A Unified Framework of Homomorphic Encryption for Multiple Parties with Non-Interactive Setup

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Abstract. Homomorphic Encryption (HE), first constructed in 2009, is a class of encryption schemes that enables computation over encrypted data. Variants of HE in the context of multiple parties have led to the development of two different lines of HE schemes – Multi-Party Homomorphic Encryption (MPHE) and Multi-Key Homomorphic Encryption (MKHE). These primitives cater to different applications and each approach has its own pros and cons. At a high level, MPHE schemes tend to be much more efficient but require the set of computing parties to be fixed throughout the entire operation, frequently a limiting assumption. On the other hand, MKHE schemes tend to have poor scaling (quadratic) with the number of parties but allow us to add new parties to the joint computation anytime since they support computation between ciphertexts under different keys.

In this work, we formalize a new variant of HE called Multi-Group Homomorphic Encryption (MGHE). Stated informally, an MGHE scheme provides a seamless integration between MPHE and MKHE, and combines the best of both these primitives. In an MGHE scheme, a group of parties generates a public key jointly which results in the compact ciphertexts and efficient homomorphic operations, similar to MPHE. However, unlike MPHE, it also supports computations on encrypted data under different keys, a property enjoyed by MKHE schemes.

We provide a concrete construction of such an MGHE scheme from the BFV scheme. The public key generation procedure of our scheme is fully non-interactive so that the set of computing parties does not have to be determined and no information about other parties is needed in advance of individual key generation. At the heart of our construction is a novel refactoring of the relinearization key to avoid interaction as typically needed. We also implement our scheme and demonstrate that the this generalization does not incur any additional overhead and in fact, can be more performant than existing MPHE and MKHE schemes.

1 Introduction

With the rapid growth of the data science industry, it has been a significant issue to effectively utilize a large amount of data. There are challenges for individuals or organizations with limited resources to participate in such a data science. Fortunately, cloud computing technologies offer sharing of resources and outsourcing computation that enable such individuals or organizations to utilize their data. Being stored in plaintext, however, the uploaded data shares a risk of breach by an attacker or a malicious cloud service provider. In order to securely compute and take the advantage of outsourced data, Homomorphic Encryption (HE) came into the spotlight as a cryptographic solution to this conundrum.

HE enables computation over encrypted data without decryption. Thus, it prevents the leakage of private information while evaluating data within an untrusted environment. It requires large resource even when it computes a simple arithmetic operation such as multiplication. Therefore, HE is appropriate in applying on the cloud system which is able to supply large compute resources for evaluation. Private Set Intersection is a representative example of this privacy-preserving cloud service [15, 14]. However, a typical HE only supports computations between data encrypted by the same key. When there are multiple data owners, therefore, it assumes a trusted third party who possesses a key released to each party for encryption. However, this merely transfers the trust problem from the cloud service provider to the new third party and thus does not provide an acceptable solution to this problem.
To resolve the aforementioned problem, a long line of research has explored the idea of using distributed trust in designing HE schemes involving multiple parties. There are two important lines of HE schemes in the context of multiple parties, namely Multi-Party Homomorphic Encryption (MPHE, a.k.a. Threshold HE) and Multi-Key Homomorphic Encryption (MKHE). In MPHE [3, 36, 38], multiple parties work collaboratively to generate a joint public key and the joint secret key is (additively) shared among them. The performance of MPHE is comparable to that of the single-key HE schemes since encryption and homomorphic computation are performed in similar fashion. However, the set of participants should be determined beforehand and fixed in the preparation phase and no other parties can join the computation in the middle. Moreover, the existing MPHE schemes are based on multi-round key generation protocol in which the involved parties should interact with each other to generate a joint evaluation (relinearization) key.

On the other hand, MKHE has a distributed setup phase where each party independently generates its own key pair which does require no information about other participants. The encryption can be done by a single key, and it is possible to perform arithmetic operations on ciphertexts which do not necessarily have to be encrypted under the same key. The main advantage of MKHE is its flexibility: it is not necessary to pre-determine the list of participants or the computational task. From the performance perspective, however, the size of ciphertexts grows with the number of the involved parties as does the complexity of homomorphic operations.

1.1 Our Contributions

Formalization of Multi-Group Homomorphic Encryption (MGHE). In this paper, we propose a generalized variant of HE for multiple parties, called Multi-Group Homomorphic Encryption. An MGHE scheme can be viewed as a generalization of both MPHE and MKHE and enjoys the best of both these primitives. In MGHE, a group of parties collaboratively generates a public key which can be commonly used among the parties for encryption and hence, MGHE behaves like an MPHE scheme in a single group. Moreover, an MGHE scheme can perform an arbitrary computation over encrypted data, regardless of whether the input ciphertexts are encrypted under the same group key or not, a crucial property enjoyed by MKHE schemes. Finally, we state the semantic security for MGHE.

Construction of MGHE. We also present a concrete construction of an MGHE scheme based on the B/FV scheme [7, 23]. First of all, we design an MPHE scheme as a stepping stone to MGHE. To the best of our knowledge, all known MPHE schemes require the users to interact with each other in order to generate a shared key. We present a novel key generation algorithm satisfying the key-homomorphic property where the joint public and evaluation keys for a group of parties can be obtained from independently generated individual keys by simply summing them. As a result, we present the first construction of an MPHE scheme with fully non-interactive setup.

We then extend this MPHE scheme to compile it into a construction for a MGHE scheme. We regard a MPHE ciphertext as a single-key encryption under the joint secret key so that ciphertexts from different groups can be operated in a multi-key manner. Consequently, our MGHE scheme has a hierarchical structure that a ciphertext is decryptable by the joint secret keys of multiple groups each of which is shared among the group members.

Building MPC from MGHE. We build an MPC protocol on top of our MGHE scheme. We show that any polynomial time circuit can be securely computed using a 3-round MPC protocol constructed using our MGHE scheme. We show that the protocol is secure against semi-malicious adversaries in the dishonest majority setting from the semantic security of MGHE.

Implementation of MGHE. We demonstrate that our generalized HE scheme, one that enjoys the benefits of both MPHE and MKHE, does not come at a high concrete efficiency cost. In fact, when coupled with some improvements we make in the ‘multi-key part’, our MGHE scheme is 1.3 to 1.5× faster compared to the state-of-the-art MKHE scheme [12] in homomorphic multiplication.
MGHE

\[ s_{MGHE} = (s_1, s_2, \ldots, s_k) \] where \( s_j = \sum_{i \in I_j} [s_i] \)

\[ ct_{MGHE} = (c_0, \ldots, c_k) \] such that
\[ c_0 + c_1 s_1 + \cdots + c_k s_k \approx \Delta \cdot m \pmod q \]

Fig. 1. A schematic presenting the overall structure of MGHE schemes. Each boxed group of participants acts as an MPHE scheme. The secret keys and ciphertext equations for each group and the entire set of participants (including between groups) are described above.

1.2 Technical Overview

At the heart of our construction lies a non-interactive key generation algorithm. This allows the joint key of a group to be constructed non-interactively from independently generated keys of the group members. The key generation follows a hybrid construction between MPHE (the encryption key aspects) and MKHE (the relinearization mechanisms). We begin by giving a high-level overview of our MPHE construction.

We assume that each party is identified as a unique index \( i \) and let \( I \) be a group of parties. The homomorphic property of LWE makes the summation of public and secret key pairs be a valid key pair. To be precise, an MPHE scheme behaves like a single-key HE scheme where the joint secret key \( s = \sum_{i \in I} [s_i] \) is additively shared among the members of \( I \). We use the Common Random String (CRS) assumption to construct a joint public (encryption) key: given a random polynomial \( a \in \mathbb{R}_q \), each party \( i \in I \) generates \( [b_i] = a \cdot [s_i] + [e_i] \pmod q \) for some error \( [e_i] \). Then the joint public key is obtained as \( b = \sum_{i \in I} [b_i] \approx a \cdot s \pmod q \). However, it is more challenging to generate a joint evaluation key because, roughly speaking, the relinearization key is usually supposed to be an encryption of \( s^2 \) which has quadratic structure with respect to the individual secrets \([s_i]\). In the previous constructions [3, 36], the key generation process involved a multi-round protocol among the parties: the first round for generating a joint public key as described above, and additional rounds for constructing a joint relinearization key from encryptions of \([s_i] \cdot s \) under \( s \) generated by parties \( i \in I \). In our MPHE scheme, we propose a new key generation algorithm which is nearly linear with respect to the secret key. This property enables the parties to generate their public keys \([pk_i]\) independently from individual secrets \([s_i]\), which add up to a valid joint public (encryption and evaluation) key \( jpk = \sum_{i \in I} [pk_i] \) corresponding to the joint secret \( s = \sum_{i \in I} [s_i] \). The technical details of our MPHE construction are described in Section 4.

Finally, to construct our MGHE scheme, we show how the functionality of our MPHE scheme can be extended so that it supports homomorphic computation between ciphertexts under different (joint) secret keys. For example, if we perform homomorphic computation on \( ct_j \)'s which are MPHE ciphertexts encrypted under the joint secret keys \( s_j = \sum_{i \in I_j} [s_i] \) of groups \( I_j \) for \( 1 \leq j \leq k \), then the output is a ‘multi-group’ ciphertext under the secret \((s_1, \ldots, s_k)\). Moreover, no additional interaction or computation
is required among the parties since the same joint public keys of the involved groups can be reused in the relinearization process of multi-group ciphertexts. The technical details of our MGHE construction are described in Section 5.

Thus, our MGHE scheme behaves as if it is an MKHE scheme in which each key is jointly generated by a group of parties (akin to MPHE). This makes MGHE an ideal generalization of both these HE variants and the hierarchical key structure allows an MGHE scheme to take advantage of strengths of both MPHE and MKHE.

1.3 Related Works

We first remark that the terminology for HE-like primitive has not been agreed yet in the literature. We use the terms ‘MPHE’ and ‘MKHE’ to classify the related works.

Asharov et al. [3] designed the first MPHE scheme from BGV [8]. Mouchet et al. [36] proposed a simplified construction from BFV [7, 23] and presented some experimental results. Park [38] recently modified the key generation protocol to reduce the interaction and also suggested a conversion between MPHE and MKHE. To the best of our knowledge, all known MPHE schemes require a multi-round protocol among the parties to generate a shared key pair.

On the other hand, there have been several attempts to construct an MKHE scheme by generalizing single-key HE schemes. López-Alt et al. [32] designed the first MKHE from NTRU [28], and [21, 37, 39] studied multi-key variants of GSW [26]. Then, Brakerski and Perlman [9] presented an LWE-based MKHE [9], followed by Chen et al. [11] who presented a multi-key variant of TFHE [19]. Another line of work [16, 12] studied MKHE schemes from batched HEs such as BGV [8], BFV [7, 23] and CKKS [18]. Our MGHE construction is inspired by [12], but we make an additional CRS assumption to possess the linearity property. Recently, Ananth et al. [2] proposed a general methodology to design an MKHE scheme in the plain model. The construction is done by combining an oblivious transfer protocol and MKHE schemes with limited functionality or trusted setup.

