Multiple Noisy Private Remote Source Observations for Secure Function Computation

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Abstract—The problem of reliable function computation is extended by imposing privacy, secrecy, and storage constraints on a remote source whose noisy measurements are observed by multiple parties. The main additions to the classic function computation problem include 1) privacy leakage to an eavesdropper is measured with respect to the remote source rather than the transmitting terminals’ observed sequences; 2) the information leakage to a fusion center with respect to the remote source is considered as another privacy leakage metric; 3) two transmitting node observations are used to compute a function. Inner and outer bounds on the rate regions are derived for lossless single-function computation with two transmitting nodes, which recover previous results in the literature, and for special cases that consider invertible functions simplified bounds are established.

I. INTRODUCTION

We consider function computation scenarios in a network with multiple nodes involved. Each node observes a random sequence and all observed random sequences are modeled to be correlated. Recent advancements in network function virtualization [1] and distributed machine learning applications [2] make function computation in a wireless network via software defined networking an important practical problem that should be tackled to improve the performance of future communication systems. In a classic function computation scenario, the nodes exchange messages through authenticated, noiseless, and public communication links, which results in undesired information leakage about the function computed [3]–[5]. Furthermore, it is possible to reduce the amount of public communications [6], [7], e.g., by using distributed lossless source coding (or Slepian-Wolf coding) techniques [8]; see [9]–[13] for several extensions. A decrease in public communications is important also to limit the information about the computed function leaked to an eavesdropper in the same network, i.e., secrecy leakage. In addition to the public messages, an eavesdropper has generally access to a random sequence correlated with other sequences; see [14]–[16] for various secure function computation extensions.

An important addition to the secure function computation model is a privacy constraint that measures the amount of information about the observed sequence leaked to an eavesdropper [17]. Providing privacy is necessary to ensure confidentiality of a private sequence that can be re-used for future function computations [18], [19]. An extension of the results in [17] are given in [20], where two privacy constraints are considered on a remote source whose different noisy measurements are observed by multiple nodes in the same network. The extension in [20] is different from the previous secure and private function computation models due to the posit that there exists a remote source that is the main reason for the correlation between the random sequences observed by the nodes in the network. It is illustrated via practical examples that considering a remote source hinders unexpected decrease in reliability and unnoticed secrecy leakage [19]. Similarly, such a hidden source model is proposed, e.g., in [21] for biometric secrecy and in [22], [23] for user or device authentication problems. It is shown in [20] that with such a hidden source model two different privacy leakage rate values should be limited, unlike a single constraint considered in [17].

We consider a private remote source whose noisy versions are used for secure function computation. The main additions to the problem are to compute one function we consider that two nodes transmit public indices to a fusion center. In [20], for each function computation one node sends a public index to a fusion center. In [17], cases with two transmitting nodes for function computation are considered for a visible source model, whose results are improved in this work for a remote source model with an additional privacy leakage constraint. We provide inner and outer bounds for the single function computation model with two transmitting nodes under one secrecy, two privacy, two storage, and one reliability constraint. We use the output statistics of random binning (OSRB) method [24] to simplify the proofs, as in [20], and further simplify the bounds for invertible functions.

II. SYSTEM MODEL

We consider the function computation model with two transmitting nodes illustrated in Fig. 1. Noisy measurements $\tilde{X}_1^n$ and $\tilde{X}_2^n$ of an independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) remote source $X^n \sim P_X$ through memoryless channels $P_{\tilde{X}_1|X}$ and $P_{\tilde{X}_2|X}$, respectively, are observed by two legitimate nodes in a network. Similarly, other noisy measurements $Y^n$ and $Z^n$ of the same remote source are observed by, respectively, the fusion center and eavesdropper (Eve) through another memoryless channel $P_{Y|Z,X}$. Encoders $Enc_1(\cdot)$ and $Enc_2(\cdot)$ of the legitimate nodes send indices $W_1$ and $W_2$, respectively, to
the fusion center over public communication links with storage rate constraints. The fusion center decoder \( \text{Dec}() \) then uses its observed noisy sequence \( Y^n \) and the public indices \( W_1 \) and \( W_2 \) to reliably estimate a function \( f^n(X_1^n, X_2^n, Y^n) \) such that

\[
f^n(X_1^n, X_2^n, Y^n) = \{ f(X_1, i, X_2, Y_i) \}_{i=1}^n.
\]

(1)

The source and measurement alphabets are finite sets.

A natural secrecy leakage constraint is to minimize the information leakage about the function output \( f^n(X_1^n, X_2^n, Y^n) \) to Eve. However, its analysis depends on the specific function \( f(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot) \) computed, so we impose another secrecy leakage constraint that does not depend on the function used and that provides an upper bound for secrecy leakage for all functions, as considered in [17], [20]. We impose two privacy leakage constraints to minimize the information leakage about \( X^n \) to the fusion center and Eve as well as public storage constraints that minimize the rate of storage for transmitting nodes.

