Efficient Implementation of Lightweight Hash Functions on GPU and Quantum Computers for IoT Applications

Wai-Kong Lee,* Member, IEEE, Kyungbae Jang†, Gyeongju Song‡, Hyunji Kim†, Seong Oun Hwang*, Senior Member, IEEE, and Hwajeong Seo†, Member, IEEE
*Department of Computer Engineering, Gachon University, South Korea.
†Department of IT Engineering, Hansung University, South Korea.

Abstract—Secure communication is important for Internet of Things (IoT) applications, to avoid cyber-security attacks. One of the key security aspects is data integrity, which can be protected by employing cryptographic hash functions. Recently, the US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) announced a competition to standardize lightweight hash functions, which can be used in IoT applications. IoT communication involves various hardware platforms, from low-end microcontrollers to high-end cloud servers with GPU accelerators. Since many sensor nodes are connected to the gateway devices and cloud servers, performing high throughput integrity check is very important to secure IoT applications. However, this is a very time consuming task even for high-end servers, which may affect the response time in IoT systems. Moreover, no prior work had evaluated the performance of NIST candidates on contemporary processors like GPU and quantum computers. In this study, we showed that with carefully crafted implementation techniques, all the finalist hash function candidates in the NIST standardization competition can achieve high throughput (up to 1,000 Gbps) on a RTX 3080 GPU. This research output can be used by IoT gateway devices and cloud servers to perform data integrity checks at high speed, thus ensuring a timely response. In addition, this is also the first study that showcase the implementation of NIST lightweight hash functions on a quantum computer (IBM ProjectQ). Besides securing the communication in IoT, these efficient implementations on a GPU and quantum computer can be used to evaluate the strength of respective hash functions against brute-force attack.

Index Terms—Lightweight Cryptography, Graphics Processing Units (GPU), Hash Function, Quantum Computer.

I. INTRODUCTION

INTERNET of things (IoT) is an emerging field of technology that has inspired many innovative applications in recent years. Combined with other important technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) and cloud computing, IoT involves various smart applications that can greatly enhance the quality of our lives. For instance, smart homes [1], smart laboratories [2], and smart cities [3] will become possible with the advances in IoT and other relevant technologies. Since many IoT applications involve the use of sensitive data, protecting communications in IoT is of utmost importance [4]. One of the important criteria used to secure IoT communication is the ability to check the integrity of the sensor data being communicated. This can be achieved through the use of cryptographic hash functions like SHA-2 and SHA-3. In 2018, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) of the United States (US) initiated a worldwide competition [5] to standardize lightweight cryptography (LWC), targeting applications in constrained systems. The LWC selection criteria included requirements for small memory and fast computation, which is very useful for IoT applications. This standardization is currently in its final round [6]. Four hash functions and nine authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) algorithms are being reviewed.

Communication within an IoT system is usually heavy because of the large number of connected sensor nodes, and the complex communication protocols between the sensor nodes, gateway devices and cloud server. In addition, IoT communication involves various platforms, including low-end microcontrollers, mid-end gateway devices, and high-end cloud servers. Considering these factors, it is critical that the hash functions be efficiently implemented on various platforms to provide integrity checks, so that they do not severely affect the system response time. Although a LWC can achieve good performance in constrained platforms [7], its performance in mid-end gateway devices and high-end cloud servers is unknown. In this paper, we show that with carefully designed implementation techniques, all of the NIST finalist candidates (lightweight hash functions) can achieve very high throughput.

Brute-force attacks are a common way of evaluating the strength of a hash function without exploiting a weakness in the underlying algorithm. This process is important to better understand the security of the selected hash functions and protect IoT systems in the future. To achieve this, we present the first implementation of the NIST finalist hash functions in a quantum computer, which is a contemporary computing system that is potentially faster than many existing computer systems. Note that the efficient implementation techniques presented in this paper can be used to perform brute-force attacks on both GPU and quantum computers.

The contributions of this paper are summarized below:

1) The first efficient implementations of PHOTON-Beetle, ASCON, Xoodyak, and SPARKLE on GPU platforms are presented in this paper. The proposed techniques include table-based implementation with warp shuffle instruction and various memory optimization techniques on GPU.
platforms. The performance of these implementations was evaluated on a high-end GPU platform (RTX 3080). The hash throughput of our implementation was up to 1,000 Gbps, which is fast enough to handle the massive traffic of an IoT system.

2) We report the first implementation of PHOTON-Beetle, ASCON, Xoodyak, and SPARKLE hash functions on quantum computers. Hash functions were optimized taking into account the reversible computing environment in quantum computers, which is different from classical computers. The implementation was performed on ProjectQ, a quantum programming tool provided by IBM [8].

3) For the purpose of reproduction, we share the GPU implementation codes in the public domain at: https://github.com/benlwk/lwcnist-finalists

II. BACKGROUND

This section describes how cryptographic hash functions are used to check data integrity in IoT communication. It also provides an overview of the selected hash functions and implementation platforms.

A. Secure Communication in IoT Applications

Referring to Figure 1, an IoT system usually consists of three communicating parties: the sensor nodes, gateway device and cloud server. Sensor nodes are usually placed ubiquitously to collect important sensor data. Because of this requirement, sensor nodes are designed with low power microcontrollers and powered by battery. Gateway devices are placed at a strategic location to obtain the IoT data from sensor nodes. These gateway devices need to handle connections from a lot of sensor nodes, so they are usually implemented with a more powerful processor and connected to a continuous power source. The communication between gateway device and sensor nodes utilizes wireless technology, like Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) or Zigbee. It is not directly connected to the Internet. The cloud server does communicate with the gateway devices through an internet connection, which is usually protected through TLS protocol.