We remark that some MKHE schemes can be converted into MGHE: if the key generation algorithm of an MKHE scheme has the homomorphic property, then we can simply operate on the public keys of multiple parties to build a shared key for the group. For example, multi-key GSW schemes [21, 37, 39] hold the condition since GSW does not require an evaluation key for multiplication.

Aloufi et al. [1] combined MPHE and MKHE to perform computation on ciphertexts under two different keys: a joint key of model owners and the other of a client. This can be viewed as a special case of MGHE in which there are two groups consisting of model owners and a client, respectively. However, its key generation procedure also involves an interactive protocol to obtain a relinearization key.

Bonneh et al. [6] suggested the notion of threshold FHE that has $t$-out-of-$n$ access structure protocol by splitting the secret key into shares. Its key generation is based on a Shamir secret sharing scheme where each party receives a share of the secret key. Badrinarayanan et al. [4] also presented a threshold FHE scheme but in the distributed setting.

2 Background

2.1 Notation

We assume all logarithms are in base two unless otherwise indicated. Vectors are denoted in bold, e.g. $\mathbf{a}$, and matrices in upper-case bold, e.g. $\mathbf{A}$. We denote the inner product of two vectors $\mathbf{u}$, $\mathbf{v}$ as $\langle \mathbf{u}, \mathbf{v} \rangle$. For a finite set $S$, $U(S)$ denotes the uniform distribution over $S$.

Let $n$ be a power of two. We denote by $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$ the ring of integers of the $(2n)$-th cyclotomic field and $R_q = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$ the residue ring of $R$ modulo an integer $q$. An element of $R$ (or $R_q$) is uniquely represented as a polynomial of degree $< n$ with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}$ (or $\mathbb{Z}_q$). We identify $a = \sum_{0 \leq i < n} a_i \cdot X^i \in R$ with the vector of its coefficients $(a_0, \ldots, a_{n-1}) \in \mathbb{Z}^n$. For $\sigma > 0$, we denote by $D_\sigma$ a distribution over $R$ which samples $n$ coefficients independently from the discrete Gaussian distribution of variance $\sigma^2$ and $\chi$ as a key distribution.

For $a, b \in R_q$, we informally write $a \approx b \pmod{q}$ if $b = a + e \pmod{q}$ for some small $e \in R$. 

2.2 Ring Learning with Errors

Given the parameters \((n, q, \chi, \sigma)\), consider the samples of the form \(b_i = s \cdot a_i + e_i \pmod{q}\) for polynomial number of \(i\)'s where \(a_i \sim U(R_q)\) and \(e_i \sim D_q\) for a fixed \(s \sim \chi\). The Ring Learning with Errors (RLWE) assumption states that the RLWE samples \((b_i, a_i)\)'s are computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random elements of \(U(R_q^n)\).

2.3 Gadget Decomposition and External Product

The gadget decomposition is a widely used technique in HE schemes to manage the noise growth of homomorphic operations. For a gadget vector \(g = (g_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^d\) and an integer \(q\), the gadget decomposition is a map \(g^{-1} : R_q \rightarrow R^d\) such that \(a = \langle g^{-1}(a), g \rangle \pmod{q}\) for all \(a \in R_q\). Typical examples are bit decomposition [7, 8], digit decomposition [19], and Residue Number System (RNS) based decompositions [5, 27]. Our implementation is based on an RNS-friendly decomposition for efficiency.

For \(\mu \in R\), we call \(U = (u_0, u_1) \in R_q^{d \times 2}\) a gadget encryption of \(\mu\) under secret \(s\) if \(u_0 + s \cdot u_1 \approx \mu \cdot g \pmod{q}\). Chillotti et al. [19] formalized an operation between RLWE and RGSW ciphertexts and named it the external product. We adopt and generalize this concept as follows: For \(c \in R_q\) and \(v \in R_q^{d}\), we define the external product as \(c \sqcap v := \langle g^{-1}(c), v \rangle \pmod{q}\). We also write \(c \sqcap U = (c \sqcap u_0, c \sqcap u_1)\) for \(U = (u_0, u_1) \in R_q^{d \times 2}\). We note that \((c \sqcap (U, (1, s))) = c \sqcap (u_0 + s \cdot u_1) \approx c \cdot \mu \pmod{q}\) if \(U\) is a gadget encryption of \(\mu\).

The special modulus technique [25] is a well-known technique to reduce the noise growth of homomorphic operations. Although the special modulus technique is applied to the external product in our implementation, we do not describe it in our scheme description for simplicity.

3 Formalizing a Multi-Group Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

In this section, we formally describe what is a Multi-Group Homomorphic Encryption (MGHE) scheme, its correctness and security properties. We also discuss the connection of MGHE schemes with MPHE and MKHE schemes and describe application scenarios that are enabled by MGHE schemes.

3.1 Definition

Let \(\mathcal{M}\) be a plaintext space. An MGHE scheme over \(\mathcal{M}\) is a tuple \(\text{MGHE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Eval})\) of algorithms and multi-party protocols.

- **Setup:** \(pp \leftarrow \text{MGHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d)\). On input the security parameter \(\lambda\) and a depth bound \(d\), the setup algorithm outputs a public parameter set \(pp\).

- **Key Generation Protocol:** \(\text{MGHE.KeyGen}(pp, I)\). Initially the parties in \(I\) hold \(pp\) and run the key-generation protocol. At the end of the protocol, it outputs a public key \(pk\) and each party \(i \in I\) obtains a private share [sk]\. We denote by sk the (implicitly defined) secret key which can be recovered from the shares [sk]\_, \(i \in I\).

- **Encryption:** \(ct \leftarrow \text{MGHE.Enc}(pk; m)\). Given a public key \(pk\) and a message \(m \in \mathcal{M}\), the encryption algorithm outputs a ciphertext \(ct\).

- **Evaluation:** \(ct \leftarrow \text{MGHE.Eval}(pk_1, \ldots, pk_L; C, ct_1, \ldots, ct_L)\). Given input a circuit \(C : \mathcal{M}^L \rightarrow \mathcal{M}\), \(L\) ciphertexts \(ct_1, \ldots, ct_L\), let \(pk_1, \ldots, pk_L\) be the public keys which are associated to at least one input ciphertext. The evaluation algorithm outputs a ciphertext \(ct\). The output ciphertext contains \(L\) references to the associated public keys \(pk_1, \ldots, pk_L\).

- **Decryption:** \(m \leftarrow \text{MGHE.Dec}(sk_1, \ldots, sk_L; ct)\). Given a ciphertext \(ct\) and the associated secret keys \(sk_1, \ldots, sk_L\), the decryption algorithm outputs a message \(m \in \mathcal{M}\).
Note that while the decryption algorithm requires access to all the involved secret keys. However, when building an MPC protocol from MGHE, we can use a distributed decryption protocol which does not reveal the individual secret keys. For our MGHE construction described in Section 5, we also provide such a distributed decryption algorithm. Now we define a new semantic security and correctness of the MGHE primitive.

**Definition 1 (Semantic security).** Let $I_1, I_2, \ldots, I_k$ be sets of parties and let $\mathcal{I} = \bigcup_{1 \leq j \leq k} I_j$. Let $\mathcal{A} \subset \mathcal{I}$ be a set of adversarial parties and $\mathcal{H} = \mathcal{I} \setminus \mathcal{A}$. An MGHE scheme is said to be semantically secure if the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in the following game is negligible for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$.

- **Setup:** The challenger generates a public parameter $pp \leftarrow \text{MGHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d)$.
- **Key Generation:** Adversary plays with an honest challenger the key generation protocols $\text{MGHE.KeyGen}(pp, I_j)$ for all $1 \leq j \leq k$. At the end of the protocol, the adversary gets the secret shares $\{[sk_j]_i : i \in \mathcal{A}, 1 \leq j \leq k\}$ and the challenger receives $\{[sk_j]_i : i \in \mathcal{H}, 1 \leq j \leq k\}$.
- **Challenge:** The adversary chooses messages $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ and an index $j$ such that $I_j \not\subset \mathcal{A}$, and sends them to the challenger. The challenger samples a random bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and sends $\text{MGHE.Enc}(pk_j; m_b)$ back to the adversary.
- **Output:** The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $b'$. The advantage of the adversary is defined as $|\Pr[b = b'] - 1/2|$.

**Definition 2 (Correctness).** An MGHE scheme is said to be correct if the following holds: Let $pp \leftarrow \text{MGHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d)$. Let $pk_1, \ldots, pk_k$ be public keys each of which is generated by parties in $I_1, \ldots, I_k$ and $sk_1, \ldots, sk_k$ the corresponding secret keys, respectively. For any $m_1, \ldots, m_L \in \mathcal{M}$ and indices $1 \leq k_1, \ldots, k_L \leq k$, let $ct_i \leftarrow \text{MGHE.Enc}(pk_{k_i}; m_i)$. For any circuit $C : \mathcal{M}^L \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ of depth $\leq d$, it holds that

$$\text{MGHE.Dec}(sk_1, \ldots, sk_k; \text{MGHE.Eval}(pk_1, \ldots, pk_k; C, ct_1, \ldots, ct_L)) = C(m_1, \ldots, m_L)$$

with an overwhelming probability in $\lambda$.

### 3.2 Connections to MPHE and MKHE Schemes

MPHE and MKHE are different generalizations of HE with distributed authority. Our suggestion, the MGHE primitive, can be considered as a generalization of both primitives. In other words, MPHE and MKHE are specific instantiations of MGHE which are obtained by restricting the number of groups or parties. Recall that an MGHE scheme works on groups of parties, where the evaluation is done within a group in MPHE sense and among groups in MKHE sense. Hence, MGHE over a single group can be viewed as an MPHE scheme, on the other hand, it can also be viewed as an MKHE scheme when each group consists of only one party.

In addition, the semantic security of MGHE is also a natural extension of security definitions of MPHE and MKHE. In the single-group case, there is only one index to be chosen in the challenge phase, so the security game is the same as that of MPHE [31]. On the other hand, if each subset $I_j$ contains only one index, then the encryption is done by a single key which corresponds to the ordinary semantic security of (MK)HE.

From technical aspect, our MGHE construction is not just a combination of the existing MPHE and MKHE schemes but we made a significant improvement in the MPHE part. The existing MPHE schemes had a common limitation that the key generation procedure requires multiple rounds of interaction between the parties due to the quadratic structure of the relinearization key. In our scheme, however, parties only need to publish their own key pairs independently from the groups they belong to. This makes our MGHE scheme achieve the non-interactivity property of the key generation phase and especially come in handy when a party belongs to multiple groups since the same key can be reused to build joint public keys of belonging groups, eventually saving the communication cost proportional to the number of groups. In addition, this property allows us to form the computing groups dynamically on-the-fly by data providers or the cloud without interacting with parties.
3.3 Applications

Our MGHE scheme has three important properties that make it a key enabler for certain application scenarios. In particular, an MGHE scheme is (1) an HE scheme (2) enjoy non-interactivity of the key generation phase and (3) provides efficient computation between ciphertexts encrypted under different keys. Below we describe a few applications that can be enabled by such a scheme.

