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Paper 2021/1704

Verifiable Encryption from MPC-in-the-Head

Akira Takahashi and Greg Zaverucha

Abstract

Verifiable encryption (VE) is a protocol where one can provide assurance that an encrypted plaintext satisfies certain properties. It is an important buiding block in cryptography with many useful applications, such as key escrow, group signatures, optimistic fair exchange, etc. However, a majority of previous VE schemes are restricted to instantiation with specific public-key encryption schemes or relations. In this work, we propose a novel framework that realizes VE protocols using the MPC-in-the-head zero-knowledge proof systems (Ishai et al. STOC 2007). Our generic compiler can turn a large class of MPC-in-the-head ZK proofs into secure VE protocols for any CPA secure public-key encryption (PKE) schemes with the undeniability property, a notion that essentially guarantees binding of encryption when used as a commitment scheme. Our framework is versatile: because the circuit proven by the MPC-in-the-head prover is decoupled from a complex encryption function, the prover’s work can be focused on proving properties (i.e. relation) about the encrypted data, not the proof of plaintext knowledge. Hence, our approach allows for instantiation with various combinations of properties about encrypted data and encryption functions. As concrete applications we describe new approaches to verifiably encrypting discrete logarithms in any prime order group and AES private keys.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
verifiable encryptionzero knowledge proofMPC-in-the-head
Contact author(s)
takahashi @ cs au dk
gregz @ microsoft com
History
2023-10-16: revised
2021-12-31: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2021/1704
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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