Accountable Light Client Systems for PoS Blockchains

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Abstract

A major challenge for blockchain interoperability is having an on-chain light client protocol that is both efficient and secure. We present a protocol that provides short proofs about the state of a decentralised consensus protocol while being able to detect misbehaving parties. To do this naively, a verifier would need to maintain an updated list of all participants’ public keys which makes the corresponding proofs long. In general, existing solutions either lack accountability or are not efficient. We define and design a committee key scheme with short proofs that do not include any of the individual participants’ public keys in plain. Our committee key scheme, in turn, uses a custom designed SNARK which has a fast prover time. Moreover, using our committee key scheme, we define and design an accountable light client system as the main cryptographic core for building bridges between proof of stake blockchains. Finally, we implement a prototype of our custom SNARK for which we provide benchmarks.

1 Introduction

Blockchain systems rely on consensus among a large number of participants. Having a large number of participants is important for decentralisation, which, in turn is the foundation of security for blockchains. Following consensus of a blockchain can become expensive in terms of networking bandwidth, storage and computation. Depending on the consensus type, these challenges can be aggravated when the size of participants’ set is large or when the participants’ set changes frequently. Light clients (such as SPV clients in Bitcoin or inter-blockchain bridge components that support interoperability) are designed to allow resource constrained users to follow consensus of a blockchain with minimal cost.

We are interested in blockchains that use Byzantine agreement type consensus protocols, particularly proof of stake systems like Polkadot \cite{1}, Ethereum or many other systems \cite{2,3,4,5,6}. These protocols may have a large number of consensus participants, from 1000s to 100000s, and in such PoS protocols, the set of participants may change regularly.

Following the consensus protocols in the examples above entails proving that a large subset of a designated set of participants, which are called validators, signed the same message (e.g. a block header). All existing approaches have limiting shortcomings as follows: 1) verifying all signatures has a large communication overhead for large validator sets; 2) verifying a single aggregatable signature, by computing an aggregate public key from the signer’s public keys, has the shortcoming that any verifier still needs to know the entire list of public keys and this, again, has expensive communication if the list changes frequently. 3) verifying a threshold signature has two shortcomings: first, such a signature does not reveal the set of signers impacting the security of PoS systems; second, it requires an interactive setup which becomes expensive if the validator set is large or changes frequently.

Our Approach: Committee Key Schemes

We introduce a committee key scheme which allows to succinctly prove that a subset of signers signed a message using a commitment to a list of all the signers’ public keys. Our primitive is an extension of an aggregatable signature scheme and it allows us to prove the desired statement, in turn, by proving the correctness of an aggregate public key.
for the subset of signers. In more detail, the committee key scheme defines a committee key which is a commitment to all the signers’ public keys. The committee key scheme generates a succinct proof that a particular subset of the list of public keys signed a message. The proof can be verified using the committee key. Because of the way the aggregatable signature scheme works, we need to specify the subset of signers; for this purpose we use a bitvector. More precisely, if the owner of the $m$th public key in the list of public keys signed the message, then the $m$th bit of this bitvector is 1 otherwise is 0. Using the committee key, the proof and the bitvector, a light client can verify that the corresponding subset of validators to whom the public keys belong (as per our use case) signed the message. Although the bitvector has length proportional to the number of validators, it is still orders of magnitude more succinct than giving all the public keys or signatures. Public keys or signatures are usually 100s of bits long and as a result this scheme reduces the amount of data required by a factor of 100 times or more. We could instantiate our committee key scheme using any universal SNARK scheme and suitable commitment scheme. However to avoid long prover times for large validator sets, we use custom SNARKs. We have implemented this scheme (Section 6) and it gives fast enough proof times for the use cases we consider: a prover with commodity hardware can generate these custom SNARK proofs in real time, i.e. as fast as the consensus generates instances of this problem.

Application: Accountable Light Client Systems To understand when and how our scheme described above is useful and compare it to other approaches, we return to what a light client is used for. Light clients allow resource constrained devices such as browsers or phones to follow a decentralised consensus protocol. A blockchain is another resource constrained device on which a light client is useful. In this case a light client verifier (think smart contracts on Ethereum, for example) allows building trustless bridges protocols between blockchains. Currently, computation and storage costs on existing blockchains are much higher than those in a browser on a modern phone. If such a bridge is responsible for securing assets with high total value, then the corresponding light client system which defines such a light client verifier must be secure as well as efficient. Our light client system has the following properties which we explain below: It is accountable, it has asynchronous safety and it is incremental.

- Our light client system is accountable, i.e. if the light client verifier is misled and the transcript of its communication is given to the network then one can identify a large number (e.g. 1/3) of misbehaving consensus participants (i.e., misbehaving validators in our specific case). On the one hand, identifying misbehaving consensus participants is challenging in the light client system context when we want to send minimal data to the light client verifier. On the other hand, identifying misbehaviour is necessary for any proof of stake protocols (including Polkadot and Ethereum) whose security relies on identifying and punishing misbehaving consensus participants.

- Our light client system is asynchronously safe i.e. under the consensus’ honesty assumptions, our light client verifier cannot be misled even if it has a restricted view of the network e.g. only connecting to one node, which may be malicious. This is because our light client system inherits the property of asynchronous safety from the Byzantine agreement protocol of the blockchain. Such light client systems would not be possible for consensus based on longest chains.

- Our light client system is incremental - i.e its succinct state is incrementally updated - is optimised to make these updates efficiently, which is particularly relevant for the bridge application, as opposed to trying to optimise verifying consensus decisions from the blockchain genesis.

Bridge security We note that $1.2$ billion has been stolen in attacks on insecure bridges during first 8 months of 2022 alone [7, 8]. Of the top 10 crypto thefts of all times, $1.6bn$ out of $3.4bn$ come from bridge attacks [8]. Such bridges may be a weaker point, compared to the security of the blockchains themselves and they carry a lot of economical value. It therefore makes sense to consider a security model for the bridges that is as strong as that for the corresponding blockchains. For blockchains that have accountable safety for consensus, that means having accountable safety for bridges. The most secure bridges use light clients, e.g. Cosmos’ IBC protocol [9], but efficiency is still an obstacle in using on-chain light clients in bridges. Our light client system is not only easily implementable on top of existing blockchains that use BLS signatures but also allows achieving accountability much more cheaply.
Structure The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we sketch our proposed protocol and compare it to existing work. In Section 3, we give cryptographic preliminaries necessary for later sections. In Section 4, we describe in detail the SNARKs for our committee key scheme and prove their security. In Section 5, we give a model for a light client system and the consensus system it works with, we provide a light client system instantiation and prove it satisfies the security properties according to the newly introduced definitions. In Section 6, we describe and give benchmarks for our custom SNARKs implementations.

2 Our Solution

In this section we present a sketch of our solution for both the committee key scheme and the accountable light client system, then describe the technical challenges and contributions and finish with an overview of related work.

2.1 Sketch of Committee Key Scheme

Suppose that a prover wants to prove to a verifier that a subset $S$ of some set $T$ of signers have signed a message. One obvious approach would be using BLS aggregatable signatures with the following steps:

- a. The verifier knows all the public keys $\{pk_i\}_{i \in T}$ of all signers in $T$.
- b. The prover sends the verifier an aggregatable signature $\sigma$ and a representation of the subset $S$.
- c. The verifier computes the aggregate public key $apk = \sum_{i \in S} pk_i$ of the public keys of signers in $S$. Then it verifies the aggregatable signature $\sigma$ for the aggregate public key $apk$ and it accepts if the verification succeeds.

However, we can represent a subset $S$ of a list of signers compactly using a bitvector $b$: the $i$th signer in the list is in $S$ if and only if the $i$th bit of $b$ is 1. Our committee key scheme describes an alternative approach:

- a'. The verifier knows a commitment $C$ to the list of the public keys $\{pk_i\}_{i \in T}$.
- b'. The prover sends the verifier an aggregatable signature $\sigma$, a bitvector $b$ representing $S$, an aggregate public key $apk = \sum_{i \in S} pk_i$ of the public keys of signers in $S$. Then it verifies the aggregatable signature $\sigma$ for the aggregate public key $apk$ and it accepts if the verification succeeds.
- c'. The verifier using $C$, $apk$ and the bitvector $b$ checks if $\pi$ is valid. It then verifies $\sigma$ against $apk$ and accepts if both steps succeed.

With the above committee key scheme, if $C$ and $\pi$ are constant size, the communication cost becomes $O(1) + |T|$ bits instead of $|T|$ public keys.

2.2 Light Client Verifier Using Our Committee Key Scheme

Below we sketch how a light client verifier uses our committee key scheme. Beforehand, to provide context, we describe how a general light client verifier works for the type of consensus systems we are interested in.

Suppose that a light client verifier wants to know some information $info_n$ about the state of a blockchain at block number $n$ without having to download the entire blockchain. Another entity, a full node, who knows all the data of the blockchain and is following the consensus, should be able to convince the light client verifier using a computational proof that $info_n$ was indeed decided. Assume that $info_n$ can be proven from a commitment $C_n$ to the state at block number $n$, e.g. $C_n$ could be a block hash. To convince the light client verifier that $C_n$ (and, implicitly, $info_n$) was decided, the full node needs to convince the light client verifier that a threshold number $t$ of validators from the current validator set signed $C_n$, where $t$ depends on the type of consensus. Byzantine fault tolerant based consensus often use $t$ to be over $2/3$ of the total number of validators. If the light client verifier does not know the current validator set, but knows the initial validator set of the blockchain, it needs to be convinced iteratively of each validator set change. This means that the light client verifier needs
to be convinced that a threshold of each validator set signed a message that commits to the next validator set; and this iterative chain of proofs starts from the initial validator set and ends with the current validator set.

If one follows the obvious approach described above using BLS aggregation and aims to convince the light client verifier that \( \text{info}_n \) is decided, then one needs to send \( O(v) \) public keys for each validator set change, where \( v \) is the upper bound on the size of the validator set.

Using our succinct committee key scheme however, one requires only a constant size proof and \( O(v) \) bits for each validator set change to convince the light client verifier that \( \text{info}_n \) was decided. Since a public key or signature typically takes 100s of bits, our approach achieves much smaller proof sizes. More details our achieved efficiency are available in Section 6.

2.3 Our Custom SNARKs

In the following we discuss how we use custom SNARKs with efficient prover time to implement our committee key scheme. While we achieved very fast proving time in our SNARKs implementation, this came at the cost of not using a general purpose SNARK protocol, in turn leading to a more involved security model and the necessity of additional security proofs. For more details, please see section 2.3.1 below.

The public inputs for our SNARKs are: an aggregate public key \( \text{apk} \), a commitment \( C \) to the list of public keys \( (pk_i)_{i \in T} \) and a bitvector \( (b_i)_{i \in T} \) succinctly representing a subset \( S \) of public keys. Our SNARKs provers’ output a proof that \( \text{apk} = \sum_{i \in T} b_i pk_i \) and that \( C \) is the commitment to the list of public keys \( (pk_i)_{i \in T} \); however the list itself is a witness for the relations defining our SNARKs and, hence, the verifiers do not have access to it. This, in turn, ensures that our SNARKs verifiers do not have to parse or check anything based on such a possibly long list which is an important step towards our SNARKs verifiers’ efficiency. Moreover, we detail below two further optimisations of our custom SNARKs.

- Our SNARKs are an instance of commit and prove SNARKs (see section 2.4.3 for more details); they work as follows. The underlying commitment scheme used for computing the public input commitment \( C \) mentioned above is the same as the (polynomial) commitment scheme used in the rest of our SNARK(s). Hence, we do not need to add an witness for \( C \) to the SNARK constraint system in the same way we would have to if our commitment scheme were, for example, to use a hash function. If adding such a witness were required, and implicitly, the respective constraints for checking a hash inside our custom SNARKs, that would have increased the size of the constraint system and would have lead to several orders of magnitude increase in our prover time. The tradeoff for our SNARKs design (i.e., with a commitment as part of the public input) is that we cannot use an existing SNARK compiler as a black box. Hence, our SNARKs require us to extend the existing security models and, also, they require specialised security proofs.

- Our constraint system is simple enough such that our custom SNARKs do not require a permutation argument or a lincheck argument which general proving systems need to bind together gates. In fact, the underlying circuit for our SNARKs can be described as an affine addition gate with a couple of constraints added in order to avoid the incompleteness of our addition formulae. Overall, the simplicity of our circuit and our set of constraints implies smaller proof sizes for our SNARKs and, respectively, faster proving times.

2.3.1 Technical Challenges and Contributions Regarding our Custom SNARKs

In order to define and implement our committee key scheme accountable light client systems and in order to design the custom SNARKs that support our efficiency results, we had to tackle some technical challenges and make additional contributions as summarised below.

Extending PLONK Compiler to Mixed Commitment and Vectors NP Relations Firstly, our custom SNARKs takes inspiration from PLONK [10] in terms design of the proof system used, and of the circuits and gates. However, our SNARKs also have differences compared to PLONK. PLONK applies to NP relations that use vectors of field elements for public inputs and witnesses. However we need
SNARKs whose defining NP relations also have polynomial commitments (in our case, the committee key $C$) as part of their public inputs. Hence, the original PLONK compiler does not suffice; we therefore extend it with a second step in which we show that under certain conditions (fulfilled by our light client system), the SNARKs obtained using the original PLONK compiler are also SNARKs for a mixed type of NP relation containing both vectors and polynomial commitments. The full details and proofs can be found in Section 4.4 and we believe this compiler extension to be of independent interest, beyond our concrete use case.

Conditional NP Relations for Efficiency  Secondly, we also require the NP relations we work with to have a well-defined subpredicate which is verified outside the SNARKs we design. In our blockchain instantiation, any current validator set has to come to a consensus, among other things, on the next validator set, which is represented by a set of public keys. The validator set computes and signs a pair of polynomial commitments to the next set of validators’ public keys. Before including a public key in the set, the validators perform several checks on the proposed public key, such as being in a particular subgroup of the elliptic curve. This check is not performed by the SNARKs’ constraint system, but is required for the correctness of the statement the SNARKs prove. This design decision makes our SNARKs more efficient, but it also means we have to extend the usual definition of NP relations to conditional NP relations, where in fact, one of the subpredicates that define the conditional relation is checked outside the SNARKs or ensured due to a well-defined assumption. We introduce the general notion of conditional NP relation in section 3.4 and describe our concrete conditional NP relations in section 4.

Hybrid Model SNARKs Thirdly, in line with the two above technical challenges and the solutions we came up with, we also revisit the existing definitions related to SNARKs [11, 10] and we extend them by introducing an algorithm which we call PartInput. For our light client system use case, this allows us to separate the public input for the NP relations that define our custom SNARKs in two: a part that is computed by the current set of validators on the blockchain in question and the rest of the public input plus the corresponding SNARK proof are computed by a (possibly malicious) prover interacting with the light client verifier. Our newly introduced notion of hybrid model SNARK (see section 3.5) generalises this public input separation concept and its definition is used to prove the security of our custom SNARKs in section 4.4.

2.4 Related work

2.4.1 Naive Approaches and Their Use in Blockchains

There are a number of approaches commonly used in practice to verifying that a subset of a large set signed a message.

Verify All Signatures One could verify a signature for each signing validator. This is what participants do in protocols like Polkadot [1], with 297 validators (or Kusama with 1000 validators) and Tendermint [12 5], which is frequently used with 100 validators). The Tendermint light client system, which is accountable and uses the verification of all individual signatures approach, is used in bridges in the IBC protocol[9]. However this approach becomes prohibitively expensive for a light client verifier when there are 1000s or 1,000,000s of signatures.

Aggregatable Signatures One could use an aggregatable signature scheme like BLS [13 14] and reduce this to verifying one signature, but that requires calculating an aggregate public key. This aggregate key is different for every subset of signers and needs to be calculated from the public keys. This is what Ethereum does, which currently has 415,278 validators. However for a light client verifier, it is expensive to keep a list of 100,000s of public keys updated. As such only full nodes of Ethereum use this approach and instead light clients verifiers of Ethereum [15] follow signatures of randomly selected subsets of validators of size 512. This means that the resulting light client system is not accountable because these 512 validators are only backed by a small fraction of the total stake.

Threshold Signatures Alternatively threshold signature scheme may be used, with one public key for the entire set of validators. This approach was adopted by Dfinity [16]. Threshold signature schemes used in practice use secret sharing for the secret key corresponding to the single public key.
This gives the schemes two downsides. Firstly, they require a communication-heavy distributed key generation protocol for the setup which is difficult to scale to large numbers of validators. Indeed, despite recent progress [17, 16, 18], it is still challenging to implement setup schemes for threshold signatures across a peer-to-peer network with a large number of participants, which is what many blockchain related use cases require. Moreover, such a setup may need repeating whenever the signer set changes. Secondly, for secret sharing based threshold signature schemes, the signature does not depend on the set of signers and so we cannot tell which subset of the validators signed a signature i.e. they are not accountable. Dfinity [16] uses a re-shareable BLS threshold signature, where the threshold public key remains the same even when the validator set changes. Such a signature scheme provides the light client verifier with a constant size proof, even over many validator set changes, but means that the proof not only does not identify which of a particular set of validators are misbehaving, but also we cannot say when this misbehaviour happened i.e. which validator set misbehaved. This is because the signature would be the same for any threshold subset of any validator set.

It is worth noting that if a protocol already implemented aggregatable BLS signatures, our committee key scheme can be used with those without altering the consensus layer. Indeed it may be easier to alter a protocol that uses individual signatures to one using aggregatable BLS signatures than to implement threshold signatures from scratch because the latter requires waiting for an interactive setup before making validator set changes.

2.4.2 Using SNARKs to Roll up Consensus

Celo [4] and Mina [3] blockchains have associated light clients which allow their resource constrained users to efficiently and securely sync from the beginning of the blockchain to the latest block.

Plumo [19] is the most relevant comparison to our scheme. It also tackles the problem we consider, i.e., that of proving validator set changes. In more detail, Plumo uses a Groth16 SNARK [11] to prove that enough validators signed a statement using BLS signatures from a set of the public keys. In Celo [4], the blockchain that designed and plans to use Plumo, validators may change every epoch which is about a day long and the Plumo’s SNARK iteratively proves 120 epochs worth of validator set changes. Since in Celo there are no more than 100 validators in a validator set at any one time, the respective public keys are used in plain as public input for Plumo’s SNARK, as opposed to a succinct polynomial commitment in the case of our custom SNARKs. All of the above increase the size of Plumo’s prover circuit. Since Plumo is designed to help resource constrained light clients sync from scratch, it is not an impediment that the Plumo SNARK cannot be efficiently generated, i.e., in real time. In the case of a light client verifier for bridges (i.e., the most resource constrained application), we expect it to be in sync at all times and, by design, we care only about one validator set change at a time. Our slimmed down and custom SNARK not only can be generated in real time, but, also due to the use of specialised commitments schemes for public keys, our validator sets can scale up to much larger sizes as well without impacting the efficiency of our system.

Mina achieves light clients with $O(1)$ sized light client proofs using recursive SNARKs. This requires some nodes have a large computational overhead to produce these proofs. Also because this requires verifying consensus with small circuits, they do not use the consensus paradigm discussed above where a majority of validators sign, and instead use a longest chain rule version of proof of stake [3]. This is not accountable because, as with Dfinity above, it is not possible to tell from the proof which validators signed off on a fork, nor when this happened. Another downside is that because the proof only shows the length of a chain (and its block density), similar to a Bitcoin SPV proof, a light client needs to be connected to an honest node to tell if a block is in the longest chain. If the client is connected to a single malicious node, it could be given a proof for a shorter fork and not see any proofs of chains the fork choice rule would prefer.

2.4.3 Commit-and-Prove and Related Approaches

Our custom SNARKs are an instance of the commit-and-prove paradigm [20, 21, 22] which, in turn, is a generalisation for zero-knowledge proofs/arguments in which the prover proves statements about values that are committed. In practice, commit-and-prove systems (for short, CP) can be used to compress a large data structure and then prove something about its content (e.g., polynomial commitments [23].
vector commitments [24], accumulators [24]. CP schemes can also be used to decouple the publishing of commitments to some data from the proof generation: each of these actions may be performed by different parties or entities [20]. Finally, commitments can be used to make different proof systems interoperable [27, 28]. Our custom design SNARKs have properties from the first two categories, however we could not have simply re-used an existing argument system: by designing custom circuits and SNARKs, we ensured improved efficiency for our use cases.

Another paradigm related to commit-and-prove is called hash-and-prove [29]: for large data structures or simply data that is expensive to be handled directly by a computationally constrained verifier, one can hash that data and then create a (succinct) proof for some verifiable computation that uses the original, large, dataset. The committee key scheme notion that we define in this work has both similarities to but also differences with regard to this paradigm. The similarities are that, both the way we instantiate our committee key (i.e., using a polynomial commitment with a trusted universal setup) and the way we instantiate our aggregate public key, can be generalised as some form of (possibly deterministic) hash function. One difference is that the setup for the polynomial commitment is the same as that from which the proving and verification key for our committee key scheme are computed; thus our version of the hashes and the keys for the committee key scheme are definitely not independent as in the case of hash-and-commit [29]. Finally, built into our definition of committee key scheme and its security properties, we make use of a secure aggregatable signature scheme. This, in turn, allows us to design and prove the security properties of our accountable light client(s). In fact, to add some intuition to the fact that a committee key scheme is more than just a hash-and-prove instance, we mention that our committee key scheme inherits an unforgeability property from its aggregatable scheme subcomponent. This is one property that as far as we are aware no hash-and-prove scheme has.

When proving the security of our arguments, we use an extension of some of the more commonly employed SNARK definitions; we call this extension “a hybrid model SNARK”. Our notion resembles the existing notion of SNARKs with online-offline verifiers as described in [29], where the verifier computation is split into two parts: during the offline phase some computation (possibly of commitments) happens; this computation takes some public inputs as parameters and, when not performed by the verifier, it may also be performed (in part) by the prover. The online phase is the main computation performed by the verifier. In the case of our hybrid model SNARKs, however, the input to the offline counterpart described above (which is what we call the PartInput algorithm) may even be the witness or a part of the witness for the respective relation. For our custom SNARKs, PartInput produces part of the public input used by the verifier; since for our use case, PartInput does handle a portion of the witness, this operation cannot be performed by the verifier for that relation. Moreover, in our instantiation, PartInput produces computationally binding commitment schemes that are opened by the prover. Both of these properties are not explicitly part of our general definition for hybrid model SNARKs, but they are crucial and explicitly assumed and used in proving the security for the result of our compiler’s second step (see section 4.4).

3 Preliminaries

We assume all algorithms receive an implicit security parameter $\lambda$ given in unary representation. We use interchangeably “efficient algorithm” or “PPT algorithm” to mean an algorithm that runs in uniform probabilistic polynomial time in the length of its input. Wherever necessary, before the run of all the algorithms and protocols, we assume the correct parameters for the curves, groups, parings, the group generators, etc. have been generated and shared with the corresponding parties.

We write $y = A(x; r)$ when algorithm $A$ on input $x$ and randomness $r$, outputs $y$. We write $y \leftarrow A(x)$ for the process of picking randomness $r$ at random and setting $y = A(x; r)$. We also write $y \leftarrow \hat{S}$ for sampling $y$ uniformly at random from the set $S$. We denote by $|S|$ the cardinality of set $S$. Unless otherwise stated, when we write that an event holds with some probability, we implicitly mean that the probability is computed over all randomised algorithms involved. We say a function is negligible in $\lambda$ and denote it by $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ if that function vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in $\lambda$. We say that a function is overwhelming in $\lambda$ if it has the form $1 -$ some function negligible in $\lambda$. We also use the notation e.w.n.p. to mean except with negligible probability, or, equivalently, with overwhelming probability. We denote by $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ an unspecified function which has a polynomial expression in $\lambda$. We generally use boldface font to denote vectors whose components

$y \leftarrow A(x)$
we explicitly make use of in the text and we use italic font to denote the rest of the variables.

We work over finite fields of large characteristic. When we work with polynomials we denote by \( \mathbb{F}_{<d}[X] \) the set of all polynomials of degree less than \( d \) over the field \( \mathbb{F} \). For any integer \( n \geq 1 \), we denote by \( [n] \) the set \( \{1, \ldots, n\} \).

3.1 Pairings

If \( E \) is an elliptic curve defined over a prime field \( \mathbb{F}_p \) of large characteristic \( p \), we denote by \( E(\mathbb{F}_p) \) the abelian group containing all the points \( (x, y) \in (\mathbb{F}_p)^2 \) that satisfy the elliptic curve equation along with the point at infinity. Let \( r \) be a large prime such that \( r \) divides \( |E(\mathbb{F}_p)| \) and \( \gcd(p, r) = 1 \). The embedding degree of \( E \) is the smallest integer \( k \) such that \( r \) divides \( p^k - 1 \). If \( k \) is small we say \( E \) is pairing friendly. We call \( \mathbb{F}_p \) the base field of \( E \) and \( \mathbb{F}_r \) (i.e., the prime field of characteristic \( r \)) the scalar field of \( E \).

Pairing friendly curves are important to us in this work because they allow us to efficiently construct and instantiate aggregatable signatures and SNARKs. For a pairing friendly curve \( E \) as above, let \( G_1, G_2 \) and \( G_T \) be appropriately chosen subgroups of order \( r \) in \( E(\mathbb{F}_p) \), \( E(\mathbb{F}_r) \) (for some \( l \leq k \)) and in the multiplicative group \( \mathbb{F}_k^* \) of the extension field \( \mathbb{F}_k \). The types of pairings we are interested in this work are mappings \( e \) which are secure \(^3\), efficiently computable, they are defined as \( e : G_1 \times G_2 \rightarrow G_T \) for which bilinearity (i.e., \( e(a \cdot g_1, b \cdot g_2) = e(g_1, g_2)^{a \cdot b}, \forall a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_r, \forall g_1 \in G_1, \forall g_2 \in G_2 \)) and non-degeneracy (i.e., if \( g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) are generators of \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \), respectively, then \( g_T = e(g_1, g_2) \) is a generator for \( G_T \)) hold.

Our results in this work hold for a pair of pairing-friendly elliptic curves \( E_{\text{inn}} \) (the inner curve) and \( E_{\text{out}} \) (the outer curve) such that the base field of \( E_{\text{inn}} \) equals the scalar field of \( E_{\text{out}} \). In line with the naming from \(^3\), we call any pair of pairing friendly elliptic curves with such property a pairing-friendly two-chain. We denote by \( \mathbb{F} \) the base field of \( E_{\text{inn}} \) and we call \( p \) its characteristic. We denote by \( r \) the characteristic of the scalar field of \( E_{\text{inn}} \). We also denote by \( e_{\text{inn}} \) and by \( e_{\text{out}} \) the efficient, secure pairings over \( E_{\text{inn}} \) and \( E_{\text{out}} \), respectively.

