Hiding in Plain Sight:
Memory-tight Proofs via Randomness Programming

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Abstract. This paper continues the study of memory-tight reductions (Auerbach et al, CRYPTO '17). These are reductions that only incur minimal memory costs over those of the original adversary, allowing precise security statements for memory-bounded adversaries (under appropriate assumptions expressed in terms of adversary time and memory usage). Despite its importance, only a few techniques to achieve memory-tightness are known and impossibility results in prior works show that even basic, textbook reductions cannot be made memory-tight.

This paper introduces a new class of memory-tight reductions which leverage random strings in the interaction with the adversary to hide state information, thus shifting the memory costs to the adversary. We exhibit this technique with several examples. We give memory-tight proofs for digital signatures allowing many forgery attempts when considering randomized message distributions or probabilistic RSA-FDH signatures specifically. We prove security of the authenticated encryption scheme Encrypt-then-PRF with a memory-tight reduction to the underlying encryption scheme. By considering specific schemes or restricted definitions we avoid generic impossibility results of Auerbach et al. (CRYPTO '17) and Ghoshal et al. (CRYPTO '20).

As a further case study, we consider the textbook equivalence of CCA-security for public-key encryption for one or multiple encryption queries. We show two qualitatively different memory-tight versions of this result, depending on the considered notion of CCA security.

Keywords: Provable security, memory-tightness, time-memory trade-offs

1 Introduction

The aim of concrete security proofs is to lower bound, as precisely as possible, the resources needed to break a cryptographic scheme of interest, under some plausible assumptions. The traditional resource used in provable security is time complexity (as well as related metrics, like data complexity). Recent works \cite{2,28,22,16,11,20,19,14,26} have focused on additionally taking the memory costs of the adversary into account. This is important, as the amount of available memory can seriously impact the feasibility of an attack.

This paper presents new techniques for memory-tight reductions, a notion introduced by Auerbach et al. \cite{2} to relate the assumed time-memory hardness of an underlying computational problem to the security of a scheme. More precisely, the end goal is to prove, via a reduction, that any adversary running in time \( t \) and with \( s \) bits of memory can achieve at most advantage \( \epsilon = \epsilon(t, s) \) in compromising a scheme, by assuming that some underlying computational problem can only be solved with advantage \( \delta = \delta(t', s') \) by algorithms running in time \( t' \) and with memory \( s' \). A memory-tight reduction guarantees that \( s \approx s' \), and usually, we want this to be tight also according to other parameters, i.e., \( t \approx t' \) and \( \epsilon \approx \delta \).

Memory-tight reductions are of value whenever the underlying problem is (conjectured to) be memory sensitive, i.e., the time needed to solve it grows as the amount of memory available to the adversary is
reduction checks whether, for instance, assume that the reduction has access to an injective function \( f \) to UFCMA can set \( f \) and can simulate them in special ways, and program this, intuitively, does not seem to help resolve the above issue, because random messages are hardest to consider a corresponding variant of mUFCMA security, which we want to reduce to (plain) UFCMA security.

Inefficient tagging and non-time-tight reductions. Developing memory-tight reductions is not always easy, and can be (provably) impossible \([2,28,20,19]\). This makes it fundamental to develop as many techniques as possible to obtain such reductions. In this paper, we identify a class of examples which admit a new kind of memory-tight reductions. Our approach relies on the availability of random strings exchanged between the adversary and the security game, and which the reduction can leverage to encode state which can be recovered from later queries of the adversary, without the need to store this information locally, and thus saving memory. (In particular, the burden of keeping this information remains on the adversary, which needs to reproduce this random string for this state information to be relevant.) We present these techniques abstractly in the next section, with the help of a motivating example, and then move on to an overview of our specific results.

1.1 Our Techniques - An Overview

As a motivating example, consider the standard UFCMA security notion for signatures. It is defined via a game where the attacker, given the verification key \( vk \), obtains signatures for chosen messages \( m_1, m_2, \ldots \), after which it outputs a candidate message-signature pair \((m^*, \sigma^*)\), and wins if \( m^* \) was not signed before, and \( \sigma^* \) is valid for \( m^* \). When ignoring memory, this notion is tightly equivalent to one (which we refer to as mUFCMA) that allows for an arbitrary number of “forgery attempts” for pairs \((m^*, \sigma^*)\), and the adversary wins if one of them succeeds in the above sense. This is convenient: we generally target mUFCMA, but only need to deal with proving the simpler UFCMA notion.

The classical reduction transforms any mUFCMA adversary into a roughly equally efficient UFCMA adversary, which wins with the same probability, by (1) simulating forgery queries using the verification key, and (2) outputting the first forgery query \((m^*, \sigma^*)\) which validates and such that \( m^* \) is fresh. This reduction is however not memory-tight, as we need to ensure the freshness of \( m^* \), which requires remembering the previously signed messages. ACFK \([2]\) prove that this is in some sense necessary, by showing that a (restricted) class of reductions cannot be memory-tight via a reduction to streaming lower bounds.

Our idea: Efficient tagging. To illustrate our new technique, which we refer to as efficient tagging, imagine now that we only use the signature scheme to sign random messages \( m_1, m_2, \ldots, m_q \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell \), and consider a corresponding variant of mUFCMA security, which we want to reduce to (plain) UFCMA security. This, intuitively, does not seem to help resolve the above issue, because random messages are hardest to compress.

However, what is important here is that the reduction is responsible for simulating the random messages, and can simulate them in special ways, and program them so that they encode state information. For instance, assume that the reduction has access to an injective random function \( f : [q] \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell \), with inverse \( f^{-1} \), which can be simulated succinctly from a short key as a pseudorandom object. Then, the reduction to UFCMA can set \( m_i \leftarrow f(i) \) for the \( i \)-th query, and upon simulating a forgery query for \((m^*, \sigma^*)\), the reduction checks whether \( f^{-1}(m^*) \in [q] \) to learn whether \( m^* \) is a fresh signing query or not.

Of course, the simulation is not perfect: The original \( m_i \)'s are not necessarily distinct (this can be handled via the classical “switching lemma”). Also, the reduction could miss a valid forgery if the adversary outputs \( m_i \) before it is given to the adversary, but this again only occurs with small probability.

Inefficient tagging and non-time-tight reductions. In the above example, we can efficiently check that \( f^{-1}(m^*) \in [q] \). However, in some cases we may not – again, consider an example where the messages to be signed are sampled as \( m_i \leftarrow h(r_i) \), where \( h \) is a hard-to-invert function and \( r_i \) is random. Then, we could adapt our proof above by setting \( m_i \leftarrow h(f(i)) \), but now, to detect a prior signing query, we would have to check whether \( m^* = h(f(i)) \) for some \( i \in [q] \), and this can only be done in linear time. The resulting

\(^4\) However, the discrete logarithm problem in elliptic-curve groups, or any other group in which the best-known attacks are generic, is not memory sensitive, since optimal memory-less attacks are known.
UFCMA adversary runs in time $t' = t + \Theta(q_F \cdot q)$, where $t$ is the running time of the original adversary and $q_F$ is the number of forgery attempts. For example, if $q \approx q_F \approx t$, the reduction is not time tight, and the adversary runs in time $t' = O(t^2)$.

**Are non-time-tight reductions useless?** It turns out that such non-time-tight reductions can still be helpful to infer that breaking a scheme requires memory, although this ultimately depends on the concrete security of the problem targeted by the reduction. Say, for example, a reduction for a given scheme transforms a successful adversary running in time $t$ and using memory $s$ into an adversary running in time $t^2$ and using memory $s$ breaking discrete logarithms over $\mathbb{F}_p$, for a 4096-bit prime $p$. It turns out that if we have fewer than $2^{78}$ bits of memory, no known discrete logarithm algorithm is better than a generic one (i.e. runs in time better than $2^{2048}$), which means that our non-time-tight reduction is still sufficient to infer security for any $s < 2^{78}$ as long as $t < 2^{1024}$.

**Message encoding.** At the highest level, what happens is that the reduction is in control of certain random values which we can exploit to hide state information which can later be uniquely recovered, since triggering a situation where the reduction needs to remember requires the adversary to actually give back to the reduction this value. In the above, this state information is simple, namely whether the query is old or not. But as we will show below, the paradigm can be used to store complex information – we refer to this technique as *message encoding*, and discuss an example below.

**Connection to algorithmic substitution.** Our approach bears resemblance with *algorithmic substitution attacks* [7,29,30,5,25,1], where a honest cryptographic implementation is replaced by an indistinguishable one which reveals a secret (e.g., the secret key) to an attacker with an available trapdoor. There is however no clear formal connection here, and in our case we abuse the interface of the *security game* and not necessarily of the scheme.

**A new viewpoint:** $\mathcal{F}$-oracle adversaries. In our technique described above we needed access to a large random injection, which we argue can be simulated pseudorandomly. Prior works have similarly used PRFs to pseudorandomly simulate random oracles [2,10] with low memory. The fact that one needs to decide how to simulate such objects when stating a memory-tight reduction is rather inconvenient: different instantiations seemingly lead to quantitatively different reductions, although this fact does not appear to be a reflection of any particular reality. In this paper, we propose (and advocate for) what we believe to be the “right” viewpoint: Our reductions are stated in terms of $\mathcal{F}$-oracle adversaries where $\mathcal{F}$ is a set of functions and such an adversary expects oracle access to a random $f \in \mathcal{F}$. Then, a memory-tightness theorem is obtained in one of two ways, by either (1) assuming that the use of $f$ does not functionally increase the success chances of the adversary because $f$ is independent of the problem instance being solved (this is provably the case for some information theoretic problems), or (2) applying a generic lemma stating that $f$ can be instantiated in low memory using an $\mathcal{F}$-pseudorandom function. In particular, (2) is more conservative than (1), but it is very likely that (1) is also a viable approach which leads to cleaner result – indeed, we do not expect any of the considered memory-sensitive problems to become easier given access to an oracle from any natural class $\mathcal{F}$ – e.g., Factoring does not become easier given access to a random injection.

### 1.2 Our Results

We now move to an overview of our results (summarized in Fig. 1) which exemplify different applications of the tagging and message-encoding techniques.

**Multi-challenge security of digital signatures.** Our first results consider the security of digital signatures in the face of multiple forgery attempts (i.e., challenge queries), generalizing the examples discussed above. We work with a notion we refer to as UFRMA (unforgeability under randomized message attack). This notion is parameterized by a *message distribution* $\mathcal{D}$ and when the attacker makes a signing query for $m$ it receives a signature of $m' = \mathcal{D}(m; r)$ for a random $r$. If $m$ and $r$ can be extracted from $m'$, giving the notion xUFRMA (or mxUFRMA for many forgery attempts), we can generalize our efficient tagging approach above by having the reduction to UFCMA choose $r = f(m, i)$ where each $f(m, \cdot)$ is a random injection. This setting can capture, e.g., the signatures used in key exchange protocols like TLS 1.3 where the server signs a
transcript which includes a random 256-bit nonce. A version of our inefficient tagging example works when only $m$ can be extracted from $m^*$ (wUFRMA); we pick $r = f(m, i)$ and in verification of a forgery query perform the linear time check of whether $m^* = D(m; f(m, i))$ for some $i \in [q]$. This setting captures places where the message to be signed includes a fresh public key or ciphertext. This includes, for example, the use of signatures for signing certificates, in some key exchange protocols, and in signcryption.

We further prove mUFCMA security for particular schemes. First, we can randomize any digital signature scheme DS (obtaining a scheme we call RDS) by signing $m| r$ for random $r$ chosen by the signing algorithm and including $r$ as part of the signature. An immediate implication of our mxUFCRA result is a tight reduction from the mUFCMA security of RDS to the UFCMA security of the underlying scheme. One particular instantiation of RDS is Probabilistic Full Domain Hash with RSA (RSA-PFDH) which was introduced by Coron [13] to provide a variant of Full Domain Hash [8] with an (advantage-) tighter security proof. Using our efficient tagging technique we obtain a fully tight proof of the strong mUFCMA security of RSA-PFDH from the RSA assumption.

In independent and concurrent work, Diemert, Gellert, Jager, and Lyu [15] studied the mUFCMA security of digital signature schemes. They also considered the RDS construction, proving that if DS can be proven strong UFCMA1 secure\(^5\) with a restricted class of “canonical” memory-tight reductions then there is a memory-tight reduction for the strong mUFCMA security of RDS. This complements our result, showing memory-tight strong mUFCMA security of RDS based on a restricted class of schemes while our result proves memory-tight plain mUFCMA security based on any plain UFCMA scheme. They apply their RDS result to establish tight proofs for the strong mUFCMA security of RSA-PFDH (matching our direct proof in Theorem 4) as well as schemes based on lossy identification schemes and pairings.

Authenticated Encryption Security. Ghoshal, Jaeger, and Tessaro [19] have recently observed that in the context of authenticated encryption (AE), it is difficult to lift confidentiality of the scheme, in terms of INDR security, to full AE security, when additionally assuming ciphertext integrity, if we want to do so in a memory-tight way. This is well motivated, as several works establish tight time-memory trade-offs for INDR security [27,22,17,14,26], which we would like to lift to their AE security. The difficulty in the proof is that the INDR reduction must simulate a decryption oracle which rejects all ciphertexts except those forwarded from an encryption query. Recognizing these forwarded ciphertexts seems to require remembering state.

Here, we give a different take and show that for specific schemes – in particular, those obtained by adding integrity via a PRF, following the lines of [24,6,23] – a memory-tight reduction can be given. Our INDR reduction is applied after arguing that the PRF looks like a random function $f$ and thus forgeries are unlikely to occur. It uses $f$ in a version of our efficient tagging technique to identify whether a ciphertext queried to decryption is fresh.\(^6\)

Chosen ciphertext security: One to many. A classical textbook result for public-key encryption shows that CCA-security against a single encryption query (1CCA) implies security against multiple queries (mCCA), with a quantitative advantage loss accounting to the number of such queries. ACFK [2] claim, incorrectly, that the associated reduction from 1CCA to mCCA is easy to make memory-tight, but this appears to be an oversight: No such reduction is known, and here we use our techniques to recover a memory-tight way. This is well motivated, as several works establish tight time-memory trade-offs for INDR

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\(^5\) The suffix ‘1’ indicates a variant of UFCMA security in which the adversary can only obtain a single signature per message. The security game always returning the same signature if the adversary repeats signature queries.

\(^6\) Ghosal et al. [19] in fact described three variants of AE with different conventions for how decryption responds to non-fresh queries. By our results, memory-tight reductions to INDR are possible for two of the three variants.
We will resolve this in two ways. First, we give a new memory-tight reduction using the inefficient tagging method, with the same advantage loss as the original textbook reduction. Our reduction non-time-tight, so may not be suitable for all situations. The main idea here is that we use the randomness used to generate the challenge ciphertext as our tag.

To obtain a reduction which is also tight with respect to time, we resort to the observation that changing to a stronger (but still commonly achieved) definition of CCA-security allows for different memory-tight reductions. We give in particular a memory-tight and time-tight reduction (with the usual factor $q$ advantage loss) from the notion of $\text{1CCA}$-$m$ security to the notion of $\text{mCCA}$-$m$ security. These are variants of CCA security where (1) encryption queries are with respect to a single message, and return either the encryption of the message, or a random, independent ciphertext, and (2) decryption queries on a challenge ciphertext $c_i$ returns the associated message.

Our reduction uses the full power of our message encoding approach, simulating random ciphertexts in a careful way which allows for recovering the associated challenge plaintext.

A FEW REMARKS. The above results on CCA security show us that the ability to give a memory-tight reduction is strongly coupled with definitional choices. In particular, different equivalent approaches to modeling the decryption oracle in the memory unbounded regime may not be equivalent in the memory-bounded setting. This means in particular that we need to exercise more care in choosing the right definition. We believe, for example, that the approach taken in $\text{mCCA}$-$m$ security is the more “natural” one (as it does not require artificially blocking the output of the decryption oracle, by always returning a message), but there may be contexts where other definitional choices are favored.

Another important lesson learnt from our AE result is that impossibility results, such as those in [2, 28, 20, 19], do not preclude positive results in form of memory-tight reductions, either by leveraging the structure of specific schemes, or by considering restricted security notions.

1.3 Paper Outline

Section 2 introduces notation, our computational model, and basic cryptographic background. Section 3 discusses our convention of using $F$-oracle adversaries. Section 4 gives our memory-tight reduction for digital signature schemes when many forgery attempts are allowed. In particular, the generic results are in Section 4.2, while the result specific to RSA-PFDH is in Section 4.5. Section 5 proves the security of Encrypt-then-PRF with a memory-tight reduction to the INDR security of the encryption scheme. Section 6 gives our results relating the one- and many-challenge query variants of CCA security. In particular, Section 6.1 gives our result for the traditional “left-vs.-right” notion and Section 6.2 gives our result for the “indistinguishable from random” variant.
2 Preliminaries

Let $N = \{0, 1, \ldots\}$ and $[n] = \{1, \ldots, n\}$ for $n \in \mathbb{N}$. If $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ is a string, then $|x|$ denotes its length in bits. If $S$ is a set, then $|S|$ denotes its size. We let $x \mid y \mid \ldots$ denote an encoding of the strings $x, y, \ldots$ from which the constituent strings can be unambiguously recovered. We identify bitstrings with integers in the standard way.

FUNCTIONS. Let $T$ be a set (called the tweak set) and for each $t \in T$ let $D_t$ and $R_t$ be sets. Then $\text{Fcs}(T, D, R)$ denotes the set of all $f$ such that for each $t \in T$, $f(t, \cdot)$ is a function from $D_t$ to $R_t$. Similarly, $\text{Inj}(T, D, R)$ denotes the set of all $f$ such that for each $t \in T$, $f(t, \cdot)$ is an injection from $D_t$ to $R_t$. When $D_t$ or $R_t$ are independent of the choice of $t$ we may omit the subscript.

If $f \in \text{Inj}(T, D, R)$, then its inverse $f^{-1}$ is defined by $f^{-1}(t, f(t, x)) = x$ for all $(t, x)$ and $f^{-1}(t, y) = \bot$ for $y \notin f(t, D_t)$. For such $f$ we let $f^\pm$ denote the function defined by $f^\pm(\cdot, x) = f(x)$ and $f^\pm(\cdot, -) = f^{-1}(x)$.

We let $\text{Inj}^\pm(T, D, R) = \{f^\pm : f \in \text{Inj}(T, D, R)\}$.

2.1 Computational Model

PSEUDOCODE. We regularly use pseudocode inspired by the code-based framework of [9]. We think of algorithms as randomized RAMs when not specified otherwise. If $\mathcal{A}$ is an algorithm, then $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x_1, \ldots, r)$ denotes running $\mathcal{A}$ on inputs $x_1, \ldots$ with coins $r$ and access to the oracles $O_1, \ldots$ to produce output $y$. When the coins are implicit we write $\leftarrow$ in place of $\leftarrow$ and omit $r$.

We let $x \leftarrow D$ denote sampling $x$ according to the distribution $D$. If $D$ is a set, we overload notation and let $D$ also denote the uniform distribution over elements of $D$. The domain of $D$ is denoted by $[D]$.

Security notions are defined via games; for an example see Fig. 2. The probability that $G$ outputs $\text{true}$ is denoted $\Pr[G]$. In proofs we sometimes define a sequence of “hybrid” games in one figure, using comments of the form “// $H_{i,j}$.” A line of code commented thusly is only included in the hybrids $H_{i,j}$ (code no longer included in the $i$-th hybrid) and $H_{i,j}$ (code new to the $k$-th hybrid).

We let $\bot$ be a special symbol used to indicate rejection. If we do not explicitly include $\bot$ in a set, then $\bot$ is not contained in that set. If $\bot$ is an input to a function or algorithm, then we assume its output is $\bot$. We do not distinguish between $\bot$ and tuples $(\bot, \ldots, \bot)$. Algorithms cannot query $\bot$ to their oracles.

COMPLEXITY MEASURES. To measure the complexity of algorithms we follow the conventions of measuring their local complexity, not including the complexity of whatever oracles they interact with. Local complexity was preferred by Auerbach et al. [2] for analyzing memory-limited adversaries so that analysis can be agnostic to minor details of security definitions’ implementations. We focus on worst-case runtime $\text{Time}(\mathcal{A})$ and memory complexity $\text{Mem}(\mathcal{A})$ (i.e. how many bits of state it stores for local computation). These exclude the internal complexity of oracles queried by $\mathcal{A}$, but include the time and memory used to write the query and receive the response. If $\mathcal{A}$ expects access to $n$ oracles then we let $\text{Query}(\mathcal{A}) = (q_1, \ldots, q_n)$ where $q_i$ is an upper bound on the number of queries to its $i$-th oracle. (Here we index from left to right, so for $\mathcal{A}(O_1, \ldots, O_n)$, the $i$-th oracle is $O_i$.) If $S$ is a scheme, then $\text{Time}(S)$ and $\text{Mem}(S)$ are the sums of the corresponding complexities over all of its algorithms. If $G$ is a game, then we define $\text{Time}(G)$ and $\text{Mem}(G)$ to exclude the complexity of any adversaries embedded in the game.

2.2 Cryptographic Background

IDEAL MODELS. Some schemes we look at may be proven secure in ideal models (e.g. the random oracle or ideal cipher models). To capture this we can think of a scheme $S$ as specifying a set of functions $S_1, S_2$. At the beginning of a security game a function $h$ will be sampled from this set. The adversary and all algorithms of $S$ are given oracle access to $h$. 

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FUNCTION FAMILIES. A family of functions $F$ specifies, for each $K \in F.K$, an efficiently computable function $F_K \in F.F$. We refer to $F.F$ as the function space of $F$. Pseudorandom (PR) security of $F$ is captured by the game defined in Fig. 2. It measures how $F$ with a random key can be distinguished from a random function in $F.F$ via oracle access. We define $\text{Adv}_F^{d}(A) = \Pr[F_{\text{cs}}(A)] - \Pr[F_{\text{cs}}^{pr}(A)]$. The standard notions of (tweakable) pseudorandom functions/injections/ permutations or strong injections/ permutations are captured by appropriate choices of $F.F$.

SWITCHING LEMA. We make use of the following standard result which bounds how well a random function and a random injection can be distinguished.

**Lemma 1 (Switching Lemma).** Fix $T$, $D$, and $R$. Let $N = \min_{t \in T} |R_t|$. Then for any adversary $A$ with $q = \text{Query}(A)$ we have that

$$|\Pr[A^f \Rightarrow 1] - \Pr[A^g \Rightarrow 1]| \leq q^2/N.$$  

The probabilities are measured over the coins of $A$, the uniform choice of $f$ from $\text{Fcs}(T,D,R)$, and the uniform choice of $g$ from $\text{Inj}(T,D,R)$.

