From Privacy-Only to Simulatable OT: Black-Box, Round-Optimal, Information-theoretic

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Abstract. We present an information-theoretic transformation from any 2-round OT protocol with only game-based security in the presence of malicious adversaries into a 4-round (which is known to be optimal) OT protocol with simulation-based security in the presence of malicious adversaries.

Our transform is the first satisfying all of the following properties at the same time:
- It is in the plain model, without requiring any setup assumption.
- It only makes black-box usage of the underlying OT protocol.
- It is information-theoretic, as it does not require any further cryptographic assumption (besides the existence of the underlying OT protocol).

Additionally, our transform yields a cubic improvement in communication complexity over the best previously known transformation.

Keywords: oblivious transfer · malicious security · plain model

1 Introduction

Oblivious Transfer (OT), introduced by Rabin [Rab05], is a core primitive in cryptography. Intuitively, an OT protocol considers a sender with input a pair of strings ($s_0, s_1$) and a receiver with input a choice bit $b$. At the end of the protocol, the receiver should learn the string $s_b$ (and nothing more), without the sender obtaining any information about $b$.

Privacy-only OT. Perhaps, the most basic way to define security of OT is to require that the receiver’s messages are computationally indistinguishable when $b = 0$ and when $b = 1$, while the sender’s messages computationally hide $s_1 - b$. An OT protocol satisfying this property in the presence of malicious adversaries is sometimes referred to as privacy-only [HL10]. Privacy-only OT can be constructed from both generic assumptions such as the existence of trapdoor permutations, additively homomorphic encryption and public-key encryption with oblivious public key generation (see, e.g., [BM90,GKM+00]), and concrete assumptions such as Decisional Diffie-Hellman [NP01, AIR01], Quadratic Residuosity and Decisional Composite Residuosity [HK12], and Learning with Errors [BD18]. In particular, 2-round privacy-only OT protocols against malicious adversaries are known under all such assumptions in the plain model.

Simulatable OT. Kilian [Kil92] shows that an ideal “OT oracle” is sufficient to securely compute any cryptographic task. This seminal result has been extended in many different ways [IPS08, IKO+11, BL18, GS18], thus making OT a central tool in cryptography. Unfortunately, privacy-only OT is not sufficient to instantiate an ideal OT oracle, which instead requires a flavour of security known as simulatability. A simulatable OT protocol admits a polynomial-time algorithm, called simulator, that is able to fake transcripts of the real protocol without knowing the inputs of the honest parties, and by only having access to the ideal OT oracle.

To make an OT protocol simulatable, intuitively, one needs to augment the protocol with mechanisms that allow a simulator to extract the inputs of the malicious party from the protocol messages,
as well as to correctly compute the messages from the honest parties without knowing their inputs. When a setup assumption, such as a Common Reference String (CRS) is available, it is possible to transform privacy-only OT to simulatable OT by embedding special trapdoors in the CRS: the simulator can use these trapdoors to “decrypt”/“equivocate” the protocol messages of the malicious/honest party. Indeed, a rich line of work shows that two rounds are sufficient in order to obtain simulatable OT in the CRS model [Gar04,JS07,PVVW08,CKWZ13,DGH+20]. Alternatively, 2-round simulatable OT can be obtained in the Random Oracle Model (ROM) [BR93,CJS14,BPRS17] where parties have oracle access to a truly-random hash function.

**Round-optimal simulatable OT in the plain model.** While two rounds are sufficient to build simulatable OT in the CRS model and in the ROM, Katz and Ostrovsky [KO04] show that four rounds are necessary for simulatable OT in the plain model. The need for four rounds comes from the fact that, without assuming setup, there are no extraction trapdoors that the simulator can use. Hence, to extract the inputs of the malicious party, the simulator must use rewinding, which requires at least three rounds of communication. In the same paper, Katz and Ostrovsky show that four rounds are also sufficient, by providing a simulatable OT protocol from certified trapdoor permutations. Their construction leverages 3-round witness indistinguishable (WI) arguments of knowledge (AoK) and 4-round zero-knowledge (ZK) AoK, to force parties to behave honestly and consistently with the OT protocol.

It is folklore that a similar approach, based on adding general WI/ZK-AoK, could be used to transform any 2-round privacy-only OT to round-optimal simulatable OT. However, the latter would entail unrolling the computation of the underlying OT into a Boolean (or arithmetic) circuit, and using the OT circuit and the transcript as a statement for the WI/ZK proof of consistency; the secret inputs used to compute the transcript would instead be the witnesses for the proof. The AoK property of WI/ZK proofs enables a simulator to extract the witness for the proof by rewinding, whereas the soundness property ensures that the witnesses extracted by the simulator are consistent with the transcript of the underlying privacy-only OT protocol. While very general, such a non-black-box approach requires to unroll the circuit of the OT, hence the complexity of the compiler depends on the circuit complexity of the underlying OT (and not on the security parameter and inputs/outputs of the protocol).

A central question in cryptography is to understand whether a given task can be performed having only black-box access to other cryptographic primitives. Thus, it is natural to ask whether one can provide a general black-box compiler from privacy-only OT to (possibly round-optimal) simulatable OT.

**Black-box round-optimal simulatable OT in the plain model.** When treating the underlying OT as a black-box the main challenge is to add an extraction/rewinding mechanism, from which the simulator can extract values that are consistent with the actual secret inputs played in the OT protocol, and such that the output of the honest parties is distributed identically in the real and ideal world. In fact, Lindell and Pinkas [LP12] show that there are input-dependent attacks that emerge uniquely in the black-box approach. Haitner, Ishai, Kushilevitz, Lindell, and Petrank [Hai08,HIK+11] showed that input-extraction and input-consistency are possible to achieve via cut-and-choose techniques, but unfortunately their compiler requires at least 12 rounds (assuming some steps can be parallelized).

In a different work, Ostrovsky, Richelson and Scafuro [ORS15] provided a 4-round simulatable OT from black-box use of certified trapdoor permutations. Very recently, Friolo, Masny and Venturi...
Table 1. Related works that present simulatable OT in the plain model. Our work is the only one transforming semi-honest OT into 4-round simulatable OT using information-theoretic techniques.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Work</th>
<th>Assumption</th>
<th>Black-box</th>
<th>Round-Optimal</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[KO04]</td>
<td>Certified TDPs</td>
<td>×</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>[HIK+11]</td>
<td>Semi-honest OT</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>[ORS15]</td>
<td>Certified TDPs</td>
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<tr>
<td>[FMV19]</td>
<td>Strongly-uniform OT</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>[CCG+21]</td>
<td>TDPs</td>
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<td>This work</td>
<td>Semi-honest OT</td>
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turi [FMV19] greatly generalized the approach of [ORS15] by exhibiting a compiler that transforms any strongly-uniform\(^7\) 2-round OT protocol into a 4-round simulatable OT. Strong uniformity means that the messages sent by the receiver appear computationally indistinguishable from random to a malicious sender. Importantly, as shown in [FMV19], strongly-uniform OT can be instantiated from the most common number-theoretic assumptions (e.g., DDH, CDH, LPN, Subset Sum, and LWE).

Yet, the compiler of [FMV19] inherits the complexity and significant overhead of its predecessor. Indeed, as in [ORS15], it entails two intermediate transformations: one for achieving simulatability against malicious receivers, and one for achieving simulatability against malicious senders. Each transformation is somewhat complex and requires the use of extractable commitments (to extract the inputs) and black-box commit-and-prove of equality (in particular, a modification of the one built by Kilian [Kil92]) to enforce input consistency w.r.t. the underlying OT. In particular, the resulting communication complexity of this compiler is quartic in the security parameter (i.e., \(O(|\mu_R|^4 + 2|\mu_S|\lambda)\) where \(\mu_R\) is the message sent by the receiver and \(\mu_S\) is the message sent by the sender in the underlying 2-round OT protocol).

More recently, Choudhuri, Ciampi, Goyal, Jain and Ostrovsky [CCG+21] constructed 4-round simulatable OT from black-box use of trapdoor permutations. Their construction still relies on the inefficient transformation from [ORS15] to go from one-sided simulatable to fully simulatable OT.

Hence, the question:

*Does there exist an efficient, information-theoretic, black-box transform from privacy-only OT to round-optimal simulatable OT in the plain model?*

1.1 Our Contribution

In this work, we answer the above question in the positive by providing a simple, black-box, information-theoretic, transformation turning any privacy-only 2-round OT protocol into a round-optimal simulatable OT protocol. We elaborate on our contributions in more details below.

An information-theoretic transform. Our transformation does not require any additional cryptographic assumption besides the existence of privacy-only OT. As a result, our approach is much simpler than previous work and, in fact, yields an improved communication complexity of \(O(|\mu_R|\lambda + |\mu_S|\lambda + \lambda^2)\). In particular, we prove the following theorem:

**Theorem 1 (Main Theorem, informal).** *There is a black-box information-theoretic transformation from any 2-round privacy-only OT protocol to a 4-round simulatable OT protocol in the plain model.*

Towards assuming semi-honest privacy only. From a theoretical perspective, the holy grail in this line of research would be to build a round-optimal simulatable OT protocol that makes black-box usage of any semi-honest privacy-only 2-round OT protocol. While we do not settle this question in the plain model, we do give a positive answer in the ROM as explained below.

\(^7\) Specifically, they require an OT protocol that is strongly-uniform against malicious senders and simulatable in presence of semi-honest receivers.
First, we observe that our compiler only requires privacy against defensible receivers [HIK+11], which is a weaker flavour of privacy than privacy only OT, which is private against malicious receivers. Defensible here refers to the fact that, while a malicious receiver can cheat in the protocol and learn both inputs of the sender without being detected, it should be hard to later convince the sender that it behaved honestly. Second, we prove that any 2-round semi-honest privacy-only OT is necessarily private against malicious senders.

Putting together the above two observations, we can plug into our transform any 2-round OT protocol that is both: (i) private against defensible receivers, and (ii) private against semi-honest senders. Next, we show that in the ROM we can relax the security requirements for the underlying OT even further to just requiring semi-honest privacy against both the sender and the receiver. More in details, we exhibit a transformation turning any 2-round semi-honest privacy-only OT into one satisfying properties (i) and (ii) above. Our transform is round-preserving, and simply requires the receiver to use randomness derived from the output of the random oracle. The programmability of the random oracle is used only in the reduction.

As mentioned earlier, it is well known that if the simulator is allowed to both observe and program the random oracle, it is fairly easy to build a simulatable OT protocol. Yet, since in our transform the random oracle is used only to lift (game-based) privacy against semi-honest receivers to (game-based) privacy against defensible receivers, we believe the gap to fill towards a result in the plain model is much narrower. In other words, future work must only focus on finding a round-preserving transformation from OT with privacy against semi-honest receivers to OT with privacy against defensible receivers in the plain model.

1.2 Our Techniques

As mentioned above, in the black-box setting, the main challenge towards obtaining simulatable OT is to design extraction mechanisms which allow the simulator to extract inputs that are consistent with the ones played by the parties in the real world. The latter is particularly challenging when only 4 rounds of communication are available.

The compiler of Friolo, Masny and Venturi [FMV19] achieves extractability and input consistency by adding black-box commit-and-prove proofs of consistency. In particular, they rely on such proofs for two reasons: (1) to force the receiver to sample one of the messages for the underlying OT protocol uniformly, and (2) to force the sender to create a valid secret sharing of its inputs (without opening the way to input-dependent abort attacks against the receiver), while allowing the simulator to successfully reconstruct both inputs.

In this work, we take a completely different approach. In particular, instead of adding mechanisms to force good behaviour, we only add publicly-verifiable checkpoints to assess good behavior. Public verifiability here means that the checkpoints are verifiable by looking only at the protocol transcript (without requiring access to secret inputs), which avoids attacks based on input-dependent aborts. As a result, we can enforce both extractability and indistinguishability of the simulation, by simply having parties justify some of their actions (when challenged). Thanks to this feature, our transform does not require any additional cryptographic primitives (e.g., commitments), and can be based just on privacy-only OT and threshold secret sharing.

Overview of our compiler. The sender and the receiver engage in \( m \) parallel sessions \((\mu_R^{(i)}, \mu_S^{(i)})\) of the underlying 2-round privacy-only OT protocol, using uniformly random inputs: the receiver uses random choice bits \(b(1), \ldots, b(m)\), whereas the sender uses pairs of random keys \((\kappa_0^{(1)}, \kappa_1^{(1)}), \ldots, (\kappa_0^{(m)}, \kappa_1^{(m)})\). This results in messages \(\mu_R^{(i)}\) which are sent from the receiver to the sender in the first round of the compiled protocol.

In the second round, the sender responds to the messages received from the receiver with its own messages \(\mu_S^{(i)}\) (computed via the underlying 2-round OT protocol), but also selects a random subset \(A\) of \(t_R\) indices in \([m]\) for cut-and-choose: In the third round, for each \(i \in A\), the receiver is asked to
Sim aborts whenever there are more than simulator to obtain good defenses for at least 2/3 of the the alive sessions in the main thread. We call the execution up to this point the minimum number of shares required for reconstruction in the underlying secret sharing scheme). The bit $d_i$ allows to adjust the bit $b_i$ in the i-th session to the choice bit $b$ of the receiver.