We further denote by \( G_{1,\text{inn}}, G_{2,\text{inn}} \) and \( G_{T,\text{inn}} \) the two cyclic source groups and the cyclic target group for \( e_{\text{inn}} \) and \( g_{1,\text{inn}}, g_{2,\text{inn}}, g_{T,\text{inn}} \) are uniformly random chosen generators of these three groups. Analogously, \( G_{1,\text{out}}, G_{2,\text{out}} \) and \( G_{T,\text{out}} \) are the two cyclic source groups and the cyclic target group for \( e_{\text{out}} \) and \( g_{1,\text{out}}, g_{2,\text{out}}, g_{T,\text{out}} \) are uniformly random chosen generators of these three groups. We consider \( G_{1,\text{inn}}, G_{2,\text{inn}}, G_{1,\text{out}}, G_{2,\text{out}} \) with additive notation for their group operation and we consider \( G_{T,\text{inn}} \) and \( G_{T,\text{out}} \) with multiplicative notation. We additionally write \( [x]_{1,\text{inn}} = x \cdot g_{1,\text{inn}}, [x]_{2,\text{inn}} = x \cdot g_{2,\text{inn}} \).

We assume that the curves, groups and fields defined in the last two paragraphs have been generated using implicit security parameter \( \lambda \).

Finally, we note that in our implementation we instantiate \( E_{\text{inn}} \) with BLS12-377 \(^3\) and \( E_{\text{out}} \) with BW6-761 \(^3\).

3.2 Secure Signature Aggregation

An aggregatable signature scheme is a signature scheme that compresses signatures issued using possibly different signing keys into one signature. Below we give the formal definition of an aggregatable signature scheme making explicit use of the proofs-of-possession (PoPs) key registration model as introduced and employed in \(^4\). This approach both maintains the general formal presentation clear and simple and allows for an easy transition to the aggregatable signature scheme instantiation used as part of our main (accountable light client system) construction. In particular, for our instantiation we use aggregatable BLS signatures that have a very efficient aggregation procedure by adding together keys and by multiplying together signatures, but they are vulnerable to rogue key attacks \(^5\); against these attacks one can protect using PoPs. This is in contrast to other aggregation procedures that do not require PoPs for security but incur a higher computational cost (e.g., due to the use of

\(^3\) \( E(\mathbb{F}_r) \) is the group of all points \( (x, y) \in (\mathbb{F}_r)^2 \) that satisfy the elliptic curve equation of \( E \) along with the point at infinity.

\(^4\) BLS12-377

\(^5\) BW6-761
multi-scalar multiplication). Moreover, for our concrete use case of accountable light clients, our efficient and simple signature aggregation method results in a simple and more efficient custom argument scheme (i.e., SNARK), which, in turn, compensates for the cost of having to work with PoPs.

**Definition 1.** (Aggregatable Signature Scheme) An aggregatable signature scheme consists of the following tuple of algorithms $(AS.\text{Setup}, AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}, AS.\text{VerifyPoP}, AS.\text{Sign}, AS.\text{AggregateKeys}, AS.\text{AggregateSignatures}, AS.\text{Verify})$ such that for implicit security parameter $\lambda$:

- $pp \leftarrow AS.\text{Setup}(aux_{AS})$: a setup algorithm that, given an auxiliary parameter $aux_{AS}$, outputs public protocol parameters $pp$.
- $((pk, \pi_{PoP}, sk) \leftarrow AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}(pp)$: a key pair generation algorithm that outputs a secret key $sk$, and the corresponding public key $pk$ together with a proof of possession $\pi_{PoP}$ for the secret key.
- $0/1 \leftarrow AS.\text{VerifyPoP}(pp, pk, \pi_{PoP})$: a public key verification algorithm that, given a public key $pk$ and a proof of possession $\pi_{PoP}$, outputs 1 if $\pi_{PoP}$ is valid for $pk$ and 0 otherwise.
- $\sigma \leftarrow AS.\text{Sign}(pp, sk, m)$: a signing algorithm that, given a secret key $sk$ and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, returns a signature $\sigma$.
- $apk \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateKeys}(pp, (pk_i)_{i=1}^n)$: a public key aggregation algorithm that, given a vector of public keys $(pk_i)_{i=1}^n$, returns an aggregate public key $apk$.
- $asig \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateSignatures}(pp, (\sigma_i)_{i=1}^n)$: a signature aggregation algorithm that, given a vector of signatures $(\sigma_i)_{i=1}^n$, returns an aggregate signature $asig$.
- $0/1 \leftarrow AS.\text{Verify}(pp, apk, m, asig)$: a signature verification algorithm that, given an aggregate public key $apk$, a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and an aggregate signature $\sigma$, returns 1 or 0 to indicate if the signature is valid.

We say $(AS.\text{Setup}, AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}, AS.\text{VerifyPoP}, AS.\text{Sign}, AS.\text{AggregateKeys}, AS.\text{AggregateSignatures}, AS.\text{Verify})$ is an aggregatable signature scheme if it satisfies perfect completeness, perfect completeness for aggregation and unforgeability as defined below.

**Perfect Completeness** An aggregatable signature scheme $(AS.\text{Setup}, AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}, AS.\text{VerifyPoP}, AS.\text{Sign}, AS.\text{AggregateKeys}, AS.\text{AggregateSignatures}, AS.\text{Verify})$ has perfect completeness if for any message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and any $u \in \mathbb{N}$ it holds that:

$$\Pr[AS.\text{Verify}(pp, apk, m, asig) = 1 \land \forall i \in [u] AS.\text{VerifyPoP}(pp, pk_i, \pi_{PoP,i}) = 1 | pp \leftarrow AS.\text{Setup}(aux_{AS}), ((pk_i, \pi_{PoP,i}, sk_i) \leftarrow AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}(pp), i = 1, \ldots, u, apk \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateKeys}(pp, (pk_i)_{i=1}^n), \sigma_i \leftarrow AS.\text{Sign}(pp, sk_i, m), i = 1, \ldots, u, asig \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateSignatures}(pp, (\sigma_i)_{i=1}^n)] = 1.$$

We note that an aggregatable signature scheme with perfect completeness implies the underlying signature scheme has perfect completeness.

**Perfect Completeness for Aggregation** An aggregatable signature scheme $(AS.\text{Setup}, AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}, AS.\text{VerifyPoP}, AS.\text{Sign}, AS.\text{AggregateKeys}, AS.\text{AggregateSignatures}, AS.\text{Verify})$ has perfect completeness for aggregation if, for every adversary $A$

$$\Pr[AS.\text{Verify}(pp, apk, m, asig) = 1 | pp \leftarrow AS.\text{Setup}(aux_{AS}), ((pk_i)_{i=1}^n, (\sigma_i)_{i=1}^n) \leftarrow A(pp), \forall i \in [u], AS.\text{Verify}(pp, pk_i, m, \sigma_i) = 1, apk \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateKeys}(pp, (pk_i)_{i=1}^n), asig \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateSignatures}(pp, (\sigma_i)_{i=1}^n)] = 1.$$

**Unforgeable Aggregatable Signature** For an aggregatable signature scheme $(AS.\text{Setup}, AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}, AS.\text{VerifyPoP}, AS.\text{Sign}, AS.\text{AggregateKeys}, AS.\text{AggregateSignatures}, AS.\text{Verify})$ the advantage of an adversary against unforgeability is defined by
\[ Adv^\text{forge}_A(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{Game}^\text{forge}_A(\lambda) = 1] \]

where

\[
\text{Game}^\text{forge}_A(\lambda) : \\
pp \leftarrow AS.\text{Setup}(aux_{AS}) \\
((pk^*, \pi_{\text{PoP}}^*, sk^*)) \leftarrow AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}(pp) \\
Q \leftarrow \emptyset \\
((pk_i, \pi_{\text{PoP}, i}^*, sk_i)_{i=1}^u, m, \text{asig}) \leftarrow A^{\text{OSign}}(pp, (pk^*, \pi_{\text{PoP}}^*)) \\
\text{If } pk^* \notin \{ pk_i \}_{i=1}^u \forall m \in Q, \text{ then return } 0 \\
\text{For } i \in [u] \\
\text{If } AS.\text{VerifyPoP}(pp, pk_i, \pi_{\text{PoP}, i}) = 0 \text{ return } 0 \\
apk \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateKeys}(pp, (pk_i)_{i=1}^u) \\
\text{Return } AS.\text{Verify}(pp, apk, m, \text{asig})
\]

and

\[
\text{OSign}(m_j) : \\
\sigma_j \leftarrow AS.\text{Sign}(pp, sk^*, m_j) \\
Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{ m_j \} \\
\text{Return } \sigma_j
\]

and \( A^{\text{OSign}} \) denotes the adversary \( A \) with access to oracle \( \text{OSign} \).

We say an aggregatable signature scheme is unforgeable if for all efficient adversaries \( A \) it holds that \( Adv^\text{forge}_A(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \).

### 3.2.1 An Aggregatable Signature Instantiation

In the following, we instantiate the aggregatable signature definition given above with a scheme inspired by the BLS signature scheme [32] and its follow-up variants [34, 33].

**Instantiation 2. (Aggregatable Signatures) In our implementation we call aggregatable signatures the following instantiation of aggregatable signatures definition. Note that in our implementation we instantiate \( E_{\text{inn}} \) with BLS12-377 [32].**

- \((G_{1,\text{inn}}, g_{1,\text{inn}}, G_{2,\text{inn}}, g_{2,\text{inn}}, G_{T,\text{inn}}, e_{\text{inn}}, H_{\text{inn}}, H_{\text{PoP}}) \subset pp \leftarrow AS.\text{Setup}(aux_{AS})\), where \( G_{1,\text{inn}}, g_{1,\text{inn}}, G_{2,\text{inn}}, g_{2,\text{inn}}, G_{T,\text{inn}}, e_{\text{inn}} \) were defined in section 3.1 and \( H_{\text{inn}} : \{ 0,1 \}^* \rightarrow G_{2,\text{inn}} \) and \( H_{\text{PoP}} : \{ 0,1 \}^* \rightarrow G_{2,\text{inn}} \) are two hash functions. The auxiliary parameter \( aux_{AS} \) is such that there exists \( N \in \mathbb{N} \), \( N \) is the first component of the vector \( aux_{AS} \) and there exists a subgroup of size at least \( N \) in the multiplicative group of \( \mathbb{F} \), where \( \mathbb{F} \) is the base field of \( E_{\text{inn}} \), but also the size of the subgroup \( \in \mathbb{O}(N) \).
- \((pk, sk, \pi_{\text{inn}}) \leftarrow AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}(pp)\), where \( sk \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p^* \) and \( pk = sk \cdot g_{1,\text{inn}} \in G_{1,\text{inn}} \) and \( \pi_{\text{inn}} \leftarrow sk \cdot H_{\text{PoP}}(pk) \) and \( r \) was defined in section 3.1 as the characteristic of the scalar field of \( E_{\text{inn}} \).
- \( 0/1 \leftarrow AS.\text{VerifyPoP}(pp, pk, \pi_{\text{inn}}) \), where \( AS.\text{VerifyPoP} \) outputs 1 if
  \[ e_{\text{inn}}(g_{1,\text{inn}}, \pi_{\text{inn}}) = e_{\text{inn}}(pk, H_{\text{PoP}}(pk)) \]
  holds and 0 otherwise. Note that implicitly, as part of running \( AS.\text{VerifyPoP} \), one checks that \( pk \in G_{1,\text{inn}} \) also holds.
- \( \sigma \leftarrow AS.\text{Sign}(pp, sk, m) \): where \( \sigma = sk \cdot H_{\text{inn}}(m) \in G_{2,\text{inn}} \).
- \( apk \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateKeys}(pp, (pk_i)_{i=1}^u) \), where \( apk = \sum_{i=1}^u pk_i \). Note that \( AS.\text{AggregateKeys} \) checks whether \( \{ (pk_i)_{i=1}^u \} \in G_{1,\text{inn}}^u \) and, if that is not the case, it outputs \( \perp \); if \( (+) \) holds, the algorithm \( AS.\text{AggregateKeys} \) continues with the computations described above.
- \( \text{asig} \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateSignatures}(pp, (\sigma_i)_{i=1}^u) \), where \( \text{asig} = \sum_{i=1}^u \sigma_i \).
- \( 0/1 \leftarrow AS.\text{Verify}(pp, apk, m, \text{asig}) \), where \( AS.\text{Verify} \) outputs 1 if \( apk \neq \perp \) and \( apk \in G_{1,\text{inn}} \) and \( e_{\text{inn}}(apk, H_{\text{inn}}(m)) = e_{\text{inn}}(g_{1,\text{inn}}, \text{asig}) \); otherwise, it outputs 0.
3.3 Committee Key Scheme for Aggregatable Signatures

Below we introduce the notion of committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures. This generalises the notion of aggregatable signature scheme. We will use the notion of committee key scheme and its instantiation presented in section 4.6 in order to design, instantiate and prove our accountable light client schemes in section 5.

**Definition 3.** (Committee Key Scheme for Aggregatable Signatures) Let AS be an aggregatable signature scheme that fulfills definition 1. A committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures consists of the following tuple of algorithms (CKS.Setup, CKS.GenerateCommitteeKey, CKS.Prove, CKS.Verify) such that for implicit security parameter $\lambda$:

- $(pp, rs_{sk}, rs_{pk}) \leftarrow$ CKS.Setup($\nu$): a setup algorithm that, given an upper bound $\nu \in \mathbb{N}$, $\nu = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ outputs some public parameters $pp$ and proving and verification keys $rs_{pk}$ and $rs_{sk}$, respectively, where $pp \leftarrow$ AS.Setup(auxAS), for some auxAS chosen by the aggregated signature AS.

- $ck \leftarrow$ CKS.GenerateCommitteeKey($rs_{pk}, (pk_i)_{i=1}^{\nu}$): a committee key generation algorithm that, given a proving key $rs_{pk}$ and a list of public keys, outputs a committee key $ck$, where $u \leq \nu$.

- $\pi \leftarrow$ CKS.Prove($rs_{pk}, ck, (pk_i)_{i=1}^{\nu}, (bit_i)_{i=1}^{\nu}$): a proving algorithm that, given a proving key $rs_{pk}$, a committee key $ck$, a list of public keys and a bitvector $(bit_i)_{i=1}^{\nu} \in \{0, 1\}^\nu$, outputs a proof $\pi$, where $u \leq \nu$.

- $0/1 \leftarrow$ CKS.Verify($pp, rs_{sk}, ck, m, asig, \pi, \text{bitvector}$): a verification algorithm that, given public parameters $pp$, a verification key $rs_{sk}$, a committee key $ck$, a message $m$, a signature $asig$, a proof $\pi$ and a vector $\text{bitvector} \in \{0, 1\}^\nu$, outputs $1$ if the verification succeeds and $0$ otherwise.

We say (CKS.Setup, CKS.GenerateCommitteeKey, CKS.Prove, CKS.Verify) is a committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures if it satisfies perfect completeness and soundness as defined below.

**Perfect Completeness** A committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures (CKS.Setup, CKS.GenerateCommitteeKey, CKS.Prove, CKS.Verify) has perfect completeness if for any message $m \in \{0, 1\}^\nu$, for any vector of public keys $(pk_i)_{i=1}^{\nu}$ generated using AS.GenerateKeypair($pp$), for any bitmask $(bit_i)_{i=1}^{\nu} \in \{0, 1\}^\nu$, for any aggregated signature $asig$, it holds that:

$$\Pr[\text{AS.Verify}(pp, apk, m, asig) = 1 \implies \text{CKS.Verify}(pp, rs_{sk}, ck, m, asig, \pi, (bit_i)_{i=1}^{\nu}) = 1] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

**Soundness** A committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures (CKS.Setup, CKS.GenerateCommitteeKey, CKS.Prove, CKS.Verify) has soundness if for every efficient adversary $A$ it holds that:

$$\Pr[\text{CKS.Verify}(pp, rs_{sk}, ck, m, asig, \pi, (bit_i)_{i=1}^{\nu}) = 1 \implies \text{AS.Verify}(pp, apk, m, asig) = 1] \leq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Next, we define an additional security property for a committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures, namely unforgeability.

**Unforgeability** For a committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures (CKS.Setup, CKS.GenerateCommitteeKey, CKS.Prove, CKS.Verify) the advantage of an adversary $A$ against
unforgeability is defined by 
\[ \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{forgecomkey}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{Game}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{forgecomkey}}(\lambda) = 1], \]
where
\[
\text{Game}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{forgecomkey}}(\lambda) : (pp, rs_{\text{sk}}, rs_{\text{pk}}) \leftarrow \text{CKS.Setup}(\nu) \\
((pk^*, \pi_{\text{PoP}}), sk^*) \leftarrow \text{AS.GenerateKeypair}(pp) \\
Q \leftarrow \emptyset \\
((pk_i, \pi_{\text{PoP},i})_{u=1}^u, (\text{bit}_i)_{i=1}^m, \text{asig}, \pi, m) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{OSign}}(pp, rs_{\text{sk}}, rs_{\text{pk}}, (pk^*, \pi_{\text{PoP}})) \\
\text{If } (\forall i : pk^* \neq pk_i \land \text{bit}_i = 0) \lor m \in Q, \text{ then return } 0 \\
\text{For } i \in [u] \\
\text{If } \text{AS.VerifyPoP}(pp, pk_i, \pi_{\text{PoP},i}) = 0 \text{ return } 0 \\
ck \leftarrow \text{CKS.GenerateCommitteKey}(rs_{\text{pk}}, (pk_i)_{i=1}^m) \\
\text{Return } \text{CKS.Verify}(pp, rs_{\text{sk}}, ck, m, \text{asig}, \pi, (\text{bit}_i)_{i=1}^m) \]

We say a committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures is unforgeable if for all efficient adversaries \( \mathcal{A} \) it holds that
\[ \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{forgecomkey}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda). \]

**Corollary 4.** Let AS be an aggregatable signature scheme that fulfils definition \([1]\). If CKS is a committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures that fulfils definition \([3]\) then CKS is unforgeable, as defined above.

**Proof.** Assume by contradiction there exists an efficient adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) such that \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{forgecomkey}}(\lambda) \) is non-negligible. Using \( \mathcal{A} \) and the soundness property of a committee key scheme, one can construct in a straightforward manner an efficient adversary \( \mathcal{A}' \) such that
\[ \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}'}^{\text{forge}}(\lambda) \geq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{forgecomkey}}(\lambda) - \text{negl}(\lambda). \]

This, in turn, implies that \( \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}'}^{\text{forge}}(\lambda) \) is non-negligible which contradicts the unforgeability property of aggregatable signature scheme AS. Thus, our assumption is false and our statement holds. \( \square \)

### 3.4 Conditional NP Relations

By \( \mathcal{R} = \{(x;w) : p(x,w) = 1\} \) we denote the binary relation such that \((x,w)\) fulfil predicate \(p(x,w) = 1\). We say \( \mathcal{R} \) is an NP relation if predicate \( p \) can be checked in polynomial time in the length of both inputs \( x \) and \( w \) and \( L(\mathcal{R}) = \{x \mid \exists w \text{ s.t. } (x,w) \in \mathcal{R}\} \) is an NP language w.r.t. predicate \( p \). In such a case we call \( x \) an instance and \( w \) a witness.

In order to model a specific property of our NP relations, we introduce further notation which we call conditional NP relation, we denote it by
\[ \mathcal{R}^c = \{(x;w) : (p_1(x,w) = 1) \land c(x,w) = 1 \land p_2(x,w) = 1\} \]
and we interpret as the NP relation containing the pairs of inputs and witnesses \((x,w)\) such that \(c(x,w) = 1\), \(p_1(x,w) = 1\) and \(p_2(x,w) = 1\) hold. However, in order to prove that \((x,w) \in \mathcal{R}^c\) we assume/take it as a given that \(c(x,w) = 1\) and we are left to prove only that \(p_1(x,w) = 1\) and \(p_2(x,w) = 1\) hold.

We explicitly include in the definition of any NP relation \( \mathcal{R} \) or \( \mathcal{R}^c \) the corresponding domain for each type of public input. The interpretation of such domains is that each type of public input is parsed by the honest parties (e.g., a SNARK verifier for an NP relation \( \mathcal{R} \) or \( \mathcal{R}^c \)) as per the definition of the respective domain, without additional checks. We assume that all our relations have been generated using implicit security parameter \( \lambda \). Finally, if not stated explicitly, when we make a statement about an NP relation we implicitly mean the statement is about a conditional relation \( \mathcal{R}^c \), where \( c \) may be the predicate that always outputs 1.
3.5 SNARKs

All three SNARKs we design in this work have access to a structured reference string (srs) of the form \( \{(\lambda^i)_{i=0}^d, \{\lambda^i\}_{i=0}^d\} \) where \( \lambda \) is a random (and allegedly secret) value in \( \mathbb{F} \) and \( d \) is bounded by a polynomial in \( \lambda \). Such an srs is universal and updatable \cite{35} and, as long as at least one of the participants that took part in the MPC generating the srs was honest, the srs cannot be used by any coalition of other MPC participants to prove false statements with more than a negligible probability of success \cite{35,36}.

Our SNARKs are secure in the algebraic group model (AGM) \cite{37}. If \( G \) is a cyclic group of prime order \( p \), then, informally, we call an algorithm \( A \) algebraic if it fulfills the following requirement: whenever \( A \) outputs a group element \( g \in G \), it also outputs a representation \( a = (a_1, ..., a_l) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^l \) such that \( g = \sum_{i=1}^l a_i \cdot B_i \) where \( (B_1, ..., B_l) \) are all the \( G \) group elements that were given to \( A \) during its execution so far. The AGM lies in between the generic group model (GGM) \cite{38,39} and the standard model and, lately, it has been the preferred model for proving security for the most efficient SNARKs (e.g., PLONK \cite{10}, Marlin \cite{40} or Groth16 \cite{11} with its proof in the AGM model presented in \cite{37,41}).

In the following, we introduce a generalisation of the usual SNARK definition which we call a hybrid model SNARK. As mentioned in the introduction, this is inspired by the notion of online-offline SNARKs \cite{29}, however, for our use case we need to further refine it as describe below:

**Definition 5.** (Hybrid Model SNARK) A hybrid model succinct non-interactive algorithm of knowledge for relation \( R \) is a tuple \( \{A, SNARK, KeyGen, SNARK.Prove, SNARK.Verify, SNARK.PartInputs\} \) such that for implicit security parameter \( \lambda \):

- \( srs \leftarrow SNARK.Setup(auxSNARK) \): a setup algorithm that on input auxiliary parameter \( auxSNARK \) from some domain \( D \) outputs a universal structured reference string tuple \( srs \),
- \( (srs_{pk}, srs_{sk}) \leftarrow SNARK.KeyGen(srs, R) \): a key generation algorithm that on input a universal structured reference string \( srs \) and an NP relation \( R \) outputs a proving key and a verification key pair \( (srs_{pk}, srs_{sk}) \),
- \( \pi \leftarrow SNARK.Prove(srs_{pk}, (x, w), R) \): a proof generation algorithm that on input a proving key \( srs_{pk} \) and a pair \( (x, w) \in R \) outputs proof \( \pi \),
- \( 0/1 \leftarrow SNARK.Verify(srs_{sk}, x, \pi, R) \): a proof verification algorithm that on input a verification key \( srs_{sk} \), an instance \( x \) and a proof \( \pi \) outputs a bit that signals acceptance (if output is 1) or rejection (if output is 0),
- \( (x_1, state_1) \leftarrow SNARK.PartInputs(srs, state_1, R) \): a deterministic public inputs generation algorithm that takes as input a universal structured reference string \( srs \), an NP relation \( R \) and some state \( state_1 \) and outputs some updated state \( state_2 \) and some partial public input \( x_1 \),

and satisfies completeness, knowledge soundness with respect to \( SNARK.PartInputs \) and succinctness as defined below:

**Perfect Completeness** holds if an honest prover will always convince an honest verifier: for all \( (x, w) \in R \) and for all \( auxSNARK \in D \)

\[
Pr[SNARK.Verify(srs_{sk}, x, \pi, R) = 1 | srs \leftarrow SNARK.Setup(auxSNARK), (srs_{pk}, srs_{sk}) \leftarrow SNARK.KeyGen(srs, R), \pi \leftarrow SNARK.Prove(srs_{pk}, (x, w), R)] = 1.
\]

**Notation** In the following, we denote by \( State_R \) the set of all states \( state_1 \) such that given some relation \( R \) and any possible \( srs \), for any output \( x_1 \) of \( SNARK.PartInputs(srs, R, state_1) \) with \( state_1 \in State_R \), we have that there exists \( x_2 \) and \( w \) with \( (x = (x_1, x_2), w) \in R \); we further make the assumption that \( State_R \neq \emptyset \).

**Knowledge-soundness with respect to SNARK.PartInputs** holds if there exists a PPT extractor \( E \) such that for all PPT adversaries \( A \), for all \( auxSNARK \in D \) and for all \( state_1 \in State_R \)

\[
Pr[(x \in (x_1, x_2), w) \in R \land 1 \leftarrow SNARK.Verify(srs_{sk}, x = (x_1, x_2), \pi, R) | srs \leftarrow SNARK.Setup(auxSNARK), (srs_{pk}, srs_{sk}) \leftarrow SNARK.KeyGen(srs, R), (x_1, state_2) \leftarrow SNARK.PartInput(srs, state_1, R), (x_2, \pi) \leftarrow A(srs, state_2, R), w \leftarrow E^A(srs, state_2, R)] \]
is overwhelming in $\lambda$, where by $\mathcal{E}^A$ we denote the extractor $\mathcal{E}$ that has access to all of $A$’s messages during the protocol with the honest verifier.

**Succinctness** holds if the size of the proof $\pi$ is $\text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $\text{SNARK}$.Verify runs in time $\text{poly}(\lambda+|x|)$.

