

Reverse Engineering the Micro-Architectural Leakage Features of a Commercial Processor

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Abstract

Micro-architectural leakage is a reality even on low- to mid-range commercial processors. Dealing with it is expensive, because micro-architectural leakage is often only discovered after implementation choices have been made (i.e. when evaluating the concrete implementation). We demonstrate that it is feasible, using a recent leakage modelling technique, to reverse engineer significant elements of the micro-architectural leakage of a mid-range commercial processor in a “grey-box” setting. Our approach first recovers the micro-architectural features of each stage in the pipeline, and the leakage of elements that are known to produce glitches. To put our reverse engineered micro-architectural leakage in context, we compare and contrast a leakage analysis of a relevant piece of masking code. More specifically, we compare the leakage that we would anticipate given our analysis, and predictions of the to-date most sophisticated leakage simulators (e.g. ELMO and MAPS) on the same piece of code. Our research demonstrates that reverse engineering of micro-architectural components (and their leakage) is clearly feasible using available side-channel leakage, and following, it should be possible to build more accurate leakage simulators.

1 Introduction

Securing a specific implementation on a concrete device is never a trivial task. Take power analysis [13] for instance: despite 20 years of research on countermeasures (in particular masking on closed-source commercial processors), it is still only with hindsight (based on costly evaluation results) that developers realise that specific assumptions of masking schemes are not fulfilled in practice.

In recent years, a proposal to help with this misery has attracted some attention: instead of testing the security on the physical device, leakage simulators like [6, 18, 22] have surfaced, which all claim to capture significant leakage of the respective devices that they apply to. A comprehensive survey of existing simulators was recently published [3]. This survey

puts forward a range of challenges that are yet to be solved, among which is the inclusion of more micro-architectural effects (of the resp. processor).

The challenge, to include more micro-architectural effects, is a non-trivial one when working with many interesting cores. Processor manufacturers typically do not make a full hardware description available (we call this a grey-box setting), and state-of-the-art mid-range cores all feature pipelining (thus multiple instructions execute in parallel). Even if a full hardware description was available, it is clear that power simulations of a full core executing a masking scheme are infeasible (e.g. [9] is able to work with a single S-box only). Thus a methodology that enables to capture the *relevant* micro-architectural leakage would be desirable.

Side-channel leakage has been used in the past for reverse engineering of both programs and hardware [4, 10, 12, 20, 23]. In these works the authors used standard DPA style attacks (with and without using device leakage models) to confirm hypotheses about the internals of the respective devices/implementations, which were relatively simple. In order to tackle devices that feature pipelining, and/or a more interesting memory subsystem, a better approach is needed. In recent work [8], Gao and Oswald pick up the methodology from [18] and extend it so it can work with (arbitrarily) complex nested models. They define so called *collapsed* models, that enable testing if a reduced model is relatively complete to an assumed full model.

We show that this idea can not only be used to reason about nested leakage models, but that it is actually a tool for reverse engineering. We use it to dissect the captured leakage from a mid-range processor and reveal its micro-architectural leakage characteristics. Doing so is all but straightforward, [8] are clear that the test itself provides “clues” about the internal mechanisms, but one needs to design additional confirmatory experiments to actually verify the micro-architectural meaning of these clues (this ties in with another recent paper [17]).

Our contributions. We demonstrate how the methodology in [8] can be utilised to dissect the leakage of a mid-range

processor to reveal its micro-architectural elements and their leakage. We detail our methodology, and demonstrate it on an existing commodity processor. The target processor is NXP LPC1313, an off-the-shelf ARM Cortex-M3 processor. For this processor, ARM provides an obfuscated reference design code for academic usage, which underpins [6]. However, our leakage model is completely built in a grey-box scenario, because there is no guarantee that the LPC1313 (licensed and produced by NXP) implements the reference design as provided by ARM.

To put our results into the context of the existing leakage simulation literature, we then compare leakage predictions that are based on the reverse-engineered micro-architectural leakage with the predictions of the most sophisticated simulators ELMO, and MAPS¹.

Whilst our methodology currently involves intensive manual effort, we argue such effort is worthwhile, because:

- it enriches our understanding of micro-architecture effects in relevant processor architectures,
- it significantly improves the state-of-the-art leakage modelling of micro-architectural elements
- it showcases that many existing leakage models and tools miss significant micro-architectural effects.

Although our work currently needs a lot of manual effort (we leave it as an open question to identify what can be automated at this point), it is clear that given time and measurements, our method can tackle at least existing mid-range processors. Thus an important question that is raised by our work is *can manufacturers still keep (part of) the micro-architecture of their products as a secret?*

1.1 Tooling

Throughout this paper, we preserve the same experimental setup:

- Target: NXP LPC1313 (ARM Cortex-M3) running at 1 MHz with only Thumb instructions
- Measurement point: voltage at a 100 Ohm shunt resistor at the VCC end
- Pre-processing: on-board 22db amplifier (NXP BGA2801)
- Oscilloscope: Picoscope 5243D running at 250 MSa/s

¹ELMO* [22] offers an extension to ELMO that captures some more leakage from the memory subsystem. ELMO offers also such an extension (in the follow-up development), yet both are drawn from experimental guesses. Nevertheless, our focus in this paper still lies in pipelined core, where the entire ELMO family sticks with the original ELMO model [18].

Unless stated otherwise, each tested code snippet takes 50k traces. Our setup ensures leakage does not last for more than 1 cycle, which helps to identify how leakage changes from cycle to cycle. Thus, most experimental results in the following two sections have been cropped to the exact cycle, which contains 250 sample points.