We note that, since the underlying OT satisfies privacy against malicious senders, the random bits $b_i$ used by the receiver are computationally hidden, which implies the adjusting bits $d_i$ are computationally close to uniform and hide the receiver’s choice bit $b$ to the eyes of a computationally-bounded malicious sender. Moreover, observe that at the end of the execution of the underlying 2-round OT sessions, the receiver might have already noticed that some of the messages $μ_S^{(i)}$ played by the sender are “bad”, in the sense that they yield an invalid output (we do not make any assumption about how the underlying OT protocol deals with bogus inputs). Hence, in such a case, it seems the receiver should just abort (and rightfully so) instead of continuing with the protocol. Doing so, however, opens the door to attacks based on input-dependent abort. For instance, the sender could plant a single $⊥$ in, say, the $j$-th session, by playing with the inputs $(κ_{0,j}^{(i)}, ⊥)$, and thus learning that $b_j = 0$ in case the receiver did not abort. Later, after observing $d_j$, the sender can compute $b = d_j + b_j$ which is a clear security breach. To prevent this type of attack, in our compiler we never let parties abort depending on their local view. (In fact, up to this point, in our protocol the parties eventually abort only after checking the responses to cut-and-choose challenges, which do not involve secret inputs.)

In the fourth (and last) round, for each $i ∈ B$, the sender reveals the randomness $ρ_S^{(i)}$ and the inputs $(s_{0,i}^{(i)}, s_1^{(i)})$ that explain the message $μ_S^{(i)}$ sent in the $i$-th session. Moreover, it uses the $n$ pairs of keys $(κ_{0,i}^{(i)}, κ_{1,i}^{(i)})$ corresponding to each alive session to mask $n$ shares $s_{0,i}^{(i)}$ and $s_1^{(i)}$ of the actual secret inputs $s_0$ and $s_1$, yielding ciphertexts $(γ_{0,i}^{(i)}, γ_1^{(i)})$; here, we make use of the bits $d_i$ sent by the receiver to align the shares $s_{0,i}^{(i)}$ and $s_1^{(i)}$ with the keys obtained by the receiver in the $i$-th session. Namely, the share $s_{0,i}^{(i)}$ (resp. $s_1^{(i)}$) is encrypted using key $κ_{d_i}^{(i)}$ (resp. $κ_{1,1=0,d_i}^{(i)}$) to create the ciphertext $γ_{d_i}^{(i)}$ (resp. $γ_{1_1=0,d_i}^{(i)}$).

After checking the defenses from the sender, for each alive session, the receiver decrypts the ciphertext $γ_j^{(i)}$ using the key $κ_{b_j}^{(i)}$ previously obtained as output in the $i$-th session, which yields the $i$-th share $s_{b_i}^{(i)}$ of $s_b$ and thus allows to reconstruct $s_b$ using any subset of $t$ shares (where $t$ is the minimum number of shares required for reconstruction in the underlying secret sharing scheme).

We will show how to choose the parameters $m$, $t_R$, $t_S$ and $t$ when discussing the simulator below. Note that the receiver does not check if different subsets of shares lead to different secrets, neither it aborts if in some of the alive sessions it retrieves a bogus string. The only other aborting case in the real world would be when the receiver gets less than $t$ “valid keys”, and thus shares, which however we bound to happen with negligible probability if the number of parallel sessions and the cut-and-choose parameters are set appropriately.

**Simulator for malicious receivers.** Let $R^*$ be a malicious receiver. The simulator $Sim$ starts by running $R^*$ and thus receiving the messages $(μ_R^{(i)})_{i ∈ [m]}$ that the receiver sends in the first round. Hence, it can perfectly simulate the second round $((μ_S^{(i)})_{i ∈ A}, A)$ of the protocol using pairs of random keys $(κ_{0,i}^{(i)}, κ_{1,i}^{(i)})$ for each of the sessions $i ∈ [m] \setminus A$ (as the honest sender would do).

Next, $R^*$ replies with $((γ_R^{(i)})_{i ∈ A}, d_i^{(i)}_{i ∈ Alive}, B)$ where $Alive = [m] \setminus (A \cup B)$ contains all the indices corresponding to alive sessions. We call the execution up to this point the main thread. Now, after checking the defenses from the receiver are good, $Sim$ rewind $R^*$ and forwards it a freshly sampled second round $((μ_S^{(i)})_{i ∈ A'}, A')$. This process is repeated until the cut-and-choose sets $A'$ allows the simulator to obtain good defenses for at least 2/3 of the the alive sessions in the main thread. The $Sim$ aborts whenever there are more than $m/9$ bad defenses.
A combinatorial analysis shows that setting \( m = O(\lambda) \) and \( t_R = t_S = m/3 \) suffices in order to ensure that: (i) the simulator runs in expected polynomial time, and (ii) the simulator aborts with probability that is negligibly close to the probability that the honest party would have aborted in the real world.

At this point, Sim can extract a bit \( b(i) \) for \( 2/3 \) of the alive sessions. This in turn allows to define \( b \) as the value \( b(i) = b(i) \oplus d(i) \) that appears at least \( t/2 \) times, where \( t = 2/3|\text{Alive}| = 2m/9 \). Note that at this point the simulator will have received good defenses for at least \( 2/3 \) of the alive sessions, otherwise the simulator will have aborted. The simulator forwards \( b \) to the OT ideal functionality and completes the simulation with \( R^* \) by using the value \( s_b \) returned from the functionality, along with a uniformly random string \( s_{1-b} \).

The rationale behind the above simulation strategy is that whenever a bit \( b \) appears more than \( t/2 \) times the adversary can only learn the value \( s_b \) or nothing at all. Note that \( R^* \) requires at least \( t \) shares to compute \( s_{1-b} \). Out of the \( m/3 \) sessions in Alive, assume \( R^* \) is able to learn both strings for \( |\text{Alive}| - t = m/9 \) shares. Now if there exist greater than \( t/2 = m/9 \) shares for the bit \( b \), then there exist at most \( m/9 - 1 \) shares for \( s_{1-b} \). Thus the adversary is only able to learn at most \( m/9 + (m/9 - 1) \) shares of \( s_{1-b} \). This allows the simulator to randomly sample \( s_{1-b} \) in the simulation. On the other hand if the adversary plays honestly it learns \( s_b \) as in the real-world protocol.

**Simulator for malicious senders.** The simulator \( \text{Sim} \) for the case of malicious senders is based on similar ideas. Let \( S^* \) be a malicious sender. This time, \( \text{Sim} \) starts by sampling the first round \( (\mu_R^{(i)}{i \in [m]} \) exactly as the honest receiver would do, upon which \( S^* \) replies with \( (\mu_S^{(i)})_{{i \in [m] \backslash A,A}} \). Hence, the simulator generates the third round \( ((\delta_R^{(i)})_{{i \in A}},(\delta_s^{(i)})_{{i \in \text{Alive} \cup B}},(\delta_b^{(i)})_{{i \in \text{Alive}}}) \) as the honest receiver would do, except that the bits \( d(i) \) are picked uniformly at random (as \( \text{Sim} \) does not know \( b \)).

Next, the malicious sender sends the final round \( ((\delta_S^{(i)})_{{i \in B}},(\gamma_0^{(i)},\gamma_1^{(i)})_{{i \in \text{Alive}}}) \). Now, after checking the defenses from the sender are good, \( \text{Sim} \) rewinds \( S^* \) and forwards it a freshly sampled third round \( ((\delta_R^{(i)})_{{i \in A}},(\delta_s^{(i)})_{{i \in \text{Alive} \cup B'}},(\delta_b^{(i)})_{{i \in \text{Alive}}}) \) where \( \text{Alive}' = [m] \backslash (A \cup B') \). This process is repeated until the cut-and-choose sets \( B' \) allows the \( \text{Sim} \) to obtain defenses \( \delta_S^{(i)} = (\kappa_0^{(i)},\kappa_1^{(i)},\rho_S^{(i)}) \) for \( 2/3 \) of the alive sessions in the main thread. An analysis similar to the case of malicious receivers shows that \( \text{Sim} \) runs in expected polynomial time and aborts only with negligible probability.

At this point, the simulator can use the keys \( (\kappa_0^{(i)},\kappa_1^{(i)}) \) for each index corresponding to an alive session for which \( S^* \) showed a good defense, in order to decrypt both ciphertexts \( (\gamma_0^{(i)},\gamma_1^{(i)}) \). This allows \( \text{Sim} \) to extract both \( s_0 \) and \( s_1 \), after re-aligning the index of the shares consistently with the values \( d(i) \) used in the simulation of the main thread. Moreover, the fact that the underlying OT protocol satisfies privacy against malicious senders ensures that the bits \( b(i) \) used by the simulator in the alive session of the main thread are indistinguishable from random, and thus so are the values \( d(i) \) (as in the simulation).

**Defensible privacy and the ROM.** It is not hard to see that the proof for the case of malicious receivers actually only requires the underlying OT protocol to satisfy privacy against defensible (rather than malicious) receivers. Intuitively, this is because the sender can check the defenses of the receiver before sending the messages that contain its actual input.

While many known constructions of 2-round OT satisfy the stronger property of privacy against malicious receivers, we observe that in the ROM one can obtain privacy against defensible receivers from any OT protocol with semi-honest privacy. The idea is to simply force the receiver to use good randomness by hashing a random string along with the choice bit.

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8 Unfortunately, the opposite is not true as the receiver obtains the defenses from the sender after it has already sent the bits \( d(i) \). This is the reason why we need to assume privacy against malicious (rather than defensible) senders for the underlying OT protocol. Nevertheless, recall that we also show the latter property comes for free in the case of 2-round protocols.
1.3 Comparison with Friolo et al. [FMV19]

Besides using a very different approach, which leads to a significantly more efficient compiler, the main difference between our compiler and the one by Friolo et al. [FMV19] is in terms of starting assumptions. Our compiler starts from any 2-round privacy-only OT, whereas [FMV19] starts from any 2-round strongly-uniform OT. While it is tempting to consider the latter as a much weaker assumption than the former and hence the resulting compiler more general, we notice that the two assumptions are somewhat incomparable. To appreciate the difference, first, consider an edge case where we try to instantiate the two compilers using any 2-round universally composable OT protocol. Since universal composability does not necessarily imply strong uniformity, the compiler of [FMV19] would not work. In contrast, our compiler would work as universal composability implies privacy-only.

Also, it is not hard to see that 2-round strongly-uniform OT is not implied by a 2-round semi-honest OT. Indeed, it is easy to come up with a 2-round semi-honest OT that is not strongly uniform. For example, consider the classical 2-round OT construction based on PKE with oblivious key generation instantiated with a contrived PKE where each public key is concatenated with a dummy bit that always equals zero. This PKE scheme still implies a 2-round semi-honest OT, yet the distribution of public keys is far from uniform (and thus the OT protocol is not strongly uniform).

We do acknowledge however that building a 2-round strong uniform semi-honest OT protocol appears to be an easier task than building a 2-round privacy-only OT protocol.

One may wonder whether the compiler of [FMV19] can be simplified if starting with a 2-round privacy-only OT, instead of a strong-uniform OT. For instance, by removing the burden of the commit-and-open protocol on the receiver side. We note that the commit-and-open protocol in [FMV19] is essential to achieve input extraction for both sides, which is required in order to prove simulation-based security. Hence, even when starting with a privacy-only OT protocol, the compiler of [FMV19] cannot forgo the use of commit-and-open (or some other mechanism) for the simulator to extract the inputs.

We refer the reader to Appendix A for a more detailed comparison between the efficiency of our compiler and the one of [FMV19] in terms of communication complexity. For the sake of concreteness, we also discuss there an explicit instantiation of both compilers in the plain model, based on the hardness of LWE. In this case, we can instantiate our compiler using the 2-round OT protocol by Brakerski and Döttling [BD18] (which satisfies privacy against malicious, and hence defensible, receivers and semi-honest senders, and thus suffices for our compiler in Theorem 1). For the compiler in [FMV19], instead, we can use the 2-round strongly-uniform OT protocol based on the PKE scheme by Peikert et al. [PVW08]. As we show, this results in a communication complexity of $\tilde{O}(\lambda^3)$ for our compiler, against $\tilde{O}(\lambda^6)$ for the compiler of [FMV19] (where $\lambda$ is the security parameter).

1.4 Related Work

The compilers in [ORS15,FMV19,CCG+21] yield the only known round-optimal black-box constructions of simulatable OT in the plain model. In this section, we survey other relevant work on black-box constructions for two-party functionalities. Lindell, Oxman and Pinkas [LOP11], relying on ideas from Ishai, Prabhakaran and Sahai [IPS08], provide a significantly more efficient black-box compiler from semi-honest OT to malicious OT, which however takes at least 8 rounds (and thus is not round-optimal). Pass and Wee [PW09] build commitment and zero-knowledge protocols from black-box access to one-way functions. Hazay and Venkitasubramaniam [HV18] improve this result by giving a round-optimal construction. More recently, a rich body of work [Wee10,PW10,GLOV12] culminated in round-optimal black-box constructions for non-malleable commitments [GPR16,GR19], and commit-and-prove [Kiy20].

In the CRS model, Choi, Dachman-Soled, Malkin and Wee [CDMW09] show a black-box compiler from adaptive semi-honest OT into constant-round adaptive UC-secure two-party computation.

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9 See, e.g., [DGH+20] for a concrete example of a 2-round universally composable OT protocol that is not strongly uniform.
We denote with $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ the security parameter. For $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we let $[n] = \{1, \ldots, n\}$. A negligible function, denoted $\text{negl}(\lambda)$, is a function that vanishes faster than the reciprocal of any polynomial $\text{poly}(\lambda)$. We use standard notation for computational/statistical indistinguishability of distribution ensembles.

