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Paper 2021/261

MIRACLE: MIcRo-ArChitectural Leakage Evaluation

Ben Marshall and Dan Page and James Webb

Abstract

In this paper, we describe an extensible experimental infrastructure and methodology for evaluating the micro-architectural leakage, based on power consumption, which stems from a physical device. Building on existing literature, we use it to systematically study 14 different devices, which span 4 different instruction set architectures and 4 different vendors. The study allows a characterisation of each device with respect to any leakage effects stemming from sources within the micro-architectural implementation; we use it, for example, to identify and document several novel leakage effects (e.g., due to speculative instruction execution), and scenarios where an assumption about leakage is non-portable between different yet compatible devices. Ours is the widest study of its kind we are aware of, and highlights a range of challenges with respect to 1) the design, implementation, and evaluation of masking schemes, 2) construction of accurate fine-grained leakage models, and 3) selection of suitable devices for experimental research. For example, in relation to 1), we cast further doubt on whether a given device can or does uphold the assumptions required by a given masking scheme; in relation to 2), we ultimately conclude that real-world leakage models (either statistical or formal) must include information about the micro-architecture of the device being modelled; in relation to 3), we claim the near mono-culture of devices that dominates existing literature is insufficient to support general claims regarding security. This is particularly important

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
side-channel attackmicro-architectural leakageleakage modelling
Contact author(s)
ben marshall @ bristol ac uk
History
2021-09-22: last of 3 revisions
2021-03-03: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/261
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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