As a reverse engineering tool we use the methodology from [8]. In a nutshell, this means that for two sets of variables (i.e. operands from processor instructions), which correspond to the nested regression models $m_1 \subset m_2$, we test if the explanatory power (as provided by the F-test) of m_1 is as high as the explanatory power of m_2 . If so then we consider m_1 as complete relative to m_2 . We define one of the models to be an overly conservative set (i.e. we include, with reasoning, many/all of the operands from prior and future instructions) and we define the other model as a subset of the larger model. The test hence helps us to “narrow” down which operands/-values are truly presented in the execution at any given time point.

1.2 Methodology and Paper Organisation

In the following three sections, we discuss step by step how to reverse engineer the micro-architectural leakage elements of a close-sourced commercial processor. In contrast to previous works that captured only simple micro-architectural leakage (e.g. [6, 18, 21, 22]), we aim to comprehensively recover all micro-architectural leakage.

Restricted by a closed source setting, we cannot take advantage of a detailed hardware description, but we can utilise publicly available architectural information to guide our analysis. Therefore, our methodology is based on the following key steps:

1. Build an abstract diagram from the public available information (e.g. architecture reference [14], ISA [15] etc.) and make some safe architectural inferences (Section 2).
2. Recover the relevant micro-architectural details through analysing the side-channel leakage. Specify the data flow for each instruction and construct a micro-architectural leakage model for each pipeline stage (Section 3).
3. Evaluate the overall micro-architectural leakage for the target processor, further adding more subtle micro-architectural leakages (e.g. glitches) or discarding non-significant factors (Section 4).

We then challenge the resulting micro-architectural leakage model of our M3 by a comprehensive comparison in Section 5, and we conclude this paper in Section 6.

loaded operand(-s) to the pipeline register(-s)(i.e. block **De** in Figure 1).

Figure 2b plots our view of the micro-architecture for the **Decode** stage. The decoder translates the instruction (D.1) into control signals, including the register indices for the pre-loaded operands (D.2-D.4) and potential immediate numbers (D.8). The corresponding operands are loaded from the register file (D.5-D.7), then sent to the pipeline registers (D.9-D.10). The pipeline registers rs_1 and rs_2 mark the beginning of **Execute**. All the wires in this stage are plotted as purple lines: if the signal is directly read from a register, we use solid line; otherwise, we use dash line to represent the fact that this signal might be affected by glitches (analysed in Section 4.2). Note that there should also be a few pipeline registers storing the control signals and the immediate number: as they are not data-dependent, we simply omit those in Figure 2b.

Unlike **Fetch**, there are a few ambiguities in the **Decode** stage: first, it is unclear how many read ports/operands should exist in Figure 2b. Considering most Thumb instructions take at most 2 operands, previous tools often assume the register file has 2 read ports [6, 18] (i.e. connected to D.5 and D.6). We also started with a similar architecture, but identified some instructions that access one extra register. From side-channel leakage alone, we cannot conclude whether there is another read port (i.e. D.7), or such leakage is from a multiplexing route of the existing ports or even an unexpected access from glitches. Either way, we proceed our analysis assuming there are 3 read ports (which is leakage equivalent to the other options).

With multiple read ports existing in the micro-architecture, the next question to ask is *which operand is loaded from which port*. Thus, we design the following experiments and try to find the answer from analysing the realistic measurements.

Testing the read ports. We denote $\$a$ as the the low register r_a where a randomised operand A is stored in. The 3 reading ports in Figure 2b (marked as $Data_{1-3}$, connected to D.5-7), we denote them as $port_1$, $port_2$ and $port_3$ respectively. As we can see from the following code snippet, when executing the first *eors*, the second instruction enters the **Decode** stage. According to Figure 2b, operands C and D should occupy two read ports on the register files (therefore also two connected buses D.5 and D.6), while the previous values on these ports should be A and B . Thus, within the cycle that is decoding the second instruction, as long as we observe a leakage that corresponds to the interaction of A and C , it is expected that A and C should share the same reading port/operand bus.

```

1 Testing_port :
2 ...
3 eors $a, $b
4 INSTR $c, $d
5 nop

```

```

6 eors $0, $0 // $0=register that stores 0
7 ...

```

Formally speaking, let us assume in *eors* $\$a, \b , A takes port 1 (i.e. D.5)². From here, whenever an interaction is detected between A and C , we set C to port 1. Otherwise, if an interaction is detected between A and D , we set D to port 1.

By using a *collapsed* nested F-test between two models M_0 and M_1 we can test if the simplified model (M_1) is sufficient to explain the observed leakage, or if the larger model M_0 is necessary. Notice that we do not restrict the larger model to any conventional leakage assumption (e.g. Hamming distance between operands). Whilst we do not want to detail the full methodology and notation of [8] we now provide some more explanation to keep this paper reasonably self contained. What is called the model M_0 can be understood as a regression equation in the variables A and C that contains all possible interaction terms that can arise from A and C . It is therefore a multinomial with 2^{2n} terms (if both A and C are n bit variables), whereby β is a coefficient vector of length 2^{2n} . The smaller model M_1 includes both A and C , but not their interactions. It is therefore a multinomial with 2^{n+1} variables (the β here is again the corresponding coefficient vector). The model M_1 is included in the model M_0 because all terms of M_1 are included in M_0 . In terms of a statistical analysis, the model M_1 is too large to really work with. The idea of “collapsing models” introduced in [8] enables however practical leakage testing. If M_1 is accepted (i.e. p-value higher than the statistical threshold), we say there is no strong evidence of A and C interact with each other, therefore it is less likely A and C shares the same reading port/operand bus in the micro-architecture. Otherwise, A is clearly interacting with C : if the interaction is indeed coming from the micro-architecture³, it is likely A and C share the same reading port/operand bus.