For an interactive protocol $\Pi$ between parties $A, B$ holding inputs $x, y$ respectively, we denote the transcript of a protocol execution as $(A, B)$. Additionally, we let $\text{View}^\Pi_{A,B}(\lambda, x, y)$ be the random variable corresponding to the view of $A$ in a run of $\Pi$ with input $x$ when interacting with $B$ with input $y$. This view consists of $A$’s input, randomness, and messages received.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

We denote with $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ the security parameter. For $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we let $[n] = \{1, \ldots, n\}$. A negligible function, denoted $\text{negl}(\lambda)$, is a function that vanishes faster than the reciprocal of any polynomial $\text{poly}(\lambda)$. We use standard notation for computational/statistical indistinguishability of distribution ensembles.

For an interactive protocol $\Pi$ between parties $A, B$ holding inputs $x, y$ respectively, we denote the transcript of a protocol execution as $(A, B)$. Additionally, we let $\text{View}^\Pi_{A,B}(\lambda, x, y)$ be the random variable corresponding to the view of $A$ in a run of $\Pi$ with input $x$ when interacting with $B$ with input $y$. This view consists of $A$’s input, randomness, and messages received.

2.2 Oblivious Transfer

Oblivious transfer (OT) is a two-party protocol $\Pi$ in which a sender $S$ has two input strings $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and a receiver $R$ has a choice bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. An OT protocol is called non-trivial if for any pair of strings $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and for any $b \in \{0, 1\}$, after participating in the interactive protocol, $S$ outputs nothing and $R$ learns $s_b$. Below, we recall relevant security notions for OT protocols.

Simulatable OT The standard security definition for OT compares an execution of $\Pi$ in the real world, where an attacker can corrupt either the sender $S$ or the receiver $R$, with an execution in the ideal world where a trusted third party knows all inputs and computes the output on behalf of the players. The corresponding ideal functionality is depicted in Fig. 1. In what follows, we denote by $\text{Real}_{\Pi,R^*}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ (resp., $\text{Real}_{\Pi,S^*}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$) the output of the malicious receiver $R^*$ (resp., sender $S^*$) during a real execution of the protocol $\Pi$ (with $s_0, s_1$ as inputs of the sender, $b$ as choice bit of the receiver, and $z$ as auxiliary input for the adversary), and by $\text{Ideal}_{\text{OT},\text{Sim}^*}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ (resp., $\text{Ideal}_{\text{OT},\text{Sim}^*}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$) the output of the malicious receiver $R^*$ (resp., sender $S^*$) in an ideal execution where the parties (with analogous inputs) interact with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OT}}$, and where the simulator is given black-box access to the adversary.

Definition 1 (Simulatable OT). We say that $\Pi = (S, R)$ securely computes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OT}}$ if the following holds:

- For every non-uniform PPT malicious receiver $R^*$, there exists a non-uniform PPT simulator $\text{Sim}^*$ such that

$$\left\{\text{Real}_{\Pi,R^*}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\right\}_{\lambda, s_0, s_1, b, z} \approx \left\{\text{Ideal}_{\text{OT},\text{Sim}^*}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\right\}_{\lambda, s_0, s_1, b, z},$$

where $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda, b \in \{0, 1\}$, and $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$. 

Fig. 1. Ideal functionality for oblivious transfer

Kiyoshima, Lin and Venkitasubramaniam in [KLV17] provide a unified approach to build black-box protocols under trusted setup assumptions, improving on a previous approach by Hazay and Venkitasubramaniam [HV19]. These works are not round-optimal and are not in the plain model.
For every non-uniform PPT malicious sender \( S^* \), there exists a non-uniform PPT simulator \( \text{Sim} \) such that
\[
\left\{ \text{Real}_{\Pi,S^*(s)}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b) \right\}_{\lambda, s_0, s_1, b, z} \approx \left\{ \text{Ideal}_{\Pi,\text{Sim}^{S^*}(s)}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b) \right\}_{\lambda, s_0, s_1, b, z},
\]
where \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda, b \in \{0, 1\}, \) and \( z \in \{0, 1\}^* \).

Privacy-Only OT A weaker guarantee than simulatable security is the so-called privacy property, which does not require the existence of a simulator. Roughly, privacy for the receiver means that the choice bit is computationally hidden, whereas privacy for the sender means that the receiver can obtain at most one input from the sender. Below, we formalize this notion for different adversarial behaviours and assuming that the input of the players are uniformly random (which will suffice for our purpose).

Semi-honest privacy. The definition below formalizes privacy in the semi-honest setting (i.e., when corrupted parties do not deviate from the protocol).

**Definition 2 (Semi-honest privacy for random inputs).** Let \( \Pi = (S, R) \) be a non-trivial OT protocol. We say that \( \Pi = (S, R) \) is private for random inputs against semi-honest receivers if the following holds:
\[
\left\{ \text{View}_{\Pi,R}^S(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), s_{1-b} \right\}_{\lambda, b} \approx \left\{ \text{View}_{\Pi,R}^S(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), s' \right\}_{\lambda, b}
\]
where \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \ b \in \{0, 1\}, \) and \( s_0, s_1, s' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \). Similarly, \( \Pi \) is private for random inputs against semi-honest senders if the following holds:
\[
\left\{ \text{View}_{\Pi,S}^R(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), b \right\}_{\lambda, s_0, s_1} \approx \left\{ \text{View}_{\Pi,S}^R(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), b' \right\}_{\lambda, s_0, s_1}
\]
where \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \ s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda, \) and \( b, b' \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \).

Malicious privacy. The definition below formalizes privacy in the malicious setting (i.e., when corrupted parties can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol).

**Definition 3 (Malicious privacy for random inputs).** Let \( \Pi = (S, R) \) be a non-trivial OT protocol. We say that \( \Pi \) is private for random inputs against malicious receivers if for every non-uniform PPT malicious receiver \( R^* \):
\[
\left\{ \text{View}_{\Pi,R^*(s)}^S(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), s_{1-b} \right\}_{\lambda, b, z} \approx \left\{ \text{View}_{\Pi,R^*(s)}^S(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), s' \right\}_{\lambda, b, z}
\]
where \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \ b \in \{0, 1\}, \ z \in \{0, 1\}^*, \) and \( s_0, s_1, s' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda \). Similarly, \( \Pi \) is private for random inputs against malicious senders if for every non-uniform PPT malicious sender \( S^* \):
\[
\left\{ \text{View}_{\Pi,S^*(s)}^R(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), b \right\}_{\lambda, s_0, s_1, z} \approx \left\{ \text{View}_{\Pi,S^*(s)}^R(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), b' \right\}_{\lambda, s_0, s_1, z}
\]
where \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N}, \ s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda, \ z \in \{0, 1\}^*, \) and \( b, b' \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \).

Defensible privacy. Following Haitner et al. [Hai08,HIK+11], we call defense by \( R^* \) an input \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) and a random tape \( \rho_S \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \) provided by the receiver at the end of the protocol. Intuitively, a defense is good if the honest receiver using this very input and randomness would have sent the exact same messages as the malicious receiver sent. A similar notion can be considered for the sender, where defenses are of the form \( (s_0, s_1, \rho_S) \) with \( s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \) and \( \rho_S \in \{0, 1\}^* \).
The definition below formalizes the concept of good defense in the special case of 2-round OT protocols, which we model as follows. Let OTR a PPT algorithm taking as input the choice bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and the random tape $\rho_R \in \{0, 1\}^*$ for the receiver, and outputting a message $\mu_R \in \{0, 1\}^*$ for the sender; similarly, let OTS be a PPT algorithm taking as input the strings $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and the random tape $\rho_S \in \{0, 1\}^*$ for the sender, as well as a message $\mu_R \in \{0, 1\}^*$ from the receiver, and outputting a message $\mu_S \in \{0, 1\}^*$ for the receiver. Finally, let OTD be a PPT algorithm taking as input the choice bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and the random tape $\rho_R \in \{0, 1\}^*$ for the receiver, as well as message $\mu_S$ from the sender, and outputting a value $s$ in $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$.

**Definition 4 (Good defense for 2-round OT).** Let $\Pi = (\text{OTR}, \text{OTS}, \text{OTD})$ be a 2-round OT protocol. Fix any transcript $\tau = (\mu_R, \mu_S) \in (\{0, 1\}^*)^2$ for $\Pi$. We say that the pair $\delta_R = (b, \rho_R)$ (resp. $\delta_S = (s_0, s_1, \rho_S)$), where $b \in \{0, 1\}$, constitutes a **good defense** by the receiver (resp. by the sender) for $\tau$ in $\Pi$ if it holds that $\mu_R = \text{OTR}(b; \rho_R)$ (resp. $\mu_S = \text{OTS}(s_0, s_1, \mu_R; \rho_S)$).

Loosely speaking, an OT protocol has defensible privacy if the privacy property holds against malicious adversaries that can provide a good defense.

**Definition 5 (Defensible privacy for random inputs).** Let $\Pi = (S, R)$ be a non-trivial OT protocol. We say that $\Pi$ is private for random inputs against defensible receivers if for every non-uniform PPT malicious receiver $R^*$:

$$\{ \Gamma(\text{View}^S_{H, R^*(z)}(\lambda, (s_0, s_1), b), s_{1-b}) \} \approx_c \{ \Gamma(\text{View}^S_{H, R^*(z)}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), s') \}$$

where $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $b \in \{0, 1\}$, $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $s_0, s_1, s' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and $\Gamma(v, s)$ is set to $(v, s)$ if following the execution $R^*$ outputs a good defense (and to $\bot$ otherwise). Similarly, $\Pi$ is private for random inputs against defensible senders if for every non-uniform PPT malicious sender $S^*$:

$$\{ \Gamma(\text{View}^R_{H, S^*(z)}(\lambda, (s_0, s_1), b), b) \} \approx_c \{ \Gamma(\text{View}^R_{H, S^*(z)}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b), b') \}$$

where $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$, $b, b' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, and $\Gamma(v, s)$ is set to $(v, s)$ if following the execution $S^*$ outputs a good defense (and to $\bot$ otherwise).

### 2.3 Secret Sharing

A threshold secret sharing scheme allows to share an input string $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ into $n$ shares $s_1, \ldots, s_n \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ in such a way that it is possible to efficiently recover $s$ from any subset of at least $t$ shares, while at the same time an attacker corrupting up to $t - 1$ share holders obtains no information about the secret.

**Definition 6 (Secret sharing).** An $(n, t)$-secret sharing scheme over $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$ is defined by a pair of algorithms $(\text{Share}, \text{Recon})$, where $\text{Share}$ is a randomized mapping of an input $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to shares $s = (s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_n) \in (\{0, 1\}^\lambda)^n$, and $\text{Recon}$ is a function mapping a subset $\mathcal{I}$ of $[n]$, along with the corresponding shares $s_{\mathcal{I}} = (s_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$, to a value in $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$, such that the following holds:

1. **Reconstruction.** For all $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and for all sets $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [n]$ with $|\mathcal{I}| \geq t$, the output of $\text{Recon}(\mathcal{I}, s_{\mathcal{I}})$ such that $(s_1, \ldots, s_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s)$ is equal to $s$.
2. **Security.** For all $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and for all sets $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [n]$ with $|\mathcal{I}| < t$, the joint distribution $s_{\mathcal{I}} = (s_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$ of shares received by the subset of parties $\mathcal{I}$, where $(s_1, \ldots, s_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(s)$, is independent of the secret $s$.

We call a share **valid** if it is a $\lambda$-bit string. For our construction, we will implicitly assume that running algorithm $\text{Recon}$ upon input any sequence of $t$ valid shares (possibly outside the support of $\text{Share}$) still yields a $\lambda$-bit message. Note that, e.g., Shamir’s secret sharing [Sha79] satisfies this property.
3 Observations on Two-Round OT

Here, we collect a few observations on 2-round OT protocols. First, in Section 3.1, we show that any 2-round OT protocol with privacy against semi-honest senders is already private against malicious senders. Next, in Section 3.2, we overview existing 2-round OT protocols that satisfy the notion of privacy against defensible receivers. Furthermore, we show a simple compiler in the ROM that adds the latter property to any 2-round OT protocol with semi-honest privacy only.

3.1 Privacy against Malicious Senders

The lemma below states that any 2-round OT protocol with privacy against semi-honest senders is already private against malicious senders. Intuitively, this is the case since in a 2-round OT protocol the only thing a sender can do is to respond to the first message sent by the receiver, however, this does not help to learn the choice bit of the receiver. While we prove the lemma for the case of privacy with random inputs, a similar statement holds for any distribution of the receiver’s choice bit.

**Lemma 1.** Any 2-round OT protocol that is private (for random inputs) against semi-honest senders is also private (for random inputs) against malicious senders.

**Proof.** Recall that the view of the sender consists of the inputs $s_0, s_1$, the random tape $\rho_S$, and the message $\mu_R$ from the receiver. By contradiction, assume that there is a PPT distinguisher $D^*$, a non-uniform PPT malicious sender $S^*$, a pair of strings $s_0, s_1 \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$, and an auxiliary input $z \in \{0,1\}^*$ such that

$$\left| \Pr[D^*((s_0, s_1, \rho_S, \mu_R), b) = 1] - \Pr[D^*((s_0, s_1, \rho_S, \mu_R), b') = 1] \right| \geq 1/\text{poly}(\lambda),$$

where $b, b' \leftarrow \{0,1\}$, $\mu_R \leftarrow \text{OTR}(b)$, and $\rho_S$ is the random tape used by $S^*(z)$.

