Identity-certifying Authority-aided Identity-based Searchable Encryption Framework in Cloud System

Zi-Yuan Liu, Yi-Fan Tseng, Raylin Tso, Yu-Chi Chen, and Masahiro Mambo

Abstract—In the era of cloud computing, massive quantities of data are encrypted and uploaded to the cloud to realize a variety of applications and services while protecting user confidentiality. Accordingly, the formulation of methods for efficiently searching encrypted data has become a critical problem. Public-key encryption with keyword search is an efficient solution that allows the data owner to generate encrypted keywords for a given document while also allowing the data user to generate the corresponding trapdoor for searching. Huang and Li proposed a public-key authenticated encryption with keyword search (PAEKS) scheme to resist keyword guessing attacks, where the data owner not only encrypts keywords but also authenticates them. However, existing PAEKS-related schemes carry a trade-off between efficiency, storage cost, and security. In this paper, we introduce a novel framework, called identity-certifying authority-aided identity-based searchable encryption, which has the advantage of reducing storage space while remaining the efficiency and security. We formally define the system model and desired security requirements to represent attacks in a real scenario. In addition, we propose a provably secure scheme based on the gap bilinear Diffie–Hellman assumption and experimentally evaluate our scheme in terms of its performance and theoretical features against its state-of-the-art counterparts.

Index Terms—identity-certifying authority, cloud system, identity-based encryption, keyword search.

I. INTRODUCTION

With the maturation of cloud computing technology, enterprises have increasingly uploaded massive quantities of data to the cloud to reduce their storage and computing burden. For example, convenience store chains upload data from each branch to the cloud for analysis, and hospitals upload patient data to the cloud for management. In addition, since the introduction of the concept of Industry 4.0 by Lasi et al. [1], firms have begun integrating cloud systems into their data collection and production processes. However, privacy concerns remain. Data on shipments, patient records, and even factory inventory are highly sensitive, and companies may be reluctant to directly upload them to a cloud system that they cannot fully trust. Consequently, data are often encrypted before being uploaded to a cloud system in order to avoid information leakage, but such encrypted data pose a computational challenge for cloud systems.

Symmetric searchable encryption (SSE), introduced by Song et al. [2], is one solution to the aforementioned problem. In SSE, a data owner (DO) can generate encrypted keywords for each encrypted file by using a symmetric key that is shared with the data user (DU) before their data are uploaded to the cloud system. Subsequently, the DU can generate a trapdoor for specified keywords and submit them to the cloud system to search for encrypted files that are related to these keywords. Because of these properties, SSE is well suited to cloud computing, and various SSE approaches have been proposed [3]–[5]. However, SSE is restricted to the key sharing problem of symmetric cryptosystems. Specifically, the DO and DU must agree on a shared key before encrypting keywords and generating trapdoors, respectively.

To further increase the range of application and reduce the communication overhead of negotiating keys, Boneh et al. [7] introduced a searchable encryption method in a public-key setting, called public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS). Instead of using a shared key as done in SSE, in PEKS, the DO encrypts keywords by using the DU’s public key, and the DU generates corresponding trapdoors by using his or her secret key. After the pioneering work by Boneh et al., PEKS immediately caught the attention of researchers, and many studies have applied PEKS to various applications [8]–[12]. However, in 2006, Byun et al. [13] observed that because the entropy of keywords is low, any malicious party, through a so-called keyword guessing attack, can randomly select keywords to generate the ciphertext and test whether the ciphertext is passable; thus, the malicious party can obtain the information associated with the keywords in the trapdoor. In particular, to resolve the keyword guessing attack launched by a malicious cloud server (CS) as part of a so-called insider keyword guessing attack (IKGA), Chen et al. [14]–[16] have first proposed solutions for dual-server setting, and their methods were improved upon by Tso et al. [17].

Huang and Li [18] recently introduced the concept of public authenticated encryption with keyword search (PAEKS) under a single-server setting, where the trapdoor works only for ciphertext that is authenticated by the DO using his or her secret key; therefore, a malicious CS cannot randomly generate ciphertext and further perform IKGA. Inspired by Huang and Li’s work [18], scholars have proposed several PAEKS schemes [19]–[22]. However, because PAEKS schemes are based on public key settings and do not provide implicit authentication, they require a trusted public key infrastructure to bind public keys with the respective identities of entities through issuing certificates; nevertheless, this process incurs additional overhead. Several approaches are available for in-
tuitively solving this problem in PAEKS:

1) Identity-based authenticated encryption with keyword search (IBAEKS) [23]: In IBAEKS schemes, the user can apply to a trusted key generation center (KGC) for the secret key of a specific identity; they can then use the identity as their public key. Thus, in IBAEKS, no additional steps are required to prove the validity of the public key.

2) Certificate-based authenticated encryption with keyword search (CBAEKS) [24], [25]: In CBAEKS schemes, the user can apply to a trusted certification authority for the certificate of a pair comprising a specific identity and public key. Unlike the certificates used in PAEKS schemes, the certificate in CBAEKS not only implicitly authenticates the validity of the identity and public key but also acts as a partial secret key.

3) Certificateless authenticated encryption with keyword search (CLAEKS) [26]–[28]: The solution of CLAEKS is similar to that of IBAEKS, except that the user generates a pair comprising public and secret values, in addition to obtaining the secret key of their identity from the KGC. The user finally uses the identity and public value as the full public key and uses the secret key and secret value as the full secret key.

Although the three aforementioned approaches solve the problem in PAEKS, each approach has its disadvantages in safety, storage, or efficiency. Specifically, in IBAEKS [23], because the KGC can gain access to any user’s secret key, key escrow problems occur when the KGC is malicious. By contrast, although CBAEKS [24], [25] and CLAEKS [26]–[28] solve the key escrow problem, the users in these schemes require an additional generated certificate and a pair comprising a public and secret value. The larger key size in these schemes also entails larger ciphertext and trapdoor sizes. Consequently, users require more storage space to store keys, certificates, ciphertext, and trapdoors in CBAEKS and CLAEKS than they do in PAEKS and IBAEKS. Therefore, existing methods carry a three-way trade-off between efficiency, storage cost, and security.

Accordingly, to ameliorate this trade-off, we present a novel identity-certifying authority (ICA)-aided identity-based searchable encryption (IBSE) framework (hereafter referred to as ICA-IBSE). Our contributions are summarized as follows:

- To master the trade-off between efficiency and security, on the basis of Chow et al. [29] and Emura et al. [30], who have used an identity-certifying authority in identity-based encryption, we propose our ICA-IBSE scheme, which inherits the advantages of IBAEKS in terms of convenience and storage requirements and eliminates the disadvantage of IBAEKS regarding the key escrow problem.
- We define the system model and security requirements of the ICA-IBSE framework before applying it to a practical case. Moreover, we provide the security proofs to show that under the defined security models, our scheme is secure if the gap bilinear Diffie–Hellman (GBDH) assumption holds.

![](image)

**Fig. 1. The proposed ICA-IBSE framework**

- We further provide a theoretical comparison and performance evaluation of our scheme against state-of-the-art schemes [20], [21], [23]–[26], [28]. The results indicate that our scheme is more efficient and that it performs better at reducing the storage requirement for the public key, ciphertext, and trapdoor.

## II. Problem Formulation

### A. System Model

The ICA-IBSE system model comprises five entities, namely the ICA, KGC, CS, DO, and DU, which are displayed in Fig. 1:

- **ICA:** This authority is responsible for validating the DO’s and DU’s identities and issuing trapdoor information and an identity certificate to them.
- **KGC:** By validating the correctness of the identity certificate, the KGC generates the DO’s and DU’s partial secret key without knowing any information about their identity.
- **CS:** The CS has sufficient storage and computing capacity and is mainly responsible for storing encrypted data along with the corresponding encrypted keywords and searching for data.
- **DO:** The DO first requests their certificate from the ICA and further generates their partial secret key by interacting with the KGC. Finally, the DO obtains their secret key by using trapdoor information. The DO can generate massive quantities of encrypted data along with the corresponding encrypted keywords, which are uploaded to the CS to reduce the storage requirement.
- **DU:** The DU generates their secret key as the DO does. Subsequently, the DU can issue trapdoors, generated by using their secret key, to the CS to retrieve the encrypted data associated with the specified keyword.
B. Adversary Model

In the following analysis, we consider adversary threats from different perspectives. We assume that the DO and DU are fully trusted, as is the case with most PEKS schemes. The DO and DU cannot collude with other parties to reveal their secret keys. In addition, we assume that the ICA and KGC cannot collude with each other to generate the DU’s and DO’s secret keys.