**Definition 1.** A tuple \( (R_s, R_{w,1}, R_{w,2}, R_{t,\text{Dec}}, R_{t,\text{Eve}}) \) is **achievable** if, for any \( \delta > 0 \), there exist \( n \geq 1 \), two encoders, and one decoder such that

\[
\Pr \left[ f^n(X_1^n, X_2^n, Y^n) \neq f^n(X_1^n, X_2^n, Y^n) \right] \leq \delta \quad \text{(reliability)}
\]

\[
I(X_1^n, X_2^n, Y^n; W_1, W_2 | Z^n) \leq n(R_s + \delta) \quad \text{(secrecy)}
\]

\[
\log |W_1| \leq n(R_{w,1} + \delta) \quad \text{(storage 1)}
\]

\[
\log |W_2| \leq n(R_{w,2} + \delta) \quad \text{(storage 2)}
\]

\[
I(X^n; W_1, W_2 | Z^n) \leq n(R_{t,\text{Dec}} + \delta) \quad \text{(privacyDec)}
\]

\[
I(X^n; W_1, W_2 | Z^n) \leq n(R_{t,\text{Eve}} + \delta) \quad \text{(privacyEve). (7)}
\]

The region \( \mathcal{R} \) is the closure of the set of all achievable tuples.

### III. INNER AND OUTER BOUNDS

We first extend the notion of admissibility for a random variable defined in [6] for a single auxiliary random variable to two auxiliary random variables, used in the inner and outer bounds below; see also [17, Theorem 3].

**Definition 2.** A pair of (vector) random variables \( (U_1, U_2) \) is **admissible** for a function \( f(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, Y) \) if \( H(f(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, Y) | U_1, U_2, Y) = 0 \) and both \( U_1 - \tilde{X}_1 - (\tilde{X}_2, Y) \) and \( U_2 - \tilde{X}_2 - (\tilde{X}_1, Y) \) form Markov chains.

Given any \( a \in \mathbb{R} \), define \( [a]^- = \min\{a, 0\} \). We next provide inner and outer bounds for the region \( \mathcal{R} \); see Section IV for a proof sketch.

**Theorem 1.** (Inner Bound): An achievable region is the union over all \( P_Q, P_{V_1|Q}, P_{V_2|Q}, P_{\tilde{X}_1|V_1}, P_{U_2|V_2}, P_{\tilde{X}_2|U_1} \) and \( P_{X_2|U_2} \) of the rate tuples \( (R_s, R_{w,1}, R_{w,2}, R_{t,\text{Dec}}, R_{t,\text{Eve}}) \) such that \((U_1, U_2)\) pair is admissible for the function \( f(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, Y) \) and

\[
R_s \geq \left[ I(U_1, U_2; Z | V_1, V_2, Q) - I(U_1, U_2; Y | V_1, V_2, Q) \right] ^ - \quad \text{and} \quad \text{(14)}
\]

\[
R_{w,1} \geq \left[ I(V_1; \tilde{X}_1 | V_2, Y) + I(U_1; \tilde{X}_1 | V_1, U_2, Y) \right] ^ - \quad \text{and} \quad \text{(9)}
\]

\[
R_{w,2} \geq \left[ I(V_2; \tilde{X}_2 | V_1, Y) + I(U_2; \tilde{X}_2 | V_2, U_1, Y) \right] ^ - \quad \text{and} \quad \text{(10)}
\]

\[
R_{t,\text{Dec}} \geq \left[ I(U_1, U_2; X | Y) \right] ^ - \quad \text{and} \quad \text{(11)}
\]

\[
R_{t,\text{Eve}} \geq \left[ I(U_1, U_2; Z | V_1, V_2, Q) - I(U_1, U_2; Y | V_1, V_2, Q) \right] ^ - \quad \text{and} \quad \text{(13)}
\]

where \( P_{Q,V_1|V_2,U_2,X_1,X_2,Y,Z} \) is equal to

\[
P_{Q|V_1,V_2,U_1,X_1,X_2,Y,Z} \quad \text{(12)}
\]

**Outer Bound:** An outer bound for the region \( \mathcal{R} \) is the union of the rate tuples in (8), (11)-(13), and

\[
R_{w,1} \geq \left[ I(V_1; \tilde{X}_1 | V_2, Y) + I(U_1; \tilde{X}_1 | V_1, U_2, Y) \right] \quad \text{(15)}
\]

\[
R_{w,2} \geq \left[ I(V_2; \tilde{X}_2 | V_1, Y) + I(U_2; \tilde{X}_2 | V_2, U_1, Y) \right] \quad \text{(16)}
\]

over all \( P_Q, P_{V_1|Q}, P_{V_2|Q}, P_{\tilde{X}_1|V_1}, P_{U_2|V_2}, P_{\tilde{X}_2|U_1} \) and \( P_{X_2|U_2} \) such that \((U_1, U_2)\) pair is admissible for the function \( f(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, Y) \) and

\[
(Q, V_1) - U_1 - \tilde{X}_1 - X - (\tilde{X}_2, Y, Z) \quad \text{(17)}
\]

\[
(Q, V_2) - U_2 - \tilde{X}_2 - X - (\tilde{X}_1, Y, Z) \quad \text{(18)}
\]

form Markov chains. One can limit the cardinalities to \( |Q| \leq 2, |V_1| \leq |\tilde{X}_1| + 6, |V_2| \leq |\tilde{X}_2| + 6, |U_1| \leq (|\tilde{X}_1| + 6)^2, \)

\[
|U_2| \leq (|\tilde{X}_2| + 6)^2.
\]

We remark that if the joint probability distribution in (14) is imposed on the outer bound, (15) and (16) recover (9) and (10), respectively, because then \((V_1, U_1) - \tilde{X}_1 - (Y, U_2, V_2) \) and \((V_2, U_2) - \tilde{X}_2 - (Y, U_1, V_1) \) form Markov chains for (14). However, the outer bound that satisfies (17) and (18) defines a rate region that is in general larger than the rate region defined by the inner bound that satisfies (14). Thus, inner and outer bounds generally differ. The results in Theorem 1 recovers
previous results including [17, Theorem 3] and, naturally, also other results that are recovered by these previous results such as the Slepian-Wolf coding problem.