Consider now the PPT distinguisher $D'$ that upon receiving $((s_0, s_1, \rho_S', \mu_R'), b)$, where $\rho_S' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^*$, $\mu_R' \leftarrow \text{OTR}(b)$, and $b' \in \{b, b'\}$, forwards $\mu_R'$ to $S^*(s_0, s_1; \rho_S')$ and then outputs the same as $D^*((s_0, s_1, \rho_S', \mu_R'), b')$. Notice, that the malicious sender $S^*$ can ignore the provided inputs and random tape. However, since the distribution of $\mu_R'$ and $\rho_S'$ is identical regardless the sender being honest or not, the view of $D^*$ is perfectly simulated. Thus $D'$ breaks privacy of $\Pi$ (for random inputs) against semi-honest senders. This concludes the proof.

3.2 Privacy against Defensible Receivers

Two-round OT protocols (for random inputs) with privacy against defensible receivers exist under standard number-theoretic assumptions, including DDH [NP01,AIR01], QR and DCR [HK12], and LWE [BD18]. In fact, these protocols satisfy the stronger property of privacy against malicious receivers.

In this section, we present a round-preserving transform turning any 2-round OT protocol with semi-honest privacy into one with privacy against defensible receivers in the ROM. Intuitively, our transform ensures that the receiver cannot influence the randomness used to generate the first OT message. This is achieved by hashing the choice bit $b$ along with a random string $\rho_K$ chosen by the receiver. We refer the reader to Appendix B for a formal proof of the statement below.

**Lemma 2.** If there exists a 2-round OT protocol with privacy (for random inputs) against semi-honest senders and receivers, then there exists a 2-round OT protocol with privacy (for random inputs) against defensible receivers and semi-honest senders in the ROM.

---

10 A similar observation appears in [FMV19, p. 12].
Protocol \( \Pi = (S, R) \)

\begin{align*}
\text{Sender’s Input: } & s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \\
\text{Receiver’s Input: } & b \in \{0, 1\} \\
1. & (R \rightarrow S): \text{For each } i \in [m], \text{the receiver picks } b^{(i)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \text{ and } \rho^{(i)}_R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*, \text{let } \mu^{(i)}_R = OTR(b^{(i)}; \rho^{(i)}_R), \text{ and sends } (\mu^{(i)}_R)_{i \in [m]} \text{ to the sender.} \\
2. & (S \rightarrow R): \text{The sender’s first message is computed as follows.} \\
& \text{(a) Sample } \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{t_R} \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \text{ and let } A = \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{t_R}\}. \\
& \text{(b) For each } i \in [m] \setminus A, \text{ pick } \kappa^{(i)}_0, \kappa^{(i)}_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda \text{ and } \rho^{(i)}_S \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*, \text{ and let } \mu^{(i)}_S = OTS(\kappa^{(i)}_0, \kappa^{(i)}_1; \mu^{(i)}_R; \rho^{(i)}_S). \text{ Send } (\mu^{(i)}_S)_{i \in [m] \setminus A} \text{ and } A \text{ to the receiver.} \\
3. & (R \rightarrow S): \text{The receiver’s second message is computed as follows.} \\
& \text{(a) For each } i \in A, \text{ let } \delta^{(i)}_R = (\rho^{(i)}_R, b^{(i)}). \\
& \text{(b) Sample } \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_{t_S} \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \text{ and let } B = \{\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_{t_S}\}. \\
& \text{(c) Let } Alive = [m] \setminus (A \cup B). \text{ For each } i \in Alive, \text{ let } \kappa^{(i)}_b = OTD(\delta^{(i)}; \mu^{(i)}_S; \rho^{(i)}_R) \text{ define } d^{(i)} = b^{(i)} \oplus b. \text{ Send } (\delta^{(i)}_R)_{i \in A} \text{ and } (d^{(i)})_{i \in Alive}, \text{ along with the set } B, \text{ to the sender.} \\
4. & (S \rightarrow R): \text{The sender’s last message is computed as follows.} \\
& \text{(a) For each } i \in A, \text{ check that } \delta^{(i)}_R \text{ is good. If not, abort.} \\
& \text{(b) For each } i \in B, \text{ let } \delta^{(i)}_S = (\kappa^{(i)}_0, \kappa^{(i)}_1; \rho^{(i)}_S). \\
& \text{(c) Let } Alive = n = m - t_R - t_S. \text{ Run } (s^{(i)}_0)_{i \in Alive} \leftarrow Share(s_0) \text{ and } (s^{(i)}_1)_{i \in Alive} \leftarrow Share(s_1) \text{ (i.e., secret share } s_0 \text{ and } s_1 \text{ and assign one share to each of the alive sessions).} \\
& \text{(d) For each } i \in Alive, \text{ let } \gamma^{(i)}_{b \oplus d(i)} = \kappa^{(i)}_0 \oplus s^{(i)}_0 \text{ and } \gamma^{(i)}_{1 \oplus d(i)} = \kappa^{(i)}_1 \oplus s^{(i)}_1. \text{ (Note that this implies } \gamma^{(i)}_{b \oplus d(i)} = \kappa^{(i)}_0 \oplus s^{(i)}_0 \text{ for all } b \in \{0, 1\}.) \text{ Send } (\delta^{(i)}_S)_{i \in B} \text{ and } (\gamma^{(i)}_{b \oplus d(i)}; \gamma^{(i)}_{1 \oplus d(i)})_{i \in Alive} \text{ to the receiver.} \\
5. & \text{(Receiver’s Output:)} \text{The receiver determines the final output as follows. For each } i \in B, \text{ check that } \delta^{(i)}_S \text{ is good. If not, abort. Else, for each } i \in Alive, \text{ let } s^{(i)}_b = \gamma^{(i)}_{b \oplus d(i)} \oplus \kappa^{(i)}_b \text{, pick any subset } I \text{ of } (s^{(i)}_b)_{i \in Alive} \text{ containing at least } t \text{ valid shares, and return } s_b = Recon((s^{(i)}_b)_{i \in I}).
\end{align*}

Fig. 2. Formal description of our black-box compiler

4 Our Compiler

In this section, we show a black-box compiler for obtaining round-optimal simulatable OT starting from any 2-round OT satisfying privacy for random inputs against defensible receivers (cf. Definition 5) and malicious senders (cf. Definition 3). Recall that, by Lemma 1, the latter property follows from privacy for random inputs against semi-honest senders.

4.1 Protocol Description

Let \( \Pi’ = (OTR, OTS, OTD) \) be a 2-round OT protocol. We transform \( \Pi’ \) into a 4-round OT protocol \( \Pi \) as depicted in Fig. 2; see also Fig. 5 on page 29 for a pictorial representation. Intuitively, the protocol \( \Pi \) proceeds as follows:

Round 1: The receiver starts \( m \) parallel sessions of the underlying OT protocol \( \Pi’ \). In each session \( i \in [m] \), it uses a uniformly random choice bit \( b^{(i)} \), which yields a message \( \mu^{(i)}_R \). Hence, it forwards \( \mu^{(i)}_R \) to the sender.

Round 2: The sender picks random indices \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{t_R} \in [m] \) for cut-and-choose, where \( t_R = m/3 \). For the remaining sessions, it picks two random strings \( (\kappa^{(i)}_0, \kappa^{(i)}_1) \) and computes \( \mu^{(i)}_S \) as a response to the message \( \mu^{(i)}_R \) using the underlying OT protocol. Looking ahead, these random strings will serve as masks to hide the input messages in the last round of the protocol. Hence, it forwards the indices \( \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_{t_R} \) and the messages \( \mu^{(i)}_S \) (for all sessions but the ones selected for cut-and-choose).
Recall that a share is called valid if it is a by summing up the above probability over the range of all $j$

Let \( \Pi' = (\text{OTR}, \text{OTS}, \text{OTD}) \) be a 2-round OT protocol with privacy for random inputs against defensible receivers and against malicious senders, and let \((\text{Share}, \text{Recon})\) be a t-out-of-n secret sharing scheme. Then, for parameters \(m, t_R, t_S, t, n\) such that \(m = O(\lambda)\), \(t_R = t_S = n = m/3\) and \(t = 2n/3\), the protocol \(\Pi = (S, R)\) from Fig. 2 securely realizes \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{OT}}\).

To prove the theorem, in the subsections below, we consider separately the cases where the receiver is corrupt and when the sender is corrupt.

### 4.2 Simulator for Malicious Receivers

The simulator Sim, with oracle access to \(R^*\), is defined in Fig 3.

**Definition 3.** Let \( \text{Bad} \subset \text{Alive} \) be a set of indices for which the simulator does not get a defense.

**Lemma 3.** Let \( p \) be a polynomial and let \( 1/p \) be the probability does not abort in the main thread. Conditioned on the fact that Sim did not abort in the main thread, the cardinality of Bad (Definition 7) is strictly less than \( m/9 \) with overwhelming probability.

**Proof.** Let \( \text{Bad}_0 \) be the event that \(|\text{Bad}| \) exceeds or equals \(m/9\). We need to prove that \( \Pr[\text{Bad}_0] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \). To do that, we will first compute the probability of the event as a function of \(m\) and finally show that this probability is negligible for our choice of \(m = O(\lambda)\). Denote by \(j \in [m]\) the number of bad indices in the main thread, so that there are \(m - j\) indices for which \(R^*\) sends good defenses. Note that, for a fixed \(j\), the probability of passing the cut-and-choose without being caught is equal to the ratio between the number of ways to pick only good defenses divided by the total number of ways to select \(t_R = m/3\) out of \(m\) indices, i.e. \((m-j)/(m/3)\). Hence, we can compute the probability of \(\text{Bad}_0\) by summing up the above probability over the range of all \(j\)’s that could make the event happen:

\[ \Pr[\text{Bad}_0] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \]
Putting the above observations together, we can write:

Main thread:

1. Upon receiving $\mu_R^{(1)}, \ldots, \mu_R^{(m)}$ from $R^*$:
   (a) Sample indices $\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m \leftarrow \$ [m]$ and let $A = \{\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m\}$.
   (b) For each $i \in [m] \setminus A$, pick $\kappa_0^{(i)}, \kappa_1^{(i)} \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and $\rho_S^{(i)} \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}^*$, and let $\mu_S^{(i)} = \text{OTS}(\kappa_0^{(i)}, \kappa_1^{(i)}, \rho_S^{(i)})$.
   (c) Send $\mu_S^{(i)}$ (for each $i \in [m] \setminus A$) and $A$ to $R^*$.

2. Upon receiving $((\delta_R^{(i)})_{i \in A}, (d^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}}, B)$ from $R^*$ (where $\text{Alive} = [m] \setminus A \cup B$), check that all defenses $\delta_R^{(i)} = (b^{(i)}, \rho_R^{(i)})$ are good. If not, simulate the sender aborting. Else initialize $\text{Bits} = \emptyset$ and $\text{ctr} = 0$.
   (a) Sample $A' = \{\alpha_1', \ldots, \alpha_m'\}$ randomly as in Item 1a.
   (b) Recompute $\mu_S^{(i)}$ using fresh randomness (for each $i \in [m] \setminus A'$), send these messages along with $A'$ to $R^*$ and receive $((\delta_R^{(i)})_{i \in A'}, B', (d^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}'})$ in response, where $\text{Alive}' = [m] \setminus (A' \cup B')$.
   (c) For every defense $\delta_R^{(i)} = (b^{(i)}, \rho_R^{(i)})$ corresponding to an index $i \in \text{Alive}$ (from the main thread) that was not observed in a previous rewind: If the defense is good add the bit $b^{(i)}$ to the set Bits.
   (d) Increment $\text{ctr} = \text{ctr} + 1$. If $\text{ctr} = 2^\lambda$, abort.
   (e) If $|\text{Bits}| + m/9 < |\text{Alive}|$ go to Item 2a; else proceed to the next step.

3. Complete the simulation in the main thread as follows.
   (a) For each $b^{(i)} \in \text{Bits}$, compute $\hat{b}^{(i)} = b^{(i)} \oplus d^{(i)}$.
   (b) Let $b$ be a bit that appears among the $\hat{b}^{(i)}$ more than $t/2$ times.
   (c) Forward $b$ to $F_{\text{OT}}$ obtaining $s_b \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, sample $s_{b-\text{Bits}} \leftarrow \$ \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and simulate the final message $((\delta_R^{(i)})_{i \in B}, (\gamma_0^{(i)}, \gamma_1^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}'})$ as the honest sender would do.

 Rewind thread:

(a) Sample $A' = \{\alpha_1', \ldots, \alpha_m'\}$ randomly as in Item 1a.
(b) For each $i \in [m] \setminus A'$, sample $s_i \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and let $\mu_S^{(i)} = \text{OTS}(\kappa_0^{(i)}, \kappa_1^{(i)}, \rho_S^{(i)})$.
(c) Send $\mu_S^{(i)}$ (for each $i \in [m] \setminus A$) and $A$ to $R^*$.
(d) Upon receiving $((\delta_R^{(i)})_{i \in A}, (d^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}}, B)$ from $R^*$, check that all defenses $\delta_R^{(i)} = (b^{(i)}, \rho_R^{(i)})$ are good. If not, simulate the sender aborting.