- $M_0 = \beta\{AC\}$, $AC = \{x|x = a|c, a \in A, c \in C\}$
- $M_1 = \beta\{A, C\}$ (similarly BD, AD, BC)

Altogether we tested 55 Thumb instructions, which covers almost the entire instruction set (versus 23 cryptography-relevant instructions in ELMO [18]). Table 1 gives a concise summary of the instructions and our findings through leakage analysis, which we explain subsequently.

Results. Our analysis shows that the decoding leakage (i.e. which operand is loaded through which port) strongly depends on the instruction encoding. More specifically, the column *Encoding* in Table 1 demonstrates the encoding bit-field of each instruction: ARM often uses R_d to represent the destination

²If it is the other way around, what we learned is a “mirrored specification”, which will be remedied by a *mirrored* leakage model later.

³In theory, it is also possible that the interaction is caused by glitches, or physical defaults such as coupling [5]. In our experiments, we find the magnitude of wire transition leakage is usually larger than the other options, which makes it possible to make a distinction.

Group	Operand	Assembler	Encoding				Decoding			Executing	
			Type	Rd	Rm	Rn	Port 1	Port 2	Port 3	RS_1	RS_2
ALU	0	MOVS Rd, #<imm8>	I	10-8	-	-	Rd	-	-	-	-
		INSTR_a Rd, Rm(, #<imm3/5>)	II	2-0	5-3	-	Rd	Rm	-	Rm	-
	1	INSTR_b Rd, Rm(, #<imm3/5>)	II	2-0	5-3	-	Rd	Rm	-	-	Rm
		INSTR Rd, Rd, #<imm8>	I	10-8	-	-	Rd	-	-	Rd	-
		INSTR Rd, Rm	III	7,2-0	6-3	-	Rd	Rm	-	-	Rm
		INSTR Rd, Rn, Rm	IV	2-0	8-6	5-3	Rd	Rm	Rn	Rn	Rm
	2	ADD Rdn, Rm	III	7,2-0	6-3	-	Rdn	Rm	-	Rdn	Rm
		MUL Rdm, Rn	IV	2-0	-	5-3	Rdm	Rn	-	Rdm	Rn
LOAD	Imm	LDR(H/B) Rd, [Rn, #<imm>]	IV	2-0	-	5-3	Rd	Rn	-	Rn	-
	Reg	LDR(H/B) Rd, [Rn, Rm]	IV	2-0	8-6	5-3	Rd	Rn	Rm	Rn	Rm
	Multiple	LDM Rn!, <loreglist>	V	-	-	10-8	-	-	Rn	Rn	-
	Pop	POP <loreglist>		-	-	-	-	-	-	C	-
STORE	Imm	STR(H/B) Rd, [Rn, #<imm>]	IV	2-0	-	5-3	Rd	Rn	-	Rn	Rd
	Reg	STR Rd, [Rn, Rm]	IV	2-0	8-6	5-3	Rd	Rn	Rm	Rn->Rd	Rm
	Multiple	STM Rn!, <loreglist>	V	-	-	10-8	-	-	Rn	Rn	-
	Push	PUSH <loreglist>		-	-	-	-	-	-	C	-

Table 1: Summary of tested Thumb-16 instructions.

register and R_m/R_n represent the source registers. The assembler instruction uses those explicitly, yet did not explicitly explain the distinction (especially for R_m and R_n), or whether it links to any micro-architecture element. From our following analysis, it seems there is at least some connection.

Let us first look at some concrete F-test results as given in Figure 3. In this figure, the black dashed line gives the F-test threshold, and any of the coloured lines that exceed the threshold indicates that the corresponding term cannot be dropped (or in other words, it needs to be included as a micro-architectural leakage element). There are six sub-figures, which correspond to different cases:

- $adds\ \$c, \#1$ (Type I): only interaction AC appears, which suggests C is loaded to port 1.
- $eors\ \$c, \d (Type II): as expected, this group shows interaction AC and BD, even if R_d is not required by the functionality (e.g. $rsbs\ R_d, R_m$). Required or not, C/D is loaded to port 1/2 respectively.
- $adds\ \$c, \d (Type III): as showed in Table 1, the only difference here is both C and D can come from a high register (R_{8-13}). Although the interaction is significantly weaker, we saw the same interaction as Type II in Figure 3 (i.e. $A \rightarrow C$ and $B \rightarrow D$).
- $mults\ \$c, \d (Type IV): unlike the previous cases, Type IV explicitly uses another register R_n (see Table 1). For mul and ldr , the leakage form is consistent: R_d (C) is connected to port 1 and R_n (D) is connected to port 2, therefore all transitions of AC and BD remain the same. We assume R_m (if used) is loaded from the extra port 3.




Figure 3: Leakage analysis on register access in the decoding stage.

- *adds \$e, \$c, \$d* (Type IV, exceptional): 3-register instructions (i.e. *adds, subs*) are exceptional: they connect R_m instead of R_n to port 2. R_d is still loaded, yet not interacting with operand A or B. Although no concrete evidence, we set R_d to port 1 and leave R_n to port 3.
- *eors \$a, \$b → ldm \$d, [loreglist]* (Type V): this group shows no interaction; we assume R_n connects to port 3.

push and *pop* do not load any operand (other than the non-data-dependent stack register SP) in the decoding stage, therefore have been excluded from the decoding part of Table 1. Corresponding to the 3 purple dash lines (D.5-D.7) in Figure 2b, Table 1 documents the operand on each port for each instruction. Note that in a grey-box scenario, Table 1 represents the “reasonable conjectures” from leakage analysis: without reviewing the source code, this is the best possible guess we can come up with. D.9 and D.10 connect to the pipeline registers rs_1 and rs_2 , which will be inspected in the **Execute** stage.