Suppose now we impose the condition that the function \( f(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, Y) \) is invertible, i.e., \( H(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2 | f(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, Y), Y) = 0 \) as discussed in [10], [25]. We provide in Corollary 1 below an achievable rate region for the single-function computation problem with two transmitting nodes when the function \( f(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, Y) \) is invertible. The proof of Corollary 1 follows from Theorem 1 by assigning \( U_1 = \tilde{X}_1, U_2 = \tilde{X}_2, \) and constant \( V_1 \) and \( V_2 \). Note that choosing \( V_1 \) and \( V_2 \) constant results generally in suboptimal rate regions.

**Corollary 1.** The region \( R \) when \( f(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, Y) \) is an invertible function includes the set of all tuples \((R_1, R_{w,1}, R_{w,2}, R_{t,dec}, R_{t,enc})\) satisfying

\[
\begin{align*}
R_0 &\geq [I(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2; Z|Q) - I(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2; Y|Q)]^+ + H(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2|Z) \\
R_{w,1} \geq H(\tilde{X}_1|\tilde{X}_2, Y) \\
R_{w,2} \geq H(\tilde{X}_2|\tilde{X}_1, Y) \\
R_{t,1} + R_{t,2} \geq H(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2|Y) \\
R_{t,dec} \geq I(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2; X|Y) \\
R_{t,enc} \geq [I(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2; Z|Q) - I(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2; Y|Q)]^+ + I(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2; X|Z)
\end{align*}
\]

where \( Q \) is a Markov chain. One can limit the cardinality to \(|Q| \leq 2\).

**IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 1**

**A. Inner Bound Proof Sketch**

**Proof.** The OSRB method [24] is used by applying the steps given in [26, Section 1.6]. Let \((V^n_1, V^n_2, U^n_1, U^n_2, \tilde{X}^n_1, \tilde{X}^n_2, X^n, Y^n, Z^n)\) be i.i.d. according to \( P_{V^n_1V^n_2U^n_1U^n_2\tilde{X}^n_1\tilde{X}^n_2XY} \) that can be obtained from (14) with \( U^n_1 = \tilde{X}^n_1 \) and \( U^n_2 = \tilde{X}^n_2 \) such that the pair \((U^n_1, U^n_2)\) is admissible for a function \( f(\tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2, Y) \), so \((U^n_1, U^n_2)\) is also admissible due to i.i.d. random variables.

To each \( v^n_i \) assign two random bin indices \((F^n_i, W^n_i)\) such that \( F^n_i = \{1 : 2^{nR^n_i}\} \) and \( W^n_i = \{1 : 2^{nR^n_i}\} \). Furthermore, to each \( u^n_i \) assign two random indices \((F^n_i, W^n_i)\) such that \( F^n_i = \{1 : 2^{nR^n_i}\} \) and \( W^n_i = \{1 : 2^{nR^n_i}\} \). Similarly, random indices \((F^n_2, W^n_2)\) and \((F^n_2, W^n_2)\) are assigned to each \( v^n_2 \) and \( u^n_2 \), respectively. The indices \( F^n_1 = (F^n_1, W^n_1) \) and \( F^n_2 = (F^n_2, W^n_2) \) represent the public choice of two encoders and one decoder, whereas \( W^n_1 = (W^n_1, W^n_1) \) and \( W^n_2 = (W^n_2, W^n_2) \) are the public messages sent by the encoders \( Enc_1(\cdot) \) and \( Enc_2(\cdot) \), respectively, to the fusion center.

We consider the following decoding order: 1) observing \((Y^n, F_1^n, W_1^n)\), the decoder \( Dec(\cdot) \) estimates \( V_1^n \) as \( \tilde{V}_1^n \); 2) observing \((Y^n, \tilde{V}_1^n, F_2^n, W_2^n)\), the decoder estimates \( V_2^n \) as \( \tilde{V}_2^n \); 3) observing \((Y^n, \tilde{V}_1^n, \tilde{V}_2^n, F_1^n, W_1^n)\), the decoder estimates \( U_1^n \) as \( \tilde{U}_1^n \); 4) observing \((Y^n, \tilde{V}_1^n, \tilde{V}_2^n, \tilde{U}_1^n, F_2^n, W_2^n)\), the decoder estimates \( U_2^n \) as \( \tilde{U}_2^n \). By swapping indices 1 and 2 in the decoding order another corner point in the achievable rate region is obtained, so we analyze the given decoding order but also provide the results for the other corner point.

Consider Step 1 in the decoding order given above. Using a Slepian-Wolf (SW) [8] decoder, one can reliably estimate \( V^n_2 \) from \((Y^n, F_1^n, W_1^n)\) such that the expected value of the error probability taken over the random bin assignments vanishes when \( n \to \infty \), if we have [24, Lemma 1]

\[
\tilde{R}_{v_1} + R_{t,1} > H(V_1|Y).
\]

Similarly, Step 2, 3, and 4 estimations are reliable if we have

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{R}_{v_2} + R_{t,2} &> H(V_2|V_1, Y) \\
\tilde{R}_{u_1} + R_{t,1} &> H(U_1|V_1, V_2, Y) \\
\tilde{R}_{u_2} + R_{t,2} &> H(U_2|V_1, V_2, U_1, Y) + H(U_2|V_2, U_1, Y)
\end{align*}
\]

where (a) follows from the Markov chain \( V_1 - U_1 - (U_2, V_2, Y) \). Therefore, (2) is satisfied if (25)-(28) are satisfied.