Data integrity is important for security because it ensures the collected sensor data is not maliciously modified during the communication process, from the sensor nodes to the cloud server. With the use of a cryptographic hash function, any malicious modification of the communicated sensor data can be easily detected. This allows us to verify the integrity of the sensor data on the gateway or server side, which greatly strengthens the security of IoT communication. On top of that, the hash function is also used to construct a mutual authentication protocol [9] or hash-based message authentication code (HMAC) to ensure confidentiality and authenticity. The role of a hash-based signature in IoT systems was also investigated in a prior work [10]. Although hash functions are generally considered lightweight, efficient implementation is still important because of the massive amount of traffic in IoT communication. For instance, the gateway device may need to perform a data integrity check (i.e., recomputing the hash value) on all sensor data it receives. This can impose a huge burden on the gateway device and potentially degrade its response time, causing unwanted communication delay. To mitigate this potential performance bottleneck, we offloaded the data integrity check to an accelerator (e.g., GPU), following the strategy proposed by Chang et al. [11]. Efficiently implementing hash functions on GPU platforms is crucial to secure future IoT communication systems, especially applications that have a large number of sensor nodes.

B. Lightweight Hash Functions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Symbol</th>
<th>Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>⊕</td>
<td>Bitwise sum (XOR)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⊗</td>
<td>Bitwise product (AND)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⊙</td>
<td>Matrix multiplication</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>⊖</td>
<td>Bitwise complement of A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≫</td>
<td>Right rotate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≫</td>
<td>Right shift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≬</td>
<td>Left rotate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>≬</td>
<td>Left shift</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In March 2021, NIST announced that four hash function candidates (PHOTON-Beetle, Ascon, Xoodyak, and Sparkle) had successfully advanced into the final round. Another five AEAD candidates (Elephant, GIFT-COFB, Grain128-AEAD, ISAP, Romulus, and TinyJambu) also advanced into the final round. Note that PHOTON-Beetle, Ascon and Sparkle can also be configured to operate as AEAD. This sub-section provides an overview of the four finalist hash functions that were selected for implementation in the present study. More detailed descriptions can be found in the respective specifications submitted to NIST for standardization [12], [13], [14], [15]. Notations used to describe the operations in these four hash functions are presented in Table I.

PHOTON-Beetle [12] uses the PHOTON permutation function and sponge-based mode Beetle to construct the hash
function. The main computation lies on the PHOTON permutation function, which is described in Algorithm 1. PHOTON permutation makes use of a 4-bit S-Box described in Table II.

Algorithm 1 PHOTON permutation function.

1: X[64] $\triangleright$ 512-bit state represented in 8×8 bytes
2: RC[12] $\left\{ 1,3,7,14,13,11,6,12,9,2,5,10 \right\}$
3: IC[8] $\left\{ 0,1,3,7,15,14,12,8 \right\}$
4: for i = 0 to 7 do
5: \(X[i,0] \leftarrow X[i,0] \oplus RC[k] \oplus IC[i];\)
6: end for
7: for i = 0 to 7, j = 0 to 7 do
8: \(X[i,j] \leftarrow S(X[i,j]);\)
9: end for
10: for i = 0 to 7, j = 0 to 7 do
11: \(X[i,j] \leftarrow X[i,(j+i)\%8];\)
12: end for
13: for i = 0 to 7, j = 0 to 7 do
14: \(M \leftarrow \text{Serial} [2,4,2,11,2,8,5,6];\)
15: \(X \leftarrow M^8 \circ X;\)
16: end for

Ascon [13] consists of authenticated ciphers (Ascon-128 and Ascon-128a), a hash function (Ascon-Hash, Ascon-XOF), and a new variant Ascon-80pq with increased resistance against quantum key-search [16]. The Ascon design is based on a substitution-permutation network (SPN) that makes use of the 5-bit S-Box described in Table III, and a linear layer explained in Equation (1):

\[
\begin{align*}
    x_0 &\leftarrow \sum (x_0) = x_0 \oplus (x_0 \gg 19) \oplus (x_0 \gg 28) \\
    x_1 &\leftarrow \sum (x_1) = x_1 \oplus (x_1 \gg 61) \oplus (x_1 \gg 39) \\
    x_2 &\leftarrow \sum (x_2) = x_2 \oplus (x_2 \gg 1) \oplus (x_2 \gg 6) \\
    x_3 &\leftarrow \sum (x_3) = x_3 \oplus (x_3 \gg 10) \oplus (x_3 \gg 17) \\
    x_4 &\leftarrow \sum (x_4) = x_4 \oplus (x_4 \gg 7) \oplus (x_4 \gg 41)
\end{align*}
\]

Algorithm 2 Xoodyak permutation function.

1: \(A[48] \triangleright 384\text{-bit state represented in 48 bytes}\)
2: \(C_i \triangleright\text{Round constant at round } i\)
3: \(\theta:\)
4: \(P \leftarrow A_0 + A_1 + A_2\)
5: \(E \leftarrow P \lll (1,5) + P \lll (1,14)\)
6: \(A_y \leftarrow A_y + E\) for \(y \in \{0,1,2\}\)
7: \(\rho_{\text{west}}:\)
8: \(A_1 \leftarrow A_1 \lll (1,0)\)
9: \(P \leftarrow A_2 \lll (0,11)\)
10: \(t:\)
11: \(A_0 \leftarrow A_0 + C_i\)
12: \(x:\)
13: \(B_0 \leftarrow A_1 \cdot A_2\)
14: \(B_1 \leftarrow A_2 \cdot A_0\)
15: \(B_2 \leftarrow A_0 \cdot A_1\)
16: \(A_y \leftarrow A_y + A_y\) for \(y \in \{0,1,2\}\)
17: \(\rho_{\text{east}}:\)
18: \(A_1 \leftarrow A_1 \lll (0,1)\)
19: \(A_2 \leftarrow A_2 \lll (2,8)\)

Xoodyak [14] make use of the Xooodoo permutation, which was inspired by the Keccak-p permutation function. The Xooodoo permutation consists of five simple steps, illustrated in Algorithm 2. Xoodyak can be used as a hash function or extendable output function (XOF), but not as AEAD.

Algorithm 3 Alzette ARX-box in the Sparkle permutation function.