- The KGC and CS are honest but curious, which means that they will attempt to retrieve the sensitive information of the keywords from encrypted keywords and trapdoors.
- The ICA is malicious. In addition to attempting to obtain keyword information as the KGC and CS do, the ICA can generate a potentially malicious ICA key pair.
- The communication channels between the DO and DU and the cloud server are insecure, which means that all transmitted information is eavesdropped upon by any one party (i.e., ICA, KGC, and a malicious outsider). However, the communication channels between the DO and DU and the ICA and KGC are secure. In other words, we assume that the communication channels are encrypted and authenticated (e.g., by using TLS 1.3 [31]).

III. DEFINITION AND SECURITY MODELS

A. ICA-IBSE Framework

A typical ICA-IBSE scheme comprises seven algorithms and a protocol, which are described as follows:

Setup($1^\lambda$): The security parameter $\lambda$ is taken as the input, and the system parameter $pp$ is the output. Here, we assume that the keyword space $W$ and the identity space $TD$ are defined by the system parameter $pp$.

ICA-Setup($pp$): The system parameter $pp$ is taken as the input, and the public–secret key pair $(pk_{ICA}, sk_{ICA})$ of the ICA is the output.

KGC-Setup($pp$): The system parameter $pp$ is taken as the input, and the public–secret key pair $(pk_{KGC}, sk_{KGC})$ of the KGC is the output.

ICA-Cert($pp, pk_{ICA}, sk_{ICA}, ID$): The system parameter $pp$, ICA’s public key $pk_{ICA}$, ICA’s secret key $sk_{ICA}$, and a user’s identity $ID \in TD$ are taken as the inputs, and a certificate $cert_{ID}$ and a piece of trapdoor information $tf_{ID}$ are the outputs, which are sent to the ID through a secure channel.

(User-Obtain-Key($pp, pk_{KGC}, ID, cert_{ID}, tf_{ID}$), KGC-Issue-Key($pp, pk_{KGC}, sk_{KGC}, pk_{ICA}$)): This is an interactive key-issuing protocol between a user and the KGC that comprises two algorithms: User-Obtain-Key and KGC-Issue-Key. The user first generates the first-round message $M_1 \leftarrow$ User-Obtain-Key and submits it to the KGC. Subsequently, the KGC returns a second-round message $M_2 \leftarrow$ KGC-Issue-Key to the user. At the end of the protocol, the user can locally output a secret key $sk_{ID}$ or $\perp$.

Encrypt($pp, sk_{DO}, DU, w$): The system parameter $pp$, DO’s secret key $sk_{DO}$, DU’s identity $DU$, and a keyword $w \in W$ are taken as the inputs, and a searchable ciphertext $ct_w$ associated with keyword $w$ is the output.

Trapdoor($pp, DO, sk_{DU}, w$): The system parameter $pp$, DO’s identity $DO$, DU’s secret key $sk_{DU}$, and a keyword $w \in W$ are taken as the inputs, and a trapdoor $td_w$ associated with keyword $w$ is the output.

Test($pp, ct_w, td_w$): The system parameter $pp$, a searchable ciphertext $ct_w$, and a trapdoor $td_w$ are taken as the inputs, and $1$ is the output if $ct_w$ is matched with $td_w$; otherwise, $0$ is the output.

Definition 1 (Correctness and Consistency of ICA-IBSE). For all security parameters $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, all DOs $DO \in TD$, all DUs $DU \in TD$, and all keywords $w, w' \in W$, ICA-IBSE is defined to be correct if, when $w = w'$, we have

$$\Pr[\text{Test}(pp, ct_w, td_w) = 1] = 1$$

and ICA-IBSE is defined to be consistent if, when $w \neq w'$, we have

$$\Pr[\text{Test}(pp, ct_w, td_w) = 0] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda); (pk_{ICA}, sk_{ICA}) \leftarrow \text{ICA-Setup}(pp); (pk_{KGC}, sk_{KGC}) \leftarrow \text{KGC-Setup}(pp); (cert_i, td_i) \leftarrow \text{ICA-Cert}(pp, pk_{ICA}, sk_{ICA}, ID); \text{ and } sk_i \leftarrow \langle \text{User-Obtain-Key}(pp, pk_{KGC}, i, cert_i, td_i), KGC-Issure-Key(pp, pk_{KGC}, sk_{KGC}, pk_{ICA}) \rangle$, for $i = \{DO, DU\}, ct_w = \text{Encrypt}(pp, sk_{DO}, DU, w)$, and $td_w \leftarrow \text{Trapdoor}(pp, DO, sk_{DU}, w').$

B. Security Models

To model the different aspects of the attacks described in Section 1.1-B, we revise the security model in [32] and [21] to account for multichosen keyword attacks (MCKAs) and IKGAs. MCKAs, recently introduced by Qin et al. [21], ensure that no adversary can obtain any information from two tuples of encrypted keywords; IKGAs ensure that no insider adversary (i.e., the CS) can obtain any information on keywords from the trapdoor, even when an insider can conduct tests.

Before presenting our security models, we first define the following oracles that are simulated by the challenger for the adversary:

Certificate Oracle $O_{cert}$: For any identity $ID \in TD$, the challenger outputs $(cert_{ID}, tf_{ID}) \leftarrow \text{ICA-Cert}(pp, pk_{ICA}, sk_{ICA}, ID)$ to the adversary.

Secret Key Oracle $O_{sk}$: For any first-round message $M_1$, the challenger runs $M_2 \leftarrow$ KGC-Issue-Key($pp, pk_{KGC}, sk_{KGC}, pk_{ICA}$) and returns $M_2$ to the adversary.

Ciphertext Oracle $O_{ct}$: For any keyword $w \in W$, the challenger outputs $ct_w = \text{Encrypt}(pp, sk_{DO}, DU, w)$ to the adversary.

Trapdoor Oracle $O_{td}$: For any keyword $w \in W$, the challenger outputs $td_w \leftarrow \text{Trapdoor}(pp, DO, sk_{DU}, w)$ to the adversary.

Issue Key KGC Oracle $O_{sk-KGC}$: When the adversary makes this query, the challenger randomly chooses $ID \in TD$ and computes $(cert_{ID}, tf_{ID}) \leftarrow \text{ICA-Cert}(pp, pk_{ICA}, sk_{ICA}, ID)$. In addition, it runs $M_1 \leftarrow \text{User-Obtain-Key}(pp, pk_{KGC}, ID, cert_{ID}, tf_{ID})$, and
and returns $M_1$ to the adversary, stores ID to IDList, and updates $Q_{key} \leftarrow Q_{key} + 1$. Here, $Q_{key}$ is the number of instances $O_{\text{sk-KGC}}$ is queried, and IDList is a list of identities whose corresponding $M_1$ values have been obtained by the adversary through querying $O_{\text{sk-KGC}}$.

Ciphertext KGC Oracle $O_{\text{ct-KGC}}$: For any keyword $w \in W$, DO index $doi$, and DU index $dui$, the challenger first checks whether $doi \in [Q_{key}]$ and $dui \in [Q_{key}]$. If not, the challenger forces the adversary to output a random bit $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. Otherwise, the challenger retrieves the $doi$-th identity's secret key $sk_{\text{IDList[doi]}}$ and $dui$-th identity IDList[dui] in IDList and subsequently outputs $ct_w \leftarrow \text{Encrypt}(pp, sk_{\text{IDList[doi]}}, \text{IDList[dui]}, w)$ to the adversary.