The public index \( F^n_1 \) is almost independent of \( \tilde{X}^n_1 \), so it is almost independent of \((\tilde{X}^n_1, \tilde{X}^n_2, X^n, Y^n, Z^n)\), if we have [24, Theorem 1]

\[
\tilde{R}_{u_1} < H(V_1|\tilde{X}_1)
\]

because then the expected value, which is taken over the random bin assignments, of the variational distance between the joint probability distributions \( Unif[1 : 2^{nR^n_1}] \cdot P_{X^n} \) and \( P_{F_1, \tilde{X}^n_1} \) to vanish when \( n \to \infty \). Furthermore, the public index \( F^n_2 \) is almost independent of \( \tilde{X}^n_2 \) if we have

\[
\tilde{R}_{v_2} < H(V_2|\tilde{X}_2)
\]

and \( F^n_2 \) is almost independent of \( V^n_2, \tilde{X}^n_2 \) if we have

\[
\tilde{R}_{u_2} < H(U_2|V_2, \tilde{X}_2)
\]

To satisfy (25)-(32), for any \( \epsilon > 0 \) we fix

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{R}_{v_1} &= H(V_1|\tilde{X}_1) - \epsilon \\
\tilde{R}_{v_1} &= I(V_1; \tilde{X}_1) - I(V_1; Y) + 2\epsilon \\
\tilde{R}_{v_2} &= H(V_2|\tilde{X}_2) - \epsilon \\
\tilde{R}_{v_2} &= I(V_2; \tilde{X}_2) - I(V_2; V_1, Y) + 2\epsilon \\
\tilde{R}_{u_1} &= H(U_1|V_1, \tilde{X}_1) - \epsilon \\
\tilde{R}_{u_1} &= I(U_1; \tilde{X}_1|V_1) - I(U_1; V_2, Y|V_1) + 2\epsilon \\
\tilde{R}_{u_2} &= H(U_2|V_2, \tilde{X}_2) - \epsilon \\
\tilde{R}_{u_2} &= I(U_2; \tilde{X}_2|V_2) - I(U_2; U_1, Y|V_2) + 2\epsilon.
\end{align*}
\]
Public Message (Storage) Rates: (34) and (38) result in a public message (storage) rate \( R_w \), of

\[
R_w = R_{w_1} + R_{w_2} \\
\\n(a) \quad I(V_1; \tilde{X}_1 | Y) + H(U_1 | V_1, X_2) - H(U_1 | V_1, \tilde{X}_1) + 4\epsilon \\
\] \[
(b) \quad I(V_1; \tilde{X}_1 | Y) + I(U_1; V_1, X_2) + 4\epsilon \tag{41}
\]

where (a) follows because \( V_1 - \tilde{X}_1 - Y \) form a Markov chain and (b) follows because \( U_1 - (V_1, \tilde{X}_1) - (V_2, Y) \) form a Markov chain. Furthermore, (36) and (40) result in a storage rate \( R_{w_2} \) of

\[
R_{w_2} = R_{w_2} + R_{w_2} \\
\\n(a) \quad I(V_2; \tilde{X}_2 | V_1, Y) + H(U_2 | V_2, X_2) - H(U_2 | \tilde{X}_2, X_2) + 4\epsilon \\
\] \[
(b) \quad I(V_2; \tilde{X}_2 | V_1, Y) + I(U_2; \tilde{X}_2, U_2, Y) + 4\epsilon \tag{42}
\]

where (a) follows from the Markov chain \( V_2 - \tilde{X}_2 - (V_1, Y) \) and (b) from \( U_2 - (\tilde{V}_2, \tilde{X}_2) - (U_1, Y) \). We remark that if the indices 1 and 2 in the decoding order given above are swapped, the other corner point with

\[
R'_{w_1} = I(V_2; \tilde{X}_2 | V_1, Y) + I(U_1; \tilde{X}_1, U_1, V_1, Y) + 4\epsilon \tag{43}
\]

\[
R'_{w_2} = I(V_2; \tilde{X}_2 | V_1, Y) + I(U_2; \tilde{X}_2, U_2, Y) + 4\epsilon \tag{44}
\]

is achieved.

Privacy Leakage to Decoder: We have

\[
I(X^n; W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Y^n) \\
= I(X^n; W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Y^n) + I(X^n; F_1, F_2 | Y^n) \tag{a}
\]

\[
= H(X^n | Y^n) - H(X^n | W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2, V_1^n, V_2^n, U_1^n, U_2^n, Y^n) + 4\epsilon_n \tag{b}
\]

\[
= nI(U_1, U_2; X | Y) + 4\epsilon_n \tag{c}
\]

where (a) follows for some \( \epsilon_n > 0 \) with \( \epsilon_n \to 0 \) when \( n \to \infty \) because

\[
I(X^n; F_1, F_2 | Y^n) \\
= I(X^n; F_1 | Y^n) + I(X^n; F_2 | F_1, Y^n) \\
+ I(X^n; F_2 | F_1, F_1, Y^n) + I(X^n; F_2 | F_1, F_2, Y^n) \leq 4\epsilon_n \tag{46}
\]