Recent papers [22,16,26] have given improved versions of the switching lemma for adversaries with bounded memory complexity, as long as it does not repeat oracle queries. In our application of the switching lemma the adversary’s memory complexity is too large for these bounds to provide any improvement.

OTHER PRIMITIVES. We recall relevant syntax and security definitions for digital signatures, nonce-based encryption, and public key encryption schemes in the sections where we consider them (Sections 4, 5, and 6 respectively).

### 3 Adversaries With Access to Random Functions

This paper proposes and adopts what we consider to be a better formalism to deal with memory-tight reductions. Namely, all of our reductions will require access to some variety of large random functions which it will query on a small number of inputs (specifically uniformly random functions and invertible random injections). That is, our reduction adversaries can be written in the form shown of the left below, for some set of functions $F$ and algorithm $A_2$. (On the right is a pseudorandom version of $A$ which we will discuss momentarily.)

![Game](image)

We refer to such an $A$ as an $F$-oracle adversary. In this section we will generally discuss such adversaries, rather than separately providing the analysis for such adversaries each time we apply them.

The time and memory complexity of any $F$-oracle adversary must include the complexity of sampling, storing, and evaluating $f$. This will be significant if $F$ is large. However, as we will argue, this additional state and time should be assumed to not significantly increase the advantage of $A$. As such, we will define the reduced complexity of $A$ by

$$\text{Time}^{*}(A) = \text{Time}(A_2) \text{ and } \text{Mem}^{*}(A) = \text{Mem}(A_2).$$

Later we state theorems in terms of reduced complexity when appropriate.
INFORMATION THEORETIC SETTINGS. As a first observation why the storage of $f$ may not help $\mathcal{A}$, note that $f$ is completely independent of the “problem” $\mathcal{A}$ is trying to solve (as specified by $\text{in}$ and the behavior of $\text{O}$). In various settings it seems likely (or even is provable) that such independent state does not help.

For example, it would be very surprising (or even a breakthrough) to show a better factoring or lattice algorithm given access to a random function $f$ from a natural set. One example where it would typically be even provable that such $f$ cannot help in information theoretic settings. In such settings we often prove bounds of the form $\text{Adv}(\mathcal{A}) \leq c(\text{Time}(\mathcal{A}), \text{Mem}(\mathcal{A}), \text{Query}(\mathcal{A}))$. Note that this bound does not depend on the code size of $\mathcal{A}$. Thus the bound can likely be extended to prove $\text{Adv}(\mathcal{A}) \leq c(\text{Time}^*(\mathcal{A}), \text{Mem}^*(\mathcal{A}), \text{Query}(\mathcal{A}))$ by a coin-fixing argument in which we fix the random choice of function ahead of time and embed it in the description of the adversary. This is, for example, the case for the recent time-memory tradeoffs shown for distinguishing between a random function and a random injection without repeating queries [22,16,26].

PSEUDORANDOM REPLACEMENT. If we are unwilling to a priori assume that the random independent state cannot help an adversary, we could instead bound how much it can help by replacing it with a pseudorandom version. This was the approach taken by Auerbach et al. [2] when they used pseudorandom functions for purposes such as emulating random oracles and storing the coins required by an adversary with low memory. If $F$ is a function family with $F.F = F$, then the adversary $\mathcal{A}_F$ we gave above does exactly this. It replaces $\mathcal{A}_2$’s oracle access to $f$ with access to $F_K$ for a random $K$. The following lemma is straightforward.

**Lemma 2.** Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an $F$-oracle adversary for a game $G$. Then for any function family $F$ with $F.F = F$ we can define a pseudorandomness adversary $\mathcal{A}_F$ such that

$$
\begin{align*}
\Pr[G(\mathcal{A})] &\leq \Pr[G(\mathcal{A}_F)] + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^F(\mathcal{A}_F), \\
\text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \text{Time}^*(\mathcal{A}) + \text{Time}(G(\mathcal{A})), \\
\text{Query}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq q, \text{ and} \\
\text{Mem}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \text{Mem}^*(\mathcal{A}) + \text{Mem}(G(\mathcal{A})).
\end{align*}
$$

Here $q$ is an upper bound on the number of queries $\mathcal{A}_2$ makes to its second oracle.

Note that the complexity of $\mathcal{A}_F$ is given by $\text{Time}(\mathcal{A}_F) = \text{Time}^*(\mathcal{A}) + q \cdot \text{Time}(F)$ and $\text{Mem}(\mathcal{A}_F) = \text{Mem}^*(\mathcal{A}) + \text{Mem}(F)$. Thus the existence of an appropriate pseudorandom $F$ ensures that the memory and time complexity excluded by $\text{Time}^*$ and $\text{Mem}^*$ cannot significantly aid an adversary. In the use of this technique by Auerbach et al. [2] the reduction $\mathcal{A}_2$ was memory-tight. Note this is not strictly necessary as long as we are willing to assume the existence of $F$ with sufficient security as a function of attackers’ time and query complexities without regard to memory complexity.

We could have combined Lemma 2 with any of our coming theorems to obtain bounds in terms of $\text{Time}$ and $\text{Mem}$, rather than their reduced version. However we find the use of reduced complexity cleaner as it simplifies our theorems, allowing us to focus on their conceptual core of the proofs without having to repeat the rote step of replacing random objects with pseudorandom ones.

When combining the lemma with a theorem, game $G$ would correspond to the security game played by the reduction adversary. For our theorems, that game will have low time and memory overhead over that of $\mathcal{A}$, so the application of the lemma would be time- and memory-tight. That said, the tightness of this is less important than the tightness of the other components of the theorem we would apply it to. Note that the definition of $\mathcal{A}_i$ is independent of the choice of $F$. Consequently, we can always choose $F$ with a very high security threshold to counteract any looseness in the lemma. In Appendix A we summarize the $\mathcal{F}$ used in our theorems and how they could be pseudorandomly instantiated.

4 Multi-challenge Security of Digital Signature Schemes

In the context of memory-tightness, the security of digital signature schemes has been considered in several prior works [2,28,15]. The standard security notion for signatures asks the attacker, given examples, to come up with a forged signature on a fresh message. A straightforward proof shows (in the standard setting where memory efficiency is not a concern) that the security notion is equivalent whether the attacker is allowed one or many forgery attempts. However, Auerbach et al. [2] proved an impossibility result showing that a (certain form of black-box) reduction cannot be time, memory, and advantage tight. The difficulty faced by
the reduction is in distinguishing between when the adversary has produced a novel forgery and when it is simply repeating a signature that it was given.

In this section we show a few ways that security against many forgery attempts (i.e., multiple challenges) can be proven to follow from security against a single forgery (i.e., a single challenge) in a memory-tight manner. Our first results consider a variant definition of digital signature security we introduce (called UFRMA) in which the adversary has only partial control over the messages being signed. Using our new techniques, we show that single challenge UFCMA security implies multi-challenge UFRMA security in a memory-tight manner. Our first results consider a variant definition of digital signature security we introduce (called SUFCMA) in which the adversary is given incomplete control over the messages which are signed. A message distribution will be parameterized by a message distribution syntax.

### 4.1 Syntax and Security

**Digital Signature Syntax.** A digital signature scheme DS specifies a key generation algorithm DS.K, a signing algorithm DS.Sign, and a verification algorithm DS.Ver. The syntaxes of these algorithms are shown in Fig. 3. When relevant we let DS.M denote the set of messages it accepts. The verification and signing keys are respectively denoted by vk and sk. The message to be signed is m, the signature produced is σ, and the decision is d ∈ {true,false}. Correctness requires DS.Ver(vk, m, σ) = true for all (vk, sk) ∈ DS.K, all m ∈ DS.M, and all σ ∈ DS.Sign(vk, m).

**Message Distribution Syntax.** One of the security notions we consider for digital signature schemes will be parameterized by a message distribution via which the adversary is given incomplete control over the messages which are signed. A message distribution D specifies sampling algorithm DS which samples an output message m' based on parameters m given as input (written m' ← DS(m)). The parameters m must be drawn from a set DS.M, which we typically leave implicit. When making the randomness of the sampling algorithm explicit we let D.R be the set from which its randomness is drawn and write m' ← DS(m; r). If there exists an extraction algorithm DX such that DX(D.S(m; r)) = (m, r) for all m, r then we say D is extractable. If DX(D.S(m; r)) = m for all m, r then we say D is weakly extractable. We assume that DX(m') = ⊥ if m' ≠ DS(m; r) for all m, r. We define the min-entropy of D as

$$D.H_x = -\log \max_m \Pr[r \leftrightarrow D.R : D.S(m; r) = m'] .$$

**Unforgeability Security.** The unforgeability security notions we consider are defined in Fig. 4. The standard notion of UFCMA (unforgeability under chosen message attack) security is captured by G^{ufcma} which includes the boxed but not the highlighted code, giving the adversary access to a regular signing oracle.
SIGN. The goal of the adversary is to query FORGE with a valid signature $\sigma^*$ of a message $m^*$ which was not previously included in a signing query (as stored by the set $S$). We define $\text{Adv}_{\text{ufcma}}(A) = \Pr[\mathcal{G}_{\text{ufcma}}^*(A)]$.

Our new security notion UFRMA (unforgeability under randomized message attack) is captured by the game $\mathcal{G}_{\text{ufrma}}$ which is parameterized by a message distribution $D$. In this game the adversary is instead given access to the randomized signing oracle $\text{RSIGN}$ where the message to be signed is chosen by $D$. Note that the coins used by $D$ are returned to the adversary along with the signature. Otherwise this game matches that of UFCMA security. We define $\text{Adv}_{\text{frma}}(A) = \Pr[\mathcal{G}_{\text{frma}}^*(A)]$.

We will relate the advantage of attacks making only a single forgery attempt and those making many such attempts. When wanting to make the distinction explicit we prefix the abbreviation of a security notion with a superscript such as in $\text{1UFCMA}$. We define $\text{SUFRMA}$, $\text{G}_{\text{ufrma}}$, and $\text{Adv}_{\text{ufrma}}$ analogously. We write $\text{xUFRMA}$ when assuming that $D$ is extractable and $\text{wUFRMA}$ when assuming it is weakly extractable.

### 4.2 Multi-Challenge Security for Extractable Message Distributions

The first applications we show for our techniques are generic methods of tightly implying security of a digital signature scheme against multiple forgery attempts (i.e., multi-challenge security). Recall that Auerbach et al. [2] gave a lower bound showing that a black-box reduction proving that single UFCMA security implies many UFCMA cannot be made memory-tight and time-tight. We avoid this in two ways; first by considering mUFRMA, rather than mUFCMA, security and then by considering a particular choice of digital signature scheme.

**High-Level Idea.** The primary difficulty of a tight proof that 1UFCMA security implies mUFCMA security is that a successful mUFCMA attacker may have made many FORGE queries which verify correctly, one of which is a valid forgery and the rest of which were just forwarded from its $\text{SIGN}$ oracle. A 1UFCMA reduction must then somehow be able to identify which of the queries is the true forgery so it can forward this to its own FORGE oracle.

The technical core of the coming proof for mUFRMA is that our reduction adversary will use the random coins of the message distribution $D$ to signal things to its future self. In particular, when $A$, makes a query $\text{RSIGN}(m)$, the reduction will chose coins for $D.S$ via $r \leftarrow f(m, i)$ where $i$ is a counter which is incremented with each query and $f$ is a random tweakable function/injection. The coins then act as a sort of authentication tag for $m$. On a later $\text{FORGE}(m^*, \sigma^*)$ query, if $m^* = D.S(m; r)$ where $r = f(m, i)$ for some $i \in [q_{\text{SIGN}}]$, the reduction can safely assume this message was signed by an earlier $\text{RSIGN}$ query.

When $D$ is fully extractable, we perform the requisite check for FORGE by having $f$ be an injection. We extract $m$ and $r$ from $m^*$ and then compute $i \leftarrow f^{-1}(m, r)$. This is the strategy used in Theorem 1. If we assume only that $D$ is weakly extractable, we can extract $m$ if $D$ has a sufficient amount of entropy, and then individually check if $D.S(m; f(m, i))$ holds for each choice of $i$. This reduction strategy, used in Theorem 3, obtains the same advantage at the cost of an extra runtime being needed to iterate over the possible choices of $i$ in $\text{FORGE}$.

**Extractable Message Distribution.** If the message distribution $D$ is extractable, the following theorem captures that 1UFCMA security tightly implies mUFRMA security. The proof makes use of our efficient tagging technique.

**Theorem 1 (1UFCMA $\Rightarrow$ mUFRMA).** Let $DS$ be a digital signature scheme and $D$ be an extractable message distribution. Let $A_d$ be an adversary with $(q_{\text{SIGN}}, q_{\text{FORGE}}, q_h) = \text{Query}(A_d)$ and assume $q_{\text{SIGN}} \leq 0.5|D.R|$. Let $A_u$ be the $\mathcal{I}(\mathcal{D}.M[[q_{\text{SIGN}}], D.R])$-oracle adversary shown in Fig. 5. Then,

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{DS,D}}(A_d) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{DS}}(A_u) + (0.5 \cdot q_{\text{SIGN}}^2 + 2 \cdot q_{\text{SIGN}} \cdot q_{\text{FORGE}})/|D.R|
\]

\[
\text{Query}(A_u) = (q_{\text{SIGN}}, q_h + q_{\text{FORGE}} \cdot \text{Query}(DS))
\]

\[
\text{Time}^*(A_u) = \text{Time}(A_d) + q_{\text{SIGN}} \cdot \text{Time}(D) + q_{\text{FORGE}}(\text{Time}(D) + \text{Time}(DS))
\]

\[
\text{Mem}^*(A_u) = \text{Mem}(A_d) + \text{Mem}(D) + \text{Mem}(DS) + \log(q_{\text{SIGN}}).
\]
Appendix 4.3. It applies the switching lemma to argue the use of $f$ so $\Pr$ replace the random sampling of $r$ variables

\[\text{Proof.} \]

We consider a sequence of hybrids $H$.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
$A^0_{\text{or,forge,}h(vk)}$ & $\text{SimRSign}(m)$ & $\text{SimForge}(m^*, \sigma^*)$ \\
\hline $i \leftarrow 0$ & $i \leftarrow i + 1$ & $(m, r) \leftarrow DX(m^*)$ \\
$f \leftarrow \text{Inj}(DS.M, [q_{\text{sign}}], D.R)$ & $r \leftarrow f(m, i)$ & If $f^{-1}(m, r) \notin [q_{\text{sign}}]$ \\
\text{Run } $A^0_{\text{or,forge,}h(vk)}$ & $m' \leftarrow DS(m; r)$ & If DS Ver$^h(vk, m^*, \sigma^*)$: \\
\text{Return } $\sigma$ & $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(m')$ & Query Forge$(m^*, \sigma^*)$ \\
\text{Return } $\sigma, r$ & & Halt execution \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Fig. 5. Adversary $A_0$ used in proof of Theorem 1.

\begin{table}[h]
\centering
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
Games $H_b$ for $0 \leq b \leq 4$ & RSign$(m)$ & $\text{Forge}(m^*, \sigma^*)$ \\
\hline $h \leftarrow \text{DS.1}$ & $r \leftarrow D.R$ & $(m, r) \leftarrow D.X(m^*)$ \\
$(vk, sk) \leftarrow \text{DS.K}, S \leftarrow \emptyset$ & $i \leftarrow i + 1$ & If $m^* \notin S$: //$H_{0,1}$ \\
$\text{win} \leftarrow$ false & $r \leftarrow f(m, i)$ & If $f^{-1}(m, r) \notin [m]$: //$H_{0,2}$ \\
$i \leftarrow 0$; $I[i] \leftarrow \emptyset$ & $I(m) \leftarrow I(m) \cup \{i\}$ & If $f^{-1}(m, r) \notin [q_{\text{sign}}]$: //$H_{0,3}$ \\
$f \leftarrow \text{Fce}(DS.M, [q_{\text{sign}}], D.R)$ & $S \leftarrow S \cup \{m'\}$ & If DS Ver$^h(vk, m^*, \sigma^*)$: \\
$f \leftarrow \text{Inj}(DS.M, [q_{\text{sign}}], D.R)$ & $\sigma \leftarrow DS.$ Sign$(vk, m')$ & win $\leftarrow$ true \\
\text{Run } $A^0_{\text{or,forge,}h(vk)}$ & Return $\sigma, r$ & \\
\text{Return } $\text{win}$ & & \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{table}

Fig. 6. Hybrid games used in proof of Theorem 1.

This is time-tight because $\text{Time}(A_0) \in \Omega(q_{\text{sign}} + q_{\text{forge}})$ must hold and $\text{Time}(D)$ and $\text{Time}(DS)$ will be small. This is memory-tight because $\text{Mem}(D)$, $\text{Mem}(DS)$, and $\text{lg}(q_{\text{sign}})$ will be small.

The main idea of $A_0$ is using the output of an invertible random injection $f$ on the message and a counter as coins instead of sampling them uniformly at random when answering RSign queries. Since $D$ is fully extractable, during a Forge query on $m^*$, we can extract $(m, r) \leftarrow D.X(m^*)$ and use the fact that $f$ is invertible to compute $f^{-1}(m, r)$ and check if the index is in $[q_{\text{sign}}]$. This is used to avoid remembering $S$. If $m^* \in S$, and $(m, r) \leftarrow D.X(m^*)$, then there exists $j \in [q_{\text{sign}}]$ such that $r = f(m, j)$ -- so the check passes. We can argue that if $m^* \notin S$, our check is unlikely to pass. We give the formal proof of this theorem below. In Appendix 4.3. It applies the switching lemma to argue the use of $f$ cannot be distinguished from honestly sampling $r$ with advantage better than $0.5 \cdot q_{\text{sign}}^2/|D.R|$ and shows that the probability of falsely making the check pass is bounded by $q_{\text{sign}}q_{\text{forge}}/|D.R|$.

We would not be able to use the technique in this proof to prove mxSUFRMA from 1SUFCMA in a memory-tight way. In particular, since the coins $r$ of the message distribution are chosen before $s$ is known, our trick of using $r$ to signal freshness of a forgery query does not work for a message-signature pair.

4.3 Proof of Theorem 1 (1UFCMA $\Rightarrow$ mUFRMA)

**Proof.** We consider a sequence of hybrids $H_0$ through $H_4$ defined in Fig. 6. When examining these hybrids recall our conventions regarding $\text{"//"}$ comments described in Sec. 2.1. Of these hybrids we will make the following claims, which establish the upper bound on the advantage of $A$, claimed in the proof.

1. $\Pr[G_{\text{UFRMA}}(A)] = \Pr[H_0] = \Pr[H_1]$
2. $\Pr[H_1] \leq \Pr[H_2] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{sign}}^2/|D.R|
3. $\Pr[H_2] = \Pr[H_3]
4. $\Pr[H_3] \leq \Pr[H_4] + 2q_{\text{sign}}q_{\text{forge}}/|D.R|
5. $\Pr[H_4] = \text{Adv}_{\text{DS}}^\text{forge}(A_0)$

**Transition to $H_0, H_1$.** The hybrid $H_0$ is simply a copy of the game $G_{\text{UFRMA}}$. (We also added code to initialize variables $i$ and $I[\cdot]$ that will be used in later hybrids.) Hence $\Pr[G_{\text{UFRMA}}(A)] = \Pr[H_0]$. In hybrid $H_1$, we replace the random sampling of $r$ for $D$ in RSign with the output of a random function $f$ applied to $m$, using a counter $i$ to provide domain separation between different queries. This method of choosing $r$ equivalent, so $\Pr[H_0] = \Pr[H_1]$. 

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Transition $H_1$ to $H_2$. In hybrid $H_2$ we replace the random function with a random injection. This modifies the behavior of the game only in that values of $r$ are guaranteed not to repeat across different signing queries that used the same message. There are at most $q_{\text{SIGN}}$ invocations of $f$, so the switching lemma (Lemma 1) tells us that $\Pr[H_1] \leq \Pr[H_2] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{SIGN}}^2/|D.R|$.

Transition $H_2$ to $H_3$. In hybrid $H_3$, we replace the check whether $m^* \notin S$ in oracle FORGE with a check if $f^{-1}(m, r) \notin I[m]$ where $(m, r) = D.X(m^*)$. Here $I[\cdot]$ is a new table introduced into the game. In RSIGN, code was added which uses $I[m]$ to store each of the counter values for which $A_i$ made a signing query for $m$. Hence $f^{-1}(m, r)$ will be in $I[m]$ iff $m^*$ is in $S$ and so $\Pr[H_2] = \Pr[H_3]$.

Transition $H_3$ to $H_4$. In the final transition to hybrid $H_4$ we replace the FORGE check $f^{-1}(m, r) \notin I[m]$ with $f^{-1}(m, r) \notin q_{\text{SIGN}}$. This does change behavior if $A_i$ ever makes a successful forgery query for $m^* = D.S(m; f(i, m))$ without its $i$-th signing query having used the message $m$. This would require guessing $f(m, i)$ for some $i \in [q_{\text{SIGN}}], I[m]$. We can bound the probability of this ever occurring by a union bound over the FORGE queries made by $A_i$. Consider the set $f(m, q_{\text{SIGN}}), I[m]) = \{f(m, i) \in [q_{\text{SIGN}}], I[m]\}$. It has size at most $q_{\text{SIGN}}$. Because $f$ is a random injection it is uniform subset of the set $D.R, f(m, I[m])$ (which has size at least $|D.R| - q_{\text{SIGN}}$). Hence the probability of any particular query triggering this different behavior is at most $q_{\text{SIGN}}/|D.R| - q_{\text{SIGN}} < 2q_{\text{SIGN}}/|D.R|$. Applying the union bound gives us $\Pr[H_3] \leq \Pr[H_4] + 2q_{\text{SIGN}} \cdot q_{\text{FORGE}}/|D.R|$.

Reduction to UFCMA. We complete the proof using adversary $A_u$ from Fig. 5 which simulates hybrid $H_4$ and succeeds whenever $A_i$ would. The adversary $A_u$ samples $f$ at random from $\text{Inf}(DS.M, [q_{\text{SIGN}}], D.R)$. When run on input $vk$ it runs $A_i$ on the same input. It gives $A_i$ direct access to $h$. To simulate a query $\text{SIGN}(m)$, it computes $m' \leftarrow D.S(m; f(m, i))$, increments $i$, and queries $\text{SIGN}(m')$, returning the result to $A_i$. On a query $\text{FORGE}(m^*, \sigma^*)$, it computes $(m, r) \leftarrow D.X(m^*)$. If $f^{-1}(r) \notin q_{\text{SIGN}}$ and $\text{DS.Ver}(vk, m^*, \sigma) = \text{true}$ then it queries its oracle with $(m^*, \sigma)$ and halts. Otherwise it ignores the query.

