Private Lives Matter: A Differential Private Functional Encryption Scheme
(extended version)*, **

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Abstract. The use of data combined with tailored statistical analysis have presented a unique opportunity to organizations in diverse fields to observe users’ behaviours and needs, and accordingly adapt and fine tune their services. However, in order to offer utilizable, plausible and personalized alternatives to users, this process usually also entails a breach of their privacy. The use of statistical databases for releasing data analytics is growing exponentially, and while many cryptographic methods are utilized to protect the confidentiality of the data – a task that has been ably carried out by many authors over the years – only a few works focus on the problem of privatizing the actual databases. Believing that securing and privatizing databases are two equilateral problems, in this paper we propose a hybrid approach by combining Functional Encryption with the principles of Differential Privacy. Our main goal is not only to design a scheme for processing statistical data and releasing statistics in a privacy-preserving way but also provide a richer, more balanced and comprehensive approach in which data analytics and cryptography go hand in hand with a shift towards increased privacy.

Keywords: Differential Privacy · Functional Encryption · Multi-Party Computation

1 Introduction

The continually increasing sophistication of technology is shaping the unceasing evolution of data and analytics. Industries are undergoing persistent digital transformation resulting in an ever increasing amount of data collected. Today, every business relies on small or big data and valuable insights derived from it. Data analytics is highly resourceful when it comes to understanding the target

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audience and their preferences. Using this information, organizations can easily anticipate customer needs and potentially gain significant competitive advantage in the market. Telecom and financial services industries are the most active early adopters of big data analytics, with technology and healthcare following in the third and fourth place.

The aggressive penetration of data analytics inevitably raises companies’ concerns regarding the usage of users’ data and possible breaches of privacy. For example, a recent study found that 19 out of a sample of 24 general-purpose mobile health apps shared user data with more than 50 unique companies, most of which were data analytics companies. This, along with other older reported privacy attacks are very alarming developments considering that statistical databases are of significant importance for decision making in numerous fields ranging from sports and entertainment to national security. A response to such attacks was presented in with the formalization of differential privacy.

Differential privacy allows sharing information about a dataset, while simultaneously withholding information about individuals. A curator (data owner) creates the database and then periodically releases statistics upon receiving request from an analyst. In order to ensure the individuals’ privacy, the curator filters the statistics through a privacy mechanism and replies to the analyst with a noisy result. The results must be presented in a form allowing the analyst to deduce accurate enough results about the dataset, without breaching individuals’ privacy. While the problem of privatizing datasets has been thoroughly studied, further securing the datasets through the use of cryptography has not yet drawn much attention. However, this is an issue of paramount importance when the database is outsourced to a possibly malicious cloud service provider (CSP). To the best of our knowledge, the only work that considered this scenario is the one presented in where authors rely on homomorphic encryption (HE) and structured encryption (SE) to design a scheme for private histogram queries. In this paper, we approach a similar problem by using Functional Encryption (FE) as the starting point.

Functional Encryption (FE) is an emerging cryptographic technique that allows selective computations over encrypted data. FE schemes provide a key generation algorithm that outputs decryption keys with remarkable capabilities. More precisely, each decryption key is associated with a function . In contrast to traditional cryptographic techniques, using on a ciphertext does not recover but a function – thus keeping the actual value private. While the first constructions of FE allowed the computation of a function over a single ciphertext, more recent works introduced the more general notion of multi-input FE (MIFE). In a MIFE scheme, given ciphertexts , a user can use to recover . The function can allow only highly processed forms of data to be learned by the functional key holder. Unfortunately, while MIFE seems to be a perfect fit for many real-life applications – especially cloud-based ones where multiple users store large volumes of data in remote and possibly corrupted entities – most of the works in the field revolve around constructing generic schemes that do not support
specific functions. Hence, while the concept of FE has the potential to unleash new, creative, useful and emerging applications, from a practical perspective, it still holds a largely unfulfilled promise. Having identified the importance of FE and believing that it is a family of modern encryption schemes that can push us into an uncharted technological terrain, we made a first attempt at smoothing out the identified asymmetries betwixt theory and practice.

**Contributions** We make the following contributions:

1. First, we design a MIFE scheme in the public key setting for the $\ell_1$ norm of a vector and then we generalize our construction to further support the inner product functionality. We also show how our scheme for the $\ell_1$ norm can be transformed from the single-client to the multi-client setting. This transformation requires the users to perform a Multi-Party Computation (MPC). More precisely, each user generates their own public/private key pair for the same public-key encryption scheme and then they collaborate to calculate a functional decryption key $sk_f$ which is derived from a combination of all the generated private keys. This result is quite remarkable since users generate their private keys locally and independently. As a result, the keys are never exposed to unauthorized parties and thus, no private information about the content of the underlying ciphertexts is revealed. At the same time, sufficient information to generate the functional decryption key is provided without the use of a fully trusted party.

2. Our second contribution derives from the identified need to create a dialogue between the theoretical concept of FE and real life applications. We tried to provide a pathway towards new prospects that show the direct and realistic applicability of this promising encryption technique when applied to concrete obstacles. To this end, we showed how our MIFE scheme can be used to provide a solution to the problem of designing encrypted private databases. In particular, we present three different solutions two of which remain private under continual observations, while our third solution satisfies the traditional definition of differential privacy but in the multi-client setting.

3. In comparison with the seminal work [5], our scheme offers more functionalities as it allows an analyst to perform different kind of queries, and not only request the value of a counter. This is because our construction is based on FE which is a better fit for such a scenario, and outperforms HE in terms of efficiency. Moreover, we consider a stronger threat model by allowing the malicious analyst to collude with the CSP in an attempt to remove the noise from the results. Finally, in contrast with the purely theoretical work in [5], we present extensive experiments to prove that enhancing the security of an encrypted dataset with differential privacy does not add significant computational costs.

2 Motivation and Application Domain

The use of analytics and data processing has been used productively in various fields, including the healthcare sector (e.g. medical diagnosis), intelligence anal-
ysis, finance, safety, military services and many more. However, the importance of performing privacy-preserving analytics is an issue that has lately gained momentum in public’s mind. As a result, a significant number of companies are moving towards implementing services that respect users’ privacy.

To facilitate the reader’s understanding of the motivation, and the type of problem we are trying to solve, we considered a specific example capable of showing the immediate application of our research. In layman’s terms, the goal of this work, is to allow authorized users to perform statistical analyses over arbitrary datasets in a privacy-preserving way. To achieve this, we built a functional encryption scheme that can protect users’ data and their privacy against both internal (e.g. malicious servers) and external (e.g malicious analysts) attacks.

Our solution utilizes a binary range tree, similar to the one described in [16]. The binary range tree is a complete binary tree in which each node represents a numerical range. Moreover, in each node we store the sum of the values stored in its children nodes. In other words, each node contains a partial sum corresponding to a specific range. To release statistics in a privacy-preserving way, this binary mechanism outputs noisy sums. To make things clearer let us consider the following example:

We consider a scenario in which 40 students have enrolled in a university course. After the final exam, the professor grades students. Grades are assigned as numbers in the range (1-8) where 8 corresponds to the highest possible mark. The professor creates a complete binary tree in which all grades are stored. Finally, the tree is outsourced to the university’s cloud server. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the binary tree looks like the one in figure 1, where the content of each node refers to the number of students whose grades were in a specific range and each $c_x$ denotes the ciphertext corresponding to a plaintext $x$. Furthermore, we assume that there exists a service in the university through which authorized users (e.g. an analyst) can evaluate any course based on students’ grades. The analyst should be able to execute any query on the server. A query could be of the form “How many students got a grade between 1 and 7?”. To answer this query, the server should release the sum of the nodes that correspond to the specified range. In our example, this would be the nodes representing the ranges (1-4), (5-6) and (7). Our goal is to design an encryption scheme that will allow an analyst to perform a set of computations on stored data without learning anything about the individual values. In addition to that, our scheme will have to be secure against both internal (compromised university service) and external attacks (corrupted analyst). We consider for example that Alice, another enrolled student, missed the first exam and participated in a new exam after the tree was already published. Now, an analyst by issuing a query for an average upgrade, could easily deduce Alice’s grade just by observing how the average was influenced by Alice’s grade. To ensure Alice’s privacy, we rely on the differential privacy under continual observations model that was formalized independently in [22] and [16]. Differential privacy under continual observations ensures that even if the data is constantly modified and updated, the privacy
of the individuals will not be compromised. Our solution focuses on combining Differential privacy under continual observations with FE.

Given that the ciphertexts are produced using an FE scheme, the professor can issue functional decryption keys to any party (i.e. an analyst) that wishes to perform statistics based on the grades of the students. Given such a functional key, the server will be able to output results identical to those where the contents of the nodes were in plaintext. To make the data private apart from just encrypting the individual records we embed a randomized error in the plaintext prior to the encryption.