Firstly, note that if one chooses $x_1$, $\text{state}_1$ and $\text{state}_2$ to be the empty strings in the definition of $\text{SNARK}.\text{PartInput}$ and in relation to the knowledge soundness property, one obtains a more standard SNARK definition. Secondly, $\mathcal{R}$ is not a component of the vector $\text{auxSNARK}$ so even if $\text{SNARK}.\text{Setup}$ has $\text{auxSNARK}$ as parameter, it is universal, i.e., it can be used to derive proving and verification keys for circuits of any size up to a polynomial in the security parameter $\lambda$, independently of any specific NP relation. Moreover, for the SNARKs we design, the size of the key used by the honest verifier is much smaller than the size of the honest prover’s key. We have made the separation clear between the two keys to be able to better capture this special case; however, a potential adversarial prover has access to the complete $\text{srs}$ key. Thirdly, as mentioned the SNARKs that we design in this work are secure in the AGM model. This means that we limit our adversaries to AGM adversaries only and by $\mathcal{E}^A$ we denote the extractor $\mathcal{E}$ that has access to all of $A$’s messages during the protocol with the honest verifier: the messages include the coefficients of the linear combinations of group elements used by the AGM adversary at any step in order to output new group elements at the next step in the protocol. Moreover, the auxiliary input (i.e., $\text{state}_2$) is required to be drawn from a “benign distribution” or else extraction may be impossible [42, 43]. Finally, in the SNARK definition above we did not include the notion of zero-knowledge since it is not required in the rest of the paper.

### 3.6 Ranged Polynomial Protocols and Polynomial Commitments

In order to prove the security of the SNARKs designed in this work we use a SNARK compiler inspired by the one provided in lemma 4.7 from PLONK [10]. In more detail, for each of our three conditional NP relations we describe a ranged polynomial protocol and then we use our compiler to obtain three SNARKs secure in the AGM. We remind the definition of ranged polynomial protocols in appendix A. Moreover, we also make use of KZG polynomial commitments [23], in particular their batched version and their security definitions as described in section 3 from PLONK. For brevity, and since we do not make any alterations to the definition of batched KZG commitments, we do not repeat it in this initial version of our work but invite the reader to review them, if necessary, by following the reference provided.

#### 3.7 Lagrange Bases

In order to design the SNARKs presented in this work, it is more convenient to represent the polynomials we work with over the Lagrange base rather than the monomial base. Formally, for the finite field $F$ defined in section 3.1 we denote by $H$ a subgroup of the multiplicative group of $F$ such that $n = |H|$ is a large power of 2. Let $\omega$ be an $n$-th root of unity in $F$ such that $\omega$ is a generator of $H$.

Then, we call the following polynomial base \( \{L_i(X)\}_{0 \leq i \leq n-1} \) a Lagrange base, where $\forall i, 0 \leq i \leq n-1$, $L_i(X)$ is the unique polynomial in $\mathbb{F}_{<n}[X]$ such that $L_i(\omega) = 1$ and $L_i(\omega^j) = 0, \forall j \neq i$.

Independent of the notion of Lagrange bases, but related to $n$ we define block also a power of 2 such that block $< n$. We use block when defining one of our conditional NP relations in section 4. In the following we assume $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and block = $\Theta(\lambda)$ and $|F| = 2^{\Theta(\lambda)}$.

### 4 Custom SNARKs for Public Keys Aggregation Proofs

In the following, we construct three related SNARKS, each of them allowing a prover to convince an efficient verifier that an alleged aggregated public key has indeed been computed correctly as an aggregate of a vector of public keys for which two succinct commitments (one to the vector of $x$ affine coordinates and the other to the vector of $y$ affine coordinates, respectively) are publicly known. The differences between the three constructions stem from whether a bitmask (also called a bitvector) with one bit associated to each public key (necessary to signal the inclusion or omission of the respective public key w.r.t. the aggregate key) is part of the verifier’s public input or is part of the witness. For the former case, we describe, in fact, two distinct SNARKs: a basic accountable SNARK (the bitmask is represented as a sequence of $\{0, 1\}$ field elements) and a packed accountable SNARK (the bitmask is partitioned into equal blocks of consecutive binary bits, and, in turn, each block is represented as
a field element). For the latter case, we describe a counting SNARK. Each of our three SNARKs implements a conditional NP relation bearing the same name as the SNARK it implements. Note that the names “basic accountable” (for short, “basic”), “packed accountable” (for short, “packed”) and “counting” do not refer to the security of the respective SNARK but they summarise properties of the underlying sets of constraints that define the SNARKs, and, hence their use case. In particular, we use the basic accountable and the packed accountable SNARKs for building accountable light client systems and we use the counting SNARK for building non-accountable light client systems.

In order to compile our desired SNARKs we proceed as follows:

- We start by defining three conditional NP relations based only on vectors. These relations capture the specific constraints we are interested in. We denote these NP relations by \( R_{\text{incl}} \) (i.e., basic accountable), \( R_{\text{pa incl}} \) (packed accountable) and \( R_{\text{count}} \) (counting). (See sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 respectively, for full details.)

- We design three ranged polynomial protocols for the above three relations. (Again, see sections 4.1, 4.2 and 4.3 respectively, for full details.) The definition of ranged polynomial protocols originates in \([10]\) and, for convenience, we remind it to the reader in appendix A.

- We define and use a two-steps PLONK-based compiler that allows us to compile the three ranged polynomial protocols into the desired SNARKs for a novel type of conditional NP relations which include trusted inputs and, in particular, trusted polynomial commitments as part of the public inputs. In more detail, we compile three SNARKs for three mixed polynomial commitments and vector based relations which we denote by \( R_{\text{ba,com}} \), \( R_{\text{pa,com}} \) and \( R_{\text{c,com}} \) respectively. These are the direct counterparts of pure vector based relations \( R_{\text{incl}} \), \( R_{\text{pa incl}} \) and \( R_{\text{count}} \). (See section 4.4 for full details. For completeness, we also include in appendix B the full rolled-out SNARK implementing \( R_{\text{pa,com}} \).)

- We include a detailed comparison between the original PLONK and our SNARKs. (See section 4.5.)

- We conclude this section with an instantiation for committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures which uses, in turn, our SNARKS compiled in section 4.4 and our instantiation for BLS aggregatable signatures from section 3.2.1. (See section 4.6 for full details.)

In more detail, as motivated in the introduction and in section 3.1 we define all our conditional NP relations for our three SNARKs over \( \mathbb{F} \) which is the base field of the curve \( E_{\text{ann}} \). Moreover, our corresponding SNARKs provers’ circuits are naturally defined as well over \( \mathbb{F} \) as the scalar field of \( E_{\text{ann}} \). In particular, the vector of public keys, which is part of the public input for all of our three relations, and is denoted by \( \text{pk} = (pk_0, \ldots, pk_{n-2}) \), is a vector of pairs with each component in \( \mathbb{F} \). Note that this vector has size \( n - 1 \) where \( n \) has been defined in section 3.7. For the basic accountable and the counting conditional NP relations, we denote the \( n \) components bitmask by \( \text{bit} = (bit_0, \ldots, bit_{n-1}) \) (meaning that each component belongs to the set \( \{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{F} \)), while the packed accountable conditional NP relation is defined using the compacted bitmask \( \text{b}' = (b'_0, \ldots, b'_{\text{block} - 1}) \) of \( \frac{n}{\text{block}} \) field elements, each of which is block binary bits long (block has been defined in section 3.7). Intuitively, each of the binary components in the bit representation of these field elements signals the inclusion (or exclusion) of the index-wise corresponding public keys into the aggregated public key \( \text{apk} \). Note that, in fact, the last bit of field element \( b'_{\text{block} - 1} \) as well as the \( n \)-th component \( bit_{n-1} \) do not correspond to any public key, but, as will become clear in the following, they have been included for easier design of constraints.

Notation-wise, we denote by \( H \) the multiplicative subgroup of \( \mathbb{F} \) generated by \( \omega \) as defined in section 3.7.1. We additionally denote by \( \text{incl}(a_0, \ldots, a_{n-2}) \) the inclusion predicate that checks if \( (a_0, \ldots, a_{n-2}) \in G_{1, \text{ann}} \). Moreover let \( h = (h_x, h_y) \) be some fixed, publicly known element in \( E_{\text{ann}} \setminus G_{1, \text{ann}} \). (See full version of this work for how to handle the special case \( E_{\text{ann}} = G_{1, \text{ann}} \).) We denote by \( (a_x, a_y) \) the affine representation in \( x \) and \( y \) coordinates of \( a \in E_{\text{ann}} \) and by \( + \) the point addition in affine coordinates on the elliptic curve \( E_{\text{ann}} \). We denote by \([s]P\) the scalar multiplication by scalar \( s \in \mathbb{F} \) of point \( P \in E_{\text{ann}} \). We denote by \( B = \{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{F} \).

Finally, as mentioned in section 3.4 the interpretation of adding explicit domains to public inputs in the definition of conditional NP relations is that the honest parties (in our case, both the polynomial protocol verifiers and the SNARKs verifiers as defined in this section below) parse the public inputs according to the specified domains without any further checks. Any checks or computations that the
honest parties perform regarding the public inputs are explicitly described as part of the protocols followed by the honest parties.

4.1 Basic Accountable Ranged Polynomial Protocol

We start by describing our conditional basic accountable relation $R_{ba}^{incl}$ and the corresponding $H$-ranged polynomial protocol $P_{ba}$. Both $n$ and the domains used in the explicit definitions of our conditional NP relations depend implicitly on the security parameter $\lambda$, hence $R_{ba}^{incl}$ as well implicitly depends on $\lambda$. However, for brevity, here and in the rest of the paper we choose to omit the security parameter $\lambda$ whenever we refer to any of the conditional NP relations for which we build our SNARKs.

Conditional Basic Accountable Relation $R_{ba}^{incl}$

$$R_{ba}^{incl} = \{(pk \in (\mathbb{F}^2)^{n-1}, bit \in \mathbb{B}^n, apk \in \mathbb{F}_2^2; \_ : apk = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} [bit_i] \cdot pk_i \mid pk \in \mathbb{G}^{n-1}_{i,inn}\}$$

where $pk = (pk_0, \ldots, pk_{n-2})$ and $bit = (bit_0, \ldots, bit_{n-1})$. Throughout this section we are going to use the following polynomials and polynomial identities:

Polynomials as Computed by Honest Parties

$$b(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} bit_i \cdot L_i(X)$$
$$pkx(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} pkx_i \cdot L_i(X)$$
$$pky(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} pky_i \cdot L_i(X)$$
$$kacxy(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} kacxy_i \cdot L_i(X)$$
$$kaccy(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} kaccy_i \cdot L_i(X),$$

where $(pkx_0, \ldots, pkx_{n-2})$ and $(pky_0, \ldots, pky_{n-2})$ are computed such that $\forall i \in \{0, \ldots, n-2\}$, $pk_i$ is interpreted as a pair $(pkx_i, pky_i)$ with its components in $\mathbb{F}$; we also have $(kacxy_0, kaccy_0) = (h_x, h_y)$ and $(kacxy_{i+1}, kaccy_{i+1}) = (kacxy_i, kaccy_i) \oplus bit_i(pkx_i, pky_i), \forall i < n-1$. Note that in the last relation $bit_i$ is not interpreted as a field element anymore but as a binary bit.

Polynomial Identities

$$id_1(X) = (X - \omega^{n-1}) \cdot [b(X) \cdot ((kacxy(X) - pkx(X))^2 \cdot (kacxy(X) + pkx(X)) + kacxy(\omega \cdot X)) -$$
$$- (pky(X) - kaccy(X))^2 + (1 - b(X)) \cdot (kacxy(\omega \cdot X) - kaccy(X))]$$

$$id_2(X) = (X - \omega^{n-1}) \cdot [b(X) \cdot ((kacxy(X) - pkx(X)) \cdot (kacxy(\omega \cdot X) + kacxy(X)) -$$
$$- (pky(X) - kaccy(X)) \cdot (kacxy(\omega \cdot X) - kacxy(X)) + (1 - b(X)) \cdot (kacxy(\omega \cdot X) - kacxy(X))]$$

$$id_3(X) = (kacxy(X) - h_x) \cdot L_0(X) + (kacxy(X) - (h \oplus apk)_x) \cdot L_{n-1}(X)$$

$$id_4(X) = (kaccy(X) - h_y) \cdot L_0(X) + (kaccy(X) - (h \oplus apk)_y) \cdot L_{n-1}(X)$$

$$id_5(X) = b(X)(1 - b(X)).$$

Note that polynomial identity $id_3(X)$ is not needed for defining ranged polynomial protocols for $R_{ba}^{incl}$, however it is included here to ease presentation and for proofs consistency for the ranged polynomial protocols in the following two sections.

$H$-ranged Polynomial Protocol for Conditional Packed Accountable Relation $R_{ba}^{incl}$
In the following, we describe $H$-ranged polynomial protocol $P_{ba}$ for conditional relation $R_{ba}^{incl}$. Protocol $P_{ba}$ describes the interaction of three parties, the prover $P_{poly}$, the verifier $V_{poly}$ and the trusted third party $I$ in accordance to Definition 20 from section A.

**Protocol $P_{ba}$**

$P_{poly}$ and $V_{poly}$ know public input $\text{bit} \in \mathbb{B}^n$, $pk \in (\mathbb{F}^2)^{n-1}$ and $apk \in \mathbb{F}^2$ which are interpreted as per their respective domains.

1. $V_{poly}$ computes $b(X)$, $pkx(X)$, $pky(X)$.
2. $P_{poly}$ sends polynomials $kaccx(X)$ and $kacy(X)$ to $I$.
3. $V_{poly}$ asks $I$ to check whether the following polynomial relations hold over range $H$

$$id_i(X) = 0, \forall i \in [4].$$

4. $V_{poly}$ accepts if $I$’s checks verify.

We show that protocol $P_{ba}$ is an $H$-ranged polynomial protocol for conditional relation $R_{ba}^{incl}$. For this, we first prove that:

**Claim 6.** Assume that $\forall i < n − 1$ such that $\text{bit}_i = 1, pk_i = (pkx_i, pky_i) \in G_{1, \text{incl}}$. If polynomial identities $id_i(X) = 0, \forall i \in [5]$, hold over range $H$ and the polynomial $b(X)$ has been constructed via interpolation on $H$ such that $b(\omega_i) = \text{bit}_i, \forall i < n$ then $\text{bit}_i \in \mathbb{B} = \{0, 1\} \subset \mathbb{F}, \forall i < n$

$$(kacz_{0}, kacy_{0}) = (h_x, h_y),$$

$$(kacz_{n-1}, kacy_{n-1}) = (h_x, h_y) \oplus (apk_x, apk_y),$$

$$(kacz_{n+1}, kacy_{n+1}) = (kacz_{n}, kacy_{n}) \oplus \text{bit}_i(pkx_{n}, pky_{n}), \forall i < n − 1, \text{where in the last relation bit}_i \text{ should not be interpreted as a field element but as a binary bit.}$$

**Proof.** Everything but the last property in the claim is easy to derive from polynomial identities $id_3(X) = 0, id_4(X) = 0, id_5(X) = 0$ holding over $H$.

In order to prove the remaining property, we remind the incomplete addition formulae for curve points in affine coordinates, over elliptic curve in short Weierstrasse form and state:

**Observation:** Suppose that $\text{bit} \in \{0, 1\}$, $(x_1, y_1)$ is a point on an elliptic curve in short Weierstrasse form, and, if $\text{bit} = 1$, so is $(x_2, y_2)$. We claim that the following equations:

$$\text{bit}(x_1 - x_2)^2(x_1 + x_2 + x_3) - (y_2 - y_1)^2) + (1 - \text{bit})(y_1 - y_3) = 0 \quad (\ast)$$

$$\text{bit}(x_1 - x_2)(y_1 + y_3) - (y_2 - y_1)(x_3 - x_1)) + (1 - \text{bit})(x_3 - x_1) = 0 \quad (\ast\ast)$$

hold if and only if one of the following three conditions hold

1. $\text{bit} = 1$ and $(x_1, y_1) \oplus (x_2, y_2) = (x_3, y_3)$ and $x_1 \neq x_2$
2. $\text{bit} = 0$ and $(x_3, y_3) = (x_1, y_1)$
3. $\text{bit} = 1$ and $(x_1, y_1) = (x_2, y_2)$

It is easy to see that each of the conditions $[1][2][3]$ above implies equations ($\ast$) and ($\ast\ast$). For the implication in the opposite direction, if we assume that ($\ast$) and ($\ast\ast$) hold, then

**Case a:** For $\text{bit} = 0$, the first term of each equation ($\ast$) and ($\ast\ast$) vanishes, leaving us with $y_3 - y_1 = 0$ and $x_3 - x_1 = 0$ which are equivalent to condition $[2]$

**Case b:** For $\text{bit} = 1$ and $x_1 = x_2$, by simple substitution in ($\ast$) and ($\ast\ast$), we obtain $y_1 = y_2$, i.e., condition $[3]$.

\[2\text{Note that under condition }[3](x_3, y_3) \text{ can be any point whatsoever, maybe not even on the curve. The same holds true for } (x_2, y_2) \text{ under the condition }[2].\]
Case c: For $\text{bit} = 1$ and $x_1 \neq x_2$, then we can substitute

$$\beta = \frac{y_2 - y_1}{x_2 - x_1}$$

into equations (*) and (**), leaving us with

$$x_1 + x_2 + x_3 = \beta^2$$

and $y_1 + y_1 = \beta(x_3 - x_1)$.

which are the usual formulae for short Weierstrass form addition of affine coordinate points when $x_1 \neq x_2$ so this is equivalent to condition 4.

We apply the above Observation by noticing that if $id_1(X)$ and $id_2(X)$ hold over $H$, then (*) and (**) hold with $(x_1, y_1)$ substituted by $(kaccx, kaccy)$, $(x_2, y_2)$ substituted by $(pkx, pky)$, $(x_3, y_3)$ substituted by $(kaccx+i, kaccy+i)$ and bit substituted by $bit_i$ for $0 \leq i \leq n-2$, where $bit_i$ should not be interpreted as a field element but as binary bit. Moreover, since $(kaccx0, kaccy0) = (h_x, h_y) \in E_{\text{inn}} \setminus G_{1, \text{inn}}$ and if $(pkx, pky) \in G_{1, \text{inn}}$ whenever $bit_i = 1$, then $\forall i < n-1$ equations (*) and (**) obtained after the substitution defined above are equivalent to either condition 1 or condition 2 but never condition 3 so the result of the sum (i.e., $(kaccx+i, kaccy+i)$, $0 \leq i \leq n-2$) is, by induction, at each step a well-defined point on the curve and this concludes our proof.

**Corollary 7.** Assume $\forall i < n - 1$ such that $bit_i = 1$, $pk_i = (pkx_i, pky_i) \in G_{1, \text{inn}}$. If the polynomial identities $id_i(X) = 0, \forall i \in [4]$, hold over range $H$ and $bit_i \in \mathbb{B}$, $\forall i < n - 1$ and $b(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} bit_i \cdot L_i(X)$ then:

$$(kaccx0, kaccy0) = (h_x, h_y),$$

$$(kaccx_{n-1}, kaccy_{n-1}) = (h_x, h_y) \oplus (apk_x, apk_y),$$

$$(kaccx_i, kaccy_i) = (kaccx_{i+1}, kaccy_{i+1}) \oplus bit_i(pkx_i, pky_i), \forall i < n - 1,$$ where in the last relation bit should not be interpreted as a field element but as a binary bit.

**Proof.** The proof follows trivially from the more general result stated by Claim 6.

**Lemma 8.** $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ba}}$ as described above is an $H$-ranged polynomial protocol for conditional relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{incl}}$.

**Proof.** It is easy to see that perfect completeness holds. Indeed, if $(\text{bit, pk, apk}) \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{incl}}$ holds, meaning that $\text{bit} \in \mathbb{B}^n$ and $pk \in G_{1, \text{inn}}^{n-1}$ and $apk = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} [bit_i] \cdot pk_i$ hold, then it is easy to see that the honest prover $\mathcal{P}_{\text{poly}}$ in $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ba}}$ will convince the honest verifier $\mathcal{V}_{\text{poly}}$ in $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ba}}$ to accept with probability 1. Regarding knowledge-soundness, if the verifier $\mathcal{V}_{\text{poly}}$ in $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ba}}$ accepts, then the extractor $\mathcal{E}$ does not have to do anything as the relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{incl}}$ does not have a witness. However, we have to prove that if $pk \in G_{1, \text{inn}}^{n-1}$ and the verifier in $\mathcal{P}_{\text{ba}}$ accepts, then $(\text{bit, pk, apk}) \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{incl}}$ holds, which given our definition for conditional relation is equivalent to proving that $apk = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} [bit_i] \cdot pk_i$ holds. This is indeed the case due to Corollary 7.

4.2 Packed Accountable Ranged Polynomial Protocol

In the following, we denote by $F_{[\text{block}]}$ the subset of field elements in $F$ that can be represented using at most $\text{block}$ bits, i.e., the set $\{0, \ldots, 2^{\text{block}-1}\}$, where $\text{block}$ has been defined in section 3.7.

Our conditional packed accountable relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{incl}}^{\text{pa}}$ and the corresponding $H$-ranged polynomial protocol $\mathcal{P}_{\text{pa}}$ are defined as follows:

Conditional Packed Accountable Relation $\mathcal{R}_{\text{pa}}^{\text{incl}}$

$$\mathcal{R}_{\text{pa}}^{\text{incl}} = \{(pk) \in (F^2)^{n-1}, b' \in F_{[\text{block}]}^{|\text{block}|}, apk \in F^2, \text{bit} \in \mathbb{B}^n \land b' = \sum_{i=0}^{\text{block}-1} 2^i \cdot \text{bit}_{\text{block}+i}, \forall \text{bit} < \frac{n}{\text{block}}\}$$

where $b' = (b'_0, \ldots, b'_{\frac{n}{\text{block}}-1})$.

We define new polynomials and polynomial identities:
New Polynomials as Computed by Honest Parties

\[ \text{aux}(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{aux}_i \cdot L_i(X) \]
\[ c_a(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} c_{a,i} \cdot L_i(X) \]
\[ \text{acc}_a(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{acc}_{a,i} \cdot L_i(X) \]

where \( \text{aux}_i = 1 \in \mathbb{F} \) if \( i \) is divisible with \( \text{block} \) and \( \text{aux}_i = 0 \in \mathbb{F} \) otherwise, \( \forall i < n \) and \( c_{a,i} = 2^k \cdot r^j \), \( k = i \mod \text{block} \), \( j = i \div \text{block} \), \( \forall i < n \) (\( r \in \mathbb{F} \) is introduced in protocol \( \mathcal{P}_{pa} \)) and \( \text{acc}_{a,i} \) are components of the vector \( (0, \text{bit}_0 \cdot c_{a,0}, \text{bit}_0 \cdot c_{a,0} + \text{bit}_1 \cdot c_{a,1}, \ldots, \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} \text{bit}_i \cdot c_{a,i}) \), where \( \text{bit}_0, \ldots, \text{bit}_{n-1} \) represent the first \( n \) bits (however, we interpret them as elements in \( \mathbb{B} \)) of the concatenation of the binary representation of \( b_0, \ldots, b_{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1} \). Note that with this definition of vector \( (b_0, \ldots, b_{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1}) \), the definition of \( b(X) \) remains the same as in section 4.1.

New Polynomial Identities

\[ \text{id}_0(X) = c_a(\omega \cdot X) - c_a(X) \cdot (2 + (\frac{r}{\text{block}} - 2) \cdot \text{aux}(\omega \cdot X)) - (1 - r \frac{n}{\text{block}}) \cdot L_n(X). \]
\[ \text{id}_1(X) = \text{acc}_a(\omega \cdot X) - \text{acc}_a(X) - b(X) \cdot c_a(X) + \text{sum} \cdot L_{n-1}(X), \]

where \( \text{sum} \) is a field element known to both \( \mathcal{P}_{poly} \) and \( V_{poly} \) and will be defined below.

\( H \)-ranged Polynomial Protocol for Conditional Packed Accountable Relation \( \mathcal{R}_{pa}^{\text{incl}} \)

In the following, we describe \( H \)-ranged polynomial protocol \( \mathcal{P}_{pa} \) for conditional relation \( \mathcal{R}_{pa}^{\text{incl}} \).

Protocol \( \mathcal{P}_{pa} \)

\( \mathcal{P}_{poly} \) and \( V_{poly} \) know public inputs \( b' \in \mathbb{F}^{\frac{n}{\text{block}}} \) and \( \text{pk} \in (\mathbb{F}^2)^{n-1} \) and \( \text{apk} \in \mathbb{F}^2 \) which are interpreted as per their respective domains.

1. \( V_{poly} \) computes \( pkx(X), pky(X) \) and \( \text{aux}(X) \).
2. \( \mathcal{P}_{poly} \) sends polynomials \( b(X), kacx(X) \) and \( kacy(X) \) to \( \mathcal{I} \).
3. \( V_{poly} \) replies with a random value \( r \) chosen from \( \mathbb{F} \).
4. \( V_{poly} \) computes \( \text{sum} \) as \( \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1} b'_j \cdot r^j \).
5. \( \mathcal{P}_{poly} \) sends polynomials \( c_a(X) \) and \( \text{acc}_a(X) \) to \( \mathcal{I} \).
6. \( V_{poly} \) asks \( \mathcal{I} \) to check whether the following polynomial relations hold over range \( H \):

\[ \text{id}_i(X) = 0, \forall i \in [7]. \]

7. \( V_{poly} \) accepts if \( \mathcal{I} \)'s checks verify.

We show that protocol \( \mathcal{P}_{pa} \) is an \( H \)-ranged polynomial protocol for conditional relation \( \mathcal{R}_{pa}^{\text{incl}} \). First, we prove the following:

---

3 As part of a correct public input for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{pa}^{\text{incl}} \), each field element in the set \( \{b'_j, \ldots, b'_{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1}\} \) is at most \( \text{block} \) binary bits long. If any such field element has fewer than \( \text{block} \) bits long, then the honest prover will pad it with 0s starting from the most significant bit up to a total individual length of \( \text{block} \) bits.

4 Note that if \( b'_j = \sum_{k=0}^{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1} 2^k \cdot \text{bit}_{\text{block} \cdot j + k}, \forall j < \frac{n}{\text{block}} \) and \( \text{bit}_i \in \mathbb{B}, \forall i < n \), then \( \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} 2^i \mod \text{block} \cdot r^i \cdot \text{block} \cdot \text{bit}_i = \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1} \sum_{i=0}^{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1} 2^k \cdot \text{bit}_{\text{block} \cdot j + k} \cdot r^i = \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1} b'_j \cdot r^j \).
Claim 9. If the polynomial identities \( id_6(X) = 0, id_7(X) = 0 \) hold over range \( H \), then, e.w.n.p., we have \( c_{a,i} = 2^i \mod \text{block} \cdot r^{i \cdot \text{block}}, \forall i < n \) and \( \text{sum} = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} b_i \cdot c_{a,i} \), where \( b_i = b(a^i), \forall i < n \). If, additionally, identity \( id_5(X) = 0 \) holds over \( H \), \( r \) has been randomly chosen in \( F \), \( \text{sum} = \sum_{j=0}^{\text{block}-1} b_j r^j \) (as computed by \( V_{\text{poly}} \)) and \( bit_i, \in \mathbb{B}, \forall i < n \) and \( b_i = \sum_{k=0}^{\text{block}-1} 2^k \cdot \text{block}^{j+k} \cdot r, \forall j \leq \frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1 \) (due to the input \( (b_0, \ldots, b_\text{block}^{-1}) \) being interpreted by the verifier \( V_{\text{poly}} \), as in \( F_\text{block}^{\text{block}} \)), then e.w.n.p., \( b_i = \text{bit}_i, \forall i < n \).

