a$, let the extractor construct the random base $e$ that includes $\xi, \xi$ and has all the other its base vectors sampled independently and uniformly, as in (114). Also, let the extractor perform $(t + s + 1)$ rew windings and obtain the witnesses $a$ in (113) for the base $e$, collecting them into the vector $e$. As $\xi, \xi \in e$, the vector $e \supset a, \hat{a}$ contains at least two different scalars. Note, since $\xi, \xi \in e$ are not collinear and the other base vectors in $e$ are random, there holds $\det(e) \neq 0$.

For the newly sampled random base $a$, let the extractor obtain the witness vector $a$ by making $(t + s + 1)$ more rew windings. According to the transformation rule (122), the vectors $e$ and $a$ are connected as

$$a = d \cdot e, \text{ where } d = a \cdot e^{-1}. \quad (132)$$

For an isolated of $a$ consideration of $d$, according to the Claim 3, each row $d_i \in b$ has all its items distributed uniformly at random, with $(t + s)$ of them independent and one of them, say, $d_{i0}$, completely determined by the equality $(d_i, \{1\}^{t+s+1}) = 1$. At the same time, for this consideration, as the vector $e$ is defined before $a$ is sampled, and hence $e$ is independent of $a$, the vector $e$ is independent of $d$. Thus, in this consideration, each item $a_i \in a$ calculated by the formula (132) as

$$a_i = (d_i, e) \quad (133)$$

is the inner product of the uniformly distributed vector $d_i$, which has $(t + s)$ independent items $d_{ij} \in d_i \setminus \{d_{i0}\}$ and one dependent item $d_{i0}$ calculated as

$$d_{i0} = 1 - \sum_{j=1}^{t+s} d_{ij}, \quad (134)$$

with the independent and not necessarily uniformly distributed vector $e$ which has at least two different items. Inserting (134) into (133), $a_i$ gets the form

$$a_i = e_0 + \sum_{j=1}^{t+s} (e_j - e_0) d_{ij}, \quad (135)$$

which makes $a_i$ look uniformly random in an isolated of $a$, consideration of it, namely, in isolation of $a$ and, hence, without $a$’s dependency $b$, and with at least two different $e_k$’s in $e$.

For each index $i \in [0 \ldots t + s]$, the scalar $a_i \in a$ is independent of the other scalars in $a$ since, according to (135), they are built using different and completely independent sources of randomness $d_i$.

S.3 INDEPENDENCE OF SCALARS IN AN EXPRESSION CONTAINING ONLY B AND A

Proof: [Claim 5] According to the Claim 3, since neither the matrix $e$ nor its dependencies participate in the expression in question, all scalars in the matrix $b$ can be considered as independent and uniformly random, except for the ones in the first column which can be found from the equality (123).

As for the vector $a$, its items are independent of the items in $b$ by the above, according to the Claim 3. In addition to this, by the Claim 4, the items in $a$ are distributed uniformly at random and independently of each other.

S.4 RANK OF M

Proof: [Claim 6] Rank of the $(t + s) \times (t + s + 1)$ matrix $m$ is equal to rank of the $(t + s + 1) \times (t + s + 1)$ matrix $(s \cdot a)$, as the former is obtained from the latter by removing a column which contains only zeros (the first column).

Rank of the square matrix $(s \cdot a)$ is equal to rank of the $(t + s + 1) \times (t + s + 1)$ square matrix $s$ (126), as the former is built as a product of the latter with an invertible matrix, namely, with the $(t + s + 1) \times (t + s + 1)$ square matrix $a$ (114) which has $\det(a) \neq 0$ as a random one. Thus,

$$\text{rank}(m) = \text{rank}(s). \quad (136)$$

Let us consider a submatrix of $s$ which is obtained by removing both the first column and row from $s$. We denote it as $\bar{s}$ below. According to (126), each item $s_{ij} \in \bar{s}$, where $i, j \in [1 \ldots t + s]$, has the form

$$s_{ij} = (b_i, a) b_{ij} - a_j b_{ij}. \quad (137)$$

Recalling (123), the equality (137) rewrites as

$$s_{ij} = \left( a_0 \left( 1 - \sum_{k=1}^{t+s} b_{ik} \right) + \sum_{k=1}^{t+s} a_k b_{ik} - a_j \right) b_{ij} = \left( a_0 + \sum_{k=1}^{t+s} (a_k - a_0) b_{ik} - a_j \right) b_{ij}. \quad (138)$$

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The matrix $s$ comprises $b$ and $a$ only, so Claim 5 applies to it. The same is true for $\tilde{s} \subset s$. Moreover, according to (138), each item $s_{ij} \in \tilde{s}$ is represented by a multivariate polynomial of total degree 3 of the set of variables $(b_i \setminus \{b_{i0}\}) \cup a$, each of which can be regarded, according to Claim 5, as distributed independently and uniformly.