3 Related Work

Functional Encryption Functional encryption was formalized as a generalization of public-key encryption in [14]. Since then, numerous studies with general definitions and generic constructions of FE have been proposed [7, 25, 26, 38, 40]. Despite the promising works that have been published, there is a clear lack of works proposing FE schemes supporting specific functions - a necessary step that would allow FE to transcend its limitations and provide the foundations for reaching its full potential. To the best of our knowledge, currently the number of supported functionalities is limited to inner products [2, 4, 8, 11] and quadratic
polynomials \cite{39}. In this work, we propose a MIFE scheme for the $\ell_1$ norm of a vector. We first present a generic construction and then show how to instantiate our scheme from well-studied public-key schemes.

**Differential Privacy.** Differential privacy is a notion first formalized in \cite{21}, where authors focused on ensuring the privacy of individuals. More precisely, it was proved that by adding well-calibrated noise to the data, the presence or absence of an individual’s information is irrelevant to the output of a database query. Since then, differential privacy has drawn the attention of both researchers \cite{13,33} and key industrial players such as Google \cite{23,24}, Uber \cite{28} and organizations like the US Census Bureau \cite{32}. Another interesting application of differential privacy was deployed by Apple with the recent release of iOS 14 \cite{1}. In iOS 14 Apple offers its users the ability to enable a feature called “approximated location”. More specifically, for apps that require location access, a user can choose to share an Approximate Location, which is close to the real location but not precisely spot on, making it harder for apps to keep track of where the user is going and better protecting location privacy.

**Continual Observations.** Modern applications require data to be constantly modified and updated. Having identified this need as well as its possible difficulties and implications, authors in \cite{22} proposed a new model of differential privacy having in mind scenarios such as real-time traffic analysis, social trends observations and disease outbreaks discovery. In \cite{15}, authors proved that continual release of statistics tend to leak more information. This problem was addressed independently in \cite{22} and \cite{16} and since then, the continual observations model is considered to be the new standard in the field of differential privacy \cite{31,41}.

**Crypto-assisted Approaches.** Over the past few years researchers have started exploring the possibilities of combining differential privacy with cryptographic primitives in an attempt to provide stronger security guarantees \cite{5,36,37}. In particular, in \cite{37} authors proposed a framework for combining differential privacy with cryptography in the *centralized differential privacy* (CDP) model. In the CDP model, data are collected and stored in plaintext in a fully trusted entity. In \cite{37}, authors relied on traditional cryptographic techniques to obviate the need of a trusted entity. However, they only managed to replace the trusted entity with two semi-honest servers. Another interesting approach is presented in \cite{30}, where authors combine differential privacy with searchable encryption to construct a volume-hiding scheme. Such schemes always return the maximum number of data among all possible queries in an attempt to hide the access pattern. Unfortunately, volume-hiding schemes are designed with single-keyword search in mind, and hence, can not be used for range queries.

**Most Relevant Related Work.** In \cite{5}, authors designed the first private encrypted database, and they proved that their construction is $\epsilon$-differential private in the continual observation model. More specifically, their scheme consists of an encrypted counter that is homomorphically encrypted using the Paillier cryptosystem. A data owner periodically updates the value of the counter and can also release its current noisy value. Moreover, they combine their encrypted
counter with techniques from structured encryption \cite{6,17,29,30} (a generalization of Symmetric Searchable Encryption \cite{9,10,20}) to design a scheme for private histogram queries. Inspired by their work, we sought to explore the new but already emerging field of private encrypted databases in an attempt to build up a feel for what might be an interesting research direction in which to head in the future. With \cite{5} as a starting point of our research, this work is differentiated as follows:

- Instead of using structured and homomorphic encryption, we base our work on FE. We firmly believe that FE is a cryptographic primitive that squarely fits applications where statistics need to be periodically released. As such, to the best of our knowledge, we construct the first scheme for functionally-encrypted private databases.

- Using FE instead of structured encryption as a basis, allow us to release a number of different statistics and not only the current value of a counter. This is a significant result as it is more applicable to a plethora of applications. Our scheme enables the privacy-preserving publication of statistics that can be computed using a sum. Such statistics may involve, but not limited to, averages, range queries, top-k/bot-k queries etc.

- We consider a stronger threat model. More precisely, in \cite{5}, the authors suggest that the noise is added to the data by the cloud service provider. Hence, in their model the cloud must be a trusted entity. Otherwise, an attack in which the server colludes with a malicious analyst can be launched and the actual noise used to mask users data can be easily removed. While this is a simple attack, it cancels out the property of differential privacy and, as a result, any malicious analyst can breach the privacy of individuals. To address this problem, in our approach the error is added to the initial data by the actual data owner prior to outsourcing them to the cloud. Hence, the only information that is leaked to the CSP is the final noisy result.

4 Preliminaries

In this section, we present the necessary notation and definitions needed to follow this paper. The section is divided into five parts: We start by describing the basic notations, then we give definitions about Public-Key Encryption, Functional Encryption, Homomorphic Encryption and differential privacy.

**Notation** If \( \mathcal{Y} \) is a set, we use \( y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y} \) if \( y \) is chosen uniformly at random from \( \mathcal{Y} \). The cardinality of a set \( \mathcal{Y} \) is denoted by \( |\mathcal{Y}| \). For a positive integer \( m \), \([m] \) denotes the set \{1, \ldots, m\}. Vectors are denoted in bold as \( \mathbf{x} = [x_1, \ldots, x_n] \). A PPT adversary \( \mathcal{ADV} \) is a randomized algorithm for which there exists a polynomial \( p(z) \) such that for all input \( z \), the running time of \( \mathcal{ADV}(z) \) is bounded by \( p(|z|) \).

\(^3\) We first present PLM\(_H\) - a scheme that uses homomorphic encryption and then, we move on to present PLM - a variation where homomorphic encryption is not taken into account.
A function \( \text{negl}(\cdot) \) is called negligible if \( \forall c \in \mathbb{N}, \exists \epsilon_0 \in \mathbb{N} \) such that \( \forall \epsilon \geq \epsilon_0 : \text{negl}(\epsilon) < \epsilon^{-c} \).

**Definition 1 (Inner Product).** The inner product (or dot product) of \( \mathbb{Z}^n \), for two vectors \( x, y \in \mathbb{Z}^n \) is a function \( \langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle \) defined by:

\[
f(x, y) = \langle x, y \rangle = x_1 y_1 + \cdots + x_n y_n
\]

**Definition 2 (\( \ell_1 \) norm).** The \( \ell_1 \) norm of \( \mathbb{R}^n \) for a vector \( x \in \mathbb{R}^n \) is a function \( \| \cdot \|_1 \) defined by:

\[
f(x) = \| x \|_1 = \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} |x_i| = |x_1| + \cdots + |x_n|.
\]

Starting from this traditional definition of the \( \ell_1 \) norm over the reals, we examine what happens when calculating the \( \ell_1 \) norm of a vector \( x \in \mathbb{Z}^n \). Since we want to work with any arbitrary vector \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{R}^n \), we first express each \( x_i \) component in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \), and then compute \( \sum_{i=1}^{i=n} x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n \). For example, assuming that we are working with the vector \( x = (-1, 1, 3) \in \mathbb{R}^3 \) and we want to compute its \( \ell_1 \) norm in \( \mathbb{Z}_5^n \), we first express \( x \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_5^3 \) as \( x = (4, 3, 3) \) and then sum all the components to get \( \| x \|_{\ell_1} = 10 \mod 5 = 0 \). This approach, obviates the need for the absolute values in the traditional definition of the \( \ell_1 \) norm, and it reduces the problem of computing the \( \ell_1 \) norm to a summation problem.

**Definition 3 (\( \ell_2 \) norm).** The \( \ell_2 \) norm of \( \mathbb{Z}^n \) for a vector \( x \in \mathbb{Z}^n \) is a function \( \| \cdot \|_2 \) defined by:

\[
f(x) = \| x \|_2 = \sqrt{\sum_{i=1}^{i=n} x_i^2}
\]

### 4.1 Public-Key Encryption

**Definition 4 (Public-Key Encryption scheme).** A public-key encryption scheme \( \text{PKE} \) for a message space \( \mathcal{M} \), consists of three algorithms \( \text{PKE} = (\text{Gen, Enc, Dec}) \). A PKE scheme is said to be correct if:

\[
\Pr[\text{Dec}(sk, c) \neq m \mid ([pk, sk] \leftarrow \text{Setip}(1^\lambda)) \land [m \in \mathcal{M}] \land [c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m)]] = \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

To formalize the security of a PKE scheme, we follow the IND-CPA paradigm.

