Architecture Support for Bitslicing

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Abstract—The bitsliced programming model has shown to boost the throughput of software programs. However, on a standard architecture, it exerts a high pressure on register access, causing memory spills and restraining the full potential of bitslicing. In this work, we present architecture support for bitslicing in a System-on-Chip. Our hardware extensions are of two types; internal to the processor core, in the form of custom instructions, and external to the processor, in the form of direct memory access module with support for data transposition. We present a comprehensive performance evaluation of the proposed enhancements in the context of several RISC-V ISA definitions (RV32I, RV64I, RV32B, RV64B). The proposed 14 new custom instructions use 1.5x fewer registers compared to the equivalent functionality expressed using RISC-V instructions. The integration of those custom instructions in a 5-stage pipelined RISC-V RV32I core incurs 10.21% and 12.72% overhead respectively in area and cell count using the SkyWater 130nm standard cell library. The proposed bitslice transposition unit with DMA provides a further speedup, changing the quadratic increase in execution time of data transposition to linear. Finally, we demonstrate a comprehensive performance evaluation using a set of benchmarks of lightweight and masked ciphers.

Index Terms—Bitslicing, instruction set extension, direct memory access, system-on-chip, hardware extension, computer architecture.

1 INTRODUCTION

Bitslicing was first introduced as a programming model to boost the throughput of the software implementation of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) cryptographic algorithm [1]. Since then, researchers have explored applications that can benefit from this model of programming in security [2], [3], [4], [5] and dynamic word-length computation [6], [7] among others.

Bitslicing is a software technique, and as such it does not require any changes to the underlying design of the processor. However, bitsliced programs bear significant memory spills due to their extensive amount of live registers [8]. Therefore, hardware support for bitslicing can lead to a significant increase in performance of various bitsliced applications.

Today, many digital circuits have a System-on-Chip (SoC) architecture. In such systems, hardware support for bitslicing can be in the form of instruction extension in the processor implementation or it can be a hardware module accessible by the processor through a bus. Our goal in this work is to integrate both of these types of hardware support for bitslicing into an SoC. Even though our focus is mostly on security applications, non-security related applications of bitslicing can equally benefit from part of our proposed hardware extensions.

As the open-source RISC-V Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) is gaining more attention both in research as well as in industry, domain-specific Instruction Set Extensions (ISEs) are becoming more and more relevant [9], [10], [11]. In our previous work [12], we proposed Skiva, a 32-bit ISE for the SPARC V8 ISA. Skiva supports protection against a combination of active and passive physical attacks, i.e., power Side-Channel Analysis (SCA), fault injection, and timing SCA. These protections are in the form of masking [13], redundant computation, and bitslicing.

In this work, we present the following contributions to further the level of hardware support for bitslicing.
1) We port the ISE in Skiva to RISC-V and call it Skiva-V
2) We compare the proposed Skiva-V ISE with the newly proposed bit-manipulation ISA for RISC-V (RV32B, RV64B)
3) To support programming of Skiva-V, we rely on parallel synchronous programming (PSP) [8]. We port a compiler for PSP to the newly proposed instructions, and compare the performance of auto-generated bitsliced codes for masked implementations of light-weight ciphers with their corresponding implementations in the literature.
4) Finally, we propose a Direct Memory Access (DMA) module, called T-DMA, which is capable of transposing data as part of a memory block transfer. This capability of T-DMA in itself shows how an extra-processor support for bitslicing can be beneficial for any bitsliced implementation. However, we further tune this module to add support for our security-related programming needs, namely on the fly masking and redundancy generation/checking.

Our focus in this work is on the performance analysis of the proposed instructions. For the security analysis of the custom instructions in Skiva, we refer the reader to our

1. We will open-source the design files and the modified GCC compiler before the paper’s publication.
previous work [12]. Furthermore, we note that several authors have proposed a security analysis for similar bitsliced masked software [3], [14], [15]. For our implementation-based evaluations, we focus on the 32-bit version of Skiva-V instructions as the representative architecture to highlight the advantage of the proposed instructions in an SoC.

The rest of the paper is as follows: Section 2 gives an overview of the concepts underlying the proposed system. Section 3 describes the definition of the custom instructions in Skiva-V, their ISA-level performance analysis, and implementation footprint. Section 4 demonstrates how to generate bitsliced programs for Skiva-V. Section 5 presents our proposed DMA module with support for transposing, masking, and duplicating the data. It further describes its functionality, design, and synthesized implementation footprint. Section 6 describes the integration of Skiva-V processor core and T-DMA into an SoC architecture. Section 7 demonstrates benchmarks to emphasize the impact of hardware support in performance of bitsliced and masked software. Finally, Section 8 concludes the paper.

2 PRELIMINARIES

In this section, we provide preliminaries on the underlying programming concepts in this work. We describe Bitslicing, Masking and Redundant Computation, while the reader already familiar with these techniques can skip ahead to Section 3.

