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Paper 2021/997

Higher-Order Lookup Table Masking in Essentially Constant Memory

Annapurna Valiveti and Srinivas Vivek

Abstract

Masking using randomised lookup tables is a popular countermeasure for side-channel attacks, particularly at small masking orders. An advantage of this class of countermeasures for masking S-boxes compared to ISW-based masking is that it supports pre-processing and thus significantly reducing the amount of computation to be done after the unmasked inputs are available. Indeed, the online computation can be as fast as just a table lookup. But the size of the randomised lookup table increases linearly with the masking order, and hence the RAM memory required to store pre-processed tables becomes infeasible for higher masking orders. Hence demonstrating the feasibility of full pre-processing of higher-order lookup table-based masking schemes on resource-constrained devices has remained an open problem. In this work, we solve the above problem by implementing a higher-order lookup table-based scheme using an amount of RAM memory that is essentially independent of the masking order. More concretely, we reduce the amount of RAM memory needed for the table-based scheme of Coron et al. (TCHES 2018) approximately by a factor equal to the number of shares. Our technique is based upon the use of PRG to minimise the randomness complexity of ISW-based masking schemes proposed by Ishai et al. (ICALP 2013) and Coron et al. (Eurocrypt 2020). Hence we show that for lookup table-based masking schemes, the use of a PRG not only reduces the randomness complexity (now logarithmic in the size of the S-box) but also the memory complexity, and without any significant increase in the overall running time. We have implemented in software the higher-order table-based masking scheme of Coron et al. (TCHES 2018) at tenth order with full pre-processing of a single execution of all the AES S-boxes on a ARM Cortex-M4 device that has 256 KB RAM memory. Our technique requires only 41.2 KB of RAM memory, whereas the original scheme would have needed 440 KB. Moreover, our 8-bit implementation results demonstrate that the online execution time of our variant is about 1.5 times faster compared to the 8-bit bitsliced masked implementation of AES-128.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published by the IACR in TCHES 2021
Keywords
Side-channel attacksMaskingS-boxProbing leakage modelPRGSNI securityIoT securitySoftware implementation
Contact author(s)
annapurna @ iiitb ac in
srinivas vivek @ iiitb ac in
History
2021-07-28: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/997
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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