1: \(x[8] \triangleright 256\text{-bit state represented in eight 32-bit words}\)
2: \(c \triangleright\text{Round constant}\)
3: \(x \leftarrow x + (y \gg 31)\)
4: \(y \leftarrow y \oplus (x \gg 24)\)
5: \(x \leftarrow x \oplus c\)
6: \(x \leftarrow x + (y \gg 17)\)
7: \(y \leftarrow y \oplus (x \gg 17)\)
8: \(x \leftarrow x \oplus c\)
9: \(x \leftarrow x + (y \gg 0)\)
10: \(y \leftarrow y \oplus (x \gg 31)\)
11: \(x \leftarrow x \oplus c\)
12: \(x \leftarrow x + (y \gg 24)\)
13: \(y \leftarrow y \oplus (x \gg 16)\)
14: \(x \leftarrow x \oplus c\)

C. Overview of the GPU Architecture

A GPU is a massively parallel architecture consisting of hundreds to thousands of cores. To achieve high throughput, every core is assigned the same instruction, but operates on a different piece of data. This is essentially a single instruction multiple data (SIMD) parallel computing paradigm. The GPU
Algorithm 4 Linear diffusion layer $L_g(x)$ in the Sparkle permutation function.

1: $t \leftarrow y_0 \oplus y_1 \oplus y_2$
2: $t \leftarrow t \oplus (t \ll 16) \ll 16$
3: $(x_3, x_4, x_5) \leftarrow (x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus t, x_4 \oplus x_1 \oplus t, x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus t)$
4: $(x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3, x_4, x_5) \leftarrow (x_4, x_5, x_3, x_0, x_1, x_2)$

has a deep memory architecture that needs to be carefully used in order to achieve high performance. The DRAM is the global memory in the GPU. It tends to be large in size but very slow in access speed. Shared memory is a user-managed cache that can be used to cache temporary data or look-up table; it is faster than global memory but small in size (e.g., 96KB). The register is the fastest memory in a GPU, but it is limited to thread-level access and small in size (64K registers per streaming-multiprocessor). To exchange data across different threads, we need to rely on shared memory or warp shuffle instructions. A more detailed explanation of the GPU architecture and its programming model can be found in [17].

D. Quantum Computers for Brute-force Attack

A preimage attack on hash functions involves finding a message that outputs a specific hash value. Preimage resistance means that it is difficult to find a preimage $x$ for a given $y$ in the hash function $h(x) = y$. The Grover search algorithm is a quantum algorithm that is optimal for preimage attacks on hash functions [18]. Compared to the preimage attack, which requires $2^n$ searches (worst case) on a classic computer, the Grover preimage attack finds a preimage with a high probability with only $2^\frac{n}{2}$ searches. The steps for a Grover preimage attack are as follows.

1) Preparing an $n$-qubit message in superposition state $|\psi\rangle$ using Hadamard gates. This ensures that all qubits have the same amplitude.

$$|\psi\rangle = H^\otimes n |0\rangle^\otimes n = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{x=0}^{2^n-1} |x\rangle$$  \hspace{1cm} (2)

2) A hash function implemented as a quantum circuit is located in oracle $f(x)$ and is defined as follows. Oracle operator $U_f$ turns the solution (i.e., the preimage) into a negative sign. Since $(-1)^1 = -1$, the sign becomes negative only when $f(x) = 1$ and applies to all states.

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } h(x) = y \\ 0 & \text{if } h(x) \neq y \end{cases}$$  \hspace{1cm} (3)

$$U_f(|\psi\rangle |-) = \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} \sum_{x=0}^{2^n-1} (-1)^{f(x)} |x\rangle |-\rangle$$  \hspace{1cm} (4)

3) Lastly, the probability is increased by amplituting the amplitude of the negative sign state in the diffusion operator.

The Grover algorithm repeats steps 2 and 3 to increase the probability of measuring a solution. The optimal number of Grover iterations is $\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor$ (about $2^\frac{n}{2}$). That is, the classical preimage attack which requires $2^n$ searches is reduced to $2^\frac{n}{2}$ searches by using the Grover search algorithm. What is important in this attack is to efficiently implement the hash function $h(x)$ as a quantum circuit. Since the diffusion operator has a typical structure, there is no special technique to implement.

E. Quantum gates

Quantum computing is reversible for all changes except measurement. Reversible means that the initial state must be re-produced using only the output state. There are quantum gates with reversible properties that can replace classical gates. Figure 2 shows representative quantum gates used in quantum computing.

1) NOT/X gate : NOT(x), Inverting the input qubit.
2) CNOT gate : CNOT(x, y) = (x, x ⊕ y), One of the two qubits acts as a control qubit. If the control qubit x is 1, y is inverted.
3) SWAP gate : SWAP(x, y) = (y, x), Changing the state of two qubits x, y.
4) CCNOT/Toffoli gate : Toffoli(x, y, z) = (x, y, x ⊕ y ⊕ z), Using two control qubits. When both control qubits x and y are 1, z is inverted.

III. DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION TECHNIQUES ON GPU

This section describes the optimization techniques developed to implement the selected hash functions in the GPU. Note that in order to achieve high throughput, we adopt a coarse grain parallel method, wherein many parallel threads are initiated and each thread computes one hash value independently.

A. PHOTON-Beetle

The PHOTON permutation function (Algorithm 1) operates in a 256-bit state organized in an 8-bit array (X) with $8 \times 8$ dimension. The SubCells, ShiftRows and MixColumnSerial operations can be combined and pre-computed in a table, which greatly improves implementation performance. In PHOTON-beetle, optimizing the access to this pre-computed table is the key to achieving high throughput performance in GPU.
Algorithm 5 PHOTON permutation function with pre-computed table.

1: X[64] \rightarrow 256-bit state represented in 8 \times 8 bytes
2: RC[12] \leftarrow \{1,3,7,14,13,11,6,12,9,2,5,10\}
3: IC[8] \leftarrow \{0,1,3,7,15,14,12,8\}
4: for i = 0 to 7 do \rightarrow \text{AddConstant}
5: \quad X[i,0] \leftarrow X[i,0] \oplus RC[k] \oplus IC[i];
6: end for
7: for i = 0 to 7 do
8: \quad v \leftarrow 0;
9: \quad for j = 0 to 7 do \rightarrow \text{Use Pre-computed table}
10: \quad \quad v \leftarrow v \oplus Table[j*16 + X(j,(j+i)%8)]
11: \quad end for
12: \quad for j = 1 to 8 do
13: \quad \quad X(8-j,i) \leftarrow v \cdot (1<<4) - 1
14: \quad \quad v \leftarrow v \gg 4;
15: \quad end for
16: end for

Algorithm 5 describes the PHOTON permutation function implemented with the pre-computed table.