3.3 Execute

On the contrary, the **Execute** stage is relatively simple: preloaded operands start from the pipeline register (E.1 and E.2 in Figure 4a), then go through the computation logic within the ALU. The ALU’s output (E.4) is then sent back to the register file or memory, depending on the specific instruction. There might be some more complicated computation logic (e.g. the multiplier in Figure 1), but from a leakage point of view, since they all connect to the pipeline registers, we simply combine everything into the equivalent ALU. Most previous tools assume there are two pipeline registers that store the operands: in our analysis, we found that 2 registers could already explain our observed leakage, therefore we stick with 2 registers in Figure 4a.

In previous tools, **Execute** is often regarded as the critical part: for instance, ELMO [18] captures the leakage/transition leakage from the 2 operands on the data buses E.1 and E.2 in Figure 4a. MAPS [6] on the other hand, captures the transition leakage on the pipeline registers rs_1 and rs_2 , as well as the destination register transition in the register file (the assignment for rs_1 and rs_2 may or may not be identical to NXP’s implementation). Both tools ignore the **Fetch** and **Decode** stage and focus on part of the **Execute** stage’s leakage. Recall that our analysis in the previous section did not reveal D.9 or D.10. Even if we knew what appears on D.9 and D.10, the pipeline registers rs_1 and rs_2 could still preserve their own values (driven by their control signal). Thus, the fundamental question to answer in this stage, is *which value enters rs_1/rs_2 ?*

We can perform a similar analysis as for the **Decode** stage. Specifically, let us consider the following code snippet:

```

1 Testing_rs1rs2:
2 ...
3 eors $a, $b

```




Figure 4: Hypothetical micro-architecture: **Execute** and **Memory**.

```

4 INSTR $c, $d
5 nop
6 eors $0, $0 // $0=register that stores 0
7 ...

```

Assuming *eors* sets rs_1 to A and rs_2 to B , as the latter *eors* should have the same micro-architectural effect as the previous one, thus it would set both rs_1 and rs_2 to 0. We have tested beforehand that *nop* does not touch the pipeline registers in our target core, which is also confirmed in [17]. The purpose of having this *nop* is separating the pipelined leakage: in a 3-stage processor, when executing the latter *eors*, it is expected that the target instruction *INSTR* has already committed its result, therefore does not further affect the leakage. Thus, we can test if the operands A or B still affects the leakage for the latter *eors*: if so, the pipeline register transits as

$$rs_1 : A \rightarrow A \rightarrow 0, HD = A$$

otherwise, we further test whether C or D affects the leakage. If C is presented in the leakage, it suggests:

$$rs_1 : A \rightarrow C \rightarrow 0, HD = C$$

Considering the observed leakage for executing the latter *eors* is not affected by the decoding stage of *INSTR*, we can have a higher confidence that C enters rs_1 .

Following this approach, we have tested all instructions in Table 1. A few representative results are presented in Figure 5, namely:

- *movs \$c, #imm* does not store the immediate in pipeline registers, therefore both rs_1 and rs_2 keep their previous values (i.e. A and B).
- There are two types of 1-operand ALU instructions (Table 1): *mov, shift-s*, and *add/sub* use only rs_1 , while *neg/mvn, reverse*, and *extend* instructions utilise only rs_2 .




Figure 5: Pipeline register analysis in the executing stage.

- 2-operand ALU instructions always use both rs_1 and rs_2 . Further analysing the transition shows that the left operand always goes to rs_1 : that is to say, R_d goes to rs_1 if R_d contains a necessary operand; otherwise R_n enters rs_1 (i.e. *INSTR Rd, Rn, Rm*).
- For *ldr*-s, the base address (R_n) enters rs_1 , while the offset (if not constant), goes to rs_2 . If the offset is constant, rs_2 preserves its previous value.
- For *str*-s, the first cycle works the same way as *ldr*, while the second cycle sends R_d to rs_1 .
- *pop* and *push* clear rs_1 with the address in SP, which according to our assumption, should be a constant.

It is worthwhile to mention that most our results in Table 1 regarding the pipeline registers are consistent with Le Corre, Großschädl and Dinu’s observations in [6]⁴. The fact that their conclusion is drawn from analysing the semi-obfuscated source code of Cortex-M3 from ARM is reassuring: our technique did successfully recover the underlying micro-architecture elements. The only exception we found is shift-s: in MAPS [6], the target operand is always set to rs_2 ; while our test suggests the operand goes to rs_1 . Either this difference is because NXP indeed changed the design, or ARM has multiple versions of Cortex-M3 design.

⁴Available in their code repository, not in the paper.

3.4 Memory sub-system

It is well known that the memory subsystem produces various “unexpected” issues [9, 17, 19, 21, 22]. The main challenge is that while the ISA specifies *what should happen in the processor*, it certainly does not specify the detailed design of any asynchronous component (i.e. the memory). More specifically, in our case, ARM specifies the memory interface through the AMBA APB Protocol [16]: the protocol defines how the processor should communicate with the peripheral, performing read/write operations. However, the peripheral is asynchronous (aka self-timed) to the processor, therefore the response time as well as internal interactions are completely up to the peripheral. Take *ldr/str* instructions for instance, although it is often assumed they take 2 cycles, in practice, the situation is much more complicated. The peripheral can prolong the transfer by adding wait states [16], or for certain instructions, the ALU can proceed without the peripheral finishing its task.

