Quantum-safe HIBE: does it cost a LATTE?

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Abstract—The United Kingdom (UK) government is considering advanced primitives such as identity-based encryption (IBE) for adoption as they transition their public-safety communications network from TETRA to an LTE-based service. However, the current LTE standard relies on elliptic-curve-based IBE, which will be vulnerable to quantum computing attacks, expected within the next 20–30 years. Lattices can provide quantum-safe alternatives for IBE. These schemes have shown promising results in terms of practicality. To date, several IBE schemes over lattices have been proposed, but there has been little in the way of practical evaluation. This paper provides the first complete optimised practical implementation and benchmarking of LATTE, a promising Hierarchical IBE (HIBE) scheme proposed by the UK National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) in 2017 and endorsed by European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). We propose optimisations for the KeyGen, Delegate, Extract and Gaussian sampling components of LATTE, to increase attack costs, reduce decryption key lengths by 2×–3×, ciphertext sizes by up to 33%, and improve speed. In addition, we conduct a precision analysis, bounding the Rényi divergence of the distribution of the real Gaussian sampling procedures from the ideal distribution in corroboration of our claimed security levels. Our resulting implementation of the Delegate function takes 0.4 seconds at 80-bit security level on a desktop machine at 4.2GHz, significantly faster than the order of minutes estimated in the ETSI technical report. Furthermore, our optimised LATTE Encrypt/Decrypt implementation reaches speeds up to 9.7× faster than the ETSI implementation.

Index Terms—lattice-based cryptography, hierarchical identity-based encryption, advanced primitives, software design, post-quantum

I. INTRODUCTION

The UK Government anticipates the migration of its mission-critical communications network from Airwave TETRA to LTE-based Emergency Services Network (ESN) [1] will be complete by 2026 [2]. However, the current standard [3] relies on Elliptic Curve (ECC)-based IBE scheme MIKEY-SAKKE for securing messages. The first such device authorised for ESN is the Panasonic Toughbook Tablet which runs on Intel i5 and transmits data via EM7511 Band 14 mobile broadband. An IBE scheme removes the need for a certificate repository by deriving a user’s public key from their already established public identity. This provides a low latency setup with instantaneous communication capabilities, hence is ideal for this use-case. However, ECC will be rendered insecure under quantum computing attacks, as acknowledged by current post-quantum cryptography standardization efforts by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [4].

One of the advantages of lattice-based cryptography, a contender for quantum-secure cryptographic solutions, is the ability to build advanced primitives such as IBE. Furthermore, a hierarchy can be built into an IBE scheme to provide a more distributed workload and allow for finer-grained control over private key distribution. HIBE schemes extend the concept of using a personal identity as a public key to a multi-levelled scenario, such as one would find within a functioning company. HIBE has further applications such as forward-secure encryption [5] and public key broadcast encryption [6]. Besides ESN, there are other real-world application scenarios for HIBE, for example, in Messaging apps for forward-security of ratchet protocols like Signal (see [7], [8]). It is also well known that the key generation algorithm of HIBE can be used as a Hierarchical ID-Based Signature (HIBS), and HIBS also has potential real-world applications in forward secure signatures used in blockchain [9]. Other real-world deployments of IBEs for encrypted file transfer and email are offered by companies such as Voltage Security and TrendMicro. Also, HP utilised it in their time data release service Time Vault. However, IBE is set to grow in the post-quantum world, where key sizes become larger and the number of connected devices demanding instantaneous data transfer grows. However, (H)IBE is still new territory within the post-quantum field. Additionally, with the growth of the Internet of Things, which brings with it complex interconnected systems of constrained devices, there is a greater requirement for lightweight, advanced primitives unlike ever before. The long-term security considerations indicate that these should be made quantum-secure today. The aim of this paper is to assess the practicality and optimise the implementation/integration of a quantum-safe (H)IBE scheme.

The DLP IBE scheme [10] was in 2017 combined with the Bonsai tree HIBE scheme introduced in [11] to create LATTE by Campbell and Groves [12]. This research was carried out by the NCSC, with a view to utilising the scheme in UK public safety communications. They are currently working with the ETSI in a move towards standardising the scheme [13]. However, the proposed specification [13] only provides the Encrypt and Decrypt performance results, and it is unclear if LATTE KeyGen, Delegate, and Extract are practical at all. There remains substantial analysis to be performed to determine if and how this scheme will work in the real world. This is the gap our research endeavours to bridge.

This paper provides the first performance benchmarking

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of a quantum-safe HIBE scheme, LATTE, written in C.\(^1\) We implement the following parameter sets defined in the ETSI report [13]: the single-level LATTE-1 and LATTE-2 with 128 and 256 bits security, and the two-level LATTE-3 and LATTE-4 with 80 and 160 bits security, respectively. We also identify bottlenecks, propose optimisations, and provide further statistical and security analysis for LATTE and consider its suitability for such applications. In more detail, the contributions of this paper are:

**Precision Analysis of LATTE:** We develop a statistical model for floating-point arithmetic errors in our efficient LATTE implementation, verified by experimental analysis. This allows us to quantify the security impact on LATTE with varying arithmetic precision. In particular, we bound the Rényi divergence (RD) from ideal, as recommended in [14], of the Gaussian lattice sampler (with its underlying fast ffSampling algorithm), and deduce that 53 bits of precision retain our claimed security levels for LATTE-1 and LATTE-2 with up to \(2^{42}\) key Extract/Delegate queries. For LATTE-3 and LATTE-4, our analysis shows that about 90 bits of precision should be sufficient. We also apply our statistical model to the FALCON signature selected by NIST for PQC standardisation [15], and demonstrate a \(\approx 3\) bit improved precision estimate for it using a refined analysis compared to that in [15].

**Optimised LATTE (Sub-)Algorithms:** We first reduce the module dimension of the extracted user keys by one compared to [13] by extending a similar approach used in the DLP IBE [10]. This leads to faster performance and reduces user key sizes by 2\(x\)–3\(x\) and ciphertext length by up to 33\%. In addition, we also show a faster \(\text{ffLDL}\) algorithm for (Mod)NTRU basis in Sec. V-A. We then adopt the NTRU/Solve function from FALCON [15] in order to efficiently solve the NTRU equation in our optimised LATTE KeyGen algorithm. The NTRUSolve is both faster and more compact [16] than the resultant method [10] used in [13]. In addition, we adopt the technique from MODFALCON [17] and the length reduction technique by using Cramer’s rule [13] in order to efficiently solve the NTRU equation for higher lattice dimensions in our optimised LATTE Delegate algorithm. We further adopt the FFT sampling procedures from FALCON [15], which is faster than the Klein-GPV sampler [18] used in [13]. In addition, the proposed LATTE specification [13] did not discuss the integer discrete Gaussian sampling techniques suitable for the needed standard deviations. We integrate efficient sampling techniques, including FACCT [19] and the variant [20] of COSAC [21] in our optimised LATTE implementation.

**New Parameter Sets for LATTE:** We provide slightly revised parameter sets for LATTE, fixing a bug in the ETSI technical report [13], and also modify a Gaussian sampling standard deviation parameter to accommodate the more efficient FACCT [19] sampler for the Key Generation algorithm. Security estimates for these revised parameters are also presented as we discover that our redesign reduces the decryption failure rate and increases the cost of recovering the user key.

**First Full and Practical Implementation of LATTE:** Applying our optimisation techniques, we give the first complete practical performance results for a lattice-based HIBE scheme, including the KeyGen, Delegate, and Extract algorithms, whereas implementation results were unclear in [13]. The proposed specification [13] estimated that the Delegate would have run-time in the order of minutes on a desktop machine. In contrast, we show that our efficient implementation can perform the Delegate function in 0.4s (resp. 1.3s) for 80-bit (resp. 160-bit) security level on a desktop machine. In addition, for the same ring dimension, our optimised LATTE implementation is up to 11.1\(x\) faster than the DLP IBE implementation result from [13] for the corresponding algorithms, and our LATTE Extract run-time overhead is less than 3.9\(x\) over the FALCON Sign algorithm run-time with the same lattice dimension.

The structure of the paper is as follows. Sec. II gives the background to HIBE and the lattice-based concepts used in HIBE schemes. Sec. III describes our improved LATTE HIBE scheme. Sec. IV provides the precision and security analyses. Sec. V discusses our implementation techniques in making the scheme practical for real-world applications. Performance results for the scheme are given in Sec. VI.

### II. Preliminaries

A lattice can be expressed as a collection of integer linear combinations of a set of basis vectors. Popular underlying hard lattice problems believed to be secure against quantum computing attacks include the Learning With Errors (LWE) alongside its ring variant (over ideal lattices), RLWE. Another common lattice problem is the NTRU assumption [22]; that is, given a polynomial \(h\), one must find non-trivial short \(f\) such that \(h = g : f^{-1}\).

In this paper, vectors or, interchangeably through the canonical embedding, polynomials will be denoted by bold small letters like \(f\), matrices \(M\), polynomial ring of integers mod \(q\) as \(R_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(x^N + 1)\) (for an integer \(N\)), and lattices as \(\Lambda\). The field of integers mod \(q\) is denoted as \(\mathbb{Z}_q\). Discrete Gaussian distributions with centre \(t\) and standard deviation \(\sigma\) are denoted as \(D_{\sigma,t}\). We omit the centre if it is zero, i.e. \(D_\sigma\), if \(t = 0\). A distribution is \(B\)-bounded for some \(B \in \mathbb{R}^+\), if its support is in the interval \([-B,B]\).

The smoothing parameter of \(\mathbb{Z}\) is denoted as \(\eta(\mathbb{Z}) = (1/\pi)\sqrt{\ln(2 + 2/\varepsilon)/2}\). The Euclidean norm of a vector/polynomial \(f\) is denoted \(\|f\|\). The transpose \(f^\top\) of polynomial \(f = f_0 + f_1x + \cdots + f_{N-1}x^{N-1}\) is defined as \(f^\top = f_0 - f_{N-1}x - \cdots - f_1x^{N-1}\). We denote \(M^\top\) as the transpose of matrix \(M\) where \(M_{i,j}^\top = (M_{j,i})^\top\). The Hermitian product of vectors \(a, b\) is denoted as \((a, b)\).

The concatenation of several vectors \(\mathbf{f}_1, \mathbf{f}_2, \ldots, \mathbf{f}_N\) will be written as \((\mathbf{f}_1|\mathbf{f}_2| \cdots |\mathbf{f}_N)\). In HIBE schemes, user identities at level \(\ell\) are denoted by \(1D_{\ell}\). A hash function from an arbitrary length input to a vector of integers of length \(N\) is written as \(H : \{0,1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^N\). An arrow \(\mapsto\) is used to show the uniform random sampling of an element from a set, e.g. \(f \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^N\). The operator \(\oplus\) means XOR. A Gram-Schmidt orthogonalised (GSO) basis of \(B\) is denoted as \(B = \{\mathbf{b}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_N\}\). For a full-rank matrix \(B\), there exists a GSO decomposition \(B = L \cdot B_\perp\), where \(L\) is unit lower triangular and rows \(\mathbf{b}_i\) of \(B\) are pairwise orthogonal. For a full-rank Gram matrix

\[1\]https://gitlab.com/raykzhao/latte
G, there exists an LDL* decomposition $G = LDL^*$, where $L$ is a lower triangular matrix with 1 on its diagonal and $D$ is a diagonal matrix. The notation $A(f)$ refers to the anticyclic matrix associated with polynomial $f$. The notation $\lfloor k \rfloor$ indicates the real number $k$ is to be rounded to the nearest integer. The rounding $\lceil f \rceil$ of a polynomial $f$ is taken to be coefficient-wise rounding. The Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) and Number Theoretic Transform (NTT) of polynomial $f$ are the evaluations $f(\zeta^i)$ for $i \in \{0, \ldots, N - 1\}$, where $\zeta$ is the $2N$-th complex root of unity in the FFT, and $\zeta$ is the $2N$-th root of unity mod $q$ in the NTT. Let $\oplus$ be the point-wise multiplication.

Definition II.1 (Rényi Divergence [23]). For two discrete distributions $P$ and $Q$ such that $\text{Supp}(P) \subseteq \text{Supp}(Q)$, the Rényi divergence (RD) of order $a \in (1, +\infty)$ is defined as:

$$R_a(P||Q) = \left( \sum_{x \in \text{Supp}(P)} \frac{P(x)^a}{Q(x)^a} \right)^{1/a}.$$  

For $a = +\infty$, we have: $R_\infty(P||Q) = \max_{x \in \text{Supp}(P)} \frac{P(x)}{Q(x)}$.

Lemma II.1. Let $a \in [1, +\infty]$. Let $P$ and $Q$ denote distributions with $\text{Supp}(P) \subseteq \text{Supp}(Q)$. Then the following properties hold:

Data Processing Inequality: $R_a(P^f||Q^f) \leq R_a(P||Q)$ for any function $f$, where $P^f$ (resp. $Q^f$) denotes the distribution of $f(y)$ induced by sampling $y \leftarrow P$ (resp. $y \leftarrow Q$).

Probability Preservation: Let $A \subseteq \text{Supp}(Q)$ be an arbitrary event. If $a \in (1, +\infty)$, then $Q(A) \geq P(A)\frac{1}{R_a(P||Q)}$. Further, we have $Q(A) \geq P(A)/R_\infty(P||Q)$.

We use the notation $\ll, \sim$ as in [24], to “absorb” all higher-order terms of negligible elements, e.g. if $\delta = o(1)$, then $\delta + \delta^2 \sim \delta$. The following remark bounds $R_\infty(D_2; D_1)$.

Remark 1. Let $\tau \in \mathbb{Z}$ be the tailcut bound as above, and let $Q = 2^k$ for some $k \in \mathbb{Z}$. If $\tau \geq \sqrt{2\ln(2Q)}$, then:

$$R_\infty(D_2; D_1) \leq 1/(1 - Q^{-1}) \lesssim 1 + 1/Q. \quad (1)$$  

This can be verified by using classical tailcut bounds [25, Lemma 4.4].

Proposition II.2 (Adapted from [26], Prop. 4.). Let $P$ and $Q$ denote two distributions of a $N$-tuple of random variables $(x_i)_{i<N}$. For $0 \leq i < N$, assume $P_i$ (resp $Q_i$) is the marginal distribution of $x_i$, and let $P_{i|<i}(\cdot|x < i)$ denote the conditional distribution of $x_i$ given that $(x_0, \ldots, x_{i-1}) =: x_{<i}$. Let $\alpha > 1$. Suppose that for all $0 \leq i < N$, there exists $B_i \geq 1$ such that for all $i$-tuples $x_{<i}$ in the support of $Q$ restricted to its first $i$ variables, $R_a(Q_i|x_{<i}, P_i|x_{<i}) \leq B_i$. Then $R_a(Q, P) \leq \prod_{i<N} B_i$.

Theorem II.3 (Tail-cut Bound, Adapted from [23], Theorem 2.11.). Let $D_{\sigma}$ be the $B$-bounded distribution of $D_\sigma$ by cutting its tail. For $M$ independent samples, we have $R_\infty((D_{\sigma}^M)|| (D_{\sigma}^M)) \leq \exp(1)$ if $B \geq \sigma \cdot \sqrt{2\ln(2M)}$.

A. Hierarchical Identity-based Encryption

HIBE schemes were introduced by Horwitz and Lynn [27] and can be considered a generalisation of an IBE scheme to multiple levels. A HIBE scheme consists of five components: Keygen, Delegate, Extract, Encrypt, and Decrypt. Here we depict how these components interact:

1) **KeyGen**: The master key generator establishes the master public and private keys.

2) **Delegate**: Through a delegation function, the master key generator creates a public/private key pair for the sub-key manager. This gives it the ability to delegate further key pairs, and extract user private keys at that level.

3) **Delegate**: The sub-key manager delegates a further public/private key to the next level of the hierarchy.

4) **Extract**: The extractor uses their public/private key pair to extract and share user public/private keys, as in the single-level IBE scheme.

5) **Encrypt/Decrypt**: Encryption/decryption works as a regular encryption scheme, such as RLWE encryption.