**Vertical Federated Learning (VFL):** Federated learning [35] is a technique for decentralized machine learning where the data is available in silos with privacy constraints. Vertical federated learning is a sub-category of this field where the various datasets differ in the feature space. For instance, two datasets might share the same set of user (rows) but store different attributes of these users (columns). VFL can further be split into two components, the feature engineering and the training/learning. Examples of the former include private set intersections protocols to securely identify common column identifiers while examples of the latter include traditional training of ML models using FL (once a common feature space is identified). Feature engineering is an important open problem in the field of VFL and designing secure techniques for the same is an important unsolved challenge [30].

The only solutions with cryptographic privacy that exist today rely on HE or MPC [42, 34, 29, 33, 24]. However, each of these approaches have severe practical limitations when considering the above scenario. While traditional HE schemes such as MKHE suffer from huge overheads when datasets need to be adaptively selected, MPC schemes incur the overhead of resharing the features with every group of parties. MGHE schemes can provide a transformative new tool to share features one-time, and adaptively process them making it an ideal technical tool for solving the feature engineering challenge.

**Privacy-preserving Datalake Infrastructure:** Privacy regulations such as GDPR [41] envision a goal that enables users to take control of their data in our increasing digital infrastructure. While such a goal has not been realized, our proposed MGHE scheme can provide a practical solution to the vision.

Let us assume that normal users (individuals) would like to share their data for privacy conscious analytics. However, given the overhead of hosting such databases, it is not feasible to expect each such individual to host their data. One promising approach is to have data hosting services launched by a small number of entities (such as Google, Alibaba, Meta etc.). Thus, each user encrypt and share their data to one of the datasets held by one such entity. Thus, we have datasets $D_{\text{Google}}, \ldots, D_{\text{Meta}}$, which are encrypted under the secret keys of different entities and operated by a dynamic and flexible MKHE scheme. In addition, these entities may wish to distribute the authority to eliminates the risks of a single point of failure. Hence multiple key centers can share the secret key using an MPHE scheme since it is acceptable to use a fixed key access structure in a single entity.

As a result, the use of MGHE here (1) allows for adaptive data selection where an analyst can selectively use or ignore entire datasets as well as parts of datasets (2) allows users to inherently gain control of their data, and (3) enables such a system with low overhead. In this way, MGHE schemes combine the best of both MPHE and MKHE schemes and make for an ideal solution to such a privacy-preserving datalake infrastructure.

4 Construction of MPHE with Non-Interactive Setup

In this section, we present our MPHE scheme which will be extended to an MGHE scheme in the next section. We describe our scheme over the BFV scheme [7, 23].

4.1 Basic Scheme

Our scheme is based on the Common Reference String (CRS) model, i.e., all the involved parties have access to the same random vectors sampled in the setup phase. A parameter set also includes the RLWE dimensions, ciphertext modulus, the key distribution, as well as the error parameter.

- **MPHE.Setup**(1$^\lambda$): Set the RLWE dimension $n$, the plaintext modulus $p$, the ciphertext modulus $q$, the key distribution $\chi$ over $R$, and the error parameter $\sigma$. Sample random vectors $a, u \leftarrow U(R_d^q)$ and
choose a gadget decomposition \( h : R_Q \rightarrow R^d \) with a gadget vector \( g \in R^d_Q \). Return the parameter set \( \text{pp} = (n, p, q, \chi, \sigma, a, u, h, g) \). We write \( \Delta = \lceil q/p \rceil \).

The key generation procedure consists of two steps; each party first generates (locally) a key pair and publishes the public key, and then the joint public key of a group of parties is built from the collection of public keys from the associated parties. The most distinguishing feature of our scheme is that it is fully non-interactive. The generation of the individual keys can be done locally without knowing any information about other parties, and building a joint public key can be done publicly with no interaction with the involved parties.

- **MPHE.IndKeyGen(i):** Each party \( i \) samples \([s], [r]_i \leftarrow \chi \) and \([e_0], [e_1], [e_2]_i \leftarrow D_{\sigma}^d \). Set \([b]_i = -[s]_i \cdot a + [e_0]_i (\text{mod } q), [d]_i = [r]_i \cdot a + [s]_i \cdot g + [e_1]_i (\text{mod } q)\) and \([v]_i = -[s]_i \cdot u - [r]_i \cdot g + [e_2]_i (\text{mod } q)\). Return the secret key \([\text{sk}]_i = [s]_i\) and the public key \([\text{pk}]_i = ([b]_i, [d]_i, [v]_i)\).

- **MPHE.JoinKeyGen(\{[pk]_i : i \in I\}):** Let \( I \) be a group of parties. Given a set of public keys \([\text{pk}]_i\) of parties \( i \in I \), return the joint public key \( [\text{pk}] = ([b], [d], [v]) \in \mathbb{R}^{d} \times \mathbb{R}^{d} \times \mathbb{R}^{d} \) where \( b = \sum_{i \in I} [b]_i, d = \sum_{i \in I} [d]_i \) and \( v = \sum_{i \in I} [v]_i \). We denote the joint encryption key as \( \text{jk} = ([b][0], [d][0]) \in \mathbb{R}^{d} \).

Each component of the public key \([\text{pk}]_i\) forms a gadget encryption with a CRS under the secrets \([s]_i\) or \([r]_i\). We call \( s = \sum_{i \in I} [s]_i \) the (implicitly defined) joint secret key of the group \( I \) of parties. The individual secrets \([s]_i\) of parties \( i \in I \) can be viewed as additive shares of \( s \). Note that the public key \([\text{pk}]_i\) is *nearly linear* with respect to \([s]_i\) and \([r]_i\), so that the joint public key \( [\text{pk}] = ([b], [d], [v]) \) satisfies the same properties as the individual keys:

\[
\begin{align*}
b & \approx -s \cdot a \quad (\text{mod } q) \\
d & \approx -r \cdot a + s \cdot g \quad (\text{mod } q) \\
v & \approx -s \cdot u - r \cdot g \quad (\text{mod } q)
\end{align*}
\]

Note that the encryption key \( \text{jk} \) can be viewed as an RLWE instance with secret \( s \). The usual BFV encryption and decryption algorithms are used in our scheme as follows.

- **MPHE.Enc(jk; m):** Given a message \( m \in \mathbb{R}_p \), sample \( t \leftarrow \chi \) and \( e_0, e_1 \leftarrow D_{\sigma} \). Return the ciphertext \( \text{ct} = t \cdot \text{jk} + (\Delta \cdot m + e_0, e_1) \) (mod \( q \)).

- **MPHE.Dec(sk; ct):** Given a ciphertext \( \text{ct} = (e_0, e_1) \) and a secret key \( \text{sk} = s \), output \( m = \lceil (p/q) \cdot (e_0 + e_1 \cdot s) \rceil \) (mod \( p \)).

We provide a high-level sketch of the correctness proof. We refer the reader to Appendix B for details about the noise analysis.

**Correctness and security.** Our encryption algorithm returns a valid BFV ciphertext under the secret \( s \). The only difference is that our encryption key has a larger noise variance depending on the number of parties which also affects the final encryption noise.

In Section 5.1, we will extend our MPHE scheme to MGHE. As discussed earlier, the semantic security of MPHE is directly derived from that of MGHE which we will show later.

**Distributed decryption protocol.** Ideally, an MPHE ciphertext is decryptable by the joint secret key \( s \), however, the basic decryption algorithm is not generally useful in practice since the joint secret is shared between the parties in \( I \). On the other hand, the parties can perform a simple multi-party protocol to decrypt an MPHE ciphertext in a distributed manner.

As an example, we present a well-known method based on the noise flooding technique [3, 36]. In this protocol, each party \( i \in I \) partially decrypts the input ciphertext using \([s]_i\), and publishes its approximate value by adding auxiliary noise, then the plaintext can be recovered from the sum of partial decryptions.

- **MPHE.DistDec(\{[sk]_i : i \in I\), \( \sigma \); ct):** Let \( \text{ct} = (e_0, e_1) \) be a multi-party ciphertext, \( \sigma > 0 \) an error parameter, and \([s]_i = [s]_i\) the secret key of party \( i \in I \). The distributed decryption protocol consists of the following procedures:
  - Partial decryption: Each party \( i \in I \) samples \([e']_i \leftarrow D_{\sigma'}\), then computes and publishes \([\mu]_i = c_1 \cdot [s]_i + [e']_i \) (mod \( q \)).
  - Merge: Compute \( \mu = c_0 + \sum_{i \in I} [s]_i \) (mod \( q \)) and return \( m = \lceil (p/q) \cdot \mu \rceil \).


Algorithm 1 Relinearization procedure of MPHE

Input: \(\jpk = (b, d, v)\), \(\ct_{\text{mul}} = (c''_0, c''_1, c''_2)\)

Output: \(\ct_{\text{relin}} = (c'_0, c'_1) \in R^2_q\)

1. \(c'_2 \leftarrow c''_2 \sqcap b\)
2. \((c'_0, c'_1) \leftarrow (c'_0 + c''_2 \sqcap d) + c'_2 \sqcap (v, u) \pmod{q}\)

4.2 Arithmetic Operations

In the following, we present homomorphic addition and multiplication algorithms. The major difference between our scheme and the standard BFV scheme is in their multiplication algorithms: our relinearization algorithm is more expensive due to the linear structure of a joint public key, but it provides the same functionality as shown below.

- **MPHE.Add(\(\ct, \ct'\))**: Given two ciphertexts \(\ct, \ct' \in R^2_q\), output \(\ct_{\text{add}} = \ct + \ct' \pmod{q}\).

- **MPHE.Mult(\(\jpk; \ct, \ct'\))**: Given two ciphertexts \(\ct = (c_0, c_1), \ct' = (c'_0, c'_1)\) and a joint public key \(\jpk\), let \(\ct_{\text{mul}} = (c''_0, c''_1, c''_2)\) where \(c''_0 = [(p/q) \cdot (c_0c'_0)] \pmod{q}\), \(c''_1 = [(p/q) \cdot (c_0c'_1 + c_1c'_0)] \pmod{q}\) and \(c''_2 = [(p/q) \cdot (c_1c'_1)] \pmod{q}\). Return the ciphertext \(\ct_{\text{relin}} \leftarrow \text{MPHE.Relin}(\jpk; \ct_{\text{mul}})\) where \(\text{MPHE.Relin}(\cdot; \cdot)\) is the relinearization procedure described in Alg. 1.