The pre-computed table in the PHOTON permutation function only consumes 128 32-bit words, so it can be cached in the shared memory for faster access speed. A closer look into Algorithm 5 reveals that the access pattern to Table is influenced by the state in PHOTON (X, line 9). Since the value in state X is random, the access to Table is also random. If Table is stored in shared memory, the access pattern is very likely to experience bank conflict, which is not an optimal solution.

To improve performance, we propose another technique, to store Table in registers and access it through warp shuffle instruction, which is illustrated in Algorithm 6. Each thread in a warp (32 threads) stores four values from Table into four registers (tb0, tb1, tb2, and tb3), so that the 128 values from Table are equally distributed into 32 threads. To access the values from Table, we can read one of the registers (tb0, tb1, tb2, or tb3), which is stored in one of the 32 threads. For instance, \_\_shfl(tb0, X[0][((0+c)%D)]) allows us to access tb0 stored in the thread indexed by X[0][((0+c)%D)]. The proposed warp shuffle version can eliminate the adverse effect of bank conflict and improves the throughput of the PHOTON-beetle hash function. In this study, we implemented the reference version, shared memory version, and the warp shuffle version to compare their performance.

Algorithm 6 Snippets of Table implementation (line 8 - 10 in Algorithm 5) using warp shuffle.

// tid is the thread ID. Each thread // stores four values from Table
tb0 = Table[tid%32];
tb1 = Table[tid%32 + 32];
tb2 = Table[tid%32 + 64];
tb3 = Table[tid%32 + 96];

// unrolled r
for (c = 0; c < D; c++) { // for all col.
\quad v = 0;
\quad // Retrieve the values in row-wise
\quad v ^= \_\_shfl(tb0, X[0][(0+c)%D]);
\quad v ^= \_\_shfl(tb0, 16 + X[1][(1+c)%D]);
\quad v ^= \_\_shfl(tb1, X[2][(2+c)%D]);
\quad v ^= \_\_shfl(tb1, 16 + X[3][(3+c)%D]);
\quad v ^= \_\_shfl(tb2, X[4][(4+c)%D]);
\quad v ^= \_\_shfl(tb2, 16 + X[5][(5+c)%D]);
\quad v ^= \_\_shfl(tb3, X[6][(6+c)%D]);
\quad v ^= \_\_shfl(tb3, 16 + X[7][(7+c)%D]);
\quad \ldots
\}

implemented using simple logical and shift operations (lines 17 - 21). Note that the NVIDIA GPU does not come with a native rotate instruction. Rotate operations were replaced with two shifts and one XOR instruction.

C. Xoodyak

Xoodyak uses a permutation (Xoodoo) similar to the Keccak hash function. Unlike the other three selected hash functions, Xoodyak does not have any S-box or ARX-box layer. In our GPU implementation, the round constants were stored in constant memory since it is accessible to all threads. Unlike the pre-computed Table in PHOTO-Beetle, at each round these Xoodyak round constants are only read once and consumed by every thread, so it is highly possible to be cached at the L1 cache. Hence, we did not store them in the shared memory, as it wouldn’t have provided any performance gain. Our GPU implementation of the Xoodyak permutation function follows Algorithm 2 closely. We do not repeat it here.

D. SPARKLE

The SPARKLE permutation consists of an ARX-box layer followed by a linear layer. The Alzette ARX-box in SPARKLE can be executed efficiently using only logical operations (see Algorithm 4). Like Xoodyak, the round constants are stored in constant memory instead of shared memory. The implementation of the SPARKLE-256 permutation function is illustrated in Algorithm 8.
Algorithm 7 Implementation of Ascon permutation function.

1: \( S[5] \) \quad \triangleright \quad 320-bit state represented in five 64-bit words
2: \( T[5] \) \quad \triangleright \quad 320-bit temporary state
3: \( C \) \quad \triangleright \quad \text{Round constant}
4: \( S[2] \leftarrow S[2] \oplus C \) \quad \triangleright \quad \text{Add round constant}
5: \( S[0] \leftarrow S[0] \oplus S[4] \)

// Ascon S-Box starts
8: \( T[0] \leftarrow S[0] \oplus S[1] \cdot S'[2] \)

// Ascon S-Box ends
13: \( T[1] \leftarrow T[1] \oplus T[0] \)
14: \( T[0] \leftarrow T[0] \oplus T[4] \)

// Linear diffusion layer starts
17: \( S[0] \leftarrow T[0] \oplus (T[0] \gg 19) \oplus (T[0] \gg 28) \)
18: \( S[1] \leftarrow T[1] \oplus (T[1] \gg 61) \oplus (T[1] \gg 39) \)

// Linear diffusion layer ends

IV. DEVELOPMENT OF IMPLEMENTATION TECHNIQUES ON QUANTUM COMPUTER

A. PHOTON-Beetle

The PHOTON permutation function (Algorithm 1) operates in a 256-qubit state organized in a 4-qubit array with \( 8 \times 8 \) dimensions. The PHOTON permutation function, which consists of AddConstant, SubCells, ShiftRows, and MixColumnSerial, was implemented as a quantum circuit as follows.

In AddConstant, the predetermined constants RC and IC are XORed with each other. In this case, it can be implemented using only NOT gates, and the overlapping parts are omitted. For example, when \( k = 1 \) and \( i = 1 \), in \( X[1, 0] \oplus RC[1] \oplus IC[1] \) (i.e. \( X[1, 0] \oplus 3 \oplus 1 \)), two NOT gates are performed on the first qubit of \( X[1, 0] \), so it is omitted and the NOT gate is performed only on the second qubit of \( X[1, 0] \). Subcells apply the 4-qubit S-box \( 64 \) to the 256-qubit state. When implementing an S-box in classical computing, a lookup table is a common choice. However, in quantum computing, this approach is quite inefficient. To solve this, we use the LIGHTER-R tool [19] to convert Table II into ANF (Algebraic Normal Form). The LIGHTER-R can find reversible implementations of the 4-bit SBox. The implementation works in place, thus no additional qubits are allocated. The PHOTON S-box quantum circuit of ANF is shown in Figure 3. LIGHTER-R is described in detail in [19].