As a consequence, without a timing-accurate memory simulator, the chance of constructing a timing-accurate leakage model for the memory sub-system seems gloomy. In Figure 4b, we construct a hypothetical view that captures various known issues (e.g. from [17, 22]). Specifically, we assume our memory system works as follows:

- Each load/store produces leakage on the entire word (32-bit), even if the target is only one byte (see Section 5.2 [17]).
- The memory system has only one (shared) address bus (specified by [16]).
- The memory buses preserve their values until the next access (recommended in [16]).
- Read and write share the same data bus (consistent with Section 5.1 [17]).
- There is also a dedicate bus/buffer that holds the write value (our own experiments).

Although Figure 4b does not specify the timing behaviour, fortunately, the accurate timing is not required for many application scenarios (e.g. leakage simulators [6, 18, 22]/verifiers [2]): for developers, it is essential to learn *why such leakage appears*, but less crucial *when*. Take two adjacent store instructions for instance, as long as we know there exists a transition leakage on the write bus, we do not necessarily care about *whether this leakage appears at clock cycle x or x + y*. Whilst a more detailed investigation on timing characteristics might be possible, they becomes increasingly unrewarding in a grey-box setting.

4 Step 3: Refining the micro-architectural leakage model

In the previous section, we reverse engineered where operands are stored in the micro-architecture, and we developed a first understanding of the interactions between operands across the three pipeline stages. Now we set out to refine this understanding and characterise the interactions.

4.1 Considering components with stable signals

Fetch. Stable signals are from micro-architectural components that do not have glitches. Because we assume our target program does not contain any “data-dependent branches”, we do not need to consider elements from this stage.

Decode. Because we do not consider data dependent instructions, we can also exclude all purple wires before the register file (D.1-4, D.8) as they do not produce data-dependent leakage (i.e. remain the same between each execution). After accessing the register file, each purple wire must be considered, as it carries an operand that varies from trace to trace.

Based on the information in Table 1, we can build a simplified micro-architectural leakage model that only contains the “stable” signals in the circuit for D.5-D.7 (aka read ports 1-3). The outputs of two operand MUX-s are trickier: when rs_1 is updated, D.9 carries the updated value. However, when rs_1 preserves its previous value (e.g. $rsbs Rd, Rm$), we cannot determine the value on D.9 easily. Considering the same leakage could come from various equivalent micro-architectures, we consider them separately in Section 4.2. Thus, the assumed micro-architectural leakage for the decoding stage is:

$$L_d = \beta\{port_1 \otimes port'_1, port_2 \otimes port'_2, port_3 \otimes port'_3\}$$

where $port'_1$ represents the value on port 1 from the previous instruction decoding. If both values on port 1 are not constant,

$$port_1 \otimes port'_1 = \{(x||y)|x \in port_1, y \in port'_1\}$$

Otherwise, if one of the values is a constant, this term can be simplified to only $port_1$ or $port'_1$. This leakage is a super set of both the standard HW and HD model, covering not only the leakage of the values but also any transition occurring on the wire.

Using again the *collapsed F-test* [8], we can interrogate if this model explains all observable leakage (in the decoding stage). Figure 6 plots the evaluation for the same instructions in Figure 3: for all but one instruction L_d is correct. Only for the 3-operand *adds*, the test result suggests L_d cannot explain all the observed leakage within this decoding stage.




Figure 6: Model completeness analysis in the decoding stage.

Execute. Similarly, for the **Execute** stage, we ignore the immediate number and the control signals, and focus on the wires E.1, E.2 and E.4. Obviously, the entire leakage of this stage depends on the two operands in rs_1 and rs_2 .

Unlike the **Decode** stage, these two operands deliberately interact with each other in the ALU. Thus, it is expected that there is some cross-operand leakage. Considering that the ALU is a relatively complicated piece of combinational logic where multiple computations run in parallel (i.e. not “gated” [9, 19]), finding the exact form of L_E presents its own challenge. Therefore, we leave L_E conservatively as:

$$L_E = \beta\{rs_1 \otimes rs_2 \otimes rs'_1 \otimes rs'_2\}$$

Clearly L_E includes all possible glitchy states on the red wires in Figure 4a. The data-dependent bits in the Current Program Status Register (CPSR) rely on the ALU’s output, and are therefore also covered by L_E . For conciseness we refer to [8] where one of the examples analyses just this situation; besides, Figure 8 and 9 both evaluate the entire leakage model, including the execute leakage here.

Register write-back. Although a write-back stage does not exist in this 3-stage pipeline, updating the destination register still happens after the **Execute** stage: thus, we need a separate micro-architectural leakage element L_{WB} to capture such leakage. Denote the ALU output from the last cycle as Res and the previous value of the destination register as R_d . The register write-back leakage element L_{WB} can be written as:

$$L_{WB} = \beta\{Res \otimes R_d\}$$

Note that Res is defined by the ISA and R_d is architecturally visible, therefore does not take any further investigation.

Memory. Following Section 3.4, we denote Bus as the shared bus and Bus_w as the dedicate write bus, where $Addr$ represents the address bus. The micro-architectural leakage of the memory subsystem is :

$$L_M = \beta\{Bus \otimes Bus, Bus_w \otimes Bus'_w, Addr \otimes Addr'\}$$

Although some of above leakage only appears for memory access instructions, considering the APB protocol explicitly recommends to keep the remaining values on the bus [16], we always keep L_M as part of the leakage model, even if the instruction does not access memory.