If adversary $A_i$ ever makes a FORGE query, it will succeed. It ensured that $(m^*, \sigma^*)$ is verified correctly and $f^{-1}(r) \notin q_{\text{SIGN}}$ ensures that it is has not previously made a SIGN query for $m^*$. If $A_i$ would have succeeded in hybrid $H_4$, its winning query will cause $A_u$ to make a FORGE query. Hence, we have $\Pr[H_4] = \text{Adv}^{u_{\text{DS}}}_{\text{uFCMA}}(A_u)$.

The claimed complexity of $A_u$ is straightforward. Clearly it makes $q_{\text{SIGN}}$ queries to its signing oracle and 1 query to its forgery oracle. It forwards all of $A_i$’s queries to $h$ and additionally may make queries when running $\text{DS.Ver}$ in $\text{Sim}^{\text{FORGE}}$ giving $q_i + q_{\text{FORGE}} \cdot \text{Query}(\text{DS.Ver})$ queries total. The time complexity of $A_i$ includes that of $A_i$, plus the time to execute $D.S$ for each signing query, and the time to run $D.X$ and $\text{DS.Ver}$ for each forgery attempt. The memory complexity of $A_u$ includes that of $A_i$, plus the amount of memory required to run the algorithms $D.S$, $D.X$, and $\text{DS.Ver}$ and to store the counter $i$.

### 4.4 Applications and Weakly Extractable Variant

We discuss some applications of Theorem 1. This includes scenarios where extractable message distributions are used and proving security of digital signature schemes when their messages are padded with randomness. Additionally, we give a variant of the theorem when the underlying message distribution is only weakly extractable. The resulting reduction is memory- but not time-tight.

**Example Extractable Distributions.** The simplest extractable distribution does not accept parameters as input and simply outputs its randomness as the message. Security with respect to this is the standard notion of security against random message attacks which is well-studied and has various applications.

Extractable distributions arise naturally when the messages being signed include random values. For example, protocols often include random nonces in messages that are signed. In TLS 1.3, for example, when the server is responding to the Client Hello Message it signs a transcript of the conversation up until that point which includes a 256-bit nonce just chosen by the server. We could think of the security for this setting being captured by an extractable distribution $D_{\text{tls}}$ that takes as input message parameter $m$ that specifies all of the transcript other than the nonce and sets the nonce to its randomness $r \in \{0, 1\}^{256}$.

**Padding Schemes with Randomness.** Using Theorem 1, we can see that augmenting any digital signature scheme by appending auxiliary randomness will give us a memory-tight reduction from the mUFCMA security of the augmented scheme to the 1UFCMA security of the original scheme.
Let DS be a digital signature scheme. Then we define \( \text{RDS}[\text{DS}, R] \) by having \( \text{RDS}[\text{DS}, R].\text{Sign}(sk, m) \) do “\( r \leftarrow R; \) Return \( \text{DS.Sign}(sk, m | r) \)” and having \( \text{RDS}[\text{DS}, R].\text{Ver}(vk, m, r) \) do “\( \sigma \leftarrow \sigma'; \) Return \( \text{DS.Ver}(vk, m | r, \sigma) \)” We also define a related message distribution \( \text{RD}[R] \) by \( \text{RD}[R].R = R \) and \( \text{RD}[R].S(m; r) = m | r \). Clearly it is extractable.

The following reduces the mUFCMA security of RDS to the mUFRLMA security of DS. Theorem 1 can in turn be used to reduce this to the 1UFCMA security of DS. It also relates the mSUFCMA security of RDS to the mSUFRMA security of DS. We note this because if DS has unique signatures, then its mSUFRMA and mUFRLMA security are identical and hence UFCMA security of DS implies mSUFCMA security of RDS in a memory-tight way.

**Theorem 2.** Let DS be a digital signature scheme and R be a set. Then for any \( A \) we can construct \( A' \) such that, \( \text{Adv}^{\text{ufrma}}_{\text{RDS[DS,R]}}(A) = \text{Adv}^{\text{ufrma}}_{\text{DS}}(A') \). It additionally holds that \( \text{Adv}^{\text{ufrma}}_{\text{DS}}(A) = \text{Adv}^{\text{ufrma}}_{\text{RDS[DS,R]}}(A) \). Adversary \( A' \) has essentially the same complexity as \( A \).

Proof (Sketch). The proof of this is straightforward. If \( A \) queries \( \text{Sign}(m) \), then \( A' \) queries \( \text{Sign}(m | r) \) for a random \( r \in R \). If \( A \) queries \( \text{Forge}(m^*, \sigma^* | r^*) \), then \( A' \) queries \( \text{Forge}(m^* | r^*, \sigma^*) \). Note that \( A' \) wins whenever \( A \) would. \( \Box \)

In independent and concurrent work, Diemiex6, Gellert, Jager, and Lyu [15] also considered RDS, proving that if DS can be proven SUFCMA1 secure (in this notion the game records its responses to signature queries and repeats them if the adversary repeats a query) with a restricted class of “canonical” memory-tight reductions, then there is a memory-tight reduction for the mSUFCMA security of RDS. This complements our result, they use a more restrictive assumption to prove mSUFCMA while we use a generic assumption to prove mUFCMA.

Weakly extractable message distribution. If D is only weakly extractable (but still has high entropy), then we can prove a variant of Theorem 1 with a less efficient reduction. (In particular, the running time of the reduction has an additional term of \( q_{\text{Forge}} \cdot q_{\text{Sign}} \cdot \text{Time}(D.S.) \). This difference arises because rather than extracting r and computing \( j \leftarrow f^{-1}(m, r) \) in \( \text{Forge} \) we instead need to iterate over the possible values of \( f(m, j) \) to check for consistency. Thus the proof is an instance of our inefficient tagging technique.

**Theorem 3 (1UFCMA \( \Rightarrow \) mwUFRMA).** Let DS be a digital signature scheme and D be a weakly extractable message distribution. Let \( A \) be an adversary with \( (q_{\text{Sign}}, q_{\text{Forge}}, q_h) = \text{Query}(A) \). Define the Fcs(D.S,M,[q_{\text{Sign}}, D,R])-oracle adversary \( A_u \) as shown in Fig. 7. Then.

\[
\text{Adv}^{\text{ufcm}}_{\text{DS,D,D,S,R}}(A_u) \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{ufcm}}_{\text{DS}}(A_u) + q_{\text{Sign}} \cdot q_{\text{Forge}} \cdot 2^{-D.H_e} \\
\text{Query}(A_u) = (q_{\text{Sign}}, 1, q_h + q_{\text{Forge}} \cdot \text{Query}(DS)) \\
\text{Time}^*(A_u) = \text{Time}(A) + q_{\text{Sign}} \cdot \text{Time}(D) + q_{\text{Forge}}(q_{\text{Sign}} \cdot \text{Time}(D) + \text{Time}(DS)) \\
\text{Mem}^*(A_u) = \text{Mem}(A) + \text{Mem}(D) + \text{Mem}(DS) + \text{lg}(q_{\text{Sign}}).
\]

This running time is not time-tight because \( \text{Time}(A) \in \Omega(q_{\text{Sign}} + q_{\text{Forge}}) \) may hold, while \( \text{Time}^*(A_u) \in \Omega(q_{\text{Forge}} \cdot q_{\text{Sign}}) \). This is memory-tight because we expect \( \text{Mem}(D) + \text{Mem}(DS) + \text{lg}(q_{\text{Sign}}) \) to be small. Recall that, as discussed in the introduction, such non-time-tight reductions may be useful when the best attack for the underlying problem with low memory requires significantly more running time than the best attack with high memory.

This theorem is useful when the messages being signed include values derived from randomness which are hard to invert to recover the underlying randomness. Examples of this include the signing of public keys, as is done for certificates or some key exchange protocols, and the signing of ciphertexts, as is done for signcryption. We could capture such settings with appropriate choices of D.

The main idea behind adversary \( A_u \) is very similar to the idea behind the adversary in Theorem 1. Because we now only assume weak extractability, we extract \( m \) and then iterate over each choice of \( j \) to check whether \( D.S(m; f(m, j)) = m^* \). Moreover, since we no longer need to invert \( f \) here, it suffices for \( f \) to be a random function. We give formal proof of Theorem 3.
Fig. 7. Reduction adversary used in proof of Theorem 3.

Fig. 8. Hybrid games used in proof of Theorem 3.

**Proof.** We consider a sequence of hybrids $H_0$ through $H_4$ defined in Fig. 8. Of these hybrids we will make the following claims, which establish the upper bound on the advantage of $A_r$ claimed in the proof.

1. $Pr[G_{\text{ufma}}^{\text{DS,D}}(A_r)] = Pr[H_0] = Pr[H_1]$
2. $Pr[H_1] = Pr[H_2]$
3. $Pr[H_2] = Pr[H_3]$
4. $Pr[H_3] \leq Pr[H_4] + q_{\text{SIGN}} \cdot q_{\text{FORGE}} \cdot 2^{-D,H_{\neq}}$
5. $Pr[H_4] = Adv_{\text{DS}}^{\text{ufma}}(A_r)$

**Transition to $H_0.$** The hybrid $H_0$ is simply a copy of the game $G_{\text{ufma}}.$ (We also added code to initialize variables $i$ and $I[I]$ that will be used in later hybrids.) Hence $Pr[G_{\text{ufma}}^{\text{DS,D}}(A_r)] = Pr[H_0].$

**Transition $H_0$ to $H_1.$** In hybrid $H_1$, we replace the random sampling of $r$ for $D$ in $\text{RSIGN}$ with the output of a random function $f$ applied to $m$, using a counter $i$ to provide domain separation between different queries. This method of choosing $r$ is equivalent, so $Pr[H_0] = Pr[H_1].$

**Transition $H_1$ to $H_2.$** Hybrid $H_2$ is identical to hybrid $H_1$. So $Pr[H_1] = Pr[H_2].$ We include this redundant hybrid to maintain consistency of the hybrid numbers with the proof of Theorem 3.

**Transition $H_2$ to $H_3.$** In hybrid $H_3$, we replace the check whether $m^* \notin S$ in oracle $\text{FORGE}$ with a check if $\forall j \in I[m], D.S(m; f(m, j)) \neq m^*.$ Here $I[I]$ is a new table introduced into the game. In $\text{RSIGN}$, code was added which uses $I[m]$ to store each of the counter values for which $A_r$ made a signing query for $m$. It is easy to see that if for all $j \in I[m], D.S(m; f(m, j)) \neq m^*$, then $m^* \notin S$. Also if there exists $j \in I[m]$ such that $D.S(m; f(m, j)) = m^*$, the $j$-th signing query was on $m$ and hence $m^* \in S$. Therefore the new check is equivalent to the replaced one and so $Pr[H_2] = Pr[H_3].$

**Transition $H_3$ to $H_4.$** In the final transition to hybrid $H_4$ we replace the $\text{FORGE}$ check $\forall j \in I[m], D.S(m; f(m, j)) \neq m^*$ with $\forall j \in [q_{\text{SIGN}}], D.S(m; f(m, j)) \neq m^*.$ This does change behavior if $A_r$ ever makes a
successful forgery attempt for \( m^* = D.S(m; f(m, j)) \) without its \( j \)-th signing query having used the message \( m \). Note that the view of the adversary would be independent of \( f(m, j) \) in this case and hence \( f(m, j) \) can be thought of as a value chosen uniformly at random from \( D.R \). Thus for every Forge query and \( j \in [q_{\text{Sign}}] \) the probability that \( m^* = D.S(m; f(m, j)) \) is at most \( 2^{-D.R} \). By an union bound over all values of \( j \) it follows that for every Forge this happens with probability at most \( q_{\text{Forge}} \cdot 2^{-D.R} \). By a union bound over all Forge queries we get that \( \Pr[H_3] \leq Pr[H_4] + q_{\text{Sign}} \cdot q_{\text{Forge}} \cdot 2^{-D.R} \).

\[ \text{Reduction to UFCMA.} \]

We complete the proof by designing an adversary \( A_u \) (see Fig. 7). It is easy to see that adversary \( A_u \) simulates hybrid \( H_4 \) to \( A \) and succeeds whenever \( A \) would. It follows that, \( \Pr[H_4] = \text{Adv}^\text{DS}_{\text{RS}}(A_u) \).

The claimed complexity of \( A_u \) is straightforward. Clearly it makes \( q_{\text{Sign}} \) queries to its signing oracle and 1 query to its forgery oracle. It forwards all of \( A \)'s queries to \( h \) and additionally may make queries when running DS.Ver in SimForge giving \( q_a + q_{\text{Forge}} \cdot \text{Query(DS.Ver)} \) queries total. The time complexity of \( A_u \) includes that of \( A \), plus the time to execute \( D.S \) for each signing query, and the time to run \( D.X \) at most \( q_{\text{Sign}} \) times and DS.Ver once for each forgery attempt. The memory complexity of \( A_u \) includes that of \( A \), plus the memory required to run the algorithms \( D.S \), \( D.X \), and DS.Ver and to store the counter \( i \).

4.5 mSUFCMA Security of RSA-PFDH

We saw that augmenting any digital signature scheme by including extra randomness gives us a memory-tight reduction for the mUFCA security of the augmented scheme from the 1UFCA security of the original scheme in Theorem 2. Now we will consider a particular signature scheme, RSA-based Probabilistic Full-Domain Hash (RSA-PFDH) which was originally introduced by Coron [13]. This is a digital signature scheme obtained by including extra randomness in the standard RSA-based Full Domain Hash (RSA-FDH) scheme. Theorem 2 gives us a memory-tight reduction from the mUFCA security of RSA-PFDH to the 1UFCA security of RSA-FDH, but the UFCA security reduction of the latter to hardness of inverting the RSA permutation is not tight in terms of advantage. In this section, we use the efficient tagging trick to give a direct reduction from the mSUFCMA security of RSA-PFDH to the hardness of RSA which is tight in terms of both memory and advantage.

**RSA Trapdoor Permutation.** The RSA function defines a trapdoor permutation that is plausibly one-way. It is based on the observation that given modulus \( N \in \mathbb{N} \) and an integer \( e \geq 2 \) relatively prime to \( \phi(N) \) (where \( \phi \) is Euler’s totient function), exponentiation to the \( e \)-th power modulo \( N \) is a permutation on \( \mathbb{Z}_N^* \). An RSA generator \( R \) specifies a generation algorithm \( R.\text{Gen} \) such that \( R.\text{Gen} \) returns \((N, e, d)\) where \( N \) is an integer such that \( e \) is co-prime to \( N \) and \( d = e^{-1} \mod \phi(N) \). We assume \( N \) is always of a fixed bit-length \( R.k \). Typically \( N = pq \) for distinct \((R.k/2)\)-bit primes \( p \) and \( q \). The one-wayness of an RSA generator \( R \) is defined by the game \( G_{R.\text{rsa}}^{\text{one-way}} \) in Fig. 9. The game runs \( R.\text{Gen} \) to obtain \((N, e, d)\), and then samples \( x \) uniformly at random from \( \mathbb{Z}_N^* \). It computes \( y = x^e \mod N \) and runs the adversary on input \((N, e, y)\). The adversary wins if it returns \( x' = x \). The advantage of an adversary \( A \) against RSA generator \( R \) is \( \text{Adv}_{R.\text{rsa}}^\text{one-way}(A) = \Pr[G_{R.\text{rsa}}^{\text{one-way}}(A)] \).

We let \( \text{Time}(R) \) denote the time required by \( R.\text{Gen} \) plus an upper bound on the time to compute multiplication or exponentiation by \( e \) in \( \mathbb{Z}_N^* \) for any \((N, e, d)\) output but \( R \). We define \( \text{Mem}(R) \) analogously.

**Full Domain Hash.** Full Domain Hash (FDH) [8] is a digital signature scheme where the message \( m \) is first hashed using a hash function \( h \) onto the domain of a one-way trapdoor permutation \( f \). Then the signature is \( f^{-1}(h(m)) \). When instantiated with the RSA trapdoor permutation, it is known as RSA-FDH.

Assuming \( h \) is a random oracle, it can be proven [8,12] that for every adversary \( A \) that makes \( q_{\text{Sign}} \) queries to its signing oracle and achieves advantage \( \epsilon \) against the UFCA security of RSA-FDH, we can construct an adversary \( B \) that breaks RSA with advantage \( \epsilon' \approx q_{\text{Sign}} \cdot \epsilon \). Auerbach et al. [2] showed how to make this reduction memory-tight.
In order to overcome the advantage loss factor of $q_{\text{Sign}}$, Coron [13] introduced Probabilistic FDH (PFDH) where a random salt $r$ is hashed with the message $m$ and the signature is $f^{-1}(h(m \mid r)) \mid r$. Using Theorem 2, and the result of Auerbach et al. we can give a memory-tight reduction for the mSUFCMA security of RSA-PFDH, but the reduction is not-tight in terms of advantage. Via a more direct proof we will obtain a reduction that is tight in all metrics.

We let $\text{RSA-PFDH}[R, rl]$ denote the instantiation of RSA-PFDH with a given RSA generator $R$ and randomness length $rl \in \mathbb{N}$. For compactness we typically define $\text{RSA} = \text{RSA-PFDH}[R, rl]$. Its algorithms are given in Fig. 10. They expect access to a random oracle $h$ in a range of $Z_N^*$. Its algorithms are given in Fig. 11. Highlighting shows where it halts with the specified output.

**Theorem 4 (mSUFCMA security of RSA-PFDH).** Let $R$ be an RSA generator. Let $rl \in \mathbb{N}$ and assume $rl < R.k$. Let $\text{RSA} = \text{RSA-PFDH}[R, rl]$. Let $A_m$ be an adversary with $(q_{\text{Sign}}, q_{\text{Forge}}, q_h) = \text{Query}(A_m)$ and assume $q_{\text{Sign}} \leq 2^{rl-1}$. Let $A_{\text{RSA}}$ be the adversary defined in Fig. 11. Then,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{RSA}}(A_m) \leq \text{Adv}_R^{q_{\text{sign}}}(A_{\text{RSA}}) + (0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Sign}}^2 + 2 \cdot q_{\text{Sign}} \cdot q_{\text{Forge}})/2^{rl}$$

$$\text{Time}^*(A_{\text{RSA}}) = O(\text{Time}(A_m)) + O((q_h + q_{\text{Forge}}) \text{Time}(R))$$

$$\text{Mem}^*(A_{\text{RSA}}) = O(\text{Mem}(A_m)) + O(\text{Mem}(R)) + \log(q_{\text{Sign}}).$$

Adversary $A_{\text{RSA}}$ is an $F$-oracle adversary for

$$F = \text{Fcs}([0,1]^{R \cdot k},(0,1)^* \times \text{Inj}([0,1]^*, [q_{\text{Sign}}], [0,1]^*).$$
We consider a sequence of hybrids. Proof. Jager, and Lyu [15] also give a time, memory, and advantage tight reduction for RSA-PFDH via a different approach.

These hybrids we will make the following claims, which establish the upper bound on the advantage of the adversary. We want to return a random function \( f \) for a random function \( f \) output of a random function \( f \) such that \( f \) is based around its simulation of \( h \) using the random function \( f \). Because exponentiation by \( e \) is a black box operation, we can sample \( z \) from \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) and return \( z \) as \( f \) output of a random function \( f \) if \( z \) is not in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) with probability \( \Pr \{ z \in \mathbb{Z}_q \} \). This does not change the distribution of the hash values or the signatures, so \( \Pr \{ z \in \mathbb{Z}_q \} = \Pr \{ z \notin \mathbb{Z}_q \} = \frac{1}{\phi(q)} \). Therefore, if \( z \notin \mathbb{Z}_q \) for \( \Pr \{ z \notin \mathbb{Z}_q \} \), we assume this must have been used in a signing query and respond appropriately. In concurrent work, Diemert, Gellert, Forge, Jager, and Lyu [15] also give a time, memory, and advantage tight reduction for RSA-PFDH via a different approach.

We give the formal proof of Theorem 4.

Proof. We consider a sequence of hybrids \( H_0 \) through \( H_3 \) and \( L_0 \) through \( L_3 \) defined in Fig. 12 and 13. Of these hybrids we will make the following claims, which establish the upper bound on the advantage of \( A_m \) claimed in the upper proof.

1. \( \Pr[H_{RSA}^{suca}(A_m)] = \Pr[H_0] = \Pr[H_1] = \Pr[H_2] \)
2. \( \Pr[H_3] = \Pr[H_0] \)
3. \( \Pr[H_3] = \Pr[L_0] \)
4. \( \Pr[L_0] \leq \Pr[L_1] + 2 \cdot q_{SIGN} \cdot q_{FORGE} \cdot 2^{4d} \)
5. \( \Pr[L_1] = \Pr[L_2] \)
6. \( \Pr[L_2] = \Adv_{R \rightarrow RSA}(A_{RSA}) \)

Transition from \( H_0 \) to \( H_1 \). Hybrid \( H_0 \) was obtained by embedding the code of RSA into \( G^{sufca} \) and rewriting \( h \) as an oracle that simply evaluates the random function \( f_1 \) chosen in the same way that \( h \) was sampled. Hence, \( \Pr[H_{RSA}^{suca}(A_m)] = \Pr[H_0] \).

Transition from \( H_0 \) to \( H_1 \). In hybrid \( H_1 \), we assign \( f_1(N, m \mid r) \) mod \( N \) to \( h(N, m \mid r) \) instead of \( f_1(N, m \mid r) \).

Transition from \( H_1 \) to \( H_2 \). In hybrid \( H_2 \), we replace the random sampling of \( r \) during signing with the output of a random function \( f_2 \), using a counter \( i \) to provide domain separation between different \( Sign \) queries. This method of choosing \( r \) is equivalent, so \( \Pr[H_1] = \Pr[H_2] \).

Transition from \( H_2 \) to \( H_3 \). In hybrid \( H_3 \) we replace the random function \( f_2 \) with a random injection (tweaked by the message \( m \)). This modifies the behavior of the game only in that values of \( r \) are guaranteed to not repeat across different signing queries that used the same message. There are at most \( q_{SIGN} \) invocations of \( f_2 \), so the switching lemma (Lemma 1) tells us that \( \Pr[H_2] \leq \Pr[H_3] + 0.5 \cdot q_{SIGN}^2 \).