2.1 Bitslicing

Bitslicing, first introduced by Biham [1], is a technique originally proposed to increase the throughput of a program by running multiple instances of a code in parallel. In bitslicing, all the variables are transposed so that each register contains only one bit of the variable. For example, if a variable is 32 bits wide, in bitsliced program it will reside in 32 different registers and use one bit of each. Each register of width \( \omega \) then will have the capacity to hold one bit of \( \omega \) different variables. Consequently, the program needs to be adjusted to work on one bit of its variables at a time. This implies that the adjusted (i.e., bitsliced) program can only contain bit-wise logic operations. Therefore, the bitsliced program will be capable of \( \omega \) parallel computations.

A fully-bitsliced program needs to be flattened (no branches). In a flattened program, the run-time of the program is known and data-independent. This property of bitslicing benefits the security-sensitive programs as it averts timing side-channel leakage (i.e., correlation between the run-time and the internal data of a program). Furthermore, bitslicing provides a proper base to combine our masking and redundant computation schemes as described in the next section.

2.2 Masking

Power-based SCA [16], [17], as a subset of active physical implementation attacks, has shown vulnerabilities in the implementation of algorithms which are expected to be secure at the algorithm level. In power SCA, the correlation between the power consumption and the internal data is exploited to find information about the processed data. A widely-adopted countermeasure against this type of attack is masking which tries to break this correlation.

In masking, each signal or variable is divided into shares that are independent from the original data. The number of shares depends on the masking scheme. In the \( d^{th} \)-order masking scheme, each data bit is divided into \( d + 1 \) shares. Knowing any strict subset of these shares will not disclose any information about the original data, while knowing all of the shares can reproduce the original data. A simple way to generate these shares is by applying Boolean masking. For instance, in Boolean masking for the \( 1^{st} \)-order masking scheme, a random bit \( r \) is generated (from a uniform distribution) per each original bit \( b \). The shares of the bit \( b \) will be computed as the tuple \((b \oplus r, r)\) where \( \oplus \) is the exclusive-or operation. Knowledge about one share (either \( r \) or \( b \oplus r \)) will not give any information about the original data \( b \), however, by knowing both of these shares the original data can be disclosed as the exclusive-or result of the two shares \((b \oplus r) \oplus r = b\).

Once each data is broken into independently-distributed shares, the algorithm should be modified to work on the shares of the inputs and the intermediate data to generate the shares of the outputs. The operations in the algorithm are categorized into linear and non-linear operations. An operation is linear if a uniform distribution of its inputs results in a uniform distribution for its outputs. Masking is then applied to each operation according to its linearity. In a linear operation, each share of the output can be implemented as a function of at most one share of each input. This property, however, does not hold for non-linear operations and there exists a vast body of research on how a non-linear operation can be masked [18], [19], [20].

In this work, we break every algorithm into a combination of operations from the set \( \{\text{XOR, XNOR, AND, NOT}\} \). Since this set of operations is functionally complete, every operation in the algorithm can be written as a combination of these operations. The AND operation is therefore the only non-linear operation that can appear in the adjusted algorithm. We follow the parallel masked multiplication method proposed by Barthe et al. [18] for our AND operation and a normal masked implementation for our linear operations.

2.3 Redundant Computation

Fault injection [21] is another type of implementation attack. Redundant computation is a technique to detect whether a fault has been injected in a circuit. In this technique, every computation is done multiple times and the results are compared. A mismatch between the results shows that a fault has happened. For \( n \) number of redundant computations, the occurrence of up to \( n - 1 \) faults can be detected.

In Skiva-V, our goal is to combine countermeasures against both fault injection and power SCA attacks. As shown in our previous work [12], when the redundant copies of the data are in complementary format, the intensity of power side-channel leakage is decreased. Therefore we support redundancy of two types: direct and complementary. In direct redundancy, the redundant data is a direct (uninverted) copy of the original data, whereas, in the complementary redundancy, half of the redundant copies will be in the inverted format to balance the power consumption of the direct copies.
3 Processor Support

We present an instruction set extension (ISE) for both the 32-bit and the 64-bit RISC-V ISAs called Skiva-V. The underlying data representations of Skiva-V are based on the masking order \(D\) and the spatial redundancy \(R_s\). In our 32-bit ISE, we support nine different configurations chosen from the sets \(D = \{1, 2, 4\}\) and \(R_s = \{1, 2, 4\}\). For our 64-bit ISE, we extend the 32-bit representations to add additional masking and redundancy modes. In this new configuration, Skiva-V supports sixteen different configurations from \(D = \{1, 2, 4, 8\}\) and \(R_s = \{1, 2, 4, 8\}\). In all of these configurations, the \(D\) shares of the same variable reside in the adjacent bits of a register. Next to the shares of one variable, will sit the shares of the next variable for parallel computation. This pattern repeats in the same register \(R_s\) times for redundant computation. Thus in each \((D, R_s)\) configuration for the \(N\)-bit architecture, Skiva-V supports \(p = \frac{N}{D \times R_s}\) parallel computations. Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 show all the possible configurations in the 32-bit and 64-bit ISEs respectively. In these figures, the \(r\) subscripts in \(b_i\) data bits show different variables in parallel computation. To support both direct and complementary redundancy, the even-numbered redundant copies can be either inverted or direct.