Let us consider $\det(\tilde{s})$ constructed by Leibniz's formula as a sum of signed products of $s_{ij}$'s. This way, by (138), $\det(\tilde{s})$ is a multivariate polynomial of the independent and uniformly distributed random variables $(b_i \setminus \{b_{i0}\}) \cup a$. We rewrite (138) as follows, separating the $\det s_{ij}$ summand in it,

$$s_{ij} = a_0 + \sum_{k=1, \ldots, (r+s), k \neq j} (a_k - a_0)b_{ik} - a_j b_{ij} - a_0b_{ij} + a_j b_{ij}^2. \quad (139)$$

Consider the $\prod_{i=1}^{r+s} s_{ii}$ signed product component of $\det(\tilde{s})$. According to (139), it contributes the $\prod_{i=1}^{r+s} a_i b_{ii}^2$ summand to $\det(\tilde{s})$. As follows from (139), there is no other signed product in $\det(\tilde{s})$ which contributes any other summand containing $\prod_{i=1}^{r+s} a_i b_{ii}^2$. Thus, the multivariate polynomial representing $\det(\tilde{s})$ contains the uncompensated $\prod_{i=1}^{r+s} a_i b_{ii}^2$ and, therefore, $\det(\tilde{s})$ has total degree not less than $3(t+s)$.

By the Schwartz–Zippel lemma \cite{9, 31, 25}, having total degree greater than zero, $\det(\tilde{s})$ has only negligible probability to be zero and, thus, with overwhelming probability there holds

$$\text{rank}(s) = (t+s), \quad (140)$$

which implies, by (136), that with overwhelming probability

$$\text{rank}(m) = (t+s).$$

The claim is proved.

**T RANDOMLY WEIGHTED SUMS IMPLY THE SYSTEM IN MULTRATUG**

When moving from the equality (49) to the system (50) in EFLRSLWB, we implicitly used Theorem 3. More details about this are proved in the proof of Theorem 13, particularly in Appendix O, where the equality (49) corresponds to the equality (93).

However, in Multratug, verifier has the equality (66) instead of (49). The transition from (66) to the system (67) in Multratug may not seem apparent. Nevertheless, with Theorem 14, which is a generalization of Theorem 3 to $(t+s+1)$-element tuples, the transition from (66) to (67) becomes easy, details are in the proof of the following claim.

**Claim 7:**

*If the Multratug protocol in Figure 24 completes successfully, then verifier is convinced that the equality (66) implies the system (67) in it.*

**Proof:** Let

$$P = \hat{U}_k, \quad Q = \{P_{sk}, \hat{I}_k\}, \quad S = \{A_k^{\text{imp}} - A_{sk}, U_{sk} - U_k^{\text{imp}}\}, \quad H = H, \quad Z = J_k, \quad F = \{G, U_k^{\text{imp}}\}.$$

The right-hand sides of these equalities contain the elements from the Multratug scheme in Figure 24, whereas the left-hand sides contain ones from the protocol of Theorem 14 in Figure 23. By the formulas (55) and (56), respectively, the t-s-tuples become

$$T = (\hat{U}_k, P_{sk}, \hat{I}_k, A_k^{\text{imp}} - A_{sk}, U_{sk} - U_k^{\text{imp}}), \quad (141)$$

$$D = (J_k, G, U_k^{\text{imp}}, 0, 0). \quad (142)$$

Also, in accordance to Figure 24, the random scalar vector $\xi$ in the formula (59) becomes

$$\xi = [1, x^{-1}, x^{-1}\theta, x^{-1}\omega, x^{-1}\xi]. \quad (143)$$
By Theorem 12, due to the zkLin22Choice protocol call in Figure 24, verifier is convinced that prover knows $p_k, v_k$ such that there holds the equality, for each $k \in \{0 \ldots l - 1\}$, to the accuracy of $H$ component

$$G + \theta U_k^{\text{imp}} + \chi \hat{I}_k = p_k (P_{s_k} - K + \zeta U_{s_k} - \omega A_k) + v_k (K + \omega A_k^{\text{imp}} - \zeta U_k^{\text{imp}} + \theta \hat{I}_k + \chi \hat{U}_k),$$

(144)

which becomes the equality (66) after eliminating the hash to group $K$. The elimination is performed the same way as for (90) in Appendix O. Namely, since $K$ is orthogonal to everything else, it collapses guaranteeing $p_k = v_k$.