**Definition 5 (Indistinguishability-Based Security).** Let \( \text{PKE} = (\text{Gen, Enc, Dec}) \) be a public-key encryption scheme. We define the following experiments:

\[
\text{Exp}^{\text{Ind-CPA}}(\text{ADV})
\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( \text{Initialize}(\lambda, x_0, x_1) )</th>
<th>(pk, sk) ( \leftarrow ) Gen(1(^\lambda))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Return pk} )</td>
<td>( \beta' = \beta )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \text{Challenge}() )</td>
<td>( c_\beta \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_\beta) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The advantage $\epsilon$ of $ADV$ is defined as:

$$
\epsilon = \left| Pr[Exp^{s-ind-CPA-0}(ADV) = 1] - Pr[Exp^{s-ind-CPA-1}(ADV) = 1] \right|
$$

We say that PKE is $s$-IND-CPA-\(\beta\) secure if

$$
\epsilon = \text{negl}(\lambda)
$$

Definition 6 (Linear Ciphertext Homomorphism (LCH)). We say that a PKE scheme has linear ciphertext homomorphism if:

$$
\prod_{i=1}^{n} \text{Enc}(pk, x_i) = \text{Enc} \left( \prod_{i=1}^{n} pk, \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \right)
$$

Definition 7 (Linear Key Homomorphism (LKH)). Let $(pk_1, sk_1)$ and $(pk_2, sk_2)$ be two public/private key pairs that have been generated using PKE.Gen. We say that PKE has linear key homomorphism if $sk_1 + sk_2$ is a private key to a public key computed as $pk_1 \cdot pk_2$.

A direct result of definitions 6 and 7 is that if a PKE scheme is linear ciphertext and key homomorphic, then the public keys of PKE live in multiplicative group $G_{pub} = (G, \cdot, 1_{G_{pub}})$ and the private keys in an additive group $H_{priv} = (H, +, 0_{H_{priv}})$.

4.2 Multi-Input Functional Encryption

Definition 8 (Multi-Input Functional Encryption).

A Multi-Input Functional Encryption scheme MIFE for a message space $\mathcal{M}$ is a tuple $\text{MIFE} = (\text{Setup, Enc, KeyGen, Dec})$ such that:

- Setup($\lambda$): The Setup algorithm is a probabilistic algorithm that on input the security parameter $\lambda$, outputs a master public/private key pair $(mpk, msk)$.
- Enc($mpk, x$): The encryption algorithm Enc is a probabilistic algorithm that on input the master public key $mpk$ and a message $x = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\} \in \mathcal{M}$, outputs a ciphertext $c = \{c_1, \ldots, c_n\}$.
- KeyGen($msk, f$): The key generation algorithm KeyGen is a deterministic algorithm that on input the master secret key $msk$ and a function $f$, outputs a functional key $sk_f$.
- Dec($sk_f, c$): The decryption algorithm Dec is a deterministic algorithm that on input a functional key $sk_f$ and a ciphertext $c$, outputs $f(x_1, \ldots, x_n)$.

A MIFE scheme is said to be correct if:

$$
Pr[\text{Dec}(sk_f, c) \neq f(x) \mid (mpk, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda)]
\wedge [c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(mpk, x)] \wedge [sk_f \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(msk, f)] = \text{negl}(\lambda)
$$
Just like in the case of PKE, we base our security definition on the selective-IND-CPA formalization:

**Definition 9 (MIFE Indistinguishability-Based Security).**

For a MIFE scheme \(\text{MIFE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})\), we define the following experiments:

\[
\text{Exp}^{s-IND-FE-CPA-\beta}(\text{ADV})
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Initialize}(\lambda, x_0, x_1) & \quad \text{Output mpk} \\
\text{mpk, msk} & \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\
L & \leftarrow \emptyset \\
\text{Key Generation}(f) & \\
L & \leftarrow L \cup \{f\} \\
sk_f & \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f) \\
\text{Output sk}_f
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Challenge}(\beta) & \\
\beta_\beta & \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, x_\beta) \\
\text{Finalize}(\beta') & \\
& \begin{cases} 
\text{Else} & f(x_0) \neq f(x_1) \\
\beta' = \beta & \text{Output } \bot
\end{cases}
\end{align*}
\]

The advantage \(\epsilon\) of \(\text{ADV}\) is defined as:

\[
\epsilon = \left| Pr[\text{Exp}^{s-IND-FE-CPA-0}(\text{ADV}) = 1] - Pr[\text{Exp}^{s-IND-FE-CPA-1}(\text{ADV}) = 1]\right|
\]

We say that PKE is \(s\)-IND-FE-CPA-\(\beta\) secure if

\[
\epsilon = \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]

### 4.3 Homomorphic Encryption

A homomorphism is a structure-preserving map between two algebraic structures. Homomorphic Encryption is simply an encryption scheme that retains the homomorphic property. Let us consider the function \(\text{Enc} : (\mathbb{G}, \oplus) \rightarrow (\mathbb{H}, \otimes)\), for some groups \(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{H}\) and some operators \(\oplus, \otimes\). Then, the function \(\text{Enc}\) is a homomorphism if and only if for any \(x, y \in \mathbb{G}\):

\[
\text{Enc}(x \oplus y) = \text{Enc}(x) \otimes \text{Enc}(y)
\]

### 4.4 Differential Privacy

We proceed by providing the main definitions of \(\epsilon\)-differential privacy and the main properties of the Laplace mechanism. For the rest of the paper, two databases \(DB\) and \(DB'\) are called neighbouring if they differ at most in one entry.

**Definition 10 (\(\epsilon\)-Differential Privacy).** A privacy mechanism \(\mathcal{M} : \mathbb{N}^{\lvert DB\rvert} \rightarrow \text{Im}(\mathcal{M})\) is \(\epsilon\)-Differentially private if \(\forall S \subset \text{Im}(\mathcal{M})\) and \(\forall\) neighboring databases \(DB, DB' \in \mathbb{N}^{\lvert DB\rvert}\):

\[
Pr[\mathcal{M}(DB) \in S] \leq e^\epsilon Pr[\mathcal{M}(DB') \in S]
\]
It needs to be noted, that the above definition assumes a static database and a curator who must reply to queries non-interactively. In our approach, the database is dynamic and a mechanism must update the published statistics as new data arrived. To this end, we rely on the continual observations model of differential privacy. However, to work on the continual observations model, we first need to formalize the curator operations. To do so, we use a similar formalization to the one presented in [16]. More precisely, we assume that curator’s operations are given by an input stream \( \sigma \in \{0, 1\}^\mathbb{N} \). The bit \( \sigma(t) \), denotes the occurrence of an event at time \( t \). We consider two cases of update: we assume that the only update possible, is to increase or decrease the value of a database entry.

**Definition 11 (\( \epsilon \)-Differential privacy under Continual Observations).**
A privacy mechanism \( M : \mathbb{N}^{|DB|} \rightarrow \text{Im}(M) \) is \( \epsilon \)-Differentially private under continual observations if \( \forall S \subset \text{Im}(M) \), \( \forall \) neighboring databases \( DB, DB' \) and for all neighbouring sequences of curator operations \( \sigma = (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n) \) and \( \sigma' = (\sigma'_1, \ldots, \sigma'_n) \):

\[
Pr[M(DB_1), \ldots, M(DB_n) \in S] \leq e^\epsilon Pr[M(DB'_1), \ldots, M(DB'_n) \in S]
\]

In this work we only consider two cases of update. In particular, we assume that the only update possible, is to increase or decrease the value of a database entry.

Apart from being private, we would also like the private mechanism to be useful. In other words, we would like \( M \) to return well approximated results after any update.

**Definition 12.** A mechanism \( M \) is said to be \((a, \delta)\)-useful at time \( t \), if for any string \( \sigma \) with probability at least \( 1 - \delta \), we have \( |\sum_{1}^{t} \sigma(t) - M(\sigma(t))| \leq a \).

One of the most used privacy mechanisms in literature is the Laplace mechanism, in which the noise is drawn form the Laplace distribution. We use \( \text{Lap}(b) \) to denote the Laplace distribution with mean 0 and variance \( 2b^2 \). Its probability density function is given by \( x \leftarrow \frac{1}{2b} \exp(-\frac{|x|}{b}) \).

We are now ready to proceed with the definition of the Laplace Mechanism [21].

**Definition 13 (Laplace Mechanism).** Given a query \( q : \mathbb{N}^{|DB|} \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \), the Laplace Mechanism is:

\[
M_L(DB, q, \epsilon) = q(DB) + Y_i,
\]

where \( Y_i \sim \text{Lap}(b) \)

A proof showing that the Laplace Mechanism is \( \epsilon \)-differentially private can be found in [21]. In particular in [21], the authors proved the following:
Lemma 1 (The Laplace mechanism maintains $\epsilon$-differential privacy). Let $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{R}$ such that $|\alpha - \beta| \leq 1$. Moreover, let $e \sim \text{Lap}(\frac{1}{\epsilon})$. Then $\forall$ measurable subsets $S \subseteq \mathbb{R}$:

$$\Pr[\alpha + e \in S] \leq \exp(\epsilon) \cdot \Pr[\beta + e \in S]$$

A private mechanism $M$ is said to be $B$-bounded if it only accepts strings $\sigma$ of length $B$.

We will now present two important results from [16] that are crucial for our work:

Lemma 2 (Sum of Independent Laplace Distributions). Suppose $e_i$'s are independent random variables, where each $e_i$ has Laplace distribution $\text{Lap}(b_i)$. Suppose $Y = \sum_i e_i$, and $b_m = \max(b_i)$. Let $v = \sqrt{\sum_i b_i^2}$ and $0 < \lambda < \frac{2\sqrt{2}v}{b_m}$. Then $\Pr[Y > \lambda] \leq \exp\left(-\frac{\lambda^2}{8v^2}\right)$

Corollary 1 (Measure Concentration). Let $Y, v, b_i, b_m$ be defined as in Lemma 2. Then if we set $v = \sqrt{\sum_i b_i^2} \cdot \sqrt{\ln \frac{2}{\delta}}$ we get that $Y$ is at most $O\left(\sqrt{\sum_i b_i^2 \log \left(\frac{1}{\delta}\right)}\right)$.