A HIBE scheme is said to be ID-IND-CCA-secure if it is indistinguishable under chosen-ciphertext attacks; that is, an adversary with access to a decryption oracle that can decrypt any other (non-challenge) ciphertext has a negligible advantage in distinguishing the message encrypted in the challenge ciphertext from any other message. ID-IND-CCA further implies the adversary has access to an extraction oracle that allows them to extract keys for other identities before committing to the challenge identity, yet gains no advantage. The challenge consists of the ciphertext and the challenge identity under which it is encrypted. A weaker security requirement for HIBE schemes is one-wayness under chosen-plaintext attacks (ID-OW-CPA). Compared with ID-IND-CCA, the IDS-OW-CPA security notion only requires that the adversary succeeds with negligible probability to decrypt a uniformly random message encrypted in the challenge ciphertext (one-wayness), and furthermore, the adversary does not have access to a decryption oracle (i.e. it is a CPA), although it still has access to the extraction oracle.

Various HIBE schemes based on classical assumptions [28]–[30] have been proposed in the past. In 2018, an isogeny-based version of the Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman-based HIBE scheme was proposed [31]. Despite isogenies possessing quantum-safe properties, this variant only serves to strengthen the existing classical security, by proving it secure under the assumption of either the classical version or the isogeny-based version of the problem and therefore is not necessarily quantum-safe. To the best of the authors’ knowledge, the only quantum-safe HIBE schemes so far proposed are based on lattices. We now introduce the schemes upon which LATTE is built.

B. The Ingredients of LATTE

LATTE was proposed in 2017 [12] and can be considered as a combination of the DLP IBE scheme [10] and Bonsai Tree HIBE scheme [11] to create a lattice-based HIBE scheme. It can be shown to be chosen ID indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks (ID-IND-CCA) secure, the proof
for which is given in [13], based on the NTRU and RLWE hardness assumptions.

**DLP IBE Scheme:** In 2014, Ducas et al. proposed the first efficient lattice-based IBE scheme [10]. They based their construction on the IBE scheme by Gentry et al. [18], using a variant of NTRU lattices. The underlying security problems are the NTRU problem for key generation and RLWE for encryption. The ciphertexts, therefore, have more practical sizes than previous constructions, for example, 30 kilobits for 192-bit classical security. The use of structured lattices also allowed for implementation optimisations such as the NTT, as demonstrated by [32], whose software performance of the DLP IBE outperformed that of the ECC-based Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme [33].

**Bonsai Trees HIBE:** Cash et al. [11] proposed the use of Bonsai trees to create a hierarchical structure for IBE. They model the hierarchical network of users as a tree, whereby arborists, or sub-key-managers, have control over the sub-trees and have the authority to delegate user private keys. Delegation requires the knowledge of a trapdoor basis of the lattice at that level. During the process whereby keys are delegated down the tree, the lattice is extended, and therefore its dimension and hence the key and ciphertext sizes increase. The public key size is of $O(d^3kn^2)$ and ciphertext size is of $O(d^3kn^2)$ at depth $d$, for security parameter $n$ and hash output length $k$. The root authority has control of the whole tree by knowing the short trapdoor basis for the master root lattice. The security of this HIBE scheme is based on LWE over standard lattices.

## III. Improved Latte HIBE Schema

In this Section, we demonstrate our optimised Latte HIBE scheme. First, we provide a summary of our proposed Latte design optimisations compared to the ETSI report [13] in Sec. III-A. Then, we present each of the optimised Latte algorithms in detail in Sec. III-B. Finally, we summarise the difference in security parameters compared to [13] and discuss the security impact in Sec. III-C.

### A. Summary of Proposed Design Optimisations

For the optimised Latte scheme presented in this Section and used in our software design and implementation, features of the FALCON [15] and the ModFALCON [17] signature schemes were utilised. This is the first time these features have been considered in Latte, and so the rationale for this is expanded on in Sec. III-B. The currently presented Latte in this Section also improves on the efficiency of the original proposal [13] by reducing the module dimension of the extracted secret keys by 1, by extending a similar approach used in the DLP IBE [10]. More concretely, we eliminate the random polynomial $B \leftarrow \mathbb{R}_q$ in the public key of the original Latte [13] by modifying the equation satisfied by the decryption key at level $\ell$ from the original rank $\ell + 2$ module relation over $\mathbb{R}_q$:  

$$t_0 + t_1 \cdot h + t_2 \cdot A_{1} + \cdots + t_\ell \cdot A_{\ell-1} + t_{\ell+1} \cdot A_{\ell} = B,$$  

where $A_\ell = H_E(ID_1|\ldots|ID_\ell) := H("\Xi^n")|ID_1|\ldots|ID_\ell$, and $E$ is used to distinguish between $H$ used in Extract and Delegate algorithms from here on. Furthermore, we remove the need for the Extract algorithm to be stateful. This is achieved by deriving randomness deterministically from the ID (see Sec. IV-D for discussion).

### B. Scheme Description

The full pseudocode for Latte KeyGen, Delegate, Encrypt, and Decrypt are presented in Alg. 1–Alg. 5.

**KeyGen:** The KeyGen algorithm (Alg. 1) generates an NTRU-type basis. This is performed by sampling the short basis polynomials $f, g$ from a Gaussian distribution. Operations are over the polynomial ring $\mathbb{R}_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(x^N+1)$, a variant of the NTRU ring. For the purposes of optimisation in the implementation, variables are stored in NTT representation where appropriate. The Gram-Schmidt norm of the associated basis is computed to ensure smallness allowing for short private keys to be delegated to the next level. If not, the polynomials are re-sampled. The rest of the basis, polynomials $F, G$, are computed so that they satisfy the NTRU equation, $fG - gF = q \mod x^N+1$. The solution to this is not unique, but any solution suffices provided it is short enough. This is taken care of by reduction of the coefficients. The public key consists of polynomial $h = g \cdot f^{-1}$. The master public basis $B_0$ and private basis $S_0$ at level 0 are implicit in the polynomial master keys, as follows:

$$B_0 = \begin{bmatrix} -A(h) & I_N \\ qI_N & 0_N \end{bmatrix}, \quad S_0 = \begin{bmatrix} g & f \\ F & G \end{bmatrix}.$$

Instead of the resultant-based algorithm used by the original Latte [13], we adopt the NTRUSolve algorithm from FALCON [15] to find a solution to the NTRU equation $fG - gF = q \mod x^N+1$, for a given $f$ and $g$. This algorithm makes use of the “tower of rings” structure, which utilises the fact that computations over polynomials $f, g \in \mathbb{C}[x]/(x^{N/2}+1)$ are equivalent to computations over $f(x^2), g(x^2) \in \mathbb{C}[x]/(x^N+1)$. When $N = 2^k$, for some $k \in \mathbb{Z}$, this can be applied repeatedly so that computations are performed over polynomials of degree 1. This is advantageous in terms of both memory usage, and speed [16].

**Delegate:** The Delegate process (Alg. 2) creates a public/secret key pair for the next level in the tree, allowing it to become a sub-key management service (sub-KMS). Suppose the KMS wishes to delegate a key from level $\ell - 1$ to level $\ell$. Then it can extend the public basis of the user at level $\ell$, denoted by $B_\ell$ by placing $A_\ell = H(ID_1|\ldots|ID_\ell)$, where $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^N$ is a hash function, to the beginning of the first column and filling the extra row with $I_N$ and $0_N$, as shown below. The dimension of the new matrix becomes $(\ell + 2)N \times (\ell + 2)N$.

The corresponding private basis, $S_\ell$, can then be generated. The $i^{th}$ row $(s_{i,0}, s_{i,1}, \ldots, s_{i,\ell+1})$ of the private basis is a short solution to the equation:

$$s_{i,0} + s_{i,1} \cdot h + s_{i,2} \cdot A_1 + \cdots + s_{i,\ell+1} \cdot A_\ell = 0 \mod q.$$

This can be found by sampling short vectors from the $(\ell - 1)$-level lattice using its secret basis, with centre vector...
Algorithm 1 The LATTE KeyGen algorithm.
Input: $N, q, \sigma_0$, $h \in \mathbb{R}_q$.
Output: $S_0 \in \mathbb{R}_{2^N}^{2 \times 2}$, $h \in \mathbb{R}_q$.
1: function KeyGen
2: $f, g \leftarrow D_{\sigma_0}$.
3: $\nu \leftarrow \max \left( \left\| g, -f \right\|, \left\| \left( \frac{q f^*}{2f^* + M}, \frac{q f^*}{2f^* + G} \right) \right\| \right)$.
4: if $\nu > \sigma_0 \cdot \sqrt{2N}$ then
5:  goto Step 2.
6: end if
7: $F, G \leftarrow$ NTRUSolve$_{N,q}(f, g)$.
8: if NTRUSolve is aborted then
9:  goto Step 2.
10: end if
11: if $f$ is not invertible on $\mathbb{R}_q$ then
12:  goto Step 2.
13: end if
14: $h \leftarrow g \cdot f^{-1} \mod q$ in NTT domain.
15: return $S_0 = \left( \frac{g}{G} - \frac{f}{F} \right), h$.
16: end function

$(-s_{i, \ell+1} \cdot A_i, 0, \ldots, 0)$, where $s_{i, \ell+1}$ is sampled from a discrete Gaussian distribution $D_{\sigma_{\ell}}$ over $\mathbb{R}$. A check is made to ensure the GS-norm of the sampled lattice vector is within the bound $\sigma_{\ell} \cdot \sqrt{(\ell + 2)N}$ to ensure the delegated basis will be of sufficient quality.

To sample such short vectors, instead of the Klein-GPV sampler [18] used by the original LATTE [13], we adopt the ffSampling algorithm (Alg. 6) from FALCON [15]. This algorithm utilises the ffLDL algorithm [34] to perform the LDL$^*$ decomposition in the FFT domain for the ring $\mathbb{C}[x]/(x^{N+1})$, where $N$ is a power of 2. Readers may refer to the FALCON specification [15] for subroutines (splitfft, mergefft, etc.) used by these algorithms. Compared to the Klein-GPV sampler with $O(N^2)$ time and space requirements, the ffSampling algorithm has quasilinear time and space complexities in terms of the ring dimension $N$ [34].

The remainder of the Delegate algorithm, in which the bottom row $(s_{\ell+1,0}, s_{\ell+1,1}, \ldots, s_{\ell+1,\ell+1})$ is generated, is a higher-dimensional analogue of LATTE KeyGen. The determinant of the resulting matrix is $g$. The final row is then reduced similarly to the KeyGen component to ensure the basis is of the required quality for further delegation. Generalising to level $\ell$, the public basis $B_{\ell}$ and the private basis $S_{\ell}$, respectively become:

$$B_{\ell} = \begin{bmatrix} -A(A_{\ell}) & 0_N & \ldots & 0_N \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -A(h) & 0_N & \ldots & 0_N \\ qI_0 & 0_N & \ldots & 0_N \end{bmatrix},$$

and $S_{\ell} = [s_{i,j}], 0 \leq i, j \leq \ell + 1$.

To generate the bottom row of the delegated basis for lattice dimension larger than $2N$, instead of the resultant-based algorithm used by the original LATTE [13], we adopt the following techniques from MODFALCON [17]. Let $S_{\ell} = \left( v^T M, G, F \right)$ be the delegated basis, where $G_{\ell} = s_{\ell+1,0}$, $F_{\ell} = (s_{\ell+1,1}, \ldots, s_{\ell+1,\ell+1})$, $v = (s_{0,0}, s_{1,0}, \ldots, s_{l,0})$, and $M = (s_{i,j})$ for $0 \leq i \leq \ell$ and $1 \leq j \leq \ell + 1$. By Schur complement, if $M$ is invertible, we have: $\det(S_{\ell}) = \det(G_{\ell} - F_{\ell} M^{-1} v^T) \det(M) = (G_{\ell} - F_{\ell} M^{-1} v^T) \det(M) = G_{\ell} \det(M) - F_{\ell} \det(M)$. Since one can choose $(G_{\ell}, F_{\ell})$ such that $\det(S_{\ell}) = g$ when filling the bottom row of $S_{\ell}$, we assume $F_{\ell}$ have the form $(F_{\ell}, 0, \ldots, 0)$. We have $\det(S_{\ell}) = \det(M) \cdot G_{\ell} - F_{\ell} \cdot u_0$ where $u_0$ is the first coordinate of $u = \det(M) \cdot v^T$. In order to fill the bottom row $(s_{\ell+1,0}, s_{\ell+1,1}, \ldots, s_{\ell+1,\ell+1})$ of $S_{\ell}$, if $M$ is invertible, we can use the same NTRUSolve algorithm as in LATTE KeyGen, to find $F_{\ell}, G_{\ell}$ such that $\det(M) \cdot G_{\ell} - F_{\ell} \cdot u_0 = q$, and resample when $\det(M) = 0$.

However, since the NTRUSolve algorithm [16] performs the length reduction based on the size of the coefficients in the input, the coefficient size of $F_{\ell}, G_{\ell}$ will be approximately the same as $\det(M)$, $u_0$. Since $M$ is an $(\ell+1) \times (\ell+1)$ sub-matrix of $S_{\ell}$ with coordinate sizes being in the order of $q$ among each element, the size of coefficients of $\det(M)$, $u_0$, $F_{\ell}$, and $G_{\ell}$ is in the order of $q^\ell + 1$. To make the infinity norm of $S_{\ell}$ less than $q$, we employ length reduction using Cramer’s rule.

Extract: In the LATTE Extract algorithm (Alg. 3), the user private key is a short solution $(t_0, t_1, \ldots, t_\ell)$ to:

$$t_0 + t_1 \cdot h + t_2 \cdot A_1 + \cdots + t_\ell \cdot A_{\ell-1} = A_{\ell} \mod q,$$

where $A_i = H(\|D_1\| \ldots \|D_\ell\|)$ for $1 \leq i \leq \ell$. Similar to Delegate, this is found using the ffSampling over the short basis from the previous level, instead of the Klein-GPV sampler used by the original LATTE [13].

Encrypt: Let $\mu, Z \in \{0, 1\}^{256}$. An extended version of traditional RLWE encryption [35] (Alg. 4) is used for ciphering messages. A random seed is sampled and used together with a Key Derivation Function (KDF) to one-time-pad the message $\mu$. The seed is encoded$^2$ and then encrypted using RLWE and sent. The ciphertext consists of the encrypted message $Z$ and deterministically sampled ephemeral public keys $C_1, \ldots, C_\ell, C_h$. This is a variant of the Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transform [36] to protect against invalid ciphertexts.

Decrypt: The Decrypt process (Alg. 5) takes the user’s private key to decrypt the seed and reconstruct the message. Using definitions of $C_h, C_i, 1 \leq i \leq \ell$ and Eq. (4), we have:

$$V = e_\ell + m \cdot t_1 \cdot e_h - t_2 \cdot e_1 - \cdots - t_\ell \cdot e_{\ell-1} + t_0 \cdot e.$$

By construction, the error and private key terms are small enough so that $m$ is decoded successfully to recover the seed.

From the seed, the message $\mu'$ is straightforwardly recovered from $Z$, which is sent as part of the ciphertext.

To accelerate the LATTE Encrypt and Decrypt speed, we sample the ephemeral keys $e_1, e_2, \ldots, e_\ell, e_h$ from a binomial distribution with center 0 and small standard deviation $\sigma_e = 2.0$ instead of $D_{\sigma_{\ell}}$ used by the original LATTE [13]. Sampling from a binomial distribution is much faster than sampling from $D_{\sigma_{\ell}}$, and the impact on security is negligible in the encryption [37].

C. Security Parameters

There are three main differences in terms of the security parameters compared to the ETSI report [13]: (1) We find that the

$^2$The Encode/Decode are the same as described in [13].
Algorithm 2 The LATTE Delegate algorithm (from level $\ell - 1$ to $\ell$).