Correctness of homomorphic multiplication. Let \(\{s\}_i, \{r\}_i\) be the polynomials sampled from \(\chi\) during the generation of a key pair \(\{\sk\}_i = \{s\}_i\) and \(\{\jpk\}_i = ([b], [d], [v])\) of the \(i\)-th party and let \(s = \sum_{i \in I} [s]_i\), and \(r = \sum_{i \in I} [r]_i\). First of all, we remark that the first step of homomorphic multiplication computing \(\ct_{\text{mul}}\) is identical to the usual BFV scheme. If \(\ct\) and \(\ct'\) are valid BFV encryptions of \(m\) and \(m'\), respectively, then \(\ct_{\text{mul}} = (c'_0, c'_1, c'_2)\) is an encryption of \(mm'\) under \((1, s, s^2)\), that is, \(c'_0 + c'_1 \cdot s + c'_2 \cdot s^2 \approx m \cdot mm' \pmod{q}\).

Now suppose that \((c'_0, c'_1) \leftarrow \text{MPHE.Relin}(\jpk; (c''_0, c''_1, c''_2))\) is the output of our relinearization algorithm. We claim that \(c'_0 + c'_1 \cdot s = \sum_{i \in I} [s]_i\) and \(v + s \cdot u \approx m \cdot mm' \pmod{q}\). Recall that the joint public key satisfies \(b + s \cdot a \approx 0 \pmod{q}\), \(d + r \cdot a \approx s \cdot g \pmod{q}\) and \(v + s \cdot u \approx m \cdot mm' \pmod{q}\). Then, the polynomials \(\{s\}_i\) and \(\{r\}_i\) of the \(i\)-th party are sampled from \(\chi\) and \(\{s\}_i\) and \(\{r\}_i\) of the \(i\)-th party are sampled from \(\chi\).

\[
\begin{align*}
c'_0 + c'_1 \cdot s &= c'_0 + c'_1 \cdot s + (c''_2 \sqcap d) \cdot s + c'_2 \sqcap (v + s \cdot u) \\
&\approx c'_0 + c'_1 \cdot s + c''_2 \sqcap (-rs \cdot a + s^2 \cdot g) - c'_2 \sqcap (r \cdot g) \\
&\approx c''_0 + c''_1 \cdot s + r \cdot (c''_2 \sqcap b) + c''_2 \cdot s^2 - r \cdot c'_2 \\
&\approx c'_0 + c'_1 \cdot s + c''_2 \cdot s^2 
\end{align*}
\]

as desired.

4.3 Homomorphic Automorphism

The packing technique of the BFV scheme enables us to encode multiple values in a finite field into a single plaintext polynomial for better efficiency [8]. The (un)packing algorithm has a similar algebraic structure with the canonical embedding map over the cyclotomic field \(K = \mathbb{Q}[X]/(X^n + 1)\), and the automorphisms in the Galois group \(\text{Gal}(K/Q)\) provide special functionality on the plaintext slots such as rotation. In the single-key setting, the homomorphic evaluation of an automorphism can be done by taking the automorphism on input ciphertext and then performing the key-switching procedure.

We present a multi-party variant of homomorphic automorphism such that the joint automorphism key is generated non-interactively. The following setup and automorphism key generation procedures can be added to the basic scheme to support homomorphic evaluation of an automorphism \(\psi\). We note that it is required to sample an additional CRS and include it in the public parameter.

- **MPHE.Setup(1\(^3\))**: Sample a random vector \(k \leftarrow U(R^d_q)\) and put it into the parameter set \(\text{pp}\).

- **MPHE.IndAutKeyGen([s]_i)**: Let \([s]_i\) be the secret key of party \(i\). Sample \([e]_i \leftarrow D^d_q\) and compute \([h]_i = -[s]_i \cdot k + \psi([s]_i) \cdot g + [e]_i \pmod{q}\). Return the automorphism key \([ak]_i = [h]_i \in R^d_q\).
• **MPHE.JointAutKeyGen([ak]_i : i ∈ I)**: Given a set of automorphism keys of parties i ∈ I, return the joint automorphism key \( jak = h \in R_q^*_d \) where \( h = \sum_{i \in I} [h]_i \) (mod q).

The automorphism key generation algorithm is also nearly linear with respect to the secret \([s]_i\). Hence the joint automorphism key, together with CRS \( k \), forms a gadget encryption of \( \psi(s) \) under the secret \( s \) which can be used as a key-switching key from \( \psi(s) \) to \( s \) for the usual automorphism evaluation algorithm as follows.

• **MPHE.EvalAuto(jak; ct)**: Given a ciphertext \( ct = (c_0, c_1) \) and the joint automorphism key \( jak = h \), compute and return the ciphertext \( ct_{\text{aut}} = (\psi(c_0), 0) + \psi(c_1) [\psi(h) \square (h, k)] \) (mod q).

**Correctness and security of homomorphic automorphism.** Let \( ct_{\text{aut}} = (c'_0, c'_1) \leftarrow \text{EvalAuto}(jak; ct) \) for a ciphertext \( ct = (c_0, c_1) \). As mentioned above, the joint automorphism key \( jak = h \) satisfies that \( h + s \cdot k \approx \psi(s) \cdot g \) (mod q). Therefore, we have

\[
\begin{align*}
c'_0 + c'_1 \cdot s &= \psi(c_0) + \psi(c_1) [\psi(h) + s \cdot k] \quad \text{(mod q)} \\
&\approx \psi(c_0) + \psi(c_1) \cdot \psi(s) \quad \text{(mod q)} \\
&= \psi(c_0 + c_1 \cdot s) \quad \text{(mod q)}
\end{align*}
\]

The security proof of the MPHE automorphism can be derived from the security proof of the automorphism in the MGHE scheme.

## 5 Extension to MGHE

In this section, we design an MGHE scheme by improving the functionality of our MPHE scheme. Recall that, in the MPHE setting, we can perform computations on encrypted data only if input ciphertexts are encrypted under the same joint key, but MGHE supports homomorphic operations between multi-party ciphertexts which do not necessarily have to be encrypted under the same key.

### 5.1 Scheme description

As we shall see, the setup, key generation, and encryption procedures happen to be identical to our MPHE scheme and thus is non-interactive. However, it also supports homomorphic operations between ciphertexts under different keys, and the dimension of ciphertext dimension may increase as the homomorphic computation progresses when we add or multiply two multi-group ciphertexts corresponding to different sets of groups.

• **MGHE.Setup(\( \lambda \))**: Run **MPHE.Setup(\( \lambda \))** and return the public parameter \( pp = (n, p, q, \chi, \sigma, a, u, h, g) \). If necessary, sample additional \( k \leftarrow U(R_q^*_d) \) for homomorphic automorphism and incorporate it into the parameter set.

• **MGHE.IndKeyGen(\( i \))**: Each party \( i \) runs **MPHE.IndKeyGen(\( i \))** and outputs secret and public keys \( [sk]_i = [s]_i \) and \( [pk]_i = ([b]_i, [d]_i, [v]_i) \), respectively.

• **MGHE.IndAutKeyGen([s]_i)**: The automorphism key can be generated if a CRS \( k \) is included in \( pp \). Given the secret key \( [s]_i \) of party \( i \), run **MPHE.IndAutKeyGen([s]_i)** and output the automorphism key \( [h]_i = [ak]_i \).

Note that both **IndKeyGen(\( i \))** and **IndAutKeyGen([s]_i)** are non-interactive and thus do not require any knowledge of groups or other parties involved.

• **MGHE.JointKeyGen([pk]_i : i ∈ I)**: Given a set of public keys of \( i \in I \), output the joint public key \( jpk = (b, d, v) \leftarrow \text{MPHE.JointKeyGen([pk]_i : i ∈ I)} \). We write the joint encryption key as \( jek = (b[0], a[0]) \).

• **MGHE.JointAutKeyGen([ak]_i : i ∈ I)**: Given a set of automorphism keys of \( i \in I \), output the joint automorphism key \( jak = h \leftarrow \text{MPHE.JointAutKeyGen([ak]_i : i ∈ I)} \).

• **MGHE.Enc(jek; m)**: Given a joint encryption key \( jek \) and a message \( m \), return \( ct \leftarrow \text{MPHE.Enc(jek; m)} \).
Algorithm 2 Re-linearization procedure of MGHE

Input: $\mathcal{ct}_{\text{mul}} = (c_{i,j})_{0 \leq i,j \leq k}$, $\text{jpk}_j = (b_j, d_j, v_j)$ for $1 \leq j \leq k$.

Output: $\mathcal{ct}_{\text{relin}} = (c'_{i,j})_{0 \leq i,j \leq k} \in R^{k+1}_q$.

1: $c'_{0,0} \leftarrow c_{0,0}$
2: for $1 \leq j \leq k$ do
3: $c'_{j,j} \leftarrow c_{0,j} + c_{j,0} \pmod{q}$
4: end for
5: for $1 \leq j \leq k$ do
6: $c'_{j} \leftarrow c'_{j,j} + \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} c_{i,j} \otimes d_i \pmod{q}$
7: end for
8: for $1 \leq i < k$ do
9: $c'_{i} \leftarrow \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} c_{i,j} \otimes b_j$
10: $(c'_{i}, c'_{j}) \leftarrow (c'_{i,j} + c_{i,j} \otimes (v_i, u) \pmod{q})$
11: end for

As we discussed in Section 3, an MGHE ciphertext holds the references to the associated public keys. In our scheme, each ciphertext stores an ordered set of the involved groups. For example, a fresh ciphertext encrypted by a joint public key $\text{jpk} = \sum_{i \in I}[pk_i]$ is linked to the set containing a single element $I$.

More generally, a multi-group encryption of $m$ corresponding an ordered set of $k$ groups $\{I_1, \ldots, I_k\}$ is an $(k+1)$ tuple $\mathcal{ct} = (c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_k) \in R^{k+1}_q$ satisfying $c_0 + c_1 \cdot s_1 + \cdots + c_k \cdot s_k = \Delta \cdot m + e \pmod{q}$ for some error $e$ where $s_j = \sum_{i \in I_j} s_i$ is the joint secret key of $I_j$ for $1 \leq j \leq k$.

Homomorphic operations include a pre-processing step which aligns the components of input ciphertexts as follows. For given two multi-group ciphertexts, we consider the corresponding ordered sets and compute their joint public keys $\text{jpk}_j = (b_j, d_j, v_j) \in I_1 \cup \cdots \cup I_k$. Then, we extend the input ciphertexts by padding some zeros and rearranging their components so that both ciphertexts are decryptable with respect to the same secret $\mathcal{ct} = (c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ where $s_j$ is the joint secret of group $I_j$, $1 \leq j \leq k$. We assume that this pre-processing is always performed on the input ciphertext and the output ciphertext is linked to the union $\{I_1, \ldots, I_k\}$ of ordered sets even if it is not explicitly mentioned in the algorithm description.