The proofs for both Lemma 2 and Corollary 1 can be found in [16].

5 Multi-Input Functional Encryption for the $\|\ell\|_1$ norm

In this Section, we present $\text{MIFE}_{\ell_1}$ — a functional encryption scheme for the $\ell_1$ norm of a vector $x = \{x_1, \ldots, x_n\}$.

Construction Let PKE = $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be an IND-CPA secure cryptosystem, that also fulfills the LCH and LKE properties. Then we define our $\text{MIFE}_{\ell_1}$ as $\text{MIFE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$ where:

1. Setup($1^\lambda, n$): The setup algorithm invokes the PKE's key generation algorithm $\text{Gen}$ and generates $n$ public/private key pairs as $(\text{pk}_1, \text{sk}_1), (\text{pk}_2, \text{sk}_2), \ldots, (\text{pk}_n, \text{sk}_n)$. The public keys are then used to create and output a master public/private key pair $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk})$, where $\text{mpk} = (\text{params}, \text{pk}_3, \ldots, \text{pk}_n)$ and $\text{msk} = (\text{sk}_1, \ldots, \text{sk}_n)$.
2. Enc($\text{mpk}, x$): The encryption algorithm $\text{Enc}$ takes as input the master public key $\text{mpk}$ and a vector $x$ and outputs $c = \{c_1, \ldots, c_n\}$, where $c_i = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_i, x_i)$.
3. KeyGen($\text{msk}$): The key generation algorithm, takes as input the master secret key $\text{msk}$ and outputs a functional key $\text{sk}_{\ell_1}$ as $\text{sk}_{\ell_1} = \sum_{i=1}^{n} \text{sk}_i$.
4. Dec($\text{sk}_{\ell_1}, c$): The decryption algorithm takes as input the functional key $\text{sk}_{\ell_1}$ and an encrypted vector $c$ and outputs $\text{PKE}.\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_{\ell_1}, \prod_{i=1}^{n} c)$.\footnote{The public parameters $\text{params}$ depend on the choice of the PKE scheme.}

\footnote{We omit the description of the function since in this case we are only focusing on the $\ell_1$ norm.}
Correctness The correctness of our construction follows directly since:

\[
\text{MIFE}_{\ell_1}.\text{Dec}(sk_{\ell_1}, c) = \text{PKE}.\text{Dec}\left( sk_{\ell_1}, \prod_{i=1}^{n} \text{PKE}.\text{Enc}(pk_i, x_i) \right)
\]

\[
= \text{PKE}.\text{Dec}\left( sk_{\ell_1}, \text{PKE}.\text{Enc}\left( \prod_{i=1}^{n} pk_i, \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i \right) \right) = \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i
\]

where we used the LCH property. Since the LKE property holds, we know that \( sk_{\ell_1} \) is a valid secret key that decrypts \( \prod_{i=1}^{n} c \).

In Section 6 we describe an instantiation of our construction from DDH, that also offers the crucial property of verifiable decryption. This is extremely important as it allows a user that does not know the functional decryption key to verify that the result was computed honestly in a zero-knowledge fashion.

As a result, we prove that our MIFE construction remains secure even under a stronger threat model.

**Theorem 1 (Selective Indistinguishability).** Let \( \text{PKE} \) be an IND-CPA secure public key cryptosystem that is linear-key and linear-ciphertext homomorphic. Moreover, let \( \text{MIFE}_{\ell_1} \) be our Multi-Input Functional Encryption scheme for the \( \ell_1 \) norm of a vector which is obtained through \( \text{PKE} \). Then \( \text{MIFE}_{\ell_1} \) is s-IND-FE-CPA secure.

**Proof.** To prove the security of our construction, we will show that the s-IND-FE-CPA security game is indistinguishable from a game in which a challenger \( C \) encrypts a random linear combination of the challenge messages whose coefficients sum up to one. Let \( \text{ADV}_{\text{MIFE}} \) be an adversary that breaks the IND-FE-CPA security of MIFE. Then, we will show that there exists an adversary \( \text{ADV}_{\text{PKE}} \) that breaks the IND-CPA security of \( \text{PKE} \). We assume that two different games run independently but simultaneously. The first game is the one described in definition 5 in which \( \text{ADV}_{\text{PKE}} \) plays against a challenger \( C \). The second game is the s-IND-FE-CPA game (definition 9), in which \( \text{ADV}_{\text{PKE}} \) acts as the challenger against \( \text{ADV}_{\text{MIFE}} \). We show that \( \text{ADV}_{\text{PKE}} \) can perfectly simulate the environment for \( \text{ADV}_{\text{MIFE}} \), and at the same time infer enough information to break the IND-CPA security of PKE. In particular, if \( \epsilon_{\text{MIFE}} \) is the advantage of \( \text{ADV}_{\text{MIFE}} \) and \( \epsilon_{\text{PKE}} \) the advantage of \( \text{ADV}_{\text{PKE}} \), we will prove that \( \epsilon_{\text{MIFE}} \leq \epsilon_{\text{PKE}} \).

\( \text{ADV}_{\text{PKE}} \) initiates the game by sending \( (0, \mu) \) to the challenger \( C \) where \( \mu \) is a random element in the message space of \( \text{PKE} \). Upon reception, \( C \) generates a \( (pk_c, sk_c) \) key pair, encrypts one of them at random using \( pk_c \) and replies to \( \text{ADV}_{\text{PKE}} \) with \( (\mu, pk_c) \). Upon reception, \( \text{ADV}_{\text{PKE}} \) invokes \( \text{ADV}_{\text{MIFE}} \) and receives two messages \( x_0 \) and \( x_1 \). Recall that \( \text{ADV}_{\text{MIFE}} \) can only ask for functional decryption keys for vectors \( x_0 \) and \( x_1 \) such that \( \|x_0\|_1 = \|x_1\|_1 \). Hence, \( \text{ADV}_{\text{MIFE}} \) is allowed to issue queries to a vector space \( V \subset M \) such that
∀ x_i ∈ V : ∥x_i∥_1 = 0 and is not able to decrypt vectors in other vector spaces. An overview of our proof is given in figure 2.

Proof Overview

1. ADV_{PKE} sends (0, µ) to the challenger C.
2. C flips a random coin, and sends (c_b, pk_C), back to ADV_{PKE}, where b ∈ {0, µ}.
3. ADV_{PKE} invokes ADV_{MIFE} on mpk and receives two messages x_0, x_1.
4. ADV_{MIFE} ADV_{PKE} for functional keys for vectors x_1, ..., x_n, such that ∥x_i∥ = ∥x_j∥, ∀ i, j ∈ [1, n].
5. ADV_{PKE} flips a random coin, and sends c_b back to ADV_{MIFE}.
6. ADV_{MIFE} outputs a bit a_1.
7. ADV_{PKE} outputs a bit a_2.

Fig. 2: Sketch of our Security Proof for MIFE

Public Key Generation To generate mpk, ADV_{PKE} first selects n − 1 random vectors z_1, ..., z_{n−1} such that ∥z_i∥_1 = 0, ∀ i ∈ [1, n − 1], and then produces a basis of V as (x_1 − x_0, z_1, ..., z_{n−1}). Finally, ADV_{PKE} writes the canonical vectors of the basis as:

\[ e = \alpha_i (x_1 - x_0) + \sum_{1}^{n-1} z_j \]  

(2)

where \( \alpha_i = \frac{x_1 - x_0}{\|x_1 - x_0\|_2} \).

As a next step, ADV_{PKE} runs (pk_{z_j}, sk_{z_j}) ← PKE.Gen, ∀ j ∈ [n − 1] and finally sets:

\[ pk_i = pk_C^{\alpha_i} \prod_{j=1}^{n-1} pk_{z_j}, \]  

(3)

where pk_C is the public key received from C. The master public key is then:

\[ mpk = (pk_i)_{i∈[n]} \]  

(4)

Moreover, to ensure that ∥x_1 − x_0∥_2 ≠ 0 mod q in the message space \( M = \{0, \ldots N − 1\} \subseteq Z_q \), we need to set q to be a prime larger than \( N^2 \). Finally, due to the LKH property of the public-key encryption scheme, ADV_{PKE} is unknowingly setting

\[ sk_i = \alpha_i sk_C + \sum_{1}^{n-1} sk_{z_j} \]  

(5)

where sk_C is not known to ADV_{PKE}.
Challenge ciphertext Upon receiving $x_0$ and $x_1$, from $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$, $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ is expected to pick a $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$ and reply with $c_\beta$. However, instead of encrypting $x_\beta$ using the corresponding public key, $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ sets the challenge ciphertext $c$ to be:

$$c = c_\beta^\alpha \cdot \text{PKE.Enc} \left( \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} pk_{z_i}, 0 \right) \cdot \text{PKE.Enc}(1_{G_{pub}}, x_\beta)$$  \hspace{1cm} (6)

where $1_{G_{pub}}$ is the identity element of the group $G_{pub}$. Finally $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ replies to $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$ with $c$.