Proof. To prove the first part of the claim, assume by contradiction that \( c_{a,0} = k \neq 1 \). Then, by induction, since \( id_6(X) = 0 \) on \( H \),

\[
c_{a,i} = k \cdot 2^i \mod \text{block} \cdot r^{i \cdot \text{block}}, \forall 0 < i < n.
\]

Additionally, the property

\[
c_{a,0} = c_{a,n-1} \cdot (2 + (\frac{r}{2^{\text{block}-1}} - 2) \cdot 1) + (1 - r^\text{block}) \tag{1}
\]

holds (again, from \( id_6(X) = 0 \) on \( H \)). However, substituting \( c_{a,0} = k \) and \( c_{a,n-1} = k \cdot 2^\text{block-1} \cdot r^\text{block-1} \) in (1), we obtain

\[
k = k \cdot 2^\text{block-1} \cdot r^\text{block-1} + \frac{r}{2^{\text{block}-1}} \cdot (1 - r^\text{block}) = 1 - r^\text{block}
\]

and, due to Schwartz-Zippel Lemma and the fact that degree \( n \) is negligibly smaller compared to the size of \( F \), this implies e.w.n.p. \( k = 1 \) thus contradiction, so the values \( c_{a,i} \) have indeed the claimed form.

Next, by expanding \( id_7(X) = 0 \) over \( H \), the following holds

\[
\begin{align*}
acc_{a,1} &= acc_{a,0} + b_0 \cdot c_{a,0} \\
acc_{a,2} &= acc_{a,1} + b_1 \cdot c_{a,1} \\
\vdots \\
acc_{a,n-1} &= acc_{a,n-2} + b_{n-2} \cdot c_{a,n-2} \\
acc_{a,0} &= acc_{a,n-1} + b_{n-1} \cdot c_{a,n-1} - \text{sum}.
\end{align*}
\]

By summing together the LHS and, respectively, the RHS of the equalities above and reducing the equal terms, we obtain

\[
\text{sum} = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} b_i \cdot c_{a,i}.
\]

For the second part of the claim, since \( id_5(X) = 0 \) holds over \( H \) then \( b_i = b(a^i) \in \mathbb{B}, \forall i \leq n - 1 \).

Finally, from verifier’s computation and from the first part of the claim we have

\[
\sum_{j=0}^{\frac{n}{\text{block}}} b_j r^j = \text{sum} = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} b_i \cdot c_{a,i} = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} b_i \cdot 2^i \mod \text{block} \cdot r^{i \cdot \text{block}} = \\
\sum_{j=0}^{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1} \text{block} - 1 \cdot (\sum_{k=0}^{\text{block}-1} 2^k \cdot \text{block}^{j+k}) \cdot r^j = \sum_{j=0}^{\frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1} b_j' r^j, \tag{2}
\]

where \( \forall j, b_j' \) are field elements equal to the binary representation that uses contiguous blocks of block components from the bitmask \( (b_0, \ldots, b_{\text{block}-1}) \). Since both the LHS and the RHS of relation (2) represent two ways of computing sum as an inner product of a vector of field elements (on one hand, \( (b_0', \ldots, b_{\text{block}-1}') \), on the other hand, \( (b_0'', \ldots, b_{\text{block}-1}'') \) ) with the vector \( (1, \ldots, r^\frac{n}{\text{block}}-1) \), where \( r \) has been chosen at random, by the small exponents test \([13]\), we obtain that e.w.n.p. \( b_j'' = b_j', \forall 0 \leq j \leq \frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1 \). Finally, if we equate the bit representation in \( F \) (i.e., using field elements from \( \mathbb{B} \)) of field elements \( b_j'' \) and \( b_j', \forall 0 \leq j \leq \frac{n}{\text{block}} - 1 \) and remember that, by verifier’s check or by construction, respectively, each such field element has no more that block binary bits, we can conclude that e.w.n.p. \( b_i = \text{bit}_i, \forall i < n \).

\[
\square
\]

Lemma 10. \( \mathcal{R}_{pa} \) as described above is an \( H \)-ranged polynomial protocol for conditional relation \( \mathcal{R}_{incl}^{incl} \).

Proof. It is easy to see that perfect completeness holds. Indeed, if \( (b', pk, apk, \text{bit}) \in \mathcal{R}_{pa}^{incl} \), meaning that \( pk \in \mathcal{G}_{incl}^{incl} \) and \( \text{bit} \in \mathbb{B}^n \) and \( apk = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} |bit_i| \cdot pk_i \) and \( b_j = \sum_{i=0}^{\text{block}-1} 2^i \cdot \text{block}^{j+i}, \forall j < \frac{n}{\text{block}} \) hold then it is easy to see that the honest prover \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{poly}} \) in \( \mathcal{R}_{pa} \) will convince the honest verifier \( V_{\text{poly}} \) in \( \mathcal{R}_{pa} \) to accept with probability 1.
Regarding knowledge-soundness, if the verifier \( V_{poly} \) in \( \mathcal{P}_{pa} \) accepts, then the extractor \( \mathcal{E} \) sets \((bit_0, \ldots, bit_{n-1})\) as the vector of evaluations over \( H \) of polynomial \( b(X) \) sent by \( \mathcal{P}_{poly} \) to \( \mathcal{I} \). Next, we prove that if \((pk_0, \ldots, pk_{n-2}) \in G_{1, inn}^{n-1} \) and the verifier in \( \mathcal{P}_{pa} \) accepts, then

\[
((b'_0, \ldots, b'_{n-1}), (pk_0, \ldots, pk_{n-2}), apk, (bit_0, \ldots, bit_{n-1})) \in \mathcal{R}_{pa}^{incl},
\]

which is equivalent to proving that \( apk = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} [bit_i] \cdot pk_i \) and \( bit \in \mathbb{B}^n \) and

\[
b'_j = \sum_{i=0}^{\text{block} - 1} 2^i \cdot bit_{\text{block}+j}, \forall j < \frac{n}{\text{block}}.
\]

According to Claim[9] and Corollary[7] this indeed holds e.w.n.p. \( \square \)

### 4.3 Counting Ranged Polynomial Protocol

In the following relation, \( apk \) is the aggregated public key of at least \( s \) and at most \( s + 1 \) public keys. Hence we interpret \( s \) as a threshold on the number of public keys included in the aggregated public key. Since \( bit_{n-1} \) as the last component of the bitmask witness does not correspond to any public key and we have to account for the fact that \( bit_{n-1} \) may be \( 1 \in \mathbb{F} \), relation \( \mathcal{R}_{c}^{incl} \) includes the off-by-one constraint \( \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} bit_i = s + 1 \).

**Conditional Counting Relation \( \mathcal{R}_{c}^{incl} \)**

\[
\mathcal{R}_{c}^{incl} = \{ (pk \in (\mathbb{F}^2)^{n-1}, s \in \mathbb{F}, apk \in \mathbb{F}^2, bit) : apk = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} [bit_i] \cdot pk_i \mid pk \in G_{1, inn}^{n-1} \wedge \]

\[\wedge \ bit \in \mathbb{B}^n \wedge \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} bit_i = s + 1 \}
\]

The new polynomials and polynomial identities required in this section are:

**New Polynomial as Computed by Honest Parties**

\[
acc_{crt}(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} acc_{crt,i} \cdot L_i(X),
\]

where \( acc_{crt,i} \) are the components of the vector \((0, bit_0, bit_0 + bit_1, \ldots, \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} bit_i), \forall i < n \).

**New Polynomial Identities**

\[
id_s(X) = acc_{crt}(\omega \cdot X) - acc_{crt}(X) - b(X) + (s + 1) \cdot L_{n-1}(X),
\]

**\( H \)-ranged Polynomial Protocol for Conditional Counting Relation \( \mathcal{R}_{c}^{incl} \)**

**Protocol \( \mathcal{P}_c \)**

\( \mathcal{P}_{poly} \) and \( V_{poly} \) know public input \( s \in \mathbb{F}^2 \), \( pk \in (\mathbb{F}^2)^{n-1} \) and \( apk \in \mathbb{F}^2 \) which are interpreted as per their respective domains.

1. \( V_{poly} \) computes \( pkx(X), pky(X) \).
2. \( \mathcal{P}_{poly} \) sends polynomials \( b(X), kacx(X), kacx(Y), acc_{crt}(X) \) to \( \mathcal{I} \).
3. \( V_{poly} \) asks \( \mathcal{I} \) to check whether the following polynomial relations hold over range \( H \):

\[
id_s(X) = 0, \forall i \in [5] \text{ and } id_s(X) = 0.
\]

4. \( V_{poly} \) accepts if all of \( \mathcal{I} \)'s checks verify.

We show that protocol \( \mathcal{P}_c \) is an \( H \)-ranged polynomial protocol for conditional relation \( \mathcal{R}_{c}^{incl} \).
Lemma 11. \( \mathcal{P}_c \) as described above is an \( H \)-ranged polynomial protocol for conditional relation \( \mathcal{R}^{incl}_c \).

Proof. It is easy to see that perfect completeness holds. Indeed, if \( (\text{bit}, pk, apk) \in \mathcal{R}^{incl}_c \) holds, meaning that \( \text{bit} \in \mathbb{B}^n \) and \( pk \in \mathcal{G}_{1, \text{incl}}^{r-1} \) and \( apk = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} [\text{bit}_i] \cdot pk_i \) and \( \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{bit}_i = s + 1 \) hold, then it is easy to see that the honest prover \( \mathcal{P}_\text{pol} \) in \( \mathcal{P}_c \) will convince the honest verifier \( \mathcal{V}_\text{pol} \) in \( \mathcal{P}_c \) to accept with probability 1.

Regarding knowledge-soundness, if the verifier \( \mathcal{V}_\text{pol} \) in \( \mathcal{P}_c \) accepts, then we construct the extractor \( \mathcal{E} \) in the following way. Using the polynomial \( b(X) \) which was part of the messages from \( \mathcal{P}_\text{pol} \) to \( \mathcal{I} \) and evaluating it at the elements of the set \( H \), \( \mathcal{E} \) obtains evaluation vector \( \text{bit} = (b(1), \ldots, b(n^{a-1})) \) which, in the following, we denote as \( (\text{bit}_0, \ldots, \text{bit}_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{F}^n \).

Next, we show that if \( (pk_0, \ldots, pk_{n-1}) \in \mathcal{G}_{1, \text{incl}}^{r-1} \) holds and the verifier in \( \mathcal{P}_c \) accepts, then

\[
((pk_0, \ldots, pk_{n-1}), s, apk, (\text{bit}_0, \ldots, \text{bit}_{n-1})) \in \mathcal{R}^{incl}_c,
\]

which is equivalent to proving that \( apk = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} [\text{bit}_i] \cdot pk_i \) and \( \text{bit} \in \mathbb{B}^n \) and \( \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{bit}_i = s + 1 \). First, since \( id_b(X) = 0 \) holds over \( H \), we can expand that as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
acc_{\text{bit},1} &= acc_{\text{bit},0} + \text{bit}_0 \\
acc_{\text{bit},2} &= acc_{\text{bit},1} + \text{bit}_1 \\
acc_{\text{bit},3} &= acc_{\text{bit},2} + \text{bit}_2 \\
&
\vdots \\
acc_{\text{bit},n-1} &= acc_{\text{bit},n-2} + \text{bit}_{n-2} \\
acc_{\text{bit},0} &= acc_{\text{bit},1} + \text{bit}_{n-1} - (s + 1).
\end{align*}
\]

By summing together the LHS and, respectively, the RHS of the equalities above and reducing the equal terms, we obtain \( s + 1 = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{bit}_i \).

Second, since it holds over \( H \) that \( id_b(X) = 0 \), \( \forall i \in [5] \) and \( b(\omega^i) = \text{bit}_i, \forall i < n \) (by the definition of \( \mathcal{E} \)), the properties concluded in Claim 6 hold. Combining the two proof steps above, we obtain the desired conclusion.

4.4 Two-Steps PLONK-Based Compiler for Hybrid Model SNARKs with Mixed Inputs

In the following we present a two-steps PLONK-based compilation technique from ranged polynomial protocols for conditional NP relations (formal definition in appendix A) to hybrid model SNARKs as per definition 5 such that the conditional NP relations that define the SNARKs we compile in the second step contain both (polynomial) commitments and vectors of field elements as public inputs.

For completeness and as an example, in appendix B we give the full rolled-out hybrid model SNARK protocol \( \mathcal{P}_c^{\text{ba}} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{incl}}^{\text{ba,com}} \), where we define \( \mathcal{P}_c^{\text{ba}} \) and \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{incl}}^{\text{ba,com}} \) in Step 2 of our compiler below. By using just the first step of our compiler which is equivalent (modulo some more clarifications necessary for our use cases) to the original PLONK compiler, one would not be able to obtain SNARKs with mixed public inputs consisting of both vectors of field elements and also (polynomial) commitments. In turn, this type of NP relations with mixed inputs is crucial for designing and proving the security of our accountable light clients in section 5.

Step 1 (PLONK compiler - from polynomial protocols to SNARKs):

Our first step applies the PLONK compiler \[10\]. More precisely, we compile the information theoretical ranged polynomial protocols \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{ba}}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{pa}} \) and \( \mathcal{P}_c \) for relations \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{ba}}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{pa}}^{\text{incl}} \) and \( \mathcal{R}_c^{\text{incl}} \) respectively (as defined in sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3) into computationally secure protocols against AGM adversaries. The resulting protocols are, in fact, SNARKs. In order to keep in sync with PLONK notation, we denote the resulting SNARK protocols by \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{ba}}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{pa}}^{\text{incl}} \) and \( \mathcal{P}_c^{\text{incl}} \), respectively. In fact, we can define this compilation step in a general way, for any ranged polynomial protocols for relations (as per definition in appendix A). In order to do that we need:

- The batched version of KZG polynomial commitments \[23\] described in section 3 of PLONK \[10\].

---

\[5\] In fact, one can replace the use of KZG polynomial commitments with any binding polynomial commitment that has knowledge-soundness, including non-homomorphic polynomial commitments, such as FRI-based polynomial commitments.
• A general compilation technique: such a technique has been already defined in lemma 4.7 of PLONK; combined with lemma 4.5 from PLONK this technique can be applied with minor adaptations (this includes the corresponding technical measures) to the notion of ranged polynomial protocols as defined in appendix A.

• So far, both the ranged polynomial protocols for relations and the protocols resulted after the first compilation step have been explicitly defined as interactive protocols. In order to obtain the non-interactive version of the latter (essentially the N in SNARK) one has to apply the Fiat-Shamir transform [47], [48], [49].

Let $\mathcal{R}$ be a (conditional) NP relation, let $\mathcal{P}_\mathcal{R}$ be a ranged polynomial protocol for relation $\mathcal{R}$ and let $\mathcal{P}_\mathcal{R}^*$ be the SNARK compiled from $\mathcal{P}_\mathcal{R}$ using the PLONK compiler (as summarised above). Going into more detail, the above compilation technique requires the SNARK prover of $\mathcal{P}_\mathcal{R}^*$ to compute polynomial commitments to all polynomials that the prover $\mathcal{P}_\text{poly}$ in $\mathcal{P}_\mathcal{R}$ sent to the ideal party $I$. Analogously, it requires the SNARK verifier of $\mathcal{P}_\mathcal{R}^*$ to compute polynomial commitments to all pre-processed polynomials as well polynomial commitments to polynomials the verifier $\mathcal{V}_\text{poly}$ in $\mathcal{P}_\mathcal{R}$ sent to the ideal party $I$. Then, the SNARK prover sends the SNARK verifier openings to all the polynomial commitments computed by him as well as the polynomial commitments computed by the SNARK verifier. The SNARK prover additionally sends the corresponding batched proofs for polynomial commitment openings. In turn, the SNARK verifier accepts or rejects based on the result of the verification of the batched polynomial commitment scheme.

A more efficient compilation technique exists which reduces the number of polynomial commitments and alleged polynomial commitments openings (i.e., both group elements and field elements) sent by the SNARK prover to the SNARK verifier; this, in turn, reduces the size of the SNARK proof. This technique is called linearisation and is described, at a high level, after Lemma 4.7 in PLONK. The existing description however covers only the SNARK prover side and it does not detail the SNARK verifier side so in the following we cover that.

By functionality, the vectors that are handled by the the verifier $\mathcal{V}_\text{poly}$ are of two types: pre-processed vectors and public input vectors. These two types of vectors are used by $\mathcal{V}_\text{poly}$ to obtain, via interpolation over the range on which the respective range polynomial protocol is defined, pre-processed polynomials (as used in the definition 25, e.g., polynomial $\text{aux}(X)$ used in section 4.2 and public-inputs-derived polynomials (e.g., polynomials $pkx(X)$ and $pky(X)$ used in sections 4.1, 4.2, 4.3 and polynomial $b(X)$ used in section 4.1). The efficient linearisation technique allows the SNARK verifier to reduce the number of polynomial commitments it has to compute compared to the general PLONK compiler in the following way. Instead of having to compute polynomial commitments to all polynomials $\mathcal{V}_\text{poly}$ sends to $I$ (including any corresponding pre-processed polynomials), the SNARK verifier computes polynomial evaluations at one or multiple random points (as per the linearisation step specific requirements) for all the polynomials that are either easy to evaluate (e.g., polynomial $\text{aux}(X)$ used in section 4.2) or all the polynomials that are obtained from vectors that do not take up a large amount of memory (e.g., polynomial $b(X)$ used in section 4.1). For the rest of the polynomials (e.g., $pkx(X)$ and $pky(X)$), the SNARK verifier computes polynomial commitments as before.

We note we can apply all the techniques mentioned above, including the combined prover-and-verifier-side linearisation to compile our three ranged polynomial protocols $\mathcal{P}_{ba}$, $\mathcal{P}_{pa}$ and $\mathcal{P}_c$ into the corresponding SNARKs $\mathcal{P}_{ba}^*$, $\mathcal{P}_{pa}^*$ and $\mathcal{P}_c^*$, respectively. To conclude this step, we formally state in appendix A, lemma 26 under which condition and how efficiently one can compile ranged polynomial protocols for conditional NP relations (where the public inputs are interpreted as vector of field elements) into hybrid model SNARKs by using only the original PLONK compiler.

Step 2 (Mixed Vector and Commitments as Input for NP Relations and Associated SNARKs):

(e.g., RedShift [45]). If the optimisation gained from PLONK linearisation technique is a goal, then, with minimal changes one can use any homomorphic polynomial commitment, e.g., the discrete logarithm based polynomial commitment from Halo [46].

This is a one-time computation that is reused by the SNARK verifier for all SNARK proofs over the same circuit.
The type of NP relations we have worked with so far as well as the more general PLONK NP relation ([10], section 8.2), do not have the result of cryptographic operations as part of their public input but rather the public inputs are interpreted by honest parties as vectors of field elements. In the following, we show that the SNARKs we have compiled using Step 1 can become, under certain trust assumption, SNARKs for an additional type of NP relation that specifically contains polynomial commitments as part of the input. As detailed in section 5, interpreting our already compiled SNARKs as SNARKs for this additional type of NP relation is essential for modelling and achieving the security properties for our accountable light client systems.

In order to define Step 2 of our compiler, we need first to introduce some notation. To start with, for our accountable light client systems.

For this additional type of NP relation is essential for modelling and achieving the security properties for our accountable light client systems.

Let us denote by $P$ the type of NP relations we have worked with so far as well as the more general PLONK NP relation.

Let us also define the relation:

\[ R_{vec}^c = \{(input_1 \in D_1, input_2 \in D_2; witness_1): p_1(input_1, input_2, witness_1) = 1 \mid c(input_1) = 1 \land p_2(input_1, input_2, witness_1) = 1\}, \]

where $input_1$ is a set of public input vectors that should be parsed (but not checked) by the honest parties as belonging to some domain $D_1$. Analogously, for the set of public input vectors $input_2$ and their respective domain $D_2$. Finally, $witness_1$ is a set of witness vectors and $c$ and $p_1$ and $p_2$ are predicates. Let $P_{vec}$ be a ranged polynomial protocol for relation $R_{vec}^c$. Note that since the condition predicate $c$ applies only to a part of the public input for relation $R_{vec}^c$ (i.e., $input_1$), we can apply lemma 26 and Step 1 of our compiler to polynomial protocol $P_{vec}$.

Next, we make the following assumptions which we call hybrid model assumptions:

- (HMA.1.) The verifier $V_{poly}$ in $P_{vec}$ computes polynomials $Q_1,input_1(X), \ldots, Q_m,input_1(X)$ which depend deterministically on $input_1$ and sends them to $I$.

- (HMA.2.) The verifier $V_{poly}$ in $P_{vec}$ does not use $input_1$ in any further computation of any other polynomials or values its sends to $I$.

- (HMA.3.) By evaluating $Q_1,input_1(X), \ldots, Q_m,input_1(X)$ over the range on which the ranged polynomial protocol $P_{vec}$ is defined one obtains (using some efficiently computable and deterministic transformations) the set of vectors $input_1$.

Let us denote by $P_{vec}^*$ the hybrid model SNARK obtained after compiling $P_{vec}$ using Step 1 of our compiler. Due to assumption (HMA.1.) and according to Step 1 of our compiler, the SNARK verifier in $P_{vec}$ computes

\[ Com_1 = Com(Q_1,input_1), \ldots, Com_m = Com(Q_m,input_1) \]

which are KZG polynomial commitments to $Q_1,input_1(X), \ldots, Q_m,input_1(X)$. For brevity, we denote the vector $(Com_1, \ldots, Com_m)$ by $Com(input_1)$ and we denote by $C$ the set of all KZG polynomial commitments or vectors of such polynomial commitments.

Let us also define the relation:

\[ R_{vec,\text{com}} = \{C \in C; input_2 \in D_2; witness_1, witness_2): p_1(witness_2, input_2, witness_1) = 1 \mid c(witness_2) = 1 \land p_2(witness_2, input_2, witness_1) = 1 \land C = Com(witness_2)\} \]

Let us finally define the algorithm $SNARK.PartInput$ for some $srs$, $state_1 \supseteq witness_2$ and $R = R_{vec,\text{com}}$ as follows:
SNARK.PartInput(srs, state₁ ⊇ input₁, \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c \))

If \( c(input₁) = 0 \)

Return

Else

Compute via interpolation on the range for \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec}} \) polynomials \( Q_{1,\text{input₁}}(X), \ldots, Q_{m,\text{input₁}}(X) \).

\( C = \{ \text{Com}(Q_{1,\text{input₁}}(X)), \ldots, \text{Com}(Q_{m,\text{input₁}}(X)) \} \)

\( \text{state₂} = \text{state₁} \cup \{ C \} \)

Return(state₂, C)

With the above notation, our compiler’s Step 2 is:

The alleged hybrid model SNARK \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}} \) is defined as:

- \( \text{SNARK.Setup} \) and \( \text{SNARK.KeyGen} \) are the same as for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec}} \).
- The algorithm \( \text{SNARK.PartInput} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec}} \) (see lemma 26 in appendix A) is replaced with \( \text{SNARK.PartInput} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c \) as described above.
- The algorithm \( \text{SNARK.Prover} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c \) is identical with the algorithm \( \text{SNARK.Prover} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec}}^c \) (as compiled using Step 1) with the appropriate re-interpretation of the public inputs and witness.
- The algorithm \( \text{SNARK.Verifier} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c \) is identical with the algorithm \( \text{SNARK.Verifier} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec}}^c \) (as compiled using Step 1) with the appropriate re-interpretation of the public inputs and such that \( \text{SNARK.Verifier} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}} \) does not compute the polynomial commitments to the polynomials defined by the assumption (HMA.1.).

Lemma 12. Let \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}} \) be a ranged polynomial protocol for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec}}^c \) defined above and let \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}} \) be the hybrid model SNARK for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec}} \) secure in the AGM obtained by compiling \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}} \) using our compiler’s Step 1. If the hybrid model assumptions (HMA.1.) - (HMA.3.) hold w.r.t. protocol \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}} \) and \( \text{State}_{\text{vec,com}} \neq \emptyset \) then \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}} \) as compiled using our compiler’s Step 2 is a hybrid model SNARK for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}} \) secure also in the AGM.

Proof. Let \( E_{\text{KZG}} \) and \( E \) be the extractors from the knowledge-soundness definitions for the KZG batch polynomial commitment scheme (as in definition 3.1, section 3 in [10]) and the hybrid model SNARK \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^c \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec}}^c \) (as per definition [5]), respectively. Let \( A \) be an adversary against knowledge soundness in the hybrid model w.r.t. \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^c \) and relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c \) and let auxSNARK \( \in \mathcal{D} \) and let \( \text{state₁} \in \text{State}_{\text{vec,com}} \); let \( (C, \text{state₂}) = \text{SNARK.PartInput}(srs, \text{state₁}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c) \). By the definition of \( \text{SNARK.PartInput} \) for \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^c \) there exists \( \text{input₁} \) such that \( C = \text{Com}(\text{input₁}) \) and \( c(\text{input₁}) = 1 \). We denote by \( (\text{input₂}, \pi) \) the output of \( A(srs, \text{state₂}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c) \) and let \( A₁ \) be the part of \( A \) that sends openings and batched proofs for the polynomial commitments in \( C \).

On the one hand, if the verifier \( \text{SNARK.Verifier}(srs, (C, \text{input₂}), \pi, \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c) \) in \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^c \) accepts, then the KZG verifier corresponding to \( A₁ \) also accepts. When such an event takes place, then, e.w.n.p. \( E_{\text{KZG}} \) extracts polynomials \( Q₁(X), \ldots, Qₘ(X) \) that represent witnesses for the vector \( C \) of commitments and the alleged openings of \( A₁ \). Because the KZG polynomial commitment scheme is binding and by the definition of \( \text{SNARK.PartInput} \) for \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^c \), we obtain that \( Q₁(X) = Q₁(X), \ldots, Qₘ(X) = Qₘ(X) \). Since per (HMA.3.), the set \{ \( Q₁(X), \ldots, Qₘ(X) \) \} evaluates to \( \text{input₁} \) over the range over which \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}} \) was defined, e.w.n.p. the witness polynomials extracted by \( E_{\text{KZG}} \) evaluate to \( \text{input₁} \).