4.2 Glitch & Multiplexer

Glitchy register access. The lower left figure in Figure 6 suggests that considering only the stable signals is not always enough. In a more realistic scenario, the situation can be even worse: in order to achieve a concrete understanding of *which operand is read from which port*, we deliberately designed our setup (see Section 3.2) to avoid various “known issues”. For instance, it is reported back in 2017 by Papagiannopoulos and Veshchikov that some processors might implicitly access an adjacent register while accessing a target register [21]. It was latter explained in [9] such leakage is likely to be caused by the address decoding in the register file. When setting up our experiments, we deliberately use only the odd registers (i.e. r_1, r_3, r_5, r_7): although there is no guarantee that such LSB-neighbouring effect is the only type of neighbouring effect in our target processor, within 50k traces, we did not find this effect in our analysis.

Nonetheless, the so-called “neighbouring effect” [21] can be extended to more general glitchy accesses within the register file: in a 3-stage core, considering the decoding and operand pre-loading are happening in the same cycle, it is expected that the signal glitch starts even earlier, say from the decoded register addresses (i.e. D.2-D.4 in Figure 2b). Back to our exceptional $adds$: as one can see in Table 1, the previous $eors$ loaded R_m from bit 5-3 of the instruction, while the current $adds$ requires R_m from bit 8-6 instead. Considering this change of field needs to be initiated by the decoder, we can expect that for a short time after the clock edge, the decoder still outputs R_m as the bit 5-3 of the new $adds$ instruction (i.e. $R_n = C$), and then switches back to bit 8-6, which gives $R_m = D$. In other words, although the stable signal on $port_2$ changes as:

$$B \rightarrow D$$

the glitchy signal switches through:

$$B \rightarrow C \rightarrow D$$

which might give the transition of $B \otimes C$ and $C \otimes D$.




Figure 7: Glitchy register access in the decoding stage.

As we can see in Figure 7, the interaction $C \otimes D$ is clearly visible in the upper-left. Without including this micro-architectural leakage our constructed leakage model does not fully explain the observed leakage.

The lower half of Figure 7 demonstrates another case of this effect. Specifically, if we try the following code:

```

1 glitchy_reg:
2 ...
3 eors r5, r7 //r5=C, r7=D
4 adds r3, #1 //r1=A, r3=B
5 ...

```

Following our discussion above, when decoding $adds$, there might be a short time period when the decoder still decodes in the style of $eors$. According to Table 1, this means the immediate number 1 will be taken as register r_1 (bit 2-0 from the instruction $eors$). In the lower left of Figure 7, clearly value A is loaded in this cycle. In fact, as the signal transition goes $C \rightarrow A \rightarrow B$, there could be interaction of $C \otimes A$ and $A \otimes B$, which is exactly what we see in Figure 7. Our completeness test confirms that we can capture all of this micro-architectural leakage as long as these terms are added in.

Taking glitches into consideration, we add one glitchy term for each port: for port 1, denoted as $port_{1g}$, representing the glitchy accessed value on port 1. The glitchy decoding stage leakage can be regarded as

$$L_{Dg} = L_D + \beta\{port_{1g} \otimes port_1, port_{1g} \otimes port'_1\}$$

where $port_{1g}$ could be:

- Implicitly access caused by decoding: decoding the current instruction in the previous style

- Implicitly access caused by register address: the neighbouring effect, needs to be tested on the specific device

$port_{2g}$ can be added following the similar rules. Considering such an effect has a relatively small magnitude and enormous test space (i.e. the entire decoding space must be considered), we did not further identify which factor must be added and which can perhaps be ignored. A conservative micro-architectural leakage model will include everything, if more implementation details were available then certain elements could be excluded (and the resulting model checked via the F-test).

Multiplexer. Grey-box simulators usually discard them, because their contribution to the overall leakage is relatively limited. We follow this approach in our work here ⁵.

4.3 Putting it all together

We constructed a micro-architectural leakage model for each of the three pipeline stages, and the memory subsystem. The overall device leakage is then the sum of the micro-architectural leaks: $L = L_D + L_E + L_M + L_{WB}$, and we can, using the F-Test methodology, enquire if it is possible to drop or simplify some terms. Because we know that the micro-architectural leakage from the memory subsystem is always significant, there is no point in trying to simplify or drop this. However, we can check if the decode and execute leakage is significant enough (when considering it as all the pipeline stages are active). With the same code in Section 3.2 (“Testing_port”), we first test if removing L_D or L_E can provide a valid model: as we can see in the left half of Figure 8, both fail our test easily, which suggests both stages’ leakage must be kept.

Thus, we further test in the right half of Figure 8 if using a linear model (i.e. a weighted HW/HD model) is good enough. The upper right figure suggests if the executed instruction is *eors*, having a linear L_D or a linear L_E passes F-test, although L_D and L_E cannot be linear at the same time. This is in fact consistent with the observations in [8]: if the instruction is relatively simple, using a linear model of the ALU inputs/output can be a valid option. The lower right of Figure 8 shows that for an *adds* instruction, the execute stage must utilise a non-linear model. But, the decoding leakage L_D can always be set to linear in our experiments: considering the decoding stage only contains buses that load values and flip from one value to another, this is quite natural. Hence we always restrict the decoding leakage L_D to be a linear micro-architectural leakage element, denoted as L_{DI} . Similarly, as the write-back logic is relatively simple, we also simplify L_{WB} to be a linear micro-architectural leakage element (L_{WBI}). Because of the

⁵One recent white-box tool, Coco [9]), takes a conservative approach: if we have $MUX(s,a,b)$ (where s is the selecting signal), they simply allow any possible leakage by considering $a \otimes b \otimes s$.

known byte-wise interactions on the memory bus [17], L_M is left without any restriction.

$$L = L_{DI} + L_E + L_{WBI} + L_M$$




Figure 8: Feature selection for our leakage model.