since 1) by (29) \( F_1 \) is almost independent of \( (X^n, Y^n) \); 2) by (30) \( F_2 \) is almost independent of \( (V_1^n, X^n, Y^n) \) and because \( V_1^n \) determines \( F_1 \); 3) by (31) \( F_2 \) is almost independent of \( (U_1^n, V_1^n, X^n, Y^n) \) and because \( V_1^n \) determines \( F_1 \); 4) by (32) \( F_2 \) is almost independent of \( (V_2^n, U_1^n, V_2^n, X^n, Y^n) \) and because \( V_1^n, U_1^n \) determine \( F_1 \); \( F_2 \), \( b \) follows because \( (V_1^n, V_2^n, U_1^n, U_2^n) \) determine \( (W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2) \) and from the Markov chains \( V_1^n - U_1^n - (X^n, Y^n, U_1^n, V_2^n) \) and \( V_2^n - U_2^n - (X^n, Y^n, U_1^n) \), and (c) follows because \( (X^n, U_1^n, U_2^n, Y^n) \) are i.i.d.

Privacy Leakage to Eve: We have

\[
I(X^n; W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) \\
= H(W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) - H(W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | X^n) \tag{a}
\]

\[
= H(W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) \\
- H(W_{u_1}, F_{u_1}, W_{u_2}, F_{u_2}, V_1^n, V_2^n | X^n) \\
+ H(V_1^n | W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2, X^n) \\
+ H(V_2^n | W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2, X^n) \tag{b}
\]

\[
\leq H(W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) \\
- H(W_{u_1}, F_{u_1}, W_{u_2}, F_{u_2}, V_1^n, V_2^n | X^n) + 2n\epsilon_n \tag{c}
\]

\[
= H(W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) \\
- H(U_1^n, U_2^n, V_1^n, V_2^n | X^n) + 2n\epsilon_n \tag{d}
\]

\[
= H(W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) - H(U_1^n, U_2^n, V_1^n, V_2^n | X^n) + 4n\epsilon_n \tag{e}
\]

\[
= H(W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) \\
- nH(U_1, U_2, V_1, V_2 | X) + 4n\epsilon_n \tag{f}
\]

where (a) follows because \( (W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2) - X^n - Z^n \)
form a Markov chain, (b) follows since \( (V_1^n, V_2^n) \) determine \( (F_{u_1}, W_{u_1}, F_{u_2}, W_{u_2}) \), (c) follows for some \( \epsilon_n > 0 \) such that \( \epsilon_n \to 0 \) when \( n \to \infty \) because \( (F_{u_1}, W_{u_1}, X^n) \) can reliably recover \( V_1^n \) by (25), and similarly because \( (F_{u_2}, W_{u_2}, V_2^n) \) can reliably recover \( V_2^n \) by (26) both due to the Markov chain \( (V_1^n, V_2^n, X^n) \). (d) follows because \( (U_1^n, U_2^n) \) determine \( (F_{u_1}, W_{u_1}, F_{u_2}, W_{u_2}) \). (e) follows because \( (F_{u_1}, W_{u_1}, V_1^n, V_2^n) \) can reliably recover \( U_1^n \) by (27) and the inequality \( H(U_1 | V_1, V_2, Y) \geq H(U_1 | V_1, V_2, X) \) that follows from

\[
I(U_1; V_1, V_2, X) - I(U_1; V_1, V_2, Y) \\
\geq I(U_1; V_1, V_2, X) - I(U_1; V_1, V_2, Y, X) = 0 \tag{48}
\]

since \( U_1 - (V_1, V_2, X, Y) \) form a Markov chain. Similarly, \( (F_{u_1}, W_{u_1}, V_1^n, V_2^n, X^n) \) can reliably recover \( U_2^n \) by (28) and the inequality \( H(U_2 | V_1, V_2, U_1, Y) \geq H(U_2 | V_1, V_2, U_1, X) \) that can be proved entirely similarly to (48) by using the Markov chain \( U_2 - (V_1, V_2, U_1, X, Y) - Y \), and (f) follows because \( (U_1^n, U_2^n, V_1^n, V_2^n, X^n) \) are i.i.d.

In (47), obtaining single letter bounds on the term \( H(W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) \) requires analysis of numerous decodability cases, whereas there are only six distinct decodability cases analyzed in [20] for secure function computation with a single transmitting node. To simplify our analysis by applying the results in [20], we combine the decoding order Steps 1 and 2 above such that \( (V_1, V_2) \) are treated jointly and, similarly, we combine Steps 3 and 4 such that \( (U_1, U_2) \) are treated jointly. Using the combined steps, we can consider the six decodability cases analyzed in [20, Section V-A] by replacing \( V^n \) with \( (V_1^n, V_2^n) \) and \( U^n \) with \( (U_1^n, U_2^n) \), respectively, in the proof. Since in (47) the second term

\[-nH(U_1, U_2, V_1, V_2 | X)\] can be obtained by applying the same
replacement to the second term in [20, Eq. (54)], we obtain from (47) and these decodability analyses that

\[
I(X^n; W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) \\
\leq n[(I(U_1, U_2; Z | V_1, V_2) - I(U_1, U_2; Y | V_1, V_2) + \epsilon) \\
+ I(U_1, U_2; X | Z)] + 4\epsilon_n' + \epsilon_n''
\] (49)

for some \( \epsilon_n'' > 0 \) such that \( \epsilon_n'' \to 0 \) when \( n \to \infty \).