Functional Keys To generate a functional key for a vector $x \in V$, $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ simply sets:

$$sk_{\ell_1} = \sum_{1}^{n-1} sk_{z_i}$$  \hspace{1cm} (7)

The game concludes as follows: $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$ correctly guesses $\beta$ which implies that $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ guesses that $C$ encrypted 0 or $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$ fails to guess $\beta$ and $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ guesses that $C$ encrypted $\mu$. What remains to be done is show that $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ simulated correctly the environment for $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$. We distinguish two cases based on $C$'s choice:

1. $C$ encrypted 0. In this case, the challenge ciphertext from equation 6 becomes:

$$c = \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_C, 0)^\alpha \cdot \text{PKE.Enc} \left( \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} pk_{z_i}, 0 \right) \cdot \text{PKE.Enc}(1_{G_{pub}}, x_\beta)$$

$$= \text{PKE.Enc} \left( pk_C^\alpha \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} pk_{z_i} \cdot 1_{G_{pub}}, 0 + 0 + x_\beta \right)$$

$$= \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_i, x_\beta)$$  \hspace{1cm} (8)

Hence, it can be seen that in this case $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ perfectly simulates the environment for $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$. As a result, if $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$ can correctly guess $\beta$ with advantage $\epsilon$, then $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ will guess that $C$ encrypted 0, with exactly the same $\epsilon$.

2. $C$ encrypted $\mu$. In this case, the challenge ciphertext from equation 6 becomes:

$$c = \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_C, \mu)^\alpha \cdot \text{PKE.Enc} \left( \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} pk_{z_i}, 0 \right) \cdot \text{PKE.Enc}(1_{G_{pub}}, x_\beta)$$

$$= \text{PKE.Enc} \left( pk_C^\alpha \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{n-1} pk_{z_i} \cdot 1_{G_{pub}}, \alpha \mu + 0 + x_\beta \right)$$

$$= \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_i, \alpha \mu + x_\beta) = \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_i, x')$$  \hspace{1cm} (9)
where $x'$ is a vector defined as:

$$x' = x_\beta + \alpha \mu$$

$$= \frac{\mu}{\|x_1 - x_0\|^2_2} (x_1 - x_0) + x_\beta$$

$$= \frac{\mu}{\|x_1 - x_0\|^2_2} (x_1 - x_0) + x_0 + \beta (x_1 - x_0)$$

(10)

Setting $u = \frac{\mu}{\|x_1 - x_0\|^2_2} + \beta$, yields $x' = u x_1 + (1 - u) x_0$, which is the message that corresponds to the challenge ciphertext. Note that $x' \in V$, since $\mu \in V$, and hence $x'$ is a linear combination of elements that live in $V$. Hence, we conclude that the challenge ciphertext is a valid ciphertext for $x' = u x_1 + (1 - u) x_0$, which is a random linear combination of $x_0$ and $x_1$ whose coefficients sum up to one. Finally, $\beta$ is information theoretically hidden as the distribution of $u$ is independent of $\beta$. As a result, the advantage of $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ is 0 when a non-zero vector is encrypted by $C$.

To calculate the overall advantage of $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$, we simply need to sum its advantage for each case. Hence, we have that $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$’s advantage is $\epsilon + 0 = \epsilon$. However, recall that $\epsilon$ is defined to be the advantage of $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$ against MIFE. Thus, the best advantage one can get against the CPA security of MIFE is bounded by the best advantage one can get against IND-CPA PKE.

**Functional Keys for Vectors in Different Vector Spaces:** As already mentioned, $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$ is only allowed to request functional keys for vectors living in a vector space $V \subset M$, where $\forall x, \in V : \|x\|_1 = 0$. Notice that by allowing $\text{ADV}_{MIFE}$ to obtain functional decryption keys for vectors $x \notin V$, our scheme can be trivially broken. However, this would imply that $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ can generate such functional decryption keys, which is impossible since $\text{ADV}_{PKE}$ does not know $sk_C$. Hence, the generated functional keys can only decrypt ciphertexts whose plaintexts are elements of $V$. This is a valid assumption since otherwise, we would demand security in a scenario where the master secret key is known to the adversary.

### 5.1 From the $\ell_1$ Norm to Inner Products

We will now show how our construction for the $\ell_1$ norm can be generalized to further support the inner-product functionality. More precisely, given two vectors $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, we allow the computation of their inner product $\langle x, y \rangle = x_1 y_1 + \cdots + x_n y_n$.

**Construction for Inner Products** Let $PKE = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be an IND-CPA secure cryptosystem, that also fulfills the LCH and LKE properties. Then we define our MIFE scheme for inner products, $\text{MIFE}_{IP}$, as $\text{MIFE}_{IP} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Enc}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Dec})$ where:
1. **Setup**\(1^\lambda, n\): The setup algorithm invokes the PKE’s Gen algorithm and generates \(n\) public and private key pairs as \((pk_1, sk_1), (pk_2, sk_2), \ldots, (pk_n, sk_n)\).

The generated public keys are then used to create and output a master public/private key pair \((mpk, msk)\), where \(mpk = (\text{params}, pk_1, \ldots, pk_n)\) and \(msk = (sk_1, \ldots, sk_n)\).

2. **Enc**\((mpk, x, y)\): The encryption algorithm \(\text{Enc}\), takes as input the master public key \(mpk\) and two vectors \(x, y\) and outputs \(c = \{c_1, \ldots, c_n\}\), where \(c_i = \text{Enc}(pk_i, x_i) y_i\).

3. **KeyGen**\((msk, y)\): The key generation algorithm, takes as input the master secret key \(msk\) and the vector \(y\) and outputs a functional key \(sk_y\) as \(sk_y = \langle y_i, sk_i \rangle\).

4. **Dec**\((sk_y, c)\): The decryption algorithm takes as input the functional key \(sk_y\) and an encrypted vector \(c\) and outputs PKE.\(\text{Dec}(sk_y, \prod_{i=1}^{n} c)\).

The correctness and the IND-CPA security of MIFE\(_\ell\) are deriv ed directly from the corresponding properties of MIFE\(_\ell\). However, in the security proof, we now require that the adversary asks for functional decryption keys, for vectors \(y\) such that \(\langle x_0, y \rangle = \langle x_1, y \rangle\). This implies that the adversary can ask decryption keys for vectors \(y\) that live in the vector space spanned by \((x_1 - x_0)^\perp\) (i.e. they are orthogonal to \((x_1 - x_0)^\perp\)). Hence, the adversary will not be able to decrypt any inner product for a vector \(y\) such that \(y \notin (x_1 - x_0)^\perp\).

6 **Instantiation from DDH**

We will now show how to instantiate our construction from Section 5 using the Additively Homomorphic El Gamal cryptosystem as PKE. For the needs of the proof, we rely on the fact that El Gamal remains secure under randomness reuse, as proven in [12].

**Theorem 2.** Let MIFE\(_\ell\) be our construction from Section 5. Then our construction can be instantiated from El Gamal’s cryptosystem.

**Proof.** We will show that El Gamal satisfies the LCH and LKH properties defined in definitions 6 and 7 respectively.

Let \(q\) be a prime and \(G\) a group of order \(q\) where the DHH assumption is hard. Moreover, let \(g\) be a generator of \(G\). Then we have that the private key space is the group \((\mathbb{Z}_q^+, 0_2)\) while the public key space is the group \((G, \times, 1_G)\).

Then, an El Gamal ciphertext for a message \(x\) is:

\[c = (g^r, pk^r \cdot g^x)\]

where \(r\) is a random value used to ensure that the encryption algorithm is probabilistic.

\[\text{params}\] depend on the choice of the PKE scheme.

\[\text{In this case, the description of the function } f, \text{ is the vector } y.\]
\(- \textbf{LCH}\): If Enc is the Encryption algorithm of El Gamal, then we have:

\[
\text{Enc}(pk_1, x_1) \cdot \text{Enc}(pk_2, x_2) = g^{rsk_1}g^{x_1} \cdot g^{rsk_2}g^{x_2} \\
= g^{r(\text{sk}_1 + \text{sk}_2)} \cdot g^{x_1 + x_2} \\
= \text{Enc}(pk_1pk_2, x_1 + x_2).
\]

\(- \textbf{LKH}\): In the El Gamal cryptosystem we have that for a public/private key pair \((pk, sk)\) the following condition holds:

\[
\text{pk} = g^sk
\]

Let \((pk_1, sk_1), (pk_2, sk_2)\) be two public/private key pairs for an El Gamal instantiation such that \(pk_1, pk_2 \in (G, \cdot, 0_G)\) and \(sk_1, sk_2 \in (Z, +, 0_Z)\). Then we have:

\[
\text{pk}_1 \cdot \text{pk}_2 = g^{sk_1} \cdot g^{sk_2}g^{(sk_1 + sk_2)}
\]

Moreover, since the groups \((G, \cdot, 0_G)\) and \((Z, +, 0_Z)\) are closed with respect to multiplication and addition operations respectively, we conclude that \((\text{pk}_1\text{pk}_2, \text{sk}_1 + \text{sk}_2)\) is a valid public/private key pair.