In the rest of this section, we describe the instructions in Skiva-V, their implementation details and footprint, and how programmers can employ them in their codes.

3.1 Instruction Definitions

Our proposed instruction set extension for RISC-V is divided into three groups: instructions for bitsliced transposition, instructions for masked implementation, and instructions for redundant computation. In the following subsections, we describe each instruction. Table 1 shows the assigned opcodes and formats of the instructions in Skiva-V. The instructions' encodings in Skiva-V follow the RV32I base r-type and i-type instruction formats mentioned in RISC-V ISA manual [22]. Each of the i-type instructions in Skiva-V has its own immediate encoding that clarifies the masking order (required for subrot instruction) or the redundancy scheme (required for red1/h and ftchk). We describe the immediate assignment of each instruction with their definition in the rest of this section.

Bitsliced transposition

We propose two instructions, i.e. \texttt{tr2l rd, rs1, rs2} and \texttt{tr2h rd, rs1, rs2}, which, if applied iteratively in the butterfly pattern, can transpose the data from normal representation to its bitsliced format. These instructions take two source registers and reorder their bits in the destination register interchangeably. Instruction \texttt{tr2l} reorders the lower half of the source registers while instruction \texttt{tr2h} reorders the upper half. To transpose the bitsliced data back to its normal representation, we proposed the inverse of the above instructions, i.e. \texttt{invtr2l rd, rs1, rs2} and \texttt{invtr2h rd, rs1, rs2}. Fig. 3 shows how these instructions work. As an example, Fig. 4 shows how four 4-bit
In our masked implementation, we follow the parallel masked multiplication gadget by Barthe et al. \cite{barthe2020masked}. In this gadget, the shares of a variable are adjacent in a register and during the calculations, we need to rotate the adjacent shares. Rotating parts of a register independently is not part of the RISC-V ISA; however, in our masking schemes will be executed quite often. Hence we add this instruction to support this type of criteria in their code generation process and we can ensure this property will be held by adding it to the back-end of the compiler (code generator) as a criteria specific to the \texttt{subrot} instruction.

**Redundant computation**

As mentioned in Section 2, Skiva-V supports both direct and complementary redundant computations. Direct redundancy enables fault detection while complementary redundancy also reduces the intensity of power side-channel leakage. To prepare data for redundant representation, we introduce instructions \texttt{redl rd, rs1, imm} and \texttt{redh rd, rs1, imm} to copy data (both directly and in inverted manner) in the same register. The immediate field in these instructions decides which part of the input register has to be copied and whether it should follow direct redundancy or complementary redundancy. Table 2 shows the immediate value assignment for each redundancy mode.

To demonstrate in more detail how the bits are duplicated in the destination register, Fig. 6 demonstrates the result of \texttt{redh} and \texttt{redl} instructions when their immediate value is 7. According to Table 2 this means the bits in the range \([W-1:W/2]\) (W=32 for 32-bit ISA and W=64 for 64-bit ISA) should be duplicated in a complementary format.

In cases where our data is in complementary redundancy format, we need a logic operation \(f(.)\) to calculate \(f(.)\) on the direct copies and the inverse \((f(\neg\cdot))\) on the complemented copies to result in complemented outputs according to DeMorgan’s theorem. Fig. 7 shows the structure of complementary logic operations. Therefore, Skiva-V has logic
TABLE 2
Immediate value assignment for \textit{redl}/\textit{redh} instructions. \(W\) represents the word length (32 for the 32-bit and 64 for the 64-bit ISA). Source bits signify which bits in the source register are being replicated.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Redundancy ((R_s))</th>
<th>Source bits</th>
<th>\textit{redl}/\textit{redh} imm.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 direct</td>
<td>W-1:0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 compl.</td>
<td>W-1:0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 direct</td>
<td>W/2-1:0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 compl.</td>
<td>W/2-1:0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 direct</td>
<td>W-1:W/2</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 compl.</td>
<td>W-3:W/2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 direct (only in 64-bit ISA)</td>
<td>15-0</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 compl. (only in 64-bit ISA)</td>
<td>15-0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 direct (only in 64-bit ISA)</td>
<td>31-15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 compl. (only in 64-bit ISA)</td>
<td>31-15</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 direct (only in 64-bit ISA)</td>
<td>47-32</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 compl. (only in 64-bit ISA)</td>
<td>47-32</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 direct (only in 64-bit ISA)</td>
<td>63-48</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 compl. (only in 64-bit ISA)</td>
<td>63-48</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Instructions \textit{andcn}, \textit{xorcn}, and \textit{xnorcn} that calculate the logic operation and its inverse on part of the data in their source registers. In the 32-bit (resp. 64-bit) instruction set, \(n\) can have the value of 8 and 16 (resp. 8, 16, and 32) to operate in direct/complementary format on \(n\) consecutive bits.