Fig. 3. Simulator against a malicious receiver

− First, whenever $j > 2m/3$ there are less than $m/3$ good defenses, and thus a malicious receiver can never provide good defenses in the second round of the main thread.
− Second, whenever $j < m/9$ there are less than $m/9$ indices for which $R^*$ aborts or sends a bad defense, and thus $|\text{Bad}|$ is strictly less than $m/9$.

Putting the above observations together, we can write:

\[
\Pr[|\text{Bad}| > 0] = \sum_{j = m/9}^{2m/3} \binom{m - j}{m/3} \cdot \frac{\binom{8m/9}{j}}{\binom{m/3}{j}}
\]

(1)

\[
= \frac{(8m/9 + 1)! (m/3)! (2m/3)!}{m! (m/3 + 1)! (5m/9)!}
\]

(2)

\[
= \frac{2m/3 (2m/3 - 1) \cdots (5m/9 + 1)}{m (m - 1) \cdots (8m/9 + 2) \cdot (m/3 + 1)}
\]

(3)
In the above derivation, Eq. (1) follows by shifting the indices of the summation and using the fact that \( \binom{k}{j} = 0 \) for any \( j < k \), Eq. (2) follows by using the column-sum property of the binomial coefficients (i.e., \( \sum_{j=0}^{n} \binom{n}{j} = \binom{n+1}{1} \)), Eq. (3), Eq. (4) and Eq. (5) are routine calculations using the definition of binomial coefficients, Eq. (6) follows by multiplying and dividing for \( 8m/9 + 1 \), and Eq. (7), Eq. (8) and Eq. (9) follow by routine calculations after setting \( k = m/9 \).

Now, since for \( 0 \leq j \leq k \), it holds that \( \frac{5j+1}{5k+1} \leq 2/3 \) and \( \frac{8k+1}{8k+1} \leq 8/3 \cdot (2/3)^{m/9} \), we have obtained \( \Pr[\text{Bad}_0] \leq 8/3 \cdot (2/3)^{m/9} \) which is negligible by our choice of \( m = O(\lambda) \). We can also obtain a tighter probability by approximating Eq. (9) using Stirling’s formula (i.e. \( k! \approx \sqrt{2\pi k} \left(\frac{k}{e}\right)^k \)). In particular:

\[
\frac{(8k+1)}{(3k+1)} \prod_{i=1}^{k} \frac{5k+i}{8k+i} = \frac{(8k+1)}{(3k+1)} \frac{6k+1}{5k+1} \frac{8k!}{9k!} \approx \frac{(8k+1)}{(3k+1)} \frac{\sqrt{6}(6k)^{5k} e^{5k}}{5(5k)^{5k} e^{5k}} \frac{8(8k)^{8k} e^{8k}}{9(9k)^{9k} e^{8k}} \approx \frac{(8k+1)}{(3k+1)} \frac{16\sqrt{6} 8k 14k e^{14k}}{15 5k 9k 14k e^{14k}} = \frac{(8k+1)}{(3k+1)} \frac{16 \sqrt{6} 2^{2k+6} 3^{18k}}{15 5k 3^{18k}} \approx \frac{1}{\frac{20.07m-1.46}{15 5k 3^{2k+1+1}}}
\]

where Eq. (10) is due to the observation that \( \prod_{i=1}^{k} c \cdot k+i = c k! / ((c-1)k)! \), for a constant \( c \). Eq. (11) is from Stirling’s approximation. Eq. (12) and Eq. (13) are by canceling common terms. Finally, Eq. (14) is by taking the limit of \( (8k+1) / (3k+1) \) to be \( 8/3 \) and using \( k = m/9 \).

**Lemma 4.** The above simulator \( \text{Sim} \) runs in expected time that is polynomial in \( m \) and \( \lambda \) except with negligible probability.

**Proof.** Observe that all the steps performed before and after rewinding takes place run in strict polynomial time. Hence, it suffices to bound the number of rewind attempts. Note that the rewind iterations occur only when all defenses \( (\delta_R^{(i)})_{i \in A} \) sent by \( R^* \) in the main thread are good. Assume that this occurs with probability \( p \in (0, 1) \). Since in each rewind iteration the simulator only changes the set \( \mathcal{A}' \) for cut-and-choose and the randomness of the adversary is fixed at this point, the probability with which \( R^* \) does not abort and continues the rewinding is also equal to \( p \).

The goal of the simulator is to receive good defenses for all the indices in \( \text{Alive} \) that are not contained in \( \text{Bad} \). Note that, by Lemma 3, the number of such indices is at least \( |\text{Alive}| - m/9 \) (except
with negligible probability). Upon requesting a defense for an index $i \in \text{Alive}$ for the first time, if the defense is good the simulator adds the bit $b^{(i)}$ to the set $\text{Bits}$. Otherwise it ignores the defense.

Thus, the number of rewind attempts corresponds to repeatedly sampling $t_R = m/3$ indices in $[m]$ until the set $\text{Alive} \setminus \text{Bad}$ is covered. This is a variation of the coupon collector’s problem \cite{Sta90}, where the coupons are collected in groups. The expected number of samples for the naive coupon collector’s problem\cite{FS14} (where we pick one coupon at a time) is $O(m \log m)$, which is also an upper bound on the number of samples needed for the grouped version of the problem (where we pick multiple coupons at a time). Since the receiver continues with probability $p$ in each iteration, the expected number of rewinds is $O(m \log m)/p$.

We can thus bound the expected running time of the simulator as

$$\text{poly}(\lambda, m) \cdot p \cdot (O(m \log m)/p) = \text{poly}(\lambda, m) \cdot O(m \log m) = \text{poly}(\lambda, m),$$

and this concludes the analysis.

**Proof by hybrids.** We next prove by a sequence of hybrids that the distribution of the output of $R^*$ in the real world is computationally close to that in the ideal world with the above defined simulator. The hybrids are described\footnote{Note that the hybrids further depend on the malicious receiver $R^*$ and on the OT protocol $\Pi$, but we omit those to simplify notation.} below:

**Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_1(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$:** This is identical to $\text{Real}_{\Pi, R^*}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$.

**Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_2(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$:** Identical to the previous experiment, except that we now perform the rewinding as done by the simulator before concluding the protocol. More precisely:

1. Upon receiving $\mu_R^{(1)}, \ldots, \mu_R^{(m)}$ from $R^*$ generate $(\mu_S^{(i)})_{i \in \mathcal{A}}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ as in the real world.
2. Upon receiving $((\delta_R^{(i)})_{i \in \mathcal{A}}, (d^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}}, \mathcal{B})$ from $R^*$, check that all defenses $\delta_R^{(i)}$ are good. If not, the sender aborts. Else:
   (a) Initialize $\text{Bits} = \emptyset$ and $\text{ctr} = 0$.
   (b) Rewind the execution back to Item 1a by sampling randomly $\mathcal{A}' = \{\alpha_1', \ldots, \alpha_{t_R}'\}$.
   (c) Recompute $\mu_S^{(i)}$ using fresh randomness (for each $i \in [m] \setminus \mathcal{A}'$, send these messages along with $\mathcal{A}'$ to $R^*$ and receive $((\delta_R^{(i)})_{i \in \mathcal{A}'}, \mathcal{B}', (d^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}'})$ in response, where $\text{Alive}' = [m] \setminus (\mathcal{A}' \cup \mathcal{B}')$.
   (d) For every defense $\delta_R^{(i)} = (b^{(i)}, \mu_R^{(i)})$ corresponding to an index $i \in \text{Alive}$ (from the main thread) that was not observed in a previous rewind: If the defense is good add the bit $b^{(i)}$ to the set $\text{Bits}$.
   (e) Increment $\text{ctr} = \text{ctr} + 1$. If $\text{ctr} = 2^\lambda$, abort.
   (f) If $|\text{Bits}| + m/9 < |\text{Alive}|$ go to Item 2a; else proceed to the next step.
3. Complete the execution of the main thread by generating $((\delta_S^{(i)})_{i \in \mathcal{B}}, (\gamma_0^{(i)}, \gamma_1^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}})$ as in the real world.

**Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_3(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$:** Identical to the previous experiment except for the following difference.

1. When generating the message $((\delta_S^{(i)})_{i \in \mathcal{B}}, (\gamma_0^{(i)}, \gamma_1^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}})$ redefine $\gamma_{1-b^{(i)}} = \tilde{k}_{1-b^{(i)}} \oplus s_{1-b^{(i)}}$ using an independent $\tilde{k}_{1-b^{(i)}} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ (instead of $\kappa_{1-b^{(i)}}^{(i)}$) for each bit $b^{(i)} \in \text{Bits}$ (recall that $\tilde{b}^{(i)} = b^{(i)} \oplus d^{(i)}$).

**Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_4(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$:** Identical to the previous experiment except for the following difference.

1. After successfully completing the rewinding proceed as follows:
   (a) For each $b^{(i)} \in \text{Bits}$, compute $\tilde{b}^{(i)} = b^{(i)} \oplus d^{(i)}$.
   (b) Let $b$ be a bit that appears among the $\tilde{b}^{(i)}$ more than $t/2$ times.
   (c) Forward $b$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OT}}$ obtaining $s_b \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, sample $s'_{1-b} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and simulate the final message $((\delta_S^{(i)})_{i \in \mathcal{B}}, (\gamma_0^{(i)}, \gamma_1^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}})$ as the honest sender would do.
Since the final hybrid is identically distributed to the ideal world with the above defined simulator Sim, it remains to show that the above hybrids are all computationally indistinguishable.

Lemma 5. \[ \{\text{Hyb}_0(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\} \approx \{\text{Hyb}_1(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\}. \]

Proof. We consider two events:

- Event Bad$_1$: The event becomes true whenever $R^*$ sends good defenses in the second round of the main thread, but the size of Bad exceeds or equals $m/9$.
- Event Bad$_2$: The event becomes true whenever $|\text{Bits}| + m/9 < |\text{Alive}|$ after $\text{poly}(\lambda, m)$ rewind attempts.

Note that both of these events will cause $\text{ctr} \geq 2^\lambda$ causing the simulator to abort in Hyb$_1$. This leads to Hyb$_0$ and Hyb$_1$ to be distinguishable and thus by a standard argument it suffices to show that both Bad$_1$ and Bad$_2$ happen with negligible probability.

For Bad$_1$, it follows from Lemma 3, that $|\text{Bad}| < m/9$. Thus $\text{Pr}[\text{Bad}_1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

The event Bad$_2$ is equivalent to saying that after sampling $\text{poly}(\lambda, m)$ times a random subset of $[m]$ of size $m/3$, we fail to collect $|\text{Alive}| - m/9$ good defenses. As we showed in Lemma 4, the latter only happens with negligible probability and thus $\text{Pr}[\text{Bad}_2] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Lemma 6. \[ \{\text{Hyb}_1(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\} \approx \{\text{Hyb}_2(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\}. \]

Proof. The proof proceeds by a hybrid argument. For an index $j \in [m]$, consider the hybrid experiment $\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ in which, for all values $b^{(i)} \in \text{Bits}$ corresponding to a session such that $i \leq j$, the ciphertext $\gamma^{(i)}_{1-b^{(i)}}$ is computed using key $\kappa^{(i)}_{1-b^{(i)}}$, whereas for all values $b^{(i)} \in \text{Bits}$ corresponding to a session such that $i > j$, we use $\kappa^{(i)}_{1-b^{(i)}}$. Clearly, $\text{Hyb}_{1,0}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ is equivalent to $\text{Hyb}_2(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,m}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ is equivalent to $\text{Hyb}_0(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$. Since $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, by the hybrid argument it suffices to prove that each pair of adjacent hybrids are indistinguishable.

Consider the event Good which becomes true when both of the following conditions are met: (i) the set $B$ chosen by $R^*$ in the main thread is such that $j \not\in A \cup B$ (i.e., the $j$-th session is not selected by the malicious receiver or the simulator for cut-and-choose); (ii) The bit $b^{(j)}$ observed in the rewinding corresponding to the $j$-th session is such that $b^{(j)} \in \text{Bits}$. We note that whenever the event Good does not happen, the two hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ are identical. This is because the two experiments only differ in the way the ciphertext $\gamma^{(j)}_{1-b^{(j)}}$ is computed. However, when $j \in B \cup A$ or $b^{(j)} \notin \text{Bits}$, the $j$-th session is either: (i) not alive, or (ii) the receiver did not provide a good defense for this session. The latter implies that either: (i) $\gamma^{(j)}_{1-b^{(j)}}$ is not part of the view of the receiver, or (ii) $\gamma^{(j)}_{1-b^{(j)}}$ is computed exactly in the same way in the two experiments. This means that for all $j \in [m]$, all PPT distinguishers $D^*$, all non-uniform PPT malicious receivers $R^*$, all $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, all $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and all $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$:

$$\left| \Pr \left[ D^* (\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ D^* (\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)) = 1 \right] \right|$$

$$= \left| \Pr \left[ D^* (\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)) = 1 \wedge \text{Good} \right] - \Pr \left[ D^* (\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)) = 1 \wedge \text{Good} \right] \right|.$$

By contradiction, assume that there exists an index $j \in [m]$, a pair of inputs $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$, an auxiliary input $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$, a non-uniform PPT malicious receiver $R^*$, and a PPT distinguisher $D^*$ such that the above distinguishing advantage is at least $1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$. We construct a malicious receiver $R'$ and a distinguisher $D'$ breaking privacy for random inputs against defensible receivers of the 2-round OT protocol $\Pi'$. A description of $R'$ follows. (The distinguisher $D'$ simply runs $D^*$ on the output generated by $R'$.)
1. Run $R^*$, obtaining messages $(\mu_R^{(i)}_{\lambda})_{i \in \{\lambda\}}$. Forward $\mu_R^{(i)}_{\lambda}$ to the challenger, receiving a message $\mu_S^{\lambda}$ as a response.