 Trapdoor KGC Oracle $O_{\text{td-KGC}}$: For any keyword $w \in W$, DO index $doi$, and DU index $dui$, the challenger first checks whether $doi \in [Q_{key}]$ and $dui \in [Q_{key}]$. If not, the challenger forces the adversary to output a random bit $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. Otherwise, the challenger retrieves the $doi$-th identity IDList[doi] and $dui$-th identity’s secret key $sk_{\text{IDList[doi]}}$ and subsequently outputs $td_w \leftarrow \text{Trapdoor}(pp, IDList[doi], sk_{\text{IDList[doi]}}, w)$ to the adversary.

The CS can directly obtain the entirety of ciphertext and all trapdoors from the DO and DU individually; hence, intuitively, the CS has greater attack capability relative to eavesdroppers on the channel. Therefore, we only consider attacks from the CS and not from parties other than the CS, ICA, or KGC. We formulate six games (MCKA-CS, MCKA-KGC, MCKA-ICA, IKGA-CS, IKGA-KGC, and IKGA-ICA) to model the MCKA or IKGA from the CS, KGC, or ICA. In this paper, MCKA and IKGA games are represented using blue solid and red dotted lines, respectively.

First, in the MCKA-CS and IKGA-CS games, the adversary is restricted to issuing queries to $O_{\text{cert}}$ on some challenged identities $DO, DU \in TD$. Furthermore, the adversary cannot issue queries to oracles $O_{\text{ct}}$ on the challenged keywords $w_b,i \in W$ and cannot issue queries to oracles $O_{\text{td}}$ on the challenged keywords $w_b,i \in W$ for the challenged identities $DO, DU \in TD$, where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$. We consider that ICA-IBSE is MCKA-CS secure if the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{MCKA-CS}}^{\text{ICA-IBSE}}(\lambda) = |Pr[b = b'] - 1/2|$$

is negligible for any adversary, and we consider that ICA-IBSE is IKGA-CS secure if the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{IKGA-CS}}^{\text{ICA-IBSE}}(\lambda) = |Pr[b = b'] - 1/2|$$

is negligible for any adversary.

In MCKA-ICA and IKGA-ICA games, we model a malicious ICA that can generate a potentially malicious ICA key pair $(pk_{\text{ICA}}, sk_{\text{ICA}})$. However, to model the state of affairs where the ICA cannot interact with the KGC, we restrict the ICA to access Secret Key Oracle $O_{\text{sk}}$. In addition, the adversary is restricted to issue queries to oracles $O_{\text{ct}}$ on challenged keywords $w_{b,i} \in W$ and to issue queries to oracles $O_{\text{td}}$ on challenged keywords $w_b \in W$ for some challenged identities $DO, DU \in TD$, where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$. We consider that ICA-IBSE is MCKA-ICA secure if the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{MCKA-ICA}}^{\text{ICA-IBSE}}(\lambda) = |Pr[b = b'] - 1/2|$$

is negligible for any adversary, and we consider that ICA-IBSE is IKGA-ICA secure if the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{IKGA-ICA}}^{\text{ICA-IBSE}}(\lambda) = |Pr[b = b'] - 1/2|$$

is negligible for any adversary.

Finally, the MCKA-KGC and IKGA-KGC games differ from the preceding games in terms of their setups. Specifically, the adversary is given KGC’s secret key. Moreover, we use $Q_{key}$ to count the number of KGC queries to Issue Key KGC Oracle $O_{\text{sk-KGC}}$, and we use IDList to store the corresponding identity of the secret key that is returned by this oracle. To simulate the state of affairs where the adversary does not know the identity of the user, after the adversary completes the first query phase, the adversary outputs two arbitrary indices $\alpha, \beta \in [Q_{key}]$ instead of two identities $DO, DU \in TD$. Subsequently, by using the indices, the challenger chooses IDList[\alpha] and IDList[\beta] from IDList as the DO and DU, respectively. Furthermore, the adversary is restricted to issuing queries to $O_{\text{ct-KGC}}$ on challenged keywords $w_{b,i} \in W$ and to issuing queries to $O_{\text{td-KGC}}$ on challenged keywords $w_b \in W$ for the challenged indices $(\alpha, \beta)$, where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $i \in \{1, \ldots, n\}$. We consider that ICA-IBSE is MCKA-KGC secure if the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{MCKA-KGC}}^{\text{ICA-IBSE}}(\lambda) = |Pr[b = b'] - 1/2|$$

is negligible for any adversary, and we consider that ICA-IBSE is IKGA-KGC secure if the advantage

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{IKGA-KGC}}^{\text{ICA-IBSE}}(\lambda) = |Pr[b = b'] - 1/2|$$

is negligible for any adversary.
In this section, we first introduce the requisite preliminaries (including some background on the pairing and signature) before proposing a concrete construction. We also analyze the correctness and consistency of the proposed scheme.

A. Preliminaries
Symmetric Bilinear Groups. Let $q$ be a $\lambda$-bit prime, and let $\mathbb{G}_1$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ be two cyclic groups of the same prime order $q$, where $g \in \mathbb{G}_1$ is a generator. In addition, let $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ be a bilinear pairing (a map). We consider that the tuple $(g, g, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e})$ is a symmetric bilinear group if the following properties are satisfied:

- Bilinearity: for all $g_1, g_2 \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, $\hat{e}(g_1^a, g_2^b) = \hat{e}(g_1, g_2)^{ab}$.
- Nondegeneracy: $\hat{e}(g, g) = 1$ is a generator of $\mathbb{G}_T$ (i.e., $\hat{e}(g, g) \neq 1$ holds).
- Computability: $\hat{e}$ is efficiently computable.

Digital Signature Scheme. A digital signature scheme $\text{Sig}$ with the message space $\mathcal{M}$ comprises three algorithms:

- $\text{Sig.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$: The security parameter $\lambda$ is taken as the input, and a verification key $vk_{\text{Sig}}$ and signing key $sk_{\text{Sig}}$ are the outputs.
- $\text{Sig.Sign}(sk_{\text{Sig}}, m)$: The signing key $sk_{\text{Sig}}$ and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ are taken as the inputs, and a signature $\sigma_{\text{Sig}}$ is the output.
- $\text{Sig.Verify}(vk_{\text{Sig}}, m, \sigma_{\text{Sig}})$: The verification key $vk_{\text{Sig}}$, a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and a signature $\sigma_{\text{Sig}}$ are taken as the inputs, and 1 is the output if the signature is valid; otherwise, 0 is the output.

A signature scheme $\text{Sig}$ is considered to be correct if for all $\lambda$, all messages $m \in \mathcal{M}$, all $(vk_{\text{Sig}}, sk_{\text{Sig}}) \leftarrow \text{Sig.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$, and all $\sigma_{\text{Sig}} \leftarrow \text{Sig.Sign}(sk_{\text{Sig}}, m)$, the following holds:

$$\Pr[\text{Sig.Verify}(vk_{\text{Sig}}, m, \sigma_{\text{Sig}}) = 1] = 1.$$  

In addition, we consider that $\text{Sig}$ is secure against an existential unforgeability under an adaptive chosen message attack (EU-CMA) if, for any adversary $A$, $\text{Adv}_{\text{Sig}}^{\text{EU-CMA}}(\lambda) = \Pr[\text{Sig.Verify}(vk_{\text{Sig}}, m^*, \sigma_{\text{Sig}}) = 1]$ is negligible. Here, the adversary $A$ is allowed to query the signing oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{sign}}()$ on any message $m \neq m^* \in \mathcal{M}$ and allowed to obtain the corresponding signature $\sigma_{\text{Sig}}$.