Algorithm 8 Implementation of SPARKLE-256 permutation function.

1: \( S[5] \) \quad \triangleright \quad 256-bit state represented in five 64-bit words
2: \( rc, tx, ty, x0, y0 \) \quad \triangleright \quad \text{Temporary variables}
3: \( C \) \quad \triangleright \quad \text{Round constant}
4: \( S[1] \leftarrow S[1] \oplus C \cdot 8 \) \quad \triangleright \quad \text{Add round constant at } i\text{-th round}
5: \( S[3] \leftarrow S[3] \oplus i \)

// Ascon S-Box starts
6: \text{for } j = 0 to 11 \text{ do}
7: \( rc \leftarrow C[j \gg 1] \)
8: \( S[j] \leftarrow S[j] + S[j+1] \gg 31 \)
9: \( S[j+1] \leftarrow S[j] + S[j+1] \gg 24 \)
10: \( S[j] \leftarrow S[j] \oplus rc \)
11: \( S[j] \leftarrow S[j] + S[j+1] \gg 17 \)
12: \( S[j+1] \leftarrow S[j] + S[j+1] \gg 17 \)
13: \( S[j] \leftarrow S[j] \oplus rc \)
14: \( S[j] \leftarrow S[j] + S[j+1] \gg 31 \)
15: \( S[j+1] \leftarrow S[j] + S[j+1] \gg 31 \)
16: \( S[j] \leftarrow S[j] \oplus rc \)
17: \( S[j] \leftarrow S[j] + S[j+1] \gg 24 \)
18: \( S[j+1] \leftarrow S[j] + S[j+1] \gg 16 \)
19: \( S[j] \leftarrow S[j] \oplus rc \)

\text{end for}

// Ascon S-Box ends

// Linear layer starts
21: \( tx = x0 = S[0] \)
22: \( ty = y0 = S[1] \)
23: \text{for } j = 2 to 6 step 2 \text{ do}
24: \( tx \leftarrow tx \oplus S[j] \)
25: \( ty \leftarrow ty \oplus S[j+1] \)

\text{end for}

27: \( tx \leftarrow (tx \gg 16) \oplus (tx \cdot 0xFFFF) \)
28: \( ty \leftarrow (ty \gg 16) \oplus (ty \cdot 0xFFFF) \)
29: \text{for } j = 2 to 6 step 2 \text{ do}
30: \( S[j-2] = S[j+6] \oplus S[j] \oplus ty \)
31: \( S[j+6] = S[j] \)
32: \( S[j-1] = S[j+7] \oplus S[j+1] \oplus tx \)
33: \( S[j+7] = S[j+1] \)

\text{end for}

35: \( S[4] = S[6] \oplus x0 \oplus ty \)
36: \( S[6] = x0 \)
37: \( S[5] = S[7] \oplus y0 \oplus tx \)
38: \( S[7] = y0 \)

// Linear layer ends
and used them according to the value of \( C \) mod\( l\) for modular multiplication quantum circuits for each constant using only CNOT gates. We already know the modulus \( x^4 + x + 1 \), thus we can implement the multiplication circuit for each constant using only CNOT gates [23]. When the constant \( C = 2, C \cdot X \mod x^4 + x + 1 \) is shown in Figure 4. Since \( X \) has to be used continuously, the product is stored in the newly allocated qubits \( r_0, r_1, r_2, r_3 \). We prepare modular multiplication quantum circuits for \( C(0 \sim 15) \) and used them according to the value of \( C \) in the matrix multiplication of MixColumnSerial.

\[
\begin{align*}
1: & \text{ for } i = 1 \text{ to } 7 \text{ do} \\
2: & \quad \text{ for } j = 0 \text{ to } i - 1 \text{ do} \\
3: & \quad \quad \text{ for } k = 0 \text{ to } 7 \text{ do} \\
4: & \quad \quad \quad \text{SWAP4}(X[i, k], X[i, k + 1]) \\
5: & \quad \text{ end for} \\
6: & \text{ end for} \\
7: & \text{end for}
\end{align*}
\]

In MixColumnSerial, the matrix multiplication in \( GF(2^4) \) is used. For the general multiplication, Toffoli gates replace AND operations. Since constant multiplications are used in this matrix multiplication, only CNOT gates are used, where the gates have a lower cost than the Toffoli gates. We already know the modulus \( x^4 + x + 1 \), thus we can implement the multiplication circuit for each constant using only CNOT gates [23]. When the constant \( C = 2, C \cdot X \mod x^4 + x + 1 \) is shown in Figure 4. Since \( X \) has to be used continuously, the product is stored in the newly allocated qubits \( r_0, r_1, r_2, r_3 \). We prepare modular multiplication quantum circuits for \( C(0 \sim 15) \) and used them according to the value of \( C \) in the matrix multiplication of MixColumnSerial.

In ShiftRow, the arrangement of qubits is changed, which can only be done with Swap gates. For convenience we used Swap gates in the implementation, but we did not count them as quantum resources. This is because Swap gates can be replaced by relabeling qubits [20], [21], [22] (called a logical swap). Algorithm 9 describes Shiftrows implemented as a quantum circuit. SWAP4 means a Swap operation in units of 4 qubits.