Transition from \( H_3 \) to \( L_0 \). Now consider \( L_0 \) shown in Fig. 13. We have used grey highlighting to indicate places where code was changed from \( H_3 \) to \( L_0 \). In hybrid \( L_0 \)’s oracle \( FORGE \), we replace the check whether \( (m^*, \sigma^*) \notin S \) with a check whether \( f^{-1}(m, r) \notin I[m] \). Here \( I[m] \) is a new table: code was added to \( SIGN \) which in \( I[m] \) stores each of the counter values for which \( A_m \) made a signing query for \( m \). Note that \( f^{-1}(m, r) \) is in \( I[m] \) iff the \( f^{-1}(m, r) \)-th signing query was for \( m \) and returned \( z' \) for some \( z' \). Hence, if \( (m^*, \sigma^*) \notin S \), then \( f^{-1}(m, r) \notin I[m] \). If \( (m^*, \sigma^*) \notin S \) then \( f^{-1}(m, r) \notin I[m] \) or \( f^{-1}(m, r) \in I[m] \), but in the latter case it must be that \( \sigma^* = z \) for some \( z \) not equal to the \( z' \) returned by the signing query and so \( z^* \neq h(N, m^* \mid r) \). Hence these games are equivalent, giving \( \Pr[H_3] = \Pr[L_0] \).

Transition from \( L_0 \) to \( L_1 \). Next, in hybrid \( L_1 \) we replace the \( FORGE \) check \( f^{-1}(m, r) \notin I[m] \) with \( f^{-1}(m, r) \notin [q_{SIGN}] \). Detecting this change requires guessing \( f_2(m^*, i) \) for some \( i \in [q_{SIGN}] \). We can bound the probability of this ever occurring in \( L_0 \) by a union bound over the \( FORGE \) queries made by the adversary. Consider the set \( \{ f(m^*, i) : i \in [q_{SIGN}] \} \). It has size at most \( q_{SIGN} \). Because...
f₂ is a random injection, this is uniform subset of the set \( \{0, 1\}^r \setminus \{0, 1\}^i \). Hence the probability of any particular query being the first to trigger this different behavior is at most \( q_{\text{SIGN}}/(2^d - q_{\text{SIGN}}) \leq 2q_{\text{SIGN}}/2^d \). Applying the union bound gives us \( \Pr[L_0] \leq \Pr[L_1] + 2q_{\text{SIGN}} \cdot q_{\text{FORGE}}/2^d \).

### Transition from L₁ to L₂
In hybrid L₂ we now begin the game by sampling \( x \) at random from \( Z_N^* \) and setting \( y \leftarrow x^e \mod N \). Our goal is to “embed” \( y \) into the responses to random oracle queries so that a successful forgery allows \( x \) to be recovered. In particular, we change the output of \( h \) whenever \( f^{-1}(m, r) \notin \{q_{\text{SIGN}}\} \), now returning \( y \cdot f_1(N, m \| r)^e \mod N \). Note that multiplying the fixed element \( y \in Z_N^* \) by a uniformly random element still gives a uniformly random element. Because we only perform this modification for \( f^{-1}(m, r) \notin \{q_{\text{SIGN}}\} \), it will not cause any inconsistency with SIGN where \( f^{-1}(m, r) \in \{q_{\text{SIGN}}\} \) always holds. Hence the view of the adversary is unchanged and so \( \Pr[L_1] = \Pr[L_2] \).

### Reduction to RSA
We complete the proof by arguing that \( \mathcal{A}_{\text{RSA}} \) perfectly simulates hybrid L₂ and succeeds whenever \( \mathcal{A}_m \) would. It is formally defined in Fig. 11. Examining its code, we can see that the code is basically identical to that of L₂, except it is given \( (N, e, y) \) as input rather than generating them locally. The grey highlighted code in FORGE shows where \( \mathcal{A}_{\text{RSA}} \) will halt early whenever \( \mathcal{A}_m \) would win. The check
proof, so we omit it for simplicity. This does not meaningfully affect our nonce-based encryption scheme also takes associated data as input which

\[ \text{summe ther is a ciphertext-length function } P \]

\[ \text{in Fig. 15. The secret key is denoted by } K. \]

\[ \text{correctness requires for all } M[n, c], \text{and } \text{indicate rejection of the ciphertext. Correctness requires for all } \]

\[ \text{where } c \leftarrow \text{NE.}E(K, n, m) \text{ and } c \leftarrow \text{NE.}E(K, n, m) \text{. We define } \text{NE.}C = \bigcup_{m \in \text{NE.}M} [0, 1]^{\text{NE.}E(|m|)}. \]

\[ \text{Typically, a nonce-based encryption scheme also takes associated data as input which is authenticated during encryption. This does not meaningfully affect our proof, so we omit it for simplicity.} \]

\[ \text{Fig. 14. Games defining INDR and AE-w security of NE for } w \in \{0, \phi, \bot\}. \]

\[ \text{Fig. 15. Syntax of (nonce-based) secret-key encryption scheme.} \]

\[ \text{immediately before this ensures that } z^e \text{ mod } N = y \cdot f_3(m | r)^e \text{ mod } N. \text{ Hence } y = (z \cdot (f_3(m | r))^{-1})^e \text{ mod } N, \text{ meaning that } z \cdot (f_3(m | r))^{-1} \text{ is indeed the correct response. Hence } \text{Pr}[L_2] = \text{Adv}_{\text{INDR}}(A_{\text{RSA}}). \]

\[ \text{The complexity of } A_{\text{RSA}} \text{ follows from its description. The counter } i \text{ is the additional } \log(q_{\text{Sign}}) \text{ storage. The } \text{Time}(R) \text{ and } \text{Mem}(R) \text{ terms come from performing operations in } \mathbb{Z}_N^*. \text{ For and FORGE queries. } \]

\[ \text{5 AE Security of Encrypt-then-PRF} \]

\[ \text{For nonce-based secret-key encryption schemes, we often want Authenticated Encryption (AE) security which simultaneously asks for confidentiality and ciphertext integrity. The common approach to prove AE security of a nonce-based encryption scheme is to give separate reductions to the indistinguishability of its ciphertexts from truly random ones (INDR security) and its ciphertext integrity. Ghoshal et al. [19] proved an impossibility result showing that a (certain form of black-box) reduction from AE security to INDR security and ciphertext integrity cannot be memory-tight. Making the INDR part memory-tight is of particular interest because of results which establish tight time-memory trade-offs for INDR security [27,22,17,14,26].} \]

\[ \text{In this section we look at a particular scheme which we refer to as Encrypt-then-PRF. Given a nonce-based encryption scheme NE that only has INDR security, one generic way to construct a new encryption scheme NE’ which also achieves ciphertext integrity is to use a PRF and let the ciphertext of NE’ be the concatenation of the ciphertext of NE and a tag which is the evaluation of the PRF on the ciphertext and the nonce.} \]

\[ \text{In this section, we show that in the context of Encrypt-then-PRF, for two of the notions of AE security introduced in [19], we can give a memory-tight reduction to the INDR security of the underlying encryption scheme and a non-memory-tight reduction to the security of the PRF. This shows that we can bypass the generic impossibility result of [19] if we consider specific constructions of nonce-based authenticated encryption schemes.} \]

\[ \text{5.1 Syntax and Security Definitions} \]

\[ \text{NONCE-BASED ENCRYPTION. A nonce-based (secret-key) encryption scheme NE specifies algorithms } \text{NE.K, NE.E, and NE.D. It specifies message space NE.M and nonce space NE.N. The syntax of the algorithm is shown in Fig. 15. The secret key is denoted by } K, \text{ the message is } m, \text{ the nonce is } n, \text{ and the ciphertext is } c. \text{ The decryption algorithm may return } m = \bot \text{ to indicate rejection of the ciphertext. Correctness requires for all } K, n, m \text{ such that for all } K \in [\text{NE.K}], n \in \text{NE.N}, \text{ and } m \in \text{NE.M we have } |c| = \text{NE.cl}(|m|) \text{ where } c \leftarrow \text{NE.}E(K, n, m). \text{ We define } \text{NE.C} = \bigcup_{m \in \text{NE.M}} [0, 1]^{\text{NE.cl}(|m|)}. \text{ Typically, a nonce-based encryption scheme also takes associated data as input which is authenticated during encryption. This does not meaningfully affect our proof, so we omit it for simplicity.} \]
that there is no restriction placed on nonces used for decryption queries.)
returns random messages of the appropriate length and decryption returns
Authenticated Encryption (AE) security.
wing parameterized by
consider the games
be input to
intended to capture the power of an adversary that can observe the behavior of a decrypting party. Both the
ciphertexts are forwarded, which does not seem to model anything about real use of encryption. The
w
implication is that
query. In the memory restricted setting these definitions
and answers and without loss of generality never make a decryption query on the answer of an encryption
w
its decryption oracle. When
w
AE/CCA-
implication is that
w
encryption scheme, due to Rogaway [24]. Namprempre et al. [23] gave a more extensive exploration of the
w
previous to construct an AE encryption scheme via generic composition. Given nonce-based encryption
scheme NE and function family F, we define EtP[NE,F] by the following algorithms. We refer to the t
compontent of the ciphertext returned by EtP[NE,F].E as the “tag” below. When including associated data,
it would be input to F.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
K & (K,K') & (K,K') \leftarrow K; (c',t) \leftarrow c \\
\hline
F & K & \prime \leftarrow F.K \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
K' & (K,n,m) & (K,n) \leftarrow K; (c',t) \leftarrow c \\
\hline
F & K & \prime \leftarrow F.K(n,c) \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
K,n,c & r & \prime \leftarrow F_K(n,c) \\
\hline
NE & K,n,m & \prime \leftarrow F_K(n,c) \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

Our security result will analyze the authenticated security of EtP assuming NE has indistinguishable from
random ciphertexts and F is pseudorandom. Let us recall these security notions.

INDistinguishability FROM RANDOM (INDR) SECURITY. This security notion requires that ciphertexts
output by the encryption scheme cannot be distinguished from random strings. Consider the game G_{ind,b}
defined in Fig. 14. Here an adversary \( A \) is given access to an encryption oracle Enc_b to which it can query
a pair \((n,m)\) and receive an honest encryption of message \( m \) with nonce \( n \) if \( b = 1 \) or a random string of the
appropriate length if \( b = 0 \). We restrict attention to “valid” adversaries that never repeat the nonce \( n \) across
different encryption queries. We define \( \text{Adv}_{\text{ind}}^{\text{b}}(A) = \text{Pr}[G_{\text{ind},1}^{\text{b}}(A)] - \text{Pr}[G_{\text{ind},0}^{\text{b}}(A)] \).

AUTHENTICATED ENCRYPTION (AE) SECURITY. AE security simultaneously asks for integrity and con-


The decryption oracle is parameterized by the value \( w \in \{m,\circ,\perp\} \) corresponding to three different security
notions. In all three, we use a table \( M[\cdot,\cdot] \) to detect when the adversary forwards encryption queries on to
to its decryption oracle. When \( w = m \), the decryption oracle returns \( M[n,c] \). When \( w = \circ \), it returns a special
symbol \( \circ \). When \( w = \perp \), it returns the symbol \( \perp \) which is also used by the encryption scheme to represent
rejection. For \( w \in \{m,\circ,\perp\} \) we define the advantage of an adversary \( A \) by \( \text{Adv}_{\text{AE}}^{w}(A) = \text{Pr}[G_{\text{AE},1}^{w}(A)] - \text{Pr}[G_{\text{AE},0}^{w}(A)] \).

DISCUSSION OF VARIANTS. This choice of considering three variants of the definition follows the same choice
made by Ghoshal et al. [19]. First off, we note that if there are no restrictions on the memory of the adversary,
all the three definitions are tightly equivalent. An adversary can simply remember its past encryption queries
and answers and without loss of generality never make a decryption query on the answer of an encryption
query. In the memory restricted setting these definitions no longer appear to be equivalent. The only known
implication is that \( w = \circ \) security tightly implies \( w = \perp \) security. Other implications seem to require
remembering all encryption queries to properly simulate the decryption oracle. In Sec. 6 we parameterize
public-key encryption CCA definitions similarly. This discussion applies to those definitions as well.

Ghoshal et al. argued that \( w = m \) is the “correct” definition. They argue that chosen ciphertext security is
intended to capture the power of an adversary that can observe the behavior of a decrypting party. Both the
\( w = \perp \) and \( w = \circ \) definitions restrict what the adversary learns about this behavior when honestly generated
ciphertexts are forwarded, which does not seem to model anything about real use of encryption. The \( w = m \)
definition avoids this unnatural restriction.

We provide some technical context for this philosophical argument. In Appendix B we give memory-
tight proofs for the security of encryption schemes constructed with the KEM/DEM paradigm with \( w = m \)
and noting this does not seem possible for the other choices of \( w \). In this section and Sec. 6 we prove the
AE/CCA-w security of encryption schemes for differing choices of \( w \). We view this as a general exploration
of what results are possible with memory-tight proof. A proof which works for some \( w \), but not others helps builds some understanding of how these notions related.

5.2 Security Result

Now we give a proof of the AE-\( \circ \) security of EtP[NE, F]. In particular we provide a memory-tight reduction to the INDR security of NE and a non-memory-tight reduction to the security of F. Such a result is useful if a time-memory tradeoff is known for NE and F is sufficiently secure even against high-memory attackers.

**Theorem 5 (Security of EtP).** Let NE be a nonce-based encryption scheme and \( F \) be a family of function with \( F.F = \text{Fcs}(\text{NE.N, NE.C}, \{0, 1\}^\rho) \) for \( \rho \in \mathbb{N} \). Let \( A.a \) be an AE-\( \circ \) adversary with \( (q_{\text{Enc}}, q_{\text{Dec}}) = \text{Query}(A.a) \). Define adversaries \( A.p \) and \( A.r \) as shown in Fig. 16. Then,

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}]}^{\text{AE-}\circ}(A.a) \leq \text{Adv}_{F}^{\text{AE-}\circ}(A.p) + \text{Adv}_{\text{NE}}^{\text{INDR}}(A.r) + 2q_{\text{Dec}}/2^\rho
\]

\[
\text{Query}(A.p) = q_{\text{Enc}} + q_{\text{Dec}} \\
\text{Time}(A.p) = \text{Time}(G_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}]}^{\text{AE-}\circ}(A.a)) \\
\text{Mem}(A.p) = \text{Mem}(G_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}]}^{\text{AE-}\circ}(A.a))
\]

\[
\text{Query}(A.r) = q_{\text{Enc}} \\
\text{Time}^*(A.r) = \text{Time}(A.a) \\
\text{Mem}^*(A.r) = \text{Mem}(A.a)
\]

Adversary \( A.r \) is an F,F-oracle adversary.

The standard (not memory-tight) proof of the security of EtP begins identically to our proof; we start in \( G_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}]}^{\text{AE-}\circ} \) replace the use of \( F \) with a truly random function (using \( A.p \)) and then information theoretically argue that the attacker shall be incapable of creating any forgeries. In the standard proof we would transition to a game where the decryption oracle is exactly that of \( \text{Dec}_{\text{EtP}}^{\circ} \), i.e. it always returns \( \perp \) when \( M[n,c] = \perp \). Then we reduce to the security of NE to replace the generated ciphertexts with random. However this standard reduction will not be memory-tight because the attacker must store the table \( M[\cdot,\cdot] \) to know whether it should return \( \circ \) or \( \perp \) when simulating decryption queries.\(^7\) Instead we first transition to a world where \( F \) has been replaced by the random function \( f \) and \( \text{Dec} \) always returns \( \circ \) when given a ciphertext with a correct tag. (Which we can do because either \( M[n,c] \neq \perp \) held or the attacker managed to guess a random tag, which is unlikely.) Now we can make our INDR reduction memory-tight. It forwards encryption queries to its encryption oracle and then uses its own function \( f \) to create the tag. For decryption queries

\(^7\) Note this would be memory-tight for AE-\( \perp \) security.
it checks \( f(n, c') = t \), returning \( \diamond \) if so and \( \bot \) otherwise. Then we can finally conclude by switching to the decryption oracle \( \text{Dec}_0^\diamond \) by arguing that noticing this change requires guessing a random tag.

It does not seem possible to extend this proof technique to \( \text{AE-m} \) security because the tag would be too short to embed values of \( m \) we need to remember.

We give the formal proof of Theorem 5.

**Proof.** We consider a sequence of hybrids \( H_0 \) through \( H_4 \) defined in Fig. 17. Of these hybrids we will make the following claims, which establish the upper bound on the advantage of \( A_a \) claimed in the proof.

\[
\begin{align*}
1. \Pr[\text{G}_{\text{E}}^\diamond_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}],1}(A_a)] = \Pr[H_0] & \quad 4. \Pr[H_2] \leq \Pr[H_3] + \text{Adv}^\text{ind}_{\text{NE}}(A_a) \\
2. \Pr[H_0] \leq \Pr[H_1] + \text{Adv}^\text{p}_{\text{F}}(A_p) & \quad 5. \Pr[H_3] \leq \Pr[H_2] + \text{q}_{\text{Dec}}/2^7 \\
3. \Pr[H_1] \leq \Pr[H_2] + \text{q}_{\text{Dec}}/2^7 & \quad 6. \Pr[H_4] = \Pr[\text{G}_{\text{E}}^\diamond_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}],0}(A_a)]
\end{align*}
\]

The claims regarding the complexities of the adversaries considered are clear from their code.

**Transition to \( H_0 \).** The hybrid \( H_0 \) was obtained by plugging the code of \( \text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}] \) into \( \text{G}_{\text{E}}^\diamond_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}],1}(A_a) \), so the first claim is clear.

**Transition \( H_0 \) to \( H_1 \).** In \( H_1 \) we replace each use of \( F \) with a random \( f \) sampled from \( \text{F.F} \). The reduction to the PR security of \( F \) is given by \( A_p \) in Fig. 16. It simply simulates these hybrids for \( A_p \), using its EV oracle in place of \( F \) or \( f \). The claimed bound follows (and is in fact an equality).

**Transition \( H_1 \) to \( H_2 \).** In \( H_2 \), we change the behavior of \( \text{Dec} \). Now the oracle returns \( \diamond \) when \( M[n,c] = \bot \) and \( t = f(n, c') \). Note that this is the only case in which the hybrids we are considering differ. In particular, they are identical-until-bad and so the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [9] gives \( \Pr[H_1] \leq \Pr[H_2] + \Pr[H_2] \) sets \( \text{bad} \). Setting \( \text{bad} \) requires guessing a value \( f(n, c') \) which is a uniform value in \( \{0, 1\}^\tau \). Hence by a union bound \( \Pr[H_2] \) sets \( \text{bad} \leq \text{q}_{\text{Dec}}/2^7 \), giving the claim.

**Transition \( H_2 \) to \( H_3 \).** In \( H_3 \), we replace the real encryption of \( m \) in \( \text{ENC} \) with a uniformly random \( c' \). Consider the adversary \( A_r \) given in Fig. 16. It perfectly simulates these hybrids to \( A_r \), using its own ENC oracle to generate \( c' \). Note that \( A_r \) avoids storing the table \( M \), whenever \( M[n,c] \neq \bot \) would hold it must anyway hold that \( f(n,c') = t \) so this simulation is correct.

**Transition \( H_3 \) to \( H_4 \).** In \( H_4 \), we change the behavior of \( \text{Dec} \). Now the oracle returns \( \bot \) when \( M[n,c] = \bot \) and \( t = f(n, c') \). Using an identical-until-bad argument analogous to when we transitioned between \( H_1 \) and \( H_2 \) we get \( \Pr[H_1] \leq \Pr[H_2] + \text{q}_{\text{Dec}}/2^7 \) as desired.

**Final Transition.** Finally we claim that the view of \( A_a \) in \( H_4 \) is identical to its view in \( \text{G}_{\text{E}}^\diamond_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}],0} \) giving \( \Pr[H_4] = \Pr[\text{G}_{\text{E}}^\diamond_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}],0}(A_a)] \). If \( M[n, c] = \bot \) in \( \text{Dec} \), then the oracle it always returns \( \bot \) so we can ignore its use of \( f \). This means the only use of \( f \) is in \( \text{ENC} \) and these uses never repeat inputs because the nonces do not repeat. Hence setting \( t \leftarrow f(n, c) \) is equivalent to sampling \( t \) uniformly from \( \{0, 1\}^\tau \) which gives us exactly the view expected in \( \text{G}_{\text{E}}^\diamond_{\text{EtP}[\text{NE,F}],0} \). \(\Box\)
6 Chosen Ciphertext Security of Public Key Encryption

Now we apply our techniques to give memory-tight reductions between single- and multi-challenge notions of chosen-ciphertext security. The standard reduction bounds the advantage of an adversary making $q_{\text{Enc}}$ encryption queries by $q_{\text{Enc}}$ times the advantage of an adversary making 1 query. The reduction requires memory linear in $q_{\text{Enc}}$ and so is not memory-tight.\(^8\)

In Section 6.1, we consider the most common “left-or-right” definition of CCA security and introduce three different variants (mirroring the three notions for AE security in Section 5). We give a memory-tight reduction between single- and multi-challenge security for two of the three variants ($\circ$ and $\bot$), but the reduction is not time-tight. In Section 6.2, we look at the CCA security variant that requires ciphertexts be indistinguishable from random. We give a memory-tight and time-tight reduction between single- and multi-challenge security for all three variants of this notion.

**Public Key Encryption.** A public key encryption scheme $\text{PKE}$ specifies algorithms $\text{PKE.K}$, $\text{PKE.E}$, and $\text{PKE.D}$. The syntax of these algorithms is shown in Fig. 18. The key generation algorithm $\text{PKE.K}$ returns encryption key $ek$ and decryption key $dk$. The encryption algorithm $\text{PKE.E}$ encrypts message $m$ with $ek$ to produce a ciphertext $c$. We write $\text{PKE.E}(ek, m; r)$ when making random coins $r \in \text{PKE.R}$ explicit. The decryption algorithm decrypts $c$ with $dk$ to produce $m$. The decryption algorithm may output $m = \bot$ to indicate rejection.

Correctness requires that $\text{PKE.D}(dk, c) = m$ for all $(ek, dk) \in [\text{PKE.K}]$, all $m$, and all $c \in [\text{PKE.E}(ek, m)]$. We define the min-entropy of $\text{PKE}$ as

$$\text{PKE.H} = - \lg \max_{m, r} \Pr[r \leftarrow \text{PKE.R} : \text{PKE.E}(ek, m; r) = c].$$

6.1 Left-right CCA Security of PKE

**Left-or-right CCA security.** In this section, we consider the left-or-right definition of CCA-security most commonly used in the literature. For $w \in \{m, \circ, \bot\}$ we denote this as CCA-$w$\(^9\) and the corresponding security game $G_{\text{PKE},w}$ is defined in Fig. 19. The adversary gets the encryption key $ek$ and has access to an encryption and a decryption oracle. The encryption oracle takes in messages $m_0$ and $m_1$ and encrypts $m_b$ where $b$ is the secret bit. The decryption oracle returns the decryption of a ciphertext, unless the ciphertext was previously returned by an encryption query. This is tracked by table $M$. When $w = m$, the decryption oracle returns $M[c]$ which is $m_1$ from the earlier encryption query. When $w = \circ$, it returns $\circ$. When $w = \bot$, it

---

\(^8\) Auerbach et al. [2] stated that this reduction is memory-tight for both CPA and CCA security. While the former is correct, the latter depends on the definition of CCA. In personally communication with Auerbach et al. [3], they concurred that their claim was incorrect for their intended definition of CCA security ($w = \circ$) but pointed out that it does work for two other variants ($w - E$ and $w - P$) which we will mention briefly.