2. Forward to $R^*$ the messages $(\mu_S^{\lambda})_{i \in \{\lambda\} \setminus A}$, with the only exception that $\mu_S^{(j)}$ is replaced by $\mu_S^{\lambda}$ from the challenger. If $j \in A$ abort; else proceed to the next step.

3. Upon receiving $(\delta^{(i)}_R)_{i \in A}$ from $R^*$, if $j \in B$ abort. Else, continue the simulation as in $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ which in particular yields the set of bits $\text{Bits}$ for all alive sessions in the main thread for which $R^*$ has sent a good defense.

4. If $b^{(j)} \notin \text{Bits}$ (i.e., the receiver did not send a good defense for the $j$-th session), abort. Else, forward the defense $\delta^{(j)}_R = (b^{(j)}, \mu_R^{(j)})$ to the challenger obtaining the challenge $\kappa^\ast$ and complete the simulation of the main thread as described in $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$, except that the key $\kappa^\ast$ is used to generate the ciphertext $\gamma_{1-b^{(j)}}^{(j)} = \kappa^\ast \oplus \gamma_{1-b^{(j)}}^{(j)}$.

5. Output whatever $R^*$ outputs.

Clearly, $R^*$ is efficient. Moreover, the view of $R^*$ in the reduction is identical to that of both $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ up to the resumption of the main thread (at the end of the rewinding phase). This is because the distribution of $\mu_S^{\lambda}$ is identical to that in a run of $\Pi'$ with the honest sender responding to message $\mu_R^{(j)}$ using as input two random keys $s_0^{(j)}, s_1^{(j)} \in \{0, 1\}$.

As for the simulation of the final round in the main thread, we can distinguish two cases:

1. In case the $j$-th session is not alive, the reduction aborts. However, since we are conditioning on the event $\text{Good}$, this only happens with probability $2/3$ (as $j \notin B$).

2. In case the $j$-th session is alive, the reduction aborts if $b^{(j)} \notin \text{Bits}$. However, by definition of $\text{Good}$ this does not happen. Else, in case the $j$-th session is alive and $b^{(j)} \in \text{Bits}$, it is easy to see that depending on $\kappa^\ast = \kappa_{1-b^{(j)}}$ or $\kappa^\ast = \kappa_{1-b^{(j)}}^\ast$ the view of $R^*$ is either identical to the view in $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ or to the view in $\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$.

This finishes the proof.

**Lemma 7.** \(\{\text{Hyb}_2(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\} \approx \{\text{Hyb}_3(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\}\). 

**Proof.** Note that the two experiments only differ in the way the message $((\delta_S^{(i)}_R)_{i \in B}, (\gamma_0^{(i)}, \gamma_1^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}})$ in the final round of the main thread is computed. We can consider the following cases:

1. Both 0 and 1 appear more than $t/2$ times in among the $\hat{b}^{(i)}$.

2. Bit $b$ appears greater than $t/2$ times and $1 - b$ appears less than $t/2$ times among the $\hat{b}^{(i)}$.

We will show that in Case 1, when 0 and 1 appear more than $t/2$ times, a malicious receiver cannot reconstruct either string $s_0$ or $s_1$. Thus the simulation is indistinguishable from the real world.

Assume the number of 0s is $t/2 + k_0$ and the number of 1s is $t/2 + k_1$. Let us assume the worst case, and therefore the adversary learns both the shares for the other sessions. Thus for $n - (t/2 + k_0) - (t/2 + k_1)$ the adversary is able to learn both shares of $s_0$ and $s_1$.

Thus the total number of shares for $s_0$ is $n - (t/2 + k_0) - (t/2 + k_1) + (t/2 + k_0)$ which is $n - t/2 - k_1$ and the number shares for $s_1$ is $n - (t/2 + k_0) - (t/2 + k_1) + (t/2 + k_1)$ which is $n - t/2 - k_0$.

Note that $t = 2n/3$ and therefore the adversary will have received only $2n/3 - k_1$ shares for $s_0$ and $2n/3 - k_0$ shares for $s_1$. Since $t = 2n/3$, the adversary does not have enough shares to learn either $s_0$ or $s_1$.

Now consider Case 2 where bit $b$ appears greater than $t/2$ times and $1 - b$ appears less than $t/2$ times among the $\hat{b}^{(i)}$. Let number of shares for $b$ be $t/2 + k_b$ and number of shares for $1 - b$ be $k_{1-b} \in [1, t/2]$.

This implies the number of indices for which the adversary can learn both shares are $n - (t/2 + k_b + k_{1-b})$. Thus the total number of shares of $s_b$ received by the adversary is $n - (t/2 + k_b + k_{1-b}) + t/2 + k_b = n - k_{1-b}$ and the number of shares for $s_{1-b}$ the adversary can learn as $n - (t/2 + k_b + k_{1-b}) + k_{1-b}$ which is $n - t/2 - k_b$ which is $2n/3 - k_b$. Thus the adversary does not have enough shares to recombine $s_{1-b}$ and since $k_{1-b} < n/3$, the adversary can receive enough shares of $s_b$ to reconstruct correctly.
4.3 Simulator for Malicious Senders

The simulator Sim, with oracle access to $S^*$, proceeds as follows in Figure 4.

**Main thread:**

1. For each $i \in [m]$, pick $b(i) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ and $\rho_R(i) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, compute $\mu_R(i) = \text{OTR}(b(i); \rho_R(i))$ and send $(\mu_R(i))_{i \in [m]}$ to $S^*$.
2. Upon receiving $((\mu_R^S(i))_{i \in [m] \setminus A} \cup A)$ from $S^*$:
   
   (a) For each $i \in A$, let $\delta_R^i = (b(i), \rho_R(i))$.
   
   (b) Sample $\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_S \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \setminus (A) \cup B$ and let $B = \{\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_S\}$.
   
   (c) Let $\text{Alive} = [m] \setminus (\delta_1 \cup B)$. For each $i \in \text{Alive}$, compute $\kappa_R^i = \text{OTD}(b(i), \mu_R(i); \rho_R(i))$ and sample $d(i) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.
   
   (d) Send $((\delta_R^i)_{i \in A}, (d(i))_{i \in \text{Alive}}, B)$ to $S^*$.
3. Upon receiving $((\delta_R^S(i))_{i \in \text{Alive}}, (\gamma_R^i)_{i \in \text{Alive}})$ from $S^*$, check that all defenses $\delta_R^i = (\kappa_R^0, \kappa_R^1, \rho_R^S)$ are good. If not, simulate the receiver aborting. Else initialize $\text{Keys} = \emptyset$ and $\text{ctr} = 0$.

**Rewind thread:**

(a) Sample randomly $B' = \{\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_S\}$ as in Item 2b.

(b) Let $\text{Alive}' = [m] \setminus (A \cup B')$. For $i \in \text{Alive}'$, sample $d(i) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ using fresh randomness, send these values along with $B'$ and $(\delta_R^i)_{i \in \text{Alive}}$ to $S^*$, and receive $((\delta_R^S(i))_{i \in B'})$, $(\gamma_R^i)_{i \in \text{Alive'}}$ in response.

(c) For every defense $\delta_R^S(i) = (\kappa_R^0, \kappa_R^1, \rho_R^S(i))$ corresponding to an index $i \in \text{Alive}$ (from the main thread) that was not observed in a previous rewind: If the defense is good, add the keys $(\kappa_R^0, \kappa_R^1)$ to $\text{Keys}$.

(d) Increment $\text{ctr} = \text{ctr} + 1$ and if $\text{ctr} > 2^\lambda$ abort.

(e) If $|\text{Keys}| < |\text{Alive}| - m/9$ go to Item 3a; else proceed to the next step.

In case either of the two keys is not a $\lambda$-bit string, we assume the defense is bad.

4. For each pair of keys $(\kappa_R^0, \kappa_R^1)$ in $\text{Keys}$, compute $s^0(i) = \kappa_R^0 \xor d(i) \xor d(i)$ and $s^1(i) = \kappa_R^1 \xor d(i) \xor d(i)$ using the adjusting bits $d(i)$ sampled in the main thread. Finally, use these shares to reconstruct $s_0$ and $s_1$, forward $(s_0, s_1)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OT}}$ and output whatever $S^*$ outputs.

**Lemma 8.** The above simulator Sim runs in expected time that is polynomial in $m$ and $\lambda$.

**Proof.** Observe that all the steps performed before and after rewinding takes place run in strict polynomial time. Hence, it suffices to bound the number of rewind attempts. An analysis similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4 shows that the number of rewind iterations corresponds to repeatedly sampling $t_S = m/3$ indices in $[m] \setminus A$ (which has size $2m/3$) until the entire set Alive is covered. Since the receiver does not abort with probability $p$ in each iteration, the expected number of rewind attempts is $O(m \log m)/p$ which implies that the expected running time for the simulator is $\text{poly}(\lambda, m)$.

**Proof by hybrids.** We next prove by a sequence of hybrids that the distribution of the output of $S^*$ in the real world is computationally close to that in the ideal world with the above defined simulator. The hybrids are described below:

**Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_0(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b):$** This is identical to $\text{Real}_{II, S^*}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$.

**Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_1(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b):$** Identical to the previous experiment, except that we now perform the rewinding as done by the simulator before concluding the protocol. More precisely:

1. As in the real world, compute $(\mu_R(i))_{i \in [m]}$ and forward them to $S^*$. 

Fig. 4. Simulator for malicious sender
2. Upon receiving $((\lambda^{(i)}_{S}),_{i\in[m] \setminus A}, A)$ from $S^*$:
   (a) For each $i \in A$, let $\delta_{R}^{(i)} = (b^{(i)} ; \rho^{(i)}_R)$.
   (b) Sample $\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_{\ell_s} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{|A|}$ and let $B = \{\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_{\ell_s}\}$ .
   (c) Let Alive = $[m] \setminus (A \cup B)$. For each $i \in$ Alive, compute $\kappa_{b^{(i)}}^{(i)} = \text{OTD}(b^{(i)} ; \rho^{(i)}_S ; \rho^{(i)}_R)$ and compute $d_i^{(i)} = b_i^{(i)} \oplus b$.
   (d) Send $((\delta_{R}^{(i)})_{i\in A}, (d_i^{(i)})_{i\in\text{Alive}}, B)$ to $S^*$.

3. Upon receiving $((\lambda^{(i)}_{b}),_{i\in B}, (\gamma_{0}^{(i)}, \gamma_{1}^{(i)})_{i\in\text{Alive}})$ from $S^*$, check that all defenses $\delta_{R}^{(i)} = (\kappa_{b^{(i)}}^{(i)}, \kappa_{i}^{(i)}, \rho^{(i)}_S)$ are good. If not, the receiver aborts. Else:
   (a) Initialize Keys = $\emptyset$ and $\text{ctr} = 0$.
   (b) Rewind the execution and sample randomly $B' = \{\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_{\ell_s}\}$ .
   (c) Let Alive = $[m] \setminus (A \cup B')$. For $i \in$ Alive, sample $d_i^{(i)} \leftarrow \{0,1\}$ using fresh randomness, send these messages along with $B'$ and $\delta_{R}^{(i)}$ to $S^*$ and receive $((\lambda^{(i)}_{b}), (\gamma_{0}^{(i)}, \gamma_{1}^{(i)})_{i\in\text{Alive}}$ in response.
   (d) For every defense $\delta_{R}^{(i)} = (\kappa_{0}^{(i)}, \kappa_{1}^{(i)}, \rho^{(i)}_S)$ corresponding to an index $i \in$ Alive (from the main thread) that was not observed in a previous rewind: If the defense is good, add the keys $(\kappa_{0}^{(i)}, \kappa_{1}^{(i)})$ to Keys.
   (e) Increment $\text{ctr}$ and if $\text{ctr} = 2^\lambda$, then abort.
   (f) If $|\text{Keys}| < |\text{Alive}| - m/9$ repeat the above steps using a fresh $B'$ else proceed to the next step.

4. Complete the execution of the main thread by computing $s_b^{(i)} = \gamma_{b^{(i)}}^{(i)} \oplus \kappa_{b^{(i)}}^{(i)}$ for $i \in$ Alive, and use these shares to reconstruct and output $s_b$ as in the real world.

**Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_2(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$**: Identical to the previous experiment except for the following differences:

2(c). Let Alive = $[m] \setminus (A \cup B)$. For each $i \in$ Alive, compute $\kappa_{b^{(i)}}^{(i)} = \text{OTD}(b^{(i)} ; \rho^{(i)}_S ; \rho^{(i)}_R)$ and sample $d_i^{(i)} \leftarrow \{0,1\}$.

4. Compute $s_b^{(i)} = \gamma_{b^{(i)}}^{(i)} \oplus \kappa_{b^{(i)}}^{(i)}$ and use these shares in order to reconstruct $s_b$.

Since the final hybrid is identically distributed to the ideal world with the above defined simulator $\text{Sim}$, it remains to show that the above hybrids are all computationally indistinguishable.