4.3.1 Check and Double Check

Up to this point, our entire evaluation has been built only for our simple test snippet (i.e. “*eors* → *INSTR*”). We hence need to double check how well our micro-architectural leakage model explains what happens in more complex code sequences, and whether we (accidentally) included some board specific effects. Before moving on and looking at implementations of masking, we show how well our derived micro-architectural leakage model copes with a code sequence that computes the Midori MixColumns [1]: as a linear layer with only elements 0 and 1, the code consists only a few *eors* instructions, where the entire operation can be performed easily within the 8 low registers (i.e. no high registers/load/store). Figure 9 plots the evaluation results on two evaluation boards that share the same core and measurement setups.




Figure 9: Model evaluation for Midori’s linear matrix.

We plot in fact two models: the simpler one where we exclude glitches, and the model where glitches are included. Our results show that the micro-architectural leakage model that includes glitches explains the observed leakage on both boards (i.e. no board effects [18]), whereas the model without glitches consistently fails the same cycle on both boards.

5 A practical use case: evaluating masking

In the previous sections we reverse engineered the micro-architectural leakage for each pipeline stage, and we provided some evidence that our reverse engineered leakage elements (i.e. the leakage contributions that we identified before) explain the observed leakage. One way of utilising our results is by viewing them as the “input” to build much more sophisticated leakage simulators. With this in mind we compare and contrast the leakage predictions of our reverse engineered micro-architectural leakage model of the LPC 1313 (ARM Cortex-M3) processor with the existing simulators ELMO [18](ELMO* [22]) and MAPS [6], plus the implicit model in scVerif [2].

Before proceeding further, we summarise the leakage models of these competitors to keep this article self contained:

- ELMO. For most instructions, ELMO [18] defines the leakage to be a linear function of the values on the two operand buses plus the bit-flips⁶. Note that it is not clear from the paper *how ELMO learns which operand goes to which bus*: as the target M0 core is a commercial one (source code not available), it is likely ELMO answers this question with a *sensible guess* (that is to say, could be wrong for certain instructions).
- ELMO*. The so-called ELMO* [22] is a specific extension of ELMO, that aims at capturing a) the memory leakage and b) the dominating state transitions. The former produces significant leakage which is explicitly excluded from ELMO’s model [18], but has been verified to be a true concern in practice [7, 22]. The latter, however, could be explained in various ways: here we propose a different explanation for the observed leakage in [22]. Considering we are using a different platform (ARM Cortex-M3 versus ARM Cortex-M0 in [22]), plus the fact that both platforms are close-sourced, it is fairly possible that both explanations are correct/wrong.
- MAPS. Unlike ELMO, MAPS [6] defines the leakage from the obfuscated HDL code for the ARM Cortex-M3 reference implementation (not manufacturer specific). Within the simulator MAPS, the leakage is restricted to all architectural registers bit-flips plus the bit-flips of the two pipeline registers.
- scVerif. Technically speaking, scVerif [2] is a framework where users can program their own leakage model and verify certain security properties. That being said, there is a concrete leakage model in the proposal (for ARM M0+). Specially, they define 4 “revenant effects”—*opA, opB, opR, opW*—which are in concept, the pipeline registers rs_1, rs_2 and the read/write buffers/buses in our model. The leakage of *eors Rd, Rn* instruction is then defined as:
 - Combination of revenants. $opA \otimes opB \otimes Rd \otimes Rn$ (same as our leakage model for the **Execute** stage)
 - Destination register bit-flip.
 - Pipeline register bit-flip. $opA \otimes Rd$ and $opB \otimes Rn$; both are in fact already covered by the “combination of revenants”.

Again, there is no guarantee the provided model operates *opA* and *opB* correctly, as this is specified by the predefined leakage model (therefore out of the scope of [2]).

5.1 Decoding port leakage

Many of the listed tools do not define any explicit decoding leakage. However, ELMO (and ELMO*) always set $rs_1 = Rd$ and $rs_2 = R_m$, even if R_d is never used in certain instructions (e.g. *movs Rd, R_m* in Table 1). This is not correct (at least on the core that we utilised), but if we consider the “operand buses” in ELMO to be the decoding read ports, then decoding leakage is captured by ELMO (and ELMO*), albeit in a different clock cycle.

The following code snippet is from a 2-share bitwise ISW multiplication [11], where $a_1(b_1)$ and $a_2(b_2)$ represent the two input shares of $a(b)$. Leakage reports from ELMO⁷ and MAPS are:

- ELMO. Line 7 is leaking from the first operand’s bit-flip ($r_2 = a_2 * b_1 \rightarrow r_6 = a_1 * b_1$).
- MAPS. No leakage.

```

1 ISWd2 :
2 ...           // r1=a1*b2+r, r2=a2, r3=b1,
3 ...           // r6=a1*b1, r9=output address
4 ands r2, r3 // r2=a2*b1
5 eors r1, r2 // r1=a1*b2+r+a2*b1
6 mov r2, r9 // Get back output address
7 eors r6, r1 // r6=a1*b1+a1*b2+r+a2*b1
8 ...

```

According to Table 1, line 7 should not show any leakage from rs_1 , since line 6 never loaded r_2 to rs_1 . However, the decoding stages of line 6 and 7 load these operands into *port1*,

⁶A few instructions are allowed to have second order interactions, details see [18]

⁷The ELMO* [22] extension does not find any additional leakage.