On the other hand, if the verifier \( \text{SNARK.Verifier}(srs, (C, \text{input₂}), \pi, \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c) \) in \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^c \) accepts, then the verifier \( \text{SNARK.Verifier}(srs, \text{input₁}, \text{input₂}, \pi, \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c) \) in \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^c \) also accepts. In turn, this acceptance together with the fact that \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}} \) has knowledge-soundness as per definition [5] it implies the extractor \( E \) e.w.n.p. extracts \( \text{witness₁} \) such that

\[
(\text{input₁}, \text{input₂}, \text{witness₁}) \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec,com}}^c \quad (o).
\]

By the definition of \( \text{SNARK.PartInput} \) for \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^c \) and the way \( \text{input₁} \) was defined, it holds that \( c(\text{input₁}) = 1 \). Due to \( (o) \) and by the definition of relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec}} \), the predicates: \( p₁(\text{input₁}, \text{input₂}, \text{witness₁}) \),
witness_1) = 1 and p_2(input_1, input_2, witness_1) = 1 hold. If we let witness_2 = input_1, then it is clear that

\[ (C = \text{Com}(\text{input}_1), \text{input}_2, \text{witness}_1, \text{input}_1) \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec, com}}^{inc}, \]

so using \( \mathcal{E}_{K_{2G}} \) and \( \mathcal{E} \) we can build an extractor for any knowledge-soundness adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) for alleged hybrid model SNARK \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}} \) for relation \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec, com}} \), which concludes the proof.

To conclude this step and the detailed compiler presentation we note that it is straightforward to apply the technique described above to our SNARKs \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^{a}, \mathcal{P}_{\text{vec}}^{b} \) and \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{c}}^{b} \) compiled in Step 2 and obtain relations \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{ba, com}}^{inc}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{pa, com}}^{inc} \) and \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec, com}}^{inc} \) that fulfill lemma/2. For completeness, we include these three conditional NP relations below. We remind the reader that these NP relations depend on \( \lambda \), but, for brevity, we have omitted it from the following definitions.

\[
\mathcal{R}_{\text{ba, com}}^{inc} = \{(C \in \mathcal{C}, \text{bit} \in \mathbb{B}^n, \text{apk} \in \mathbb{F}^2; \text{pk}) : \text{apk} = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} [\text{bit}_i] \cdot \text{pk}_i \mid \text{pk} \in \mathbb{G}^{n-1}_{1, \text{inn}} \land C = \text{Com}(\text{pk}) \land \text{bit} \in \mathbb{B}^n \land b'_j = \sum_{i=0}^{\text{black} - 1} 2^i \cdot \text{bit}_{\text{block} \cdot j + i}, \forall j < \text{block} \land C = \text{Com}(\text{pk}) \}
\]

\[
\mathcal{R}_{\text{pa, com}}^{inc} = \{(C \in \mathcal{C}, s \in \mathbb{F}^2, \text{apk} \in \mathbb{F}^2; \text{pk}, \text{bit}) : \text{apk} = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} [\text{bit}_i] \cdot \text{pk}_i \mid \text{pk} \in \mathbb{G}^{n-1}_{1, \text{inn}} \land C = \text{Com}(\text{pk}) \land \text{bit} \in \mathbb{B}^n \land \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{bit}_i = s + 1 \land C = \text{Com}(\text{pk}) \}
\]

4.5 Comparison between PLONK and our SNARKs

In the following, we briefly look at the differences between PLONK universal SNARK and the SNARKs designed in this work. We observe that while the NP relation that defines PLONK is more general, the relations that define our SNARKs are bespoke as we are only interested in efficiently proving public key aggregation. Because our relations are so bespoke, it turns out we do not require the full functionality that PLONK has to offer, and, in particular, our SNARKs do not require any permutation argument.

A second difference is that while PLONK’s circuit is defined by a number of selector polynomials (which are a type of pre-processed polynomials) and a PLONK verifier needs to perform a one-time expensive computation of the polynomial commitments to those selector polynomials, our SNARK verifiers are able to avoid such a pre-processing phase. Indeed, in the case of \( \mathcal{P}_{\text{c}}^{b} \) (which is the only one of our three SNARKs that has a polynomial, namely \( \text{aux}(X) \), that defines its circuit), our respective SNARK verifier does not need to compute a commitment to its only “selector polynomial” as, due to its structure, \( \text{aux}(X) \) can be directly and efficiently evaluated by our SNARK verifier itself.

A third difference is that using our two-steps compiler, our SNARKs verifiers are able to efficiently handle input vectors of length \( O(n) \), where the degree of the polynomials committed to by our SNARK provers is also \( O(n) \). Our SNARKs verifiers achieve efficiency by offloading the expensive polynomial commitment computation involving the public inputs to a trusted third party.

Moreover, while PLONK does not incorporate trusted inputs, one can easily apply the Step 2 of our compiler to PLONK. In particular, one could imagine a situation where a PLONK verifier is relying on a trusted party to compute some or all of the polynomial commitments to the circuit’s selector polynomials. This is equivalent to our hybrid model SNARK definition applied to PLONK. The benefit is that by delegating such a computation, the PLONK verifier becomes more efficient.

\footnote{Note that due to our specific application and the proof-of-stake blockchain context in which we make use of our custom SNARKs, the assumption/requirement that \text{State}_{\mathcal{R}_{\text{vec, com}} \neq \emptyset} \text{ for } \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec, com}} \in \{ \mathcal{R}_{\text{ba, com}}^{inc}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{pa, com}}^{inc}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{vec, com}}^{inc} \} is fulfilled.}
Finally, looking ahead at our light client system instantiation in section 5.3, due to the inductive structure of the soundness proof (theorem 2), the efficiency of using a hybrid model SNARK has an even greater impact for the light client system verifier than that compared to verifying multiple instances of PLONK for the same circuit: while for the latter the PLONK verifier has to compute commitments to selector polynomial only once anyway, in the case of the former, the commitments to public inputs may differ at very step hence a trusted third party relieves a higher computation burden from the light client verifier overall.

4.6 An Instantiation for Committee Key Scheme for Aggregatable Signatures

Given the SNARKs compiler described in section 4.4 and its application to the conditional NP relations mentioned at the end of that section, we are ready to present an instantiation for committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures (see section 3.3 for the definition of this notion) as used in this work (i.e. in section 4.4). We instantiate $u$ and $v$ introduced in section 3.3 as follows: let $u = n - 1$, where $n$ was defined in section 3.7 and we let $v \in \mathbb{N}$, $n - 1 \leq v$, $v = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, where by $v$ we denote the maximum number of validators that the scheme allows.

**Instantiation 13. (Committee Key Scheme for Aggregatable Signatures)** In our implementation we call committee key scheme for aggregatable signatures the following instantiation of definition 3 where $\mathcal{R} \in \{\mathcal{R}_{\text{ba,com}}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{pa,com}}\}$ as defined in the end of section 4.4:

- $\text{CKS}_R.\text{Setup}(v)$ calls the following algorithms
  \[ (G_{1,\text{inn}}, g_{1,\text{inn}}, G_{2,\text{inn}}, g_{2,\text{inn}}, G_{T,\text{inn}}, g_{T,\text{inn}}, H_{\text{inn}}, H_{\text{pol}}) \leftarrow \text{AS.\text{Setup}}(\text{aux}_{\text{AS}} = v + 1) \]
  which is part of instantiation 2 with the additional specification that $\text{aux}_{\text{AS}} = v + 1$ and using the notation detailed in section 3.2.1.
  \[ srs = ([1]_{1,\text{out}}, [\tau]_{1,\text{out}}, [\tau^2]_{1,\text{out}}, \ldots, [\tau^{3v}]_{1,\text{out}}, [1]_{2,\text{out}}, [\tau]_{2,\text{out}}) \leftarrow \text{SNARK.\text{Setup}}(\text{aux}_{\text{SNARK}} = (v, 3e)), \]
  \[ (rs, rs_k) = \]
  \[ = ([1]_{1,\text{out}}, [\tau]_{1,\text{out}}, [\tau^2]_{1,\text{out}}, \ldots, [\tau^{3v}]_{1,\text{out}}, ([1]_{1,\text{out}}, [1]_{2,\text{out}}, [\tau]_{2,\text{out}}) \leftarrow \text{SNARK.\text{KeyGen}}(srs, \mathcal{R}) \]
  \[ \text{ck} = ([pk]_{1,\text{out}}, [pky]_{1,\text{out}}) \leftarrow \text{CKS}_R.\text{GenerateCommitteeKey}(rs, (pk)_{i=0}^{n-1}, \text{where}) \]
  \[ \text{pk} = (pk_0, \ldots, pk_{n-1}) \text{ and } \text{pky} = (pky_0, \ldots, pky_{n-1}) \text{ such that } \forall i \in \{1, \ldots, n - 1\}, pk_i = (pk_i, pky_i) \in \mathbb{F}^2 \text{ and the polynomials } pk(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} pk_i X \cdot L_i(X) \text{ and } pky(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} pky_i X \cdot L_i(X) \text{ and, finally, } [pk]_{1,\text{out}} = pk(\tau) \cdot [1]_{1,\text{out}} \text{ and } [pky]_{1,\text{out}} = pky(\tau) \cdot [1]_{1,\text{out}}. \]
  Note that $\text{CKS}_R.\text{GenerateCommitteeKey}$ first checks whether $(pk_i)_{i=1}^{n-1} \in G_{1,\text{inn}}(\cdot)$; if that is not the case it outputs ⊥; if (∗) holds, the algorithm $\text{CKS}_R.\text{GenerateCommitteeKey}$ continues with the computations described above.

- $\pi = (\pi_{\text{SNARK}}, \text{apk}) \leftarrow \text{CKS}_R.\text{Prove}(rs, ck, (pk)_{i=0}^{n-1}, (bit)_{i=0}^{n-1})$ where $\text{CKS}_R.\text{Prove}$ calls
  \[ \text{apk} = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} bit_i \cdot pk_i \leftarrow \text{AS.\text{AggregateKeys}}(pp, (pk)_{i=0}^{n-1}, \text{bit}_{i=0}^{n-1}) \text{ as defined in instantiation 2 and} \]
  \[ \pi_{\text{SNARK}} \leftarrow \text{SNARK.\text{Prove}}(rs, x, \mathcal{R}), \text{ for } \mathcal{R} \in \{\mathcal{R}_{\text{ba,com}}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{pa,com}}\} \]
  \[ \times = (ck, \text{bit}_{i=0}^{n-1}, 0, \text{apk}), w = (pk_{i=0}^{n-1}, \mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_{\text{ba,com}} \text{ and} \]
  \[ w = ((pk)_{i=0}^{n-1}, \text{bit}_{i=0}^{n-1}, 0) \text{ for } \mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_{\text{pa,com}}, \text{ where } b' \text{ is the vector of field elements formed from blocks of size } block \text{ of bits from vector } (bit)_{i=0}^{n-1} \mid 0 \text{ and } block \text{ is the highest power of 2 smaller than the size of a field element in } \mathbb{F}. \]

- $0/1 \leftarrow \text{CKS}_R.\text{Verify}(pp, rs, ck, m, \text{asig}, \pi, \text{bitvector}) \text{ parses } \pi \text{ to retrieve } \pi_{\text{SNARK}} \text{ and } \text{apk} \text{ and it calls } AS.\text{Verify}(pp, \text{apk}, m, \text{asig}) \text{ as defined in instantiation 2 and it also calls } \text{SNARK.\text{Verify}}(rs, x, \pi_{\text{SNARK}}, \mathcal{R})$, where $\pi_{\text{SNARK}}, x \text{ and } \mathcal{R}$ are as defined in the paragraph above with only the difference that $(bit)_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{ represents the first } n - 1 \text{ bits of } \text{bitvector} \text{, padded with } 0\text{s, if not sufficiently many exist in } \text{bitvector}; \text{ it outputs } 1 \text{ if both algorithms output } 1 \text{ and it outputs } 0 \text{ otherwise.}$

**Theorem 14.** Given the hybrid model SNARK scheme secure for relation $\mathcal{R} \in \{\mathcal{R}_{\text{ba,com}}, \mathcal{R}_{\text{pa,com}}\}$ as obtained using our two-step compiler in section 4.4 and the aggregatable signature scheme AS as per instantiation 2 (which fulfills definition 1 with the additional specification that $\text{aux}_{\text{AS}} = v + 1$ and choosing $v = n - 1$, if we assume that an efficient adversary (against the soundness of) $\text{CKS}_R$ outputs public keys only from the source group $G_{1,\text{inn}}$, then the committee key scheme $\text{CKS}_R$ as per instantiation 2 is secure with respect to definition 3.

For details of the proof, please see Appendix C.
5 An Accountable Light Client System

In this section, we give a model for the consensus systems that our light client system can be applied to and we define security properties for light client systems, and, in particular accountable light client systems. Moreover, we present generic pseudocode for light client systems and prove that our implementation fulfils the security properties that we associate with this notion.

5.1 Informal Model and context

First, we informally describe our model, then we formalise it in 5.2. There is a consensus system which we assume is a blockchain protocol. We consider consensus systems that make decisions based on signatures from a subset of validators, where the validator set may change periodically. Our model has the following entities:

**Full nodes** - a full node maintains a view of the consensus decisions and stores the current state of the blockchain. A full node obtains both by running the consensus protocol correctly starting from the genesis state of the blockchain.

**Validator** - a validator is a full node which the consensus protocol decides it belongs to a validator set. Once elected, validators take part in the consensus protocol and, in turn, their signatures determine what the consensus decides upon.

**Light Client Verifier** - a light client verifier is a node that does not keep the full state of the blockchain, but rather obtains (ideally short) proofs of parts of the blockchain state they are interested in; light client verifiers do this by being in communication with e.g., full nodes. In the optimistic scenario, where we have no adversary, the light client verifier can connect to a single full node and the full node should be able to convince the light client verifier of anything that the latter in interested in and the consensus system has agreed upon.

**Adversary** The adversary controls a number of full nodes and validators. They are interested in convincing the light client verifier of things that may be in contradiction to what other (honest) nodes see as decided. The adversary, via the parties it controls, can try to double spend on the same blockchain or on another blockchain via a bridge. In the accountable case (which is the one we are interested in), the adversarial parties would like to ensure that if an attack is discovered, the honest validators and not the adversarial ones are to be blamed and punished. In the pessimistic scenario, a light client verifier may only be connected to the adversary. In this scenario, we also assume that all full nodes, including honest validators are only connected to the adversary.

**Validator Sets** As briefly mentioned above, the consensus protocol decides which entities are validators; the validators, in turn, agree on the consensus. The consensus protocol designates the next validator set which, in turn, is represented by the set of the corresponding entities’ public keys.

5.1.1 Informal Security properties

We next informally describe the security properties that our light client system should satisfy.

**Completeness**: If a full node sees that some fact was decided by the consensus, they can produce a proof that would convince a light client verifier of this fact.

**Soundness**: If, from some honest full nodes point of view, at least 1/3 of the validators in the validator set at any time are honest, then the light client verifier cannot be convinced of something incompatible with something the honest full node saw as decided.

For short, completeness and soundness mean, respectively, that in the optimistic scenario, a full node can always convince a light client verifier of some fact it sees as decided, and, in the pessimistic scenario, the adversary cannot convince the light client verifier of something that was not decided. Please note the a crucial part of the overall security model for the above two security definitions is that at any one point there are enough (e.g. a majority of) honest participants during consensus. Let us call
this property \((\ast)\).

If we relax property \((\ast)\) which may not hold at all times, we require two security properties based on accountability. Accountability means that if a light client verifier was convinced of an incorrect statement (in relation to what has been decided on the blockchain so far), then one can detect the misbehaving validators that contributed to that. We can separate this into two properties:

**Accountability Completeness**: If the light client verifier is convinced via a wrong proof of something which is incompatible with something a full node sees as decided, and then the light client verifier forwards the wrong proof to the full node, that full node can detect that some validators misbehaved.

**Accountability Soundness**: If a full node is given a light client proof of something that is incompatible with something it sees as decided, then, when the full node detects that some validators misbehaved, indeed none of those validators are honest.

### 5.1.2 Consensus system model

**Messages** For a full node to prove to a light client verifier that something has been decided, in the end it will prove that a message was signed by a quorum of validators from some validator set. Typically this message will not directly include the information the full node wants to convince the light client that it has been decided (during consensus), but the message will be a commitment to that information; hence, the full node can also include an opening of this commitment.

Our formal model will not mention blockchains, but it is useful to remember that in blockchain based consensus systems, often the message is a blockhash, which is a binding commitment to multiple types of data:

1. the block header
2. all previous block headers, through parent hashes in block headers
3. the blocks themselves (whose hash is in the header)

We define the **required data** of a message to be the data that the message is a binding commitment to and which all full nodes should know. We assume that if a full node sees a message as decided, it must have the corresponding required data. The required data of messages can overlap among each other and the full node would not need to store them separately, e.g. two block hashes for blocks in the same chain may have required data that overlap for a prefix of blocks in the chain, which may be many gigabytes of data.

**Consensus decisions, validator sets, epochs and consensus views** A message is decided if sufficient signatures corresponding to validators in the current validator set sign it. However the validator set may change.

We define an **epoch** as a period of time in which the validator set cannot change. During each epoch, the consensus determines the validator set for the next epoch.

We assume that the validator set size is bounded by some known constant \(v\). Some threshold \(t\) of validators are required to sign a message such that it is considered decided. \(t\) may be a function of the size of the validator set of a given epoch, e.g. more than \(2/3\) of the validators. We assume that the message itself indicates what epoch it belongs to, and only signatures from validators chosen for that epoch count for whether a message has been decided or not.

Each full node maintains a consensus view, i.e., its view of the protocol. The consensus view records the view of the validator set for each epoch, the messages that have been decided and the signatures on those messages. It also includes the required data for each decided message.

A well-defined function of the consensus view defines its validity. Full nodes should maintain only a valid consensus view, and must not include in their consensus view messages that would make the respective view invalid.
Incompatible Messages There are some pairs of decisions that a consensus protocol cannot decide together without breaking validity. If the protocol ensures that honest validators do not sign messages corresponding to both decisions, then we can make signing such pairs of messages punishable.

Unfortunately the messages themselves need not be enough to judge their incompatibility. For example we would not want two block hashes to be decided if one is for a block of height 100 and the other is for a block of height 101, and the block of height 100 was not the parent of the block of height 101. However, if incompatibility is a function of the required data of one or both messages, then, because messages are binding commitments to their required data, this is still unambiguous for a pair of messages.

5.1.3 Network Model

When we need to assume a network model, the one we use is that all parties communicate only to the adversary, who may forward messages from one party to another when the adversary wants or not at all. Both our assumptions and our soundness and accountability soundness security definitions assume this networking model.

The proof of our security properties works in general for asynchronously safe protocols. These have a number of safety properties which hold with asynchronous networking. Asynchronous networking means that the adversary decides when a message is delivered but must deliver all messages eventually. For safety properties, those which have a statement that holds always or never, this is equivalent to our network model.

5.2 A Formal Model for Consensus-based Accountable Light Client Design

We need the following fundamental notions:

- some number $k$ of epochs with ids $1, \ldots, k$;
- for each epoch id $i$, $1 \leq i \leq k$, the validators on the blockchain may agree on a subset of the set of possible consensus messages $M_i$;
- associated with each consensus message $m$ there may exist some required data $d_m \in D$ for some set $D$; when such a $d_m$ exists, $m$ is a binding commitment to $d_m$;
- a secure aggregatable signature scheme $AS$ as defined in section 3.2.

Building on the above notions, we also define a valid consensus view.

**Definition 15.** (Consensus view) A consensus view $C$ for a set of epochs with ids $i$, $\forall i \in [k]$, for some $k$, contains for each epoch id $i$:

- a set $PK_i$ of public keys (we may also consider a list of public keys and weights, e.g. proportional to stake, but we focus here on the equal weight case for simplicity);
- a set $\{(m, \text{Signers}, \sigma) \mid m \in M_i, \text{Signers} \subseteq PK_i\}$ where $\sigma$ is a signature (or an aggregatable signature) on $m$ and the public key(s) of the signer(s) are Signers.
- some required data $d_m$ associated with each message $m$, such that $m$ is a binding commitment to $d_m$. Note that some required data associated with different messages may overlap.

In addition to the components mentioned above, a consensus view $C$ contains also a genesis state $\text{genstate}$; as a concrete example, $\text{genstate}$ may contain the set of public keys $PK_1$ for the first epoch and their proofs of possession. For each of the notions contained in some epoch of $C$ as well as for $\text{genstate}$, we say they belong to $C$ and we simply denote that by "$\in C$".

In the following, we assume that all algorithms processing messages use a common efficient representation that implicitly includes for each of them an epoch id; this epoch id is retrieved using a function $\text{epoch id}$.

**Definition 16.** (Deciding a consensus message) Given a consensus view $C$, we say a message $m \in M_i$ is decided in $C$ if $C$ contains valid signatures from at least some threshold $t$ (e.g., more than $2/3$) signers corresponding to public keys in $PK_i$, or, equivalently, a valid aggregatable signature of $t$ signers over $m$. Additionally, we denote by $(m, d_m) \in \text{decided} C$ the fact that $m \in C$, $\exists d_m \in C \cap D$, $d_m$ is the associated required data of $m$ and $m$ has been decided in $C$. 
Definition 17. (Valid consensus view) We assume the following three functions used for validation are efficiently computable and they are defined as:

- VerifyData : \( \bigcup_{m=1}^{n} M_i \times D \to \{0, 1\} \) such that it checks the validity of \( m \) given the required data \( d_m \);
- HistoricVerifyData : \( \{\text{genstate}\} \times \big( \bigcup_{m=1}^{n} M_i \times D \big)^n \times \big( \bigcup_{k=1}^{q} PK_i \big)^q \to \{0, 1\} \) such that it checks the validity of genstate, some set of \( n \) consensus messages and their required data and some set of \( q \) public keys;
- Incompatible : \( \bigcup_{i=1}^{k} (M_i \times M_j) \times D \to \{0, 1\} \) which given messages \( m_1, m_2 \) and potential required data \( d_{m_1} \) for \( m_1 \) checks the incompatibility.

Let \( m_1, \ldots, m_n \) be all the distinct consensus messages contained in \( C \). Let \( pk_1, \ldots, pk_q \) be all the public keys, including repetitions, contained in \( PK_i, \forall i \in [k] \). We say the consensus view \( C \) is valid if:

- \( \exists d_{m_i} \in D \cap C \) such that \( \text{VerifyData}(m_i, d_{m_i}) = 1 \), \( \forall 1 \leq i \leq n \).
- HistoricVerifyData(genstate, \( m_1, d_{m_1}, \ldots, m_n, d_{m_n}, pk_1, \ldots, pk_q \)) = 1.
- There exists no pair \((i, j), 1 \leq i, j \leq k, i \neq j\) such that Incompatible\((m_i, m_j, d_{m_i}) = 1 \) or Incompatible\((m_j, m_i, d_{m_j}) = 1 \).
- We require that all consensus messages in \( C \) are decided according to definition \ref{definition:16}.

We conclude this subsection by defining what we mean by honest validator.

Definition 18. (Honest validator) An honest full node of a blockchain is one that runs the protocol correctly starting from the genesis state of the blockchain. It maintains a valid consensus view of the system. A full node is a validator if they produced a public key that is in the set \( PK_i \) in some epoch \( i \) in some consensus view. An honest validator is an honest full node that is also a validator.

5.2.1 General light client properties

Next we define a light client system.

Definition 19. (Light client system) Let \( R \) be a (conditional) NP relation. A light client system involves two parties - prover and light client (also called light client verifier) - and it implements the following algorithms:

- \( pp_{LC} \leftarrow \text{LC.Setup}(R) \): a setup algorithm that takes the security parameter \( \lambda \) and a (conditional) NP relation \( R \) and outputs public parameters \( pp_{LC} \).
- \( \pi \leftarrow \text{LC.GenerateProof}(pp_{LC}, C, m, R) \): a proof generation algorithm that takes a valid consensus view \( C \), a message \( m \) decided in consensus view \( C \) and a (conditional) NP relation \( R \) and generates a proof \( \pi \).
- \( \text{acc/rej} \leftarrow \text{LC.VerifyProof}(pp_{LC}, \text{LC.seed}, \pi, m, R) \): a proof verification algorithm that takes as input a genesis summary \( \text{LC.seed} \) (whose properties are detailed in definition \ref{definition:20}), a light client proof \( \pi \) and a message \( m \) and returns \( \text{acc} \) if \( \pi \) is a valid proof for \( m \) and \( \text{rej} \) otherwise.

We call the tuple \((\text{LC.Setup}, \text{LC.GenerateProof}, \text{LC.VerifyProof})\) a light client system if it fulfils perfect completeness and soundness as defined below.

Perfect Completeness We say \((\text{LC.Setup}, \text{LC.GenerateProof}, \text{LC.VerifyProof})\) has perfect completeness if for any valid consensus view \( C \) and for any consensus message \( m \) decided in \( C \) we have that

\[
\Pr[\text{LC.VerifyProof}(pp_{LC}, \text{LC.seed}, \pi, m, R) = \text{acc} \mid pp_{LC} \leftarrow \text{LC.Setup}(R), 
\pi \leftarrow \text{LC.GenerateProof}(pp_{LC}, C, m, R)] = 1
\]

Soundness We say \((\text{LC.Setup}, \text{LC.GenerateProof}, \text{LC.VerifyProof})\) has soundness if, for every efficient malicious prover \( A \),

\[
\Pr[\text{LC.VerifyProof}(pp_{LC}, \text{LC.seed}, \pi, m, R) = \text{acc} \mid pp_{LC} \leftarrow \text{LC.Setup}(R), 
\pi \leftarrow \text{Parse}(pp_{LC}), (\pi, m, C) \leftarrow A^{\text{HonestValidator}}(pp, R), 
\text{CheckValidConsensus}(C) = 1, 
\text{NoHonestSigning}(m, \text{OGenerateKeypair}) = 1, 
\text{HonestThreshold}(t', \text{OGenerateKeypair}, C) = 1] = \text{negl}(\lambda);
\]
where the predicate \( \text{CheckValidConsensus}(C) \) checks if \( C \) is valid w.r.t. definition \([17]\) and outputs 1 in that case (and 0 otherwise);

\( \text{NoHonestSigning}(m, \text{OGenerateKeypair}) \) checks that there exists no public key in \( Q_{\text{keys}} \) (with \( Q_{\text{keys}} \) the restriction of \( Q_{\text{keys}} \) to the public keys and \( \text{OGenerateKeypair} \) defined below) that signed \( m \); it outputs 1 in that case (and 0 otherwise); \( A_{\text{HonestValidator}} \) represents the adversary \( A \) interacting with honest validators. \( \text{HonestThreshold}(t', \text{OGenerateKeypair}(C)) \) checks that at least \( t' \) of the public keys in each \( PK_i \) of \( C \) (for every epoch \( i \) in \( C \)), are part of \( Q_{\text{keys}} \) and outputs 1 in that case (and 0 otherwise). Finally, we make the assumption that \( \text{HonestValidator} \), in turn, makes oracle calls to \( \text{OGenerateKeypair}(pp) \), and \( pp \) as the public parameters of aggregated signature scheme \( AS \) are part of \( pp_{\text{LC}} \), where

\[
\text{OGenerateKeypair}(pp) : \quad
\begin{align*}
&((pk, \pi_{P_{\text{PoP}}}), sk) \leftarrow AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}(pp) \\
&Q_{\text{keys}} \leftarrow Q_{\text{keys}} \cup \{(pk, \pi_{P_{\text{PoP}}}), sk\}
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, we define the genesis summary and its properties with respect to a light client system.