**Input:** $N, q, \sigma, S_{\ell - 1}, H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^N, ID_\ell.$

**Output:** $S_\ell \in \mathcal{R}_q^{(\ell + 2) \times (\ell + 2)}.$

1. function Delegate
2. $A_\ell \leftarrow H(ID_1| \ldots |ID_\ell)$ in NTT domain.
3. $T_{\ell - 1} \leftarrow \text{flLDL}(FFT(S_{\ell - 1} \cdot S_{\ell - 1}^*))$.
4. For each leaf of $T_{\ell - 1}$, leaf.value $\leftarrow \sigma_\ell / \sqrt{\text{leaf.value}}.$
5. seed $\leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}$.
6. for $i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell\}$ do
7. $s_{\ell, i + 1} \leftarrow D_{\sigma_\ell}^N.$
8. $t \leftarrow (-s_{\ell, i + 1} \cdot A_\ell, 0, \ldots, 0) \cdot S_{\ell - 1}^{-1}.$
9. $z \leftarrow$ FFT$^{-1}(\text{ffSampling}(t, T_{\ell - 1}, \text{seeded})).$
10. $(s_0, \ldots, s_{\ell, i}) \leftarrow \{z\}$, where $z \leftarrow (t - z)S_{\ell - 1}^{-1}.$
11. if $\|s_{\ell, 0}, \ldots, s_{\ell, i + 1}\| > \sqrt{(\ell + 2)N} \cdot \sigma_\ell$ then
12. Resample.
13. end if
14. end for
15. Set $M = (s_{i,j})$, for $0 \leq i \leq \ell$, $1 \leq j \leq \ell + 1.$
16. if $M$ is not invertible then
17. goto Step 4.
18. end if
19. $u \leftarrow \text{adj}(M) \cdot (s_0, 0, s_1, 0, \ldots, s_\ell, 0)^T.$
20. $(F_\ell, G_\ell) \leftarrow \text{NTRUSolve}_{N,q}(\det(M), u_0)$, where $u_0$ is the first coordinate of $u$.
21. if NTRUSolve is aborted then
22. goto Step 4.
23. end if
24. $(s_{\ell + 1, 0}, \ldots, s_{\ell + 1, \ell + 1}) \leftarrow (G_\ell, F_\ell, 0, \ldots, 0).$
25. Set $C = (c_{i,j})$, where $c_{i,j} = s_{j,0} \cdot s_{i,0}^* + \cdots + s_{j,\ell + 1} \cdot s_{i,\ell + 1}^*$.
26. Let $k = (k_0)_{0 \leq i \leq \ell}$ be the solution to $C \cdot k = d$. By Cramer’s rule, $k_i = \frac{\det(C_i(d))}{\det(C(d))}$, where $C_i(d)$ is the matrix $C$ with its $i$th column replaced by $d_0 = s_{\ell + 1, 0} \cdot s_{i,0}^* + \cdots + s_{\ell + 1, \ell + 1} \cdot s_{i,\ell + 1}^*$.
27. for $i \in \{0, \ldots, \ell\}$ do
28. $(s_{\ell + 1, 0}, \ldots, s_{\ell + 1, \ell + 1}) = (s_{\ell + 1, 0}, \ldots, s_{\ell + 1, \ell + 1}) - [k_i] \cdot \{s_0, 0, \ldots, s_{\ell, i + 1}\}.$
29. end for
30. return $S_\ell = (s_{i,j})$, for $0 \leq i, j \leq \ell + 1.$
31. end function

Algorithm 3 LATTE Extract algorithm (from level $\ell$ to user at level $\ell$).

**Input:** $N, q, \sigma, S_{\ell - 1}, H: \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^N, G: \{0, 1\}^{256}, ID_\ell.$

**Output:** $t_1, \ldots, t_\ell \in \mathcal{R}_q.$

1. function Extract
2. $A_\ell' \leftarrow H(\ast \cdot \ast |ID_1| \ldots |ID_\ell)$ in NTT domain.
3. seed $\leftarrow G(ID_1| \ldots |ID_\ell$).
4. $T_{\ell - 1} \leftarrow \text{flLDL}(FFT(S_{\ell - 1} \cdot S_{\ell - 1}^*)).$
5. For each leaf of $T_{\ell - 1}$, leaf.value $\leftarrow \sigma_\ell / \sqrt{\text{leaf.value}}.$
6. $t \leftarrow (A_\ell', 0, \ldots, 0) \cdot S_{\ell - 1}^{-1}.$
7. $z \leftarrow$ FFT$^{-1}(\text{ffSampling}(t, T_{\ell - 1}, \text{seed})).$
8. $(t_0, t_1, \ldots, t_\ell) \leftarrow \{z\}$, where $z \leftarrow (t - z)S_{\ell - 1}^{-1}.$
9. return $t_1, \ldots, t_\ell \in \mathcal{R}_q$ in NTT domain.
10. end function

Algorithm 4 The LATTE Encrypt algorithm (at level $\ell$).

**Input:** $N, q, \sigma, h, \text{KDF}, ID_\ell, e_h \in \{0, 1\}^{256}$.

**Output:** $Z \in \{0, 1\}^{256}, C_1, \ldots, C_\ell, C_h \in \mathcal{R}_q.$

1. function Encrypt
2. seed $\leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{256}.$
3. $Z \leftarrow \mu \cdot \text{KDF}(\text{seed}).$
4. Sample $e, e_1, \ldots, e_\ell, e_h$ from a binomial distribution with center 0 and standard deviation $\sigma_e$ using the seed KDF(seed[Z]).
5. for $i \in \{1, \ldots, \ell - 1\}$ do
6. $C_i \leftarrow A_i \cdot e + e_i$, where $A_i = H(ID_1| \ldots |ID_\ell)$ in NTT domain.
7. end for
8. $m \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{seed}).$
9. $C_\ell \leftarrow A_\ell' \cdot e + e_\ell + m$, where $A_\ell' = H(\ast \cdot \ast |ID_1| \ldots |ID_\ell)$ in NTT domain.
10. $C_h \leftarrow h \cdot e + e_h.$
11. return $Z \in \{0, 1\}^{256}, C_1, \ldots, C_\ell, C_h \in \mathcal{R}_q$ in NTT domain.
12. end function

**Table I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>$\ell = 0$</th>
<th>$\ell = 1$</th>
<th>$\ell = 2$</th>
<th>$\ell = 1$</th>
<th>$\ell = 2$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-1</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>5513.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2$^{-191}$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-2</td>
<td>106.2</td>
<td>7900.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2$^{-308}$</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-3</td>
<td>6777.6</td>
<td>351968.4</td>
<td>22559988.0</td>
<td>2$^{-1110}$</td>
<td>2$^{-1259}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-4</td>
<td>9583.7</td>
<td>713167.7</td>
<td>64997288.2</td>
<td>2$^{-1110}$</td>
<td>2$^{-1259}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Discrete Gaussian statistical parameter $\varepsilon = 2^{-22.5}/(\ell + 1)N$ used by $\sigma_\ell$ in [13] was miscalculated. The KL-divergence between the sampled distribution and the ideal discrete Gaussian distribution is bounded by approximately $8((\ell + 1)N)^2\varepsilon^2$. Choosing $\varepsilon = 2^{-25.5}/(\ell + 1)N$ ensures the divergence is at most $2^{-48}$, as specified by the proposed LATTE specification [13]. If the sampled distribution has a KL-divergence of $2^{-48}$ from the ideal distribution, then using the sampler at most $2^{47}$ times will only reduce the security of the scheme by up to one-bit [38]. However, in [13], the $\varepsilon = 2^{-22.5}/(\ell + 1)N$ would only ensure the KL-divergence is at most $2^{-42}$. (2) To accommodate the use of the FACCT sampler in KeyGen, as described in Sec. V, we modify the value of $\sigma_0$, as displayed in Table I. This also has an effect on the subsequent $\sigma_\ell$, and therefore the difficulty of the underlying lattice problems and success of each attack. (3) As our redesign of LATTE discards the polynomial $B \in \mathcal{R}_q$ in the master public key and reduces the module dimension of the user private key, as described in Sec. III-A, we update the attack costs accordingly (see Appendix G). First, it reduces the decryption failure rate, as there is one less error term. The best user key recovery attack reduces to the Closest Vector Problem in the master lattice, so the attack is on the same lattice, but it demands a marginally shorter vector to be successful. We follow the same target.
The Leibler (KL) divergence to reduce memory and computational distance have recently been substituted for RD or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to reduce memory and computational resources whilst maintaining security. In this Section, we make use of the RD argument initially proposed in [14] to answer the question of how low we can allow the precision of our implementation to be, without allowing an adversary to detect any distinction between the actual distribution and the ideal distribution of a true Gaussian sample over the lattice, hence maintaining our claimed security levels. In particular, we analyze the security impact on LATTE on two points. First, the finite precision errors in the floating-point arithmetic. Second, in the $Z$-samplers used in our implementation of the Extract and Delegate algorithms. Note that these algorithms are based on the $f$Sampling lattice Gaussian algorithm. For this, we follow the following steps:

**Step 1 – RD Security Reduction:** We give a security reduction (Sec. IV-A) based RD analysis to relate the security of finite precision LATTE to the security of its ideal (infinite precision) implementation, and bounds on the errors in the centre and standard deviation parameters of $Z$ Gaussian samplers used in lattice Gaussian $f$Sampling algorithm.

**Step 2 – RD Between $Z$-Gaussians with Errors in Parameters:** To support the above security reduction, we give a tight Lemma (in Sec. IV-B) giving a bound on RD between the output distribution of $Z$ Gaussian samplers with errors in the centre and standard deviation parameters, extending the sharp RD results of [14].

**Step 3 – Statistical Model for $f$Sampling Precision Errors:** For use with the above security reduction, we introduce and empirically verify (in Sec. IV-C) a heuristic statistical model to compute upper bounds on the finite precision errors in the lattice Gaussian $f$Sampling algorithm. We give empirical evidence for the validity of our model, use it to compute estimated error bounds for LATTE parameter sets, and apply these with the above security reductions to evaluate the security impact of precision errors on LATTE.

### A. RD Security Reduction

The security reduction to establish the ID-IND-CCA of the IDEAL (infinite precision) LATTE HIBE scheme is summarised in [13, Annex C] and proceeds in two steps. Here, we show how to obtain a security reduction that takes into account and quantifies the security impact of the REAL (finite precision) implementation of LATTE. To do so, we introduce an additional middle step (Step 2 below) in the security reduction steps for LATTE, and so we end up with the following three security reduction steps:

**Step 1 – FO Transform:** This generic reduction transforms any ID-IND-CCA attack against REAL (finite precision) LATTE to an ID-OW-CPA (chosen ID one-wayness against chosen plaintext attacks) of REAL (finite precision) LATTE', assuming the random oracle model for the LATTE KDF hash function. Here, LATTE' denotes the ID-OW-CPA encryption scheme underlying LATTE: the encryption/decryption algorithms of LATTE can be obtained by applying the tag-based FO KEM-DEM transform of [40] to the LATTE' scheme. As pointed out in [13, Annex C], this reduction step follows directly from an (ID-based variant) of the composition of [40, Theorem 3.1, Theorem D.1].

---

**Algorithm 5** The LATTE Decrypt algorithm (at level $\ell$).

**Input:** $N, \sigma, h, \text{KDF}, \text{ID}, Z, (C_1, \ldots, C_{\ell}, C_h), t$.

**Output:** $\mu'$.  
1: function Decrypt  
2: \hspace{1cm} $V \leftarrow C_{\ell} - C_h \cdot t_1 - C_1 \cdot t_2 - \cdots - C_{\ell-1} \cdot t_\ell$.  
3: $seed' \leftarrow \text{Decode}(V)$.  
4: Sample $e'_1, e'_1, \ldots, e'_\ell, e'_h$ from a binomial distribution with center $0$ and standard deviation $\sigma_e$ using the seed $KDF(seed' | Z)$.  
5: for $i \in \{1, \ldots, \ell - 1\}$ do  
6: \hspace{1cm} $C'_i \leftarrow A_i \cdot e' + e'_i$, where $A_i = H(|\text{ID}|) \ldots |\text{ID}|$ in NTT domain.  
7: end for  
8: $m' \leftarrow \text{Encode}(seed')$.  
9: $C'_\ell \leftarrow A'_\ell \cdot e' + e'_\ell + m'$, where $A'_\ell = H(|\text{ID}|) \ldots |\text{ID}|$ in NTT domain.  
10: $C'_h \leftarrow h \cdot e' + e'_h$.  
11: Check $(C'_1, \ldots, C'_\ell, C'_h)$ agrees with $(C_1, \ldots, C_{\ell}, C_h)$, else return $\bot$.  
12: return $\mu' = Z \oplus KDF(seed')$.  
13: end function

**Algorithm 6** The $f$Sampling algorithm [15].

**Input:** $t = (t_0, t_1, \ldots, t_\ell)$ in FFT format, tree $T$, $seed \in \{0, 1\}^{256}$.  

**Output:** $z = (z_0, z_1, \ldots, z_\ell)$ in FFT format.

1: function $f$Sampling($t, T$)  
2: \hspace{1cm} if $n = 1$ then  
3: \hspace{2cm} $\sigma' \leftarrow T$.value.  
4: \hspace{2cm} Sample $z_0 \leftarrow D_{\sigma', t_0}$ using $seed$.  
5: \hspace{2cm} Sample $z_1 \leftarrow D_{\sigma', t_1}$ using $seed$.  
6: \hspace{2cm} return $z = (z_0, z_1)$.  
7: else  
8: \hspace{2cm} $m \leftarrow$ number of children of $T$.  
9: \hspace{2cm} for $j = m - 1, \ldots, 0$ do  
10: \hspace{3cm} $T_j \leftarrow$ the $j$th child of $T$.  
11: \hspace{3cm} $t'_j \leftarrow t_j + \sum_{i=j+1}^{m-1} (t_i - z_i) \cdot T$.value$_{1,j}$.  
12: \hspace{3cm} $t'_j \leftarrow$ $\text{splitfft}(t'_j)$.  
13: \hspace{3cm} $z'_j \leftarrow f$Sampling($t'_j, T_j$).  
14: \hspace{2cm} end for  
15: \hspace{2cm} return $z = (z_0, z_1, \ldots, z_m)$.  
17: end function

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security levels as those proposed in the ETSI report and did not revise them based on the current recommended security levels.

### IV. Security Analysis

A recurring concern around lattice-based cryptography is the precision requirements of the implementation, in particular, of the discrete Gaussian sampler. As noted in [39], the precision used is often excessive, leading to slow and impractical implementations. Traditional measures of statistical distance have recently been substituted for RD or Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence to reduce memory and computational resources whilst maintaining security. In this Section, we make use of the RD argument initially proposed in [14] to answer the question of how low we can allow the precision of our implementation to be, without allowing an adversary to detect any distinction between the actual distribution and the ideal distribution of a true Gaussian sample over the lattice, hence maintaining our claimed security levels. In particular, we analyze the security impact on LATTE on two points. First, the finite precision errors in the floating-point arithmetic. Second, in the $Z$-samplers used in our implementation of the Extract and Delegate algorithms. Note that these algorithms are based on the $f$Sampling lattice Gaussian algorithm. For this, we follow the following steps:

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Step 2 – RD – Real to Ideal: This presented reduction (in Lemma IV.1 below, with proof in Appendix A) transforms any ID-OW-CPA attack against Real (finite precision) \( \text{LATTE}' \) to an ID-OW-CPA attack against Ideal (infinite precision) \( \text{LATTE}' \), by using RD analysis techniques [14], [23]. For the latter RD reduction to apply, we exploit the fact that the one-wayness notion ID-OW-CPA is a search problem rather than a decision problem.

Step 3 – ID-OW-CPA to NTRU/RLWE: This reduction transforms any attack against Ideal \( \text{LATTE}' \) ID-OW-CPA security into attacks against the NTRU or RLWE problems, assuming the random oracle model for the ID hash function \( H \).

As pointed out in [13, Annex C], this reduction is a variant of the Bonsai tree reduction presented in [41, Theorem 5.2], with a minor modification for our improved \( \text{LATTE} \) construction (see Sec. IV-D for more details).

We remark that the security reduction analysis discussed above is in the classical Random Oracle Model (ROM) [42]. A security analysis of \( \text{LATTE} \) in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) is out of the scope of this work; QROM analysis results on Fujisaki-Okamoto transform in the QROM (e.g. [43], [44]) and GPV-IBE [45] can serve as starting points for such an analysis. However, as in the case of the NIST PQC standardised encryption scheme Kyber [46], the existing QROM security reductions for FO are not tight and therefore are unlikely to be useful for setting practical parameters.