Figure 10: Experiments with 50k traces on 2-share bitwise ISW multiplication.

which suggests a leakage can be found in the decoding cycle of line 7. The right half of Figure 10 illustrates the correlation trace using $HW(a_1 \oplus a_2)$: the correlation peaks appear in the execute cycle of line 6 (i.e. the decoding cycle of line 7). Besides, the TVLA trend in the left half of Figure 10 shows such leakage is relatively weak: it takes more than 20k traces before the leakage can be stably detected.

To show that missing out on the explicit inclusion of decoding leakage matters, we further investigate a 3-share bitwise ISW multiplication (where no first order leakage found in this implementation).

```

1 ISWd3:
2 ...
3 mov r7, r9 //r7=a3
4 mov r5, r11 //r5=b3
5 ands r5, r7 //r5=a3*b3
6 ands r4, r6 //r6=a2*b2
7 ands r3, r1 //r3=a1*b1
8 ldr r7, [r0, #0] //r7=r12
9 ...

```

In theory, there should not be any attack that combines less than three intermediates (leakage points), which increases the required number of traces. We show that a third order attack indeed does not succeed with a too limited number of traces in the upper-left of Figure 11⁸.

However, given our micro-architectural leakage model we may safely assume that the processor will inadvertently combine masking shares for us. Indeed, even the simpler ELMO model can predict such leakage: specifically, the first operand bit-flip from line 6 and 7 gives the leakage of $a_1 \oplus a_2$, which should reveal the secret a if combined with the leakage of line 3 (i.e. a_3). We have also confirmed this leakage in Figure 11: the upper-right figure shows using this combination, the correct key can be found within 10k traces.

⁸Our implementation only uses LSB to compute the bit-sliced S-box; therefore the measured trace has been averaged 50 times before analysis, in order to increase the SNR.




Figure 11: Experiments with 50k traces on 3-share bitwise ISW multiplication.

With the decoding leakage added in, our micro-architectural leakage model extensively expands the region of potential leakage: considering the execute cycle of line 7, we learned from Table 1 that *ldr* does load r_7 in the decoding cycle, which provides the leakage of a_3 . As a consequence, we can use the second order moment of the measurements from line 7 alone, which avoids the combination of noise from different time samples. In our experiments, this is indeed the best option: the correct key guess can be found with only 1k traces.

5.2 Pipeline registers assignment

When it comes to the pipeline registers, things become quite different: as we can see in Table 1, many instructions do not follow the default $rs_1 = R_d$ and $rs_2 = R_m$ setup. Considering the pipeline registers may even preserve through a few instructions, this is clearly an issue if some previous operand is believed to be cleared out of the context while in reality it is sitting somewhere within the processor.

```

1 Scverif_Ref:
2 ... // r1=output address
3 ... // r5=a2+r, r3=a1+r
4 str r5, [r1, #4] //
5 pop {r4-r5} // Reload r4 and r5
6 eors r3, r3 // Clear r3
7 ...

```




Figure 12: Experiments with 50k traces on 2-share mask refresh from scVerif.

The above code is from a 2-share refreshing gadget verified by scVerif [2]. Clearly, any transition between r_3 and r_5 leaks the secret a . Let us focus on line 5: scVerif treats pop as several *load*-s, where each *load* clears both rs_1 and rs_2 (see [2, Alg.3]). According to Table 1, pop on our target device only clears rs_1 , but not rs_2 . Thus, when executing line 6, rs_2 remains the previous value set by line 4. According to Table 1, there is a transition between $a_2 + r$ and $a_1 + r$ on rs_2 . Leakage reports from ELMO and MAPS are:

- ELMO/ELMO* [22]. No leakage.
- MAPS. Leakage from line 6, pipeline registers⁹.

Here we begin to witness the benefit of having the accurate pipeline register assignment: MAPS clearly pointed out this leakage, while neither ELMO and ELMO* finds any leakage. This is because both ELMO and ELMO* stick with ELMO’s leakage model, which also believes pop clears both rs_1 and rs_2 . At least on our target device, this is not the case: as we can see in the right half of Figure 12, a clear correlation peak in line 6 suggests rs_2 still keeps the value from line 4. Since this transition is from rs_2 (v.s. the port transition in Figure 10), the left half of Figure 12 shows its leakage is much easier to detect compared with Figure 10.

6 Conclusion

We utilised a recent statistical tool for leakage model building to reverse engineer a micro-architectural leakage model of a mid-range commodity processor (the NXP LPC1313). This model explains how operands are assigned to (assumed) micro-architectural elements, and therefore to some extent provides an in-depth picture of how the Thumb instruction set (or perhaps even their reference design) was implemented by NXP.

Using such a reverse engineered micro-architectural leakage model we showed that existing simulators still miss out

⁹MAPS needs the command line argument “-p” to calculate the pipeline registers’ leakage.

on leakage, and a next step should be to integrate our reverse engineered micro-architecture into the framework provided by existing simulators (e.g. ELMO or ELMO*).

Our research also raises the question whether manufacturers wish to keep such information confidential. If so, then even a commodity processor such as part of the LPC family should clearly implement strong side-channel countermeasures to make side-channel based reverse engineering (such as ours) impossible. Another, arguably more academic, point of view would be to say that this information should be public (no security by obscurity). In this case we would see it as good practice if manufacturers would make micro-architectural information available, to enable more secure implementations, and the easy building of better simulators (i.e. without reverse engineering) for the benefit of implementers and eventually consumers.

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