\(^9\) The discussion in Section 5 about the choice to have three variants of the definitions is applicable here as well.
returns ⊥ which is also used by the encryption scheme to represent rejection. The advantage of an adversary \( A \) against the CCA-w security of PKE is defined as \( \text{Adv}^{\text{CCA-w}}_{\text{PKE}}(A) = \text{Pr}[G^{\text{CCA-w}}_{\text{PKE},1}(A)] - \text{Pr}[G^{\text{CCA-w}}_{\text{PKE},0}(A)] \).

The goal of this section is to relate the advantage of attacks making only a single encryption query and those making many such queries. When wanting to make the distinction explicit we may use the adjectives “many” and “single” or prefix the abbreviation of a security notion with an ‘m’ or ‘1’.

1CCA-\( \Rightarrow \) mCCA-\( \ominus \). The following theorem gives a memory-tight reduction establishing that CCA-\( \ominus \) security against adversaries making one encryption query implies security for an arbitrary number of queries. The proof makes use of our inefficient tagging technique. The reduction performs a hybrid over the encryption queries of the original adversary and is thus not advantage-tight.

**Theorem 6** (1CCA-\( \ominus \) \( \Rightarrow \) mCCA-\( \ominus \)). Let PKE be a public key encryption scheme. Let \( A_m \) be an adversary with \((q_{\text{Enc}},q_{\text{Dec}}) = \text{Query}(A_m)\). Define \( D_1 \) by \( D_n = \{0,1\}^n \times \{q_{\text{Enc}}\} \). Let \( A_1 \) be the \( \text{Fcs}[N,D,\text{PKE},R] \)-oracle adversary shown in Fig. 20. Then,

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Adv}^{\text{CCA-w}}_{\text{PKE}}(A_m) &\leq q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{CCA-w}}_{\text{PKE}}(A_1) + 4 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}}/2^{\text{PKE}\cdot H}\times \\
\text{Query}(A_1) &= (1,q_{\text{Dec}}) \\
\text{Time}^\sigma(A_1) &= O(\text{Time}(A_m)) + q_{\text{Enc}}(q_{\text{Dec}} + 1)\text{Time}(\text{PKE}) \\
\text{Mem}^\sigma(A_1) &= O(\text{Mem}(A_m)) + \text{Mem}(\text{PKE}) + \lg q_{\text{Enc}}.
\end{align*}
\]

The standard (non-memory-tight) reduction against 1CCA security picks an index \( k \in [q_{\text{Enc}}] \) where \( q_{\text{Enc}} \) is the number of encryption queries made by \( A_m \). It runs \( A_m \), simulating encryption queries as follows. For the first \( k - 1 \) encryption queries, it answers with an encryption of \( m_1 \), for the \( k \)-th encryption query it forwards the query to its own encryption oracle, and the rest of the queries it answers with an encryption of \( m_0 \). To answer the decryption queries, the reduction returns \( \bot \) if it was ever queried the ciphertext for a previous encryption query. Otherwise, it forwards the query to its own decryption oracle. Finally, the reduction adversary outputs whatever \( A_m \) outputs. Standard hybrid analysis shows that if the advantage of \( A_m \) is \( \epsilon \), then the advantage of the reduction adversary is \( \epsilon/q_{\text{Enc}} \). Simulating decryption queries required remembering all prior encryption queries and hence the reduction is not memory-tight.

We give an adversary \( A_1 \) in Fig. 20 that is very similar to the reduction just described, but avoids remembering prior encryption queries. The main idea is that it picks the coins when encrypting \( m_0 \) or \( m_1 \) locally as the output of a random function \( f \) applied to the message and a counter. This allows \( A_1 \) to detect whether a ciphertext \( c \) queried to the decryption oracle is one it answered to an earlier encryption query as follows: it first asks for the decryption of \( c \) from its own decryption oracle and receives \( m \). Then it iterates over all counter values for which encryption queries have been made so far and checks if \( c \) was the encryption of \( m \) using the output of \( f \) on \( m \) and the counter as coins. If any of these checks succeed it returns \( \bot \), otherwise it returns \( m \). If \( c \) was the answer of an encryption query \( A_1 \) detects it successfully. The probability that \( A_1 \) returns \( \bot \) for a decryption query when it should not be small.

---

**Fig. 20.** Adversary \( A_1 \) for Theorem 6.
Notice that the additional memory overhead for $A_1$ is just that required to store a counter, run $PKE,E$, and store $(e^s, m^s_0, m^s_1)$. However, there is an increase in runtime by $q_{Enc} \cdot q_{Dec} \cdot Time(PKE)$ because of the iteration over the counters to answer decryption queries. As discussed in the introduction, such reductions may be useful when the best attack for the underlying problem with low memory requires significantly more running time than the best attack with high memory.

**Extension to CCA-$\bot$.** We can prove the same result for CCA-$\bot$, using a very similar proof flow. Alternatively, Theorem 6 directly implies the same result for CCA-$\bot$. First off, $1CCA-\bot$ implies $1CCA$ in a memory-tight way because an adversary with access to $Dec^+$ can simulate $Dec^+$ by just remembering the ciphertext $c^s$ returned for the single $Enc$ query, returning $\phi$ if $c^s$ is queried to $Dec$, and otherwise forwarding the response of its own decryption oracle. We also noted above that $mCCA-\phi$ implies $mCCA-\bot$ in a memory-tight way. Putting it together with Theorem 6 gives the desired result.

However, it does not seem possible to extend this proof technique to CCA-$\mathfrak{m}$ security because if the adversary queries the decryption oracle on a ciphertext $c$ which was an answer to a previous query for $(m_0, m_1)$ the oracle needs to return $m_1$ even if $c$ is an encryption of $m_0$. This seems to require memory to simulate.

**Other variants (exclusion and penalty).** In personal communication with Auerbach et al. [3] they pointed out other variants of CCA security for which the standard hybrid argument is memory-tight. These definitions were given in [4]. For the sake of concreteness we will described them as based on CCA-$\bot$, but the way they are defined means we could just as well have started from CCA-$\mathfrak{m}$ or CCA-$\phi$. The first, which we will refer to as CCA-$E$ (where ‘E’ stands for “exclusion”) is defined the same as CCA-$\bot$, except the game definitions were given in [4]. For the sake of concreteness we will described them as based on CCA-$\bot$. The standard hybrid argument can be made memory-tight for these definitions. For CCA-$E$, this follows immediately because we do not have to simulate decryption for forwarded ciphertexts. For CCA-$P$, we can exploit that if we improperly simulate responses to decryption queries for forwarded ciphertexts this cannot harm the advantage of the adversary.

The philosophical and technical arguments from Sec. 5 for why $w = \mathfrak{m}$ may be “correct” apply similarly to argue in favor of it over $w = E$ and $w = P$. Additionally, $w = E$ seems particularly “weak” because it seems overly restrictive. Consider a low-memory attacker that has made a large number of encryption queries so far. It will be incredibly restricted in what decryption queries it can make because it is required to absolutely avoid any query that has a non-zero chance of being a ciphertext returned by a prior encryption given its current state. Note that even very naive adversaries are excluded, for example one that asks a random string of appropriate format to the decryption oracle after seeing some challenge ciphertexts.

**Time-tightness if messages do not repeat.** If we require that $A_m$ never repeats messages queried to $Enc$ then we can make Theorem 6 time-tight as well. In that case, $A_1$ would not need to use the counter $i$ to ensure domain separation for $f$ and so it would not have to use the loop inside $SimDec$. One setting where this suffices is if $PKE$ is being used as a key-encapsulation mechanism. Then we can think of $m_0$ and $m_1$ being picked uniformly at random. Using the switching lemma we can switch to $m_0$ and $m_1$ being sampled without replacement, meaning the encryption queries do not repeat.\(^{10}\) We next give the formal proof of Theorem 6.

**Proof.** We start by considering the hybrid games $H^b_h$ for $0 \leq h \leq 2$ defined in Fig. 21. Of these we make the following claims for $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

1. $Pr[G_{PKE,0}^h] = Pr[H^b_0]$

\(^{10}\) Here the list of $m_0$ and $m_1$ to be queried can be specified by an oracle given to the adversary.
Combining the above claims, we get that

\[ j \text{ occurring for a given decryption query and adversary was independent of } \]

\[ \text{some } H^0 \text{ using randomness } \]

\[ \text{Enc} \quad \text{a random function} \]

\[ \text{Transition from } H^0 \text{ to } H^1, \] \[ \text{Pr}[H^0] = \text{Pr}[H^1] \]

\[ \text{3. } |\text{Pr}[H^1] - \text{Pr}[H^2]| \leq q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-\text{PKE.H}_e}. \]

Combining the above claims, we get that

\[ \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}(A_m) = \text{Pr}[G^{\text{PKE},0}_{\text{PKE},i}] - \text{Pr}[G^{\text{PKE},0}_{\text{PKE},0}] = \text{Pr}[H^0] - \text{Pr}[H^1] \]

\[ = \text{Pr}[H^1] - \text{Pr}[H_0^0] \leq \text{Pr}[H^2] - \text{Pr}[H_0^0] + 2 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-\text{PKE.H}_e}. \quad (1) \]

Next, we prove the claims.

**Transition to** \( H^0 \). The game \( H^0 \) was copied from the game \( G^{\text{PKE},0}_{\text{PKE},0} \). We added variable \( i \) that counts the number of ENC queries and will be used for future hybrids and unrolled the encryption to make the sampling of coins explicit. It follows that \( \text{Pr}[G^{\text{PKE},0}_{\text{PKE},i}] = \text{Pr}[H^0] \).

**Transition from** \( H^0 \) to \( H^1 \). In game \( H^1 \), we replace the random sampling of \( r_0 \) and \( r_1 \) with the output of a random function \( f \), using a counter \( i \) to provide domain separation between different queries. This method of choosing \( r \) is equivalent, so \( \text{Pr}[H^0] = \text{Pr}[H^1] \).

**Transition from** \( H^1 \) to \( H^2 \). In game \( H^2 \), we stop using \( M[\cdot] \) to keep track ciphertexts that were returned by ENC. Instead we first decrypt \( c \) to \( m \) and then iterating over \( j \in [i] \) to check whether \( m \) encrypted with \( ek \) using randomness \( r = f([m], (m, j)) \) is \( c \). Note that if \( M[c] \neq \perp \) holds in \( H^1 \) then there will necessarily be such a \( j \) (in particular \( j \) being the value \( i \) held at the time of the query that set \( M[c] \)).

So \( H^1 \) and \( H^2 \) are identical unless the following bad event happens: there is a DEC query on \( c \) and for some \( j \in [i] \), it holds that \( c = \text{PKE.E}(ek, m; f([m], (m, j))) \) and despite \( m \) was not \( m_0 \) for the \( j \)-th query to ENC. We can analyze the probability of this in \( H^1 \). Since \( m \) was not the \( j \)-th query to ENC, the view of the adversary was independent of \( f([m], (m, j)) \) at this time. By the min-entropy of PKE, the probability of this occurring for a given decryption query and \( j \) is at most \( 1/2^{\text{PKE.H}_e} \). Taking a union bound over all \( j \in [q_{\text{Enc}}] \) and decryption queries the overall probability is at most \( q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}}/2^{\text{PKE.H}_e} \). We could formalize this via the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [9], to get \( |\text{Pr}[H^1] - \text{Pr}[H^2]| \leq q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}}/2^{\text{PKE.H}_e} \) as desired.

![Fig. 21. First set of hybrids \( H^0 \) used in the proof of Theorem 6.](image)

![Fig. 22. Second set of hybrids used in the proof of Theorem 6.](image)
Transition to $H_{k,b}$ hybrids. We next consider the hybrid games $H_{k,b}$ for $(k, b) \in \{q_{\text{Enc}}\} \times \{0, 1\}$ defined in Fig. 22. In these hybrids, ciphertexts for $m_1$ are returned when $i < k$, ciphertexts for $m_0$ are returned when $i > k$, and a ciphertext for $m_i$ is returned when $i = k$. Note that at the extremes ($k = 1, b = 0$ and $k = q_{\text{Enc}}, b = 1$), $A_m$ will receive either all ciphertexts of $m_0$ or all ciphertexts of $m_1$. The decryption queries are answered as in $H_{2}^s$. So $H_{1,0}$ perfectly matches $H_{2}^s$ and $H_{0,1}$ perfectly matches $H_{2}^s$. Hence combining with (1), we have

$$\text{Adv}_{PKE_{Hybrids}}(A_m) \leq \Pr[H_{1,0}] - \Pr[H_{1,0}] + 2 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-PKE.H_x}.$$  

In general, in $H_{k,b}$ the first $k + b - 1$ encryption queries use $m_1$ and the rest use $m_0$; so $\Pr[H_{k,1}] = \Pr[H_{k+1,0}]$ holds. Hence

$$\Pr[H_{1,0}] - \Pr[H_{1,0}] = \Pr[H_{1,0}] - \Pr[H_{1,0}] + \sum_{i \in [q_{\text{Enc}} - 1]} \Pr[H_{i,1}] - \Pr[H_{k+1,0}]$$

$$= \sum_{i \in [q_{\text{Enc}}]} \Pr[H_{i,1}] - \Pr[H_{k,0}].$$  

(3)

Transition to $H_k$ hybrids. Next, consider the games shown in Fig. 28. Of these we make the following claims.

1. $2 \Pr[H_0] - 1 = (1/q_{\text{Enc}}) \sum_{i \in [q_{\text{Enc}}]} \Pr[H_{k,1}] - \Pr[H_{k,0}]$
2. $\Pr[H_0] \leq \Pr[H_1] + q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-PKE.H_x}$
3. $\Pr[H_1] = \Pr[H_2]$
4. $\Pr[H_2] - 1 = \text{Adv}_{PKE_{Hybrids}}(A_1)$

In the rest of the proof we address these one at a time. Putting them together along with (2) and (3) gives the bound claimed in the theorem statement via,

$$\text{Adv}_{PKE_{Hybrids}}(A_m) = 2 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-PKE.H_x} + \sum_{i \in [q_{\text{Enc}}]} \Pr[H_{i,1}] - \Pr[H_{k,0}]$$

$$= 2 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-PKE.H_x} + q_{\text{Enc}}(2 \Pr[H_0] - 1)$$

$$\leq 2 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-PKE.H_x} + q_{\text{Enc}}(2 \Pr[H_0] + 2q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-PKE.H_x} - 1)$$

$$= \text{Adv}_{PKE_{Hybrids}}(A_1) + 4q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-PKE.H_x}.$$  

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Transition to $H_0$. Game $H_0$ is identical to $H^{k,b}$ with $(k, b)$ chosen at random and with the game returning true if $A_m$ correctly guessed $b$. Standard calculations by conditioning on all the possible values of $(k, b)$ gives the claim.

Transition from $H_0$ to $H_1$. We make three changes to transition to $H_1$. First, when $i = k$ in ENC we store the two messages queried as $m^*_0$ and $m^*_1$ along with the ciphertext returned as $c^*$. Then on a DEC query, $\phi$ is returned immediately if $c = c^*$. Finally in DEC we skip over the iteration of $j = k$ if $m \in \{m^*_0, m^*_1\}$. When $m = m^*_i$ this does not change anything because the $c = c^*$ check will have covered that case.

So this only changes the behavior of the oracle when $m = m^*_i \neq m^*_b$ and $c = \text{PKE.E}(ek, m; f(|m|, (m, k)))$, in $H_0$ it would return $\phi$ while in $H_1$ it may return $m$. Note then that in $H_1$ the view of the adversary is completely independent of this $f(|m|, (m, k))$. So we can think of the adversary having DEC attempts to guess a ciphertext generated with uniformly random coins. Hence the probability of this sort of query in $H_1$ is at most $q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-|\text{PKE.H}|}$. This gives $Pr[H_0] \leq Pr[H_1] + q_{\text{Dec}} \cdot 2^{-|\text{PKE.H}|}$.

Transition from $H_1$ to $H_2$. The only change in $H_2$ is that in ENC for $i = k$, the randomness is sampled uniformly at random instead of by evaluating $f$. Because $f(|m|, (m, k))$ is used nowhere else, this does not change the behavior of the game. It follows that $Pr[H_1] = Pr[H_2]$.

Adversary $A_1$. Finally we can see that our adversary $A_1$ (defined in Fig. 20) perfectly simulates the view of $A_m$ in $H_2$. It was obtained by copying the code of $H_2$ and then modifying it to query its ENC and DEC oracle as appropriate. It follows that $Pr[H_2] = 0.5 Pr[G_{\text{PKE},1}^{CCA-\phi}(A_1)] + 0.5 (1 - Pr[G_{\text{PKE},0}^{CCA-\phi}(A_1)])$. Hence, $2 Pr[H_2] - 1 = \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{CCA-\phi}(A_1)$.

Adversary $A_1$’s extra running time comes from using $\text{PKE.E}$ in $\text{SimEnc}$ and in the loop in $\text{SimDec}$. Its extra memory is that required for running $\text{PKE.E}$, for storing $i$, and for storing $(c^*, m^*_0, m^*_1)$.

\[\square\]

### 6.2 Indistinguishable from Random CCA Security of PKE

We saw in the previous section that we could have a memory-tight reduction from mCCA-\(\phi\) to 1CCA-\(\phi\); however, the reduction is not tight with respect to running time. In this section, we show that for a different formalization of CCA security, we can indeed have a memory-tight and time-tight reduction between many-and single-challenge variants.

**Ciphertext and Encryption Key Space.** Before describing the indistinguishable from random formalization of CCA security, we need to make some assumptions on $\text{PKE}$. We define the encryption keyspace by $\text{PKE.Ek} = \{ek : (ek, dk) \in PKE.K\}$. We assume for each $ek \in \text{PKE.Ek}$ and allowed message length $n \in \mathbb{N}$ there is a set $\text{PKE.C}(ek, n)$ such that $\text{PKE.E}(ek, m; r) \in \text{PKE.C}(ek, |m|)$ always holds. Let $\text{PKE.C}^{-1}(ek, c)$ returns $n$ such that $c \in \text{PKE.C}(ek, n)$. Correctness implies that $\text{PKE.C}(ek, n)$ and $\text{PKE.C}(ek, n')$ are disjoint for $n \neq n'$.

**Indistinguishable from Random Ciphertext CCA Security.** The security notion we will consider in this section is captured by the game $G^{CCA-w}$ shown in Fig. 24. It requires that ciphertexts output by the encryption scheme cannot be distinguished from ciphertexts chosen at random even given access to a decryption oracle. The adversary gets the encryption key $ek$ and has access to an encryption oracle ENC and a decryption oracle DEC. The adversary needs to distinguish the following real and ideal worlds: in the real world, a query to ENC with a message $m$ returns an encryption of $m$ under $ek$, while in the ideal world, the
same query returns a uniformly random element of $\text{PKE.C}(ek, |m|)$. The decryption oracle $\text{Dec}^w$ acts exactly as the corresponding oracle in $\text{G}^{\text{cca-w}}$. The advantage of an adversary $A$ against the $\text{CCA-w}$ security of $\text{PKE}$ is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{\text{cca-w}}(A) = \text{Pr}[G_{\text{PKE.E}}^{\text{CCA-w}}(A)] - \text{Pr}[G_{\text{PKE.E}}^{\text{0}}(A)]$. If $\text{PKE.E}(ek, m; \cdot)$ is injective, then this is exactly identical to the standard CCA notion for $\text{PKE.C}(ek, n) = \{\text{PKE.E}(ek, m; r) : |m| = n, r \in \text{PKE.R}\}$. $1\text{CCA-m}$ IMPLIES m$\text{CCA-m}$. The following theorem captures a memory-tight reduction establishing that $1\text{CCA-m}$ security implies m$\text{CCA-m}$ security. The proof makes use of our message encoding technique.

**Theorem 7 ($1\text{CCA-m} \Rightarrow m\text{CCA-m}$).** Let $\text{PKE}$ be a public key encryption scheme. Let $\tau$ satisfy $|\text{PKE.C}(ek, n)| \geq 2^n \cdot 2^\tau$ for all $n, ek$. Let $A_m$ be an adversary with $(q_{\text{Enc}}, q_{\text{Dec}}, q_b) = \text{Query}(A_m)$ and assume $q_{\text{Enc}} + q_{\text{Dec}} \leq 0.5 \cdot 2^\tau$. Let $\mathcal{F} = \text{Inj}^2(T, D, R)$ where $T, D,$ and $R$ are defined by $T = \mathbb{N} \times \text{PKE.Ek}$, $D_{n,ek} = \{0,1\}^n \times [q_{\text{Enc}}]$ and $R_{n,ek} = \text{PKE.C}(ek, n)$. Let $A_1$ be the $\mathcal{F}$-oracle adversary defined in Fig. 25. Then,

$$\text{Adv}^{|\text{CCA-m}|}_{\text{PKE}}(A_m) \leq q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot \text{Adv}^{|\text{CCA-m}|}_{\text{PKE}}(A_1) + 8q_{\text{Enc}}q_{\text{Dec}}/2^\tau + 5q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^\tau$$

$$\text{Query}(A_1) = (1, q_{\text{Dec}}, q_b)$$

$$\text{Time}^s(A_1) = O(\text{Time}(A_m)) + q_{\text{Enc}}\cdot \text{Time}(\text{PKE})$$

$$\text{Mem}^s(A_1) = O(\text{Mem}(A_m)) + \text{Mem}(\text{PKE})\cdot \text{lg} q_{\text{Enc}}.$$ 

The standard (non-memory-tight) reduction against $1\text{CCA}$ security that runs an m$\text{CCA}$ adversary $A_m$ works in a similar manner as the standard reduction from an ICCA adversary and an mCCA adversary that we described in Section 6.1. Again here, simulating decryption queries requires remembering all the answers of the encryption queries, and hence the reduction is not memory-tight.