### 6.1 Verifiable Decryption

As already mentioned, instantiating our MIFE construction from Section 5 using DDH, allows users to verify the decryption result in a zero-knowledge manner. This is extremely important for PLM as it allows us to consider a stronger threat model. In particular, assuming a malicious curator that colludes with the CSP, could result to publishing modified statistics in an attempt to mislead the analysts. Hence, we show that an analyst that only possess a function \(f(x)\) along with the public parameters of the encryption scheme, can verify that \(f(x)\) is indeed the decryption of \(\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, (x = x_1, \ldots, x_n))\) under the function \(f\), without having access neither to the master secret key, nor the functional decryption key for the underlying function. This is done by simply calculating and verifying the equality of two discrete logarithms. More precisely, and given that the final ElGamal ciphertext is given by:

\[
(u, v) = (g^r, \text{pk} \cdot g^{f(x)}), \quad (11)
\]

the analyst needs to verify that:

\[
\log_{\text{pk}} \left[ \left( g^{f(x)} \right)^{-1} \cdot \text{pk} \cdot g^{f(x)} \right] = \log_{g} (g^r) \quad (12)
\]

Indeed, it can be seen that if a malicious party tampers with the result \(f(x)\) and replaces it with \(f(x)'\), then the term \(\left( g^{f(x)'} \right)^{-1} \) will not cancel out along with \(g^{f(x)}\) and hence, the equality will not hold.
7  Functionally-Encrypted and Differentially Private Dynamic Databases

We are now ready to present PLM-H and PLM; two schemes for functionally-encrypted private databases. To do so, we will use our MIFE₁ construction from Section 5 and the binary mechanism presented in [16]. In the first part of the section, we discuss PLM-H, our first approach to the problem that relies on the homomorphic property of the public-key encryption scheme PKE. Then, we present PLM - a modified version of PLM-H that does not require homomorphic encryption. Both versions share the same architecture, presented below:

Architecture We assume the existence of the following entities:

- **Curator (C)**: C is responsible for creating an encrypted and private database. C outsources the database to a CSP where it will be stored. Moreover, C can issue update queries to the CSP update specific entries of the database. To do so, C keeps locally the latest version of the database.
- **Analyst (A)**: A is an analyst that can perform statistics on the data stored in the CSP.
- **CSP**: A cloud service provider that stores an encrypted database. The CSP releases statistics upon request of the analyst.

Both of our constructions are proven to be differentially private in the continual observations model. In other words, by assuming two neighbouring sequence operations \( \sigma = (\sigma_1, \ldots, \sigma_n) \) and \( \sigma' = (\sigma'_1, \ldots, \sigma'_n) \), applied on two neighbouring databases \( DB \) and \( DB' \), we ensure that after \( n \) updates, the presence or absence of an individual does not affect the result of a query.

7.1 PLM using Homomorphic Encryption

**Overview** At a high-level, our construction works as follows: A curator C generates a binary tree similar to the one described in Section 2 in which each node contains a noisy value where the noise is sampled from the Laplace distribution. Then, C encrypts each noisy value using MIFE₁ with an additive homomorphic public-key encryption scheme PKE. The result, is an encrypted binary tree which is then outsourced and stored in the CSP. To update the values stored in the tree, C uses the homomorphic property of PKE. At any given time, and after the tree has been stored in the CSP, an analyst C can use the values stored in the tree to generate statistics in a privacy-preserving way. To do so, A first contacts the curator and requests a functional decryption key. Upon reception of the key, the analyst forwards it to the CSP who will reply with a sum corresponding to the analyst’s query. In our construction, errors are sampled as \( e \sim \text{Lap}(1) \), where \( \epsilon' = \frac{\epsilon}{\log N} \) and \( N \) is the total number of nodes in the tree. The reason for this, is that these parameters help us achieve \( \epsilon \)-differential privacy as we will see in the proof of theorem 3.
**Formal Construction**  PLM\(_H\) makes use of the MIFE\(_1\) and a public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) that satisfies the LCH and LKH properties. Moreover, the encryption function of PKE must be additively homomorphic. PLM\(_H\) is then defined as PLM\(_H\) = (Setup, Update, Read). Our construction is illustrated in figure 3 and works as follows:

**Setup**: Setup is a two party protocol between C and the CSP. C outputs a complete binary tree T with \(n\) nodes and adds Laplacian noise to the content of each node. As a next step, C runs MIFE\(_1\).Setup and generates \(n\) public/private key pairs \((pk_i, sk_i)\). Finally, C encrypts each node \(i\) using a public key \(pk_i\) and \(T\) is outsourced to the CSP.

**Update**: Update is a two party protocol between C and the CSP. To update the content of a node, C makes use of the homomorphic property of PKE.Enc. More precisely, assuming that C wishes to add a value \(\kappa\) to the content of a leaf node \(i\), she first finds the path from the root of the tree to the leaf \(i\). For every node \(j\) in the path, C samples a distinct \(e_j \sim Lap\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon'}\right)\) and computes \(\kappa'_j = \kappa_j + e_j\). As a next step, C encrypts each \(\kappa'_j\) using \(pk_j\). Apart from that, C samples a fresh noise \(e_m\) for every other node \(m\) of the tree and encrypts it using \(pk_m\). Finally, for each node of the tree, C sends a pair \((n, c_n)\) to the CSP. Upon reception, the CSP updates each node \(i\) using \(c_i\) by computing \(c'_n = c_{n,old} \cdot c_n\), where \(c_{n,old}\) the current content of the node \(n\).

**Read**: Read is a three party protocol between C, A and the CSP. This protocol is initiated by A who wishes to perform statistics on the data stored in the CSP. As a first step, A contacts C and requests a functional decryption key for a function \(f\). This function can be the sum of all nodes, a top-k/bot-k query, or any function that can be computed using a sum. Upon receiving the query, C generates the functional decryption key \(sk_f\) by summing up the appropriate secret keys that were generated during MIFE\(_1\).Setup. C forwards \(sk_f\) to the CSP and receives back a noisy result.

### 7.2 PLM without Homomorphic Encryption

We will now present PLM\(_H\); a modified version of PLM\(_H\) in which we show that homomorphic encryption can be dropped entirely. This is a significant improvement in terms of complexity and efficiency as homomorphic operations are particularly computationally expensive. Just like in PLM\(_H\), errors are sampled as \(e \sim Lap\left(\frac{1}{\epsilon'}\right)\). PLM is illustrated in figure 4 and works as follows:

**Setup**: PLM.Setup is identical to PLM\(_H\).Setup

**Update**: When C wishes to update the content of a node in the tree \(T\), she proceeds as in the case of PLM\(_H\).Update. However, instead of sending the list \(L\) to the CSP, C now sends directly the updated tree \(T'\) to the CSP. Upon reception, the CSP deletes \(T\) and stores \(T'\). This is possible, because, as already discussed, C always keeps a version of the current tree locally.

**Read**: PLM.Read is identical to PLM\(_H\).Read
Let MIFE_{\ell_1} be our construction from Section 5 instantiated with a public key encryption scheme PKE that satisfies the LCH, LKH properties and is additively homomorphic. Moreover, assume that the total number of nodes in the tree is N and let $\epsilon' \leftarrow \epsilon / \log N$.

PLM_{\text{Setup}}

C generates a binary tree $T$

For each node $i \in T$:
- C runs MIFE_{\ell_1}.Setup
- C samples $e_i \leftarrow \text{Lap}(\frac{1}{\ell_1})$
- C calculates $a'_i = a_i + e_i$, where $a_i$ is the content of the node $i$
- C computes $c_{a'_i} \leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_i, a'_i)$
- C replaces the content of node $i$ with $c_{a'_i}$

CSP receives $T$

PLM_{\text{Update}}

$L = \{\}$

C wishes to update the content of a leaf $k$ by either adding or subtracting to it a $\kappa \in \mathbb{R}$

For every node $j$ in the path from the root of $T$ to the leaf $i$:
- C samples $e_j \leftarrow \text{Lap}(\frac{1}{\ell_1})$ and computes $\kappa' = \kappa + e_j$
- C computes $c_{\kappa'} = \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_j, \kappa')$
- $L = L \cup \{j, c_{\kappa'}\}$

For every other node $m \in T$:
- C samples an error $e_m \leftarrow \text{Lap}(\frac{1}{\ell_1})$
- C computes $c_{e_m} \leftarrow \text{PKE.Enc}(pk_m, e_m)$
- $L = L \cup \{m, c_{e_m}\}$

C sends $L$ to the CSP

For each ciphertext $c_n \in L$
- CSP computes $c'_n = c_{\text{old}} \cdot c_n$
- CSP replaces the content of node $n$ with $c'_n$

PLM_{\text{Read}}

A request a functional key $\sk_f$ from C for a function $f$

C constructs $\sk_f = \sum \sk_i$ where each $i$ is picked based on the description of $f$

C sends $\sk_f$ to A

A sends a query to CSP including a range $[a, b]$ and $\sk_f$

CSP finds the appropriate nodes $n_1, \ldots, n_j$ and runs MIFE_{\ell_1}.Dec(\sk_f, n_1, \ldots, n_j)

A receives a noisy result

Fig. 3: PLM based on Homomorphic Encryption
Let $\text{MIFE}_t$ be instantiated with a public key encryption scheme $\text{PKE}$ that satisfies the LCH and LKH properties. Moreover, assume that the total number of nodes in the tree is $N$ and let $\epsilon' \leftarrow \epsilon / \log N$.