The following result fills the missing Step 2 above, where we apply Lemma IV.1 with the ID-OW-CPA attack game and the event \( E \) being the winning of this game by the adversary. It also quantifies the security impact of finite precision in the discrete integer Gaussian samplers and the floating-point arithmetic used in the FFT lattice Gaussian sampler. The FFT lattice Gaussian sampler itself is integrated inside the \( \text{LATTE}' \) Delegate algorithm and Extract algorithm as well. The latter security impact is expressed as a function of upper bounds \( \delta_U^{(i)} \) and \( \Delta_U^{(i)} \) on the relative (resp. absolute) finite precision errors in the integer discrete Gaussian standard deviation parameters \( \sigma^{(i)} \) (resp. Gaussian centre parameters \( t^{(i)} \)) used inside the Delegate and Extract algorithms, and an upper bound \( \Delta_U^{(i)} \) on the absolute error in the final output value of the FFT sampling algorithm. We also allow for a negligible probability \( p_{U, \sigma} \) (over the randomness of the key generation and discrete Gaussian samplers) that the above error upper bounds fail to hold. The next subsection explains our statistical model and results for estimating the latter error upper bounds and the probability \( p_{U, \sigma} \) for the chosen implementation finite precision.

Consider an attack game \( \text{REAL} \) against \( \text{LATTE}' \) with depth parameter \( d \) where the attack algorithm \( A \) is run on input a \( \text{LATTE}' \) master public key \( h \) (where \( (S_0, h) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(N, q, \sigma_0) \)), makes at most \( Q_D \) total number of queries to the Delegate algorithm and \( Q_E \) queries to the Extract algorithm implemented with:

- A finite precision \( p_D \) 1-dimensional Discrete Gaussian \( Z \)-sampling algorithm in Lines 4–5 of \( \text{ffSampling} \) in Alg. 6 outputting samples from a distribution \( D_{\sigma, t} \) within RD of order \( a \) at most \( B \) from the ideal Discrete Gaussian distribution \( D_{\sigma, t} \) i.e. \( R_{a}(D_{\sigma, t}, D_{\sigma, t}) \leq B \).
- A finite precision \( p_{f} \) floating-point arithmetic for Delegate, Extract, and Lines 11–14 of \( \text{ffSampling} \) in Alg. 6.

Let \( \text{IDEAL} \) denote the attack game against the ideal implementation of \( \text{LATTE}' \) where both \( p_D \) and \( p_{f} \) are infinite precision.

Let \( (t^{(i)}, \sigma^{(i)}) \) denote the center and std dev. parameter (resp.) for the \( i \)'th query to the 1-dim. \( Z \) Gaussian sampler (i.e. at Line 2 of KeyGen in Alg. 1, Line 7 of Delegate in Alg. 2, Line 4 or 5 of \( \text{ffSampling} \) in Alg. 6) in the game \( \text{IDEAL} \), and let \( z^{(i)} \) denote the value of \( z \) in the output of the \( j \)'th query to \( \text{FFT}^{-1}(\text{ffSampling}) \) in the game (i.e. at Line 9 of Delegate in Alg. 2 or Line 7 of Extract in Alg. 3). Suppose that, except for an event \( B_U \), the absolute errors \( \Delta_t^{(i)} \) in centers \( t^{(i)} \) relative to \( a^{(i)} \) (i.e. \( \Delta_t^{(i)}/\sigma^{(i)} \)) are upper bounded by \( \Delta_U^{(i)} \) and relative errors \( \delta_{\sigma^{(i)}} \) in standard deviations \( \sigma^{(i)} \) are upper bounded by \( \delta_{U^{(i)}} \) for all \( 1 \leq i \leq M_Z \), and the infinity-norm absolute errors \( \Delta_{z^{(i)}} \) in \( z^{(i)} \) is upper bounded by \( \Delta_U^{(i)} Z/Z < 1/2 \) for all \( 1 \leq j \leq M_f \). The above errors are computed with respect to the same game with finite precision floating point arithmetic. Here, \( M_Z = K \cdot (Q_E + (d + 1) \cdot Q_D) + 2 \) denotes the total number of queries to the 1-dim. \( Z \) Gaussian sampler in the game, \( K \) denotes the number of \( Z \) sampler calls of each call of \( \text{ffSampling} \) in Alg. 6, and \( M_f = Q_E + (d + 1) \cdot Q_D \) denotes the number of calls of \( \text{ffSampling} \) in the game.

Lemma IV.1. Let \( M_Z \) be as above. Let also \( \tau, \varepsilon > 0, Q_M := \exp(\tau^2/2)/(2M_Z) \) and \( \sigma^{(i)} \geq \eta_i(\varepsilon) \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq M_Z \). Let \( p_U \) denote the probability of event \( B_U \) in game Ideal. Let \( E \) denote any event defined over the view of \( A, B_T := B_{M_Z}, C_T := \prod_{i \leq M_Z} C_{(i)} \), where \( C_{(i)} \) is given by the right hand side of Eq. (6) in Lemma IV.2 with \( \delta_{\sigma^{(i)}} := \delta_{U^{(i)}}, \Delta_t^{(i)} := \Delta_U^{(i)} \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq M_Z \). Then,

\[
Pr[E_{\text{IDEAL}}] \geq \frac{1}{C_T} \cdot \left( \frac{Pr[E_{\text{REAL}}]^{a/(a-1)}}{B_T} - \eta \right)^{a/(a-1)} - p_U,
\]

where \( \eta := C_T(p_U + 1/Q_M)^{(a-1)/a} \).

B. RD between \( \mathbb{Z} \)-Gaussians with errors

This step builds upon unpublished work by Prest [47]. We will consider the following Gaussians:

- \( D_1 \) is an ideal Gaussian of standard deviation \( \sigma \) and center \( t \).
- \( D_2 \) is a Gaussian of standard deviation \( \sigma \) and center \( t \), restricted to the interval \( I = [t - \tau \cdot \sigma, t + \tau \cdot \sigma] \).
- \( D_3 \) is a Gaussian of standard deviation \( \sigma \) and center \( \bar{t} \), restricted to the interval \( I \).

Now, we present Lemma IV.2 showing for adequate values of \( \tau, |t - \bar{t}|/|\sigma|, \sigma \), \( D_1 \) and \( D_3 \) are close in the RD sense. The proof appears in Appendix B.

Lemma IV.2. Consider \( D_1, D_2, D_3, \tau \) as defined above. Suppose that there exist \( \delta_\varepsilon, \varepsilon, \delta, Q > 0 \) such that:

1. \( \max(\delta_\varepsilon, \varepsilon, \delta) \leq \delta = o(1) \);
2. \( |t - \bar{t}|/\sigma \leq \Delta_t^{(i)} \) (bounded absolute error);
3. \( |\bar{t} - 1| = \delta_{\sigma} \) (bounded relative error);
4. \( \sigma \geq \eta(\varepsilon) \);
5. \( Q \leq \exp(\sigma^2\tau^2/2)(2\pi/\sigma^2(1 - \varepsilon)^\varepsilon) \).
TABLE II
LATTE SECURITY IMPACT OF FINITE PRECISION BASED ON EMPIRICAL ERROR ESTIMATION RESULTS FROM OUR STATISTICAL MODEL.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>p_μ</th>
<th>p_c</th>
<th>ln(C_K)</th>
<th>Δ_q^2</th>
<th>Q_{max}</th>
<th>Q_{μ}^2</th>
<th>Q_{σ}^2</th>
<th>ln(C_K)</th>
<th>Δ_q^2</th>
<th>Q_{max}</th>
<th>Q_{μ}^2</th>
<th>Q_{σ}^2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2^−24</td>
<td>2^−30</td>
<td>2^−30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2^−24</td>
<td>2^−30</td>
<td>2^−30</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-3</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2^−19</td>
<td>2^−19</td>
<td>2^−14</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2^−35</td>
<td>2^−20</td>
<td>2^−20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-4</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2^−19</td>
<td>2^−19</td>
<td>2^−14</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2^−35</td>
<td>2^−20</td>
<td>2^−20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE III
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF ACTUAL ARITHMETIC ERRORS.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>p_μ</th>
<th>ln(C_K)</th>
<th>Δ_q^2</th>
<th>ln(C_K)</th>
<th>Δ_q^2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-1</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2^−10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-2</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2^−10</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-3</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2^−10</td>
<td>2^−94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-4</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>2^−16</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2^−10</td>
<td>2^−94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

similar heuristic statistical model is commonly used in the context of evaluating the propagation of LWE errors via a circuit computed homomorphically with Fully Homomorphic Encryption schemes [48].

We now present the details of our statistical model for estimating the standard deviations of errors, i.e., δ, Δ_y, and Δ_x. For a complex number a = μ + iμ, jμ, let us denote the absolute error of the real part μ as σ and the absolute error of the imaginary part μ as σ. We assume the real and imaginary parts of every complex number in our statistical model are independent Gaussian variables, e.g., for complex number a = μ + iμ, jμ, Re(a) follows the normal Gaussian distribution N(μ, σ_μ^2) and Im(a) follows the normal distribution N(μ, σ_μ^2), respectively, no matter whether Re(a), Im(a) are linear combinations of one or more independent normal variables. Therefore, we use the tuple (μ, σ_μ^2, σ_μ^2) to represent a complex number with errors.

Definition IV.1 (AddB, SubB, and MultB). For independent a = (μ_a, σ_a, σ_a) and b = (μ_b, σ_b, σ_b), let us define AddB(a, b) as (μ_a + b, σ_a + b, σ_a + b), SubB(a, b) as (μ_a - b, σ_a, σ_a), and MultB(a, b) as: (μ_a * b, σ_a * b, σ_a * b).

Definition IV.2 (DivB [49]). Let a = (μ_a, σ_a, σ_a, σ_a) and b = (μ_b, σ_b, σ_b, 0). Assuming Re(a), Im(a), and b are independent normal variables such that σ_a^2/μ_a^2 + σ_b^2/μ_b^2 < 1 and σ_a^2/μ_a^2 + σ_b^2/μ_b^2 < 1, we define DivB(a, b) as: (μ_a/μ_b, σ_a/μ_b, σ_a/μ_b).

Definition IV.3 (AbsB). For a = (μ_a, σ_a, σ_a, σ_a), assuming Re(a) and Im(a) are independent normal variables, let us define AbsB(a) as AddB((|Re(a)|)^2, (|Im(a)|)^2).

We can use the above absolute arithmetic error bound approximations to rewrite our optimised ffDLB in Alg. 7 in Sec. V-A and ffSampling in Alg. 6 in Sec. III-B, in order to estimate δ and Δ_y, respectively. For δ, we first use the ffDLB algorithm in Alg. 8 in Appendix H to estimate the absolute errors of the leaf values (real numbers) in ffDLB tree T for a given Gram matrix G, i.e., the standard deviation σ_leaf,R. Since σ for the 1-D integer Gaussian sampler is computed by σ_i/√T_leaf,R during tree normalisation, assuming the relative error of the floating-point arithmetic is u, we have
the following arithmetic error bound:

\[
\delta_a \leq \max_{\text{all leaves}} \left( 1 + u \right) \frac{u \sigma_z}{\sqrt{\mu_{\text{leaf}, R}} - \sigma_{\text{leaf}, R}} - 1
\]

\[
= \left( 1 + u \right)^2 \frac{1 - u \sqrt{\mu_{\text{leaf}, R}}}{\max_{\text{all leaves}} \mu_{\text{leaf}, R} - \sigma_{\text{leaf}, R}} - 1.
\]

Similarly, we can use ffSampling algorithm in Alg. 9 in Appendix H to output \( \Delta_i \) for a given vector \( t \) and ffLDL tree \( T \). In addition, we can compute the rounding errors \( \Delta_z \) i.e. Line 10 in Delegate in Alg. 2 and Line 8 in Extract in Alg. 3, by combining the FFT/FFT\(^{-1} \) errors of the input and the errors \( \sigma_{z, R}, \sigma_{z, L} \) of \( z \) computed by ffSamplingB. We also use a similar statistical modelling approach to estimate the errors of FFT/FFT\(^{-1} \) for a given vector \( a \).

Let \( C_K := \prod_{i<K} C^{(i)} \), where \( K \) is defined in Lemma IV.1. Here we show the empirical results of \( \ln C_K \) and the error \( \Delta_z \) estimated by our statistical model. For the target floating-point precisions used by our implementation of the LAITTE scheme (see Sec. VI for the rationale behind the chosen precision), we compute the errors for 100 random \((S, t)\) pairs, where \( S \) is the basis and \( t \) is the input of the ffSampling in Alg. 6. The \( \ln C_K \) and \( \Delta_z \) among these 100 iterations are shown in Table II. To provide empirical evidence for supporting the accuracy of our statistical model, for the same 100 pairs of \((S, t)\), we also give the actual arithmetic errors between the values computed by using a very high precision (1024 bits) and the values computed by using the target precisions. The actual arithmetic errors computed by this approach are shown in Table III. By comparing the results in Table II and III, the difference between the actual arithmetic errors and the estimated errors from our statistical model is at most 2 bits in this empirical experiment. We will leave modelling the distributions of \((S, t)\) to make our statistical model fully deterministic as future works.

**Security Impact of Finite Precision Errors:** In order to use the results in Table II with Lemma IV.1 to derive the security impact of floating-point errors, we first derive corresponding upper bounds \( \delta_a^{(i)} := \tau_U \cdot \delta_a^{(1)}, \Delta_z^{(i)} := \tau_U \cdot \Delta_z^{(1)}, \) and \( \Delta_z^{(i)} := \tau_U \cdot \Delta_z^{(1)} \) on the absolute value of the errors, where \( \tau_U \) is chosen so that each individual Gaussian error’s absolute value exceeds its bound with probability \( \leq 2^{-\lambda} \), which by the standard Gaussian tail bound is satisfied by setting \( 2 \exp(-\tau^2/2) \leq 2^{-\lambda} \).

Therefore by a union bound, all bounds hold with a negligible probability \( p_U \leq (2M_z + M_f)2^{-\lambda} \), with \( \lambda \) denoting the target security level. Applying Lemma IV.1 with \( a := 2\lambda \) we conclude using \( a/(a-1) \approx 1 \) and \( p_U \) is negligible, that \( \Pr[E^{\text{ideal}}] \approx \Pr[E^{\text{real}}] \) so that finite precision causes a bit security loss \( L \approx \log_2(B_T) + \log_2(C_T) \) bits. We use the above floating-point arithmetic upper bounds to compute an estimate for the maximum number of the delegate/extract queries \( Q_{\text{max}}^C \) (resp. \( Q_{\text{max}}^B \)) that ensures \( \log_2(C_T) \leq 1 \) (resp. \( \log_2(B_T) \leq 1 \)) so that if \( \max(Q_D, Q_E) \leq \min(Q_{\text{max}}^C, Q_{\text{max}}^B) \), then \( L \leq 2 \) bits of security are lost overall for our finite arithmetic precision \( p_f \) LAITTE implementation versus the infinite precision implementation. To compute \( B_T \leq B_{\text{max}} \), we use the RD bound \( B \) on the COSAC \( Z \) sampler RD from the ideal \( Z \) sampler distribution derived in [21] corresponding to the COSAC sampler precision \( p_D \) used in our COSAC implementation (see Sec. V-B for the discussions). The finite precision security impact results are summarised in Table II. Note that in Table II, \( Q_{\text{max}}^c \) is computed using the max. error values \( \delta_a^{(i)} \) and \( \Delta_z^{(i)} \) estimated by our statistical model over 100 runs with random \((S, t)\) input pairs, whereas \( Q_{\text{max}}^B \) is a more conservative estimate using tail bounds \( \delta_a^{(i)} := \tau_U \cdot \delta_a^{(1)} \) and \( \Delta_z^{(i)} := \tau_U \cdot \Delta_z^{(1)} \) on the statistical model error estimates. We conjecture the former estimates are more accurate, although our existing security proof in Lemma IV.1 only implies the latter estimates.