**Definition 20.** (Genesis summary) Light client verifiers have access to a genesis summary \( LC.\text{seed} \), which is a well defined deterministic function of the genesis state \( \text{genstate} \).

### 5.2.2 Accountable Light Client Properties

In the following, we extend our model above to include also the case that in at least one of the epochs less than \( t' \) of the validators are honest. We provide the definition for an accountable light client system which subsumes the light client system definition given above. We remark that an accountable light client system subsumes a light client system.

**Definition 21.** (Accountable light client system) Let \( R \) be a (conditional) \( NP \) relation. An accountable light client system implements algorithms \( (LC.\text{Setup}, LC.\text{GenerateProof}, LC.\text{VerifyProof}, \text{LC.DetectMisbeaviour}, LC.\text{VerifyMisbeaviour}) \) where \( LC.\text{Setup}, LC.\text{GenerateProof} \) and \( LC.\text{VerifyProof} \) are defined as in \([19]\) and

\[
(i, S, \text{bit}, \sigma, m'', m') \leftarrow LC.\text{DetectMisbeaviour}(pp_{\text{LC}}, \pi, m, C, R)
\]

is an algorithm such that it takes a proof \( \pi \) for message \( m \), a consensus view \( C \) and a (conditional) \( NP \) relation \( R \); it outputs an epoch id \( i \), a subset of misbehaving signers \( S \subseteq PK_i \) in the same epoch as messages \( m'' \) and \( m' \), with \( m' \) decided in \( C \) and \( m'' \) signed with signature \( \sigma \) and using bitmask \( \text{bit} \) against the set \( PK_i \) and

\[
\text{acc/rej} \leftarrow LC.\text{VerifyMisbeaviour}(pp_{\text{LC}}, i, S, \text{bit}, \sigma, m'', m', C, R)
\]

is an algorithm which takes the input of \( LC.\text{DetectMisbeaviour} \) together with a consensus view \( C \) and a (conditional) \( NP \) relation \( R \) and checks if indeed misbehaviour took place such that completeness, soundness, accountability and accountability soundness hold, where completeness and soundness are identical to definition \([19]\) and accountability and accountability soundness are defined below.

**Accountability** We say \( (LC.\text{Setup}, LC.\text{GenerateProof}, LC.\text{VerifyProof}, LC.\text{DetectMisbeaviour}, LC.\text{VerifyMisbeaviour}) \) achieves accountability if for every efficient adversary \( A \) it holds that:

\[
\Pr[LC.\text{VerifyMisbeaviour}(pp_{\text{LC}}, LC.\text{DetectMisbeaviour}(pp_{\text{LC}}, \pi, m, C, R), C, R) = \text{acc} | \]

\[
pp_{\text{LC}} \leftarrow LC.\text{Setup}(R), (\pi, m, C) \leftarrow A(pp_{\text{LC}}, R),
\]

\[
LC.\text{VerifyProof}(pp_{\text{LC}}, LC.\text{seed}, \pi, m, R) = \text{acc}, \text{CheckValidConsensus}(C) = 1,
\]

\[
\exists (m', d_{m'}) \in \text{decided } C, \text{Incompatible}(m', m, d_{m'}) = 1, \text{epoch}_{id}(m) = \text{epoch}_{id}(m') \] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)

**Accountability Soundness** We say \( (LC.\text{Setup}, LC.\text{GenerateProof}, LC.\text{VerifyProof}, LC.\text{DetectMisbeaviour}, LC.\text{VerifyMisbeaviour}) \) achieves accountability soundness if for every effi-
cient adversary $\mathcal{A}$ it holds that:

$$
\Pr[LC. VerifyMisbehaviour(pp_{LC}, i, S, bit, \sigma, m'', m', C, R) = acc | (i, S, bit, \sigma, m'', m', C) \leftarrow \text{Game}^{\text{accountability-soundness}}(\lambda, R),
\]

$$
\text{CheckValidConsensus}(C) = 1,
\]

$$
\text{AtLeastOneHonest}(S, \text{OGenerateKeypair}) = 1] = \text{negl}(\lambda)
$$

where by $\mathcal{A}^{\text{OSpecialSign}, \text{OGenerateKeypair}}$ we denote the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ having oracle access to oracles $\text{OGenerateKeypair}$ as defined in section 5.2.1 and $\text{OSpecialSign}$ (as defined below) and by $\text{AtLeastOneHonest}(S, \text{OGenerateKeypair})$ we denote the predicate outputting 1 if there exists at least one public key in $S \cap Q_{keys}$, where the set $Q_{keys}$ was defined in the description of $\text{OGenerateKeypair}$; we also have the following game definition

$$
\text{Game}^{\text{accountability-soundness}}(\lambda, R):$

$$
Q_D := \emptyset
\]

$$
Q_{keys} := \emptyset
\]

$$
pp_{LC} \leftarrow LC.\text{Setup}(R)
\]

$$
pp \leftarrow \text{Parse}(pp_{LC})
\]

$$
(i, S, bit, \sigma, m'', m', C) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{OSpecialSign}, \text{OGenerateKeypair}}(pp)
\]

$$
\text{Return } (i, S, bit, \sigma, m'', m', C)
$$

and

$$
\text{OSpecialSign}(m, d_m, pk):
\]

If $\text{VerifyData}(m, d_m) = 0$ then Abort
If $\exists \pi_{PoP}, sk \text{ s.t. } ((pk, \pi_{PoP}), sk) \in Q_{keys}$ then Abort
For every $(m_{aux}, d_{m_{aux}}) \in Q_D \text{ s.t. } \text{epoch}_{id}(m_{aux}) = \text{epoch}_{id}(m)$

$$
\text{If } \text{Incompatible}(m_{aux}, m, d_{m_{aux}}) = 1 \lor \text{Incompatible}(m, m_{aux}, d_m) = 1 \text{ then Abort}
\]

For $sk \text{ s.t. } ((pk, \pi_{PoP}), sk) \in Q_{keys}$

$$
Q_D \leftarrow Q_D \cup \{(m, d_m)\}
\]

$$
\sigma \leftarrow AS.\text{Sign}(pp, sk, m)
\]

$$
\text{Return } \sigma
$$

Note that as defined above, $\text{OSpecialSign}$ has read but not write access to the state of $\text{OGenerateKeypair}$. Moreover, we implicitly assume that $AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}$ generates keys such that the private keys do not repeat so two users will not receive the same pair of keys (or, if they do, this happens with negligible probability). We note that, for example, for instantiation 2 this is the case.

5.3 Accountable Light Client Systems Instantiations

We motivate our light client model from 5.2 by detailing below instantiations for a light client system that is accountable light client system. Both are compatible with proof-of-stake based blockchains and, in particular, Polkadot.

5.3.1 Conventions and Assumptions

Before listing our light client systems' algorithms, we make several notational conventions:

- We use boldface font for denoting vectors. Furthermore, whenever necessary to avoid confusion, we denote by $\text{Vec}_i(k)$ the $k$-th component of vector $\text{Vec}_i$.
- In the following, unless otherwise stated, when we use $\mathcal{R}$, we mean one of the conditional relations from the set $\{\mathcal{R}_{ba.com}, \mathcal{R}_{pa.com}\}$. 

33
Given a valid consensus view $C$ over $i$ epochs, we assume there is a well-defined order on the set $PK_j$ of public keys included in $C$, $\forall j \in [i]$; hence, in the following, we rename this set by $pk_j$, $\forall j \in [i]$ and interpret it as a vector. Moreover, we instantiate honestly generated keys in $pk_j$ with keys generated using $AS.GenerateKeypair$ as described in instantiation 2.

We remind the reader that by $\text{Com}(pk)$ we denote the set of two computationally binding polynomial commitments to the polynomials obtained by interpolating the $x$ components of $pk$ and, respectively, the $y$ components of $pk$ over a range $H$ of size at least $v + 1$, where $v$ is some maximum number of validators that the system allows. In our instantiations for (accountable) light client systems, we use the KZG polynomial commitments, but, as mentioned also in section 4.4, the general results stated in this section hold for any binding polynomial commitments with a knowledge-soundness property.

We assume there is a fixed upper bound $v$ on the number of validators in each epoch and we use $v$ in the description of our algorithms. At the same time, for compatibility with the SNARKs that we build for relations $\mathcal{R}_{ba,com}$, $\mathcal{R}_{pa,com}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{c,com}$ as defined in [4, 4] when specifically using our instantiation 13 of CKS$\_R$ or when proving our results in this section, we let $v$ equal $n - 1$, where $n$ was defined in section 3.7.

Parse and Transform denote functions performing the respective operations on the (accountable) light client algorithms’ input in order to obtain the necessary components. Parse and Transform may additionally depend on the (conditional) relation $\mathcal{R}$ under consideration. If that is the case, we explicitly include $\mathcal{R}$. In particular, Parse and Transform functions which are part of $LC.DetectMisbehaviour$ work only for $\mathcal{R} \in \{\mathcal{R}_{ba,com}, \mathcal{R}_{pa,com}\}$.

The accountable light client systems use functions $f_x$ (deriving the public inputs), $f_{\text{threshold}}$ (deriving the Hamming weight), $\text{HammingWeight}$ (deriving the Hamming weight from consensus view elements) and $f_{\text{sat}}$ (deriving the bitmask corresponding to public keys that signed a given message). Before providing these functions’ definitions, we make the convention that, whenever used as parameters/input to these functions, $\text{bit}$, apk, $b^\prime$ and $s$ have the meaning and definition provided in section 4.

\[
f_x(\text{Com}(pk), \text{bit}, s, apk, \mathcal{R}) = \begin{cases} (\text{Com}(pk), \text{bit}, apk) & \text{if } \mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_{pa,com}^{incl} \\ (\text{Com}(pk), b', apk) & \text{if } \mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_{pa,com}^{incl} \end{cases}
\]

\[
\text{HammingWeight}^*(\text{vec}) = \text{HammingWeight}(\text{vec}_1, \ldots, \text{vec}_{|\text{vec}|-1})
\]

\[
f_{\text{threshold}}(x, \mathcal{R}) = \begin{cases} \text{HammingWeight}^*(\text{bit}) & \text{if } \mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_{ba,com}^{incl} \\ \sum_{j=1}^{x+1} \text{HammingWeight}(b'_j) + \text{HammingWeight}^*(b'_{|\text{vec}|+1}) & \text{if } \mathcal{R} = \mathcal{R}_{pa,com}^{incl} \end{cases}
\]

\[
f_{\text{sat}}(C, m, v) = (\text{sign}(k))_{k=1}^{\text{sign}(v)} 0, \sigma_i),
\]

where $i = epoch(id)(m)$ and $\forall k = 1, \ldots, v$, if there exists $\sigma \in C \land AS$. Verify$(pp, pk_i(k), m, \sigma) = 1$, we set $\text{bit}_i(k) = 1$ and $\sigma_i(k) = \sigma$, otherwise, we set $\text{bit}_i(k) = 0$ and $\sigma_i(k) = 0$.

Note that for each of our relations $\mathcal{R}_{ba,com}^{incl}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{pa,com}^{incl}$, apk and $\text{Com}(pk)$ are public inputs and $pk$ is a witness. Moreover, for these relations $\mathcal{R}_{ba,com}^{incl}$ and $\mathcal{R}_{pa,com}^{incl}$, we build an accountable light client system.

We make the following instantiations: $\text{genstate}$ is the set of public keys in $pk_1$ and their alleged proofs of possession; $LC.seed = \text{Com}(pk_1)$.

### 5.3.2 The Algorithms

The setup algorithm used by the accountable light client system is:

- $LC.Setup(\mathcal{R})$

\[
(pp, rs_{pk}, rs_{sk}) \leftarrow CKS_{\mathcal{R}}.Setup(v)
\]

Return $(pp, rs_{pk}, rs_{sk})$
The four algorithms that are part of the accountable light client system are:

- **LC. VerifyProof**\((pp, rs, LC.seed, \pi, m, R)\)
  
i = epoch_id(m)
  \((\Pi, \Sigma) = Parse(\pi);\)
  For \(j = 1, \ldots, i\)
  \((x_j, \pi_{SNARK,j}) = \Pi(j);\) \((com_j, bit_j, apk_j) = Parse(x_j, R)\)
  If \(LC.seed \neq com_i\)
  Return rej
  For \(j = 1, \ldots, i\)
  If \(j < i\)
    \(m_j = (j, com_{j+1})\)
  Else
    \(m_j = m\)
  \(threshold_j = f_{threshold}(x_j, R)\)
  If \((CKS_R.Verify(pp, rs, com_j, m_j, \Sigma(j), (\pi_{SNARK,j}, apk_j), bit_j) = 0) \lor (threshold_j < t)\)
  Return rej
  Return acc

- **LC. GenerateProof**\((pp, rs, C, m, R)\)
  \(\Pi = ();\) \(\Sigma = ()\)
  \(i = epoch_id(m)\)
  For \(j = 1, \ldots, i\)
  If \(j < i\)
    \(m_j = (j, Com(pk_{j+1}))\)
  Else
    \(m_j = m\)
  \((bit_j, \sigma_j) = f_{bit}(C, m_j, v)\)
  \(\Sigma(j) \leftarrow AS.AggregateSignatures(pp, (\sigma_j(k))_{k=1}^v)\)
  \((\pi_{SNARK,j}, apk_j) \leftarrow CKS_R.Prove(rs, Com(pk_j), (pk_j(k))_{k=1}^v, (bit_j(k))_{k=1}^v)\)
  \(x_j = f_x(Com(pk_j), bit_j, s, apk_j, R)\)
  \(\Pi(j) = (x_j, \pi_{SNARK,j})\)
  Return \((\Pi, \Sigma)\)

- **LC. VerifyMisbehaviour**\((pp, i, S, bit, \sigma, m'', m', C)\)
  \(apk = AS.AggregateKeys(pp, (bit(k) \cdot pk(k))_{k=1}^v)\)
  \((bit', \_ \_ ) = f_{bit}(C, m', v)\)
  Compute \(S_{m''} = \{pk_k(k) | bit(k) = 1, k \in [v]\}\)
  Compute \(S_{m'} = \{pk_k(k) | bit'(k) = 1, k \in [v]\}\)
  If \((AS.Verify(pp, apk, m'', \sigma) = 1) \land (S_{m''} \cap S_{m'} = S) \land (|S_{m''}| \geq t) \land (|S_{m'}| \geq t) \land \)
  \(\land (m', d_{m'}) \in decided C) \land \)
  \(\land (i = epoch_id(m'') = epoch_id(m')) \land (Incompatible(m'', m', d_{m'}) = 1)\)
  Return acc
  Else
  Return rej
The assumptions about parameters are:

- **P.1.** $2t - v > 0$
- **P.2.** $t + t' > v$

The assumptions about consensus are:

- **C.1.** An honest validator never signs a message $m$ unless it knows some required data $d_m$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m, d_m) = 1$ holds.
- **C.2.** An honest validator never signs a message $m$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m, d_m) = 1$ holds if they have previously signed $m'$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m', d_{m'}) = 1$ holds and $\text{Incompatible}(m', m, d_{m'}) = 1$ or $\text{Incompatible}(m', m, d_{m'}) = 1$ hold.
- **C.3.** An honest validator does not sign any message in $M_t$ unless they have a valid consensus view $C$ (with $M_t \subset C$) for which their public key is in $\mathbf{pk}_i$ with $\mathbf{pk}_i \in C$.

The assumptions about honest validators’ behaviour are:

- **B.1.** An honest validator never signs a message $m$ unless it knows some required data $d_m$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m, d_m) = 1$ holds.
- **B.2.** An honest validator never signs a message $m$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m, d_m) = 1$ holds if they have previously signed $m'$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m', d_{m'}) = 1$ holds and $\text{Incompatible}(m', m, d_{m'}) = 1$ or $\text{Incompatible}(m', m, d_{m'}) = 1$ hold.
- **B.3.** An honest validator does not sign any message in $M_t$ unless they have a valid consensus view $C$ (with $M_t \subset C$) for which their public key is in $\mathbf{pk}_i$ with $\mathbf{pk}_i \in C$.

5.3.3 Assumptions and Security Proofs

We complete our instantiation by proving the security properties of our light client and accountable light client systems according to definitions introduced in sections 5.2.1 and 5.2.2. However, beforehand, we present the assumptions we use, of which there are six classes, i.e., there are assumptions about honest validators’ behaviour (B), about consensus (C), about parameters (P), about instantiation of primitives (S), about genesis state (G) and assumptions about light client integration (I).

The assumptions about honest validators’ behaviour are:

- **B.1.** An honest validator never signs a message $m$ unless it knows some required data $d_m$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m, d_m) = 1$ holds.
- **B.2.** An honest validator never signs a message $m$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m, d_m) = 1$ holds if they have previously signed $m'$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m', d_{m'}) = 1$ holds and $\text{Incompatible}(m', m, d_{m'}) = 1$ or $\text{Incompatible}(m', m, d_{m'}) = 1$ hold.
- **B.3.** An honest validator does not sign any message in $M_t$ unless they have a valid consensus view $C$ (with $M_t \subset C$) for which their public key is in $\mathbf{pk}_i$ with $\mathbf{pk}_i \in C$.

The assumptions about consensus are:

- **C.1.** The adversary interacting with honest validators should not except with negligible probability be able to produce both: (i) a valid consensus view $C$ in which at least $t'$ validators in every epoch are honest that decides some message $m$ with $d_m$ such that $\text{VerifyData}(m, d_m) = 1$ and (ii) a valid consensus view $C'$ with the same genesis state as $C$ (in particular, with the same $\mathbf{pk}_1 \subset \text{genstate}$) which decides some message $m'$ in the same epoch as $m$, with $\text{Incompatible}(m, d_m, m') = 1$.
- **C.2.** The adversary interacting with honest validators should not except with negligible probability be able to produce both: (i) a valid consensus view $C$ in which at least $t'$ validators in every epoch are honest and (ii) a valid consensus view $C'$ with the same genesis state as $C$ (in particular, with the same $\mathbf{pk}_1 \subset \text{genstate}$) in which there is some epoch $i$ that $C$ and $C'$ both reach with $\mathbf{pk}_i \neq \mathbf{pk}_i$.

The assumptions about parameters are:

- **P.1.** $2t - v > 0$
- **P.2.** $t + t' > v$
The assumption about instantiation of primitives is:

- (S.1.) We instantiate the aggregatable signature scheme AS such that the oracle OSign in definition \( \Box \) (in particular in the unforgeability property definition), is replaced with OSpecialSign. It is easy to see that if AS is an aggregatable signature scheme secure according to definition \( \Box \) then AS is also an aggregatable signature with oracle OSign replaced by OSpecialSign in definition \( \Box \).

The assumptions about genesis state are:

- (G.1.) In a valid consensus view, HistoricVerifyData checks, among others, that \( \forall pk \in pk_1 \subset \text{genstate} \), it holds that \( pk \in G_{i,\text{inn}} \) and that the proofs of possession for each of the public keys in \( pk_1 \) pass the verification in AS.VerifyPoP.

- (G.2.) We assume that all honest full nodes and validators have access to the same genesis state even when the genesis state is generated by a potential adversary.

Before the last class of assumptions, we add two notational conventions in the form of two functions:

- NextEpochKeys \((m, d_m)\) returns \( \perp \) or a list of public keys; if \( \text{epoch}_d(m) = i \), these keys are supposed to be the public keys of epoch \( i + 1 \).

- IsCommitment\((m)\) returns 0 or 1; IsCommitment\((m) = 1\) iff there exists some \( i \) such that \( m = (i, \text{Com}(pk_{i+1})) \).

Finally, we make the following light client integration assumptions, i.e., these are assumptions that apply to our specific light client instantiation:

- (I.1) If \( m \) and \( m' \) are such that \( \text{epoch}_d(m) = \text{epoch}_d(m') \) and NextEpochKeys\((m, d_m)\) \( \neq \perp \) and IsCommitment\((m') = 1 \) and \( m' \neq (\text{epoch}_d(m), \text{Com}(\text{NextEpochKeys}(m, d_m))) \) then

\[
\text{Incompatible}(m, m', d_m) = 1.
\]

- (I.2) If \( \text{epoch}_d(m) = i \) and NextEpochKeys\((m, d_m) = pk_{i+1} \), then ValidateData\((m, d_m)\) must call AS.VerifyPoP\((pp, pk, \pi_{POP})\) for each \( pk \in pk_{i+1} \) and some data \( \pi_{POP} \in d_m \) and also check that \( pk \in G_{i,\text{inn}} \); if any of these checks fails, then ValidateData\((m, d_m)\) fails.

- (I.3) An honest validator with a valid consensus view \( C \), does not sign a message \( m' \) with IsCommitment\((m') = 1 \) unless there exists a message \( m \) decided in \( C \) and its required data \( d_m \) (i.e., ValidateData\((m, d_m) = 1 \)) such that

\[
m' = (\text{epoch}_d(m), \text{Com}(\text{NextEpochKeys}(m, d_m))).
\]

- (I.4) If HistoricVerifyData outputs 1 and there exist a message \( m \in C \) that has been decided in epoch \( i \), then for all \( 1 \leq j < i \), \((j, \text{Com}(pk_{j+1}))\) was decided in epoch \( j \).

- (I.5) If HistoricVerifyData outputs 1 and a message \( m' \) has been decided in \( C \) such that IsCommitment\((m') = 1 \), then there exist \( m, d_m \in C \) with ValidateData\((m, d_m) = 1 \), \( m \) decided in \( C \) and epoch\(_d(m) = \text{epoch}_d(m') \) such that

\[
\text{pk}_{\text{epoch}_d(m)+1} = \text{NextEpochKeys}(m, d_m).
\]

We are now ready to state and prove the security properties of our (accountable) light client systems.

**Theorem 22.** If AS is the secure aggregatable signature scheme defined in instantiation \( \Box \) and if CKS\( _R \) is the secure committee key scheme defined in instantiation \( \Box \), then, together with the assumptions stated at the beginning of section 5.3.3 and for \( R \in \{ R_{\text{incl}}, R_{\text{com}} \} \), the tuple \( (\text{LC.Setup}, \text{LC.GenerateProof}, \text{LC.VerifyProof}) \) as instantiated in section 5.3.2 is a light client system.

**Proof.** Perfect Completeness: Let \( m \) be a message decided in some epoch \( i \) of a valid consensus view \( C \). Since \( C \) is a valid consensus view, this implies HistoricVerifyData outputs 1. Adding that \( m \) has been decided in epoch \( i \) and using assumption (I.4.), we have that for each previous epoch \( 1 \leq j < i \), \((j, \text{Com}(pk_{j+1}))\) was decided in epoch \( j \); we denote this as property (\( * \)). Since

\[
\text{IsCommitment}(j, \text{Com}(pk_{j+1})) = 1, \forall j \in [i-1]
\]

holds and using assumptions (I.5.), (I.2.) and (G.1.), we conclude the proofs of possession for each of the public keys in \( pk_j \), \( j \in [i] \) pass the verification AS.VerifyPoP (property (\( * \))\( * \)) and, as a consequence, each of the public keys in \( pk_j \), \( j \in [i] \) belong to \( G_{i,\text{inn}} \) (property (\( * \)\( * \))\( * \)). The main fact we
have to show (with the notation used in the description of LC.VerifyProof), is that the following two predicates hold:

\[ AS.\text{Verify}(pp, apk_j, m_j, \Sigma(j)) = 1, \forall j \in [i] \quad (1) \]

and

\[ \text{threshold}_j \geq t, \forall j \in [i] \quad (2). \]

Indeed, (1) holds due to perfect completeness for aggregation for secure signature scheme instantiation AS which applies because: (a) for every epoch \( j \in [i] \), as computed by LC.GenerateProof, each of the individual signatures aggregated into \( \Sigma(j) \) passes \( AS.\text{Verify} \), (b) the aggregation \( \Sigma(j) \) is computed correctly as per \( LC.\text{GenerateProof} \), (c) the proofs of possession have been checked for each of the public keys in \( \text{pk}_j \), \( \forall j \in [i] \) (see property (***)), and, finally, (d) the aggregation of public keys denoted by \( apk_j \), \( \forall j \in [i] \), has been computed correctly as \( (\text{bit}_j(k) \cdot \text{pk}_j(k))_{k=1} \) due to property (***+) and the perfect completeness of the SNARK scheme for relation \( R \) invoked by the instantiation of \( CKS_R.\text{Prove} \).

Moreover, due to definition of \( f_{\text{threshold}} \) and the fact that \( m_j = (j, \text{Com}(\text{pk}_{j+1})) \), \( \forall j \in [i-1] \) and, respectively, \( m_i = m \) have been decided in their respective epochs as per (*), we have that (2) holds.

Finally, using (1), letting \( \text{ck}_j = \text{com}_j = \text{Com}(\text{pk}_{j+1}) \), \( \forall j \in [i] \) and since \( \pi_{\text{SNARK},j}, \text{apk}_j \) and \( \text{ck}_j \), \( \forall j \in [i] \) are honestly computed as described by \( LC.\text{GenerateProof} \) and invoking the perfect completeness property of the \( CKS_R \) committee key scheme, we obtain that

\[ CKS_R.\text{Verify}(pp, rs_{\text{sk}}, \text{Com}(\text{pk}_{j+1}), m_j, \Sigma(j), (\pi_{\text{SNARK},j}, \text{apk}_j), \text{bit}_j) = 1, \forall j \in [i] \quad (3). \]

In turn, the fact that (2) and (3) hold with probability 1 immediately implies

\[ LC.\text{VerifyProof}(pp_{LC}, LC.\text{seed}, LC.\text{GenerateProof}(pp_{LC}, C, m, R), m, R) = \text{acc} \]

with probability 1 (q.e.d.).