**B. Our Construction**

Let the identity space $\mathcal{ID}$ of the ICA-IBSE scheme be $\mathcal{ID} = \mathbb{Z}_q$ and the keyword space $\mathcal{W}$ of the ICA-IBSE scheme be $\mathcal{W} = \{0, 1\}^n$ for some $n$. In addition, let $\text{Sig} : (\text{Sig.KeyGen}, \text{Sig.KeyGen}, \text{Sig.Verify})$ be an EU-CMA-secure digital signature with message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^m$ for some $m$.

**Setup($1^\lambda$):** This algorithm chooses two multiplicative cyclic groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_T$ with prime order $q$, a generator $g \in \mathbb{G}_1$; a pairing $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$; and three cryptographic hash functions $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, $h_1 : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G}_T \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and $h_2 : \mathbb{Z}_q^* \times \mathbb{G}_1 \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. It sets the system parameter to be

$$\mathcal{ID} = \{1^\lambda, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, q, g, H, h_1, h_2\}.$$

**ICA-Setup($\mathcal{ID}$):** This algorithm runs $(vk_{\text{Sig}}, sk_{\text{Sig}}) \leftarrow \text{Sig.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$. It then outputs $pk_{\text{ICA}} := vk_{\text{Sig}}$, $sk_{\text{ICA}} := sk_{\text{Sig}}$.

**KGC-Setup($\mathcal{ID}$):** The KGC picks $x \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and computes $Y = g^x$. It then outputs

$$pk_{\text{KGC}} := Y; sk_{\text{KGC}} := x.$$

**ICA-Cert($\mathcal{ID}, pk_{\text{ICA}}, sk_{\text{ICA}}, \mathcal{ID}$):** The ICA computes $u_{\mathcal{ID}} = H(\mathcal{ID})$, picks $y_{\mathcal{ID}, 1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and computes $u_{\mathcal{ID}, 1} = g^{y_{\mathcal{ID}, 1}}$. In addition, it computes $u_{\mathcal{ID}, 2} = u_{\mathcal{ID}, 1}^{y_{\mathcal{ID}, 2}} \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and $\sigma_{\text{Sig}} \leftarrow \text{Sig.Sign}(sk_{\text{Sig}}, u_{\mathcal{ID}, 2})$. Finally, it outputs

$$\text{cert}_{\mathcal{ID}} := (u_{\mathcal{ID}, 2}, \sigma_{\text{Sig}}); t_{\mathcal{ID}} := y_{\mathcal{ID}, 1}. $$

**User-Obtain-Key($\mathcal{ID}, pk_{\text{KGC}}, \mathcal{ID}, \text{cert}_{\mathcal{ID}}, t_{\mathcal{ID}}$), KGC-Issue-Key($\mathcal{ID}, pk_{\text{KGC}}, sk_{\text{KGC}}, pk_{\text{ICA}}$):** The user and the KGC run the following steps:

1) The user selects $M_1 = \text{cert}_{\mathcal{ID}} = (u_{\mathcal{ID}, 2}, \sigma_{\text{Sig}})$ and sends $M_1$ to the KGC.

2) After receiving $M_1$, the KGC verifies the correctness of $\sigma_{\text{Sig}}$. If $\text{Sig.Verify}(vk_{\text{Sig}}, u_{\mathcal{ID}, 2}, \sigma_{\text{Sig}}) = 1$, the KGC sends $M_2 = \perp$. Otherwise, it computes $M_2 = y_{\mathcal{ID}, 2} = u_{\mathcal{ID}, 2}^{t_{\mathcal{ID}}}$. Finally, it returns $M_2$ to the user.

3) If $M_2 = \perp$, the user outputs $\perp$. Otherwise, it computes $e_{\mathcal{ID}} = y_{\mathcal{ID}, 2} \cdot Y^{-y_{\mathcal{ID}, 1}}$ and outputs $sk_{\mathcal{ID}} := e_{\mathcal{ID}}$.

**Encrypt($\mathcal{ID}, sk_{\mathcal{DO}}, DU, w$):** The data owner randomly selects $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and computes $c_1 = g^r$, $c_2 = g^{h_2(h_1(DU, DU, k, w, c_1))}$, where $k = \hat{e}(sk_{\text{KDO}}, H(DU))$. Subsequently, it outputs $ct_{w} := (c_1, c_2)$.

**Trapdoor($\mathcal{ID}, DU, sk_{\mathcal{DO}}, w$):** The DU outputs $td_{w} := h_1(DU, DU, k, w)$. The KGC outputs $\text{cert}_{\mathcal{ID}} := (u_{\mathcal{ID}, 2}, \sigma_{\text{Sig}})$.
C. Correctness and Consistency of ICA-IBSE

We analyze the correctness and consistency of the proposed ICA-IBSE scheme as follows.

1) For \( i \in \{DO, DU\} \), we have
   \[ sk_i = y_{i,1} \cdot Y^{-y_i,1} \]
   \[ = u_{i,1} \cdot Y^{-y_i,1} \]
   \[ = u_{i,1} \cdot u_{i,x} \cdot Y^{-y_{i,1}} \]
   \[ = H(i)^{x} \cdot Y^{h_{i,1}} \cdot Y^{-y_{i,1}} \]
   \[ = H(i)^{x}. \]

2) Considering the Test algorithm for a ciphertext \( ct_w = (c_1, c_2) \) and a trapdoor \( td_{w'} \), we have
   \[ g^{r_2(h_1(\text{DO}, \text{DU}, k, w), c_1)} = c_2 = c_1^{h_2(td_{w'}, c_1)} \]
   \[ = g^{r_2(td_{w'}, c_1)} \]
   \[ = g^{r_2(h_1(\text{DO}, \text{DU}, k', w'), c_1)} \]

3) In addition, we have
   \[ k = \hat{e}(sk_{DO}, H(\text{DU})) = \hat{e}(H(\text{DO})^{x}, H(\text{DU})) \]
   \[ = \hat{e}(H(\text{DO}), H(\text{DU})^{x}) = \hat{e}(H(\text{DO}), sk_{DU}) \]
   \[ = k'. \]

Because \( k = k' \), when \( w = w' \), we have
\[ h_1(\text{DO}, \text{DU}, k, w) = h_1(\text{DO}, \text{DU}, k', w') \]
and
\[ c_2 = c_1^{h_2(td_{w'}, c_1)} \]
therefore, correctness is satisfied. Conversely, when \( w \neq w' \), because the probability that
\[ h_1(\text{DO}, \text{DU}, k, w) = h_1(\text{DO}, \text{DU}, k', w') \]
is negligibly low, we have \( c_2 \neq c_1^{h_2(td_{w'}, c_1)} \); therefore, consistency is also satisfied.

V. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF ICA-IBSE

In this section, we demonstrate that our scheme is secure against various forms of attacks.

Gap Bilinear Diffie–Hellman Assumption [33, [34]. Given a symmetric bilinear group tuple \( \Phi = (g, g^x, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}) \), we consider that the GBDH assumption holds if, for any probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm (PPT) adversary \( A \), the advantage (defined as follows) is negligible:

\[ \text{Adv}_{\Phi}^{\text{GBDH}}(A, \mathcal{O}_{\text{GBDH}}) := \Pr[T = \hat{e}(g^a, g^b, g^c) | a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q; T \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{GBDH}}(\Phi, g^a, g^b, g^c)] \]

where \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{GBDH}} \) denotes a decision bilinear Diffie–Hellman oracle that takes \((g^a, g^b, g^c, T)\) as its input and outputs 1 if \( \hat{e}(g^a, g^b, g^c, T) = T \) and 0 otherwise; \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{GBDH}} \) denotes the maximum number of queries by \( A \) to \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{GBDH}} \).

**Theorem 1.** The proposed construction is MCKA-CS secure if the underlying signature scheme \( \text{Sig} \) is EU-CMA secure under the hard GBDH assumption.

**Proof.** Suppose that some PPT algorithm \( A \) can break the MCKA-CS security of the proposed scheme. If so, then the following proof demonstrates that some other algorithm \( B \) can use \( A \) to solve the GBDH assumption.

Before the beginning of the game, \( B \) is given a GBDH instance \((g, g^a, g^b, g^c)\), where \( a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^* \) are random choices.