The results show that for LATTE-1 and LATTE-2, \( 2^{12} \) Extract and/or Delegate queries can be supported with at most 2 bits of security loss with our 53-bit double-precision floating-point precision implementation. This should suffice for most practical applications. For LATTE-3 and LATTE-4, the main bottleneck in precision is the \( \Delta_z \) bound, but the results indicate that even reducing the precision by about 25 bits from our chosen 113-bit arithmetic precision to \( \approx \) 90 bits precision would suffice for security.

Similarly, we apply our statistical model on the Python implementation of FALCON\(^3 \) and compute the numerical results of \( Q_{\text{max}}^C \) based on the empirical results of \( \ln C_K \). We use the Decimal fixed-point number type in Python with 1000 decimal digits and perform the experiment by using the same seeds as in the Known Answer Tests (KATs). We get \( Q_{\text{max}}^C = 2^{66} \) for FALCON-512 and \( Q_{\text{max}}^C = 2^{56} \) for FALCON-1024, respectively. We also compute \( Q_{\text{max}}^C \) by using the upper bounds of \( \delta_a, \Delta_z \) for the whole ffLDL tree from our statistical model (similar to the approach in the FALCON specification [15], which uses the empirical error upper bounds of \( \delta_a, \Delta_z \) for the whole ffLDL tree\(^4 \)), and get \( Q_{\text{max}}^C = 2^{57} \) for FALCON-512 and \( Q_{\text{max}}^C = 2^{53} \) for FALCON-1024, respectively. The results indicate that our error analysis by using the error upper bounds for each leaf instead of the whole ffLDL tree has a 3-bit improvement over the approach in [15]. Although our results are lower than the claimed number of queries \( Q_s = 2^{64} \) in the FALCON specification [15], the empirical error upper bound \( \delta_a + \Delta_z \leq 2^{-46} \) given in the specification does not satisfy the required upper bound \( \delta_a + \Delta_z \leq 2^{-46} \) from the authors’ analysis for \( 2^{64} \) queries, and the specification did not discuss the impact of such larger errors on \( Q_s \), in detail. In addition, polynomials are converted between the original domain and the FFT domain in every polynomial arithmetic operation when computing the Gram matrix \( G \) in the FALCON Python implementation, instead of only doing the conversions at the beginning/end of the \( G \) computation. These redundant FFTs will also increase the errors of \( G \) and thus increase the errors in the ffLDL tree.

**D. ID-OW-CPA security of Improved LATTE**

Recall from Sec. III that our improved LAITTE scheme achieves improved efficiency and shorter decryption keys

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\(^3\)https://github.com/tprest/falcon.py

\(^4\)The computed statistical model results are close to the empirical errors, see Table II and III.
output by the Extract algorithm relative to the original LATTE scheme. This change to Extract necessitates a different strategy for simulating the Extract oracle at level $\ell$ in the ID-OW-CPA security proof (Step 3 in the overview of Sec. IV-A), compared with the strategy outlined in [13] based on [41, Theorem 5.2]. In particular, the Extract oracle simulation at level $\ell$ must simulate the decryption key $t$ at that level without knowing the delegation secret key $S_{\ell-1}$ at level $\ell-1$. In the original LATTE using Eq. (2), this can be done by programming $A_\ell = H(E[I_{D_1}] \ldots I_{D_\ell})$ to be a matrix with an embedded NTRU trapdoor and using the basis extension method used in the Delegate oracle and its simulation at level $\ell$. But with our improved LATTE Extraction using Eq. (3), we cannot use a trapdoor for $A_{\ell}'$ to simulate multiple such decryption key vectors $t$; indeed, if this were possible then subtracting two such distinct short vectors would reveal a short vector $s$ in the (secret) level $\ell - 1$ delegation module lattice $s : s_0 + s_1 e + \cdots + t_\ell e_{\ell-1} = 0$.

Instead, our Extract simulator generates a single such short vector $t$ using the GPV signature simulation strategy [18], i.e. programming $A_{\ell}' = H(E[I_{D_1}] \ldots I_{D_\ell}) := s_0 + S_{\ell} e + \cdots + t_\ell e_{\ell-1}$ for short discrete Gaussian $t_{\ell}'$s sampled by the Extract simulator. To avoid a contradiction with the different programming strategy for $A_{\ell}'$, our modified LATTE uses a different hash function $H_E$ modelled as a random oracle (obtained from the random oracle $H$ by using the prefix "E"n") for computing $A_{\ell}'$ used in Extract so that $H$ and $H_E$ can be programmed independently. Also, for simplifying our programming strategy for $A_{\ell}' = H_E(I_{D_1} \ldots I_{D_\ell})$ only works for a single decryption key $t$, we must make Extract deterministic so that it returns the same secret key $t$ again if queried again at the same $I_{D_1} \ldots I_{D_\ell}$; this is the purpose of the hash function $G$ used to derive the randomness seed for Extract deterministically from $I_{D_1} \ldots I_{D_\ell}$.

V. IMPLEMENTATION TECHNIQUES

We now discuss the implementation techniques used in our optimised LATTE scheme. First, we present our faster novel ffLDL variant for (Mod)NTRU basis in Sec. V-A. Then, we discuss the integer Gaussian sampling techniques in Sec. V-B, including the adoption of FACC1T [19] and COSAC [20], [21] samplers in our LATTE implementation.

A. Improved ffLDL Algorithm for NTRU Basis

We observe the following theorem, which can be adopted to accelerate the computation of the ffLDL algorithm from FALCON [15], for the Fast Fourier LDL$^*$ decomposition of the (Mod)NTRU basis $S_\ell$ in LATTE:

**Theorem V.1.** Let $S_\ell$ be a (Mod)NTRU basis. In ffLDL tree of the matrix $G = S_\ell S_\ell^* \in (\mathbb{C}[x]/(x^N + 1))^{d \times d}$ in FFT domain, we get:

1) $D_{\ell,i,j} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ for some $n = 2^k \leq N$ in every node of the tree, $0 \leq i \leq d - 1$.

2) $\prod_{i=0}^{d-1} (D_{\ell,i,j}) = q^2$ in the root of tree, $0 \leq j \leq N - 1$.

3) $(D_{0,0,j})_j (D_{1,1,j}) = D_{2,2,j+1}$ for some $n = 2^k \leq N/2$ in every non-root node of the tree, where $D' \in \{D_{i,i}\}_{i=0}^{d-1}$ is from its parent, $0 \leq j \leq n - 1$.

4) $(D_{i,i,j})_j \in \mathbb{R}^+$ for some $n = 2^k \leq N$ in every node of the tree, $0 \leq i \leq d - 1$ and $0 \leq j \leq n - 1$.

**Proof:** 1) From the original ffLDL algorithm in FALCON [15], we have $(D_{0,0,j}) = (G_{0,0,j}) \text{ and } (D_{1,1,j}) = (G_{1,1,j} - \lfloor |L_{1,0,j}|^2 (G_{0,0,j}) \rfloor, 0 \leq j \leq n - 1$, for some input matrix $G$ in the FFT domain in every node of the tree. In addition, we have $(D_{1,0,j}) = (G_{1,0,j} - \sum_{k<k'}(|L_{k,k'}| (2^{k,k'}))$ at the root when $d = 2$. Therefore, we have $D_{\ell,i,j} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ assuming that $G_{i,i} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ for all $i \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$. To show that latter assumption is true, we observe that at the root we have the input $G = S_0 S_0^*$ in the FFT domain, $G_{i,i} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ for $0 \leq i \leq d - 1$. Thus, $D_{\ell,i,j} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ for $0 \leq i \leq d - 1$ at the root. Assuming $D_{\ell,i,j} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ for $0 \leq i \leq d - 1$ at an non-leaf node, for its $i$-th child, we have the ffLDL input $G'_{0,0,j} = G'_{1,1,j} = d_0$, where $(d_0)_{j} = \frac{1}{2} (D_{1,0,j} + (D_{1,1,j} + 1))$, in $\mathbb{R}$ for $0 \leq j \leq n/2 - 1$. Thus, $D_{0,0,j}, D_{1,1,j} \in \mathbb{R}^{n/2}$ in this child and we can deduce the conclusion by induction.

2) By the definition of the LDL$^*$ decomposition, we have $\det(D) = \prod_{j=0}^{d-1} D_{j,j} = \det(G)$. Because $G = S_\ell S_\ell^*$ at the root and the determinant of a (Mod)NTRU basis $S_\ell$ is $q$, we have $\prod_{j=0}^{d-1} (D_{j,j}) = q^2$ in the FFT domain at the root for $0 \leq j \leq N - 1$.

3) For the $i$-th child of a non-leaf node, we have the ffLDL input $G'_{i,j} = \left(\begin{array}{l} d_0 \ d_i \\ d_{i+1} \ d_i \end{array}\right)$ for $d_0, d_i \leftarrow \text{splitfft}(D_{i,i,j})$, $0 \leq i \leq d - 1$. By the definition of the LDL$^*$ decomposition, for this child, we have $D_{0,0,j} D_{1,1,j} = \det(G') = d_0^2 - d_1 d_i$. Thus, in the FFT domain, we have: $(D_{0,0,j} D_{1,1,j}) = (d_0^2 - \frac{1}{2} |(D_{1,0,j} + (D_{1,1,j} + 1))|)^2 - \frac{1}{4} |(D_{1,0,j} + (D_{1,1,j} + 1))|^2$, for $0 \leq j \leq n/2 - 1$. Since $(D_{1,1,j} + 1) \in \mathbb{R}$ and $|\omega| = 1$, we get $(D_{0,0,j}) D_{1,1,j} = (D_{1,0,j} + (D_{1,1,j} + 1))$.

4) The ffLDL algorithm computes the LDL$^*$ decomposition in the FFT domain. Let $S_\ell = L S_\ell^* = G$ be the GSO decomposition of $S_\ell \in \mathbb{R}^{d \times d}$. For the input $G = S_\ell S_\ell^*$ at the root, we have $G = \mathbb{L}DL^*$ where $D_\ell = S_\ell S_\ell^*$ [34]. Thus, in the FFT domain, $D_{i,i,j} \in (\mathbb{R}^n)^+$. Assuming $D_{i,i,j} \in (\mathbb{R}^n)^+$ for some $i \in \{0, \ldots, d-1\}$ at a non-leaf node, for the $i$-th child of this node, we have $(D_{0,0,j} D_{1,1,j}) = (D_{i,0,j} D_{i,1,j} + 1) \in \mathbb{R}^+$ for $0 \leq j \leq n/2 - 1$. Because $(D_{0,0,j}) = (\frac{1}{2}(D_{1,1,j} + (D_{1,1,j} + 1)))$, for the ffLDL input $G'$, we get $D_{0,0,j} D_{1,1,j} \in (\mathbb{R}^n)^+$.

Thus, we deduce the conclusion by induction.

We can utilise Theorem V.1 when computing $D$ in the ffLDL algorithm, see Alg. 7, for the (Mod)NTRU basis $S_\ell$ in LATTE with $d \in \{2, 3\}$; $d_{d-1,d-1} = 1$ at the root can be computed by $(D_{d-1,d-1}) = q^2 \prod_{i=0}^{d-1} (D_{i,i,j})$, for $0 \leq j \leq N - 1$. For all the non-root nodes, we can directly compute $D_{0,0,j}$ by using $(D_{0,0,j}) = (G_{0,0,j})$ and $D_{1,1,j} = (D_{0,0,j} + (D_{0,0,j}) j$, $0 \leq j \leq n - 1$, for some $D' \in \mathbb{R}^n$. $G_{0,0,j} = d_0' \in \mathbb{R}^n$ from its parent. Since for all $0 \leq i \leq d - 1$, we have $D_{i,i,j} \in \mathbb{R}^n$ in every node of the tree, $D$ can be computed solely by using the real number arithmetic, i.e. without complex number arithmetic. Because every complex number arithmetic computation contains multiple underlying floating-point arithmetic operations, by replacing complex number arithmetic with real
number arithmetic when computing $D$, we reduce the total amount of floating-point arithmetic operations. Therefore, this optimisation technique will accelerate the run-time speed of the ffLDL algorithm.

**Algorithm 7** Optimised ffLDL algorithm for (Mod)NTRU basis in LATTE.

**Input:** Gram matrix $G \in (\mathbb{C}[x]/(x^n+1))^{d \times d}$ in the FFT domain, $d \in \{2, 3\}$. $D' \in (\mathbb{R}^+)^{2n}$.

**Output:** Tree $T$.

1. function ffLDL($G$, $D'$)
2. if $n = 1$ then
3. $T$.value $\leftarrow G_{0,0}$.
4. else
5. $L \leftarrow I_d, D \leftarrow 0_d$.
6. for $j = 0$ to $n - 1$ do
7. $(D_{0,0})_j \leftarrow (G_{0,0})_j$.
8. $(L_{1,0})_j \leftarrow (D_{0,0})_j$.
9. if $d = 2$ then
10. if $n = N$ then
11. $(D_{1,1})_j \leftarrow \frac{q^2}{(D_{0,0})_j}$.
12. else
13. $(D_{1,1})_j \leftarrow \frac{D'_{2,j} D'_{2,j+1}}{(D_{0,0})_j}$.
14. end if
15. else if $d = 3$ then
16. $(D_{1,1})_j \leftarrow (G_{1,1})_j - \frac{(G_{0,0})_j}{(D_{0,0})_j}$.
17. $(D_{2,2})_j \leftarrow \frac{(D_{0,0})_j (D_{1,1})_j}{(G_{0,0})_j}$.
18. $(L_{2,0})_j \leftarrow \frac{(D_{0,0})_j (L_{1,0})_j}{(G_{0,0})_j}$.
19. $(I_{2,1})_j \leftarrow \frac{(G_{0,0})_j (I_{1,0})_j}{(D_{1,1})_j}$.
20. end if
21. end for
22. $T$.value $\leftarrow L$.
23. for $i = 0$ to $d - 1$ do
24. $d_0, d_1$ $\leftarrow$ splitfft($D_{i,i}$).
25. $G' = \left(\begin{array}{cc}
        d_0 & d_1 \\
        d_1 & d_0
      \end{array}\right)$.
26. $T$.child$_i$ $\leftarrow$ ffLDL($G'$, $D_{i,i}$).
27. end for
28. end if
29. return $T$.
30. end function

**B. Discrete Gaussian Sampling over Integers**

In LATTE KeyGen, $f, g$ may need to be resampled multiple times due to the norm check and possible failure to find solutions to the NTRU equation. In order to sample $2N$ coordinates efficiently from $P_{\sigma_0}$ we employ the FACCT sampler [19], which is fast and compact even for larger $\sigma_0$ used in LATTE-3 and LATTE-4. However, since the FACCT sampler can only sample with $\sigma = k \sqrt{1/2 \ln 2}$ where $k$ is a positive integer, we slightly increase $\sigma_0 \approx 1.17 \sqrt{q/(2N)}$ in LATTE parameters by setting $k = \lceil 1.17 \sqrt{q/(2N)} / \sqrt{1/2 \ln 2} \rceil$.

Let $S_{\ell} = L \cdot \hat{S}_{\ell}$ be the GSO decomposition of the delegated basis $S_{\ell} \in \mathbb{R}^{(\ell+2) \times (\ell+2)}$, where rows $\hat{s}_i$ of $\hat{S}_{\ell}$ are pairwise orthogonal. We find that the Euclidean norm of the last GSO vector $\hat{s}_{i+1}$ is very small compared to $\hat{s}_0, \ldots, \hat{s}_i$. This is because rows $\hat{s}_0, \ldots, \hat{s}_i$ of $S_{\ell}$ are sampled with a large $\sigma_0$ but $\det(S_{\ell} \cdot S'_{\ell}) = \prod_{i=0}^{\ell+1} (\hat{s}_i, \hat{s}_i)$ is constant and always equal to $q^2$ [17]. The experiment results in [50, Fig. 3] also verified that $\|s_{\ell+1}\|$ decreases significantly by increasing $|s_{\ell}|$ for $S_{\ell} \in \mathbb{R}^{3 \times 3}$. In this case, the ratio between the maximal and minimal standard deviation $\sigma'$ used by the integer discrete Gaussian sampling subroutine in ffSampling is very large and the isochronous sampler [51] used by FALCON [15] will be inefficient for our scheme, since the rejection rate of $[51]$ is proportional to $\max(\sigma')/\min(\sigma')$. In order to sample with $\sigma'$ in a broad range, we employ a variant [20] of the COSAC sampler [21] instead, which is scalable to large $\sigma'$ without sacrificing efficiency.