- **MGHE.Add($\mathcal{ct}, \mathcal{ct}'$):** Given two ciphertexts $\mathcal{ct}$ and $\mathcal{ct}'$, return the ciphertext $\mathcal{ct}_{\text{add}} = \mathcal{ct} + \mathcal{ct}' \pmod{q}$.

- **MGHE.Mult($\text{jpk}_1, \ldots, \text{jpk}_k; \mathcal{ct}, \mathcal{ct}'$):** Given two multi-group ciphertexts $\mathcal{ct} = (c_0, \ldots, c_k)$ and $\mathcal{ct}' = (c_0', \ldots, c_k')$ and $k$ joint public keys $\text{jpk}_1, \ldots, \text{jpk}_k$, compute $\mathcal{ct}_{\text{mul}} = (c_{i,j})_{0 \leq i,j \leq k}$ where $c_{i,j} = [(p/q) \cdot c_{i,j}] \pmod{q}$ for $0 \leq i, j \leq k$. Return the ciphertext $\mathcal{ct}_{\text{relin}} \leftarrow \text{MGHE.ReLin}(\text{jpk}_1, \ldots, \text{jpk}_k; \mathcal{ct}_{\text{mul}})$ where $\text{MGHE.ReLin}(\cdot)$ is the re-linearization procedure described in Alg. 2.

The idea of homomorphic automorphism for MPHE can be also extended to the multi-group case. Given a multi-group ciphertext $\mathcal{ct} = (c_0, \ldots, c_k)$ linked to $k$ groups $I_1, \ldots, I_k$, the joint automorphism key of $I_j$ is used to perform the key-switching procedure of the $j$-th entry $\psi(c_j)$ during the homomorphic evaluation of $\psi \in \mathcal{G}_{\text{al}}(K/Q)$.

- **MGHE.EvalAuto($\text{jak}_1, \ldots, \text{jak}_k; \mathcal{ct}$):** Given a ciphertext $\mathcal{ct} = (c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ and the joint automorphism keys $\text{jak}_1, \ldots, \text{jak}_k$, compute $\mathcal{ct}_{\text{aut}} = (c'_0, c'_1, \ldots, c'_k)$ where $c'_0 = \psi(c_0) + \psi(c_j) \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} (\psi(c_i) \otimes h_j)$ (mod $q$) and $c'_j = \psi(c_j) \otimes k$ (mod $q$) for $1 \leq j \leq k$.

Finally, we present a basic (ideal) decryption algorithm and a distributed decryption protocol. For given a ciphertext $\mathcal{ct} = (c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ which is linked to $k$ groups $I_1, \ldots, I_k$, the basic algorithm takes as input the joint secret keys $s_i$ of the associated groups $I_i$ and recovers the plaintext message while the distributed decryption protocol lets the parties in $\bigcup_{1 \leq j \leq k} I_j$ perform the same computation securely in a distributed manner.

- **MGHE.Dec($\text{sk}_1, \ldots, \text{sk}_k; \mathcal{ct}$):** Given a ciphertext $\mathcal{ct} = (c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_k)$ and joint secret keys $\text{sk}_j = s_j$ for $1 \leq j \leq k$, return $m = [(p/q) \cdot (c_0 + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} c_j \cdot s_j)]$ (mod $p$).
• MGHE.DistDec(∪_{1≤j≤k}I_j, σ'; \vec{c})}: Let \( \vec{c} = (c_0, \ldots, c_k) \) be a multi-group ciphertext corresponding to an ordered set of groups \( (I_1, \ldots, I_k) \).

- Partial decryption: Let \( \mathcal{I} = ∪_{1≤j≤k}I_j \). Each party \( i \in \mathcal{I} \) samples \( [e'_i] \leftarrow D_{σ'} \), then broadcasts
  \[ [μ_i] = \left( ∑_{1≤i≤k, i∈I_j} [c_j] \cdot [s_i] + [e'_i], \right. \mod q) \).
- Merge: Compute \( m = \left( (p/q) \cdot (c_0 + ∑_{i∈I}[μ_i]) \right) \mod p). \]

We remark that the relinearization algorithm can be shared between our MGHE scheme and [12] since they have the same ciphertext structure. Our relinearization algorithm is an improvement of the previous method which reduces the number of external products by almost a factor of 2. More formally, the prior algorithm computes lines 8-11 of Alg. 2 by repeating the following computation iteratively over \( 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k \):

\[
(c'_0, c'_i) \leftarrow (c_0', c_i') + (c_{i,j} ⊙ b_j) \Box (v_i, u) \mod q).
\]

We observe that \( ∑_{1≤j≤k} c_{i,j} ⊙ b_j \) is pre-computable and reusable for the relinearization of multiple ciphertext components. This idea consequently reduces the number of external products down to \( 2k^2 + 2k \) in total, compared to the former method which requires \( 4k^2 \) external products.

**Security.** We prove that our MGHE scheme is semantically secure under the RLWE assumption with parameter \((n, q, χ, σ)\). Let \( I_i \) be sets such that \( \mathcal{I} = ∪_{0≤i≤k} I_i \) and \( \mathcal{A} \subset \mathcal{I} \) be the set of adversarial parties. We also denote by \( \mathcal{H} = \mathcal{I} \setminus \mathcal{A} \) the set of honest parties. We define some hybrid games as follows:

- **Game 0:** This is a real world execution of the security game defined in Section 3.1.
- **Game 1:** It is similar to **Game 0**, but the challenger samples \( [pk]_i \) uniformly at random from \( R_q^{d×3} \) for \( i \in \mathcal{H} \).
- **Game 2:** It is similar to **Game 1**, but the challenger encrypts 0 instead of \( m_b \).

For \( i \in \mathcal{H} \), the public key \( [pk]_i = ([b]_i, [d]_i, [v]_i) \) follows the RLWE distribution of secret \( [s]_i \). Therefore, \( [b]_i \) is indistinguishable from a uniform distribution over \( R_q^d \). Meanwhile, \( ([d]_i, [v]_i) \) can be viewed as a ‘chain’ of two gadget encryptions of \( [s]_i \) and \( [r]_i \), under secrets \( [r]_i \) and \( [s]_i \). Here we make an additional circular security assumption that our scheme still remains secure even if \( [d]_i \) and \( [v]_i \) are public. Therefore, **Game 0** and **Game 1** are computationally indistinguishable.

The only difference between **Game 1** and **Game 2** is the message to be encrypted. In **Game 1**, the challenger gives an encryption of \( m_b \), while it is an encryption of 0 in **Game 2**. Let \( j \) be a group index that adversary sends to the challenger in the security game. In both games, the encryption key \( b[0] = ∑_{i∈I_j∩\mathcal{A}}[b]_i[0] + ∑_{i∈I_j∩\mathcal{H}}[b]_i[0] \) is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform random variable over \( R_q^d \) since \( I_j \setminus \mathcal{H} \) is non-empty and each \( [b]_i \) is sampled uniformly from \( R_q^d \) for all \( i \in \mathcal{H} \). Therefore, under the RLWE assumption, encryptions of 0 and \( m_b \) are also computationally indistinguishable. Thus, a difference of advantage between these two games is negligible.

According to the aforementioned reasons, we can conclude that the advantage of the adversary in **Game 0** is negligible. Since **Game 0** is a real world-execution game with the MGHE scheme, our MGHE scheme achieves the semantic security against a semi-malicious corruptions. The security of homomorphic automorphism relies on the same assumption as the basic scheme of MGHE. It also requires additional security assumption similar to the standard BFV scheme.

**Correctness.** The correctness of the encryption algorithm is obvious so we focus on the homomorphic multiplication (relinearization) and automorphism algorithms of our MGHE scheme.

Suppose that \( \vec{c} \) and \( \vec{d} \) are encryptions of \( m \) and \( m' \) under secret \( \vec{s} = (s_1, \ldots, s_k) \), respectively, and let \( c_{\text{mul}} = (c_{i,j})_{0≤i,j≤k} = \left( (p/q) \cdot \vec{c} ⊗ \vec{d} \right) \mod q). \) Then, we have \( \langle \vec{c}_{\text{mul}}, (1, \vec{s}) \otimes (1, \vec{s}) \rangle \approx Δ \cdot m'm' \) (mod q). We claim that if \( \vec{c}_{\text{relin}} \leftarrow \text{MGHE.ReLin}([vpk]_{1≤j≤k}; \vec{c}_{\text{mul}}) \), then the output ciphertext \( \vec{c}_{\text{relin}} = (c_0', \ldots, c_k') \) satisfies \( c_0' + ∑_{1≤j≤k} c_j' \cdot s_j \approx ∑_{0≤i,j≤k} c_{i,j} \cdot s_i s_j \) and thereby is a valid encryption of \( mm' \).
First, we have
\[ c_0' + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} c_j' \cdot s_j = c_{0,0} + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} (c_{0,j} + c_{j,0}) \cdot s_j + \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} (c_{i,j} \boxtimes d_i) \cdot s_j + \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} c_i'' \boxtimes (v_i + s_i \cdot u) \]

where \( c_i'' = \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} c_{i,j} \square b_j \) from the definition of Alg. 2.

We also consider the properties \( s_j \cdot d_i \approx -r_i \cdot s_j \cdot a + s_i \cdot s_j \cdot g \pmod q \) and \( v_i + s_i \cdot u \approx -r_i \cdot g \pmod q \) of the joint public keys and deduce the following equations:
\[
\sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} (c_{i,j} \square d_i) \cdot s_j \approx \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} r_i \cdot (c_{i,j} \square b_j) + \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} c_{i,j} \cdot s_i s_j \pmod q,
\]
\[
\sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} c_i'' \square (v_i + s_i \cdot u) \approx - \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} r_i \cdot c_i'' = - \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} r_i \cdot (c_{i,j} \square b_j) \pmod q.
\]

Putting them all together, we obtain
\[ c_0' + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} c_j' \cdot s_j \approx c_{0,0} + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} (c_{0,j} + c_{j,0}) \cdot s_j + \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} c_{i,j} \cdot s_i s_j \pmod q \]

which completes the correctness proof of the relinearization algorithm.

Finally, we show the correctness of the multi-group homomorphic automorphism algorithm:
\[ c_0' + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} c_j' \cdot s_j = \psi(c_0) + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} \psi(c_j) \square (h_j + s_j \cdot k) \pmod q \]
\[ \approx \psi(c_0) + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} \psi(c_j) \cdot \psi(s_j) \pmod q \]
\[ = \psi(c_0) + \sum_{1 \leq j \leq k} c_j \cdot s_j \pmod q \]

where \( \overline{\alpha} = (c_0, \ldots, c_k) \) and \( \overline{\alpha}_{\text{aut}} = (c_0', \ldots, c_k') \leftarrow \text{MGHE.EvalAuto}(h_1, \ldots, h_k; \overline{\alpha}). \)

### 5.2 Other Issues

**Applying to other HE schemes.** We built an MGHE scheme from the BFV scheme, but our idea is easily applicable to design multi-group variants of other HE schemes such as BGV [8] and CKKS [18]. In particular, we implement MGHE schemes from both BFV and CKKS and present experimental results in the next section. We provide a formal description of multi-group CKKS in Appendix A.