**Initialization.** \( B \) first generates the system parameter \( pp = \{1^\lambda, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, q, g, H, h_1, h_2\} \) according to the scheme. Subsequently, it chooses \( t_1, t_2 \leq q_H \) randomly as the indices of the challenged identities for the DO and DU, respectively. Here, \( q_H \) is the maximum number of queries that could be queried by the \( H \)-oracle for different identities. \( B \) also runs \((pk_{\text{ICA}}, sk_{\text{ICA}}) \leftarrow \text{ICA-Setup}(pp) \) and sets \( pk_{\text{KGC}} = g^q \). Furthermore, \( B \) sets initially on four lists (cert-list, H-list, h1-list, and h2-list) and randomly chooses a bit \( b \in \{0, 1\} \). Finally, \( B \) returns \((pp, pk_{\text{ICA}}, pk_{\text{KGC}}) \) to \( A \).

**Phase I.** In this phase, \( A \) is allowed to query the following oracles adaptively at polynomially many instances.

- **H-oracle:** On the \( i \)-th nonrepeated query \( ID_i \in \mathcal{I} \), \( B \) first searches the H-list for the entry \((i, ID_i, \mu_{ID_i}, u_{ID_i})\). If no such entry exists, then \( B \) executes the following under the following conditions:
  - If \( i \notin \{t_1, t_2\} \) \( B \) randomly chooses \( \mu_{ID_i} \in \mathbb{Z}_q \), computes \( u_{ID_i} = g^{\mu_{ID_i}} \), adds \((i, ID_i, \mu_{ID_i}, u_{ID_i})\) to the H-list, and returns \( u_{ID_i} \) to \( A \).
  - If \( i = t_1 \) \( B \) sets \( u_{ID_i} = g^b \), adds \((i, ID_i, \perp, u_{ID_i})\) to the H-list, and returns \( u_{ID_i} \) to \( A \).
  - If \( i = t_2 \) \( B \) sets \( u_{ID_i} = g^b \), adds \((i, ID_i, \perp, u_{ID_i})\) to the H-list, and returns \( u_{ID_i} \) to \( A \).

- **h1-oracle:** On the query \((ID_i, ID_j, k, w)\), \( B \) searches h1-list for the entry \((ID_i, ID_j, k, w, h)\) and returns \( h \). Note that we assume that \(((ID_i, ID_j, k, w, h)) \) is identical to \(((ID_j, ID_i, k, w, h)) \) for \( h \)-1-list. If no such entry exists, \( B \) runs the following steps:
  - retrieve \( u_{ID_i} \) and \( u_{ID_j} \) by calling \( H(ID_i) \) and \( H(ID_j) \), respectively.
  - check if \( \mathcal{O}_{\text{DBDH}}(pk_{\text{KGC}}, u_{ID_i}, u_{ID_j}, k) = 1 \).
  - if \( i \neq j \) \{\( \ell_1, \ell_2 \) \} and the DBDH oracle returns 1, return \( k \) as the answer to the DBDH problem and abort.
  - randomly choose \( h \in \mathbb{Z}_q \), adds \((ID_i, ID_j, k, w, h)\) to the h1-list, and return \( h \) to \( A \).

- **h2-oracle:** On the query \((h, c_i)\), \( B \) searches h2-list for the entry \((h, c_i, h)\) and returns \( h \). If no such entry exists, \( B \) randomly chooses \( h \in \mathbb{Z}_q \), adds \((h, c_i, h)\) to h2-list, and returns \( h \) to \( A \).

- **O_{ cert } ( ):** when \( A \) queries for a certificate corresponding to \( ID \), \( B \) first goes through H-list for a tuple \((*, ID, *, *)\). If no such tuple is found, \( B \) calls \( H(ID) \) first and obtains \((i, ID, \mu_{ID}, u_{ID})\). Subsequently, \( B \) samples \( y_{ID,1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and computes \( u_{ID,1} = g^{y_{ID,1}}, u_{ID,2} = u_{ID,1}^{u_{ID,1}} \), and \( H_{\text{Sig}} \leftarrow \text{Sig} \cdot \text{Sig}(sk_{\text{ICA}}, u_{ID,2}) \). \( B \) also sets \( cert_{ID} = (u_{ID,2}, H_{\text{Sig}}) \) and \( tf_{ID} = y_{ID,1} \) and adds \((cert_{ID}, tf_{ID}, ID)\) to cert-list. Finally, \( B \) returns \((cert_{ID}, tf_{ID}, ID)\) to \( A \).

- **O_{ sk } ( ):** when \( A \) queries for a secret key with a first-round message \( M_1 \), \( B \) parses \( M_1 = (u_{ID,2}, H_{\text{Sig}}) \). \( B \) returns \( \perp \) if \( \text{SigVerify}(pk_{\text{ICA}}, u_{ID,2}, H_{\text{Sig}}) = \perp \). Otherwise, \( B \) extracts \( tf_{ID} = y_{ID,1} \) from \((cert_{ID} = (u_{ID,2}, H_{\text{Sig}}), tf_{ID} = y_{ID,1}, ID)\) in cert-list. Here, we note that since \( H \) is EU-CMA secure, if the verification passes, it necessarily exists in cert-list. Subsequently, \( B \) goes through H-list for the tuple \((i, ID, \mu_{ID}, *)\).
if $i \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$: $B$ computes $y_{ID,2} = pk_{ID,2}^{ID,1 + \mu_{ID}}$. Subsequently, $B$ sets $M_2 = y_{ID,2}$ and returns it to $A$.
- if $i \in \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$: $B$ aborts the game and outputs a random element in $\mathbb{G}_T$.

- $\mathcal{O}_{ct}(\cdot)$: when $A$ queries for a ciphertext with $(ID_1, ID_1, w)$, $B$ executes the following steps:
  - retrieve $(i, ID_1, \mu_{ID_1, u_{ID_1}})$ and $(j, ID_1, \mu_{ID_1, u_{ID_1}})$ from $H$-list for $ID_1$ and $ID_1$, respectively.
  - randomly select $r \in Z_q$.
  - if $\{i, j\} = \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$: search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((ID_1, ID_1, i, w), h)$; if no such tuple exists, randomly choose $h \in Z_q^*$ and add $((ID_1, ID_1, i, w), h)$ to $h_1$-list.
  - if otherwise (i.e., $i \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$ or $j \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$), either compute $k = \tilde{e}(pk_{ID_1}^{\mu_{ID_1}}, u_{ID_1})$ if $i \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$ or compute $k = \tilde{e}(u_{ID_1}, pk_{ID_1}^{\mu_{ID_1}})$ if $j \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$. Note that if $i \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$ and $j \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$, $B$ can randomly set $k = \tilde{e}(pk_{ID_1}^{\mu_{ID_1}}, u_{ID_1})$ or $k = \tilde{e}(u_{ID_1}, pk_{ID_1}^{\mu_{ID_1}})$.
  - search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((ID_1, ID_1, k, w), h)$. If no such tuple exists, randomly choose $h \in Z_q^*$ and add $((ID_1, ID_1, k, w), h)$ to $h_1$-list.
  - compute $c_1 = g^r$ and $c_2 = g^{rh}$, where $h$ is retrieved from $h_2$-list (i.e., $h = h_2(h, c_1)$).
  - return $ct = (c_1, c_2)$.

