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Paper 2021/840

Fault-Injection Attacks against NIST's Post-Quantum Cryptography Round 3 KEM Candidates

Keita Xagawa and Akira Ito and Rei Ueno and Junko Takahashi and Naofumi Homma

Abstract

We investigate *all* NIST PQC Round~3 KEM candidates from the viewpoint of fault-injection attacks: Classic McEliece, Kyber, NTRU, Saber, BIKE, FrodoKEM, HQC, NTRU Prime, and SIKE. All KEM schemes use variants of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, so the equality test of re-encryption in decapsulation is critical. We survey effective key-recovery attacks if we can skip the equality test. We found the existing key-recovery attacks against Kyber, NTRU, Saber, FrodoKEM, HQC, one of two KEM schemes in NTRU Prime, and SIKE. We propose a new key-recovery attack against the other KEM scheme in NTRU Prime. We also report an attack against BIKE that leads to leakage of information of secret keys. The open-source pqm4 library contains all KEM schemes except Classic McEliece and HQC. We show that giving a single instruction-skipping fault in the decapsulation processes leads to skipping the equality test *virtually* for Kyber, NTRU, Saber, BIKE, and SIKE. We also report the experimental attacks against them. We also report the implementation of NTRU Prime allows chosen-ciphertext attacks freely and the timing side-channel of FrodoKEM reported in Guo, Johansson, and Nilsson (CRYPTO 2020) remains.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
post-quantum cryptographyNIST PQC standardizationKEMthe Fujisaki-Okamoto transformationfault-injection attacks.
Contact author(s)
keita xagawa zv @ hco ntt co jp,ito @ riec tohoku ac jp,rei ueno a8 @ tohoku ac jp,junko takahashi fc @ hco ntt co jp,homma @ riec tohoku ac jp
History
2021-09-17: last of 2 revisions
2021-06-21: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/840
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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