**Bootstrapping.** For a fixed parameter set, the BFV and CKKS schemes can support the evaluation of circuits with a limited depth due to the reduction of ciphertext modulus or the noise growth induced from homomorphic operations. Bootstrapping is a method to refresh a ciphertext and recover its computational capability. From the technical point of view, bootstrapping is done by homomorphically evaluating the decryption circuit of HE.

The known bootstrapping methods of BFV or CKKS (e.g. [13, 17, 10]) share the same workflow consisting of arithmetic operations and linear transformations which can be also represented by basic operations and homomorphic automorphisms. As these basic operations (multiplication, rotation) are supported in our MGHE schemes, the bootstrapping procedure can be also performed in a similar manner.

### 6 Constructing MPC from MGHE

MGHE being a generalization of both the MKHE and MPHE primitives, it can be used as a drop-in replacement for these primitives in any application build using these. Thus, MGHE can be used for general 2-round MPC computation [37], for outsourced computation applications [36], and in distributed machine learning set-ups [22]. Similarly, it can be used as a building block in MPC protocols that require a varying number of parties [20].
6.1 Overview

Either MPHE or MKHE can be used to build an MPC protocol [32, 36, 37], but each has its own limitations that constrain the set of applications where these techniques are useful. For example, MPHE-based MPC protocols require the parties to communicate each other to generate a shared key. On the other hand, MKHE schemes are more expensive than MPHE in terms of time and space complexity since ciphertexts expand as they interact with other ciphertexts under different keys. Thus, an MGHE scheme, that integrates the strengths of both these schemes can be used to construct round-efficient MPC protocols. Below we describe the structure of a 3-round MPC computation.

- **Round I:** As the first step of the protocol, all parties in every group together instantiate the MGHE scheme. They determine cryptographic public parameter set, generate their own key pair, and broadcast the public key. We can treat this step as an offline phase since all of these procedures has to be run only once and each party is able to run this step independently.

- **Round II:** In the next step, a joint public key, encryption key, and automorphism key are generated publicly by summing up the individual public keys without any interaction between the parties. After encrypting inputs with the joint encryption key, the ciphertexts are provided to a computing party which may be an external entity such as a cloud service provider. In general, semi-honest cloud service provider or parties themselves in MPC may assume the role of computing party.

- **Round III:** Now, the circuit is evaluated using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme and thus does not require any interaction. When the evaluation is over, we use an interactive protocol known as distributed decryption to securely decrypt the result without revealing the secret keys of each party. In the protocol, each party partially decrypts the ciphertext using their own secret keys with noise smudging technique [3], and the output message is obtained by adding all of the partially decrypted results.

**Implication of Non-interactive Key Generation.** Recall that the previous MPHE yields multi-round key generation due to the quadratic structure of the relinearization key with respect to the individual secret keys. In the MPC protocol derived from the previous MPHE, each party broadcasts twice for the key generation: individual encryption key to generate the joint encryption key and individual relinearization key, which is constructed using the joint encryption key, to generate the joint relinearization key. In our scheme, the novel refactoring of the relinearization key enables the parties to broadcast their keys only once. Each party broadcasts the individual public key, which implicitly contains both shares of encryption key and relinearization key. Then, the joint public key is generated publicly to be used for encryption and evaluation. By sharing the individual key pair in the first round itself, each party does not require interaction with the other parties in the rest of the process (and can be offline until the decryption process).

6.2 MPC Protocol Secure Against Semi-Malicious Corruptions

We provide a concrete MPC protocol in Figure 2 for any polynomial-time deterministic circuit $C$. The correctness of the protocol follows from the correctness of the MGHE construction and in this section we prove it’s security against a semi-malicious adversary. Note that a semi-malicious adversary follows the honest protocol specification with arbitrary values for their random coins [3, 37, 32].

To prove security under a dishonest majority model, we want show that our MPC protocol is secure against $N - 1$ corruptions where $N$ is the number of parties. Let a party $h$ be the only honest party, and $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary with $N - 1$ corrupted parties. For the proof, we generate a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ against the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ as follows.

**The Simulator.** In Round I, the simulator samples the public key of $h$ from uniform distribution over $R_q^{d \times 3}$ instead of MGHE.IndKeyGen($h$). The simulator also plays Round II honestly on behalf of the honest party, but encrypts 0 instead of the real input from $h$, if any. Note that the simulator has access to the inputs and secret keys of all parties except $h$ from the witness tape. Therefore, the simulator can evaluate the circuit $C$ on ciphertexts $ct_1, \ldots, ct_L$ and obtain the resulting ciphertext $\overline{ct}$. In addition, it also
Let $C : \mathcal{M}^L \to \mathcal{M}$ be a circuit where $L$ is the number of inputs.

**Setup:** A public parameter $\mathbf{pp}$ is generated by MGHE.Setup($1^\lambda$). All parties share the same parameter set.

**Input:** The inputs $x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_L$ are held among the parties.

**The Protocol**

**Round I:** Let $\mathcal{I}$ be the set of parties. Each party $i \in \mathcal{I}$ generates a key pair $([sk]_i, [pk]_i) \leftarrow$ MGHE.IndKeyGen($i$) and an automorphism key $[ak]_i \leftarrow$ MGHE.IndAutKeyGen($[sk]_i$), then broadcasts $([pk]_i, [ak]_i)$.

**Round II:**

- Now anybody can compute the joint public and automorphism keys of an arbitrary group. We suppose that the joint keys of $k$ groups $I_1, I_2, \ldots, I_k \subseteq \mathcal{I}$ are generated as follows:

  
  $\begin{align*}
  jpk_j & \leftarrow \text{MGHE.JointKeyGen}([pk]_i : i \in I_j), \\
  jak_j & \leftarrow \text{MGHE.JointAutKeyGen}([ak]_i : i \in I_j).
  \end{align*}$

  We denote by $jek_j$ the encryption key of $I_j$.

- For each $1 \leq \ell \leq L$, the party with input $x_\ell$ encrypts it using a joint public key $jpk_j$ for some $1 \leq j \leq k$ and broadcasts the ciphertexts $ct_\ell \leftarrow$ MGHE.Enc($jek_j ; x_\ell$).

**Round III:**

- The circuit $C$ is evaluated as following:

  $\overline{ct} \leftarrow \text{MGHE.Eval}([jpk]_{1 \leq j \leq k}, [jak]_{1 \leq j \leq k} ; C, ct_1, \ldots, ct_L)$.

- Finally, the parties concurrently take part in the distributed decryption protocol with the error parameter $\sigma'$ to deduce the output $m$:

  $m \leftarrow \text{MGHE.DistDec}(I, \sigma' ; \overline{ct})$

**Output:** Return the decrypted message $m$.

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textbf{Fig. 2.} $\pi_C$: MPC protocol for a circuit $C$ using MGHE
\end{itemize}
receives the output message $m$ from the ideal functionality. Then, the simulator computes and publishes the simulated partial decryption $[\mu]'_h$ of the honest party $h$ using a smudging error $[e']^m_h \leftarrow D_{\sigma'}$ and partial decryptions of corrupted parties corresponding to the ciphertext $\overline{a} = (c_0, \ldots, c_L)$ are

$$[\mu]'_h = (q/p) \cdot m + [e']^m_h - \sum_{i \neq h} \gamma_i - c_0$$

(1)

where $\gamma_i = \left(\sum_{1 \leq j < k, i \in I_i} \cdot [s]_i \text{ (mod } q)\right) \cdot [s]_i$. Now, we define some hybrid games and prove the computational indistinguishability between the real and ideal worlds.

- **The game $REAL_{(\pi, A, Z)}$:** An execution of the protocol $\pi$ in the real world with environment $Z$ and semi-malicious adversary $A$.
- **The game $HYB^1_{(\pi, A, Z)}$:** This is the same as $REAL_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ except the output of partial decryption of $h$. In Round III, it publishes the simulated partial decryption which is computed via (1).
- **The game $HYB^2_{(\pi, A, Z)}$:** This is similar to $HYB^1_{(\pi, A, Z)}$, but in Round II the party $h$ encrypts $0$ instead of the real input if any.
- **The game $IDEAL_{(F, S, Z)}$:** It executes the MPC protocol with the simulator $S$. The difference from $HYB^1_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ is that the public key of $h$ is sampled from a uniform distribution over $R_q^d$ instead of the individual key generation algorithm $\text{MGHE.IndKeyGen}(h)$ in Round I.

From the above games, we can consider following claims.

**Claim 1.** $REAL_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ and $HYB^1_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ are statistically indistinguishable.

**Proof.** According to the description of the simulator, the partial decryption of $h$ in the game $HYB^1_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ is generated from the partial decryptions of corrupted parties and the output message as $(q/p) \cdot m + [e']^m_h - \sum_{i \neq h} \gamma_i - c_0$. On the other hand, the real partial decryption also can be written as $(q/p) \cdot m + e + [e']_h - \sum_{i \neq h} \gamma_i - c_0$ where $e$ is the noise in the ciphertext $\overline{a}$. By noise smudging technique, the distributions of $[e']^m_h$ and $e + [e']_h$ are statistically indistinguishable. It concludes that $REAL_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ and $HYB^1_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ are also statistically indistinguishable.

**Claim 2.** $HYB^1_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ and $HYB^2_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof.** The only difference between two games is that the party $h$ encrypts the real input in $HYB^1_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ while it encrypts $0$ in the game $HYB^2_{(\pi, A, Z)}$, if any. As mentioned in security part of the MGHE scheme, these encryptions are computationally indistinguishable from the semantic security of MGHE.

**Claim 3.** $HYB^2_{(\pi, A, Z)}$ and $IDEAL_{(F, S, Z)}$ are computationally indistinguishable.

**Proof.** The only difference between two games is in the public key $pk_h$. In $HYB^2_{(\pi, A, Z)}$, $pk_h$ is a valid public key generated by $h$ while it is sampled from a uniform distribution over $R_q^d \times 3$ in the game $IDEAL_{(F, S, Z)}$. Two games are computationally indistinguishable from the RLWE and circular security assumptions.