**Secrecy Leakage (to Eve):** We obtain

\[
I(\tilde{X}_1^n, \tilde{X}_2^n; Y^n; W_1, W_2, F_1, F_2 | Z^n) \\
\leq n[(I(U_1, U_2; Z | V_1, V_2) - I(U_1, U_2; Y | V_1, V_2) + \epsilon) \\
+ nI(U_1, U_2; \tilde{X}_1, \tilde{X}_2 | Z) + 5n\epsilon_n'].
\] (51)

We consider that the public indices \((F_1, F_2)\) are generated uniformly at random and the encoders generate \((V_1^n, U_1^n)\) and \((V_2^n, U_2^n)\) according to \(P_{V_1^n U_1^n V_2^n U_2^n}^{F_1 F_2} F_1, F_2 \) obtained from the binning scheme above. This procedure induces a joint probability distribution that is almost equal to \(P_{V_1 V_2 U_1 U_2}^{F_1 F_2} F_1, F_2\) fixed by (14) [26, Section 1.6]. Since the privacy and secrecy leakage metrics considered above are expectations over all possible realizations \(F = f\), applying the selection lemma [28, Lemma 2.2], these results prove the achievability for Theorem 1 by choosing an \( \epsilon > 0 \) such that \( \epsilon \to 0 \) when \( n \to \infty \). We remark that the achievable region is convexified by using a time-sharing random variable \( Q \) such that \( P_{Q V_1 V_2} = P_Q P_{V_1 | Q} P_{V_2 | Q} \), required because of the \([\cdot]_-\) operation.

**B. Outer Bound Proof Sketch**

**Proof.** Assume that for some \( n \geq 1 \) and \( \delta_n > 0 \), there exist two encoders and a decoder such that (2)-(7) are satisfied for some tuple \((R, R_{w,1}, R_{w,2}, R_{t, Dec}, R_{t, Eve})\). Let \( V_{i,1} \equiv (W_{1,1}, Y_{1,1}, \tilde{Z}_{i-1}) \), \( V_{i,2} \equiv (W_{2,1}, Y_{2,1}, \tilde{Z}_{i-1}) \), \( U_{i,1} \equiv (X_{i-1}, W_{1,2}, Y_{1,2}, Z_{i-1}) \), and \( U_{i,2} \equiv (X_{i-1}, W_{2,2}, Y_{2,2}, Z_{i-1}) \) that satisfy the Markov chains

\[
V_{i,1} - U_{i,1} - \tilde{X}_{i-1} - X_{i} - (\tilde{X}_{i-1}, Y_{i}, Z_{i})
\]

\[
V_{i,2} - U_{i,2} - \tilde{X}_{i-1} - X_{i} - (\tilde{X}_{i-1}, Y_{i}, Z_{i})
\]

**Admissibility of \((U_1, U_2)\):** Define

\[
n\epsilon_n = n\delta_n |\tilde{X}_1| |\tilde{X}_2| |Y| + H_b(\delta_n)
\] (54)

where \( H_b(\delta) = -(1 - \delta) \log(1 - \delta) - \delta \log \delta \) is the binary entropy function such that \( \epsilon_n \to 0 \) if \( \delta_n \to 0 \). Using Fano’s inequality and (2), we obtain

\[
n\epsilon_n \geq H(f^n | \tilde{f}^n - f^n) \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(f_i | \tilde{f}_i)
\]

\[
\geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(f_i | W_{1,i}, W_{2,i}, Y_{i,1}, X_{i-1}^{-1}, Z_{i-1}^{-1})
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(f_i | W_{1,i}, W_{2,i}, Y_{i}^{n}, X_{i-1}^{-1}, Z_{i-1}^{-1}, Y_{i})
\]

\[
\geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(f_i | W_{1,i}, W_{2,i}, Y_{i}^{n}, X_{i-1}^{-1}, Z_{i-1}, Y_i)
\]

\[
= \sum_{i=1}^{n} H(f_i | U_{1,i}, U_{2,i}, Y_i)
\] (55)

where (a) follows from [29, Lemma 2] that proves that when \( n \to \infty \), there exists an i.i.d. random variable \( \tilde{f}^n \) that satisfies both \( H(f^n | \tilde{f}^n) = H(f^n | \tilde{f}^n) \) and the Markov chain \( f^n \to f^n \).
(W_1, W_2, Y^n), (b) follows from the data processing inequality because of the Markov chain \( f^n - (W_1, W_2, Y^n) - f^n \) and permits randomized decoding, (c) follows from the Markov chain

\[
Y_i^{i-1} - (X_i^{i-1}, Z_i^{i-1}, W_1, W_2, Y_i, Y_{i+1}^n) - f_i
\]  \( n \)  \( (56) \)

and (d) follows from the definitions of \( U_{1,i} \) and \( U_{2,i} \).