Finally, we propose an instruction in Skiva-V to check if the redundant copies of the data are correct. The \textit{ftchk rd}, \textit{rs1}, \textit{imm} instruction will check the redundant copies in the source register based on the immediate value and set the corresponding bit in the destination register to one if the copies of data do not agree (i.e., a fault is detected). To have continuity in the direct and complementary redundancy, the result of \textit{ftchk} operation can be in the complementary format where the comparison result is copied both directly and inversely in the destination register.

Table 3 shows the immediate value encodings for the \textit{ftchk} instruction. For example, if \(R_s = 4\) and direct redundancy in the 32-bit ISA, i.e., immediate value is either 4 or 12, the comparison flags are calculated and stored in the destination register (\textit{rd}) based on the source register (\textit{rs}) as follows for the least significant 8 bits:

\[
\text{rd}[i] = (\text{rs}[i] \oplus \text{rs}[i + 8]) | | \\
(\text{rs}[i] \oplus \text{rs}[i + 16]) | | \\
(\text{rs}[i] \oplus \text{rs}[i + 24]); \\
\forall i \in [0, 7]
\]

The same calculated results will be duplicated directly (when immediate value is 4) or in inverse format (when immediate value is 12) to fill the remaining 16 bits of the destination register (\textit{rd}).

3. C equivalent codes and compiled assemblies for RV32/64I/B are accessible at \url{https://github.com/Secure-Embedded-Systems/Skiva-V}.

Fig. 7. Complementary logic operations on complementary redundant data.

3.2 ISA-level Performance Analysis
We evaluate our instruction set extension on RISC-V for its performance. For each proposed instruction, we write a C code defining the functionality of the instruction. On an implementation of Skiva-V, this C code corresponds to only one instruction. We cross compile the C code with GCC once for RV32 and RV64 instruction sets and once for the RISC-V with bit-manipulation extension (RV32B and RV64B). While GCC with B-extension currently only supports 31 out of 95 proposed instructions in the bit-manipulation draft, it is the only tool available for automatic use of the instructions in the B-extension. Furthermore, a visual inspection of the instructions in this extension confirms that there is no exact match for the instructions in Skiva-V.

As an example, Listing 2 and Listing 3 show the assembly codes for \textit{ftchk} instruction with immediate value of 2 \((R_s = 2\) with direct redundancy\) for RV32I and RV32B respectively. These assembly codes are generated by compiling the C code in Listing 1 with RISC-V’s open-source GCC compiler and flags \(-march=rv32g\) and \(-march=rv32gb\) respectively. As the assembly codes show, the \texttt{pack} instruction in B-extension can replace the first two instructions in Listing 2 therefore reducing the total number of instructions by one.

Listing 1. C equivalent for 32bit \texttt{ftchk} with immediate value of 2
\begin{verbatim}
uint32_t ftchk2 (uint32_t rs1) {
    uint32_t rd;
    compare = (rs1 & 0x00000fff) ^ ((rs1 & 0xffff0000) >> 16);
    rd = compare | (compare << 16);
    return rd;
}
\end{verbatim}

As another example, the C equivalent for 64bit \texttt{ftchk} instruction with immediate value of 18 (complementary redundancy \(R_s = 2\) with direct output) is shown in Listing 4. The compiled assembly codes for RV32I and RV32B are shown in Listing 5 and Listing 6 respectively. Similar to the previous example, the first two instructions for RV64I...
are replaced by one $\texttt{pack}$ instruction from RV64B. Additionally, $\texttt{xor}$ and $\texttt{not}$ instructions are replaced by the $\texttt{xnor}$ instruction in the B-extension. Table 4 and Table 5 show the number of instructions from RISC-V ISA to implement the Skiva-V instructions. Based on our calculations, each of the 32-bit/64-bit Skiva-V operation replaces on average 22.34/29.98 instructions from the RV32/RV64 ISA and 21.84/29.59 instructions from the RV32B/RV64B ISA. All the proposed instructions pass the required fine-grained operations at bit-level. Although the reported numbers for RV32B and RV64B are not significantly different from RV32I and RV64I, the real advantage of the RISC-V’s bit-manipulation extension can be much bigger but not yet supported by the GCC code generator. For instance, $\texttt{rev.p rd, rs, 1}$ in RV32B/RV64B is functionally equivalent to $\texttt{subrot rd, rs, 2}$ in Skiva-V 32/64-bit. However, this was the only instance we found in the bit-manipulation extension that was obviously equivalent to the instructions in Skiva-V.

Furthermore, we calculate the number of registers each instruction-equivalent code snippet uses on RV32I/RV32B is functionally equivalent to RV32B/RV64B ISA. All the proposed instructions pass the criteria of replacing a minimum of three instructions. The general reason for this poor behavior of RV32/64I/B is the required fine-grained operations at bit-level.