The precision analysis in Sec. IV-C requires the bound $B$ on RD between a single sample from COSAC and an ideal Gaussian $\mathbb{Z}$ sample. In [21] it is shown that $B \leq 1 + 4 \sigma^2 e^2_\lambda$, where $e_\lambda$ denotes the absolute error of the underlying Box-Muller continuous Gaussian sampler used by the COSAC sampler and $\sigma$ denotes the upper bound of the integer Gaussian standard deviation $\sigma$.

When $\ell = 1$, we have $\sigma \leq \sigma_0 \cdot \min\| (\hat{s}_0) \| \leq \sigma_0 \sqrt{2N}$. Therefore, we have $\| \hat{s}_1 \| \leq \sigma_0 \sqrt{2N}^2 q$. In order to analyse the upper bound of $\sigma$ when $\ell = 2$, first we introduce the following Lemmas.

**Lemma V.2.** Every non-root, non-leaf node in a ffLDL tree satisfies $\min_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_k \leq D_{i,i} \leq \max_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_k$, for some $D' \in (\mathbb{R}^+)^{2n}$ from its parent, $0 \leq j \leq n - 1, i \in \{0, 1\}$.

**Proof:** From Theorem V.1, for a non-root, non-leaf node, since $(D_{0,0})_j = \frac{1}{2} (D'_{2,j} + D'_{2,j+1})$, $0 \leq j \leq n - 1$, for some $D' \in (\mathbb{R}^+)^{2n}$, $(D_{0,0})_j$ gets the minimal value $\min_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_{k}$ when both $D'_{2,j}$ and $D'_{2,j+1}$ are equal to $\min_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_{k}$. Similarly, $(D_{0,0})_j$ gets the maximal value $\max_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_{k}$ when both $D'_{2,j}$ and $D'_{2,j+1}$ are equal to $\max_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_{k}$.

For $(D_{1,1})_j = D'_{2,j} D'_{2,j+1}/(D_{0,0})_j = \frac{D'_{2,j}}{D'_{2,j+1}} D'_{2,j+1}$, it gets the minimal value $\min_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_{k}$ when both $D'_{2,j}$ and $D'_{2,j+1}$ are equal to $\min_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_{k}$ and $(D_{1,1})_j$ gets the maximal value $\max_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_{k}$ when both $D'_{2,j}$ and $D'_{2,j+1}$ are equal to $\max_{k=0}^{2n-1} D'_{k}$.

From Lemma V.2, if the ancestor of a non-root, non-leaf node is the $m$-th child of the root, $0 \leq m \leq d - 1$, then $(D_{i,i})_j$ of this node has the minimal value $\min_{k=0}^{2n-1} (D_{m,m})_k$ and the maximal value $\max_{k=0}^{2n-1} (D_{m,m})_k$, $i \in \{0, 1\}$, $0 \leq j \leq n - 1$, for $D_{m,m}$ from the root, respectively. The leaf value of an ffLDL tree is $\sigma = \sigma_0/\sqrt{(G_{0,0})_0}$, where $(G_{0,0})_0 = \frac{1}{2} (D'_0 + D'_1)$ for some $D'$ from its parent. Following a similar approach in the proof of Lemma V.2, we have: $\min\{D'_0, D'_1\} \leq (G_{0,0})_0 \leq \max\{D'_0, D'_1\}$. Therefore, similar to a non-root, non-leaf node, if the ancestor of a leaf node is the $m$-th child of the root, then the leaf value $\sigma$ has the minimal value $\sigma \sqrt{\max_{k=0}^{2n-1} (D_{m,m})_k}$ and the maximal value $\sigma \sqrt{\min_{k=0}^{2n-1} (D_{m,m})_k}$. 

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TABLE IV

SUMMARY OF PERFORMANCE RESULTS (op/s) AT 4.2GHZ.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>Sec.</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>log₂ q</th>
<th>KeyGen</th>
<th>Ext</th>
<th>Enc</th>
<th>Dec</th>
<th>Del</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orig. LATTE-1 [13]</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>1361.8</td>
<td>2911</td>
<td>2987</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our LATTE-1</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>2048</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>636.9</td>
<td>1335</td>
<td>1351</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orig. LATTE-2 [13]</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>1892</td>
<td>1774</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our LATTE-2</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>2048</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>6846.6</td>
<td>668</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orig. LATTE-3 [13]</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>873.2</td>
<td>8731.8</td>
<td>6029.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our LATTE-3</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>2048</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>454.1</td>
<td>2639.8</td>
<td>1621.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orig. LATTE-4 [13]</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>225.1</td>
<td>133.6</td>
<td>453.9</td>
<td>377.2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP-3 [13]</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>873.2</td>
<td>8731.8</td>
<td>6029.9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DLP-2 [13]</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>454.1</td>
<td>2639.8</td>
<td>1621.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[53]</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>336.9</td>
<td>401.8</td>
<td>1615.4</td>
<td>1442.3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[54]</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>1280</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>49.2</td>
<td>122.2</td>
<td>403.4</td>
<td>339.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In order to analyse the minimal and maximal values of $D_{m,m}'$ from the root, we introduce the following Lemma:

**Lemma V.3.** For FFT domain Gram matrix $G = S_{\ell-1}S_{\ell-1}^\top \in (C[x]/(x^N+1))^{(\ell+1)\times(\ell+1)}$, we have $\|G_{i,j}\| \leq \sigma_{\ell-1}N^2(\ell+1)^2$, $0 \leq i \leq \ell-1$, $0 \leq j \leq N-1$.

**Proof:** We have $G_{i,j} = \sum_{k=0}^{\ell} \text{FFT}(S_{\ell-1})_{i,k} \otimes \text{FFT}(S_{\ell-1})_{j,k}$, and thus $\|G_{i,j}\| = \sum_{k=0}^{\ell} (\text{FFT}(S_{\ell-1}))_{i,k}. \|z\|$ for $N$-point FFT result $z$ of scalar $a$, we have $|z_i| = \sqrt{\sum|a|^2}$ for $0 \leq i \leq N-1$ [52]. Thus, we have $\|G_{i,j}\| \leq (\ell+1)\cdot N \cdot \|S_{\ell-1})_{i,k}\|^2 \leq \sigma_{\ell-1}N^2(\ell+1)^2$, since $\|S_{\ell-1})_{i,k}\| \leq \sigma_{\ell-1} \cdot (\ell+1)N$.

For the root of an ffLDL tree when $\ell = 2$, we have $D_{0,0} = (G_{0,0})_{i,j} \leq \sigma_1^2N^2$ by Lemma V.3. For $D_{1,1} = (G_{1,1})_{i,j} \leq \sigma_1^2N^2$, since $(D_{0,0})_{i,j} \in \mathbb{R}^+$ from Theorem V.1, which gives $\|D_{1,1}\| \leq (G_{1,1})_{i,j} \leq \sigma_1^2N^2$. By Theorem V.1, we have $\|D_{2,2}\| = \|D_{0,0}\| \cdot \|D_{1,1}\| \leq \sigma_1^2N^2$, by taking the upper bound $\sigma_1^2N^2$ of $D_{0,0}$ and $D_{1,1}$. Thus, for the leaf values $\sigma$, we have $\|G_{i,j}\| \leq \sigma_1^2N^2(q^2/81\sigma_1^4N^4) = \sigma_1^2N^2/q$.

We use double precision, i.e. 53-bit floating-point arithmetic precision in the COSAC sampler for LATTE-1 and LATTE-2, which provides $ex \leq 2^{-20}$ [21]. Since the run-time speed of the underlying Box-Muller continuous Gaussian sampler is critical for the speed of the COSAC sampler [21], for the COSAC implementation in LATTE-3 and LATTE-4, we use binary128, i.e. 113-bit floating-point arithmetic precision and reduce the absolute precision of uniform sampling in the underlying Box-Muller continuous Gaussian sampler to 96 bits. This will make $ex$ less than approximately $2^{-36}$.

VI. PERFORMANCE RESULTS

The first published specification of LATTE [13] only provided the Encrypt and Decrypt performance results, as displayed in “Orig. LATTE” rows in Table IV, scaled and converted into op/s at 4.2GHz. Here, we give the first full performance results for our optimised variant of LATTE, including KeyGen, Extract, and Delegate.

We adopt Plantard’s multiplication modular reduction algorithm [55] with word size $w = 32$ bits for LATTE-1 and LATTE-2, and $w = 64$ bits for LATTE-3 and LATTE-4, respectively. Since Plantard’s algorithm requires multiplication in $2w$ bits, we use the 128-bit integer variable type _-uint128 from gcc to implement the modular reduction in LATTE-3 and LATTE-4. We employ the gmp [56] library for multi-precision integer arithmetic. For precisions of floating-point and complex number arithmetic, we use 53 bits, i.e. double precision for LATTE-1 and LATTE-2, and 113 bits i.e. binary128 for LATTE-3 and LATTE-4. We use the _-float128 and _-complex128 variable types from gcc to implement the 113-bit floating-point and complex number arithmetic for LATTE-3 and LATTE-4, respectively. Although the error analysis in Sec. IV-C indicates that the arithmetic precisions for LATTE-3 and LATTE-4 can be further reduced, however, the generic multi-precision floating-point library such as MPFR [57] is not optimised for less than 1,000-bit precision in terms of the run-time speed [58]. We will leave using hand-optimised floating-point arithmetic routines with lower precision as future works.

We use AES-256 CTR mode with hardware AES-NI instructions as the pseudorandom generator, and use SHAKE256 [59] as the KDF in LATTE Encrypt and Decrypt. The performance results have been obtained from a desktop machine with an Intel i7-7700K CPU at 4.2GHz, with both hyper-threading and TurboBoost disabled. We use gcc 11.2.0 compiler with compiling options -03 -march=native enabled. Results are given as “Our LATTE” rows in Table IV.

As expected, the KeyGen, Extract, and Delegate processes are the most time-consuming components of the scheme, and this increases as security and therefore lattice dimension increase. The trend down the hierarchical levels is that the Extract, Encrypt, and Decrypt all become more time-consuming as the hierarchical level increases. For LATTE-3 and LATTE-4, this corresponds to about 45% decrease in op/s of Extract and about 20% decrease in op/s of Encrypt/Decrypt from level 1 to level 2, respectively. On the other hand, for the Encrypt and Decrypt, our implementation is 6.0x–9.7x faster compared to the previous performance results from [13].

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TABLE V
SUMMARY OF KEY AND CIPHERTEXT SIZES (BYTES).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>Sec.</th>
<th>Master Public Key</th>
<th>Master Private Key</th>
<th>User Private Key</th>
<th>Ciphertext</th>
<th>Delegated Public Key</th>
<th>Delegated Private Key</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Orig. LATTE-1 [13]</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>6144</td>
<td>12288</td>
<td>9216</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9248</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our LATTE-1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3072</td>
<td>12288</td>
<td>3072</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6176</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orig. LATTE-2 [13]</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>12800</td>
<td>25600</td>
<td>19200</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19232</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our LATTE-2</td>
<td></td>
<td>6400</td>
<td>25600</td>
<td>6400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12832</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orig. LATTE-3 [13]</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>9216</td>
<td>18432</td>
<td>13824</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13856</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our LATTE-3</td>
<td></td>
<td>4608</td>
<td>18432</td>
<td>4608</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>9248</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orig. LATTE-4 [13]</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>19456</td>
<td>38912</td>
<td>29184</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19488</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Our LATTE-4</td>
<td></td>
<td>9728</td>
<td>38912</td>
<td>9728</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19488</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[53] Set</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>19600</td>
<td>6400</td>
<td>166400</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>19600</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[54] Set</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>352512</td>
<td>13056</td>
<td>345984</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>352512</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>126</td>
<td>772800</td>
<td>48000</td>
<td>153600</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>154560</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

speedup might be due to: (1) We change the distribution of ephemeral keys from discrete Gaussian distribution to the binomial distribution. (2) We only perform NTT for the ephemeral keys and m during the Encrypt and Decrypt, since other inputs are already in the NTT domain. (3) Since we reduce the dimension of extracted user keys by 1, there is also 1 less ephemeral key in Encrypt/Decrypt. Since the runtime speed of Encrypt/Decrypt in our LATTE implementation is in the order of microseconds, these algorithms should also be feasible on lightweight devices. Note that the more lightweight KeyGen and Delegate do not need to be run on lightweight devices in common use cases. In addition, our optimised LATTE Delegate only takes about 0.4–1.3 seconds on a desktop machine at 4.2GHz, which is practical and much faster than the estimated run-time (in the order of minutes) for the Delegate in [13].

Based on the algorithm descriptions in Sec. III-B, we expect the slowdown of most of the LATTE algorithms is linearly proportional to the hierarchical level ℓ. However, some sub-algorithms such as the ffLDL and ffSampling contain higher order factors of ℓ in their time complexities [34]. Most of the arithmetic over ℤ consists of quasilinear time complexity in terms of the ring dimension N, since they are computed via the FFT/NTT. On the other hand, for the same parameter set, we find the speeds of LATTE KeyGen, Delegate, and Extract are linearly proportional to the precision (integer and floating point) in our experiment, and thus the higher precision requirements may become the bottleneck when the number of levels in the hierarchy increases.

The key/ciphertext sizes are summarised in Table V. Since we reduce the dimension of extracted user keys by 1 in our improved LATTE scheme, we compare the key and ciphertext sizes of “Our LATTE” scheme with the original LATTE [13] labelled as “Orig. LATTE”. From Table V, our improved LATTE scheme reduces the key/ciphertext sizes by 25%–67% among all LATTE parameter sets.

As discussed in the ETSI report [13], the size of the LATTE ciphertext does not scale well when the number of levels in the hierarchy increases. For our optimised LATTE, the ciphertext at level ℓ consists of ℓ+1 polynomials C₁, . . . , Cℓ, Cₙ ∈ ℤ[q] along with a 256-bit string Z. Therefore, at level ℓ, the bit size of the full ciphertext is (ℓ+1) ⋅ ⌈log₂ q⌉ + 256. The modulus q needs to be larger than the σℓ for the highest hierarchical level ℓ. Since σℓ ≥ ηℓ(Z) √(ℓ+1)N ⋅ σℓ−1 [13] and σ₀ ≈ 1.17q/(2N), we have σℓ ≥ 1.17ηℓ(Z) √(ℓ+1)!/N+1/2 and thus q > 1.3689ηℓ(Z)(ℓ+1)!/N+1/2. By Stirling’s approximation, log₂((ℓ+1)!/N) is in the order of (ℓ+1) log₂(ℓ+1). Therefore, the bit size of the ciphertext at level ℓ is in the order of O((ℓ/z)N) at least, where O represents the soft-O notation.

Our current implementation is not constant-time since the gmp multiprecision integer arithmetic library [56] and the gcc run-time library for the binary128 floating-point and complex number arithmetic are unlikely to be constant-time [60]. We will leave the constant-time implementation of our optimised LATTE scheme as future works.

Comparison to DLP IBE: Performance results of the DLP IBE scheme from [13] (converted to op/s at 4.2GHz) are given in Table IV. Since the decryption in the DLP IBE did not include ciphertext validation, for a fair comparison with LATTE, we use the sum of DLP encryption and decryption run-time to compute the op/s of decryption in Table IV. We focus on the comparison between LATTE-1 and DLP-3, since the sizes of parameters N and q are similar. The KeyGen speed of our LATTE-1 implementation is 1.9x faster than DLP-3, and the speed of our LATTE-1 Extract implementation is about 3x faster than DLP-3 extraction. This is mainly because we adopt the faster NTRUSolve and lattice Gaussian sampling procedure from FALCON [15]. In addition, the Encrypt/Decrypt speed is 8.7x–11.1x faster in our implementation.