**Public Message (Storage Rates):** We obtain

\[
n(R_{w_1} + \delta_n) \geq \log |W_1| \geq H(W_1|Y^n) - H(W_1|\tilde{X}_1^n, Y^n) = H(\tilde{X}_1^n|Y^n) - H(\tilde{X}_1^n|W_1, Y^n)
\]

\[= H(\tilde{X}_1^n|Y^n) - \sum_{i=1}^n H(\tilde{X}_{1,i}|\tilde{X}_{1,i}^{i-1}, W_1, Y_i^{i+1}, Y_i)
\]

\[ \leq H(\tilde{X}_1^n|Y^n) - \sum_{i=1}^n H(\tilde{X}_{1,i}|X_{1,i}^{i-1}, Z_{1,i}^{i-1}, W_1, Y_i^{i+1}, Y_i)
\]

\[ \geq H(\tilde{X}_1^n|Y^n) - \sum_{i=1}^n H(\tilde{X}_{1,i}|X_{i-1}^{i-1}, Z_{i-1}^{i-1}, W_1, Y_i^{i+1}, Y_i)
\]

\[ = nH(\tilde{X}_1|Y) - \sum_{i=1}^n H(\tilde{X}_{1,i}|U_{1,i}, Y_i) = \sum_{i=1}^n I(U_{1,i}; \tilde{X}_{1,i}|Y_i)
\]

(57)

where (a) follows by (4), (b) follows from the Markov chain

\[
Y_i^{i-1} - (\tilde{X}_i^{i-1}, W_1, Y_i^{i+1}, Y_i) - \tilde{X}_{1,i}
\]

(58)

c follows from the data processing inequality applied to the Markov chain

\[
(X_i^{i-1}, Z_i^{i-1}) - (\tilde{X}_i^{i-1}, W_1, Y_i^{i+1}, Y_i) - \tilde{X}_{1,i}
\]

(59)

(d) follows from the definition of \( U_{1,i} \), and (e) follows by (52). Similarly, one can show that we have

\[
n(R_{w_2} + \delta_n)
\]

\[ \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ I(V_{2,i}; \tilde{X}_{2,i}|Y_i, V_{1,i}) - I(V_{2,i}; V_{1,i}|\tilde{X}_{2,i}, Y_i) + I(U_{2,i}; \tilde{X}_{2,i}|Y_i, V_{1,i}) - I(U_{2,i}; V_{1,i}|\tilde{X}_{2,i}, Y_i, V_{2,i}) \right].
\]

(60)

Now we consider the sum-rate bound such that

\[
n(R_{w_1} + \delta_n) + n(R_{w_2} + \delta_n) \geq \log |W_1| + \log |W_2|
\]

\[ \geq H(W_1, W_2) \geq I(W_1, W_2; \tilde{X}_1^n, \tilde{X}_2^n) - I(W_1, W_2; Y^n)
\]

\[ \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ I(W_1, W_2; \tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i}, \tilde{X}_1^{i-1}, \tilde{X}_2^{i-1}, Y_i^{i+1}) - I(W_1, W_2; Y_i^{i+1}) \right]
\]

\[ \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ I(W_1, W_2, X_i^{i-1}, Y_i^{i+1}; \tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i}) - I(W_1, W_2, X_i^{i-1}, Y_i^{i+1}; Y_i) \right]
\]

\[ \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ I(U_{1,i}, U_{2,i}; \tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i}) - I(U_{1,i}, U_{2,i}; Y_i) \right]
\]

\[ \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ I(U_{1,i}, U_{2,i}; \tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i}, Y_i) + I(V_{1,i}; V_{2,i}; \tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i}, Y_i) \right]
\]

\[ \geq \sum_{i=1}^n \left[ I(U_{1,i}; \tilde{X}_{1,i}|Y_i, V_{1,i}, V_{2,i}) + I(U_{2,i}; \tilde{X}_{2,i}|Y_i, V_{1,i}) \right]
\]

(61)

where (a) follows by (4) and (5), (b) follows from Csiszár’s sum rate inequality [30], (c) follows because \((X_1^n, \tilde{X}_1^n, Y^n)\) are i.i.d., (d) follows from the data processing inequality applied to the Markov chains

\[
(X_i^{i-1}, Z_i^{i-1}) - (\tilde{X}_i^{i-1}, \tilde{X}_2^{i-1}, W_1, W_2, Y_i^{i+1}) - (\tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i})
\]

(62)

e follows from the definitions of \( U_{1,i} \) and \( U_{2,i} \), (f) and (g) follow from the Markov chain

\[
(V_{1,i}, V_{2,i}) - (U_{1,i}, U_{2,i}) - (\tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i}) - Y_i
\]

(63)

(h) follows from the Markov chain \( V_{1,i} - (U_{1,i}, Y_i, V_{2,i}) - (U_{2,i}, \tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i}) \).
Privacy Leakage to Decoder: We have

\[
\begin{align*}
& n(R_{t,\text{Dec}} + \delta_n) \geq H(W_1, W_2 | Y^n) - H(W_1, W_2 | X^n) \\
& \quad \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ I(W_1, W_2; X_i | X^{i-1}, Y^n_{i+1}) - I(W_1, W_2; Y_i | Y^n_{i+1}, X^{i-1}) \right] \\
& \quad \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ I(W_1, W_2; X_i | X^{i-1}, Z^{-1}, Y^n_{i+1}) - I(W_1, W_2; Y_i | Y^n_{i+1}, X^{i-1}, Z^{-1}) \right] \\
& \quad \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ I(U_{1,i}, U_{2,i}; Y_i) - I(U_{1,i}; U_{2,i}; Y_i) \right] \\
& \quad \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} I(U_{1,i}, U_{2,i}; X_i | Y_i)
\end{align*}
\]

where (a) follows by (6) and from the Markov chain \((W_1, W_2) - X^n - Y^n\), (b) follows from Csiszar’s sum identity, (c) follows from the Markov chain

\[
Z_i^{-1} - (X_i^{-1}, Y^n_{i+1}) - (X_i, Y_i, W_1, W_2) \quad (66)
\]

(d) follows because \((X^n, Y^n, Z^n)\) are i.i.d., (e) follows from the definitions of \(U_{1,i}\) and \(U_{2,i}\), and (f) follows from the Markov chain \((U_{1,i}, U_{2,i}) - X_i - Y_i\).