### 3.3 Implementation

We integrate the 32-bit Skiva-V instructions into an inorder, five-stage pipeline implementation of the RISC-V RV32I ISA. For this implementation, we use the open-source BRISC-V[23] core. This core consists of five pipeline stages, namely fetch, decode, execute, memory, and write-back. The simplicity of the Skiva-V ISE architecture, enables the easy integration of the instructions which only affect the decode stage, the ALU unit in the execute stage, and the control unit of the processor. The changes applied to the processor are to decode the added instructions (in the decode stage according to the assigned opcodes in Table 1), execute them in the ALU (in execute stage), and bypass their outputs to the next instructions in case of dependency (from write back stage to decode stage) to reduce the number of inserted bubbles in the pipeline.

Furthermore, to evaluate the area footprint of these instructions, we synthesize the Skiva-V custom instructions using the open SkyWater 130nm standard cell library. The implementation of the five-stage RV32I ISA without Skiva-V extension has an area of 88356.25um$^2$ and a cell count of 5006. After adding the Skiva-V instructions, the area and cell count increase to 97381.07um$^2$ and 5643 showing a 10.21% and 12.72% increase in area and cell count respectively.

4. https://github.com/google/skywater-pdk
Fig. 8. High-level description of PSPCG steps.

4 CODING SUPPORT

One of the challenges for bitsliced programming is its code generation. For SKIVA programming, we adopt Parallel Synchronous Programming (PSP), a model that directly maps into bitsliced programs [8]. Examples of parallel synchronous programs have since been shown in software implementation of light-weight encryption ciphers [24] and variable-precision multiplication used in neural networks [7]. In this section, we demonstrate how bitsliced programs are a subset of the parallel synchronous programs and therefore the automated code generator for PSP (i.e. PSPCG) can be used to automate the generation of bitsliced code.

PSP is semantically similar to a synchronous finite state machine with datapath (FSMD). Parallel synchronous programs consist of a core function with a status output that shows when the results are ready. This core function will be called iteratively until the status output shows the execution is done, while each iteration corresponds to a synchronous evaluation of the PSP design [9].

while (!stat_done) {
    core_f(inputs, &outputs, &stat_done);
}

Bitslicing becomes a subset of PSP by unfolding the loop and adding it into the logic of the core function. This results in a flattened function containing only logic operations in bitsliced format. Hence we can use the same automatic PSP code generation methodology (PSPCG) for bitsliced codes.

As Fig. 8 shows, to generate the bitsliced code of a software program using PSPCG, first a synchronous model of the program is needed. This synchronous model in PSPCG flow is encoded as a Verilog file. Once ready, we feed the synchronous model of the program (1) as well as the description of the instructions in our target ISA to PSPCG. These target instructions should be provided in two formats, one following liberty file (used for describing logic libraries) (2) and the other as inline assembly in C (3). Given these inputs, PSPCG internally synthesizes the given synchronous model to construct a Boolean operation graph and levels the graph to generate a Boolean program. In its last stage, the parallel synchronous core of the given model is generated as a C function. By prepending the forward transposition of the input data and appending the backward transposition of the results to the generated C function we will have the complete bitsliced C code.

Coding for Skiva-V

To generate bitsliced code for Skiva-V, we follow the PSPCG method as mentioned previously. In our custom library for the synthesis step, we use general logic cells AND, OR,
The proposed T-DMA module is capable of the following:

- Consecutive memory locations at once.
- \(\text{inv}tr2l\), \(\text{redl}\), \(\text{redh}\), \(\text{ftchk}\)
- Same operations as Skiva-V’s instructions \(\text{inv}tr2h\), \(\text{red}\), \(\text{redh}\), \(\text{ftchk}\)

In this section, we describe the Transpose DMA (T-DMA) implementation of AND operation. Inputs are at \(a_1, a_5\), random numbers are at \(a_0, a_4\), the output is written in \(a_6\).

\[
\begin{align*}
xor & t_0, a_1, a_0 \\
\text{subrot} & s_0, a_0, 2 \\
xor & t_2, t_0, s_0 \\
xor & s_0, s_0, s_0 \\
\text{and} & a_7, a_5, t_2 \\
\text{subrot} & t_5, t_2, 2 \\
\text{and} & t_1, t_5, a_5 \\
xor & t_5, t_5, a_5 \\
xor & t_3, a_4, a_7 \\
xor & t_4, t_3, t_1 \\
\text{subrot} & t_6, a_4, 2 \\
xor & a_6, t_6, t_4 \\
\end{align*}
\]

Finally, we add the proposed instructions to the RISC-V GCC assembler. This way, the mnemonics of the new instructions are recognized by the assembler and will be automatically mapped to the correct opcodes in the executable file.