**Algorithm 9 Quantum circuit for ShiftRows.**

1: for \( i = 1 \) to 7 do
2: for \( j = 0 \) to \( i - 1 \) do
3: for \( k = 0 \) to 7 do
4: SWAP4(\( X[i, k] \), \( X[i, k + 1] \))
5: end for
6: end for
7: end for

In MixColumnSerial, the matrix multiplication in \( GF(2^4) \) is used. For the general multiplication, Toffoli gates replace AND operations. Since constant multiplications are used in this matrix multiplication, only CNOT gates are used, where the gates have a lower cost than the Toffoli gates. We already know the modulus \( x^4 + x + 1 \), thus we can implement the multiplication circuit for each constant using only CNOT gates [23]. When the constant \( C = 2, C \cdot X \mod x^4 + x + 1 \) is shown in Figure 4. Since \( X \) has to be used continuously, the product is stored in the newly allocated qubits \( r_0, r_1, r_2, r_3 \). We prepare modular multiplication quantum circuits for \( C(0 \sim 15) \) and used them according to the value of \( C \) in the matrix multiplication of MixColumnSerial.

The Substitution layer and Linear diffusion layer operate in a 320-qubit state, represented in a 5 × 64-qubit array \( x_i (i = 0, \ldots, 4) \). When computing \( x_0 \) in the S-box, we need the final \( x_4 \) (yellow highlight in Figure 5). It is efficient to compute in the order \( x_4, x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3 \). Generating the final \( x_4 \), \( x_0 \), \( x_1 \) is not a problem. However, in order to obtain \( x_2 \) and \( x_3 \), the values of \( x_4 \) and \( x_0 \) before the S-box are required (red highlight in Figure 5). One way to solve this is to store the values \( (x_4 \) and \( x_0 \) before S-box) in temp qubits. However, we replaced it with additional qubits allocated from the Linear diffusion layer. In the Linear diffusion layer, to compute \( x_0 \), values of \( x_0 \gg 19 \) and \( x_0 \gg 28 \) are needed, simultaneously. If the first qubit \( x_0[0] \) is updated to \( x_0[0] \oplus x_0[19] \oplus x_0[28] \), and the original \( x_0[0] \) value disappears. Since \( x_0[45] \) and \( x_0[36] \) cannot be computed, new qubits are allocated to store the updated value.

To reduce the number of qubits, we present an S-box quantum circuit using newly allocated qubits in Linear diffusion layer. We design an efficient S-box quantum circuit by utilizing the reverse operation and taking into account the Linear diffusion layer (Equation 1). Figure 6 shows the structure of the proposed S-box quantum circuit. In this quantum circuit, 1-qubit of each register operates the S-box and transfers the value to the temp qubit of the Linear diffusion layer using CNOT gates. Then, to compute \( x_2, x_3 \), a reverse operation (except for \( LD \)) is performed to obtain \( x_4, x_0 \) before S-box. Finally, we computed \( x_2 \) and \( x_3 \) without temp qubits using \( x_4 \) and \( x_0 \) before S-box.

**C. Xoodooak**

The Xoodoo permutation function operates in a 384-qubit state, represented in a 3 × 128-qubit array \( A_0, A_1, A_2 \), and each 128-qubit is arranged in a 4 × 32 array. Algorithm 10 describes each step of the Xoodoo permutation implemented as a quantum circuit.

For the mixing layer \( \theta \), we need to allocate a new 128-qubit \( P \) for \( P = A_0 + A_1 + A_2 \). Then XOR \( A_0, A_1, A_2 \) to \( P \) using \( 3 \times \) CNOT128. CNOT128 means CNOT gates operating in units of 128 qubits. In \( \ll (a, b) \) of \( \theta \), \( a \) means a rotation in 32-bit units in a 128-bit state, and \( b \) means a...
rotation in 1-bit units in a 32-bit state. We used RotateCNOT to XOR P to A0, A1, A2 based on a logical swap for P. RotateCNOT is shown in Algorithm 11. In this way, the rotation operation can be performed without using Swap gates. In \( \rho_{\text{west}} \) and \( \rho_{\text{east}} \), the rotation operations can be replaced with a logical swap as in RotateCNOT, but for the convenience of implementation, we used Swap gates, \( i \), which adds the constant \( C_i \) to \( A_0 \), is performed using only NOT gates in the same way as AddConstant in the PHOTON permutation function. Most of the quantum gates and qubits are used for the non-linear layer \( \chi \). Toffoli gates (high cost) were used to replace AND operations on \( A_0, A_1, A_2 \) and the results were stored in newly allocated \( B_0, B_1 \) and \( B_2 \). We reduced the use of qubits by avoiding allocation for \( B_2 \). After computing \( B_0 = \tilde{A}_1 \cdot A_2, B_1 = \tilde{A}_2 \cdot A_0 \), the reverse operations return the values of \( A_1 \) and \( A_2 \). Then \( A_2 = A_2 + A_0 \cdot A_1 \) (i.e., replace \( A_2 = A_2 + B_2 \) avoids allocating qubits for \( B_2 \). When \( A_2 \) is completed, \( B_0 \) and \( B_1 \) can be XORed to \( A_0 \) and \( A_1 \) with CNOT128. Lastly, \( \rho_{\text{east}} \) is performed using Swap gates.

D. SPARKLE

This section only describes the Sparkle384 permutation implementation technique. This same technique works on Sparkle512. Sparkle permutations consist of an ARX-box layer followed by a linear layer. For additions in ARX-box, a quantum adder is required. For this, we used an improved quantum ripple-carry adder [24]. The ripple-carry adder stores the result of the addition of \( A + B \) in \( B \), keeps \( A \) as it is (i.e. ADD(\( A, B \)) = (\( A, A + B \))). This adder uses the MAJ and UMA modules shown in Figure 7 and uses additional qubits \( r_0 \) and \( r_1 \) except for \( A \) and \( B \) as shown in Figure 8. Since the ARX-box uses modular addition ignoring the highest carry, we only allocated a single qubit for \( r_0 \). Since this \( r_0 \) is initialized to 0 after the addition, it can be reused in subsequent additions.

![Fig. 6: Ascon S-box quantum circuit (LD : performing Linear diffusion of Equation 1).](image)

Algorithm 12 describes an ARX-box implemented as a quantum circuit. For additions and XORs using rotated input (e.g. \( x + (y \gg 31) \), \( y \oplus (x \gg 24) \)), resources for rotation were not used by using RotateCNOT and RotateADD based on logical swap. RotateCNOT32 and RotateADD32, which are based on logical swaps and operate in 32-qubit units, are similar to RotateCNOT in the Xoodoo permutation, but this can be implemented, simply. Algorithm 13 describes RotateCNOT32. For RotateADD32, the structure in Figure 8 was redesigned in 32-qubit units, and ignores the \( r_1 \) qubit line. Similar to RotateXOR32, \( a_i \) were relabeled according to the rotated result (i.e., logical swaps).