According to the claims, we conclude that the MPC protocol $\pi_C$ is secure in the semi-malicious model against $N - 1$ corrupted parties. We can also guarantee the security for adversary with arbitrary many corruptions using simulation-based proof similar as [37]. To explain briefly, pseudorandom functions (PRFs) is used to define extended circuit $C$ and MPC protocol $\pi_C$. In addition, new simulator and series of games also re-defined based on $C$ and $\pi_C$. More details are explained in [37, 3]. It is also possible to compile our MPC protocol which is secure against semi-malicious attackers into one that is secure against malicious corruptions with no additional rounds using non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [3].
7 Experimental Results

We implemented our MGHE scheme and measured the elapsed time of basic operations. The source code is written in C++ over Microsoft SEAL [40] version 3.3.0 with implementations of both BFV and CKKS. We introduce some optimization techniques and report the timing results of basic operations under several parameter settings. The experiment was conducted on Intel(R) Core(TM) i9-10900 CPU @ 2.80GHz and 64GB RAM. In our implementation, the key distribution $\chi$ samples the coefficients uniformly from the ternary set $\{-1, 0, 1\}$, the error parameter is fixed as $\sigma = 3.2$, and the plaintext modulus is fixed as $p = 65537$. Our experimentation is performed on three parameter sets: the ring dimension $n = 2^{13}$, $2^{14}$, or $2^{15}$ and the ciphertext modulus $\lceil \log q \rceil = 218$, 438, or 862, respectively, which achieve at least 128-bit security level. In addition, we set $q$ as a product of 4, 8, or 16 distinct primes of bitsize $\leq 60$.

7.1 Basic Operations

Table 1 shows the execution times to operate multiplication with relinearization and rotation, both in the BFV and CKKS schemes. Although not included in the table, the number of parties in groups does not affect the execution time in both schemes. It is because, as described in Section 4.1, the size of ciphertext does not expand even if there are many parties in the group. On the other hand, the execution time depends on the dimension of base ring and the number of groups participating in evaluation. As dimension of the plaintext increases, the ciphertext modulus increases and eventually affects the execution time of arithmetic operations. Moreover, according to the Section 5.1, relinearization or automorphism requires more external products when there are more groups involved in the evaluation. Therefore, it takes more time to complete multiplication or rotation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$n$</th>
<th>$k$</th>
<th>Mult + Relin</th>
<th>Auto</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>BFV</td>
<td>CKKS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2^{13}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>77</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>365</td>
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<td>$2^{14}$</td>
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<td>100</td>
<td>110</td>
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<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>514</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1,490</td>
<td>2,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$2^{15}$</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>651</td>
<td>675</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,443</td>
<td>1,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3,731</td>
<td>5,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11,425</td>
<td>17,450</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Performance of our MGHE scheme and the MKHE scheme by Chen et al. [12]; execution times to operate homomorphic multiplication (Mult + Relin) and automorphism (Auto), taken in milliseconds (ms). $n$ denotes the dimension of base ring and $k$ denotes the number of the associated groups (keys) to the ciphertext.

We also show the performance of the MKHE scheme [12] for comparison. As described in the Section 5.1, we reduce the number of external products during the relinearization. According to the Table 1, our algorithm achieves better performance in homomorphic multiplication when more than one groups are involved in the computation. It reduces the complexity of homomorphic multiplication of BFV and CKKS by about 1.3 and 1.5 times, respectively, when the input ciphertext is associated to eight groups.
7.2 Noise Growth

We also evaluate how much noise increases when proceeding multiplication with relinearization. Table 2 shows the growth of ciphertext noise from homomorphic multiplication. In this experimentation, we generate \( k \) fresh ciphertexts using different joint public keys and compute their summation to obtain an \( k \)-group ciphertext (depth 0). Then, we perform the squaring operation repeatedly and obtain ciphertexts of depth from 1 to 5. We observe that the ciphertext noise grows more quickly when as the number of the involved parties increases, which aligns with our theoretic estimation. We refer the reader to Appendix B for more detailed noise analysis of the relinearization and multiplication algorithms. In addition, the automorphism algorithm introduces a noise in an additive manner (unlike multiplicative noise growth of homomorphic multiplication), so it has almost no effect on the bitsize of noise since the additional automorphism noise is insignificant compared to the total noise.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>( k )</th>
<th>( N )</th>
<th>Depth 0</th>
<th>Depth 1</th>
<th>Depth 2</th>
<th>Depth 3</th>
<th>Depth 4</th>
<th>Depth 5</th>
<th>Avg. Diff.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>79.3</td>
<td>114.7</td>
<td>150.1</td>
<td>185.4</td>
<td>34.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>46.0</td>
<td>80.6</td>
<td>116.9</td>
<td>152.7</td>
<td>188.7</td>
<td>34.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>47.1</td>
<td>83.0</td>
<td>119.6</td>
<td>156.0</td>
<td>192.7</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>48.1</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>122.7</td>
<td>160.3</td>
<td>197.8</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>47.0</td>
<td>81.8</td>
<td>118.3</td>
<td>154.7</td>
<td>191.0</td>
<td>35.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>82.8</td>
<td>119.4</td>
<td>156.1</td>
<td>192.9</td>
<td>35.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>122.6</td>
<td>160.2</td>
<td>197.8</td>
<td>36.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>49.4</td>
<td>86.6</td>
<td>124.4</td>
<td>162.4</td>
<td>200.4</td>
<td>37.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>48.3</td>
<td>83.3</td>
<td>119.9</td>
<td>156.0</td>
<td>192.6</td>
<td>35.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>49.1</td>
<td>84.4</td>
<td>121.4</td>
<td>158.3</td>
<td>195.3</td>
<td>36.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>49.9</td>
<td>86.8</td>
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<td>162.0</td>
<td>199.7</td>
<td>36.9</td>
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<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>50.2</td>
<td>87.1</td>
<td>125.2</td>
<td>163.3</td>
<td>201.3</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>49.7</td>
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<td>121.3</td>
<td>158.3</td>
<td>195.0</td>
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<td>51.9</td>
<td>88.9</td>
<td>127.4</td>
<td>166.1</td>
<td>204.1</td>
<td>37.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Size of noise (bits) to operate multiplication with relinearization (Mult + Relin) several times according to the number of groups (\( k \)) and the number of parties (\( N \)). Initial level is 9 and evaluation is examined on the BFV scheme and \( n = 2^{14} \).

7.3 Application to Oblivious Neural Network

One possible application of MGHE is to enable secure workflow of machine learning models comprising the privacy of multiple data owners. Suppose the model is trained with datasets owned by multiple providers. If data owners can be determined before training, the MPHE scheme would be a reasonable solution for privacy-preserving training of the model. In the case of inference, however, the client may not be determined aforesaid and the model may deal with multiple independent clients. Thus, it is more reasonable to perform inference using an MKHE scheme which shows better flexibility. The model and the user data encrypted under the different keys of the model owners and the client, respectively, are converted into encrypted multi-key ciphertext under those two keys. After evaluating neural network inference in 2-key MKHE, the output is obtained by distributed decryption among the model owners and the client. Our MGHE interpolates between MPHE (where the neural network is trained) and MKHE (where the neural network inference is performed) so that the entire process can be done in the same encryption scheme. Aloufi et al. [1] presented a similar scenario in the random forest model where each
A Unified Framework of HE for Multiple Parties with Non-Interactive Setup

party owns a decision tree, not a single data. This is apparently involved in our scenario as their set-up is a special case of our set-up where we instantiate an MGHE scheme with multiple parties and inference is performed by 2-key evaluation, i.e., 2-group evaluation.

In this section, we apply our MGHE scheme to a convolution neural network (CNN) model and compared the performance with the previous MKHE paper [12]. Our experimentation is based on the same model with the following structure: the convolutional layer takes $28 \times 28$ input image and perform convolution with $4 \times 4$ window and stride $(2, 2)$. The five output channels are followed by the square activation function on 845 inputs. Then the fully connected layer with 845 inputs and 64 outputs is again followed by the square activation function. Finally, the second fully connected layer outputs 10 values, then the softmax is applied to obtain probabilistic values.

Table 3 shows the performance of MKHE and MGHE schemes for evaluating inference over encrypted CNN model. In MKHE scheme, the model is evaluated under two different keys each from the model owner and the client. On the other hand, the good property of our MGHE scheme supporting multiple model owners replace the key of a single model owner by the joint public key of parties that owns the model. The number of model owners, again, does not influence the performance and is set to one in Table 3 for comparison. It is shown that our MGHE scheme is slightly faster in all layers thanks to our optimization technique in the relinearization process.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scheme</th>
<th>Convolution</th>
<th>Square-1</th>
<th>FC-1</th>
<th>Square-2</th>
<th>FC-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MKHE [12]</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGHE</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>603</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3. Time taken in milliseconds (ms) to perform oblivious CNN inference to the MNIST dataset. The parameter set of dimension $n = 2^{14}$ is used.

References


40. Microsoft SEAL (release 3.3). https://github.com/Microsoft/SEAL (Jun 2019), microsoft Research, Redmond, WA.


A Construction of MGHE with CKKS

The CKKS supports approximate arithmetic operations for complex numbers. The BFV and CKKS have similar structure, so we can easily extend MGHE scheme of the CKKS. The difference is that it adds an error into the plaintext itself and additionally supports the rescaling algorithm to control the size of ciphertext. The ciphertext has a level and it decreases whenever rescaling is performed. To proceed arithmetics between two ciphertexts, they should have same level and it requires bootstrapping when level is low in order to continue evaluation. We are going to transform MPHE scheme without interactive setup first, and extend it into the MGHE scheme. In both cases, we skip setup, key generation, and joint key generation phase since they are same as BFV. Galois automorphism is also not included since it has same procedure with the BFV. We assume the ciphertext modulus \( q = \prod_{i=1}^{k} p_i \) for some integers \( p_i \) and denote \( q_l = \prod_{i=1}^{l} p_i \).

A.1 MPHE with Non-Interactive Setup

- **MP-CKKS.Enc(kek; m):** Sample \( t \leftarrow \chi \) and \( e_0, e_1 \leftarrow D_\chi \). For an input message \( m \in R_q \), return the ciphertext \( ct = t \cdot jek + (m + e_0, e_1) \pmod{q} \).
- **MP-CKKS.Add(ct, ct):** If \( ct \) and \( ct' \) have same level, return \( ct_{\text{add}} = ct + ct' \pmod{q} \). If not, lower the high-level ciphertext to low-level ciphertext before the computation.
- **MP-CKKS.Mult(jpk; ct, ct):** If \( ct \) and \( ct' \) have different level, make two ciphertexts have the same level. Given two ciphertexts \( ct = (c_0, c_1) \), \( ct' = (c'_0, c'_1) \) and a joint public key \( jpk \), let \( ct_{\text{mul}} = ct \otimes ct' = (c_0 c'_0, c_0 c'_1 + c_1 c'_0, c_1 c'_1) \). Return the ciphertext \( \text{MP-CKKS.Relin}(jpk; ct_{\text{mul}}) \) where \( \text{MP-CKKS.Relin}() \) is the relinearization procedure described in Alg. 1.
- **MP-CKKS.Rescale(ct):** Given a ciphertext \( ct = (c_0, c_1) \in R_{q_l}^2 \) at level \( l \), return \( ct' = ([p_l^{-1} \cdot c_0], [p_l^{-1} \cdot c_1]) \in R_{q_l}^2 \) which is at level \( l - 1 \).
- **MP-CKKS.Dec(sk; ct):** Given a ciphertext \( ct = (c_0, c_1) \) and a secret key \( sk = s \), output \( m = (ct, sk) = (c_0 + c_1 \cdot s) \pmod{p} \).
- **MP-CKKS.DistDec(\{[sk]_i: i \in I\}, \sigma'; ct):** Let \( ct = (c_0, c_1) \) be a multi-party ciphertext, \( \sigma' > 0 \) an error parameter, and \( [sk]_i = [s]_i \) the secret key of party \( i \in I \). The distributed decryption protocol consists of the following procedures:
  - Partial decryption: Each party \( i \in I \) samples \([e']_i \leftarrow D_{\sigma'}\), then computes and publishes \([\mu]_i = c_1 \cdot [s]_i + [e']_i \pmod{q} \).
  - Merge: Compute \( m = (c_0 + \sum_{i \in I} [\mu]_i) \).