5. Direct Memory Access with Transpose Support

In this section, we describe the Transpose DMA (T-DMA) functionality, design, and the area footprint of the synthesized circuit. T-DMA is capable of performing the same operations as Skiva-V’s instructions \((\text{inv}tr2l)\), \((\text{inv}tr2h)\), \(\text{redl}\), \(\text{redh}\), \(\text{ftchk}\) on the fly on up to 32 consecutive memory locations at once.

5.1 T-DMA Functionality

The proposed T-DMA module is capable of the following:

- Transposing/Reverse transposing an arbitrary number of memory locations (up to thirty-two) starting from a source address and storing the result in given addresses starting from an arbitrary destination address.
- Generating/Removing the masking shares of data in the source address according to the given Skiva-V working mode.
- Removing the redundancy for the data stored in given source address according to the given Skiva-V working mode.
- Checking for consistency between the redundant copies of the data stored in a given memory address.

5.2 T-DMA Design

Fig. 9 shows the design of our proposed T-DMA module. The T-DMA module consists of a controller and a datapath. The system’s processor will program the T-DMA by writing to the controller. Programming the DMA includes telling the controller the \(D, R_s\) direct/complementary redundancy, source memory address, destination memory address, number of memory locations, number of valid bits in each location, and whether we need to \{mask and duplicate\} the data or \{unmask, and check and remove the redundancy\}.

The controller, then, sets the signals for the datapath to perform the transformations. At the core of the T-DMA’s datapath design, is the transposer with a register file of thirty-two 32-bit registers (128 bytes) tuned for a 32-bit micro-architecture. Once the T-DMA starts the memory transfer, it will load the data residing in a programmable number of locations starting from a source address into the register file. While transferring the data from the system’s RAM, the existing redundancy and masking will be removed for backward transposition. In case of a forward transposition, the removal of redundancy and masking are turned off and the masking shares for each bit of the data are generated based on the programmed number of shares \((D \in \{1, 2, 4\})\). We use the Cellular Automata-based PRNG\(^6\) to generate the randomness required for masking the data.

Once the masking shares are generated, the data is formatted according to the programmed redundancy scheme \((R_s \in \{1, 2, 4\})\) and direct/complementary copy configuration and stored in the destination memory locations.

To perform the reverse transposition, the transposer first checks for the correctness of the redundant data. Once the correctness is ensured, it removes the redundancy and unmask the data. Finally, the dis-transposed data will be saved to the destination addresses.

The output of the datapath is stored in a First In, First Out (FIFO) memory. This memory stores the address and data of each output to be sent to the system’s RAM. In our implementation, the FIFO is 256 bytes with 32 entries of 64 bits wide (to store the concatenated 32-bit address and 32-bit data). Once the transposition is done, T-DMA starts writing each entry of the FIFO to the system’s RAM.

5. We will open-source the modified GCC for Skiva-V before paper’s publication.

6. https://github.com/secworks/ca_prng
Despite only having a 32×32 register file in its transposer, T-DMA is capable of transposing up to $< 2^{12}$ distinct data each of length $< 2^{12}$ bits by being programmed only once. This feature is enabled by the *stride algorithm* (Fig. 10). Following the stride algorithm, the data is divided into blocks, each containing a maximum of 32 distinct data. Each data is of a programmable word length $WL < 2^{12}$. Each block is divided into offsets containing up to 32 bits of up to 32 distinct data. Fig. 10 shows this structure. T-DMA iterates over all the offsets in a block. It takes the first offset containing the least significant bits of each data in a block to load the transposer’s register file. Subsequently, T-DMA offloads the transposed data to the memory. The hexagons in Fig. 10 represent this offloading. It then moves to the next offset containing the next 32 significant bits of the data in the block. Once all the bits of the data in the current block are transposed and stored in the destination addresses, it moves to the next block. In our implementation, 32-bit parts of the same data are at consecutive addresses therefore the distinct data in each offset are not in consecutive addresses, rather they are $n = \lceil \frac{WL}{32} \rceil$ words apart. In each configuration of the T-DMA there are $\lceil \frac{WC}{32} \rceil$ blocks to transpose. The same structure applies to both forward and backward transposition.

### 5.3 Employing T-DMA

To use the T-DMA, first, the source address should be written in the controller through the processor. In our implementation, a little-endian architecture is assumed therefore the source address is considered to hold the least significant 32 bits of the data. In addition, masking order ($D$), redundancy order ($R_s$), word length ($WL$), and word count ($WC$) are written to a 32-bit configuration register containing 2 bits for holding $D$ (0 for $D = 1$, 1 for $D = 2$, and 2 for $D = 3$), similarly 2 bits for holding $R_s$, 16 bits for $WC$, and 12 bits for $WL$. Through writing to another configuration register, it is specified whether the redundancy scheme is direct or complementary and whether we are running forward or backward transposition. Lastly, the seed for the on-chip PRNG is also provided to the controller. Once this configuration is complete, the T-DMA will start operating by receiving the destination register in a specific addressable register inside the controller.