- $\mathcal{O}_{td}(\cdot)$: when $A$ queries for a trapdoor with $(ID_1, ID_1, w)$, $B$ executes the following steps:
  - retrieve $(i, ID_1, \mu_{ID_1, u_{ID_1}})$ and $(j, ID_1, \mu_{ID_1, u_{ID_1}})$ from $H$-list for $ID_1$ and $ID_1$, respectively.
  - randomly select $r \in Z_q$.
  - if $\{i, j\} = \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$: search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((ID_1, ID_1, i, w), h)$. If no such tuple exists, randomly choose $h \in Z_q^*$ and add $((ID_1, ID_1, i, w), h)$ to $h_1$-list.
  - if otherwise (i.e., $i \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$ or $j \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$), either compute $k = \tilde{e}(pk_{ID_1}^{\mu_{ID_1}}, u_{ID_1})$ if $i \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$ or compute $k = \tilde{e}(u_{ID_1}, pk_{ID_1}^{\mu_{ID_1}})$ if $j \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$. Note that if $i \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$ and $j \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$, $B$ can randomly set $k = \tilde{e}(pk_{ID_1}^{\mu_{ID_1}}, u_{ID_1})$ or $k = \tilde{e}(u_{ID_1}, pk_{ID_1}^{\mu_{ID_1}})$.
  - search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((ID_1, ID_1, k, w), h)$. If no such tuple exists, randomly choose $h \in Z_q^*$ and add $((ID_1, ID_1, k, w), h)$ to $h_1$-list.
  - return $td = h$.

**Challenge.** At the end of Phase 1, $A$ outputs the challenged tuple $(\hat{w}_0 = \{w_{0,1}, \ldots, w_{0,n}\}, \hat{w}_1 = \{w_{1,1}, \ldots, w_{1,n}\}), (DO, DU)$ and $B$ executes the following steps:

- obtain $(i, DO, \bot, u_{DO})$ and $(j, DU, \bot, u_{DU})$ by calling $H(DO)$ and $H(DU)$, respectively. If $\{i, j\} \neq \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$, abort the game.
- for $i = 1, \ldots, n$, execute the following steps. First, randomly choose $r_i \in Z_q^*$. Second, search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((DO, DU, \bot, w_{b,i}), h_i)$; if no such entry is found, randomly choose $h_i \in Z_q^*$ and add $((DO, DU, \bot, w_{b,i}), h_i)$ to $h_1$-list. Third, compute $ct_i^* = (c_{i,1}^*, c_{i,2}^*)$, where $c_{i,1}^* = g_i^{\ast r_i}$, $c_{i,2}^* = g_i^{\ast h_i}$, and $h_i$ is retrieved from $h_2$-list (i.e., $h_i = h_2(h_i, c_{i,1}^*)$).
- return challenged ciphertext $ct^* = (ct_1^*, \ldots, ct_n^*)$. **Phase 2.** In this phase, $A$ can keep the query oracles identical to those in Phase 1.

**Guess.** Finally, $A$ outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ as its guess. $B$ searches $h_1$-list for $k^*$ such that $\mathcal{O}_{DBDH}(g^{b'}, g^b, g^r, k^*) = 1$ and returns $k^*$ as answer.

**Analyze.** Because $B$ follows the proposed scheme, with the exception that the hash functions are modeled by random oracles, its simulation is identical to that of the real scheme. Because $\ell_1$ and $\ell_2$ are independent of $A$’s perspective, the probability that $B$ does not abort the game (i.e., $\{i, j\} \notin \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$ in querying $h_1$-oracle and $\{DO, DU\} = \{ID_\ell, ID_\ell\}$ in Challenge) is $\frac{1}{q^2}$, where $q_h$ is the maximum number of queries that could be made to the $h_1$ oracle for different inputs. Furthermore, because $h_1$ is modeled as a random oracle, the adversary’s advantage is negligible unless $(DO, DU, k^*, w_{b,i}, \ell)$ appears on $h_1$-list such that $k^* = \tilde{e}(g_i, g_i)^{r_i}$. If this tuple appears on $h_1$-list, then $B$ is necessarily able to solve the GBDH problem. Therefore, if there exists some $A$ that can break the MCKA-CS-secure scheme at a nonnegligible advantage $\epsilon$, then there exists some $B$ that can break the GBDH problem at a nonnegligible advantage $\epsilon' \geq \epsilon \cdot \frac{2}{q_h}$.

**Theorem 2.** The proposed scheme is IKGA-CS secure if the underlying signature scheme $\text{Sig}$ is EU-CMA secure under the hard GBDH assumption.

**Proof.** The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 1 except for the Challenge phase. Thus, we describe only the proof for the Challenge phase.

**Challenge.** At the end of Phase 1, $A$ outputs a challenged trapdoor $(\hat{w}_0 = \{w_{0,1}, \ldots, w_{0,n}\}, \hat{w}_1 = \{w_{1,1}, \ldots, w_{1,n}\}), (DO, DU)$ and $B$ executes the following steps:

- obtain $(i, DO, \bot, u_{DO})$ and $(j, DU, \bot, u_{DU})$ by calling $H(DO)$ and $H(DU)$, respectively. If $\{i, j\} \neq \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$, abort the game.
- search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((DO, DU, \bot, w_{b,i}), h)$. If no such tuple is found, randomly choose $h \in Z_q^*$ and add $((DO, DU, \bot, w_{b,i}), h)$ to $h_1$-list.
- return challenged trapdoor $td^* = h$.

**Theorem 3.** The proposed scheme is MCKA-ICA and IKGA-ICA secure if it is MCKA-CS and IKGA-CS secure, respectively.

**Proof.** This proof is intuitive. Because the adversary in MCKA-ICA and IKGA-ICA is a weaker variant of that in MCKA-CS and IKGA-CS, respectively, Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 entail Theorem 3. Note that because $B$ need not reply to the certificate query for $A$, the signature scheme $\text{Sig}$ need not be EU-CMA secure.

**Theorem 4.** The proposed scheme is MCKA-KGC secure under the hard GBDH assumption.

**Proof.** Suppose that some PPT algorithm $A$ can break the MCKA-KGC security of the proposed scheme. If so, then the following proof demonstrates that some other algorithm $B$ can use $A$ to solve the GBDH problem.
Before the beginning of the game, $B$ is given a GBDH instance $(g,g^a,g^b,g^c)$, where $a,b,c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ are random choices.

**Initialization.** $B$ first generates the system parameter $pp \triangleq \{1^\lambda,G_1,G_T,e,q,g,H,h_1,h_2\}$ according to the scheme. Subsequently, it sets $Q_{key} := 1$ and sets the initials of an empty list $IDList$ to count the number of $A$ queries to $O_{kGKC}$ and store the corresponding identity of the secret key returned by this oracle. $B$ also runs $(pk_{ICCA},sk_{ICCA}) \leftarrow$ ICA-Setup$(pp)$ and $(pk_{KGC},sk_{KGC}) \leftarrow$ KGC-Setup$(pp)$ and chooses two arbitrary indices $\ell_1,\ell_2 \leq \text{Max}_{Q_{key}}$, where Max$_{Q_{key}}$ is the maximum number of queries that can be queried by the $O_{kGKC}$ oracle. In addition, $B$ sets the initials for three additional lists ($H$-list, $h_1$-list, and $h_2$-list) and randomly chooses a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Finally, $B$ returns $(pp,pk_{ICCA},pk_{KGC},sk_{KGC})$ to $A$.

**Phase 1.** In this phase, $A$ is allowed to query the following oracles adaptively at polynomially many instances.

- **$H$-oracle:** On the $i$th nonrepeated query $ID_i$, $B$ first searches $H$-list for the entry $(i, ID_i, \mu_{ID_i}, u_{ID_i})$. If no such entry exists, then $B$ randomly chooses $\mu_{ID_i} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, computes $u_{ID_i} = g^{\mu_{ID_i}}$, adds $(i, ID_i, \mu_{ID_i}, u_{ID_i})$ to $H$-list, and returns $u_{ID_i}$ to $A$.

- **$h_1$-oracle:** On the query $(ID_i, ID_j, k, w)$, $B$ first searches $h_1$-list for the entry $((ID_i, ID_j, k, w), h)$ and returns $h$. Notably, we assume that $((ID_j, ID_i, k, w), h)$ is identical to $((ID_j, ID_i, k, w), h)$ for $h_1$-list. If no such entry exists, $B$ executes the following steps:
  - retrieve $u_{ID_i}$ and $u_{ID_j}$ by calling $H(ID_i)$ and $H(ID_j)$, respectively.
  - check if $O_{DBDH}(pk_{KGC}, u_{ID_i}, u_{ID_j}, k) = 1$.
  - if $(i,j) \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$ and the DBDH oracle returns 1, return $k$ as the answer to the DBDH problem and abort.
  - randomly choose $h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and add $((ID_i, ID_j, k, w), h)$ to $h_1$-list, and return $h$ to $A$.