In the linear layer \( L_6(x) \), for \( y_0 \oplus y_1 \oplus y_2 \) was used. In classical computing, using temp storage (\( t \)) like this is not a problem. However, in quantum computing, the qubits for \( t \) must be newly allocated, and since they cannot be recycled, they must be allocated every \( L_6(x) \), which is very inefficient. We solved this by designing a quantum circuit for \( L_6(x) \) as in Algorithm 14. Algorithm 14 computes \( y_2 = y_0 \oplus y_1 \oplus y_2 \) (value preparation), and XORs \( y_2 \) to \( x_3, x_4 \) and \( x_5 \) (lines 8-19). CNOT16 and CNOT32 indicate CNOT operations in units of 16 and 32 qubits. In the last step, the value preparation is reversed to return to the original \( y_2 \). In the linear diffusion layer, \( L_6(y) \) is also performed on \( y \). Since \( L_6(y) \) differs from \( L_6(x) \) only in operands and the implementation technique is the same, the quantum circuit for \( L_6(y) \) is omitted.

V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

This section presents the implementation of the selected NIST lightweight hash functions on two different platforms: a GPU and a quantum computer. The GPU implementation was performed on a workstation equipped with an Intel i9-10900K CPU and an RTX 3080 GPU. The quantum computer implementation was performed on a MacBook Pro equipped with an Intel i7 CPU.

A. Results of Implementation on GPU

This study focused on achieving a high throughput for all of the hash functions implemented on the GPU. To achieve
Algorithm 10 Quantum circuit for $R_i$ in Xoodoo permutation.

1. $\theta$:
2. $P \leftarrow 128$-qubit allocation
3. $P \leftarrow$ CNOT128($A_0, P$)
4. $P \leftarrow$ CNOT128($A_1, P$)
5. $P \leftarrow$ CNOT128($A_2, P$)
6. $A_0 \leftarrow$ RotateCNOT($P, A_0$)
7. $A_1 \leftarrow$ RotateCNOT($P, A_1$)
8. $A_2 \leftarrow$ RotateCNOT($P, A_2$)
9. $\rho_{ext}$:
10. SWAP32($A_1[64 : 96], A_0[64 : 128]$)
11. SWAP32($A_1[32 : 64], A_1[64 : 96]$)
12. SWAP32($A_1[0 : 32], A_1[32 : 64]$)
13. for $j = 0$ to 10 do
14.  for $k = 0$ to 30 do
15.   SWAP($A_2[31 - k], A_2[30 - k]$)
16.   SWAP($A_2[63 - k], A_2[62 - k]$)
17.   SWAP($A_2[95 - k], A_2[94 - k]$)
18.   SWAP($A_2[127 - k], A_2[126 - k]$)
19.  end for
20. end for
21. $t$:
22. RoundConstantXOR($A_0, C_t$)
23. $\chi$:
24. $B_0 \leftarrow 128$-qubit allocation
25. $B_1 \leftarrow 128$-qubit allocation
26. $A_1 \leftarrow$ NOT128($A_1$)
27. $B_0 \leftarrow$ Toffoli128($A_1, A_2, B_0$)
28. $A_1 \leftarrow$ NOT128($A_1$) // reverse
29. $A_2 \leftarrow$ NOT128($A_2$)
30. $B_1 \leftarrow$ Toffoli128($A_2, A_0, B_1$)
31. $A_2 \leftarrow$ NOT128($A_2$) // reverse
32. $A_0 \leftarrow$ NOT128($A_0$)
33. $A_2 \leftarrow$ Toffoli128($A_0, A_1, A_2$)
34. $A_0 \leftarrow$ NOT128($A_0$) // reverse
35. $A_0 \leftarrow$ CNOT128($B_0, A_0$)
36. $A_1 \leftarrow$ CNOT128($B_1, A_1$)
37. $\rho_{ext}$:
38. for $j = 0$ to 30 do
39.  SWAP($A_1[31 - j], A_1[30 - j]$)
40.  SWAP($A_1[63 - j], A_1[62 - j]$)
41.  SWAP($A_1[95 - j], A_1[94 - j]$)
42.  SWAP($A_1[127 - j], A_1[126 - j]$)
43. end for
44. for $j = 0$ to 1 do
45.  SWAP32($A_2[64 : 96], A_2[96 : 128]$)
46.  SWAP32($A_2[32 : 64], A_2[64 : 96]$)
47.  SWAP32($A_2[0 : 32], A_2[32 : 64]$)
48. end for
49. for $j = 0$ to 7 do
50.  for $k = 0$ to 30 do
51.   SWAP($A_2[31 - k], A_2[30 - k]$)
52.   SWAP($A_2[63 - k], A_2[62 - k]$)
53.   SWAP($A_2[95 - k], A_2[94 - k]$)
54.   SWAP($A_2[127 - k], A_2[126 - k]$)
55. end for
56. end for

Algorithm 11 Quantum circuit for RotateCNOT.

1. for $i = 0$ to 31 do
2.  $A = A + (P \ll (1, 5))$
3.  $A[(5 + i)\%32] \leftarrow$ CNOT($P[96 + i], A[(5 + i)\%32])$
4.  $A[(32 + (5 + i)\%32)] \leftarrow$ CNOT($P[i], A[(32 + (5 + i)\%32)]$
5.  $A[(64 + (5 + i)\%32)] \leftarrow$ CNOT($P[32 + i], A[(64 + (5 + i)\%32)]$
6.  $A[(96 + (5 + i)\%32)] \leftarrow$ CNOT($P[64 + i], A[(96 + (5 + i)\%32)]$
7.  $A = A + (P \ll (1, 14))$
8.  $A[(5 + i)\%32] \leftarrow$ CNOT($P[96 + i], A[(14 + i)\%32])$
9.  $A[(32 + (14 + i)\%32)] \leftarrow$ CNOT($P[i], A[(32 + (14 + i)\%32)]$
10. $A[(64 + (14 + i)\%32)] \leftarrow$ CNOT($P[32 + i], A[(64 + (14 + i)\%32)]$
11. $A[(96 + (14 + i)\%32)] \leftarrow$ CNOT($P[64 + i], A[(96 + (14 + i)\%32)]$
12. end for

Algorithm 12 Quantum circuit for ARX-box in Sparkle permutation.