As mentioned previously, the controller is capable of checking the correctness of the redundant data. The result of this check is written to a read-only (by the processor) status register. After the completion of T-DMA’s job, the processor can read the status register to confirm the correctness of the redundant data. Furthermore, while the T-DMA is running, a busy flag will be held high in another status register. Using this status register, the processor will know when the T-DMA is ready for the next data transfer. Fig. 11 shows the control and status registers in T-DMA.

### 5.4 Implementation

To evaluate the size of T-DMA, we synthesize the circuit for SkyWater 130nm standard cell library. The T-DMA implementation shows a total area of 161524.07um$^2$ and a cell count of 9017 with the FIFO being the biggest contributor occupying more than 50% of the total area.

### 6 System Integration

To integrate Skiva-V processor and the T-DMA, we make the T-DMA implementation programmable from the processor by making all the aforementioned configuration and status registers in the controller address-accessible. Fig. 11 shows these registers.

Every memory access from the memory stage of the pipeline goes through the memory interface. Fig. 12 shows the connection between the modules in the integrated system. The memory interface detects whether the address is within the range of T-DMA or data memory.

In case of addressing the T-DMA, memory interface starts the transmission with the T-DMA which can include programming the T-DMA (write) or accessing its status bits (read). When the processor is trying to access the data memory, the interface module communicates with the memory arbiter.

Memory arbiter takes care of prioritizing memory accesses from the processor core and T-DMA. When T-DMA

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![Fig. 10. Stride algorithm used in T-DMA. $n = \lceil \frac{WL}{32} \rceil$](image1)

![Fig. 11. Address-accessible 32bit registers for communicating with and programming the T-DMA. Grey cells are unused. Backward transposition when $Bwd=1$, forward otherwise. Complemented redundancy when $Cmpl=1$, direct redundancy otherwise.](image2)

![Fig. 12. Integration of Skiva-V and T-DMA.](image3)
is programmed to access the data memory, memory arbiter prioritizes T-DMA’s memory access over the memory access requests from the processor core. Therefore, the processor core will insert bubbles into its pipeline while waiting for the result of its memory access.

**Implementation**

We synthesize the integrated system (Fig. 12) for the SkyWater 130nm standard cell library and measure the total area of 270,152.09um² and a total cell count of 14204. Subtracting the synthesized area of the Skiva-V and T-DMA (reported in the previous sections) from the integrated system, consisting of the memory arbiter module and the added logic to the memory interface module, the integration adds around 11,246.95um² (4.16% overhead) to the overall area.

**7 Benchmark**

In the following, we run all the experiments on our integrated system. We demonstrate the advantage of hardware support for data transposition, the performance cost of redundant computation, and the benefit of instruction-support for performance of masked implementations.

**7.1 Cost of Transposition**

To characterize the overhead of transposition more thoroughly, we evaluate the cost of transposition in our implemented system in terms of the required number of clock cycles. We write a program in which \( K (2 \leq K \leq 32) \) adjacent bits in a 32-bit register need to be transposed to reside in 1 bit of \( K \) registers. We run the same program in three different settings: using only standard RV32I instructions, using Skiva-V’s transpose instructions, i.e., \( tr2h \) and \( tr2l \), and using the T-DMA. We compare the first two cases in terms of number of required instructions and all three cases in terms of number of clock cycles.

Using the instructions in Skiva-V provides between \( 3 \times \) to \( 10 \times \) decrease in the number of instructions depending on the value of \( K \). Furthermore, as Fig. 13 shows, for each \( K \), the number of clock cycles required to transpose \( K \) adjacent bits in a 32-bit register is reduced between \( 3 \times \) to \( 6 \times \) using the Skiva-V instructions. T-DMA and Skiva-V perform closely in this scenario with T-DMA having a better performance for \( K \geq 19 \).

These results confirm the benefits of the transpose instructions in Skiva-V. However, to demonstrate the benefits of having the T-DMA, we run another experiment in which \( K \in \{2, 4, 8, 16, 32\} \) bits in \( K \) registers need to be transposed. Fig. 14 shows that as \( K \) increases, the run-time of this transposition increases linearly \((14k + 19, R^2 = 1)\) using the T-DMA but quadratically using the instructions in Skiva-V \((1.54k^2−4.3k+64.9, R^2 = 1)\) and RV32I \((55.1k^2+125k−469, R^2 = 1)\).

**7.2 Cost of Redundant Computation**

The redundant computation schemes affect the throughput of an execution as they reduce the number of parallel runs of a bitsliced software. For instance, when \( R_s = 2 \) each bit of data is copied twice in the same register therefore reduces the number of parallel runs by half. In general, in an \( R_s \) redundant scheme, the number of parallel runs will be divided by \( R_s \) therefore the throughput of the bitsliced software will also be divided by \( R_s \).