**Soundness:** We prove the proposed instantiation has soundness in Theorem 28, appendix D.

**Theorem 23.** If \( AS \) is the secure aggregatable signature scheme defined in instantiation 3 and if \( CKS_R \) is the secure committee key scheme defined in instantiation 7, then, together with the assumptions stated at the beginning of section 5.3.3 and for \( R \in \{ R_{\text{incl}}, com, R_{\text{incl}, com} \} \), the tuple \( (LC.\text{Setup}, LC.\text{GenerateProof}, LC.\text{VerifyProof}, LC.\text{DetectMisbehaviour}, LC.\text{VerifyMisbehaviour}) \) as instantiated in section 5.3.2, is an accountable light client system.

**Proof.** Due to theorem 22, the tuple \( (LC.\text{Setup}, LC.\text{GenerateProof}, LC.\text{VerifyProof}, LC.\text{DetectMisbehaviour}, LC.\text{VerifyMisbehaviour}) \) as instantiated in section 5.3.2, is already a light client system. It is only left to show that both accountability and accountability soundness also hold.

**Accountability:** Let \( A \) be an efficient adversary that on input \( pp_{LC} \) and \( R \) outputs \( \pi, m \) and \( C \). It is easy to see that if the descriptions of \( LC.\text{DetectMisbehaviour} \) and \( LC.\text{VerifyMisbehaviour} \) are followed honestly, then the predicate \( S_{m''} \cap S_{m'} = S \) checked in the end of \( LC.\text{VerifyMisbehaviour} \) is fulfilled. Moreover, due to the satisfied predicate

\[ LC.\text{VerifyProof}(pp, rs_{\text{sk}}, LC.\text{seed}, \pi, m, R) = 1 \quad (1) \]

it holds that all \( m_j, j \in [i] \) (as defined in \( LC.\text{VerifyProof} \)) are decided in \( C \). Due to the way \( m' \) and \( m'' \) are computed by \( LC.\text{DetectMisbehaviour} \) from the messages \( (m_j)_{j=1} \), this implies \( |S_{m'}| \geq t, \)

\[ |S_{m''}| \geq t \quad \text{and} \quad (m', d_m') \in \text{decided} \quad C \] and

\[ \text{Incompatible}(m'', m', d_m') = 1. \]

We are only left to show that

\[ AS.\text{Verify}(pp, apk, m'', \sigma) = 1 \quad (\ast) \]

holds with overwhelming probability. Indeed, since (1) holds then, for every epoch \( j \in [i] \) it holds that

\[ CKS_R.\text{Verify}(pp, rs_{\text{sk}}, com_j, m_j, \Sigma(j), (\pi_j, apk_j), \text{bit}_j) = 1 \quad (2). \]
In particular, (2) holds for \( j = \text{index} \). Due to soundness property of the committee key scheme \( CKS_R \), since \( \text{com}_{\text{index}} = \text{Com}(\text{pk}_{\text{index}}) \) by the definition of \( \text{index} \) and \( LC.DetectMisbehaviour \), since \( \text{apk}_{\text{index}} = AS.AggregateKeys(pp, (\text{bit}_{\text{index}}(k) \text{pk}_{\text{index}}(k)))_{k=1}^{\text{length}} \) as computed by \( LC.DetectMisbehaviour \), since also \( m'' = m_{\text{index}} \) (with \( m_j, \forall j \in [i] \) defined in \( LC.VerifyProof \) and index defined in \( LC.DetectMisbehaviour \)) and, finally, since \( \Sigma(\text{index}) = \sigma \), as defined in \( LC.DetectMisbehaviour \), it follows that (*) holds with overwhelming probability (q.e.d.).

**Accountability Soundness:** Let \( A \) be an efficient adversary with oracle access to \( O\text{SpecialSign} \) and \( O\text{GenerateKeypair} \). If \( LC.VerifyMisbehaviour(pp, i, S, \text{bit}, \sigma, m', m, C) \) outputs \( \text{acc} \) (***), its checks together with completeness for aggregation imply

\[
AS.\text{Verify}(pp, \sigma', m', \text{apks}) = 1 \text{ (**)},
\]

where

\[
\sigma_i(j) = \begin{cases} \text{sig} & \text{if } \exists \text{ sig } \in C, AS.\text{Verify}(pp, \text{sig}, m', \text{pk}_i(j)) \\ \cdot & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

\[
b_S(j) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } \text{pk}_i(j) \in S \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}
\]

\[
\sigma' \leftarrow AS.AggregateSignatures(pp, (b_S(j) \cdot \sigma_i(j)))_{j=1}^{\text{length}},
\]

\[
\text{apks} \leftarrow AS.AggregateKeys(pp, (b_S(j) \cdot \text{pk}_i(j)))_{j=1}^{\text{length}}.
\]

Additionally, since (*) holds and for \( \text{apk} \) as defined in \( LC.VerifyMisbehaviour \), we obtain

\[
AS.\text{Verify}(pp, \sigma, m'', \text{apk}) = 1 \text{ (**')}.
\]

Since \( CheckValidConsensus(C) = 1 \) holds and \( m' \) has been decided in epoch \( i \) of \( C \) and \( d_{m'} \) is the required data associated with \( m' \), due to assumptions (I.5.), (I.4.) and (I.2.) we have that \( d_{m'} \) contains correct proofs of possession for all keys in \( \text{pk}_i \) (**).

We assume by contradiction that \( AtLeastOneHonest(S, O\text{GenerateKeypair}) = 1 \) holds with more than negligible probability. This is equivalent to assuming that \( \exists \text{ pk}^* \in S \cap Q_{\text{keys}_{pk}} \) (***) holds with more than negligible probability. Note that since the following check (which is part of \( LC.VerifyMisbehaviour \) ) passes:

\[
S_{m''} \cap S_{m'} = S,
\]

any \( pk \in S \) is aggregated into \( \text{apk} \) and also into \( \text{apks} \); this includes \( \text{pk}^* \). Since the aggregate signature instantiation \( AS \) is unforgeable (see definition [1] plus the assumption (S.1.)), due to (**), (**''), (***) and (**) we have that, with more than negligible probability, both \( m' \) and \( m'' \) have been signed by the oracle \( O\text{SpecialSign} \). However, this comes in contradiction with the fact that \( Incompatible(m', m'', d_{m'}) = 1 \) which is ensured as part of the checks concluding that \( LC.VerifyMisbehaviour \) outputs \( \text{acc} \). Hence, our assumption is false and \( S \cap Q_{\text{keys}_{pk}} = \emptyset \), so the probability defined in the accountability soundness property is indeed negligible.

\[\square\]

**Corollary 24.** In an accountable light client system, the number of misbehaving validators output by \( LC.DetectMisbehaviour \) is \( |S| \) and \( |S| > 0 \).

**Proof.** Due to theorem [3.3] and, in particular, the accountability property, we know that given a valid consensus view \( C \), a verifying light client proof \( \pi \) for a message \( m'' \) and given the existence in \( C \) of a message \( m' \) incompatible with \( m'' \), we have that the number of validators that \( LC.DetectMisbehaviour \) is able to catch is at least \( |S| \). Moreover, due to the accountability soundness property of an accountable light client system, we know that any public key output by \( LC.DetectMisbehaviour \), e.w.n.p., belongs to a misbehaving validator. Finally, using the accountability property and, in particular, since \( LC.VerifyMisbehaviour \) accepts with overwhelming probability the output of an honest party running \( LC.DetectMisbehaviour \), it holds that:

\[
|S| = |S_{m'} \cap S_{m''}| = |S_{m'}| + |S_{m''}| - |S_{m'} \cup S_{m''}| \geq t + t - v > 0
\]

The last inequality holds due to assumption (P.1.) and this concludes the proof. \[\square\]
6 Implementation

We implemented and benchmarked the protocol. The implementation allows us to evaluate the performance of our protocol and serve as prototype for future deployment. The implementation is available at https://github.com/w3f/apk-proofs. It is written in Rust and uses the Arkworks library.

Table 1 gives the prover and verifier time for the three schemes (basic accountable, packed accountable and counting, see Section 3) with \(v = n - 1 = 2^{10} - 1\), \(v = n - 1 = 2^{16} - 1\) and \(v = n - 1 = 2^{20} - 1\) signers. The benchmarks were run on commodity hardware, with an i7 ? and 16GB RAM. We remind the reader that by \(v\) we denote the maximum number of validators in our system and that \(n\) was defined in section 3.7.

These signer numbers are approximately the range of the number of validators that we were aiming our implementation at e.g. the Kusama blockchain (https://kusama.network/) has 1000 validators and it has been suggested that there will be no more than \(2^{19}\) (make citation out of https://ethresear.ch/t/simplified-active-validator-cap-and-rotation-proposal/9022).

At \(v = n - 1 = 1023\), the prover can generate a proof in any scheme in well under a second, which is short enough to generate a proof for every block in most prominent blockchain protocols. Even for \(v = n - 1 = 2^{20} - 1\), the prover time is under 6.4 minutes, which is the time for an Ethereum 2 epoch, the time that validators finalise the chain. For verification time, the basic accountable scheme is slower, considerably so for larger signer numbers.

Table 2 gives the number of operations the prover and verifier use. Table 3 gives the proof constituents and also the total proof and input sizes in bits. The basic accountable scheme’s verifier performance at large numbers is so slow because it includes \(O(n)\) field operations, which dominate the running time, however at 1023 signers it gives the smallest size. The packed accountable scheme, which includes \(O(n/\lambda)\) field operations, fairs better on the benchmarks, having similar verification time than the counting scheme which has sublinear verification time, even at \(2^{20} - 1\) signers. The prover is considerably slower for the latter two schemes because it needs to do additional operations. At larger signer sizes, the proof size for the accountable schemes is dominated by the bitfield.

Table 1: Proof and verifier times for the different schemes and different numbers of signers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>(v = 2^{10} - 1)</th>
<th>(v = 2^{16} - 1)</th>
<th>(v = 2^{20} - 1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>prover</td>
<td>verifier</td>
<td>prover</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Accountable</td>
<td>587.376ms</td>
<td>27.388ms</td>
<td>20.587s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packed Accountable</td>
<td>544.614ms</td>
<td>16.565ms</td>
<td>28.398s</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counting</td>
<td>510.316ms</td>
<td>15.758ms</td>
<td>28.461s</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Expensive prover and verifier operations. \(FFT(M)\) is an FFT of size \(M\). \(ME(M)\) is a multi-exponentiation (or multi-scalar multiplication) of size \(M\). \(P\) is a pairing, \(E\) is a single exponentiation (scalar multiplication) and \(F\) is a field operation.

Table 2: Expensive prover and verifier operations. \(FFT(M)\) is an FFT of size \(M\). \(ME(M)\) is a multi-exponentiation (or multi-scalar multiplication) of size \(M\). \(P\) is a pairing, \(E\) is a single exponentiation (scalar multiplication) and \(F\) is a field operation.

References

Table 3: Proof and input constituents and total proof and input size for the implementation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Proof</th>
<th>Input</th>
<th>Actual proof + input size in bits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$5G_{out}^{1} + 5F$</td>
<td>$2G_{out}^{1} + 1G_{inn}^{1} + n$ bits</td>
<td>$v = 2^{10} - 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basic Accountable</td>
<td>$8G_{out}^{1} + 8F$</td>
<td>$2G_{out}^{1} + 1G_{inn}^{1} + n$ bits</td>
<td>$v = 2^{16} - 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Packed Accountable</td>
<td>$7G_{out}^{1} + 7F$</td>
<td>$2G_{out}^{1} + 1G_{inn}^{1}$</td>
<td>$v = 2^{20} - 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Counting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

References:


A Appendix A - Ranged Polynomial Protocols for Conditional NP Relations

In the following, we keep the convention that all algorithms receive an implicit security parameter $\lambda$. The definition below is a natural extension of the notions of polynomial protocols and polynomial protocols for relations from section 4 of PLONK [10] to polynomial protocols over ranges for conditional NP relations with additional refinements required by our specific use case; these refinements are incorporated into steps 4, 5 and 6 as follows:

**Definition 25. (Polynomial Protocols over Ranges for Conditional Relations)** Assume three parties, a prover $P_{poly}$, a verifier $V_{poly}$ and a trusted party $I$. Let $R^\subset$ be a conditional NP relation and let $x$ be a public input both of which have been given to $P_{poly}$ and $V_{poly}$ by an InitGen efficient algorithm.

For positive integers $d, D, t, l, u, e$ and for set $S \subset \mathbb{F}$, an $S$-ranged $(d, D, t, l, u, e)$-polynomial protocol $\mathcal{P}_{R^\subset}$ for relation $R^\subset$ is a multi-round protocol between $P_{poly}$, $V_{poly}$ and $I$ such that:

1. The protocol $\mathcal{P}_{R^\subset}$ definition includes a set of pre-processed polynomials $g_1(X), \ldots, g_t(X) \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[X]$.
2. The messages of $P_{poly}$ are sent to $I$ and are of the form $f(X)$ for $f(X) \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[X]$.
   If $P_{poly}$ sends a message not of this form, the protocol is aborted.
3. The messages from $V_{poly}$ to $P_{poly}$ are random coins.
4. $V_{poly}$ may perform arithmetic computations using input $x$ and the random coins used in the communication with $P_{poly}$. Let $(res_1, \ldots, res_s)$ be the results of those computations which $V_{poly}$ sends to $I$.
5. Using vectors which are part of input $x$ and/or other ad-hoc vectors which $V_{poly}$ deems useful, $V_{poly}$ may compute interpolation polynomials $s_1(X), \ldots, s_e(X)$ over domain $S$ such that $s_1(X), \ldots, s_e(X) \in \mathbb{F}_{<d}[X]$. $V_{poly}$ sends $s_1(X), \ldots, s_e(X)$ to $I$.
6. At the end of the protocol, suppose $f_1(X), \ldots, f_l(X)$ are the polynomials that were sent from $P_{poly}$ to $I$. $V_{poly}$ may ask $I$ if certain polynomial identities hold between

$$\{f_1(X), \ldots, f_l(X), g_1(X), \ldots, g_t(X), s_1(X), \ldots, s_e(X)\}$$
Definition 2.1. in PLONK [10] formally describes the 2d Model SNARKs using PLONK. Let $P$ of lemmas 4.5. and 4.7. from [10]. we are now ready to state the following result. The proof follows with only minor changes from that given in the definitions for polynomial protocols over ranges for conditional relations as detailed above.

Our definition for polynomial protocols over ranges does not include a zero-knowledge property as it needs to be fulfilled only by a part of the protocol and, simultaneously, $(\text{Perfect Completeness})$.

Additionally, the following properties hold:

**Perfect Completeness:** If $P_{\text{poly}}$ follows the protocol correctly and uses a witness $\omega$ with $(x, \omega) \in R^c$, $V_{\text{poly}}$ accepts with probability one.

**Knowledge Soundness:** There exists an efficient algorithm $E$, that given access to the messages of $P_{\text{poly}}$ to it it outputs $\omega$ such that, for any strategy of $P_{\text{poly}}$, the probability of $V_{\text{poly}}$ outputting $\text{acc}$ at the end of the protocol and, simultaneously, $(x, \omega) \in R^c$ is overwhelming in $\lambda$.

Our definition for polynomial protocols over ranges does not include a zero-knowledge property as it is not required in our current work.

Given the definition for polynomial protocols over ranges for conditional relations as detailed above, we are now ready to state the following result. The proof follows with only minor changes from that of lemmas 4.5. and 4.7. from [10].

**Lemma 26.** (Compilation of Ranged Polynomial Protocols for Conditional NP Relations into Hybrid Model SNARKs using PLONK) Let $P_{\text{R}}$ be a public coin $S$-ranged (d, D, t, l, u, c)-polynomial protocol for relation $R^c$ where only one identity is checked by $V_{\text{poly}}$ and predicate c from the definition of $R^c$ needs to be fulfilled only by a part $x_1$ of the public input of the relation $R^c$. Then one can construct a hybrid model SNARK protocol $P_{\text{R}}^*_{\text{R}}$ for relation $P_{\text{R}}$ with SNARK.Library as defined below and with $P_{\text{R}}^*_{\text{R}}$ secure in the AGM under the 2d-DLOG assumption such that:

1. The prover $P$ in $P_{\text{R}}^*_{\text{R}}$ requires $e(P_{\text{R}})$ G_{1, out} exponentiations where $e(P_{\text{R}})$ is defined analogously as in PLONK (see preamble of section 4.2.), however it additionally takes into account polynomials $s_1(X), \ldots, s_c(X)$.
2. The total prover communication consists of $t + t'(P_{\text{R}}) + 1$ G_{1, out}-elements and MF-elements, where $t'(P_{\text{R}})$ is defined identically as in PLONK (see preamble of section 4.2.).
3. The verifier $V$ in $P_{\text{R}}^*_{\text{R}}$ requires $t + t'(P_{\text{R}}) + 1$ G_{1, out}-exponentiations, two pairings and one evaluation of the polynomial $G$, and, additionally, the verifier in $P_{\text{R}}^*_{\text{R}}$ computes $c$ polynomial commitments to polynomials in the set $\{s_1(X), \ldots, s_c(X)\}$.
4. The algorithm for computing partial inputs is defined as

   $\text{SNARK.Library}(\text{PartInput}(\text{srs}, \text{state1} \geq x_1, R^c))$

   If $c(x_1) = 0$
   Return
   Else
   Return($\text{state1}, x_1$)

**B Appendix B - Rolled out Protocol $P_{\text{pa}}^h$ for Conditional NP Relation $R_{\text{pa.com}}$**

We give below the full rolled-out hybrid model protocol $P_{\text{pa}}^h$ for conditional NP relation $R_{\text{pa.com}}$. This is obtained by applying our two-steps compiler from section 4.4 to polynomial protocol $P_{\text{pa}}$. In

---

*Definition 2.1. in PLONK [10] formally describes the 2d-DLOG assumption.*
order to obtain the non-interactive version (i.e., the N from SNARK) we have additionally applied the Fiat-Shamir transform. In the following, by transcript at a certain point in time we denote the concatenation of the global constant, verification key, trusted public input, other public input and the proof elements created by the prover up to that point in time. \( H \) is a hash function, \( H : \{0,1\} \rightarrow \mathbb{F} \) and it emulates the random oracle. In the following, \( \oplus \) is the addition operation on \( E_{\text{inn}} \) in affine coordinates. Note that in our implementation we instantiate \( E_{\text{inn}} \) with BLS12-377 \( [32] \) and \( E_{\text{out}} \) with BW6-761 \( [33] \), while we choose \( v = n-1 \) and we let \( N = n \). This, in turn, ensures that \( N \) has been chosen according to the properties stated in instantiation \( [2] \) in particular when defining AS.Setup.

**Public Parameters:**
\((G_{1,\text{inn}}, g_{1,\text{inn}}, G_{2,\text{inn}}, g_{2,\text{inn}}, G_{T,\text{inn}}, c_{\text{inn}}, h_{\text{inn}}, H_{\text{inn}}, H_{\text{ Kiddish}}) \subseteq \mathbb{G} \leftarrow \text{AS.Setup}(\text{aux}_{\text{AS}} = n)\)

**Global constant:** \( h \in E_{\text{inn}} \setminus G_{1,\text{inn}} \)

**Trusted Setup:** \( srs \leftarrow \text{SNARK.Setup}(\text{aux}_{\text{SNARK}} = (n,3n - 3)) \),
where \( srs = ([1]_{1,\text{out}}, [\tau]_{1,\text{out}}, [\tau^2]_{1,\text{out}}, \ldots, [\tau^{3n - 3}]_{1,\text{out}}, [1]_{2,\text{out}}, [\tau]_{2,\text{out}}) \)

**Proving and Verifying Key Generation:** \((srs_{pk}, srs_{\text{uk}}) \leftarrow \text{SNARK.KeyGen}(srs, R_{\text{inn}}^{\text{incl}})\),
where \((srs_{pk}, srs_{\text{uk}}) = ([1]_{1,\text{out}}, [\tau]_{1,\text{out}}, [\tau^2]_{1,\text{out}}, \ldots, [\tau^{3n - 3}]_{1,\text{out}}, (1)[1]_{1,\text{out}}, [1]_{2,\text{out}}, [\tau]_{2,\text{out}})\)

**Partial Input:** \((x_1, \text{state}_2) \leftarrow \text{SNARK.PartInput}(srs, \text{state}_1 \supseteq (p_{k0}, \ldots, p_{k_{n-2}}), R_{\text{inn}}^{\text{incl}})\),
where if \((p_{k0}, \ldots, p_{k_{n-2}})) \notin G_{1,\text{inn}}^{-1}, \text{SNARK.PartInput}(srs, \text{state}_1, R_{\text{inn}}^{\text{incl}}) \) outputs the empty string, otherwise \( \text{SNARK.PartInput} \) outputs \( x_1 = ([pkx]_{1,\text{out}}, [pky]_{1,\text{out}}) \) and \( \text{state}_2 = \text{state}_1 \cup \{x_1\} \), where \( \forall i \in \{0, \ldots, n-2\}, p_{ki} \) as an element of the curve \( E_{\text{inn}} \) has the affine representation \((p_{k0}, p_{k1}, \ldots, p_{kn-2}, \ldots, p_{kn})\).
The polynomials \( pkx(X) \) and \( pky(X) \) are computed as \( pkx(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} p_{ki} \cdot L_i(X) \) and \( pky(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} p_{ki} \cdot \lambda_i(X) \) and finally, the polynomial commitments are computed as \( [pkx]_{1,\text{out}} = pkx(\tau) \cdot [1]_{1,\text{out}} \) and \( [pky]_{1,\text{out}} = pky(\tau) \cdot [1]_{1,\text{out}} \).

**Public input:** \( x_1 = ([pkx]_{1,\text{out}}, [pky]_{1,\text{out}}), x_2 = ((b_0', \ldots, b_{\text{n-2}}'), \text{ap}_{\text{pk}}) \)

**Witness:** \( w = ((p_{k0}, \ldots, p_{k_{n-2}}), (b_0, \ldots, b_{n-1})) \)

**Prover’s Algorithm:** \( \pi \leftarrow \text{SNARK.Prove}(srs_{pk}, ((x_1, x_2), w), R_{\text{inn}}^{\text{incl}}), \) where

**Step 1:**
Compute the affine representation \( h = (h_x, h_y) \) and \( \text{ap}_{\text{pk}} \oplus h = ((\text{ap} \oplus h)_x, (\text{ap} \oplus h)_y) \).

Compute \( pkx = (pkx_0, \ldots, pkx_{n-2}) \) and \( pky = (pky_0, \ldots, pky_{n-2}) \) s. t. \( \forall i \in \{0, \ldots, n-2\}, p_{ki} \) as an element of the curve \( E_{\text{inn}} \) has the affine representation \((pkx_i, pky_i)\).

Let \((kaccx_0, kaccy_0) = (h_x, h_y) \) and compute \((kaccx_{i+1}, kaccy_{i+1}) = (kaccx_i, kaccy_i) \oplus \text{bit}_{i}(pkx_i, pky_i), \forall i < n - 1\).

Compute polynomials
\[
b(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{bit}_i \cdot L_i(X),
\]
\[
kaccx(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} kaccx_i \cdot L_i(X),
\]
\[
kaccy(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} kaccy_i \cdot L_i(X),
\]
\[ \text{Compute } pkx(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} pkx_i \cdot L_i(X), \]
\[ \text{Compute } pkym(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-2} pkym_i \cdot L_i(X). \]

Compute \([b]_{i, out} = b(\tau) \cdot [1]_{i, out}, [kaex]_{i, out} = kaex(\tau) \cdot [1]_{i, out}, [kacy]_{i, out} = kacy(\tau) \cdot [1]_{i, out}.\]

The first output of the prover is \([(b)_{i, out}, [kaex]_{i, out}, [kacy]_{i, out}].\)

**Step 2:**
Compute the sum challenge \(r = \mathcal{H}(\text{transcript}).\)

Compute \(\text{sum } = \sum_{j=0}^{\max - 1} b'_j r^j.\)

Compute: \(\frac{r^\text{block}}{r^\text{\max}}.\)

Compute polynomials
\[ c(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} c_i \cdot L_i(X), \]
where \(c_i = 2^i \mod \text{block} \cdot r^{i \mod \text{block}}, \ 0 \leq i \leq n - 1.\)

\[ \text{acc}(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{acc}_i \cdot L_i(X), \]
where \(\text{acc}_0 = 0\) and \(\text{acc}_i = \sum_{j=0}^{i-1} \text{bit}_j \cdot c_j, 0 < i \leq n - 1.\)

\[ \text{aux}(X) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} \text{aux}_i \cdot L_i(X), \]
where \(\text{aux}_i = 1\) if \(i\) is divisible with \(\text{block}\) and \(\text{aux}_i = 0\) otherwise, \(\forall i < n\)

Compute \([c]_{i, out} = c(\tau) \cdot [1]_{i, out}, [\text{acc}]_{i, out} = \text{acc}(\tau) \cdot [1]_{i, out}.\)

The second output of the prover is \([(c)_{i, out}, [\text{acc}]_{i, out}].\)

**Step 3:**
Compute the quotient challenge \(\alpha = \mathcal{H}(\text{transcript}).\)

Compute the polynomial \(t(X)\) of degree at most \(3 \cdot n - 3\) where
\[ t(X)(X^n - 1) = \]
\[ (X - \omega^{n-1}) \cdot [b(X) \cdot ((kaex(X) - pkx(X))^2 \cdot (kaex(X) + pkx(X) + kacy(\omega \cdot X)) - (pkym(X) - kacy(X))^2) + (1 - b(X)) \cdot (kacy(\omega \cdot X) - kacy(X))] + \]
\[ + \alpha(X - \omega^{n-1}) \cdot [b(X) \cdot ((kaex(X) - pkx(X)) \cdot (kacy(\omega \cdot X) + kacy(X)) - (pkym(X) - kacy(X))) \cdot (kacy(\omega \cdot X) - kacy(X)) + (1 - b(X)) \cdot (kacy(\omega \cdot X) - kacy(X))] + \]
\[ + \alpha^2 \cdot [b(X) \cdot (1 - b(X))] + \]
\[ + \alpha^3 \cdot [c(\omega \cdot X) - c(X) \cdot (2 + \frac{r}{2^{\text{block} - 1}} - 2) \cdot \text{aux}(\omega \cdot X)) - (1 - \frac{r^\text{max}}{r^\text{block}}) \cdot L_{n-1}(X)] + \]
\[ + \alpha^4 \cdot [((kaex(X) - h_x) \cdot L_0(X) + (kaex(X) - (h + apk)_x) \cdot L_{n-1}(X)] + \]
\[ + \alpha^5 \cdot [((kaex(X) - h_y) \cdot L_0(X) + (kacy(X) - (h + apk)_y) \cdot L_{n-1}(X)] + \]
\[ + \alpha^6 \cdot [\text{acc}(\omega \cdot X) - \text{acc}(X) - b(X) \cdot c(X) + \text{sum} \cdot L_{n-1}(X)]. \]
Compute \([t]_{t, \text{out}} = t(\nu) \cdot [1]_{t, \text{out}}\).