- **$h_2$-oracle:** On the query $(h,c_1)$, $B$ searches $h_2$-list for the entry $((h,c_1), h)$ and returns $h$. If no such entry exists, then $B$ randomly chooses $h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, adds $((h,c_1), h)$ to $h_2$-list, and returns $h$ to $A$.

- **$O_{kGKC}()$:** When $A$ issues a issue key query, $B$ first samples $ID \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ such that $ID$ does not exist in $H$-list. Subsequently, $B$ executes the following steps under the following conditions:
  - if $Q_{key} \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$, $B$ obtains $u_{ID}$ by querying $H(ID)$.
  - if $Q_{key} = \ell_1$, $B$ sets $u_{ID} = g^{ab}$ and adds $((ID, 1, u_{ID})$ to $H$-list.
  - if $Q_{key} = \ell_2$, $B$ sets $u_{ID} = g^c$ and adds $((ID, 1, u_{ID})$ to $H$-list.

In addition, $B$ randomly chooses $y_{ID,1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, computes $u_{ID,1} = g^{y_{ID,1}}$, and computes $u_{ID,2} = u_{ID}u_{ID,1} \in \mathbb{G}$ and $\sigma_{sig} \leftarrow \text{Sig.Sign}(sk_{ICCA},u_{ID,2})$. Finally, $B$ returns $M_1 = (u_{ID,2},\sigma_{sig})$ to $A$, sets $IDList[Q_{key}] = ID$, and updates $Q_{key} = Q_{key} + 1$.

- **$O_{ct}()$:** When $A$ queries for a ciphertext with $(i,j,w)$, where $i,j \in [Q_{key}]$, $B$ executes the following steps:
  - retrieve $((IDList[i], \mu_{IDList[i]}, u_{IDList[i]})$ and $(IDList[j], \mu_{IDList[j]}, u_{IDList[j]})$ from $H$-list for $IDList[i]$ and $IDList[j]$, respectively.
  - randomly select $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
  - if $(i,j) = \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$: search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((IDList[i], IDList[j]), w, h)$. If no such tuple exists, randomly choose $h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and add $((IDList[i], IDList[j]), w, h)$ to $h_1$-list.
  - if otherwise (i.e., $i \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$ or $j \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$), either compute $k = e(pk_{KGC}^{IDList[i]}, u_{IDList[j]})$ if $i \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$ or compute $k = e(u_{IDList[i]}, pk_{KGC}^{IDList[j]})$ if $j \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$. Note that if $i \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$ and $j \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$, $B$ can randomly set $k = e(pk_{KGC}^{IDList[i]}, u_{IDList[j]})$ or $k = e(u_{IDList[i]}, pk_{KGC}^{IDList[j]})$.
  - search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((IDList[i], IDList[j]), w, h)$. If no such tuple exists, randomly choose $h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and add $((IDList[i], IDList[j]), w, h)$ to $h_1$-list.
  - compute $c_1 = g^r$ and $c_2 = g^r h$, where $\tilde{h}$ is retrieved from $h_2$-list (i.e., $h_2(h_1,c_1)$).
  - return $ct_w = (c_1,c_2)$.

- **$O_{ct}()$:** when $A$ queries for a trapdoor with $(i,j,w)$, where $i,j \in [Q_{key}]$, $B$ executes the following steps:
  - retrieve $(IDList[i], \mu_{IDList[i]}, u_{IDList[i]})$ and $(IDList[j], \mu_{IDList[j]}, u_{IDList[j]})$ from $H$-list for $IDList[i]$ and $IDList[j]$, respectively.
  - if $(i,j) = \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$: search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((IDList[i], IDList[j]), w, h)$. If no such tuple exists, randomly choose $h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and add $((IDList[i], IDList[j]), w, h)$ to $h_1$-list.
  - if otherwise (i.e., $i \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$ or $j \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$), either compute $k = e(pk_{KGC}^{IDList[i]}, u_{IDList[j]})$ if $i \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$ or compute $k = e(u_{IDList[i]}, pk_{KGC}^{IDList[j]})$ if $j \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$. Note that if $i \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$ and $j \notin \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$, $B$ can randomly set $k = e(pk_{KGC}^{IDList[i]}, u_{IDList[j]})$ or $k = e(u_{IDList[i]}, pk_{KGC}^{IDList[j]})$.
  - search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((IDList[i], IDList[j]), w, h)$. If no such tuple exists, randomly choose $h \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and add $((IDList[i], IDList[j]), w, h)$ to $h_1$-list.
  - return $ct_w = h$.

**Challenge.** At the end of Phase 1, $A$ outputs the challenged tuple $(\tilde{w}_0 = \{w_{0,1}, \cdots, w_{0,n}\}, \tilde{w}_1 = \{w_{1,1}, \cdots, w_{1,n}\}, \alpha, \beta)$, and $B$ executes the following steps:

- if $(\tilde{w}_0) \notin \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, $B$ obtains $(IDList[\alpha], \mu_{IDList[\alpha]}, u_{IDList[\alpha]})$ and $(IDList[\beta], \mu_{IDList[\beta]}, u_{IDList[\beta]})$ by calling $H(IDList[\alpha])$ and $H(IDList[\beta])$, respectively. If $\{\alpha, \beta\} \neq \{(\ell_1,\ell_2)\}$, abort the game.
- for $i = 1, \cdots, n$, perform the following steps. First, randomly choose $r_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. Second, search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((IDList[\alpha], IDList[\beta], \mu_{IDList[\alpha]}, \mu_{IDList[\beta]}, w_{0,i}))$. If no such tuple is found, randomly choose $h_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and add $((IDList[\alpha], IDList[\beta], \mu_{IDList[\alpha]}, \mu_{IDList[\beta]}, w_{0,i}, h_i))$ to $h_1$-list. Third, compute $c_{\alpha}^i = (c_{\alpha}^i, c_{\alpha}^i)$, where $c_{\alpha}^i = g^{r,i}, c_{\alpha}^i = g^{r,h_i}$, and $h_i$ is retrieved from $h_2$-list (i.e., $h_i = h_2(h_i,c_{\alpha}^i)$).
- return the challenged ciphertext $ct^* = (c_1^*, \cdots, c_n^*)$.

**Phase 2.** In this phase, $A$ can keep the query oracles identical to those in Phase 1.
**Guess.** Finally, $A$ outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ as its guess. $B$ searches $h_1$-list for $k^*$ such that $O_{DBDH}(g^a, g^b, g^c, (k^*)^{x^{-1}}) = 1$ and returns $(k^*)^{x^{-1}}$ as the answer.

**Analysis.** Because $B$ follows the proposed scheme, except that the hash functions are modeled by random oracles, its simulation is identical to that of the real scheme. Because $\ell_1$ and $\ell_2$ are independent of $A$’s perspective, the probability that $B$ does not abort the game ($\{\alpha, \beta\} = \{IDList[\ell_1], IDList[\ell_2]\}$ in Challenge) is $\frac{2}{\max_{Q_{1,0}}^2}$. Furthermore, because $h_1$ is modeled as a random oracle, the adversary’s advantage is negligible, unless $(IDList[\alpha], IDList[\beta], k^*, w_b, h)$ appears in $h_1$-list such that $(k^*)^{x^{-1}} = \hat{e}(g, g)^{abcx(x^{-1})} = \hat{e}(g, g)^{abc}$. If this tuple appears in $h_1$-list, then $B$ is necessarily able to solve the GBDH problem. Therefore, if there exists such an $A$ that can break the MCKA-KGC-secure scheme at a nonnegligible advantage $\epsilon$, then there exists some $B$ that can break the GBDH problem at a nonnegligible advantage $\epsilon' \geq \epsilon \max_{Q_{1,0}}^{-2}$.