As a result, for $X, Y$ calculated by the formulas (57), (58) using (141), (142), (143), the equality (66) rewrites as

$$\chi Y = \chi p_k X.$$

(145)

Everything to the accuracy of $H$. Since $\chi$ is a nonzero scalar known to both of the prover and verifier prior to applying the Theorem 12 protocol, both sides of (145) can be divided by it, and (145) rewrites as

$$Y = p_k X,$$

(146)

which means verifier is convinced that prover knows some $a$, namely, $a = p_k$, and $\hat{a}$ such that $Y = aX + \alpha H$ holds. Moreover, by the above this connection between $Y$ and $X$ is established by a complete, shVZK, and cWEE protocol of Theorem 12 (Lin2-2Choice lemma), which proves the relation (35).

Also, according to Figure 24 the following holds. The element $\hat{U}_k$ in the tuple $T$ (141) is nonzero and is orthogonal to all the other nonzero elements of $T$ and to the blinding generator $H$, i.e., $\hat{U}_k \equiv \lim (nz(P_{s_k}, I_k), nz(A_k^{\text{imp}} - A_k, U_{s_k} - U_k^{\text{imp}}), H)$. The nonzero element $H$ is orthogonal to all nonzero elements of the set $\{P_{s_k}, \hat{I}_k, \hat{U}_k\}$, i.e., $H \equiv \lim (nz(P_{s_k}, \hat{I}_k), (\hat{U}_k))$. The element $P_{s_k}$ is guaranteed nonzero.

Thus, all steps of the zkTElemWitness protocol in Figure 23 have been performed and the premise of Theorem 14 is met. Therefore, by Theorem 14 the verifier is convinced that the relation (60) holds, and, hence, the tuples (141), (142) are elementwise proportional to each other, to the accuracy of $H$, which is equivalent to the system (67).

**U SIGNATURE MULTRATUG**

**Proof:** [Theorem 15] According to Figure 24, as the new vectors $U^{\text{imp}}, \hat{I}$ are defined by the formulas (62), (61), all proofs of Theorem 13 for the EFLRSLWB scheme in Figure 21 transfer to the Multratug scheme in Figure 24.

In fact, $U^{\text{imp}}$ is indistinguishable from the independent uniform randomness due to the blinding components $\mu H$ in it (62), hence $U^{\text{imp}}$ does not change anything. The same is for $I$ (61), which is indistinguishable from the independent uniform randomness and from the former $I$ (39). This is proved in [26], and also can be proved using the method of [11]. Also, the new vectors $\hat{I}$ and $U^{\text{imp}}$ get into $\hat{U}$'s pre-image, however this does not change anything, only deprecates any linear dependency of $\hat{U}$'s with $\hat{I}$'s and $U^{\text{imp}}$'s. The same is for the blinding generator $H$, which gets the new vectors into its pre-image.

Note, Theorem 14, which we use for Multratug instead of Theorem 3 for EFLRSLWB, does not require in the premise $\hat{I}$'s and $U^{\text{imp}}$'s to be proved linearly independent of each other, only $\hat{U}$'s and $H$ are required to be proved linearly independent of $\hat{I}$'s and $U^{\text{imp}}$'s.

With the former $I$, EFLRSLWB has (49) and gets (50) from it. With the new $U^{\text{imp}}, \hat{I}$, Multratug has (66) instead of (49), and gets (67) from it by Claim 7 in Appendix T, instead of (50). As (50) is a subset of (67), with $\hat{I}$ substituted for $I$, all the subsequent EFLRSLWB proofs use $\hat{I}$ instead of $I$ and thus translate to Multratug proofs.

This way, Multratug appears to be proved a linkable threshold ring signature, provided that EFLRSLWB is proved to be such. And, all the properties listed in Theorem 13 for the linkable threshold ring signature EFLRSLWB in Figure 21 transfer to the linkable threshold ring signature Multratug in Figure 24.