Comparison to IBEs on Standard Models: Performance results and key/ciphertext sizes of the IBEs based on standard models [53], [54] are given in Table IV and V, respectively. Similar to the DLP IBE, the decryption run-time in [53], [54] did not include ciphertext validation, so we use the sum of encryption and decryption run-time as the decryption performance results in Table IV. Additionally, since the reported KeyGen run-time of [54] is the sum of KeyGen and the pre-processing of the discrete Gaussian sampler, for a fair comparison, we also use the sum of the KeyGen and pre-processing run-time as the KeyGen performance results of [53] in Table IV and compare with the performance results of our LATTE variant computing the ffLDL tree during KeyGen in...
Table VI in Appendix C. For the run-time comparison, the Extract/Encrypt/Decrypt in our LATTE-1 are 4.5x/14.3x/12.5x faster than the 80-bit secure IBE [53], 14.8x/57.2x/53.2x faster than the 126-bit secure IBE on module lattice [54], and our LATTE-2 are 4.2x/16.1x/17.7x faster than the 195-bit secure IBE [53]. On the other hand, the KeyGen in 80/126/195-bit secure IBEs are 36.2x/5.3x/50.0x faster than LATTE-1/1/2 KeyGen, respectively, due to the fast gadget trapdoor generation algorithms [53], [54]. Note that the implementation in [53] uses 2 threads for parallelisation.

For size comparison, the sizes of master public key/master private key/user private key/ciphertext in our LATTE-1 are 114.8x/1.1x/112.6x/57.1x smaller than the 80-bit secure IBE [53], 251.6x/3.9x/50.0x/25.0x smaller than the 126-bit secure IBE on module lattice [54], and the sizes in our LATTE-2 are 161.2x/1.2x/158.7x/80.4x smaller than the 195-bit secure IBE [53], respectively.

**Portability to FALCON:** We demonstrated a ≈ 3 bit improved precision estimate for FALCON by applying our statistical model and using a refined analysis in Sec. IV-C. For the implementation techniques, our optimised fILDL algorithm in Sec. V-A is applicable to FALCON, since both the FALCON and the LATTE use similar (Mod)NTRU lattices. In addition, the Montgomery reduction [61] used by the current FALCON implementation [15] can also be replaced by the faster Plantard’s reduction [55]. We also show the performance comparison of our optimised LATTE implementation against FALCON in Appendix F.

**ACKNOWLEDGMENTS**

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**APPENDIX A**

**PROOF OF LEMMA IV.1**

**Proof:** Consider the fSampling in Alg. 6. We employ a sequence of games $G_0, \ldots, G_5$, and track the probability of the events $E$ and $B_U$ over those games using an RD approach. Let $E_i$ and $B_{U,i}$ denote the events $E$ and $B_U$ in game $i$ for $i = 0, \ldots, 5$. The games REAL and IDEAL are defined in the Lemma statement. The sequence of games is as follows:

- **$G_0$: Game REAL.**
- **$G_1$:** $G_0$, but we change the 1-dimensional $Z$-sampler from the finite precision sampler distribution $D$ to infinite precision sampler distribution $D_i$.
- **$G_2$:** $G_1$, but we abort the game if $B_U$ happens, meaning either there exists $i$ such that the errors $\Delta_{t(i)}$ (relative to $\sigma(t)$) in centers $t(i)$ exceed $\Delta_{\sigma(t)}^U$ or relative errors $\delta_{\sigma(t)}$ in standard deviations $\sigma(t)$ exceed $\delta_{\sigma(t)}^U$ or there exists $j$ such that the infinity-norm absolute errors $\Delta_{\sigma(t)}$ in $z(t)$ exceed $\Delta_{\sigma(t)}^U$.
- **$G_3$:** $G_2$, but we restrict the 1-dimensional $Z$ samplers $D$ to the corresponding $\tau$-bounded distribution $D^\tau$.
- **$G_4$:** $G_3$, but changing arithmetic from finite precision to infinite precision, and removing the $\tau$-tailcut on the 1-dimensional $Z$ samplers to return to the ideal Gaussian distribution $D_i$. This game is identical to $G_{\text{IDEAL}}$ except for the abort condition introduced in the previous game.
- **$G_5$:** $G_4$, but remove the abort introduced in $G_2$. This game is identical to $G_{\text{IDEAL}}$.

**$G_0 \rightarrow G_1$:** Changing the 1-D $Z$-sampler. Let $(\tilde{\sigma}(t), \tilde{t}(i)) = (\sigma(t) + \delta_{\sigma(t)}, t(i) + \Delta_{t(i)})$ denote the $i$’th query to the 1-D sampler in the execution of these games, and denote by $\tilde{z}(t)$ the output integer returned by the sampler for the $i$’th query. We apply Prop. II.2, with $x_0$ denoting the remaining source of randomness in the game (i.e. the random coins of $A$ and the hash function $H$), and we let $x_i := \tilde{z}(t)$ for $i = 1, \ldots, M_2$. Consider $(x_i|x_j<i)$, the conditional distribution of $x_i$, conditioned on all previous $x_j$, for $j < i$, and the RD between this distribution in $G_0$ and $G_1$. Observe that conditioned on the same value of $x_j<i$, the values of the following query $\tilde{t}(i)$ and std. deviation $\tilde{\sigma}(i)$ are identical in both $G_0$ and $G_1$ since they both use the same finite precision arithmetic. We have:

\[ R_a((x_i|x_j<i)_G_0, (x_i|x_j<i)_G_1) \leq R_a(D_{\tilde{\sigma}(t), \tilde{t}(i)}, D_{\tilde{\sigma}(t), \tilde{t}(i)}) \leq B \cdot \Delta_{x(i)} \]

then Prop. II.2 implies:

\[ R_a((x_0, \ldots, x_K)_G_0, (x_0, \ldots, x_K)_G_1) \leq B \cdot M_z := B_T. \]

By the data processing and probability preservation properties of RD, $Pr[E_1] \geq Pr[E_0]^{(1/\omega-1/\xi)} / B_T$.

**$G_1 \rightarrow G_2$:** Adding a $\tau$ tailcut to the $Z$ Gaussian samplers. By a standard bound [25, Lemma 4.4.], the statistical distance between this game and the previous one is $\leq M_2 \cdot 2 \exp(-\tau^2/2) \leq 1/Q_M$. Hence, we have $Pr[E_2] \geq Pr[E_1] - 1/Q_M$.

**$G_2 \rightarrow G_3$:** Aborting the game if the errors exceed the bounds. Recall that $B_{U,2}$ denotes the event $B_U$ in $G_2$ that the errors exceed the bounds in the Lemma statement. If the event $B_{U,2}$ does not occur, games $G_2$ and $G_3$ proceed identically. Hence, we have $Pr[E_3] \geq Pr[E_2] - Pr[B_{U,2}]$ and $Pr[B_{U,2}] = Pr[B_{U,3}]$.

**$G_3 \rightarrow G_4$:** Changing finite precision arithmetic to infinite precision and removing the $\tau$-tailcut on the Gaussians. We again apply Prop. II.2, except that this time $x_i := \tilde{z}(t)$ for $1 \leq i \leq M_2$ except if the event $B_U$ occurs at the $i$’th query to the $Z$ sampler (determined by $x_0, \ldots, x_{i-1}$), in which case $x_i := \perp$, and all subsequent $x_j := \perp$ for $j > i$. As in the previous game, we consider the conditional distribution $(x_i|x_{j<i})$ of $x_i$ conditioned on all previous $x_j$ for $j < i$, and the RD between this conditional distribution in $G_3$ and $G_4$. When the event $B_U$ occurs at the (at or before) the $i$’th query to the $Z$ sampler, the conditional distribution $(x_i|x_{j<i})$ is identical in both games (as both conditional distributions return $\perp$ with probability 1) and have RD 0. Whereas, if the event $B_U$ does not occur at (or before) the $i$’th query to the $Z$ conditioned on the same fixed value of $x_j<i$ in the support of the $j$’th 1-D $Z$-samplers, we have $\Delta_{t(i)} \leq \Delta_{t(i)}^U$. Also, the query std deviation values $\sigma(t)$ in $G_4$ and $\tilde{\sigma}(t)$ in $G_3$ have a relative error $\delta_{\sigma(t)} \leq \delta_{\sigma(t)}^U$ by definition of event $B_U$. We therefore have:

\[ R_a((x_i|x_j<i)_G_3, (x_i|x_j<i)_G_4) \leq R_a(D_{\sigma(t), t(i)}, D_{\tilde{\sigma}(t), \tilde{t}(i)}) \leq C(i), \quad (7) \]

\[ R_a((x_0, \ldots, x_K)_G_3, (x_0, \ldots, x_K)_G_4) \leq B \cdot M_z := B_T. \]

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where in the last inequality, we used Lemma IV.2. Then Prop. II.2 above implies:
\[ R_{\text{f}}((x_0, \ldots, x_{M_2}) G_2, (x_0, \ldots, x_{M_2}) G_3) \leq \prod_{i < M_2} C(i) := C_T. \]

Due to the abort condition, we have that conditioned on the same fixed value of \( x_i \)'s that do not cause an abort, the values \( \bar{z}^{(j)} \) in \( G_3 \) and \( G_4 \) differ by an absolute error at most \( \Delta z < 1/2 \), and therefore, observing that in \( G_4 \) the \( \bar{z}^{(j)} \) has integer coordinates (due to the infinite precision), the rounded \( \bar{z}^{(j)} \) values in \( G_4 \) are identical to those in \( G_3 \) conditioned on the same \( x_i \)'s. Since the adversary’s view in the game depends on \( x_i \)'s only via the rounded \( \bar{z}^{(j)} \), we conclude by the R\( \acute{e} \)nyi probability preservation property that \( \Pr[E_\bar{z}] \geq \Pr[E_3]^{\sigma/(a-1)/C_T} \) and \( \Pr[B_{U,T}] \geq \Pr[B_{U,A}]^{\sigma/(a-1)/C_T}. \)

\( G_4 \rightarrow G_5: \) In this game, we remove the abort introduced in \( G_2 \). Since the games \( G_4 \) and \( G_3 \) proceed identically until an abort occurs, we have \( \Pr[B_{U,T}] = \Pr[B_{U,A}] = \Pr[E_3] - \Pr[B_{U,A}]. \) Furthermore, by the Lemma hypothesis, we have \( \Pr[B_{U,T}] := p_U \). Putting together the above bounds, we obtain that the probability of \( E_5 \) (i.e. event \( E \) in IDEAL) is lower bounded by
\[ \Pr[E_5] \geq \Pr[E_3]^{\sigma/(a-1)/C_T} - p_U \]
and using \( p_U = \Pr[B_{U,T}] = \Pr[B_{U,A}] \geq \Pr[B_{U,3}]^{\sigma/(a-1)/C_T} \), we get bound on \( \Pr[E_3] := \Pr[E_{\text{ideal}}]. \)

**APPENDIX B**

**PROOF OF LEMMA IV.2**

**Proof:** We have that
\[ \frac{D_3(z)}{D_2(z)} = \frac{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(I)}{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(I)} \cdot \exp(u(z)), \]
where, following assumption (3) in the statement of Lemma and the notations of the proof of [14, Lemma 7], we get Eq. (9).
\[ u(z) = \frac{(t - Z)^2}{2\sigma^2} - \frac{(t - Z)^2}{2\sigma^2} = - \frac{2(t - t)^2}{2\sigma^2} \]
\[ = \frac{-2}{2\sigma^2} \left( (z - t) - (z - t) - 2\sigma^2 + \sigma^2 \right) \]
\[ = \frac{
\mathcal{D}(z)}{2(1 - \sigma^2)^2}. \]

We now first bound \( \rho_{\tau,\sigma}(I) \). Let \( \text{erfc}(\alpha) := \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \int_{\alpha}^{\infty} \exp(-y^2/2) dy \)
be the complementary error function; then we get:
\[ \rho_{\tau,\sigma}(I) = \rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z) - 2 \cdot \text{erfc}(\tau \cdot \sigma) \]
\[ = \rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z) \cdot \left( 1 - \frac{2 \cdot \text{erfc}(\tau \cdot \sigma)}{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)} \right) \geq \rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z) \cdot (1 - 1/Q), \]
where the last inequality uses \( \rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z) \sim \sqrt{2\pi}(1 - \varepsilon)\sigma \), \( \text{erfc}(\tau\sigma) \leq \frac{\exp(-\tau^2\sigma^2/2)}{2\sqrt{\pi}\sigma \tau \sigma} \), and \( Q \leq 2\sqrt{\pi} \sigma (1 - \varepsilon) \sigma \exp(\sigma^2/2 \cdot \sigma^2) \) set in condition 5). Deriving a similar inequality for \( \rho_{\tau,\sigma}(I) \), we have:
\[ 1 - 1/Q \leq \frac{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)}{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(I)} \cdot \frac{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)}{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(I)} \leq 1 + 1/Q. \]

Let \( n := (\Delta Z)^2 + 2\Delta Z(z - t)/\sigma - (2\sigma^2 + \sigma^2)((z - t)/\sigma)^2). \) By applying [14, Lemma 7], followed by Eq. (10), followed by [62, Lemma 4.4] and finally using \( \max(\delta, \varepsilon) \leq \delta \), it follows that:
\[ \ln \left( \frac{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)}{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)} \right) \leq \ln \left( \frac{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)}{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)} \right) \leq \ln \left( \frac{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)}{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)} \right) \]
\[ \leq \frac{1}{2(1 - \delta)} \cdot \ln \left( \frac{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)}{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)} \right) \]
\[ \leq \frac{1}{2(1 - \delta)} \cdot \ln \left( \frac{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)}{\rho_{\tau,\sigma}(Z)} \right) \]

Similarly, we bound \( \exp(\mu(z)) \) over \( I \) by using Eq. (10):
\[ \frac{\max |I| \cdot \mu(u)}{1 \cdot (1 - \delta)} \cdot (\Delta Z)^2 + 2\Delta Z(z - t)/\sigma - (2\sigma^2 + \sigma^2)((z - t)/\sigma)^2). \]

Combining Eq. (11), (14), and (15), we bound the relative error:
\[ \left| \ln \left( \frac{D_3}{D_2} \right) \right| \leq \left| \ln(1 + 2/Q) + \ln(1 + 1/Q) \cdot (\Delta Z)^2 + 2\Delta Z(z - t)/\sigma - (2\sigma^2 + \sigma^2)((z - t)/\sigma)^2) \right| \]

Combining Eq. (16) and [14, Lemma 3], the RD between \( D_3 \) and \( D_2 \) is derived as Eq. (5). Finally, we combine the first weak triangle inequality of [63, Lemma 4.1] with Remark 1 to obtain the RD between \( D_3 \) and \( D_1 \) as in Eq. (6).

**APPENDIX C**

**COMPUTE fFLDL TREE IN KEYGEN/DELEGATE**

If the key extraction speed is critical for the application, similar to FALCON [15], we can move the fFLDL Tree computation from the LATTE Extract (Line 4 in Alg. 3) to the LATTE KeyGen/Delegate when generating a master/delegated private key \( S_i \), at the expense of significantly larger master/delegated private key size. The KeyGen/Delegate/Extract speed of this LATTE variant is shown in Table VI. The LATTE Extract in this variant is about 1.3x–1.7x faster than the run-time speed in Table IV, while the KeyGen/Delegate is at most 66% slower.