The third output of the prover is \([t]_{t, \text{out}}\).

**Step 4:**
Compute evaluation challenge \(\xi = \mathcal{H}(\text{transcript})\).
Compute evaluations:

\[
pkx = px(z), \quad pkx = pkz(z), \quad \overline{b} = b(z), \quad kaccx = kaccx(z), \quad kaccy = kaccy(z), \quad \overline{c} = c(z), \quad \overline{acc} = \overline{acc}(z), \quad \overline{t} = t(z).
\]

Compute linearisation polynomial:

\[
r(X) = (\xi - \omega^{n-1}) \cdot \left[\overline{b} \cdot (kaccx - pkx)^2 \cdot kaccx(X) + (1 - \overline{b}) \cdot kaccy(X)\right] + \alpha \cdot (\xi - \omega^{n-1}) \cdot \left[\overline{b} \cdot (kaccx - pkx) \cdot kaccy(X) - (pkx - kaccy) \cdot kaccy(X)\right] + (1 - \overline{b}) \cdot kaccx(X) + \alpha^3 \cdot c(X) + \alpha^6 \cdot \overline{acc}(X).
\]

Compute evaluation of linearisation polynomial \(\overline{r} = r(\omega \cdot \xi)\).

The fourth output of the prover is \((pkx, pkx, \overline{b}, kaccx, kaccy, \overline{c}, \overline{acc}, \overline{r})\).

**Step 5:**
Compute opening challenge \(\nu = \mathcal{H}(\text{transcript})\).

Compute first opening proof polynomial

\[
W_\xi(X) = \frac{1}{X - \xi} \left(t(X) - \xi + \nu(pkx(X) - \overline{pkx}) + \nu^2(pkx(X) - \overline{pkx}) + \nu^3(b(X) - \overline{b}) + \nu^4(kaccx(X) - \overline{kaccx}) + \nu^5(kaccy(X) - \overline{kaccy}) + \nu^6(c(X) - \overline{c}) + \nu^7(\overline{acc}(X) - \overline{acc})\right)
\]

and second opening proof polynomial

\[
W_{\xi, \omega}(X) = \frac{1}{X - \xi \cdot \omega} \left(r(X) - \overline{r}\right).
\]

Compute \([W_\xi]_{t, \text{out}} = W_\xi(\tau) \cdot [1]_{t, \text{out}}\) and \([W_{\xi, \omega}]_{t, \text{out}} = W_{\xi, \omega}(\tau) \cdot [1]_{t, \text{out}}\).

The fifth output of the prover is \([W_\xi]_{t, \text{out}}, [W_{\xi, \omega}]_{t, \text{out}}\).

Compute the multipoint evaluation challenge \(u = \mathcal{H}(\text{transcript})\).

Return \(\pi = ([b]_{t, \text{out}}, [kaccx]_{t, \text{out}}, [kaccy]_{t, \text{out}}, [c]_{t, \text{out}}, [acc]_{t, \text{out}}, [t]_{t, \text{out}}, [W_\xi]_{t, \text{out}}, [W_{\xi, \omega}]_{t, \text{out}}, \overline{pkx}, pkx, \overline{b}, kaccx, kaccy, \overline{c}, \overline{acc}, \overline{r})\).

**Verifier’s Algorithm:** \(0/1 \leftarrow \text{SNARK.Verify}(x_1, x_2, \pi, \mathcal{R}_{\text{pub}, \text{com}})\), where

**Step 1:**
Compute the affine representation \(h = (h_x, h_y)\) and \(apk \oplus h = ((apk \oplus h)_x, (apk \oplus h)_y)\).
Step 2:
Validate proof elements \([(b)_{t,\text{out}}, [kaccx]_{t,\text{out}}, [kaccy]_{t,\text{out}}, [c]_{t,\text{out}}, [acc]_{t,\text{out}}, [t]_{t,\text{out}}, [W_{\xi}]_{t,\text{out}}, [W_{\zeta} \omega]_{t,\text{out}}]\) \(\in \mathbb{G}_2^{\text{out}}\).

Step 3:
Validate proof elements \((pkx, pky, \bar{b}, kaccx, kaccy, \bar{c}, \bar{acc}, \bar{\tau}_{\omega}) \in \mathbb{F}^8\).

Step 4:
Compute challenges \((r, \alpha, \zeta, \nu, u)\) as in the prover \(P^\text{SNARK}_{\text{com}}\) description from the common input, trusted public input, public input and respective necessary parts of the transcript using elements of \(\pi_{\text{pa}}\).

Step 5:
Compute: \(\sum = \sum_{j=0}^{n} b_j r^j\).

Compute: \(\frac{r}{pky}, r\ \bar{m}_{\text{wx}}\).

Step 6:
Compute polynomial evaluations \(\zeta^n - 1\) and \(\bar{\pi}\pi_x_{\omega} = aux(\omega \cdot \zeta^n)\) and Lagrange basis polynomials \(L_0(\zeta) = (\zeta^n - 1) / (\zeta - 1)\) and \(L_{n-1}(\zeta) = (\zeta^n - 1) / (\zeta - 1)\).

Step 7\(^9\)
Compute quotient polynomial evaluation
\[
\bar{t} = \frac{r}{pky} + \frac{[b] ((kaccx - pkx)^2 \cdot (kaccx + pkx) - (pky - kaccy)^2) - (1 - \bar{b}) \cdot kaccx \cdot \bar{c}}{\zeta^n - 1} + \\
\frac{\alpha \cdot \bar{b} \cdot ((kaccx - pkx) \cdot kaccx + (pky - kaccy) \cdot kaccx) - (1 - \bar{b}) \cdot kaccx \cdot \bar{c}}{\zeta^n - 1} + \\
\frac{\alpha^2 \cdot \bar{b} \cdot (1 - \bar{b})}{\zeta^n - 1} + \\
- \frac{\alpha^3 \cdot [(1 - r \ \bar{m}_{\text{wx}}) \cdot L_{n-1}(\zeta)]}{\zeta^n - 1} - \frac{\alpha^3 \cdot \bar{c} \cdot (2 + \left(\frac{r}{\bar{m}_{\text{block}}} - 2\right)) \cdot \bar{\pi}\pi_x_{\omega} +}{\zeta^n - 1} + \\
\frac{\alpha^4 \cdot [(kaccx - h_x) \cdot L_0(\zeta) + (kaccx - (h + apk)x) \cdot L_{n-1}(\zeta)]}{\zeta^n - 1} + \\
\frac{\alpha^5 \cdot [(kaccy - h_y) \cdot L_0(\zeta) + (kaccy - (h + apk)y) \cdot L_{n-1}(\zeta)]}{\zeta^n - 1} + \\
\frac{\alpha^6 \cdot [-\bar{\pi}\pi_x - \bar{b} \cdot \bar{c} + \sum \cdot L_{n-1}(\zeta)]}{\zeta^n - 1}.
\]

Step 8:
Compute full batched polynomial commitment \([F]_{t,\text{out}}\).
\[
[F]_{t,\text{out}} = [t]_{t,\text{out}} + \nu \cdot [pkx]_{t,\text{out}} + \nu^2 \cdot [pky]_{t,\text{out}} + \nu^3 \cdot [b]_{t,\text{out}} + \\
\quad (u \cdot (\zeta - \omega^{n-1}) \cdot (\bar{b} \cdot ((kaccx - pkx)^2 + \alpha \cdot (pky - kaccy)) + \alpha \cdot (1 - \bar{b}) + \nu^3) \cdot [kaccx]_{t,\text{out}} + \\
\quad (u \cdot (\zeta - \omega^{n-1}) \cdot (\alpha \cdot \bar{b} \cdot \bar{c}) \cdot [kaccy]_{t,\text{out}} + \\
\quad (u \cdot \alpha^3 + \nu^3) \cdot [c]_{t,\text{out}} + \\
\quad (u \cdot \alpha^6 + \nu^7) \cdot [acc]_{t,\text{out}}.
\]

\(^9\)We have \(aux(\omega \cdot \zeta^n) = 1\) if \((\omega \cdot \zeta^n) \bar{m}_{\text{wx}} = 1\) and \(aux(\omega \cdot \zeta^n) = \frac{1}{pky} \cdot \frac{\zeta^n - 1}{(\omega \cdot \zeta^n) \bar{m}_{\text{wx}} - 1}\) otherwise.

\(^{10}\)This step can be optimised in obvious ways in order to reduce the number of field operations necessary to compute \(t\).
We choose to include the non-compact formula in this write-up such that the reader is able to follow the linearisation process to a larger extent than via a more compact formula.
Step 9: Computegroup-encoded batch evaluation \([E]_{1,\text{out}}\)

\([E]_{1,\text{out}} = (\ell + \nu \cdot pk + \nu^2 \cdot pky + \nu^3 \cdot \delta + \nu^4 \cdot kaccx + \nu^5 \cdot kaccy + \nu^5 \cdot \epsilon + \nu^5 \cdot \pi \cdot u \cdot \bar{w} \cdot 1)_{1,\text{out}}\)

Step 10: Batch validate all evaluations by checking that the following holds

\(e_{\text{out}}([W_1]_{1,\text{out}} + \omega [W_1]_{1,\text{out}}, [\tau]_{2,\text{out}}) = e_{\text{out}}(\sigma [W_1]_{1,\text{out}} + \omega [W_1]_{1,\text{out}} + [F]_{1,\text{out}} - [E]_{1,\text{out}}, [1]_{2,\text{out}})\)

C Appendix C - Postponed Security Proof for Committee Key Scheme Instantiation

**Theorem 27.** Given the hybrid model SNARK scheme secure for relation \(R \in \{R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}, R_{\text{pa,com}}^{\text{incl}}\}\) as obtained using our two-step compiler in section 4.4 and the aggregatable signature scheme \(AS\) as per instantiation 3 (which fulfills definition 4), with the additional specification that \(\text{aut}_{AS} = v + 1\) and choosing \(v = n - 1\), if we assume that an efficient adversary (against soundness of) \(\text{CKS}_R\) outputs public keys only from the source group \(G_{1,\text{inn}}\), then the committee key scheme \(\text{CKS}_R\) as per instantiation 3 is secure with respect to definition 3.

**Proof.** We prove below the statement only for \(R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}\). The statement can be proven analogously for \(R_{\text{pa,com}}^{\text{incl}}\).

In order to prove perfect completeness for \(\text{CKS}_R\) instantiation 13 using a hybrid model SNARK secure for relation \(R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}\), we note that if \(AS.\text{Verify}(pp, \text{apk}, m, \text{asig}) = 1\) holds, then due to the instantiation for \(\text{CKS}_{R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}}\), \(\text{Verify}\), we have that

\[\text{CKS}_{R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}} . \text{Verify}(pp, rs_{sk}, ck, m, \text{asig}, (\pi_{\text{SNARK}}, \text{apk})), (\text{bit})_{i=1}^{n-1} = 1\]

iff, in turn,

\[\text{SNARK. Verify}(rs_{sk}, (ck, (\text{bit})_{i=1}^{n-1}), 0, \text{apk}), \pi_{\text{SNARK}}, R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}} = 1 \quad (1)\]

holds. Using the fact that the keys \(rs_{sk}\) and \((rs_{pk}, rs_{sk})\) for our hybrid model SNARK were generated correctly using \(\text{SNARK. Setup}(r, 3w)\) and respectively \(\text{SNARK. KeyGen}(rs_{sk}, R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}})\), also since \((\text{pk})_{i=1}^{n-1} \in \mathbb{G}_{1,\text{inn}}^{n-1}\) as honestly generated by \(AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}\), then

\((x = (ck, (\text{bit})_{i=1}^{n-1}), 0, \text{apk}), w = (\text{pk})_{i=1}^{n-1} \in R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}\)

(because \(\text{apk} = \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \text{bit}_i \cdot \text{pk}_i\) due to instantiation 2 and \(ck\) was honestly generated as \(\text{Com}(\text{pk})_{i=1}^{n-1}\)) as a pair of binding polynomial commitments to the \(x\) and \(y\) coordinates of the keys in \(w\), respectively)

and, finally, adding that the proof \(\pi_{\text{SNARK}}\) was generated correctly as

\[\pi_{\text{SNARK}} \leftarrow \text{SNARK. Prove}(rs_{pk}, (x, w), R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}})\]

then, by the perfect completeness property of the hybrid model SNARK for relation \(R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}\), we can conclude (1).

The proof for the soundness property is described below. Let \(\mathcal{A}\) be an efficient adversary that, whenever it outputs a vector of public keys \((\text{pk})_{i=1}^{n-1}\), the respective vector belongs to the set \(G_{1,\text{inn}}^{n-1}\). Assuming that the following holds

\[\text{CKS}_{R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}} . \text{Verify}(pp, rs_{sk}, ck, m, \text{asig}, \pi = (\pi_{\text{SNARK}}, \text{apk}')), (\text{bit})_{i=1}^{n-1} = 1,\]

then, according to instantiation for \(\text{CKS}_{R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}}\), it implies that both

\[AS.\text{Verify}(pp, \text{apk}', m, \text{asig}) = 1 \quad (2)\]
and
\[ \text{SNARK}. \text{Verify}(\pi_{\text{sk}}, (ck, (bit_i))_{i=1}^{n-1}|0, \text{apk}') \), \pi_{\text{SNARK}}, R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}) = 1 \] (3)

hold where \text{apk}' was parsed from \pi. Since \text{ck} was generated correctly as the pair of binding polynomial commitments \( \text{Com}(\pi_{\text{sk}}, (ck, (bit_i))_{i=1}^{n-1}) \) using the vector \( (ck, (bit_i))_{i=1}^{n-1} \) output by the adversary \A (which, as per adversary definition, belongs to \( G_{r, \text{com}}^{\text{incl}} \)) and due to the knowledge soundness property of the SNARK scheme secure for relation \( R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}} \), the knowledge soundness and the computational binding property of the polynomial commitment scheme (since for our \text{CKSR} instantiation we use the KZG commitment scheme), it implies that, with overwhelming probability \( (x = (ck, (bit_i))_{i=1}^{n-1}, \text{apk}') \), \( w = (pk_i)_{i=1}^{n-1} \) \( \in R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}} \). From this, in turn, by the definition of relation \( R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}} \), we obtain that \text{apk}' = \( \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \text{bit}_i \cdot \text{pk}_i \).

Moreover, by the instantiation of aggregatable signature scheme \( \text{AS} \), we have that \( \sum_{i=1}^{n-1} \text{bit}_i \cdot \text{pk}_i = \text{AS.AggregateKeys}(\text{pp}, (\text{pk}_i)_{i=\text{incl}}) \). Hence \text{apk}' = \text{apk}. Finally, due to (2), we conclude that \( \text{AS.Verify}(\text{pp}, \text{apk}, m, \text{asig}) = 1 \)

holds with overwhelming probability (q.e.d.).

\[ \Box \]

D Appendix D - Postponed Security Proof for Light Client Soundness

In this appendix we prove the following theorem:

**Theorem 28.** If \( \text{AS} \) is the secure aggregatable signature scheme defined in instantiation 2 and if \( \text{CKSR} \) is the secure committee key scheme defined in instantiation 13 then, together with the assumptions stated at the beginning of section 5.3.3 and for \( \mathcal{R} \in \{ R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}}, R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}} \}, \) the tuple \((\text{LC.Setup}, \text{LC.GenerateProof}, \text{LC.VerifyProof})\) as instantiated in section 5.3.2 has soundness as formalised in definition 19.

In order to do that, we first state and prove the following:

**Proposition 29.** Given an efficient adversary \A as defined in the soundness game (definition 19) and let \( (\pi, m, C) \) be its corresponding output. Let \( i = \text{epoch}_{\text{ch}}(m) \). Assuming that \( \text{LC.VerifyProof}(\text{pp}_{\text{LC}}, \text{LC.seed}, m, \mathcal{R}) = \text{acc} \)

and \( \text{CheckValidConsensus}(C) = 1 \) and \( \text{HonestThreshold}(t', \text{OGGenerateKeypair}(C)) = 1 \) (i.e., the light client proof \( \pi \) is accepted, \( C \) is a valid consensus view as per definition 17 and for each epoch \( k \) in \( C \), \( \text{PK}_k \) contains at least \( t' \) honest validators), then:

- **Statement A(j):** for \( j < i \), assuming further that \( \text{com}_j = \text{Com}(\text{pk}_j) \), then there exists some honest validator whose key is in \( \text{pk}_j \) such that it signed \( m_j = (j, \text{Com}(\text{pk}_{j+1})) \), except with negligible probability.
- **Statement B(j):** For \( j < i \), if an honest validator whose key is in \( \text{pk}_j \) signed \( m_j \) with \( \text{epoch}_{\text{ch}}(m_j) = j \) and \( \text{IsCommitment}(m_j) = 1 \) then \( m_j = (j, \text{Com}(\text{pk}_{j+1})) \).

**Proof.** (Proposition) We prove the proposition above by induction. Moreover, we prove the proposition only for \( \mathcal{R} = R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}} \). The proposition can be proven analogously for \( \mathcal{R} = R_{\text{ba,com}}^{\text{incl}} \). Proving the base case, namely that \( A(1) \) holds under the assumption G.1. and proving that \( A(j) \) holds if \( B(j-1) \) holds follows a very similar proof structure hence we give complete details only for the latter and add only the differences for the former. We complete the induction step by proving that if \( A(j) \) holds then \( B(j) \) holds.

First proof of the induction step: Assume that statement \( B(j-1) \) holds. We have to prove that \( A(j) \) holds. Due to the assumption that the light client proof \( \pi \) is accepted and due to the definition of step \( j \) in algorithm \text{LC.VerifyProof}, we have that properties (1) and (2) as described below hold, except with negligible probability, where

\[ (\text{CKSR}. \text{Verify}(\text{pp}_{\text{sk}}, \text{rs}_{\text{sk}}, \text{com}_j, m_j, \Sigma(j), (\pi_{\text{SNARK}}, \text{apk}_j), \text{bit}_j) = 1 \) \quad (1) \]

and

\[ (\text{threshold}_j \geq t) \] \quad (2)
Due to instantiation \[13\] (1), in turn, is equivalent to properties (3) and (4) holding, except with negligible probability, where:

\[AS.\text{Verify}(pp, apk_j, m_j, \Sigma(j)) = 1\] (3)

and

\[\text{SNARK.\text{Verify}}(\tau_{sk}, (\text{com}_j, \text{bit}_j||0, apk), \pi_{\text{SNARK}}, \mathcal{R}) = 1\] (4)

By the knowledge soundness property of the hybrid model SNARK for relation \(\mathcal{R}\) and algorithm SNARK.PartInputs defined in section 4.4 (where \(c(pk_j) = \text{incl}(pk_j) = 1\) iff \(pk_j \in G_{i,\text{inn}}^{n-1}\) holds) and since (4) holds and since \(pk_j \in G_{i,\text{inn}}^{n-1}\) holds as a consequence of the fact that the proofs of possession for each of the public keys in \(pk_j\) pass the verification in \(AS.\text{VerifyPoP}\) (which, in turn, holds since \(B(j-1)\) holds plus due to integration assumptions I.1.-I.3. and the definition of IsCommitment), it means that, extractor \(E\) (as described in definition 3.5) can extract \(w\) such that \((x_j = (\text{com}_j, \text{bit}_j||0, apk_j), w = pk') \in \mathcal{R}\), except with negligible probability. In particular, this means \(apk_j = \sum_{k=1}^{n-1} \text{bit}_j(k) \cdot pk'(k)\) and \(\text{Com}(pk') = \text{com}_j\). By the computational binding of the KZG commitment used in defining \(\pi_{\text{PK}}\) and by the fact that \(com_j = \text{Com}(pk_j)\) by assumption (i), we obtain that \(pk' = pk_j\), hence

\[apk_j = \sum_{k=1}^{n-1} \text{bit}_j(k) \cdot pk_j(k)\] (5)

which, in turn, by the definition of aggregatable signature scheme instantiation \(AS\) is equivalent to

\[apk_j = AS.\text{AggregateKeys}(pp, (pk_j(k))_{k=1}^{n-1})\] (6)

Next, we look at (2) which is equivalent to \(\text{HammingWeight}^*(\text{bit}_j) \geq t\) (7) together with the fact that there are at least \(t'\) honest validators in \(pk\) (implied by HonestThreshold\((t', O\text{GenerateKeypair}, C) = 1\)) and the assumption P.2. that \(t + t' \geq v = n - 1\), we obtain that there exists at least an honest validator in \(pk_j\) whose public key is aggregated into \(apk_j\). We denote this as property (8).

Finally, it is clear that due to (3), (6), (8) and since the proofs of possession for each of the public keys in \(pk_j\) pass the verification in \(AS.\text{VerifyPoP}\) (in turn, since \(B(j-1)\) holds and due to integration assumptions I.1.-I.3. and the definition of IsCommitment), the statement \(A(j)\) becomes equivalent to showing that the advantage \(Adv_{\text{multiforge}}(\lambda)\) in the following game is negligible (9), where, in general,

\[Adv_{\text{multiforge}}(\lambda) = \Pr[Game_{\text{multiforge}}(\lambda) = 1]\]

and

\[Game_{\text{multiforge}}(\lambda) :\]

\[pp \leftarrow AS.\text{Setup}(\text{aux}_{\lambda})\]

\[((pk^*_k, \pi^*_k, pp_k, m))_{k=1}^{t'} \leftarrow AS.\text{GenerateKeypair}(pp)\]

\[Q \leftarrow \emptyset\]

\[((pk_k, \pi_k, pp_k, m))_{k=1}^{n} \leftarrow A^{\text{OMSign}}(pp, (pk^*_k, \pi^*_k, pp_k)_{k=1}^{t'})\]

If \(\exists k \in [t']\), \(pk_k \notin \{pk_j\}_{j=1}^{n} \cup (m, pk^*_k) \in Q, \text{ then return } 0\]

For \(i \in [n]\)

\[\text{If } AS.\text{VerifyPoP}(pp, pk, \pi_{pp, i}) = 0 \text{ return } 0\]

\[apk \leftarrow AS.\text{AggregateKeys}(pp, (pk_i)_{i=1}^{n})\]

\[\text{Return } AS.\text{Verify}(pp, apk, m, asig)\]

and

\[OMSign(m_k, pk^*_k) :\]

\[\text{If } pk^*_k \in Q_{\text{key}}\]

\[\sigma_j \leftarrow AS.\text{Sign}(pp, sk^*, m_k)\]

\[Q \leftarrow Q \cup \{(m_k, pk^*_k)\}\]

\[\text{return } \sigma_k\]

\[\text{Else}\]

\[\text{return}\]

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and \(A_{\text{sound}}\) is defined such that \(asig = \sum j\), \(m = m_j\), \(apk = apk_j\) and the public keys output by \(A_{\text{sound}}\) are the non-zero public keys from the vector \((\text{bit}_j(k) \cdot \text{pk}_j(k))_{k=1}^{n-1}\).

We prove statement (9) by contradiction: if we assume the advantage \(Adv_{A_{\text{multiforge}}}(\lambda)\) is non-negligible, then, using a standard hybrid argument and reducing the game \(\text{Game}_{A_{\text{multiforge}}}^{\text{multiforge}}(\lambda)\) to the game \(\text{Game}_{A_{\text{forge}}}^{\text{forge}}(\lambda)\) as per definition 1, the advantage \(Adv_{A_{\text{forge}}}^{\text{forge}}(\lambda)\) is also non-negligible; however, this, in turn, contradicts the fact that the instantiation \(A_S\) is an unforgeable aggregatable signature scheme, hence our proof for \(A(j)\) is complete.

Observation: In the case of the proof for \(A(1)\), the only difference is that the proofs of possession for each of the public keys in \(\text{pk}_1\) pass the verification in \(A_{\text{Sound}}\). VerifyPoP by assumption G.1. By the definition of aggregatable signature scheme \(A_{\text{Sound}}\), as the consequence, \(\text{pk}_1 \in \mathbb{G}^{n-1}\).

Second proof of the induction step: Assume that statement \(A(j)\) holds. Assume by contradiction that \(B(j)\) does not hold, i.e., an honest validator \(HVal\) whose key is in \(\text{pk}_j\) signed \(m_j\) such that \(\text{IsCommitment}(m_j) = 1\) and \(m_j \neq (j, \text{Com}(\text{pk}_j+1))\) (we call this property (10)).

Due to assumption I.3, \(HVal\) does not sign \(m_j\) unless \(HVal\) has a valid consensus view \(C'\) deciding a message \(m'\) with required data \(d_{m'}\) and \(m_j = (j, \text{Com}(\text{NextEpochKeys}(m', d_{m'})))\) (we call this property (11)). By (10) and (11) and the fact that the commitment scheme used to compute \(\text{Com}(\cdot)\) is binding, we obtain:

\[
\text{NextEpochKeys}(m', r_{m'}) \neq \text{pk}_{j+1}^{k+1} \tag{12}
\]

By assumptions I.3. and I.4, there exists in epoch \(j\) of valid consensus view \(C\) some decided message \(m'_j\) with \(\text{epoch}_d(m'_j) = j\) and \(m'_j = \text{Com}(\text{pk}_{j+1})\). Then, by assumption I.1, \(m'_j\) and \(m'\) are incompatible. This, in turn, contradicts assumption C.1. combined with assumption G.2. since \(C\) and \(C'\) decided in epoch \(j\) messages \(m'_j\) and \(m'\), respectively. Hence our initial assumption is false and \(B(j)\) is proven to hold.

\[\square\]

Proof. (Theorem) Given an efficient adversary \(A\) as defined in the soundness game (definition 19) and let \((\pi, m, C)\) be its corresponding output. Let \(i = \text{epoch}_d(m)\). Assuming that

\[
\text{LC. VerifyProof}(\text{pp}_{LC}, \text{LC. seed}, m, R) = \text{acc}
\]

and \(\text{CheckValidConsensus}(C) = 1\) and \(\text{HonestThreshold}(t', \text{OGenerateKeypair}, C) = 1\), then, using proposition 29 we obtain that statement \(B(i-1)\) holds. Then, letting \(m_i = m\) and with an analogous reasoning used for proving the induction step, namely that \(A(j)\) holds when \(B(j)\) holds (please see proof above) we are able to conclude that \(m\) was signed by an honest validator only with negligible probability (q.e.d.).

\[\square\]