**7.3 Masked Implementations of LWC Ciphers**

We take the finalists of the NIST’s Light-Weight Cryptography (LWC) competition that mention masking as their design options; ASCON [29] and GIFT-COFB [28]. We generate the masked implementation of their permutations (shown in Listing 9 and Listing 10) for \( D \in \{1, 2, 4\} \) number of shares using the discussed code-generation method (Section 4). In the \( D=1 \), \( D=2 \), and \( D=4 \) settings, we support 32, 16, and 8 parallel executions respectively. We run the generated programs on Skiva-V system and calculate the number of cycles.

To supply the required randomness, we assume that the system has access to a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG) with a high throughput so that accessing a random number is equivalent to reading a register. Listing 7 and Listing 8 show the assembly code for masked 2-input AND instruction with D=2 and D=4 masked shares which follow the scheme described by Barthe et al. [18] and use the subrot instruction available in Skiva-V for rotation of shares sitting adjacently in the registers. Note that in this section, we do not perform any redundant computation, i.e., \( R_s = 1 \). In case of using complementary redundancy, the corresponding complementary logic instructions (described in Section 3.1) would replace the and and xor operations in Listing 7 and Listing 8. Table 6 reports the number of cycles per byte calculated as \( \frac{c}{s \times p} \) where \( c \) is the number of clock cycles, \( s \) is the size of the state of the cipher in bytes (\( \frac{120}{8} \) for ASCON and \( \frac{128}{8} \) for GIFT-COFB), and \( p \) is the number of parallel runs.
The PRNG is assumed to have a high enough throughput to not cause any reading delay. Tornado results are for ARM Cortex-M4; Skiva-V results are for RISC-V RV32I with extensions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cipher</th>
<th>D=1 (no masking)</th>
<th>D=2 (first-order masking)</th>
<th>D=4 (third-order masking)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Tornado</td>
<td>Skiva-V</td>
<td>Speed-up</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCON</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>159.677</td>
<td>0.633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GIFT</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>441.941</td>
<td>0.810</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Listing 9. ASCON permutation
void ascon_perm (int* state, int* round_const) {
    for (i = 0; i < 12; i++) {
        add_constant(state, round_const[i]);
        substitution(state);
        linear_diffusion(state);
    }
}

Listing 10. GIFT permutation
void gift_perm (int* state, int* key) {
    for (i = 0; i < 40; i++) {
        sub_cells(state);
        perm_bits(state);
        add_roundkey(state, key);
        key_update(key);
    }
}

We compare our results with a similar work, Tornado [27], which reports the same cycles/byte metric for the masked implementations (with the same fast assumption on the PRNG) of the same permutations of the LWC candidates but on Cortex-M4. Table 6 highlights the advantage of having hardware support for bitslicing. First, for an unmasked implementation (D=1), Tornado reports higher performance. Note that we assume the data is already in bitsliced (and masked if D ≠ 1) format hence the transposition is not included in our measurements. Therefore, for unmasked implementations, the Skiva-V instructions are not used and the comparison is between the RISC-V RV32I and Cortex-M4 ISAs and the code generation process. Thus, the higher performance reported by Tornado can be attributed to the more advanced nature of Cortex-M4 ISA compared to the RISC-V ISA and to the code generation tool. Second, for a third-order masked implementation (D=3), we observe that Skiva-V can result in 1.5× and 3.2× speedup for ASCON and GIFT-COFB respectively. Since Tornado does not report first-order masking results, we were not able to compare with Skiva-V for the D=2 setting.

We further analyze this data in terms of added number of clock cycles per unit increase in the masking order. This criterion depends on the cipher algorithm and the implementation of the algorithm. Since our goal is to compare the implementations, and not the cipher algorithms, we compare this criterion for ASCON and GIFT separately. For this purpose, we make a linear regression of the cycles/byte vs. number of shares (D) as reported in Table 6.

The trend-line of the linear regression for ASCON’s performance is 613D − 476 for Skiva-V and 990D − 889 for Tornado. This means increasing the order of masking by one, will cause 613 extra clock cycles for Skiva-V and 990 for Tornado (1.6× increase compared to Skiva-V).

The same experiment for GIFT’s performance shows a trend-line of 1002D − 587 for Skiva-V and 3574D − 3216 for Tornado. For this cipher, the increase of clock cycles is more significant than ASCON which can be attributed to the multiplicative complexity of its algorithm. Furthermore, for an increase of one in the masking order, Tornado is affected by a 3.6× higher increase in the required clock cycles than Skiva-V.

8 Conclusion
In this contribution, we demonstrated how selected hardware techniques can significantly enhance the performance of bitslice software programs. By creating custom hardware to speed up frequent bit-level manipulation instructions, we illustrated a reduction on the register pressure for software bitslicing, and a performance boost over two state of the art bitsliced lightweight cipher designs. We demonstrated hardware support in the form of ISE as well as a stand-alone T-DMA peripheral. We presented synthesis results for the complete design in 130nm standard cells, and estimate the area overhead of the proposed extensions to be less than 5% at SoC level.

References


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