Here we also analyse the overhead in the master/delegated private key size of this variant due to the fFLDL tree \( T \). Assuming a floating-point value has \( p \) bytes, the size of \( T \) consists of the following 3 parts: (1) For a \( d \times d \) basis, the root of \( T \) stores \( d(d - 1)/2 \) components of \( L \) from the LDDL decomposition, with each component in \( \mathbb{C}[x]/(x^N + 1) \). Thus, the root of \( T \) has \( d(d - 1)/2 \cdot 2Np = Npd(d - 1) \) bytes. (2) The root of \( T \) has \( d \) sub-trees. The \( i \)-th non-leaf level of a sub-tree has \( 2^i \) nodes, \( 0 \leq i \leq \log_2 N - 2 \). Each node at \( i \)-th level of a sub-tree stores \( L_{1,0} \) \( \mathbb{C}[x]/(x^{n^2} + 1) \) from the LDDL decomposition, where \( n = N/2^{d-1} \). Therefore, the total size of \( i \)-th level of a sub-tree is \( 2^i \cdot 2N(2^{d-1} + 1)p = Npd \) bytes, and the total size of all non-leaf nodes in a sub-tree is \( Npd(\log_2 N - 1) \) bytes. (3) A sub-tree has \( N/2 \) leaf nodes. Each leaf node stores a \( p \)-byte floating-point value, therefore, the total size of all leaf nodes in a sub-tree is \( Np/2 \) bytes. Thus, the total size of \( T \) is \( Npd(d - 1) + d(Np/2) + Npd(\log_2 N - 1) + Npd(3/2) \) bytes. Columns “\( T \) Size” in Table VI summarise the fFLDL tree size for the parameters and floating-point precisions in our LATTE implementation.
TABLE VI
Performance Results (op/s) and fflDL Tree Size (Bytes) of Latte Variant at 4.2GHz.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Set</th>
<th>KeyGen</th>
<th>Ext</th>
<th>Del</th>
<th>ℓ = 1</th>
<th>ℓ = 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-1</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>1802.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>172032</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>826.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>376382</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-3</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>54.6</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>344064</td>
<td>33.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LATTE-4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>26.0</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>753664</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

APPENDIX D
Cramer’s Rule

Cramer’s rule [64] is used for solving systems of linear equations. Considering a system of \( N \) equations with \( N \) unknowns \( x \), represented as \( Ax = b \). Cramer’s rule states that the solution can be written as \( x_i = \frac{\text{det}(A_i)}{\text{det}(A)} \), where \( A_i \) is the matrix formed by replacing the \( i \)-th column of \( A \) by the column vector \( b \).

The formulae for the reduction coefficients in the KeyGen and Delegate process come directly from Cramer’s Rule applied to the system \( Ax = b \), where, in the first level, \( A \) is the \( 2 \times 2 \) matrix whose \((i, j)\)-entry is the Hermitian product \((s_i, s_j)\) of the \( i \)-th and \( j \)-th rows of the delegation matrix, and where \( b \) is the two-dimensional column vector whose \( i \)-th coefficient is \((s_2, s_i)\). This result generalises to arbitrary levels; i.e., for any given number of levels \( \ell \geq 1 \), the reduction of the vector \( s_\ell + 1 \) is effected by replacing it with \( s_\ell + 1 - [k_0]s_0 - \ldots - [k_\ell]s_\ell \), where the \( k_i \) are the coefficients of the solution \( x \) to the system \( Ax = b \), where \( A \) is the \((\ell + 1) \times (\ell + 1)\) matrix whose \((i, j)\)-entry is the Hermitian product \((s_i, s_j)\) of the \( i \)-th and \( j \)-th rows of the delegation matrix, and where \( b \) is the \((\ell + 1)\)-dimensional column vector whose \( i \)-th coefficient is \((s_\ell + 1, s_i)\).

APPENDIX E
Key Size Calculations

The keys of Latte are mainly collections of polynomials in \( \mathcal{R} \). The degree of each polynomial is \( N \) and the number of bits in each coefficient is \( \kappa = \lceil \log_2 q \rceil \). The parameters \( N \) and \( q \) are dependent on the security level required. The bit size of key is equal to \( N \cdot \kappa \cdot \text{number of polynomials} \). Furthermore, we usually consider the key sizes in bytes, and so when the total bit size is computed, it will be divided by 8 to give the size in bytes.

**Master Keys:** The master public key consists of a polynomial \( h \in \mathcal{R}_q \). Therefore the bit size is \( N \cdot \kappa \). The master private key \( S_0 \) consists of \( (f, g, F, G) \). However, \( F \) and \( G \) can be recomputed on the fly from \( f \) and \( g \) using NTRUSolve. The solution is not unique but as long as it is a short solution, it will suffice. However, this is not efficient and so this research considers the entire \( (f, g, F, G) \) to be stored as the private key. Therefore, the master private key is of size \( 4N\cdot \kappa \).

**Delegated Keys:** The delegated public key can be straightforwardly generated using the master public key and the chain of user IDs along which the delegation process is happening. Although this can be efficiently generated on the fly, given the user ID chain, we will consider it being stored as the polynomials \( h, A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_\ell \), which translates as \((\ell + 1)\) polynomials in \( \mathcal{R} \), and so the total bit size of the delegated public key is \((\ell + 1)\cdot N\cdot \kappa \). The delegated private key generated from level \( \ell - 1 \) to level \( \ell \), to be passed onto users at level \( \ell + 1 \), is a \((\ell + 2) \times (\ell + 2)\) matrix of polynomials in \( \mathcal{R}_q \). Its size is therefore \((\ell + 2) \cdot (\ell + 2) \cdot N \cdot \kappa \).

**User Private Keys:** The user’s public key is entirely dependent on the identity, so we only examine the size of the user’s private key. In Latte for a user at level \( \ell \), this is a tuple of \((\ell + 1)\) polynomials in \( \mathcal{R}_q \). However, we only need to store \( \ell \) of these polynomials (disregarding \( t_0 \)) and so the user private key is of bit size \( \ell \cdot N \cdot \kappa \).

APPENDIX F
Comparison to Falcon

After adopting the NTRUSolve and lattice Gaussian sampling procedures from Falcon [15], our optimised Latte KeyGen becomes similar to the Falcon KeyGen, and our optimised Latte Extract becomes similar to the Falcon Sign, in terms of the operations used by these algorithms. Therefore, here we compare the run-time speed of our optimised Latte KeyGen/Extract against the Falcon KeyGen/Sign, respectively. The performance results of the Falcon are summarised in Table VII. We focus on the comparison between Latte-1 and Falcon-1024 since the size of parameter \( N \) is the same. The KeyGen speed of our Latte-1 implementation is about 7.1x slower than Falcon-1024, and the speed of our Latte-1 Extract implementation is about 3.9x slower than Falcon-1024 Sign. This is mainly because (1) The size of \( q \) in Latte is much larger than Falcon (24 bits for Latte-1 compared to 14 bits for Falcon-1024), which will significantly increase the maximal integer size in NTRUSolve, as well as the run-time overhead in KeyGen [16]. (2) Falcon computes the fflDL Tree during the KeyGen, while the fflDL Tree is computed during the Extract in our Latte scheme. This difference will add overhead to the run-time speed of our Latte Extract implementation. (3) From the Falcon specification [15], the AVX2 and FMA instructions were used in the source code during the benchmark. However, these instructions are not used in the source code of our Latte implementation.

APPENDIX G
Concrete Parameter Sets Based on Best Known Attacks

The security of each component of Latte depends on an associated lattice problem and so the computational security of each of these problems must be considered to derive parameters, with the most vulnerable component determining the overall security for a given parameter set. The global parameters for the scheme are dimension \( N \) and modulus \( q \), but we will also need to consider level-specific parameters, namely the standard deviation used for sampling at each level, \( \sigma_\ell \). The six security constraints to be considered are: (1) Gaussian sampler security (2) Decryption failure (3) Master key recovery (breaking the NTRU problem/finding short vectors in the NTRU lattice) (4) Delegated key recovery (finding short vectors in the lattice) (5) User key recovery (solving...
closest vector problem) (6) Message recovery (breaking the RLWE encryption scheme). These are discussed in detail in [13], so here we only state the mathematical conditions which must be satisfied and compute the security levels using our updated parameters and modifications to the scheme. We first summarise the differences between our security analysis and [13]. Any other differences are negligible and due to precision variations in the attack costing script.

A. Gaussian Sampler Security

The statistical security of the Gaussian sampler used for sampling short vectors from lattice cosets in extraction and delegation to level \(\ell\) is determined by the standard deviation of the sampler \(\sigma_\ell\) and its relation to the Gram-Schmidt norm of the input basis. As this property of the basis is determined from the master key generation and any previous delegations, i.e. \(\|B\| \leq \sqrt{(\ell + 2)N} \cdot \sigma_\ell\), we can draw the following condition based on the relationship of the standard deviations at each level:

\[
\sigma_\ell \geq \eta g(\ell) \sqrt{(\ell + 1)N} \cdot \sigma_{\ell - 1},
\]  

(17)

taking \(\varepsilon\) as \(2^{-25.5}/(\ell + 1)N\) in order to make the KL-divergence of the sampler from the discrete Gaussian is at most \(2^{-46}\). However, we also require the sampled vectors to be short for the purposes of keeping the underlying lattice problem hard. Therefore, we can set \(\sigma_\ell\) to be equal to right hand side of Eq. (17), where \(\sigma_0 \approx 1.17\sqrt{q/(2N)}\). The quantity \(\sigma_0\) is chosen to be this as it minimises the Gram-Schmidt norm of the master basis (resulting in short user private keys in the single-level IBE), as deduced in [10].

B. Decryption Failure

To protect against attacks which exploit random decryption failures, we must bound the error term incurred in the RLWE encryption scheme. The probability that the error term is too large is derived in [13], based on the method of [37]. Essentially, the decryption failure rate cannot exceed \(2^{-\lambda}\), where \(\lambda\) is the security level in bits of the scheme. For each parameter set and level, we can compute the probability of decryption failure, noting that our design consists of one less ephemeral private key than in [13], reducing the standard deviation \(\tau\) of the Gaussian distribution of the coefficients of the error term \(d\) to \(\tau = \sqrt{\sigma_\ell^2 + (\ell + 1)N}\sigma_\ell^2\sigma_\ell',\) marginally reducing the failure rate.

C. Master Key Recovery

The security of the master key recovery depends upon the difficulty of finding the short vector \((g, f)\) in the lattice, given the public NTRU basis. The attack is successful if the projection of the short vector onto the vector space spanned by the final \(\beta\) Gram-Schmidt vectors is shorter than the length of the \((2N - \beta + 1)^{th}\) Gram-Schmidt vector. This corresponds to minimising block size \(\beta\), for:

\[
\sigma_0\sqrt{\beta} \leq G\ell(\beta)^{(2\beta-2N)/(\beta-1)} \cdot \det(\Lambda_0)^{1/2N}.
\]

The minimum solutions to this inequality for different parameter sets is given in Table VIII. The work required to find the shortest vector using this block size with the BKZ2.0 algorithm is also given.

D. Delegated Key Recovery

For delegated key recovery, the attacker must find a short sequence of vectors in \(\Lambda_{\ell - 1}\). This can reduce to solving SVP in the master lattice \(\Lambda_0\) to find a vector of length \(\sigma_\ell \cdot \sqrt{2N}\). Table IX gives the minimum block size \(\beta\) required (as per below Eq. (18)) for a successful attack using BKZ2.0 and the classical and quantum cost of these attacks which depend on \(N\) and \(q\).

\[
\sigma_\ell \cdot \sqrt{2N} \leq G\ell(\beta)^{(2N)/(\beta-1)} \cdot \det(\Lambda_0)^{1/2N}.
\]  

(18)
TABLE XI
COST OF PRIMAL MESSAGE RECOVERY ATTACK.

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<th>$\beta$</th>
<th>Classical Security</th>
<th>Quantum Security</th>
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<td>LATTE-2</td>
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<td>998</td>
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<tr>
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TABLE XII
COST OF DUAL MESSAGE RECOVERY ATTACK.

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<th>Classical Security</th>
<th>Quantum Security</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>LATTE-3</td>
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<td>232</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>78</td>
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<tr>
<td>LATTE-4</td>
<td>2101</td>
<td>560</td>
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<td>165</td>
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</table>

E. User Key Recovery

User key recovery requires finding a short solution to $t_0 + t_1 \cdot h + t_2 \cdot A_1 + \cdots + t_{\ell-1} \cdot A_{\ell-1} = A_\ell$, which reduces to solving the CVP in the master lattice $\Lambda_0$, of the form $t_0 + t_1 \cdot A_0 = A_\ell$. It is enough to find a short $(t_0, t_1)$ with length $\leq \sigma_\ell \cdot \sqrt{2(\ell+1)} \cdot \sqrt{2N}$. To do this, it is required to minimise Eq. (19) over $\beta$. Table X gives the minimum block size $\beta$ required for a successful attack and the classical and quantum cost of these attacks.

$$\sigma_\ell \cdot \sqrt{2(\ell+1)} \cdot \sqrt{2N} \leq GH(\beta)^{2N/\beta+1} \cdot \det(\Lambda_0)^{1/2N}. \quad (19)$$

F. Message Recovery

There are two attacks to consider for this. Message recovery depends on solving an extended version of RLWE, which reduces to an instance of the primal-CVP or dual-SVP. In the primal-CVP attack, the ephemeral private keys are recovered via a close vector problem. In the dual-SVP attack, an attempt is made to distinguish the ciphertext elements from uniformly random polynomials in $R_q$. In fact, it is enough for the attacker to recover one of the ephemeral private keys, $e$, and so message recovery cost is not affected by hierarchical level, or by our redesign.

The minimal block size $\beta$ needed for a successful attack, and the cost of these attacks are given in Tables XI and XII, depending on $(N, q)$. The code to populate Tables XI and XII is that used in [37]. By considering the cost of all attacks covered in this Section, the security levels in Table XIII could be derived.

G. Setting up Parameters

The parameter sets are given in Table XIII. These are the parameters recommended in the original specification [13]. We have extended the security estimates from [13] to give them on a per-level basis. The security decreases as we move down the hierarchy. However, it turns out that each parameter set’s security is determined by the message recovery capabilities, which remain constant down the levels. Therefore our parameter security conclusions match that of [13], and furthermore are not affected by our optimisations, as the message recovery attack is independent of the modified parameter $\ell$.

Parameter sets LATTE-1 and 2 are only applicable to a single level, essentially an IBE rather than HIBE, version of the scheme. LATTE-3 and 4 can be used for up to two levels. The reason we cannot use these parameters beyond these levels is that the decryption failure rate exceeds the target security level. In fact, the failure rate is so high it renders the scheme completely insecure and also not suitable for use.

APPENDIX H
ALGORITHMS IN THE STATISTICAL MODEL

We present the supplementary algorithms (Alg. 8–13) of our statistical model, including fflDLB, ffSamplingB, splitffB, mergeffB, FFTB, and FFTInB.

REFERENCES

Algorithm 8: The fflDLB algorithm based on statistical model.

**Input:** G, D'.

**Output:** Tree T.
1. **function** fflDLB(G, D')
2.  
3.  
4.  
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Algorithm 9: The fflSamplingB algorithm based on statistical model.

**Input:** t = (t₀, . . . , tₖ) in FFT format, tree T.

**Output:** z = (z₀, . . . , zₖ) in FFT format.
1. **function** fflSamplingB(t, T)
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
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Algorithm 10: The splitfftB algorithm based on statistical model.

**Input:** a, n.

**Output:** f₀, f₁.
1. **function** splitfftB(a, n)
2.  
3.  
4.  
5.  
6.  
7.  
8.  
9.  
10.  
11.  


Algorithm 11 The mergeFFT algorithm based on statistical model.

**Input:** $f_0, f_1, n$.

**Output:** a.

1: function mergeFFT($f_0, f_1, n$)
2:   $a_0 \leftarrow (\mu(f_0)_R, \sigma(f_0)_R, \mu(f_1)_R, \sigma(f_1)_R)$.
3:   for $k \leftarrow 0, \ldots, n/2 - 1$ do
4:     $u \leftarrow \text{MultB}((f_1)_k, \omega^{\text{bitrev}(n/2+k)})$.
5:     $a_{2k} \leftarrow \text{AddB}(f_0)_k, u$.
6:     $a_{2k+1} \leftarrow \text{SubB}(f_0)_k, u$.
7:   end for
8:   return $a$.
9: end function

Algorithm 12 The FFTB algorithm based on statistical model.

**Input:** a.

1: function FFTB(a)
2:   $m = 1$.
3:   $t = n$.
4:   while $m < n$ do
5:     $t \leftarrow t/2$.
6:     for $i = 0$ to $m - 1$ do
7:       $j_1 = 2it$.
8:       $j_2 = j_1 + t - 1$.
9:       for $j = j_1$ to $j_2$ do
10:          $u \leftarrow a_j$.
11:         $v \leftarrow \text{MultB}(a_{j+t}, \omega^{\text{bitrev}(m+i)})$.
12:         $a_{j+t} \leftarrow \text{AddB}(u, v)$.
13:         $a_{j+t} \leftarrow \text{SubB}(u, v)$.
14:       end for
15:     end for
16:     $m \leftarrow 2m$.
17:   end while
18: end function


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