**V VECTOR SCHNORR ARGUMENT**

**Proof:** [Theorem 16] Design of the protocol in Figure 25 is clearly Schnorr-like. Hence, its completeness, shVZK, and cWEE can be proved in the standard way, so we do not include a detailed proof here, clarifications are the same as for zk2ElemComm in Appendix A.

In addition to this, all the explanatory details can be found in [2], where the shVZK and cWEE properties are proved for quite a similar protocol.

**W NON-ZK LOG-SIZE VECTOR COMMITMENT ARGUMENT**

**Proof:** [Theorem 17] For $n > 4$, the protocol in Figure 26 comprises the reductions used in the inner product argument [6] with $b = (0)^n$ and, hence, it is complete and has cWEE for these reductions. For $n \leq 4$, $\mathcal{P}$ simply opens the witness to $\mathcal{V}$ and the latter checks the relation. Thus, for $n > 1$, the protocol is complete and has cWEE.

Also, in [2] the shVZK and cWEE properties are proved for a similar protocol.
**X OPTIMIZED ZK LOG-SIZE VECTOR COMMITMENT ARGUMENT**

**Proof:** [Theorem 18] Completeness is by-design. The argVC_{n+1} call in the last step of zkVC_{opt} has cWEE by Theorem 17. Having extracted the witness τ from it, the protocol turns out to be zkNElemComm_{n+1}, which has cWEE by Theorem 16. Thus, zkVC_{opt} has cWEE. Even with the opened τ the protocol remains sHVZK by Theorem 16, so partially hiding it inside argVC_{n+1} doesn’t make zkVC_{opt} less zero-knowledge. Thus, zkVC_{opt} is sHVZK.

Also, in [2] such a composition is proved to be having sHVZK and cWEE properties.

**Y NOTES ABOUT DUALRING-EC**

The DualRing-EC signature, according to its security model in [30], requires all keys in the ring to be honestly generated, i.e., it does not work with malformed ones. In contrast, our security model defined by Theorem 9 allows malformed keys to appear in the rings. We have tried to assess, whether an environment in which EFLRSL remains secure can be used for DualRing-EC, and discovered the following attack to DualRing-EC, of course, with reference to our security model.

Let a dishonest P want to sign with DualRing-EC using a ring of four malformed public keys, none of which it knows secret key for. Knowing no secret keys for Q, R, K and knowing secret key for P, it creates the four-element ring as \{Q, R, P + K, P − K\}. Then P performs as though it signs honestly with P’s secret key using three-element ring \{Q, R, P\}. However, it still hashes the four-element ring to create the challenge. Instead of creating the Sum Argument [30] for three challenges c₀, c₁, c₂, which correspond to Q, R, P, it splits c₂ into two halves and includes the Sum Argument for four challenges c₀, c₁, c₂/2, c₂/2 into the forgery. After that, honest V accepts this signature.

**Z LOW ANONYMITY OF U/X**

Let us show some anonymity implications of having an element of the form \(x^{-1}U\) in a public transcript such that U is a fixed generator and x is a private key. The element may not be necessarily a linking tag, such element may appear, for instance, in a part of the scheme proving the balance.

Consider a rather possible case of non-uniform distribution of x’s. Let the distribution have a probability peak for pairs of private keys (x₁, x₂) such that \(x₂ = 2x₁\). Consequently, there will be non-negligible probability to randomly pick two signatures which were signed with keys from the same pair. These two signatures will be linked together by simply checking whether the element \(x₁^{-1}U\) multiplied by 2 is equal to its counterpart.

The obvious objection to this case is that the system may by-design forbid such the non-uniform distributions or other tightly coupled keys. This is, for example, the case in [28], where private keys behind the public keys in the rings have the form \(x = b + r\) with hidden \(b\) and with independently and uniformly distributed \(r\) which may even be known to adversary. Thus, the element in question takes the form

\[(b + r)^{-1}U, \text{ where } r \text{ is known to the adversary, and always is independently and uniformly distributed.}\]

According to [18, 29, 22], this form makes it impossible to break anonymity, even if the adversary is diligently observing r.

Takeaway from this is that if a scheme contains an element of the form \(x^{-1}U\), then it is not anonymous w.r.t. chosen public key attackers. Also, in this case it seems not possible to follow the usual methods for proving existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen message / public key attackers, even if the scheme possesses this property.