**PLM.Setup**
Identical to $\text{PLM}_h$. Setup

**PLM$_h$.Update**
$L = \{\}$
C wishes to update the content of a leaf $k$ by either adding or subtracting to it a $\kappa \in \mathbb{R}$
C runs $\text{PLM}.Setup$ where the content of the leaf $k$ and every node in the path from the root to the leaf $k$ is updated by either adding or subtracting $\kappa$. C outputs a tree $T'$
CSP receives $T'$, deletes $T$ and stores $T'$

**PLM.Read**
Identical to $\text{PLM}_h$. Read

---

**Fig. 4:** PLM without Homomorphic Encryption

### 7.3 Privacy and Utility

We will now prove that both $\text{PLM}_h$ and PLM satisfy $\epsilon$-differential privacy. Moreover, we prove the usefulness of our two schemes.

**Theorem 3.** The Read algorithm in both $\text{PLM}_h$ and PLM is $\epsilon$-differentially private as per definition [1]

**Proof.** Suppose a privacy mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ adds $\text{Lap}(1/\epsilon)$ noise to every sum before releasing it. Since in each update operation, we add freshly sampled noise to every node of the tree, and since each node contains a sum, we conclude that $N$ sums are affected by a factor of $1/\epsilon$ during every update. Hence, if the tree has a total of $N$ nodes, then $\mathcal{M}$ achieves $N \cdot \epsilon$-differential privacy. To achieve $\epsilon$-differential privacy, we can scale appropriately to $\epsilon' = \frac{\epsilon}{\log T}$ since Laplace mechanism maintains differential privacy. Now, if the mechanism $\mathcal{M}$ adds $\text{Lap}(\frac{1}{T})$ noise to each released sum, we get: $\text{Lap} \left( \frac{1}{T} \right) = \text{Lap} \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon'} \right)$

Since, as we said before, adding $\text{Lap} \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon} \right)$ results to $N \cdot \epsilon$-differential privacy, by adding $\text{Lap} \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon'} \right)$ results to:

$$N \cdot \frac{\epsilon}{\log T} = \epsilon$$-differential privacy

**Theorem 4.** For each update $\sigma(t)$ at time $t$, both $\text{PLM}_h$ and PLM are $(\frac{1}{T}) \cdot \sqrt{N} \cdot \sqrt{\log N} \cdot \log \frac{1}{\delta}, \delta)$-useful at time $t$. 
Proof. Let $e_i$ be independent random variables, where each $e_i$ has Laplace distribution $\text{Lap}(\log N)$. Note that $|\sum_{t} \sigma(t) - M(\sigma(t))| = \sum_{t} e_i$. Hence, using Corollary 1, with $b_i = \frac{\log N}{\epsilon}$ we get that:

$$\sum_{i} e_i \leq O \left( \sqrt{\sum_{i} \left( \frac{\log N}{\epsilon} \right)^2 \log \left( \frac{1}{\delta} \right)} \right)$$

From which we conclude that both PLM$_H$ and PLM are

$$\left( O \left( \frac{1}{\epsilon} \right) \cdot N \cdot \sqrt{\log N \cdot \log \frac{1}{\delta}} \right) - \text{useful}. \quad (13)$$

7.4 Comparison between PLM$_H$ and PLM

Since, PLM$_H$ requires the CSP to perform a homomorphic encryption on every node of the tree, we conclude that, PLM$_H$ requires to perform $O(2^{\log N}) = O(N)$ homomorphic encryptions. As a result, we see that PLM outperforms PLM$_H$ by a factor of $N$. It is important to note that despite its inefficiencies, PLM$_H$ is a very good candidate for a multi-client model, in which each node of the tree is encrypted by a different user. However, dealing with the updates in a multi-client scenario is not trivial as it would require the cooperation of every user to embed a freshly sampled noise to each node of the tree. As such, we leave it for future work. However, in the next section, we present a scheme that offers $\epsilon$-differential privacy, in the multi-client model when the database is static.

8 A Static Private Database in the Multi-Client Model

In this section, we are addressing the multi-client model and design a scheme for a functionally encrypted private database. Both in PLM and PLM$_H$, the Setup function is executed by a single curator who has total control over all ciphertexts. However, if we consider that each ciphertext in the database is generated by a different user, then generating a functional decryption key is not a trivial problem. To address this problem, we design PLM$_M$ in which we show how several users can cooperate to generate such a key. Our solution is based on an MPC similar to the one presented in [18].

Problem Statement 1 (MIFE$_{\ell_1}$ with Multi-Client Support) Let $U = \{u_1, \ldots, u_n\}$ be a set of users. Each user $u_j \in U$ generates a public/private key pair $(pk_j, sk_j)$ for a public-key encryption scheme satisfying the properties defined in definitions 6 and 7, and uses $pk_j$ to encrypt a message $x_j$. Additionally, assume that all generated ciphertexts are outsourced and stored in a remote location operated by an untrusted (i.e. possible malicious) CSP. Furthermore, we assume that an analyst (e.g. a user from $U$) wishes to perform statistics on the data stored on the CSP. Our multi-client construction shows how a legitimate analyst can do this without learning any valuable information about the individual values $x_j$. 
**MPC** Upon request of A, each user \( u_i \in U \) generates a random number \( r_i \) and breaks it into \( n \) shares as \( r_i = r_{i,1} + \cdots + r_{i,n} \). Each share will be sent to a different user from the set \( U = \{u_1, \ldots, u_n\} \). Upon receiving \( n-1 \) different shares, each user \( u_i \) mask her private key \( sk_i \) as \( b_i = sk_i + r_i - \sum_{j=1}^{n} r_{j,i} \), and sends the masked key to A. When A has gathered all the masked keys, she computes \( sk_{\ell_i} \) as \( sk_{\ell_i} = \sum_{i}^{n} b_i \). The MPC is illustrated in algorithm 1.

**Algorithm 1** MPC

1. A generates \( r_i \)
2. A writes \( r_i \) as \( r_i = r_{i,1} + \cdots + r_{i,n} \)
3. for \( j \in [n-1] \)

   4. A sends \( r_{i,j} \) to \( u_j \)

5. for all \( u_j \in U \backslash \{A\} \)

6. \( u_j \) generates \( r_j \)
7. \( u_j \) writes \( r_j \) as \( r_j = r_{j,1} + \cdots + r_{j,n} \)
8. \( u_j \) computes the masked values of the key as \( s_j = sk_j + r_j - \sum_{k=1}^{n} r_{k,i} \)
9. \( u_j \) sends \( s_j \) to \( u_i \)
10. A computes \( \sum_{i}^{n} s_j = \sum_{\ell_i}^{n} sk_j = sk_{\ell_i} \)

It is important to highlight that splitting and distributing the random numbers to the different users, allows the users to work in parallel for the MPC and hence, we overcome the limitations that would emerge by using a ring topology.

We are now ready to describe PLM\(_M\). Our construction consists of two algorithms such that PLM\(_M\) = (Setup, Read). PLM\(_M\) is illustrated in figure 5 and works as follows:

**Setup**: During the Setup, each \( u_i \) generates a public/private key pair \( (pk_i, sk_i) \) for a linear ciphertext and key homomorphic public key encryption scheme PKE. Apart from that, \( u_i \) picks a \( x_i \) that wishes to encrypt. Before the encryption, \( u_i \) samples \( e_i \sim Lap(1/\epsilon) \) and calculates \( x_i' = x_i + e_i \). Finally, \( u_i \) runs \( c_i \leftarrow PKE.Enc(pk_i, x_i') \) and sends \( c_i \) to the CSP. When all users are done, the CSP has received \( n \) distinct ciphertexts.

**Read**: The analyst A first needs to generate the functional key \( sk_{\ell_i} \). To do so, A initiates the MPC described in algorithm 1. As soon as A retrieves the functional key \( sk_{\ell_i} \), she simply forwards it to the CSP. Upon reception, the CSP runs \( Dec(sk_{\ell_i}, c_1, \ldots, c_n) = \sum_{i}^{n} x'_i \) and sends the result to A.

Showing that the PLM\(_M\).Read maintains \( \epsilon \)-differential privacy is trivial as it is a direct result of the fact that the Laplace mechanism maintains differential privacy. In other words, to prove that PLM\(_M\) is \( \epsilon \)-differentially private one needs to prove that the Laplace mechanism is \( \epsilon \)-differential private.

