Paper 2021/1398
Universally Composable Almost-Everywhere Secure Computation
Nishanth Chandran and Pouyan Forghani and Juan Garay and Rafail Ostrovsky and Rutvik Patel and Vassilis Zikas
Abstract
Most existing work on secure multi-party computation (MPC) ignores a key idiosyncrasy of modern communication networks, that there are a limited number of communication paths between any two nodes, many of whom might even be corrupted. The work by Garay and Ostrovsky [EUROCRYPT'08] on almost-everywhere MPC (AE-MPC), introduced “best-possible security” properties for MPC over such incomplete networks, where necessarily some of the honest parties may be excluded from the computation—we call such parties “doomed.” In this work we provide a universally composable definition of almost-everywhere security, which allows us to automatically and accurately capture the guarantees of AE-MPC (as well as AE-communication, the analogous “best-possible security” version of secure communication) in the Universal Composability (UC) framework of Canetti. Our result offers the first simulation-based treatment of this important but under-investigated problem, along with the first simulation-based proof of AE-MPC.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Secure multi-party computationuniversal composabilityalmost-everywhere secure computationsparse graphssecure message transmission
- Contact author(s)
- rsp7 @ tamu edu,pouyan forghani @ tamu edu,garay @ tamu edu
- History
- 2023-05-19: last of 3 revisions
- 2021-10-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2021/1398
- License
-
CC BY