**Lemma 9.** $\{\text{Hyb}_0(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\} \approx \{\text{Hyb}_2(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\}$.

**Proof.** We consider two events:

- **Event $\text{Bad}_3$:** The event becomes true whenever $S^*$ sends good defenses in the third round of the main thread, but the size of Bad exceeds $m/9$ in Item 3d.
- **Event $\text{Bad}_4$:** The event becomes true whenever $|\text{Keys}| < |\text{Alive}| - m/9$ after $\text{poly}(\lambda, m)$ rewind attempts.

Note that the two hybrids are identically distributed conditioning on the above events not happening, and thus by a standard argument it suffices to show that both $\text{Bad}_3$ and $\text{Bad}_4$ happen with negligible probability.

Let us start with event $\text{Bad}_4$. Note that this event is equivalent to saying that after sampling $\text{poly}(\lambda, m)$ times a random subset of $[m] \setminus A$ of size $m/3$, we fail to cover the set Alive of alive sessions in the main thread (which is of size $m/3$). As we showed in Lemma 8, the latter only happens with negligible probability and thus $\text{Pr}[\text{Bad}_4] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

As for event $\text{Bad}_3$, we can do an analysis similar to that in the proof of Lemma 5. In particular, the only difference is that the probability of passing the cut-and-choose with $j$ bad defenses is now $(\binom{2m/3 - j}{m/3})/\binom{2m/3}{m/3}$. Hence:

$$\text{Pr}[\text{Bad}_3] = \sum_{i=m/9+1}^{m/3} \binom{2m/3 - j}{m/3} \approx \frac{2k}{3k + 1} \prod_{i=1}^{k} \frac{2k + i}{5k + i} \approx \frac{1}{20.095 m + 0.435}.$$

By our choice of $m = O(\lambda)$, this finishes the proof.
Lemma 10. \{\text{Hyb}_b(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\} \approx \{\text{Hyb}_b(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)\}.

Proof. We first argue that the computation of $s_b(i)$, for each $i \in \text{Alive}$, is equivalent in the two hybrids. Recall that in $\text{Hyb}_1(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ we have $d(i) = b \oplus b(i)$, and thus the receiver recovers the shares by letting $s_b(i) = \gamma_b(i) \oplus \kappa_b(i) = \gamma_b(b(i)) \oplus \kappa_b(d(i))$. This is equivalent to how $s_b(i)$ is recovered in $\text{Hyb}_2(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$, which allows to choose the values $d(i)$ randomly and independently of $b(i)$. Recall that we implicitly assume the secret sharing scheme satisfies the property that reconstruction works using values that are possibly outside the range of \text{Share} (see discussion after Definition 6), which implies that the above equation is well defined even if $S^*$ uses bogus keys as input of the underlying OT protocol.

The rest of the proof proceeds by a hybrid argument. For an index $j \in [m]$, consider the hybrid experiment $\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ in which for all pairs $(\kappa_0(i), \kappa_1(i)) \in \text{Keys}$ corresponding to a session such that $i \leq j$, we set $d(i) = b(i) \oplus b$, whereas for all pairs $(\kappa_0(i), \kappa_1(i)) \in \text{Keys}$ corresponding to a session such that $i > j$, we set $d(i) \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. Clearly, $\text{Hyb}_{1,0}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ is equivalent to $\text{Hyb}_2(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,m}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ is equivalent to $\text{Hyb}_1(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$. Since $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, by the hybrid argument it suffices to prove that each pair of adjacent hybrids are indistinguishable.

Consider the event Good which becomes true when the set $A$ chosen by $S^*$ in the main thread is such that $j \not\in A$ (i.e., the $j$-th session is not selected by the malicious sender for cut-and-choose). We note that whenever the event Good does not happen, the two hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ are identical. This is because the two experiments only differ in the way the bit $d(j)$ is computed. However, when $j \in A$, the $j$-th session is not alive and thus $d(j)$ is not part of the view of the sender. This means that for all $j \in [m]$, all PPT distinguishers $D^*$, all non-uniform PPT malicious senders $S^*$, all $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, all $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and all $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$:

$$
\begin{align*}
\Pr[D^*(\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)) = 1] &- \Pr[D^*(\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)) = 1] \\
&= \Pr[D^*(\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)) = 1 \land \text{Good}] \\
&\quad - \Pr[D^*(\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)) = 1 \land \text{Good}].
\end{align*}
$$

By contradiction, assume that there exists an index $j \in [m]$, a pair of inputs $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$, an auxiliary input $z \in \{0, 1\}^*$, a non-uniform PPT malicious sender $S^*$, and a PPT distinguisher $D^*$ such that the above distinguishing advantage is at least $1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$. We construct a malicious sender $S'$ and a distinguisher $D'$ breaking privacy for random inputs against malicious senders of the 2-round OT protocol $II'$. A description of $S'$ follows. (The distinguisher $D'$ simply runs $D^*$ on the output generated by $S'$.)

1. Upon receiving a message $\mu_R^j$ from the challenger, run $S^*$ upon input messages $(\mu_R^j)_{j \in [m]}$ that are generated exactly as in $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ with the only exception that $\mu_R^j$ is replaced by $\mu_R^*$ from the challenger.

2. Upon receiving $(\mu_S^j)_{j \in [m] \setminus A, A}$ from $S^*$, if $j \in A$ abort. Else, forward $\mu_S^j$ to the challenger obtaining the challenge $b^*$.

3. Generate the messages $(\delta_R^j)_{j \in A, (\delta_R^j)_{j \in \text{Alive}, B}}$ exactly as in $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ with the only exception that the value $d(j)$ is set to $d(j) = b \oplus b^*$. If $j \in B$ abort; else proceed to the next step.

4. Upon receiving $(\delta_S^j)_{j \in B, (\gamma_0^j, \gamma_1^j)_{j \in \text{Alive}}}$ from $S^*$, continue the simulation as in $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$.

5. Output whatever $S^*$ outputs.

Clearly, $S'$ is efficient. Moreover, the view of $S^*$ in the reduction up to the end of the first round is identical to that of both $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$. This is because the distribution of $\mu_R^j$ is identical to that in a run of $II'$ with the honest receiver using as input a random bit $b(j) \in \{0, 1\}$.

As for the simulation of the third round in the main thread, we can distinguish two cases:
1. In case the $j$-th session is not alive, the reduction aborts. However, since we are conditioning on the event $\text{Good}$, this only happens with probability $2/3$ (as $j \notin A$).

2. In case the $j$-th session is alive, it is easy to see that depending on $b^* = b^{(j)}$ or $b^* = b' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ it holds that either $d^{(j)} = b \oplus b^{(j)}$ or $d^{(j)}$ is uniformly random, and thus the view of $S^*$ is either identical to the view in $\text{Hyb}_{1,j-1}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$ or to the view in $\text{Hyb}_{1,j}(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b)$.

This finishes the proof.

5 Conclusions

We have shown a compiler for turning any 2-round privacy-only (i.e., game-based) OT protocol against malicious adversaries into a round-optimal simulatable OT protocol against malicious adversaries. Our transform is black-box (in that it only uses the underlying 2-round OT protocol as an oracle), information-theoretic (in that it does not rely on cryptographic assumptions), and in the plain model (in that it does not require any form of trusted setup). In fact, our compiler works even assuming the underlying 2-round OT protocol satisfies privacy against semi-honest senders and defensible receivers.

It remains an open problem to find a similar transform (with the same properties) starting with any 2-round OT protocol satisfying only privacy against semi-honest (rather than defensible) receivers. Also, it would be interesting to find simple constructions of 2-round OT protocols in the plain model that are private against defensible receivers, and that rely on hard assumptions from which we do not know how to obtain 2-round OT protocols that are private against malicious receivers (e.g., CDH, LPN, and Subset Sum).

References


13 Crucially, in this proof we cannot distinguish the two cases in which the corresponding defense $\delta^{(j)}$ is either good or bad. Intuitively, this is the reason why we need privacy against malicious (rather than defensible) senders: an attacker not providing a good defense for the $j$-th session could tell apart $d^{(j)}$ from random.


A Efficiency Considerations

In this section, we compare the efficiency of our protocol and the compiler by Friolo, Masny and Venturi [FMV19] in terms of communication complexity.

A.1 Communication Complexity of Our Compiler

We start by evaluating the communication complexity of our protocol from Fig. 2, in terms of the number of repetitions $m$ of the underlying 2-round OT protocol and of the security parameter $\lambda$. For simplicity, we will make the following assumptions: (i) the challenge indices $\alpha_i, \beta_i$ used for cut and choose can be represented as an $m$-bit string; (ii) the defense $\delta_R^{(i)} = (b^{(i)}, p_R^{(i)})$ used by the receiver is of size $|\delta_R| = \lambda + 1$; (iii) the defense $\delta_S^{(i)} = (\kappa_0^{(i)}, \kappa_1^{(i)}, p_S^{(i)})$ used by the sender is of size $|\delta_S| = 3\lambda$; (iv) the messages $(\gamma_0^{(i)}, \gamma_1^{(i)})$ sent by the sender in the last round are of size $|\gamma_0^{(i)}| = |\gamma_1^{(i)}| = \lambda$.

Hence, we can evaluate the communication complexity of our protocol as follows (using the range of parameters suggested in Theorem 2):

1. In the first round, the receiver sends $m$ messages for the underlying 2-round OT protocol, resulting in a total of $m|\mu_R|$ bits.
2. In the second round, the sender forwards the indices for cut-and-choose as well as the response messages for the underlying 2-round OT protocol, resulting in a total of $m + \frac{2m|\mu_S|}{3}$.
3. In the third round, the receiver sends his defenses (consisting of $\frac{m}{3}(\lambda + 1)$ bits) along with the indices for cut and choose and the adjusting bits, resulting in a total of $\frac{4m}{3} + \frac{2\lambda}{3}$ bits.
4. In the final round, the sender sends his defenses as well as the ciphertexts for each of the alive sessions, resulting in a total of $\frac{2m}{3}\lambda + m\lambda = \frac{5m}{3}\lambda$ bits.

Summing up, the total communication complexity (in bits) is:

$$m|\mu_R| + m + \frac{2m|\mu_S|}{3} + \frac{4m}{3} + m\lambda + \frac{5m}{3}\lambda = m|\mu_R| + \frac{2m|\mu_S|}{3} + \frac{7m}{3} + 2m\lambda.$$

Finally, combining the above with the expression for $m$ in Lemma 5, the communication complexity can be simplified to $(|\mu_R| + \frac{2|\mu_S|}{3} + \frac{7}{3} + 2\lambda) \cdot O(\lambda)$, which is $O(|\mu_R|\lambda + |\mu_S|\lambda + \lambda^2)$.

A.2 Comparison with Friolo et al.

Let us start by briefly recalling how the compiler by Friolo, Masny and Venturi [FMV19] works. Their transform is based upon two main ingredients:

- A commit-and-open (C&O) protocol, introduced implicitly in [ORS15]. Informally, a C&O protocol is a 3-round public-coin protocol in which at the end of the first round a malicious prover is committed to at least one of two messages $\sigma_0, \sigma_1$. In the last round, the prover opens the commitment by revealing $\sigma_0, \sigma_1$ without leaking to a malicious verifier which branch (i.e., left or right) corresponds to the committed message.

- A 2-round strongly-uniform semi-honest OT (SUSH-OT) protocol. Informally, such a protocol guarantees simulatability against semi-honest receivers and strong uniformity against malicious senders, where the latter means that the distribution of the receiver’s message is computationally close to uniform even in case the sender is malicious.

- A cut-and-choose technique (used also in [ORS15]) to compile a 4-round OT protocol with receiver-sided simulatability (i.e., where simulatability holds only w.r.t. malicious receivers) to a 4-round OT protocol with full simulatability (i.e., where simulatability holds both w.r.t. malicious senders and receivers).

We are now ready to describe how the compiler from [FMV19] enforces honest behavior of the parties in order to get a simulatable OT protocol.
1. In the first round, the receiver picks a random string $\sigma_{1-b}$ (where $b$ is the choice bit) and uses the C&O protocol in order to commit to this string using branch $1-b$.

2. In the second round, the sender forwards the random challenge for the C&O protocol along with two random strings $\rho_0, \rho_1$.

3. In the third round, the receiver executes the underlying OT protocol with choice bit fixed to $0$, obtaining a message $\mu^{(b)}_R$ that is used in order to define the message $\sigma_b = \mu^{(b)}_R - \rho_0$ required to complete the execution of the C&O protocol in the non-committing branch $b$.

4. In the final round, the sender checks that the opening is correct. If so, it picks random $r_0, r_1$ and runs the sender of the underlying 2-round OT protocol twice: one with input strings $(s_0, r_0)$ and receiver's message $\mu^{(0)}_R = \sigma_0 + \rho_0$, and one with input strings $(s_1, r_1)$ and receiver’s message $\mu^{(1)}_R = \sigma_1 + \rho_1$.

5. Upon receiving the sender’s messages $(\mu^{(0)}_S, \mu^{(1)}_S)$, the receiver learns $s_b$ by running the receiver of the underlying 2-round OT protocol upon input $\mu^{(b)}_S$.