We give an adversary $A_1$ in Fig. 25 that is very similar to the standard reduction, but avoids remembering all the answers of the encryption queries. The main idea here is picking the ciphertext $c_0$ as the output of a random injective function $f$ evaluated on the message and a counter, instead of sampling it uniformly at random. This way of picking the $c_0$ allows $A_1$ detect whether a ciphertext $c$ queried to the decryption oracle was the answer to an earlier encryption query as follows: it first checks if the inverse of $f$ on the ciphertext is defined (i.e., not $\bot$), it returns the message part of the inverse. Otherwise it asks for the decryption of the ciphertext to its own decryption oracle and returns the answer. Using our assumption on the size of $\text{PKE.C}(ek, n)$, we can argue that except with small probability, $A_1$ simulates the decryption oracle correctly. The additional memory overhead for $A_1$ is only a counter. Moreover, there is no increase in the running time of $A_1$ unlike the adversary in Theorem 6.

**Extension to $\text{CCA-\omega}$, $\text{CCA-\bot}$.** We can prove the same result for $\text{CCA-\omega}$, $\text{CCA-\bot}$ but the adversary would not be tight with respect to running time. The adversary in these cases would pick the coins for encrypting $m$ (to compute $c_1$) like the adversary in Theorem 6. This would require iterating over counters to

---

11 As mentioned, the discussion in Section 5 about the three variants definitions is applicable here as well. In Appendix B we give an example where we can prove CCA security of a KEM/DEM scheme in the memory restricted setting, but only if we use the $w \rightarrow m$ definition.
Combining the above claims, we get that $H_{c}^{D}$ the code inside it can be ignored. In particular that means the behavior of $T_{\text{Dec}}$ for these notions because they would not involve any new ideas beyond those presented in Theorems 6 and 7.

We start by considering the hybrid games $H_{c}^{D}$ again note that in $H_{c}^{D}$ follows that $Pr_{\text{Dec}}^{s}(c)$ answer decryption queries and hence lead to looseness with respect to running time. We omit the theorems for these notions because they would not involve any new ideas beyond those presented in Theorems 6 and 7.

We give the formal proof of Theorem 7. We start by considering the hybrid games $H_{c}^{D}$ defined in Fig. 26. In this and future games we define $T$, $D$, and $R$ by $T = \mathbb{N} \times \text{PKE.Ek}$, $D_{n,ek} = \{0,1\}^{n} \times [q_{\text{Enc}}]$ and $R_{n,ek} = \text{PKE.C}(n, ek)$ Of these we make the following claims for $b \in \{0,1\}$.

1. $Pr_{\text{PKE.b}}[G_{\text{PKE.b}}^{s}] = Pr_{i}[H_{0}^{b}]$  
2. $|Pr_{i}[H_{0}^{b}] - Pr_{i}[H_{1}^{b}]| \leq 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^{2}/2^{\tau}$  
3. $Pr_{i}[H_{0}^{b}] = Pr_{i}[H_{1}^{b}]$  
4. $|Pr_{i}[H_{1}^{b}] - Pr_{i}[H_{0}^{b}]| \leq 2q_{\text{Enc}}^{2}q_{\text{Dec}}^{2}/2^{\tau}$

Combining the above claims, we get that

$$
\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE.b}}^{s}(A_{m}) = Pr_{i}[G_{\text{PKE.b}}^{s}] - Pr_{i}[G_{\text{PKE.b}}^{s}] = Pr_{i}[H_{0}^{b}] - Pr_{i}[H_{1}^{b}] \\
\leq Pr_{i}[H_{2}^{0}] - Pr_{i}[H_{1}^{0}] + q_{\text{Enc}}^{2}/2^{\tau} + 4q_{\text{Enc}}q_{\text{Dec}}^{2}/2^{\tau}. \quad (4)
$$

Next, we prove the claims.

**Transition to $H_{0}^{b}$**. The game $H_{0}^{b}$ was copied from the game $G_{\text{PKE.b}}^{s}$ with some code added that has been highlighted (note that the entire code inside the highlighted if statement is new). We added a variable $i$ that counts the number of ENC queries and sample a random injective function $f$ that we will be used for future hybrids. We add an if statement to DEC in which checks if $b = 0$ and $i \geq 1$ if and true it computes $(m,j) \leftarrow f^{-1}((n, ek), c)$ where $n \leftarrow \text{PKE.C}^{-1}(ek, c)$ and then if the check $m \neq \bot$ and $j \leq i$ succeeds, it sets a flag $\text{bad}$, otherwise returns $m$. We note that in $H_{0}^{b}$, the return statement never occurs because if $M[c] \neq \bot$, we would have returned before the execution of this if statement. Hence the code inside the highlighted if statement can be ignored in $H_{0}^{b}$. Therefore, there is no change in behavior in $H_{0}^{b}$ compared to $G_{\text{PKE.b}}^{s}$. It follows that $Pr_{i}[G_{\text{PKE.b}}^{s}] = Pr_{i}[H_{0}^{b}]$.

**Transition from $H_{0}^{b}$ to $H_{1}^{b}$**. In game $H_{1}^{b}$, we replace the random sampling of $c_{0}$ with the output of the random injective function $f$. Using the counter $i$ to provide domain separation between different queries. We again note that in $H_{1}^{b}$, we would never return anything from inside the highlighted if statement, and hence the code inside it can be ignored. In particular that means the behavior of $\text{Dec}$ is independent of $f$. So this modification in how we compute $c_{0}$ changes behavior only in ENC since the values of $c_{0}$ will never repeat in $H_{1}^{b}$ unlike $H_{0}^{b}$. Hence, the switching lemma (Lemma 1) gives us $|Pr_{i}[H_{0}^{b}] - Pr_{i}[H_{1}^{b}]| \leq 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^{2}/2^{\tau}$ (since the image of $f$ always has size at least $2^{\tau}$).
The latter check already implies former, so in future games we remove the former.

When \( M[c] = \bot \) and \( M[c] \neq \bot \), then both \( H^1 \) and \( H^2 \) return \( M[c] = f^{-1}(m, ek), c) \). If \( b = 0 \) and \( M[c] = \bot \), then both \( H^1 \) and \( H^2 \) return \( m = \text{PKE}(d, c) \). Hence the behavior of \( \text{Dec} \) is identical in \( H^1 \) and \( H^2 \). So, \( \Pr[H^1] = \Pr[H^2] \).

Transition from \( H^1 \) to \( H^3 \). In game \( H^3 \), we return \( m \) if the bad flag gets set. Note that for a \( \text{Dec} \) query on \( c \), bad is set in \( H^3 \) only if \( M[c] = \bot \) and \( f^{-1}(m, ek), c) \). This has no effect when \( b = 1 \). The probability that in \( H^3 \) that a given \( \text{Dec} \) query has a \( c \) such that \( M[c] = \bot \) and \( f^{-1}(m, ek), c) \) \( \neq \bot \) is at most \( q_{\text{Enc}}^2/(2^{n+\tau} - q_{\text{Enc}}) \). This follows because there are \( q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot 2^n \) values in the domain (and hence image) of \( f \) and the view of the adversary in \( H^3 \) is dependent only on \( q_{\text{Enc}} \) points of \( f \) which are mapped to \( c \) satisfying \( M[c] \neq \bot \) (i.e. those returned by \( \text{Enc} \)). Taking a union bound over all \( \text{Dec} \) queries, we get that bad is set with probability at most \( 2q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}}/2^7 \). Since \( H^2 \) and \( H^3 \) are identical-untill-bad, using the Fundamental Lemma of Game Playing [9], we get, for \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), \( \Pr[H^2] = \Pr[H^3] \leq 2q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}}/2^7 \).

Transition to \( H^{k,b} \) hybrids. We next consider the hybrid games \( H^{k,b} \) for \((k, b) \in \{q_{\text{Enc}}\} \times \{0, 1\} \) defined in Fig. 27 which have been derived by cleaning up (removing \( M \) and bad) and modifying the code of \( H^3 \). The modified code has been highlighted in Fig. 27. In \( \text{Enc} \) of \( H^{k,b} \), ciphertexts \( c_0 \) and \( c_1 \) are computed as in \( H^3 \), but \( H^{k,b} \) returns \( c_1 \) when \( i < k \), \( c_0 \) when \( i > k \), and \( c_0 \) when \( i = k \). Note that at the extremes \((k = 1, b = 0 \) or \( k = q_{\text{Enc}}, b = 1) \) \( A_m \) will either always receive \( c_0 \) or always receive \( c_1 \). The decryption queries are answered as in \( H^3 \) with some modifications – the \( b = 0 \) and \( i \geq 1 \) check is modified to \( i \geq k + b \) and the check \( j \leq i \) is modified to \( k + b \leq j \leq i \).\(^{12}\) Observe that \( \text{Dec} \) queries in \( H^{1,0} \) will be answered identically as in \( H^3 \) because the condition \( i \geq k + b \) in \( H^{1,0} \) \( i \geq 1 \) and the condition \( b = 0 \) \( i \geq 1 \) \( i \) is equivalent to \( i \geq 1 \) in \( H_0 \), and \( 1 \leq j \leq i \) is equivalent to \( j \leq i \) since \( j \geq 1 \). Similarly the \( \text{Dec} \) queries in \( H^{q_{\text{Enc}},1} \) will be answered identically as in \( H^3 \) because the condition \( i \geq q_{\text{Enc}} + 1 \) in \( H^{q_{\text{Enc}},1} \) is always false and the condition \( b = 0 \) \( i \geq 1 \) is always false in \( H^3 \), and the check \( k + b \leq j \leq i \) is never executed in \( H^{q_{\text{Enc}},1} \) just like the check \( j \leq i \) in \( H^3 \). So \( H^{1,0} \) perfectly matches \( H^3 \) and \( H^{q_{\text{Enc}},1} \) perfectly matches \( H^3 \). Hence combining with (4), we have

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{\text{Sec-a}}(A_m) \leq \Pr[H^{1,1}] - \Pr[H^{q_{\text{Enc}},0}] + (q_{\text{Enc}}^2 + 4 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot q_{\text{Dec}})/2^7. 
\]

In general, in \( H^{k,b} \) the first \( k + b - 1 \) encryption queries use \( c_1 \) and the rest use \( c_0 \); also in \( \text{Dec} \), the checks involve \( k + b \), making them identical in \( H^{k,1} \) and \( H^{k+1,0} \), so \( \Pr[H^{k,1}] = \Pr[H^{k+1,0}] \) holds. Hence

\[
\Pr[H^{q_{\text{Enc}},1}] - \Pr[H^{q_{\text{Enc}},0}] = \Pr[H^{q_{\text{Enc}},1}] - \Pr[H^{1,0}] + \sum_{k \in \{q_{\text{Enc}} - 1\}} \Pr[H^{k,1}] - \Pr[H^{k+1,0}] = \sum_{k \in \{q_{\text{Enc}} - 1\}} \Pr[H^{k,1}] - \Pr[H^{k,0}].
\]

Transition to \( H_k \) hybrids. Next, consider the games shown in Fig. 28. Of these we make the following claims.

\(^{12}\) The latter check already implies former, so in future games we remove the former.
In the rest of the proof we address these one at a time. Putting them together along with (5) and (3) gives the bound claimed in the theorem statement via the following calculation, where we let $\epsilon = (q_{\text{Enc}}^2 + 4q_{\text{Enc}}q_{\text{Dec}})/2^\tau$.

\[
\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{\text{cca-cmi}}(\mathcal{A}_m) = \epsilon + \sum_{k \in \mathbb{Z}} \Pr[H^{k,1}] - \Pr[H^{k,0}] = \\
= \epsilon + q_{\text{Enc}}(2 \Pr[H_0] - 1) \\
\leq \epsilon + q_{\text{Enc}}(2 \Pr[H_1] + (2q_{\text{Enc}} + 4q_{\text{Dec}})/2^\tau - 1) \\
\leq \epsilon + q_{\text{Enc}}(2 \Pr[H_2] + (2q_{\text{Enc}} + 4q_{\text{Dec}})/2^\tau + 2q_{\text{Enc}}/2^\tau - 1) \\
= \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{\text{cca-cmi}}(\mathcal{A}_1) + \epsilon + 4q_{\text{Enc}}q_{\text{Dec}}/2^\tau + 4q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^\tau \\
= \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{\text{cca-cmi}}(\mathcal{A}_1) + 8q_{\text{Enc}}q_{\text{Dec}}/2^\tau + 5q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^\tau
\]

Transition to $H_0$. Game $H_0$ is identical to $H^{k,b}$ with $(k,b)$ chosen at random and with the game returning true if $\mathcal{A}_m$ correctly guessed $b$. We added highlighted code to ENC which stores the message and ciphertext from when $i = k$ in preparation for the next hybrid. We removed the $i \geq k + b$ check in DEC because it is anyway implied by the $k + b \leq j \leq i$ check. Standard calculations by conditioning on all the possible values of $(k,b)$ gives the claim.

Transition from $H_0$ to $H_1$. We make three changes to DEC to transition to $H_1$. First, it immediately returns $m^*$ if given $c = c^*$. Secondly, we modify the check $k + b \leq j \leq i$ to $k \leq j \leq i$. Thirdly, we add an if statement inside the if statement checking $m \neq \bot$ and $k \leq j \leq i$, which checks if $(m,j) = (m^*,k)$ and skipping returning $m$ if that is the case.

Note that if $b = 0$, a DEC query on $c = c^*$ would never exhibit different behavior in $H_1$ compared to $H_0$ because it returns $m^*$ in both cases. A DEC query on $c \neq c^*$ would never exhibit different behavior in $H_1$ compared to $H_0$ because in $H_1$ the condition to skip a line never gets triggered since $f^{-1}((n,ek),c^*) = (m^*,k)$ (because $f$ is injective). Since $b = 0$, the change from $k + b \leq j$ to $k \leq j$ has no effect.

For $b = 1$, a DEC query on $c = c^*$ would exhibit different behavior in $H_0$ than in $H_1$ only if $f^{-1}((n,ek),c^*) \neq \bot$ in $H_1$ (recall that for $b = 1$, $c^*$ is an actual encryption of $m^*$). Note that, up until $c^*$ is defined in $H_0$, the view of the adversary is independent of $f$. So, the probability that $f^{-1}((n,ek),c^*) \neq \bot$ is at most $q_{\text{Enc}}/2^\tau \leq q_{\text{Enc}}/2^\tau$.  

**Fig. 28.** Final set of hybrids for the proof of Theorem 7. The highlighted line is new with respect to the code of $H^{k,b}$.  

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hybrids $H_0$</th>
<th>ENC($m$)</th>
<th>DEC($c$)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>//0 \leq h \leq 2</td>
<td>$i \leftarrow i + 1$</td>
<td>If $c = c^<em>$: Return $m^</em> //H_{1,x}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(k,b) \leftarrow (q_{\text{Enc}} \times [0,1])$</td>
<td>$c_0 \leftarrow f((m,ek),(m,i))$</td>
<td>$n \leftarrow (m,j) \leftarrow f^{-1}((n,ek),c)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$i \leftarrow 0$</td>
<td>If $i &lt; k$:</td>
<td>If $m \neq \bot$ and $k + b \leq j \leq i$: //H$_{0,1}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(ek,dk) \leftarrow \text{PKE.K}$</td>
<td>$c \leftarrow c_1$</td>
<td>If $m \neq \bot$ and $k \leq j \leq i$: //H$_{1,x}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f \leftarrow \text{Inj}(T,D,R)$</td>
<td>If $i = k$:</td>
<td>If $(m,j) = (m^*,k)$: //H$_{1,x}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y' \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\mathcal{A}_m\cdot\text{Dec}(ek)}(y)$</td>
<td>$c \leftarrow c_b$</td>
<td>Skip next line //H$_{1,x}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $y' = b$</td>
<td>$(c^<em>,m^</em>) \leftarrow (c,m)$</td>
<td>Return $m$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>If $i &gt; k$:</td>
<td>$m \leftarrow \text{PKE.D}(dk,c)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c \leftarrow c_0$</td>
<td>Return $m$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Return $c$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For $b = 1$, a Dec query on $c \neq c^s$ would exhibit different behavior in $H_1$ compared to $H_0$ only if $f^{-1}((n, ek), c) = (m, j)$ and $m \neq \updownarrow$ and $k = j$ holds in $H_1$. Because otherwise if $m = \updownarrow$ or $k < j$, the outer if statements would not be true in either game or if $k > j$ then the skip condition (the only difference inside the outer if statement for $H_0$ and $H_1$) would never be triggered for $H_1$.

For every Dec($c$) query, the probability that it was first query where $c$ satisfies $f^{-1}((n, ek), c) = (m, k)$ is at most $2^n/(2^{n+\tau} - q_{\text{Enc}} - q_{\text{Dec}}) \leq 2/2^\tau$. This follows because there are $2^n$ values in the domain of $f^{-1}$ that map to $(m, k)$ for some $m$ and because it is the first query where $c$ satisfies $f^{-1}((n, ek), c) = (m, k)$, the view of the adversary is dependent only on points of $f^{-1}$ which are mapped to $\updownarrow$ or $(m', k')$ where $k' \neq k$.

Taking a union bound over all Dec queries, this event happens with probability at most $2q_{\text{Dec}}/2^\tau$ (where we use the fact that $q_{\text{Dec}} + q_{\text{Enc}} \leq 0.5 \cdot \tau$). This gives us, $Pr[H_0] \leq Pr[H_1] + (q_{\text{Enc}} + 2q_{\text{Dec}})/2^\tau$.

**Transition from $H_2$ to $H_3$.** The only change in $H_3$ is that in Enc for $i = k$, $c_0$ sampled uniformly at random instead of evaluating $f$. Note that this changes behavior in Enc of $H_3$ only if the $c_0$ sampled is the same as $c_0$ for some previous Enc query – since the size of PKE,C is always at least $2^\tau$, this happens with probability at most $q_{\text{Enc}}/2^\tau$. For Dec queries on $c = c^s$, the behavior is identical in $H_2$ and $H_3$ because of the check at the beginning. For a Dec query on $c \neq c^s$, the answer of the query in no way would depend on $c_0$ sampled for $i = k$. So the behavior of Dec is unchanged. It follows that $Pr[H_2] \leq Pr[H_3] + q_{\text{Enc}}/2^\tau$.

**Adversary $A_1$.** Finally we can see that our adversary $A_1$ (defined in Fig. 25) perfectly simulates the view of $A_m$ in $H_3$. It was obtained by copying the code of $H_3$ and then modifying it to query its Dec oracle as appropriate. It follows that $Pr[H_2] = 0.5Pr[C_{\text{PKE,C}}^{\text{Enc}}_{\text{SimEnc},1}] + 0.5(1-Pr[C_{\text{PKE,C}}^{\text{Enc}}_{\text{SimEnc},0}])$. Hence, $2Pr[H_2] - 1 = \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE,C}}^{\text{Enc}}(A_1)$.

Adversary $A_1$’s extra running time comes from using PKE,E in SimEnc. Its extra memory is that required for running PKE,E, for storing $i$, and for storing $(c^s, m^s)$.  

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**References**

A Extended Discussion of Oracle Adversaries

Following our convention from Section 3, the reduction adversaries we provide in a variety of our results are $\mathcal{F}$-oracle adversaries for different choices of $\mathcal{F}$. This is summarized by the table in Fig. 29. One justification for why this is acceptable is that this oracle can always be pseudorandomly instantiated, if needed (as captured by Theorem 2). In this section we will give examples to show that appropriate pseudorandom objects exist.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Result</th>
<th>Security Notion</th>
<th>Required Oracle</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thm. 1</td>
<td>1UFCMA</td>
<td>ln(2) × (DS.M, [qSIGN], D.R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thm. 3</td>
<td>1UFCMA</td>
<td>Fcs(DS.M, [qSIGN], D.R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thm. 4</td>
<td>OW-RSA</td>
<td>Fcs({0, 1}^k, {0, 1}^x, \mathbb{Z}_N^<em>) × ln({0, 1}^</em>, [qSIGN], {0, 1}^n)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thm. 5</td>
<td>INDR</td>
<td>Fcs(NE.N, NE.C, {0, 1}^x)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thm. 6</td>
<td>1CCA-o</td>
<td>Fcs(N, D, PKE.R)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thm. 7</td>
<td>1$$CCA-m</td>
<td>ln(2) × (N × PKE.Ek, {0, 1}^x × [qENC], PKE.C(ek, n))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 29. Summary of the $\mathcal{F}$-oracle adversaries obtained by the results in our paper.

However we emphasize that our perspective is that, in general, fixing specific concrete choices for these instantiations is a secondary concern. Suppose, for example, that an efficient, low-memory adversary $A$ is shown to exist against the security of a digital signature scheme DS which was proven secure with an $\mathcal{F}$-oracle reduction $\mathcal{R}$ to cryptographic assumption $\Pi$. A motivated cryptographer could easily put together a list $F_1, F_2, \ldots$ or many candidate $\mathcal{F}$-pseudorandom functions. Either instantiating $\mathcal{R}[A]$’s oracle with one of the functions on this list would give an efficient, low-memory attack against $\Pi$ or $\mathcal{R}[A]$ would be successfully attacking the pseudorandomness of every $F_i$ on our list (which was chosen after $\mathcal{R}$ and $A$ were fixed).

Consequently, our priority in this section is to highlight the existence of appropriate pseudorandom objects, not in making optimal choices for them. We optimize our choices for ease of explanation. For example, all the required tweakable random functions (Theorems 3, 4, 5, and 6) can implemented using a hash function (say SHA2 or SHA3) which is commonly modeled as a random oracle. For $\mathcal{F}$cs($T, D, R$) given a hash function $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow R$ we simply define $F_p(t, d) = H(K | (t, d))$ where is $\langle \cdot, \cdot \rangle$ encoding of tuples from $T \times D$. If $R = \{0, 1\}^r$, finding such an $H$ is straightforward. For other $R$ of interest we expect to be able to use standard techniques to create such a $H$ from $H'$ with range $\{0, 1\}^r$ (e.g. using rejection sampling, so $H(x) = H'(i, x)$ for the first $i \in [n]$ such that $H'(i, x) \in R$).