A.2 Extension to MGHE with CKKS

- **MG-CKKS.Enc(kek; m):** For a joint encryption key \( jek \) and a message \( m \), return \( ct \leftarrow \text{MP-CKKS.Enc}(jek; m) \).
- **MG-CKKS.Add(\overline{ct}, \overline{ct}'):** If two given ciphertexts \( \overline{ct} \) and \( \overline{ct}' \) have same level, return the ciphertext \( \overline{ct}_{\text{add}} = \overline{ct} + \overline{ct}' \pmod{q} \). If not, modify ciphertexts to have same level before the computation.
- **MG-CKKS.Mult(\{jpk\}L_{j \leq k}; \overline{ct}, \overline{ct}'):** Set \( ct \) and \( ct' \) have same level. Let \( \overline{ct} = (c_{0j})_{0 \leq j \leq k} \) and \( \overline{ct}' = (c'_{0j})_{0 \leq j \leq k} \) be two multi-group ciphertexts and \( \{jpk\} \) the collection of the joint public keys of groups \( I_j \) for \( 1 \leq j \leq k \). Compute \( \overline{ct}_{\text{mul}} = (c_{i,j})_{0 \leq i, j \leq k} \) where \( c_{i,j} = c_i c'_j \pmod{q} \) for \( 0 \leq i, j \leq k \). Return the ciphertext \( \text{MG-CKKS.Relin}(\{jpk\}; \overline{ct}_{\text{mul}}) \) where \( \text{MG-CKKS.Relin}() \) is the relinearization procedure described in Alg. 2.
- **MG-CKKS.Rescale(\overline{ct}):** Given a ciphertext \( \overline{ct} = (c_0, c_1, \ldots, c_k) \in R_{q_l}^{k+1} \) at level \( l \), compute \( c'_i = p_l^{-1} \cdot c_i \) for \( 1 \leq i \leq k \), and return \( \overline{ct}' = (c'_0, c'_1, \ldots, c'_k) \in R_{q_l}^{k+1} \) which is at level \( l - 1 \).
In Alg. 2 of Section 5.1, it satisfies that 

\[ B.2 \text{ Relinearization} \]

there is no scaling factor \( \Delta \). Recall that the encryption \( \text{ct} \) is smaller than a certain fraction of ciphertext modulus \( q \). A fresh ciphertext has a small initial noise, yet it grows along with homomorphic operation, especially multiplication (with relinearization).

We analyze an average-case noise growth on the variance of polynomial coefficients.

Before estimating a noise growth, we specify some distributions for sampling randomness or errors. Let the key distribution \( \chi \) be the uniform distribution over the set of binary polynomials and the error distribution \( \psi \) be the discrete Gaussian distribution of variance \( \sigma^2 \). We also assume that the coefficients of the polynomials are independent zero-mean random variables with the same variances. We denote by \( \text{Var}(a) = \text{Var}(a_i) \) the variance of coefficients for random variable \( a = \sum_i a_i \cdot X^i \) over the ring \( R \). Then the variance of the product \( c = a \cdot b \) of two polynomials with degree \( n \) can be represented as \( \text{Var}(c) = n \cdot \text{Var}(a) \cdot \text{Var}(b) \) if \( a \) and \( b \) are independent. Similarly, we define variance for a vector \( a \in R^d \) of random variables as \( \text{Var}(a) = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{i=1}^{d} \text{Var}(a[i]) \). We also assume that each ciphertext behaves as if it is a uniform random variable over \( R_q^{k+1} \).

We analyze the noise growth of \( k \)-group case, each comprising \( N_i \) parties for \( 1 \leq i \leq k \).

**B.1 Encryption**

Recall that the encryption \( \text{ct} = (c_0, c_1) \in R_q^2 \) of \( m \in R_p \) is

\[
\text{ct} = t \cdot \text{jek} + (\Delta \cdot m + c_0, e_1) \quad (\text{mod } q)
\]

where \( t \leftarrow \chi \) and \( c_0, e_1 \leftarrow D_\sigma \). For \( \text{jek} = (b[0], a[0]) \in R_q^2 \), we remark that \( b[0] + a[0] \cdot s = \sum_{i \in I} [e_0][i][0] \) and each \( [e_0][i][0] \) is sampled from \( D_\sigma \). Then, it satisfies that

\[
c_0 + c_1 \cdot s = \Delta \cdot m + t(b[0] + a[0] \cdot s) + (c_0 + e_1 \cdot s)
\]

\[
= \Delta \cdot m + (t \sum_{i \in I} [e_0][i][0] + c_0 + e_1 \cdot s) \quad (\text{mod } q)
\]

The encryption noise \( e_{enc} = t \sum_{i \in I} [e_0][i][0] + c_0 + e_1 \cdot s \) has the variance of

\[
V_{enc} = \sigma^2 \cdot \left( \frac{n|I|}{2} + 1 + \frac{n}{2} \right) \approx \frac{n\sigma^2(|I| + 1)}{2}.
\]

The CKKS scheme has the same encryption error as the BFV scheme. The only difference is that there is no scaling factor \( \Delta \) in the result of decryption.

**B.2 Relinearization**

In Alg. 2 of Section 5.1, it satisfies that

\[
\sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} c_i'' \otimes (v_i + s_i \cdot u) = -\sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} r_i \cdot c_i'' + \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} e_i'' \otimes e_{i,2}
\]

\[
= -\sum_{1 \leq i, j \leq k} r_i \cdot (c_{i,j} \otimes b_j) + \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} c_i'' \otimes e_{i,2} \quad (\text{mod } q)
\]
and
\[
\sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} (c_{i,j} \otimes d_i) \cdot s_j \\
= \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} r_i \cdot (c_{i,j} \otimes (b_j + e_{j,0})) + \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} s_is_j \cdot c_{i,j} + \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} s_j \cdot (c_{i,j} \otimes e_{i,1}) \\
= \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} r_i \cdot (c_{i,j} \otimes b_j) + \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} s_is_j \cdot c_{i,j} + \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} e'_{i,j} \pmod{q}
\]
where \(e'_{i,j} = c_{i,j} \otimes (r_i \cdot e_{j,0} + s_j \cdot e_{i,1}) \pmod{q}\).

We denote by \(V_g = \text{Var}(g^{-1}(a))\) where \(a\) is a uniform random variable over \(R_q\). Then, the variance of relinearization error \(e_{\text{relin}} = \sum_{1 \leq i,j \leq k} (e''_i \otimes e_{i,2} + e'_{i,j})\) is obtained as follows.
\[
V_{\text{relin}} = nq \cdot \sigma^2 \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} N_i^2 + n^2 \cdot dV_g k \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} N_i^2 \approx n^2 \cdot dV_g k \sum_{1 \leq i \leq k} N_i^2
\]
In our implementation, we use RNS-friendly decomposition \(R_q = \prod_{i=1}^{d} R_{p_i}\) such that \(p_i\)'s have the same bit-size. Here, we have \(V_g = \frac{1}{12q^2} \sum_{i=1}^{d} p_i^2\) for \(d = \lceil \log q / \log p_i \rceil\).

### B.3 Multiplication

We again consider \(k\)-group case, each comprising \(N_i\) parties for \(1 \leq i \leq k\). Let \(\bar{c}_i\) and \(\bar{c}_2\) be the input ciphertexts of messages \(m_1\) and \(m_2\) respectively. Each ciphertext \(\bar{c}_i\) satisfies that \(\langle \bar{c}_i, \bar{sk} \rangle = q \cdot I_i + \Delta \cdot m_i + e_i\) for \(I_i = \lfloor \frac{1}{q} \langle \bar{c}_i, \bar{sk} \rangle \rfloor\) and some \(e_i\). Here, we have the variance \(\text{Var}(I_i) \approx \frac{1}{12} (1 + \frac{1}{2} kn) \approx \frac{1}{24} kn\) since \(\frac{1}{q} \cdot \bar{c}_i\) behaves as an uniform random variable over \(\frac{1}{q} \cdot R_q^{k+1}\).

The result of tensor product satisfies that
\[
\langle \bar{c}_1 \otimes \bar{c}_2, \bar{sk} \otimes \bar{sk} \rangle = \langle \bar{c}_1, \bar{sk} \rangle \cdot \langle \bar{c}_2, \bar{sk} \rangle \\
= \Delta^2 \cdot m_1m_2 + q \cdot (I_1e_2 + I_2e_1) + \Delta \cdot (m_1e_2 + m_2e_1) + e_1e_2 \pmod{q \cdot \Delta}
\]
and for \(\bar{c}_{\text{mul}} = \lfloor \frac{p}{q} \cdot \bar{c}_1 \otimes \bar{c}_2 \rfloor\), we have
\[
\langle \bar{c}_{\text{mul}}, \bar{sk} \otimes \bar{sk} \rangle = \Delta \cdot m_1m_2 + p \cdot (I_1e_2 + I_2e_1) + (m_1e_2 + m_2e_1) + e_1e_2 + e_{rd}
\]
where \(e_{rd} = \langle \frac{p}{q} \cdot \bar{c}_1 \otimes \bar{c}_2 - \bar{c}_{\text{mul}}, \bar{sk} \otimes \bar{sk} \rangle\). That is, the multiplication error is obtained by
\[
e_{\text{mul}} = p \cdot (I_1e_2 + I_2e_1) + (m_1e_2 + m_2e_1) + \Delta^{-1} \cdot e_1e_2 + e_{rd}.
\]
From the above equation, the first term \(p \cdot (I_1e_2 + I_2e_1)\) dominates the whole multiplication error. Therefore, we have the variance of multiplication error by
\[
V_{\text{mul}} \approx np^2 \cdot (\text{Var}(I_1)\text{Var}(e_2) + \text{Var}(I_2)\text{Var}(e_1)) \approx \frac{1}{24} kn^2 p^2 (\text{Var}(e_1) + \text{Var}(e_2)).
\]

While the relinearization error has a fixed size depending on the parameters, the multiplication error increases by a certain ratio as computation proceeds. Therefore, the total noise is eventually dominated by the multiplication error unless \((\text{Var}(e_1) + \text{Var}(e_2))\) is very small (e.g. fresh ciphertext).