Since the distribution of $\sigma_{1-b}$ is independent from $\rho_{1-b}$, by strong uniformity, one can replace the string $\rho_{1-b} + \sigma_{1-b}$ with the message $\mu^{(1-b)}_R$ resulting from an honest execution of the underlying 2-round OT protocol. Moreover, the security guarantee of the C&O protocol against malicious provers ensures that a malicious receiver must be committed to message $\sigma_{1-b}$ already at the end of the first round, so that the receiver’s input can be extracted by rewinding the execution at the beginning of the second round. Finally, the security guarantee of the C&O protocol against malicious verifiers ensures that the above protocol satisfies privacy against malicious receivers, which is sufficient to ultimately get simulatable OT with malicious security by running $2\lambda$ parallel executions and cut-and-choose techniques [ORS15].

Using the concrete C&O protocol by Ostrovsky et al. [ORS15] based on linear error detecting codes over finite fields of size $q = O(\lambda)$ and statistically binding commitments (see also [FMV19, Appendix A.2]), we obtain the following estimates on the communication complexity of the above protocol (without taking cut-and-choose into account):

1. $(R \rightarrow S)$ Note that we can set $|\sigma_{1-b}| = |\mu_R|$. The commitment to $\sigma_{1-b}$ is computed by sampling 2 matrices $M_{b,i} \leftarrow Z_{q}^{2 \times d}$ for each $i = 1, \ldots, |\mu_R|$. Using $q = O(\lambda)$, we have that each matrix is of size $O(\lambda^2)$. Thus, a linear map $\Psi : Z_q^n \rightarrow Z_q^{n-1}$ is applied to specific rows of both matrices adding $O(\lambda^2)$ bits. Finally, one commits to the two matrices by committing to each coordinate in the matrix, which yields a total of $O(\lambda^3)$ bits if we assume that each commitment is a $\lambda$-bit string. Hence, the size of the first message is $(2O(\lambda^3) + 2O(\lambda^3)|\mu_R|)$ bits which can be simplified to $O(|\mu_R|\lambda^3)$.

2. $(S \rightarrow R)$ A challenge for the C&O protocol consists of two random strings of length $|\mu_R|$.\[O(|\mu_R|)^3 + |\mu_S|)]$ bits. The cut-and-choose technique involves running $2\lambda$ executions of the above mentioned protocol, thus contributing a total of $O(|\mu_R|\lambda^4 + |\mu_S|\lambda)$ bits to the communication complexity.

## A.3 Concrete Instantiation based on LWE

For the sake of concreteness, we finally instantiate the above protocols under the LWE assumption. Recall that the LWE problem is parameterized by integers $q, \lambda, m$, and by a distribution $\chi$ over $\mathbb{Z}_q$, where $\lambda$ is the security parameter, $q$ is a modulus which is polynomially larger than $\lambda$, and $m = \Theta(n \log q)$ [Reg06].

Since we have already computed the communication complexity in terms of $\lambda$, $|\mu_R|$ and $|\mu_S|$, we only need to estimate the size of the messages in the underlying 2-round OT protocols. In particular:
To instantiate our compiler, we take the 2-round privacy-only OT protocol by Brakerski and Döttling [BD18], which requires to set \( q = \tilde{O}(\lambda^3) \) and \( m = 3\lambda \log(\lambda) \). The protocol also uses seeded strong average-case extractors with seeds of size \( d \) which we assume to be \( \lambda \) bits. The receiver sends \( \mu_R = \left[ A_1 || A_2 \right]^T \), where \( A_1, A_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_2^{n \times m} \). Using the parameters from above, this yields \( \tilde{O}(\lambda^2) \) bits. The sender replies with a pair of strings \((c_0, c_1)\), and one can verify that \(|c_0| = |c_1| = \tilde{O}(\lambda)\). Hence, we have obtained \(|\mu_R| = \tilde{O}(\lambda^2)\) and \(|\mu_S| = \tilde{O}(\lambda)\). Plugging these values in the analysis of Appendix A.1, we obtain a communication complexity of \( \tilde{O}(\lambda^3) \).

As shown in [FMV19], SUSH-OT can be obtained using PKE schemes with special properties as follows: (1) The sender sends two public keys (generated in different ways depending on the value of the choice bit); (2) The sender sends two ciphertexts that encrypt random \( \lambda \)-bit pads \( \kappa_0, \kappa_1 \) which are used to hide the actual inputs as in \( s_0 \oplus \kappa_0 \) and \( s_1 \oplus \kappa_1 \).

Assuming hardness of LWE, we can instantiate the PKE scheme with the one by Peikert et al. [PVW08]. Here, a public key is of size \( \tilde{O}(\lambda^2) \), whereas the ciphertexts have size that is \( O(1) \) greater than the message size. Thus, we have obtained \(|\mu_R| = \tilde{O}(\lambda^2)\) and \(|\mu_S| = \tilde{O}(\lambda)\). Plugging these values in the analysis of Appendix A.2 we obtain a communication complexity of \( \tilde{O}(\lambda^6) \).

## B Privacy against Defensible Receivers in the ROM

Let \( II' = (\text{OTR}, \text{OTS}, \text{OTD}) \) be the initial 2-round OT protocol, and \( H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \{0,1\}^* \) be a hash function modelled as a random oracle. Consider the derived 2-round OT protocol \( II = (S, R) \) that proceeds as follows:

1. In the first round, upon input choice bit \( b \in \{0,1\} \), the receiver \( R \) runs \( \mu_R = \text{OTR}(b; \rho'_R) \) where \( \rho'_R = H(\rho_R || b) \) for uniformly random \( \rho_R \in \{0,1\}^* \).
2. In the second round, upon input strings \( s_0, s_1 \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \) and the message \( \mu_R \in \{0,1\}^* \) from the receiver, the sender answers with \( \mu_S = \text{OTS}(s_0, s_1, \mu_R; \rho_S) \) for uniformly random \( \rho_S \in \{0,1\}^* \).
3. The receiver outputs \( \text{OTD}(b, \mu_S; \rho_R) \).

We first note that if \( II' \) satisfies privacy against semi-honest senders, so does \( II \). Intuitively, this is because the sender’s message does not change in the protocol (the formal proof is straightforward, and thus omitted). In what follows, we show that \( II \) satisfies privacy against defensible receivers (see Definition 5), so long as \( II' \) satisfies privacy against semi-honest receivers.

Assume that there exist a PPT distinguisher \( D^* \), a non-uniform PPT malicious receiver \( R^* \), a pair of strings \( s_0, s_1 \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \), and a bit \( b \in \{0,1\} \), such that:

\[
\Pr \left[ D^* \left( \Gamma \left( \text{View}_{II,R^*}^S(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b, s_1-b) \right) \right) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[ D^* \left( \Gamma \left( \text{View}_{II,R^*}^S(\lambda, s_0, s_1, b, s') \right) \right) = 1 \right] \geq 1/\text{poly}(\lambda),
\]

where \( s' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \). W.l.o.g., we will assume that \( R^* \) never repeats the same RO query twice, and that whenever \( R^* \) outputs a good defense \( \delta_R = (b, \rho_R) \) then it must have queried the RO upon input \( \rho_R || b \).

Consider now the following PPT distinguisher \( D' \) attacking privacy of \( II' \) against semi-honest receivers (see Definition 2).

\[-\text{The distinguisher takes as input the view for the receiver—which can be parsed as } (b, \rho'_R, \mu_S) \text{ such that } \mu_S \leftarrow \text{OTS}(s_0, s_1, \mu_R) \text{ for } \mu_R = \text{OTR}(b; \rho'_R) \text{—along with a challenge } s^* \in \{s_1-b, s'\} \text{ for } s' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda .\]

\[14\text{ The proof in the case of privacy for random inputs is analogous.}\]

\[15\text{ If not, we can always consider the malicious receiver that is identical to } R^* \text{ but after outputting } (b, \rho_R) \text{ queries } \rho_R || b \text{ to the RO. Clearly, such a receiver yields the same distinguishing advantage as } R^* \text{ does.}\]
Let $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ be the number of RO queries asked by $R^*$. At the outset, $D$ picks a random index $i \leftarrow [q]$. Hence, it answers RO queries as follows:

- For each query $x_j$ such that $j \neq i$, it picks a random $y_j \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ and returns $y_j$.
- For the query $x_i$, it replies with $\rho'_R$ from the receiver’s view.

Upon receiving a message $\mu_R$ from $R^*$, the distinguisher replies with $\mu_S$ from the receiver’s view.

Upon receiving a defense $\delta_R = (b, \rho_R)$ from $R^*$, the distinguisher first checks that $x_i = b||\rho_R$. If not, it aborts. Else, it further checks that $\delta_R$ is a good defense (i.e., $\mu_R = \text{OTR}(b; H(b||\rho_R)) = \text{OTR}(b; \rho'_R)$). If not, it runs $D^*$ upon input the view $(b, \rho_R, \mu_S)$ and challenge $s^* = \perp$; else, it runs $D^*$ upon input $(b, \rho_R, \mu_S)$ and $s^*$.

Output whatever $D^*$ outputs.

We note that the distinguisher $D'$ perfectly simulates RO queries. Denote by $\text{Guess}$ the event that $D'$ guesses correctly the index $i$ corresponding to the query in which $R^*$ inputs the string $\rho_R||b$ to the RO. We have:

\[
\begin{align*}
\left| \Pr[D'(b, \rho'_R, \mu_S, s_{1-b}) = 1] - \Pr[D'(b, \rho'_R, \mu_S, s') = 1] \right| \\
= \left| \Pr[D^*(\Gamma((b, \rho_R, \mu_S), s_{1-b}) = 1 \land \text{Guess}] \\
- \Pr[D^*(\Gamma((b, \rho_R, \mu_S), s') = 1 | \text{Guess}] \right| \\
= \frac{1}{q} \cdot \left| \Pr[D^*(\Gamma((b, \rho_R, \mu_S), s_{1-b})) = 1 \land \text{Guess}] \\
- \Pr[D^*(\Gamma((b, \rho_R, \mu_S), s') = 1 | \text{Guess}] \right| \\
\geq \frac{1}{q} \cdot 1/\text{poly}(\lambda) \geq 1/\text{poly}(\lambda).
\end{align*}
\]

In the above derivation, the first equation follows by the fact that $D'$ aborts when $\text{Guess}$ does not happen and otherwise it outputs whatever $D^*$ outputs. The second equation uses the fact that the random tape $\rho_R$ is uniformly distributed, and thus the index $i$ is information-theoretically hidden which implies $\Pr[\text{Guess}] = 1/q$. The last equation follows because, conditioning on $\text{Guess}$, the view of $D^*$ is perfectly simulated. This finishes the proof.
From Privacy-Only to Simulatable OT

Sender\((s_0, s_1)\)  

Round 1

For \(i \in [m]\):
\[ b^{(i)} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}; \mu^{(i)}_R \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^* \]
\[ \rho^{(i)} = \text{OTR}(b^{(i)}, \mu^{(i)}_R) \]

\((\mu^{(i)}_R)_{i \in [m]}\)

Round 2

\[ \alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t \leftarrow [m] \]
\[ A = (\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_t) \]
For \(i \in [m] \setminus A:\)
\[ \kappa^{(i)}_0, \kappa^{(i)}_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda; \rho^{(i)}_S \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^* \]
\[ \mu^{(i)}_S = \text{OTS}(\kappa^{(i)}_0, \kappa^{(i)}_1, \mu^{(i)}_R, \rho^{(i)}_S) \]
\[ \kappa^{(i)}_0, \mu^{(i)}_R \]
\[ (\mu^{(i)}_S)_{i \in [m] \setminus A} \]

Round 3

For \(i \in A:\)
\[ \delta^{(i)}_R = (b^{(i)}, \mu^{(i)}_R) \]
\[ \beta_1, \ldots, \beta_S \leftarrow [m] \setminus A \]
\[ B = (\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_S) \]
\[ \text{Alive} = [m] \setminus (A \cup B) \]
For \(i \in \text{Alive}:\)
\[ \kappa^{(i)}_0, \mu^{(i)}_S; \rho^{(i)}_S \]
\[ d^{(i)} = b^{(i)} \oplus b \]
\[ (\delta^{(i)}_R, b^{(i)})_{i \in A}, (\delta^{(i)}_S)_{i \in \text{Alive}} \]

Round 4

Check \((\delta^{(i)}_R)_{i \in A}\) are good
For \(i \in B:\)
\[ \delta^{(i)}_S = (\kappa^{(i)}_0, \kappa^{(i)}_1, \mu^{(i)}_S) \]
\[ (s_0^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}} \leftarrow \text{Share}(s_0) \]
\[ (s_1^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}} \leftarrow \text{Share}(s_1) \]
For \(i \in \text{Alive}:\)
\[ s^{(i)}_0 = \kappa^{(i)}_0 \oplus s^{(i)}_0 \]
\[ s^{(i)}_1 = \kappa^{(i)}_1 \oplus s^{(i)}_1 \]
\[ (\delta^{(i)}_S)_{i \in B}, (s_0^{(i)}, s_1^{(i)})_{i \in \text{Alive}} \]

Check \((\delta^{(i)}_S)_{i \in B}\) are good
For \(i \in \text{Alive}:
\[ s^{(i)}_0 = \gamma^{(i)}_0 \oplus \kappa^{(i)}_0 \]
\[ \ gamma^{(i)}_1 = \gamma^{(i)}_1 \oplus \kappa^{(i)}_1 \]
\[ I \leftarrow \text{Alive with } |I| = t \text{ valid shares} \]
\[ s_b = \text{Recon}((s^{(i)}_0)_{i \in I}) \]

Fig. 5. Pictorial representation of our black-box compiler