Tweakable injections, $\ln{2}(T, D, R)$, are needed for Theorems 1, 4, and 7. A large, structured tweak set $T$ can always be handled by using a collision-resistant hash function to map it to a more standard tweak set. For examples of interest, the choices of $R$ for Theorems 1 and 4 are likely to be $\{0, 1\}^{128}$ or $\{0, 1\}^{256}$. Thus we can implement them by taking tweakable blockciphers obtained from standard blockciphers and restricting their domain to match $D$. Should Theorem 1 require a larger $R$ we can use a large-block blockcipher such as those designed by Hoang, Krotetz, and Rogaway [21]. For Theorem 7, given tweak $(n, ek)$ we need an injection from elements of $\{0, 1\}^n × [qENC]$ to $\text{PKE.C}(ek, n)$ the ciphertext space of $\text{PKE}$ using key $ek$ for messages of length $n$. How this is achieved, will of course depend on the choice of $\text{PKE}$. One common possibility is $\text{PKE.C}(ek, n) = \mathcal{C}(ek) × \{0, 1\}^{n+3}$ where $\mathcal{C}$ is some structured set dependent on $ek$ (e.g. $\mathbb{Z}_N$ for RSA) and $\tau$ is a constant (e.g. 128). If $\log q_{ENC}$ bits of a random element of $c \in \mathcal{C}(ek)$ look uniformly random (when not conditioned on the rest of $c$) then we can use a misuse-resistant authenticated encryption scheme with ciphertexts $\tau$ bits longer than the input message to encrypt the message $(m, i) \in \{0, 1\}^n × [qENC]$ using $(n, ek)$ as a nonce to obtain a ciphertext of length $\log q_{ENC} + n + \tau$. Treating the first $\log q_{ENC}$ bits of the ciphertext as part of some $c \in \mathcal{C}(ek)$ we can use deterministic rejection sampling (using some PRF) to sample the rest of the bits of $c$.
B KEM/DEM (Application Requiring AE/\$CCA-m)

In this section we exhibit reductions which are memory-tight when we use the \( w = m \) variant of definitions, but for which this memory-tightness does not appear possible if we use \( w = \circ \) or \( \bot \). The reductions are for proving the security encryption schemes based on the KEM/DEM paradigm. In the paradigm we construct an encryption scheme \( KD \) given two encryption schemes \( KEM \) and \( DEM \). To encrypt a message \( m \) we first sample a random key \( K \) for \( DEM \) which we encrypt using \( KEM \). Then using \( DEM \) with key \( K \) we encrypt \( m \). Decryption proceeds by using \( KEM \) to recover \( K \) and then using it with \( DEM \) to recover \( m \).

We consider the cases when \( KEM \) (and hence \( KD \)) is a secret-key or public-key encryption scheme.\(^{13}\) In either case we use a secret-key encryption scheme for \( DEM \). For now let us consider the secret-key case; the public-key case is similar. Our goal is to show that if \( KEM \) is AE-w secure and \( DEM \) is AE-w secure (against multi-user attacks making one encryption query per user), then \( KD \) is AE-w secure. Our goal is for these reductions to be memory-tight.

In particular, for motivating the usefulness of \(-m\) style definition, we are most interested in the reduction to the security of \( KEM \). In fact, the standard reduction to the security of \( KEM \) works and is memory-tight when \( w = m \). (The reduction to the security of \( DEM \) will require non-standard steps making use of our efficient tagging technique.) It seems unlikely the reduction to \( KEM \)'s security can be made memory-tight if \( w \in \{\bot, \circ\} \) instead.

To understand the issue at hand, let us discuss how the proof works at a high level. Broadly, we use a reduction to the security of \( KEM \) to switch ciphertexts encrypting \( K \) to be random so that \( K \) itself is random from the perspective of the adversary. With these random \( K \) we can then apply the security of \( DEM \). Our focus is on the memory-tightness of the first step. Given adversary \( A_{kd} \) against \( KD \) we build \( A_k \) against security of \( KEM \) as following. On an encryption query for \( m \), adversary \( A_k \) will sample a random \( K \) and then ask its own encryption oracle for an encryption \( c_k \) of \( K \) and locally use \( K \) to encrypt \( m \) into the ciphertext \( c_d \). It returns \((c_k, c_d)\) to \( A_{kd} \). The interesting challenge is in simulating decryption queries for some \((c_k, c_d)\). When \( w = m \), adversary \( A_k \) can query \( c_k \) to its own decryption oracle to receive some \( K \) and use that to decrypt \( c_d \). For \( w \in \{\bot, \circ\} \), this works fine unless \( c_k \) was previously returned by an encryption query in which case \( A_k \)'s oracle returns \( \bot \) or \( \circ \) (as appropriate) which does not enable \( A_k \) to simulate decryption properly if \( c_d \) was not also returned by that encryption query. As such, it is not clear how \( A_k \) could respond correctly without storing all prior encryption queries.

The step described above is main motivation of this section, showing how \( w = m \) can be useful for security proofs. The second step of the proof also required some care to be memory-tight. The natural reduction to the multi-user security of \( DEM \) works as follows. For an encryption query it samples a random ciphertext for the \( KEM \), samples key \( K \) at random, then queries its oracles to create a new user for \( DEM \) and have that user encrypt \( K \). On a decryption query \((c_k, c_d)\), if \( c_k \) was a ciphertext it picked randomly for a prior encryption query, it wants to query its decryption oracle to get \( c_d \) decrypted. This requires remembering the name of the new user created during the encryption query that returned \( c_k \) and would thus not be memory-tight. We use our message encoding technique to make this memory-tight. In particular, to respond to encryption queries we create \( c_k \) as the output of an injection applied to the name of the new user being created which allows us to later recover this when responding to decryption queries.

In Section B.1 we formalize the proof when \( KEM \) is a secret-key, nonce-based scheme and in Section B.2 we do the same for when it is a public-key scheme.

B.1 Secret-key KEM/DEM

KEM/DEM Scheme. Let \( NE_k \) and \( NE_d \) be nonce-based encryption schemes. Then we define the KEM/DEM nonce-based encryption scheme \( KD[NE_k, NE_d] \) as shown in Fig. 30. Technically \( KD \) does not meet our syntax for nonce-based encryption from Section 5, due to being randomized. Requiring nonce-based encryption be deterministic is not actually important for our purposes, so we ignore this technicality.

\(^{13}\) The public-key case is a standard “textbook” construction of an encryption scheme. The secret-key case also arises in practice where a master key is used to encryption subkeys which are used to encryption the message. See, for example, some key-rotation schemes [18].
**Multi-user AE Security.** For our proof we will require that $\text{NE}_d$ provide multi-user security against attacks making one encryption query. So we require an extension of the notion of AE security to the multi-user setting. The multi-user setting allows the adversary to make encryption and decryption queries for multiple keys. We use the games in Fig. 31 to define the multi-user AE (muAE) security. For the multi-user setting allows the adversary to make encryption and decryption queries for multiple keys. We will make the following claims, which establish the claimed upper bound on the advantage of $\text{Adv}_{\text{mu-ae}}(A)$.

**Theorem 8.** Let $\text{NE}_k$, $\text{NE}_d$ be nonce-based encryption schemes and let $\tau = \text{NE}_k.c(\text{NE}_d.k)$, $\text{NE}_d$. Let $A_0$ be an AE-$m$ adversary with $\text{Query}(A_0) = (q_{\text{Enc}}, q_{\text{Dec}})$. Define $(T, D, R) = (\text{NE}_k.N_i, [q_{\text{Enc}}], \{0, 1\}^\tau)$. Let $B_d$ be as defined in Fig. 33 and $C_a$ be the $\text{Inj}^2(T, D, R)$-oracle adversary defined in Fig. 35. Then,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{mu-ae}}^{\text{ae}}(A_a) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{NE}_d}^{\text{ae}}(B_a) + \text{Adv}_{\text{NE}_d^{\text{mu-ae}}}^{\text{ae}}(C_a) + q_{\text{Enc}}(q_{\text{Enc}} + 4q_{\text{Dec}})^2/2^\tau.$$ 

**Proof.** We consider the hybrids $H_0$ through $H_3$ and $L_0$ through $L_4$ defined in Figs. 32 and 34. Of these hybrids we will make the following claims, which establish the claimed upper bound on the advantage of $A_a$.

1. $\Pr[G^{\text{ae}}_{\text{NE}_d.N_i.\text{NE}_d}(A_a)] = \Pr[H_0]$
2. $\Pr[H_0] \leq \Pr[H_1] + \text{Adv}_{\text{NE}_d^{\text{ae}}}^{\text{ae}}(B_a)$
3. $\Pr[H_1] \leq \Pr[H_2] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^\tau$
4. $\Pr[H_2] = \Pr[H_3]$
5. $\Pr[H_3] \leq \Pr[L_0] + 2q_{\text{Enc}}q_{\text{Dec}}/2^\tau$
6. $\Pr[L_0] \leq \Pr[L_1] + \text{Adv}_{\text{NE}_d^{\text{mu-ae}}}^{\text{ae}}(C_a)$
7. $\Pr[L_1] \leq \Pr[L_2] + 2q_{\text{Enc}}q_{\text{Dec}}/2^\tau$
8. $\Pr[L_2] \leq \Pr[L_3] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^\tau$
9. $\Pr[L_3] = \Pr[G^{\text{ae}}_{\text{KD}[\text{NE}_d.\text{NE}_d]}(A_a)]$

**Transition to $H_0$.** We claim that $H_0$ is identical to $G^{\text{ae}}_{\text{KD}[\text{NE}_d.\text{NE}_d]}(A_a)$. Note that, in the latter, ENC produces honest encryptions using KD and DEC produces honest decryptions. It is immediately clear that the same holds for ENC in $H_0$ and the else branch of DEC in $H_0$. Consider the first branch in DEC. We have used grey highlighting to indicate the relevant code. Note that $l$ is the identity function (its presence will be
notationally convenient for future game transitions). \( Y \) is a table indexed by \( n, c_k \) pairs which stores the key in encrypted \( c_k \). The use of \( Y \) in \( \text{Dec} \) simply recovers this \( K \) without decrypting \( c_k \). By the correctness of \( \text{NE} \) this is identical to having done the decryption, so \( \Pr[K_0 \leftarrow \text{G}^{ae \leftarrow \text{w}}_{\text{NE} \cdot \text{NE} \cdot 1}(A_0)] = \Pr[K_0] \) follows.

**Transition \( H_0 \) to \( H_1 \).** In hybrid \( H_1 \), the ciphertext \( c_k \) is now sampled uniformly at random. Also in \( \text{Dec} \), the key \( K \) is assigned the value \( \perp \) if the \( Y[n, c_k] = \perp \). These difference correspond to what we expect from the security of \( \text{NE} \). We define \( B_0 \) in Fig. 33 from hybrid \( H_1 \) by replacing encryption and decryption of \( K \) with appropriate queries to its oracle. This adversary is nonce-respecting because \( A_0 \) is. Note that the use of table \( Y \) in the hybrids matches the table from \( \text{G}^{ae \leftarrow \text{w}}_{\text{NE} \cdot \text{NE} \cdot 1} \). We can see that when interacting with \( \text{G}^{ae \leftarrow \text{w}}_{\text{NE} \cdot \text{NE} \cdot 1} \), \( B_0 \) simulates \( H_0 \) to \( A_0 \) and when interacting with \( \text{G}^{ae \leftarrow \text{w}}_{\text{NE} \cdot \text{NE} \cdot 1} \), \( B_0 \) simulates \( H_1 \) to \( A_0 \). Hence \( \Pr[H_0] = \Pr[H_1] + \text{Adv}_{\text{NE} \cdot \text{NE} \cdot 1}(B_0) \).

After this transition the else branch in \( \text{Dec} \) is dead code. We remove it later when transitioning to \( L_0 \).

**Transition \( H_1 \) to \( H_2 \).** In hybrid \( H_2 \), instead of sampling \( c_k \) at random, we assign it the output of a random injective function \( f \) applied to nonce \( n \) and a counter \( u \) (we will later make \( u \) correspond to users in \( \text{G}^{\text{usr} \leftarrow \text{w}}_{\text{w}} \)). The switching lemma tells us that \( \Pr[H_2] \leq \Pr[H_1] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^2 / 2^7 \).

**Transition \( H_2 \) to \( H_3 \).** In hybrid \( H_3 \), we introduce a table \( M \) which is indexed by \( n, c_k, c_d \) (the first two via \( l \)) and stores the value of \( m \) whose encryption under \( K = Y[l(n, c_k)] \) is \( c_d \). This table is used in \( \text{Dec} \) to skip the step of decrypting \( c_d \). By the correctness of \( \text{NE} \) this does not change functionality, so \( \Pr[H_2] = \Pr[H_3] \).

**Transition \( H_3 \) to \( L_0 \).** Next we transition to hybrid \( L_0 \) shown in Fig. 34. We have highlighted all ways that this differs from hybrid \( H_3 \) (other than the elimination of the aforementioned dead code in the else branch of \( \text{Dec} \)). Our changes were twofold, consisting of switching the function \( l \) indexing into our tables to \( f^{-1} \) and switching the if condition in \( \text{Dec} \). Considering the latter first, note that the checks \( Y[l(n, c_k)] \neq \perp \) in \( H_3 \) and \( 1 \leq f^{-1}(n, c_k) \leq u \) in \( L_0 \) can only differ if the second is true and the first is false. This requires the adversary to guess something in the image of \( f(n, \cdot) \) other than the (at most) one example it can obtain from \( \text{Enc} \). Switching to using \( l = f^{-1} \) similarly can only change behavior if a \( \text{Dec}(n, (c_k, c_d)) \) query is made where \( c_k \) is in the image of \( f(n, \cdot) \), but \( c_d \) was not returned in a prior \( \text{Enc} \) query with \( n \). Note that the domain (and hence the image) of \( f(n, \cdot) \) has size \( q_{\text{Enc}} \) and its range has size \( 2^7 \). So for a given decryption query this bad event happens in \( H_3 \) with probability at most \( q_{\text{Enc}} / 2^7 = \Pr[L_0] + 2q_{\text{Enc}}q_{\text{Dec}} / 2^7 \). Taking a union bound over all \( \text{Dec} \) queries gives that \( \Pr[H_3] \leq \Pr[L_0] + 2q_{\text{Enc}}q_{\text{Dec}} / 2^7 \).
Hybrids $L_\ell$ for $0 \leq \ell \leq 3$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$f \leftarrow f^{-1}$</th>
<th>$l \leftarrow l \cup {0,2}$</th>
<th>$u \leftarrow 1$</th>
<th>$K \leftarrow \text{NE}_L$</th>
<th>$c_f \leftarrow f(u, u)$</th>
<th>$c_f \leftarrow {0, 1} \text{NE}_{cl}[K]$</th>
<th>$c_{e_f} \leftarrow \text{NE}_d, E(K, 0, m)$</th>
<th>$c_{e_f} \leftarrow {0, 1} \text{NE}_{cl}[m]$</th>
<th>$Y(f(u, n, c_f)) \leftarrow K$</th>
<th>$M[f(u, n, c_f), c_d] \leftarrow m$</th>
<th>$\text{Dec}(n, c)$</th>
<th>$(c_k, c_d) \leftarrow c$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Enc}(n, m)$</td>
<td>$u \leftarrow u + 1$</td>
<td>$\text{NEW}(n)$</td>
<td>$k \leftarrow f^{-1}(u, u)$</td>
<td>$c_d \leftarrow \text{Enc}(u, 0, m)$</td>
<td>$\text{Return}(c_k, c_d)$</td>
<td>$\text{Return}(c_k, c_d)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Dec}(n, c)$</td>
<td>$l \leftarrow l \cup {0,2}$</td>
<td>$u \leftarrow 1$</td>
<td>$K \leftarrow \text{NE}_L$</td>
<td>$c_f \leftarrow f(u, u)$</td>
<td>$c_f \leftarrow {0, 1} \text{NE}_{cl}[K]$</td>
<td>$c_{e_f} \leftarrow \text{NE}_d, E(K, 0, m)$</td>
<td>$c_{e_f} \leftarrow {0, 1} \text{NE}_{cl}[m]$</td>
<td>$Y(f(u, n, c_f)) \leftarrow K$</td>
<td>$M[f(u, n, c_f), c_d] \leftarrow m$</td>
<td>$\text{Dec}(n, c)$</td>
<td>$(c_k, c_d) \leftarrow c$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Enc}(n, m)$</td>
<td>$u \leftarrow u + 1$</td>
<td>$\text{NEW}(n)$</td>
<td>$k \leftarrow f^{-1}(u, u)$</td>
<td>$c_d \leftarrow \text{Enc}(u, 0, m)$</td>
<td>$\text{Return}(c_k, c_d)$</td>
<td>$\text{Return}(c_k, c_d)$</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Dec}(n, c)$</td>
<td>$l \leftarrow l \cup {0,2}$</td>
<td>$u \leftarrow 1$</td>
<td>$K \leftarrow \text{NE}_L$</td>
<td>$c_f \leftarrow f(u, u)$</td>
<td>$c_f \leftarrow {0, 1} \text{NE}_{cl}[K]$</td>
<td>$c_{e_f} \leftarrow \text{NE}_d, E(K, 0, m)$</td>
<td>$c_{e_f} \leftarrow {0, 1} \text{NE}_{cl}[m]$</td>
<td>$Y(f(u, n, c_f)) \leftarrow K$</td>
<td>$M[f(u, n, c_f), c_d] \leftarrow m$</td>
<td>$\text{Dec}(n, c)$</td>
<td>$(c_k, c_d) \leftarrow c$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 34. Second set of hybrids used for proof of Theorem 8.

| Adversary $C_a^{\text{New, Enc, Dec}}$ | $f \leftarrow f^{-1}$ | $l \leftarrow l \cup \{0,2\}$ | $u \leftarrow 1$ | $K \leftarrow \text{NE}_L$ | $c_f \leftarrow f(u, u)$ | $c_{e_f} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(u, 0, m)$ | $\text{Return}(c_k, c_d)$ |
|-------------------------|-----------------|-------|-------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| $\text{SIM ENC}(n, m)$ | $u \leftarrow u + 1$ | $\text{NEW}(n)$ | $k \leftarrow f^{-1}(u, u)$ | $c_d \leftarrow \text{Enc}(u, 0, m)$ | $\text{Return}(c_k, c_d)$ | $\text{Return}(c_k, c_d)$ |
| $\text{SIM DEC}(n, c)$ | $(c_k, c_d) \leftarrow c$ | $i \leftarrow f^{-1}(u, u)$ | If $1 \leq i \leq u$ | $\text{Return Dec}(i, 0, c_d)$ | $\text{Return}$ |

Fig. 35. Adversary $C_a$ for Theorem 8.

**Transition $L_0$ to $L_1$.** In hybrid $L_1$, the ciphertext $c_d$ is now sampled uniformly at random. Also in Dec, if the $M[I(n, c_k), c_d] = 1$ then the oracle always returns 1. These differences correspond to what we expect from the multi-user security of $\text{NE}_d$. We define $C_a$ in Fig. 35 from hybrid $L_1$ by replacing encryption and decryption of $c_d$ with appropriate values to its oracle. We claim that when interacting with $G_{\text{NE}, 1}^{\text{mu-ae-a}}$, $C_a$ simulates $L_0$ to $A_a$, and when interacting with $G_{\text{NE}, 0}^{\text{mu-ae-a}}$, $C_a$ simulates $L_1$ to $A_a$. To see this, note that the variable $u$ in these hybrids matches the same variable in $G_{\text{NE}, b}^{\text{mu-ae-a}}$. Additionally, if $i = I(n, c_k)$ then the values $Y[i]$ and $M[i, c_d]$ in these hybrids always match $K_i$ and $M[i, 0, c_d]$ in $G_{\text{NE}, b}^{\text{mu-ae-a}}$. (The claims can be rigorously verified by plugging the code of $G_{\text{NE}, b}^{\text{mu-ae-a}}$ into $C_a$ and comparing side-by-side with $L_{1-L_0}$.) This gives $Pr[L_1] \leq Pr[L_0] + \text{Adv}^{\text{mu-ae-a}}_{\text{NE}}(C_a)$.

**Transition $L_1$ to $L_2$.** In hybrid $L_2$, we undo the code changes used to transition from $H_2$ to $L_0$. Namely, $l$ is set back to 1 and the if statement in Dec is reverted. By the same logic as that prior transition, $Pr[L_2] \leq Pr[L_1] + 2\text{Pr}_{\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}}' / 2^\ell$.

**Transition $L_2$ to $L_3$.** In hybrid $L_3$, we undo the code changes used to transition from $H_1$ to $H_2$. Namely, we get rid of the injection $f$ and sample $c_k$ uniformly. By the same logic as that prior transition, $Pr[L_3] \leq Pr[L_2] + 0.5 \cdot \text{Pr}_{\text{Enc}, \text{Dec}}' / 2^\ell$.

**Final Transition.** Finally, we claim that $L_3$ and $G_{\text{ne}, 0}^{\text{mu-ae-a}}$ are identical. Recall that in the latter, Enc always returns random ciphertexts. The same holds in $L_3$. Similarly, the two games have the same behavior in only responding with non-$\perp$ values to Dec queries for ciphertexts that were trivially forwarded from earlier Enc queries. In particular, we can see this by noting that $M[I(n, c_k), c_d]$ in $L_3$ always has the same value as the $M[n, (c_k, c_d)]$ in $G_{\text{ne}, 0}^{\text{mu-ae-a}}$ and that $M[I(n, c_k), c_d] \neq \perp$ implies $Y[I(n, c_k)] \neq \perp$. □

**B.2 Public-key KEM/DEM**

**KEM/DEM scheme.** Let $\text{NE}$ be a nonce-based encryption scheme. Let $\text{PKE}$ be a public-key encryption scheme. Then we define the KEM/DEM public-key encryption scheme $\text{KD}[\text{PKE, NE}]$ as shown in Fig. 37.

**Multi-user $\text{SCCA}$ security of $\text{NE}$.** For our proof we will again require that $\text{NE}$ provide multi-user security against attacks making one encryption query. For this proof we will use a $\text{SCCA}$-style definition rather than $\text{AE}$. We use the games in Fig. 36 to define the multi-user $\text{SCCA}$ ($\mu\text{SCCA}$) security of $\text{NE}$. If differs from
Fig. 36. Game defining multi-user $\Sigma$CCA security of nonce-based encryption.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Game $G_{\text{NE},\kappa}^{\mu\Sigma\text{CCA}^{-w}}(A)$</th>
<th>ENC$_\kappa(i, n, m)$</th>
<th>DEC$_\kappa(i, n, c)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$u \leftarrow 0$</td>
<td>$c \leftarrow \text{NE.E}(K, n, m)$</td>
<td>$M[i, n, c] \leftarrow m$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$y' \leftarrow A^{\text{NE, ENC, DEC}}_{\mu\Sigma\text{CCA}^{-w}}(y)$</td>
<td>$c_0 \leftarrow \text{NE.E}[0, 1]^{</td>
<td>\text{cl}(\text{m})</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $y' = 1$</td>
<td>$M[i, n, c] \leftarrow m$</td>
<td>Return $m$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 37. A public-key scheme $\text{KD}[\text{PKE, NE}]$ constructed from a public key encryption scheme PKE and a nonce-based encryption scheme NE.

muAE only in that the decryption oracle always returns honest decryptions of ciphertexts that were not trivially forwarded. For $w \in \{\emptyset, \top\}$, the advantage against multi-user AE security of a scheme NE is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\text{muAE}}^{\mu\Sigma\text{CCA}^{-w}}(A) = \Pr[A \in \{0, 1\}^{|c|}; c \leftarrow \text{PKE.E}(ek, K)]$.