**Theorem 5.** The Read protocol defined in PLM\(_M\).Read is \( \epsilon \)-differential private.

What remains to be done is prove the security of our construction in the presence of an adversary. In particular, we prove the following theorem:
Let \( \text{MIFE}_\ell \) be our construction from Section 5 instantiated with a public key encryption scheme \( PKE \) that satisfies the LCH and LKH properties. Moreover, let \( e_i \sim \text{Lap}(1/\epsilon) \).

**PLM\text{\textsubscript{M}}.\text{Setup}**

For \( i \in [n] \)

- \( u_i \) runs \((pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow (PKE.\text{Gen})\)
- \( u_i \) samples \( e_i \sim \text{Lap}(\frac{1}{\epsilon}) \)
- \( u_i \) computes \( x'_i = x_i + e_i \)
- \( u_i \) runs \( c_i \leftarrow PKE.\text{Enc}(pk_i, x'_i) \)
- \( u_i \) sends \( c_i \) to the CSP

**PLM\text{\textsubscript{M}}.\text{Read}**

- \( A \) initiates the MPC protocol from algorithm 1 and receives \( sk_\ell \)
- \( A \) forwards \( sk_\ell \) to the CSP
- CSP runs \( \text{MIFE}_\ell.\text{Dec}(sk_\ell, c_1, \ldots, c_n) \rightarrow \sum x'_i \)
- CSP sends \( \sum x'_i \) to \( A \)

**Theorem 6.** Let \( \text{ADV} \) be an adversary that corruptions at most \( n - 2 \) users out of those in \( U \). Then, \( \text{ADV} \) cannot infer any information about the secret keys of the legitimate users.

**Proof.** Recall that each user receives \( n - 1 \) shares from the remaining users. Assuming that \( \text{ADV} \) has colluded with \( n - 2 \) users, we conclude that \( \text{ADV} \) will know the \( n \cdot (n - 2) \) shares of the compromised users. Moreover, \( \text{ADV} \) will also know the \( n - 4 \) shares sent from the legitimate users \( u_l \) and \( u_\ell \) to the compromised ones. In other words, \( \text{ADV} \) knows all the exchanged shares except from the ones that \( u_l \) and \( u_\ell \) keep for themselves as well as the ones exchanged between \( u_l \) and \( u_\ell \). More specifically, the shares \( r_{l,1} \) and \( r_{\ell,1} \) are kept with \( u_l \) and \( u_\ell \) respectively, while the shares \( r_{l,1} \) and \( r_{\ell,1} \) are exchanged between \( u_l \) and \( u_\ell \). We notice that:

\[
s_l = (sk_l) + (r_l) - (r_{1,l} + \cdots + r_{l,l} + \cdots + r_{n,l})
\]

(14)

and

\[
s_\ell = (sk_\ell) + (r_\ell) - (r_{1,\ell} + \cdots + r_{l,\ell} + \cdots + r_{n,\ell})
\]

(15)

Where the circled terms are the ones that \( \text{ADV} \) does not know. Equations (14) and (15) can also be written as:

\[
s_l = (sk_l) + \sum_{j \neq l, \ell} (r_{l,j} - r_{j,l}) + (r_{l,\ell} - r_{\ell,l})
\]

(16)
and

\[
st_\ell = (sk_\ell) + \sum_{j \neq \ell, \ell} (r_{\ell, j} - r_{j, \ell}) + (r_{\ell, \ell} - r_{j, \ell})
\] (17)

We see that for \( \text{ADV} \) to find the secret keys \( sk_\ell \) and \( sk_\ell \), she needs to solve a system of two equations with four unknown terms. Hence, we conclude that even in the extreme scenario where \( n-2 \) users are corrupted, \( \text{ADV} \) cannot infer any information about the keys of the legitimate users.

9 Experimental Evaluation

Below, we present the measured processing time of the experiments in our construction. For the implementation of our MIFE scheme, we used ElGamal as the public-key encryption scheme. All experiments were executed on a Lenovo T470p with 2.81 GHz Intel Core i7 and 32GB RAM running Windows 10, 64-bit. The construction was implemented in Python 3.9.4 using the PyCryptoDome and numpy libraries. For the experiments we mainly focused on (1) The Setup time and (2) The generation of functional decryption keys. The results presented are the average processing time computed after 50 runs of each experiment. Our results support our claim that using differential privacy on top of encryption, does not add a noticeable increase to the total processing time.

**Setup phase** This phase consists of (1) Generating and populating a binary tree with plaintext values and (2) Embed noise and encrypt each node of the tree. We used randomly generated datasets of different size consisting of real numbers (100, 500, 1000 and 10000).

- **Tree generation**: The tree was implemented as a list, where each element on the list corresponded to a leaf on the tree. To make our construction compatible with continuous variables, each leaf represented a subinterval in the interval defined by subtracting the min value of the dataset from the max. Hence, the value of each leaf represents the number of values in a specific interval. We measured the time to generate the tree for different datasets and number of nodes. The total number of nodes can be calculated by the number of leaves, since a complete binary tree with \( 2^n \) leaves, consists of a total \( 2^{n+1} - 1 \) nodes. Our experiments were conducted for \( n = 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 \), resulting in binary trees of sizes 63, 127, 255, 511, 1023 and 2047 respectively. This procedure did not add any noticeable burden to the overall processing time, as in the worst case scenario, the tree generation took less than a second. Table 1 gives a more detailed overview.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dataset Size</th>
<th>Number of Leaves</th>
<th>Time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>0.61ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>1.21ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>2.42ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>256</td>
<td>4.38ms</td>
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<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>10.5ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>20ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>32</td>
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<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>3.4s</td>
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<td>128</td>
<td>6.8ms</td>
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<tr>
<td>500</td>
<td>256</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>512</td>
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<td>500</td>
<td>1024</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000</td>
<td>1024</td>
<td>942.9ms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Time Required to Generate and Populate a tree with different number of leaves from various Dataset sizes

![Graph showing running time vs number of leaves/interval for different dataset sizes](image)

Fig. 6: Total Setup Time

- Encryption and Noise: After the tree generation, we had to (1) Add noise to the value of each node, (2) Generate an ElGamal key pair for each node and (3) Encrypt all noised contents. This part of the experiments depended only on the number of nodes and not on the size of the dataset. Embedding Laplacian noise to the tree's nodes was much faster than key generation and encryption. The time
for adding noise varied from 0.16ms for 63 nodes tree to 5.7ms for a 2,047 nodes tree. In contrast, generating 63 and 2,047 ElGamal key pairs of size 1,024bits took 0.28s and 9.14s respectively. Similarly, encrypting 63 and 2,047 was measured at 0.377s and 9.457s respectively. It is important to note that the key generation times were significantly accelerated since all keys were sampled from the same group $G$, using the same generator $g$. Despite this acceleration, as shown in table 2, the key generation and tree node encryption time comprised more than 99% of the total processing time. This is an important result, as it proves that further securing an encrypted dataset with differential privacy does not add significant computational burden. In Figure 6, we see that the overall setup time is $O(n)$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Number of Tree Nodes</th>
<th>Time Required for each Function</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Laplacian Noise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>63</td>
<td>0.16ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>127</td>
<td>0.35ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>255</td>
<td>0.67ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>511</td>
<td>1.4ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1021</td>
<td>2.8ms</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2047</td>
<td>5.7ms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Processing time for all Setup functions for the most demanding dataset.

**Functional Decryption Key Generation.** In this phase of our experiments, we assumed that the analyst performs queries of the form "How many values lie in the interval $I = [a, b]$". To reply to such a query, we must: (1) Find all the subintervals $I_i$ such that $\sum I_i = I$ and retrieve the ciphertext that lies in each interval and (2) Retrieve the private key that corresponds to each interval and compute the functional decryption key. To prove the efficiency of our construction, we assumed the analyst makes a complex query of the form "How many values lie in the first interval and how many values lie in the second interval and ... and how many values lie in the last interval". To answer such a query, all we have to do is retrieve the value from the root of the tree and decrypt it. To capture a, fully unrealistic/worst-case scenario, we measured the time required to answer such a query sequentially, that is we only retrieved values from tree’s sibling leaves, and for each pair of siblings, generated a functional decryption key. The time required to retrieve all the leaf values from a 1,024 leaves tree, was 0.9777s. When we exploited the tree structure to reply to such a query, the required time was imperceptible. Similarly, the required time for generating functional keys was also negligible. For reference, the average time to create a functional decryption key as the sum of 1,000 private keys, was 0.119ms.
10 Conclusion

Achieving competitive advantage in today’s market is largely a function of deploying better and more advanced analytics. Analytics’ expansion is driven by systematic, fully automated data collection and capture of behavioural data from multiple touch points. Companies use this data not only to see the current consumer choices and behaviours but to shape the future ones. However the systems using statistical models to analyze users’ behaviours are incorporating proxies which are often inexact and unfair. As big data is here to stay, and statistical models increasingly will be the tools to rely on, bringing transparency into the game is crucial. A possible solution is to protect users’ personal data from potentially unfair analytics algorithms. Creating schemes capable of performing high accuracy predictions, whilst being unable to learn anything about processed data, would inevitably ensure improved fairness.

References

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