**Theorem 5.** The proposed scheme is IKGA-KGC secure under the hard GBDH assumption.

**Proof.** The proof is similar to the proof of Theorem 4 except for the Challenge phase. Therefore, only the proof for the Challenge phase is presented.

**Challenge.** At the end of Phase 1, $A$ outputs the challenged tuple $(w_0, w_1, \alpha, \beta)$ and $B$ executes the following steps:

- obtain $(IDList[\alpha], \bot, u_{IDList[\alpha]})$ and $(IDList[\beta], \bot, u_{IDList[\beta]})$ by calling $H(IDList[\alpha])$ and $H(IDList[\beta])$, respectively. If $\{\alpha, \beta\} \neq \{\ell_1, \ell_2\}$, $B$ aborts the game.
- search $h_1$-list for the tuple $((IDList[\alpha], IDList[\beta], \bot, w_b, h))$. If no such tuple is found, randomly choose $h \in Z_q^*$ and add $((IDList[\alpha], IDList[\beta], \bot, w_b, h)$ to $h_1$-list.
- return the challenged trapdoor $td^* = h$.

**VI. THEORETICAL COMPARISON AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION**

In this section, we detail the theoretical comparison of our scheme with other state-of-the-art schemes, specifically the PAEKS schemes CWZH19 [20] and QCHLZ20 [21], the IBAEKS scheme LHSYS19 [23], the CBAEKS schemes LLZ19 [25] and LLW21 [24], and the CLAEKS schemes HMZKL19 [28] and PSE20 [26]. The features of these schemes are listed in Table I. We also evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme against that of the LHSYS19 [23], QCHLZ20 [21], and LLW21 [24] schemes.

**A. Theoretical Comparison**

We compare the schemes with respect to their communication cost and computational cost. The comparison results are presented in Table II. For communication cost, we use $|Z_q|$, $|G_1|$, and $|G_T|$ to denote the bit lengths of group elements in $Z_q$, $G_1$, and $G_T$, respectively. In addition, we use $|ID|$ and $|h|$ to denote the bit lengths of a user’s identity and output of the hash function, respectively. Note that in the CBAEKS
exponential, hash-to-point, and hash operations, which are time-consuming operations, namely bilinear pairing, modular trapdoor. In this theoretical comparison, we consider only four of performing a test of whether a ciphertext is matched with a certificate in ICA-IBSE are used to generate secret keys only once; by contrast, certificates in PAEKS are continually used for authentication, and those in CBAEKS are continually used for encrypting or generating the Trapdoor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>Type</th>
<th>Certificateless</th>
<th>Implicit Authentication</th>
<th>No Key</th>
<th>Escrow</th>
<th>No Key Distribution</th>
<th>No Secure Channel</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMZKL18</td>
<td>CLAES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHYSYS19</td>
<td>IBAEKS</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWZH19</td>
<td>PAEKS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLZ19</td>
<td>CBAEKS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE20</td>
<td>CLAES</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCH20</td>
<td>PAEKS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW21</td>
<td>CBAEKS</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ours</td>
<td>ICA-IBSE</td>
<td>Yes²</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|---------|---------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|

| | | | | | | | | | | |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>Public Key</th>
<th>Secret Key</th>
<th>Ciphertext</th>
<th>Trapdoor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMZKL18</td>
<td>2[G₁] + [ID]</td>
<td>2[Z₁]</td>
<td>2[G₁]</td>
<td>[G₁]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHYSYS19</td>
<td>[ID]</td>
<td>[G₁]</td>
<td>2[G₁] + [G₁]</td>
<td>2[G₁]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWZH19</td>
<td>[G₁]</td>
<td>[Z₁]</td>
<td>3[G₁]</td>
<td>[G₁]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLZ19</td>
<td>2[G₁]</td>
<td>[Z₁]</td>
<td>3[G₁] + [h]</td>
<td>[G₁]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE20</td>
<td>2[G₁] + [ID]</td>
<td>[G₁] + [Z₁]</td>
<td>2[G₁]</td>
<td>[G₁] + [h]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCH20</td>
<td>3[G₁]</td>
<td>2[Z₁]</td>
<td>[G₁] + 2[Z₁] + [h]</td>
<td>[G₁] + [Z₁]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW21</td>
<td>3[G₁]</td>
<td>[Z₁]</td>
<td>2[G₁] + [h]</td>
<td>[G₁] + [Z₁]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Ours    | [ID] | [G₁] | 2[G₁] | [h] |

| Bit-length (bit) | 512 | 1024 | 160 | 256 | 1.858 | 0.014 | 0.002 | 0.000016 |

| | | |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>Communication Cost</th>
<th>Computation Cost</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HMZKL18</td>
<td>5T_E + T_H + 2T_h</td>
<td>T_P + 3T_E + T_H + 2T_h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LHYSYS19</td>
<td>2T_P + 3T_E + 2T_H</td>
<td>T_P + 2T_E + 2T_H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CWZH19</td>
<td>5T_E + T_H</td>
<td>2T_P + 3T_E + T_H</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLZ19</td>
<td>2T_P + 3T_E + T_H + 4T_h</td>
<td>T_P + 3T_E + 2T_H + T_h</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSE20</td>
<td>T_P + 3T_E + T_H</td>
<td>T_E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QCH20</td>
<td>T_P + 3T_E + T_H + T_h</td>
<td>T_E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLW21</td>
<td>5T_E + 4T_h</td>
<td>T_E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ours</td>
<td>T_P + 2T_E + T_H + 2T_h</td>
<td>T_E</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III
BIT LENGTH OF ELEMENTS AND RUNNING TIME OF OPERATIONS

| Bit-length (bit) | 512 | 1024 | 160 | 256 | 1.858 | 0.014 | 0.002 | 0.000016 |

| | | |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Schemes</th>
<th>CPU</th>
<th>AMD Ryzen 5-2600 3.4GHz</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Schemes</td>
<td>CPU processor number</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schemes</td>
<td>Operation system</td>
<td>Ubuntu 18.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schemes</td>
<td>Linux kernel version</td>
<td>5.3.0-59-generic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schemes</td>
<td>Random access memory</td>
<td>16.3GB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schemes</td>
<td>Solid state disk</td>
<td>232.9GB</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

B. Performance Evaluation

To evaluate the performance of our scheme, we fully implement our proposed scheme and the LHYSYS19 [23], QCHLZ20 [21], and LLW21 [24] schemes. The source codes are available at [https://github.com/zyliu-crypto/ICA-IBSE](https://github.com/zyliu-crypto/ICA-IBSE). We conduct the experiment in the environment described in Table IV. Specifically, we use the SHA-3-256 library for the general cryptographic hash function, and we use the PBC library for operations over groups. In particular, we adopt Type-A pairing with a 160-bit group order, 512-bit group element for G₁, and 1024-bit group element for G₁.

The results are presented in Figs. 2, 3, and 4, indicating that our scheme efficiently encrypts keywords and generates trapdoors. These results demonstrate that our scheme, although slower than the LHYSYS19 [23] and QCHLZ20 [21] schemes in encrypting keywords and generating trapdoors. However, although our scheme is theoretically faster than the QCHLZ20 scheme [21] in Test (i.e., T_E + T_h < T_P + T_h in Table II), during the implementation, we must perform additional operations to convert the output of the hash function to some element in Zₚ, which takes time. Therefore, our scheme is faster than the LLW21 scheme [24] only in terms of Test.
VII. Conclusion

In this paper, we present a novel ICA-IBSE scheme that masters the trade-off between efficiency (in terms of low storage requirement) and convenience (which IBAEKS achieves by avoiding the key escrow problem). A concrete framework is presented, and security proofs are provided, which demonstrate that the ICA-IBSE scheme can resist MCKAs and IKGAs by avoiding the key escrow problem. A concrete framework is age requirement) and convenience (which IBAEKS achieves masters the trade-off between efficiency (in terms of low stor-

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

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