UNIFORMITY of PKE. For our proof we will additionally need to make the statistical assumption that the distribution of sampling ciphertexts randomly from PKE.C(ek, NE.kl) is close (in statistical distance) to the distribution obtained by encrypting a random K. Formally, we say that PKE is $(\kappa, \epsilon)$-uniform if for all $(ek, dk) \in \text{PKE.K}$ and all (not necessarily efficient) $A$ it holds that

$$\Pr[A(c) = 1 : c \leftarrow \text{PKE.C}(ek, \kappa)] - \Pr[A(c) = 1 : K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa; c \leftarrow \text{PKE.E}(ek, K)] \leq \epsilon.$$ 

As one example, this will hold with $\epsilon = 0$ for schemes in which PKE.E(ek, K; ·) is injective for all $K \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and PKE.C(ek, $\kappa$) $\subseteq$ PKE.E(ek, K; $\cdot$).

SECURITY RESULT. The following theorem captures that $\text{KD}[\text{PKE, NE}]$ can be proven $\Sigma$CCA-m secure from the security of PKE and NE, where all reductions are memory-tight.

**Theorem 9.** Let NE be a nonce-based encryption scheme with $\text{NE.cl}(n) \geq n + \text{NE.xl}$ for all $n$ and let PKE be a $(\text{NE.kl}, \epsilon)$-uniform public key encryption scheme. Let $\tau$ satisfy $|\text{PKE.C}(ek, \text{NE.kl})| \geq 2^\tau$ for all $ek$ and NE.xl $\geq \tau$. Let $A$ be an $\Sigma$CCA-$m$ adversary with $\text{Query}(A, c) = (q_{\text{ENC}}, q_{\text{DEC}})$ and assume $q_{\text{ENC}} \leq 0.5 \cdot 2^\tau$.

Define $T = \text{PKE.E}(ek)$ and $(D_{ek}, R_{ek}) = (\{1\}^{|\text{ENC}|}, \text{PKE.C}(ek, \text{NE.kl}))$ for $ek \in T$. Define $T' = \{0, 1\}^\tau \times N$, $D'_{(a, t)} = \{0, 1\}^t$, and $R'_{(a, t)} = \{0, 1\}^{|\text{NE.cl}(t)|}$. Let $B_c$ be as defined in Fig. 39, let $\text{C}_a$ be the $\text{Inv}^\text{w}(T, D, R)$-oracle adversary defined in Fig. 41, and let $\text{E}_c$ be the $\text{Inv}^\text{w}(T', D', R')$-oracle adversary defined in Fig. 43. Then,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KD}[\text{PKE, NE}]}^{\mu\Sigma\text{CCA}^{-w}}(A, c) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{\mu\Sigma\text{CCA}^{-w}}(B_c) + \text{Adv}_{\text{NE}}^{\mu\Sigma\text{CCA}^{-w}}(C_a) + \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{\mu\Sigma\text{CCA}^{-w}}(E_c) + 2q_{\text{ENC}} \cdot \epsilon + (2.5 \cdot q_{\text{ENC}}^2 + 4q_{\text{ENC}})/2^\tau.$$ 

| Query($B_c$) | (q_{ENC}, q_{DEC}) |
| Time($B_c$) | Time($A_c$) + (q_{ENC} + q_{DEC}) Time(NE) |
| Mem($B_c$) | Mem($A_c$) + Mem(NE) |

| Query($C_a$) | (q_{ENC}, q_{ENC}, q_{DEC}) |
| Time($C_a$) | Time($A_c$) + (q_{ENC} + q_{DEC}) Time(NE) |
| Mem($C_a$) | Mem($A_c$) + Mem(NE) |
Honest encryptions using Transition to $H$

We claim that $\mathcal{A}$ of $\text{PKE}$ key encrypted in notationally convenient for future game transitions).

### Proof

We consider the hybrids $H_0$ through $H_3$ and $L_0$ through $L_3$ defined in Figs. 38 and 40. Of these hybrids we the following claims establish the upper bound on the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ claimed in the proof.

1. $\Pr[G_{\text{PKE},0}(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[H_0]$
2. $\Pr[H_0] \leq \Pr[H_1] + \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}(\mathcal{B}_e)$
3. $\Pr[H_1] \leq \Pr[H_2] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^2$
4. $\Pr[H_2] = \Pr[H_3] = \Pr[L_0]$
5. $\Pr[L_0] \leq \Pr[L_1] + \text{Adv}_{\text{NE}}$
6. $\Pr[L_1] = \Pr[L_2] = \Pr[L_3]$
7. $\Pr[L_3] \leq \Pr[L_4] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^2$
8. $\Pr[L_4] = \Pr[M_0]$
9. $\Pr[M_0] \leq \Pr[M_1] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^2$

### Transition to $H_0$

We claim that $H_0$ is identical to $G_{\text{PKE},0}(\mathcal{A})$. Note that, in the latter, Enc produces honest encryptions using KD and DEC produces honest decryptions. It is immediately clear that the same holds for Enc in $H_0$ and the else branch of DEC in $H_0$. Consider the first branch in DEC. We have used grey highlighting to indicate the relevant code. Note that $l$ is the identity function $\text{I}$ (its presence will be notationally convenient for future game transitions). $Y$ is a table indexed by $ek$, $c_d$ pairs which stores the key encrypted in $c_d$. The use of $Y$ in DEC simply recovers this $K$ without decrypting $c_k$. By the correctness of PKE this is identical to having done the decryption, so $\Pr[G_{\text{PKE},0}(\mathcal{A})] = \Pr[H_0]$ follows.

### Transition $H_0$ to $H_1$

In hybrid $H_1$, the ciphertext $c_d$ is now sampled uniformly at random. This difference corresponds to what we expect from the SCCA-m security of PKE. We define $\mathcal{B}_e$ in Fig. 39 from hybrid $H_1$ by replacing encryption and decryption of $K$ with appropriate queries to its oracle. Note that the use of table $Y$ in the hybrids is similar to the table $M$ from $G_{\text{Enc}}$ (in $Y$ all entries are additionally indexed by the same $ek$). We can see that when interacting with $G_{\text{PKE},0}$, $\mathcal{B}_0$ simulates $H_0$ to $\mathcal{A}$ and when interacting with $G_{\text{PKE},0}$, $\mathcal{B}_e$ simulates $H_1$ to $\mathcal{A}$. Hence $\Pr[H_0] \leq \Pr[H_1] + \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}(\mathcal{B}_e)$.

### Transition $H_1$ to $H_2$

In hybrid $H_2$, instead of sampling $c_d$ at random, we assign it the output of a random injective function $f$ applied to the encryption key $ek$ as the tweak and a counter $u$ (we will later make $u$ correspond to users in $G_{\text{mut}}$). The switching lemma tells us that $\Pr[H_1] \leq \Pr[H_2] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^2$.

### Table

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fig. 38. First set of hybrids used for proof of Theorem 9. $I$ denotes the identity function.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Hybrids } H_h$ for $0 \leq h \leq 3$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$f \leftarrow \text{Inj}(T, D, R) \land \langle H[2,x] \rangle$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$l \leftarrow I$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u \leftarrow 0 \land \langle H[2,x] \rangle$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{PKE.K}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b' \leftarrow A_{\text{Enc},\text{Dec}}(ek)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $b' - 1$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Enc}(m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$u \leftarrow u + 1 \land \langle H[2,x] \rangle$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K \leftarrow \text{NE.K}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_d \leftarrow \text{PKE.C}(ek, K) \land \langle H[0,1] \rangle$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_d \leftarrow \text{PKE.C}(ek, [K]) \land \langle H[1,2] \rangle$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_d \leftarrow f(ek, u) \land \langle H[2,x] \rangle$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_d \leftarrow \text{NE.E}(K, 0, m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$Y[l(ek, c_d)] \leftarrow K$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$M[l(ek, c_d), c_d] \leftarrow \langle H[3,x] \rangle$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(c_d, c_d)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Dec}(c)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(c_d, c_d) \leftarrow c$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If $Y[l(ek, c_d)] \neq \bot$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If $M[l(ek, c_d), c_d] \neq \bot$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $M[l(ek, c_d), c_d] \land \langle H[3,x] \rangle$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $\bot$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fig. 39. Adversary $B_e$ for Theorem 9.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\text{Adversary } B_{\text{Enc},\text{Dec}}(ek)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$b' \leftarrow A_{\text{Enc},\text{Dec}}(ek)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $b'$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{SimEnc}(m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K \leftarrow \text{NE.K}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_d \leftarrow \text{Enc}(K)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$c_d \leftarrow \text{NE.E}(K, 0, m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $(c_d, c_d)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\text{SimDec}(c)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$(c_d, c_d) \leftarrow c$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$K \leftarrow \text{Dec}(c_d)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If $K \neq \bot$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $\bot$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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41
TRANSITION H₂ to H₃. In hybrid H₃, we introduce a table $M$ which is indexed by $ek, c_k, c_d$ (the first two via $l$) and stores the value of $m$ whose encryption under $K = Y[l(ek, c_k)]$ is $c_d$. This table is used in Dec to skip the step of decrypting $c_d$. By the correctness of NE this does not change functionality, so $Pr[H_2] = Pr[H_3]$.

TRANSITION H₃ to L₀. Next we transition to hybrid L₀ shown in Fig. 40. We have highlighted all ways that this differs from hybrid H₃. Our changes were twofold, consisting of switching the function $l$ indexing into our tables to $f^{-1}$ and switching the if condition in Dec. Considering the latter first, note that the checks $Y[l(ek, c_k)] \neq \bot$ in H₃ and $1 \leq f^{-1}(ek, c_k) \leq u$ in L₀ are identical. Note that $Y[l(ek, c_k)] \neq \bot$ iff $c_k$ was returned by the $u'$-th ENC query for some $1 \leq u' \leq u$ which holds iff $f^{-1}(ek, c_k) = u'$. Switching to using $l = f^{-1}$ cannot change behavior since $(ek, c_k) = (ek, c'_k)$ iff $f^{-1}(ek, c_k) = f^{-1}(ek, c'_k) \neq \bot$. Thus $Pr[H_3] = Pr[L_0]$.

TRANSITION L₀ to L₁. In hybrid L₁, the ciphertext $c_d$ is now sampled uniformly at random. We define $C_a$ in Fig. 41 from hybrid L₁ by replacing encryption and decryption of $c_d$ with appropriate queries to its oracle. We claim that when interacting with $G_{\text{mu-Scca-a}}^{\text{NE,1}}$, $C_a$ simulates $L_0$ to $A_c$ and when interacting with $G_{\text{NE,0}}^{\text{mu-Scca-a}}$, $C_a$ simulates $L_1$ to $A_c$. To see this, note that the variable $u$ in these hybrids matches the same variable in $G_{\text{mu-Scca-a}}$. Additionally, if $i = l(ek, c_k)$ then the values $Y[i]$ and $M[i, c_d]$ in these hybrids always match $K_i$ and $M[i, 0, c_d]$ in $G_{\text{mu-Scca-a}}$. (The claims can be rigorously verified by plugging the code of $G_{\text{mu-Scca-a}}$ into $C_a$ and comparing side-by-side with $L_{1,1}$.) This gives $Pr[L_0] \leq Pr[L_1] + \text{Adv}_{\text{mu-Scca-a}}(C_a)$.

TRANSITION L₁ to L₂. In hybrid L₂, the ciphertext $c_d$ is now the output of a random function $g$ from $\text{Fcs}(T', D', R')$, rather than being sampled uniformly. (Recall $T' = \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{N}$, $D'_{(c_k, l)} = \{0, 1\}^l$, and $R'_{(c_k, l)} = \{0, 1\}^{\text{NE,Enc}(l)}$.) The inputs to $g$ never repeat (because $c_k$ never repeats), so this does not modify the behavior of the game, giving $Pr[L_1] = Pr[L_2]$. 

Fig. 40. Second set of hybrids used for proof of Theorem 9.

Fig. 41. Adversary $C_a$ for Theorem 9.
Applying a union bound gives \( \Pr[\text{Transition}] \) hybrid argument using the \( p \) it uniformly at random. The key

\[ M \]

is mostly undoing prior transitions.

Fig. 42. Third set of hybrids used for proof of Theorem 9. Hybrids after \( M_1 \) are mostly undoing prior transitions.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Hybrids } M_\ell & \text{ENC(m)} & \text{DEC(c)} \\
\text{for } 0 \leq \ell \leq 8 & K \leftarrow \text{NE.K} & (c_k, c_d) \leftarrow c \\
(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{PKE.K} & c_k \leftarrow \text{PKE.C}(ek, |K|) & \text{If } M[c_k, c_d] \neq \bot: \ 
\text{M}[c_k, c_d] \leftarrow \text{NE.xl}, c_d \leftarrow |M[2,6]| \\
g \leftarrow \text{Bin}(T', D', R') & K' \leftarrow \text{NE.K} & \text{Return } NE.D(K, 0, c_d) \\
\text{if } l' \leftarrow A^{\text{Enc,Dek}}(ek) \quad \text{Return } l' \leftarrow 1 & c_d \leftarrow g((c_k, |m|), m) & \text{If } M \neq \bot: \text{Return } M/|M[2,6]| \\
\text{Return } l' - 1 & Y[c_k] \leftarrow K & K \leftarrow \text{PKE.D}(dk, c_k) / |M[4, x]| \\
\end{array}
\]

Transition \( L_2 \) to \( L_3 \). In hybrid \( L_1 \), we undo the code changes used to transition from \( H_3 \) to \( L_0 \). Namely, \( l \) is set back to \( I \) and the if statement in \( \text{DEC} \) is reverted. By the same logic as that prior transition, \( \Pr[L_2] = \Pr[L_3] \).

Transition \( L_3 \) to \( L_4 \). In hybrid \( L_1 \), we undo the code changes used to transition from \( H_1 \) to \( H_2 \). Namely, we get rid of the injection \( f \) and sample \( c_k \) uniformly. By the same logic as that prior transition, \( \Pr[L_3] \leq \Pr[L_4] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^z \).

Transition \( L_4 \) to \( L_0 \). Next we transition to the game \( M_0 \) shown in Fig 42. In this game we made simplifications to \( L_4 \) to prepare for our final transitions. In particular, we removed the labelling function \( l \) and instead indexed into tables \( Y \) and \( M \) directly. We additionally drop the use of \( ek \) in this indexing. Then the code in \( \text{DEC} \) was rewritten for ease of comparison to the final game we are trying to reach (\( M_8 \), which we will show is equivalent to \( \text{G}^{\text{Enc, S}}_{\text{RO}[\text{PKE, NE,}]}(A_c) \)). Because \( M[ek, c_k, c_d] \neq \bot \) implies \( Y[ek, c_k] \neq \bot \), we separated out the if statement which checks \( M \), rather than leaving it nested inside of the check for \( Y \). Rather than repeating the code which runs \( \text{NE.D} \) in two separate branches we consolidated to be run at the end of the oracle. None of these changes modify the behavior of the game, so \( \Pr[L_4] = \Pr[M_0] \).

Note that the final game \( M_8 \) we are moving toward differs from this game primarily in that, for decryption queries when \( M[ek, c_k, c_d] = \bot \) but \( Y[ek, c_k] \neq \bot \), game \( M_0 \) uses the key stored in \( Y \) (which was chosen at random) to decrypt \( c_d \) while game \( M_8 \) will used whatever key is encrypted in \( c_k \). These extra transition were not needed in our secret-key KEM/DEM proof because the final game we were transitioning to in that proof returned \( \bot \) for any decryption query not directed forwarded from encryption.

Transition \( M_0 \) to \( M_1 \). To transition to \( M_1 \) we sample \( g \) as an injection, rather than a function. The switching lemma tells us that \( \Pr[M_0] \leq \Pr[M_1] + 0.5 \cdot q_{\text{Enc}}^2/2^z \).

Transition \( M_1 \) to \( M_2 \). In \( M_2 \) we replace the use of the table \( M \) with \( g^{-1} \) in \( \text{DEC} \). These games will differ only if the adversary makes a decryption query for \( (c_k, c_d) \) where \( M[c_k, c_d] = \bot \) and \( g^{-1}((c_k, |c_d| - \text{NE.xl}), c_d) \neq \bot \).

We can bound the probability of such a query in \( M_1 \). To make such a query, the adversary must be “guessing” a new point in the image of \( g^{-1}((c_k, |c_d| - \text{NE.xl}), \cdot) \) other than the at most \( q_{\text{Enc}} \) examples it may have been given from \( \text{ENC} \). Note that in \( M_1 \), these examples from \( \text{ENC} \) are the only way that \( g \) affects the behavior of the game. Note that the range of \( g^{-1}((c_k, |c_d| - \text{NE.xl}), \cdot) \) has size \( 2^{d+d} \) and its image has size \( 2^{d+d-\text{NE.xl}} \). Thus (using that \( q_{\text{Enc}} \leq 0.5 \cdot 2^z \)) any particular decryption query has probability at most \( 2^{d+d-\text{NE.xl}}/ (2^{d+d} - q_{\text{Enc}}) \leq 2/2^z \).

Applying a union bound gives \( \Pr[M_1] \leq \Pr[M_2] + 2q_{\text{Enc}}/2^z \).

Transition \( M_2 \) to \( M_3 \). Now in \( M_3 \) we sample \( c_k \) as the encryption of a random key \( K' \) rather than choosing it uniformly at random. The key \( K' \) will thus be the key obtained if \( c_k \) is decrypted in \( \text{DEC} \). A standard hybrid argument using the \( (\text{NE.kl}, \epsilon) \)-uniformity of \( \text{PKE} \) gives that \( \Pr[M_2] \leq \Pr[M_3] + q_{\text{Enc}} \cdot \epsilon \).

Transition \( M_3 \) to \( M_4 \). Next we change the behavior of the decryption oracle when \( Y[c_k] \neq \bot \) and \( g^{-1}((c_k, |c_d| - \text{NE.xl}), c_d) = \bot \). In \( M_3 \), we used the key \( Y[c_k] \) to decrypt \( c_d \). In \( M_4 \), we use the decryp-
Consider the adversary $\mathcal{E}_c$ shown in Fig. 43. It was obtained by modifying the code of hybrids $\mathcal{M}_3$ and $\mathcal{M}_4$ to query its own encryption oracle to obtain $c_k$ when responding to encryption queries and to use its own decryption oracle to obtain $K$ when responding to and query for which it cannot obtain its response using $g^{-1}$. We claim that the view of $\mathcal{A}_c$ in $\mathcal{M}_{3+b}$ perfectly matches its view when simulated by $\mathcal{E}_c$ in $G_{\text{PKE,b}}^{\text{cca}}$. In particular, $K$ sampled during encryption in $\mathcal{M}_{3+b}$ “matches” the $K_{1-b}$ sampled for encryption in $G_{\text{PKE,b}}^{\text{cca}}(\mathcal{E}_c)$ and $K'$ matches $K_b$. Note that $K_b/K'$ is always the key encrypted in $c_k$. When $b = 0$, a later decryption query using $c_k$ will use the key stored in $Y[c_k]$ which is $K_1/K$. When $b = 1$, a later decryption query using $c_k$ will use the key actually encrypted by $c_k$ which is $K_1/K'$ (in $G_{\text{PKE,1}}$ this value is stored in $Y$, in $\mathcal{M}_4$ this is obtained by encryption).

Now, noting that $\mathcal{E}_c$ returns the opposite bit of what $\mathcal{A}_c$ returned we have that $\Pr[M_{3+b}] = 1 - \Pr[G_{\text{PKE,b}}(\mathcal{E}_c)]$ and so $\Pr[M_4] \leq \Pr[M_4] + \text{Adv}^{\text{cca}}_{\text{PKE}}(\mathcal{E}_c)$.

**Transitions $\mathcal{M}_4$ through $\mathcal{M}_8$.** The next couple transition all serve to undo prior transitions. In $\mathcal{M}_5$, we switch back to $c_k$ being sampled uniformly. By the same logic as our transition to $\mathcal{M}_3$ we have $\Pr[M_4] \leq \Pr[M_5] + \epsilon_{\text{ENC}}$. In $\mathcal{M}_6$, we switch back to using the table $M$ rather than $g^{-1}$. By analogous reasoning to our transition to $\mathcal{M}_2$ we have $\Pr[M_5] \leq \Pr[M_6] + 2\epsilon_{\text{DEC}}/2^\tau$. In $\mathcal{M}_7$, we switch from $g$ being a random injection to a random function. By the switching lemma, $\Pr[M_6] \leq \Pr[M_7] + 0.5 \cdot \epsilon_{\text{ENC}}^2/2^\tau$. In $\mathcal{M}_8$, we switch back to $c_k$ being sampled uniformly rather than using $g$. This give differing behavior only if $c_k$ ever repeats, giving $\Pr[M_7] \leq \Pr[M_8] + 0.5 \cdot \epsilon_{\text{ENC}}^2/2^\tau$.

**Final Transition.** Finally, we conclude by observing that $\mathcal{M}_8$ is identical to $G_{\text{KDE,1}}^{\text{cca}}(\mathcal{A}_c)$. In both $\text{ENC}$ returns a uniformly random ciphertext. For a decryption query $\text{DEC}(c)$, if $c$ was returned by an earlier encryption query, then the table $M$ is used to return the message from that query. Otherwise, $c$ is honestly decrypted as specified by $\text{KD[PKE,NE]}$. Hence, $\Pr[M_8] = \Pr[G_{\text{KDE,1}}^{\text{cca}}(\mathcal{A}_c)]$. □

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$\mathcal{E}_c^{\text{Enc,Dec}(ek)}$</th>
<th>$\text{SimEnc}(m)$</th>
<th>$\text{SimDec}(c)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$g \leftarrow \ln(T', D', R')$</td>
<td>$K_0 \leftarrow \text{NE.K}$</td>
<td>$(c_k, c_d) \leftarrow c$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$r \leftarrow A_{\text{SimEnc,SimDec}(ek)}$</td>
<td>$K_1 \leftarrow \text{NE.K}$</td>
<td>$m \leftarrow g^{-1}((c_k, c_d) - \text{NE.xl}), c_d)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return $1 - r'$</td>
<td>$c_k \leftarrow \text{ENC}(K_0, K_1)$</td>
<td>If $m \neq \bot$: Return $m$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>$c_d \leftarrow g((c_k, m</td>
<td>), m)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Return $(c_k, c_d)$</td>
<td>If $K \neq \bot$:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Return $\text{NE.D}(K, 0, c_d)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Return $\bot$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Fig. 43.** Adversary $\mathcal{E}_c$ for Theorem 9.