Privacy Leakage to Eve: We have

\[
\begin{align*}
& n(R_{t,\text{Eve}} + \delta_n) \\
& \quad \geq [H(W_1, W_2 | Z^n) - H(W_1, W_2 | Y^n)] \\
& \quad \quad + [H(W_1, W_2 | Y^n) - H(W_1, W_2 | X^n)] \\
& \quad \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ I(W_1, W_2; Y_i | Y^n_{i+1}, Z^{-1}) - I(W_1, W_2; Z_i | Z^{-1}, Y^n_{i+1}) \right] \\
& \quad \quad + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ I(W_1, W_2; X_i | X^{i-1}, Y^n_{i+1}) - I(W_1, W_2; Y_i | Y^n_{i+1}, X^{i-1}) \right] \\
& \quad \quad \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ I(W_1, W_2; Y_i | Y^n_{i+1}, Z^{-1}) - I(W_1, W_2; Z_i | Z^{-1}, Y^n_{i+1}) \right] \\
& \quad \quad + \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ I(W_1, W_2; X_i | X^{i-1}, Y^n_{i+1}, Z^{-1}) - I(W_1, W_2; Y_i | Y^n_{i+1}, X^{i-1}, Z^{-1}) \right]
\end{align*}
\]

where (a) follows by (7) and from the Markov chain \((W_1, W_2) - X^n - Z^n\), (b) follows from Csiszar’s sum identity, (c) follows from the Markov chain in (66), (d) follows because \((X^n, Y^n, Z^n)\) are i.i.d., (e) follows from the definitions of \(V_{i,1}, V_{i,2}, U_{1,i}\) and \(U_{2,i}\), and (f) follows from the Markov chain \((V_{i,1}, V_{i,2}) - (U_{1,i}, U_{2,i}) - X_i - Z_i\).

Secrecy Leakage to Eve: We obtain

\[
\begin{align*}
& n(R_s + \delta_n) \\
& \quad \geq [H(W_1, W_2 | Z^n) - H(W_1, W_2 | Y^n)] \\
& \quad \quad + [H(W_1, W_2 | Y^n) - H(W_1, W_2 | X^n)] \\
& \quad \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ I(W_1, W_2; Y_i | Y^n_{i+1}, Z^{-1}) - I(W_1, W_2; Z_i | Z^{-1}, Y^n_{i+1}) \right] + H(\tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i} | Y_i) \\
& \quad \quad - H(\tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i} | \tilde{X}^{-1}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}^{-1}_{2,i}, W_1, W_2, Y^n_{i+1}, Y_i) \\
& \quad \geq \sum_{i=1}^{n} \left[ I(W_1, W_2; Y_i | Y^n_{i+1}, Z^{-1}) - I(W_1, W_2; Z_i | Z^{-1}, Y^n_{i+1}) \right] + H(\tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i} | Y_i) \\
& \quad \quad - H(\tilde{X}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}_{2,i} | \tilde{X}^{-1}_{1,i}, \tilde{X}^{-1}_{2,i}, W_1, W_2, Y^n_{i+1}, Y_i)
\end{align*}
\]
Lemma 15.4] to prove the cardinality bounds and apply similar
Q (∼(X₁,i, X₂,i), Y₁) − (X₁,i, X₂,i)

where (a) follows by (3), (b) follows because (X₁,i, X₂,i, Y₁) are i.i.d., and from Csiszár’s sum identity and the Markov chain

\[ Y_{i-1} = (X_{i-1}^1, X_{i-1}^2, W_1, W_2, Y_{i+1}^n, Y_i) - (X_{1,i}, X_{2,i}) \]  

(c) follows because (Yⁿ, Zⁱ) are i.i.d. and from the data processing inequality applied to the Markov chain

\[ (X^{i-1}, Z^{i-1}) = (X_{1,i}^{i-1}, X_{2,i}^{i-1}, W_1, W_2, Y_{i+1}^n, Y_i) - (X_{1,i}, X_{2,i}) \]

(d) follows from the definitions of V₁,i, V₂,i, U₁,i, and U₂,i,

(e) follows from the Markov chain (U₁,i, U₂,i, V₁,i, V₂,i) − (X₁,i, X₂,i) − Yᵢ, and (f) follows from the Markov chain (V₁,i, V₂,i) − (U₁,i, U₂,i) − (X₁,i, X₂,i) − Zᵢ.

Introduce a uniformly distributed time-sharing random variable Q ∼ Unif[1:n] that is independent of other random variables, and define X = X_Q, X₁ = X₁,Q, X₂ = X₂,Q, Y = Y_Q, Z = Z_Q, V₁ = V₁,Q, V₂ = V₂,Q, U₁ = (U₁,Q,Q), U₂ = (U₂,Q,Q), and f = f_Q, so (Q, V₁) − U₁ − X₁ − (X₂, Y, Z) and (Q, V₂) − U₂ − X₂ − (X₁, Y, Z) form Markov chains. The proof of the outer bound follows by letting δᵣ → 0.

Cardinality Bounds: We use the support lemma [30, Lemma 15.4] to prove the cardinality bounds and apply similar steps as in [17], [20], so we omit the proof.

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