1. $x \leftarrow$ RotateADD32($y, x, r_0, 31$)
2. $y \leftarrow$ RotateCNOT32($x, y, 24$)
3. $x \leftarrow$ RoundConstantXOR($x, c$)
4. $x \leftarrow$ RotateADD32($y, x, r_0, 17$)
5. $y \leftarrow$ RotateCNOT32($x, y, 17$)
6. $x \leftarrow$ RoundConstantXOR($x, c$)
7. $x \leftarrow$ ADD32($y, x, r_0$)
8. $y \leftarrow$ RotateCNOT32($x, y, 31$)
9. $x \leftarrow$ RoundConstantXOR($x, c$)
10. $x \leftarrow$ RotateADD32($y, x, r_0, 24$)
11. $y \leftarrow$ RotateCNOT32($x, y, 16$)
12. $x \leftarrow$ RoundConstantXOR($x, c$)

Algorithm 13 Quantum circuit for RotateCNOT32($a, b, n$).

1. for $i = 0$ to 31 do
2.  $b[i] \leftarrow$ CNOT($a[(n + i)\%32], b[i])$
3. end for

Algorithm 14 Quantum circuit for $L_6(x)$.

1. Value preparation:
2. $y_2 = y_0 \oplus y_1 \oplus y_2$
3. $y_2 \leftarrow$ CNOT32($y_0, y_2$)
4. $y_2 \leftarrow$ CNOT32($y_1, y_2$)
5. $y_2 = y_2 \oplus (y_2 \ll 16)$
6. $y_2 \leftarrow$ CNOT16($y_2[0 : 16], y_2[16 : 32]$)
7. end
8. $x_3 = x_3 \oplus x_0 \oplus (y_2 \ll 16)$
9. $x_3[0 : 16] \leftarrow$ CNOT16($y_2[16 : 32], x_3[0 : 16]$)
10. $x_3[16 : 32] \leftarrow$ CNOT16($y_2[0 : 16], x_3[16 : 32]$)
11. $x_3 \leftarrow$ CNOT32($x_0, x_3$)
12. $x_4 = x_4 \oplus x_1 \oplus (y_2 \ll 16)$
13. $x_4[0 : 16] \leftarrow$ CNOT16($y_2[16 : 32], x_4[0 : 16]$)
14. $x_4[16 : 32] \leftarrow$ CNOT16($y_2[0 : 16], x_4[16 : 32]$)
15. $x_4 \leftarrow$ CNOT32($x_2, x_4$)
16. $x_5 = x_5 \oplus x_2 \oplus (y_2 \ll 16)$
17. $x_5[0 : 16] \leftarrow$ CNOT16($y_2[16 : 32], x_5[0 : 16]$)
18. $x_5[16 : 32] \leftarrow$ CNOT16($y_2[0 : 16], x_5[16 : 32]$)
19. $x_5 \leftarrow$ CNOT32($x_2, x_5$)
20. //Back from $y_0 \oplus y_1 \oplus y_2$ to $y_2$
21. Reverse(Value preparation)
this, all experiments were conducted by launching $P$ blocks in parallel, with each block consisting of 512 threads. Within each thread, we performed one hash operation with different lengths (MLEN) that ranged from 64 bytes to 512 bytes. This represents the common sizes of IoT sensor data typically found in sensor nodes that are built on constrained devices with only a few KB of RAM available. The throughput (Giga-bit per second (Gbps)) was calculated as follows:

$$\text{Throughput} = \frac{8 \times P \times 512 \times \text{MLEN}}{\text{Time elapsed}}$$  \hspace{1cm} \text{(5)}$$

Figure 9 shows the throughput achieved by PHOTON-Beetle in our GPU implementation. The shared memory version was always slower than the proposed warp shuffle version by approximately 40%. This is because in the PHOTON round function, the shared memory used to store the pre-computed table is accessed in a random manner, which may introduce a lot of bank conflicts. In contrast, the warp shuffle version stores the pre-computed table in registers, which are not affected by any random access pattern. Hence, the throughput of the warp shuffle version consistently outperformed the shared memory version. The highest throughput achieved by PHOTON-Beetle in our implementation range was between 70 Gbps to 63 Gbps for different MLEN.

Compared to PHOTON-Beetle, the other three candidates achieved a much higher throughput. Referring to Figure 10, Sparkle was able to achieve very high throughput across different MLEN, ranging between 850 Gbps to 1000 Gbps. Xoodyak and Ascon performed at a similar level, achieving throughput that ranged between 400 Gbps to 500 Gbps. The throughput achieved by these three candidates were an order of magnitude higher than PHOTON-Beetle. The main reason for the difference in performance is that PHOTON-Beetle uses byte-wise operations, which is efficient in constrained devices (e.g., a 8-bit microcontroller), but is not efficient in a GPU with a 32-bit architecture. On the other hand, Sparkle, Xoodyak and Ascon are designed based on word-level operations (32-bit or 64-bit), which can be efficiently implemented in a GPU. Hence, the throughput achieved by these three candidates was much higher compared to PHOTON-Beetle.

B. Results of Implementation on a Quantum Computer

All of the hash functions implemented in this paper were optimized for qubits and quantum gates in the reversible computing environment of quantum computers. Table IV shows the logical resources for all hash functions implemented as quantum circuits. We estimated the security strength of all hash functions using the post-quantum security requirements provided by NIST [25]. NIST presented the following requirements for the security strength of post-quantum cryptosystems.

- Attacks that break the security strength of a 256-bit hash function must require similar or more resources than those required for an attack against a hash function (e.g. SHA-256 or SHA3-256).
- Attacks that break the security strength of a block cipher with a 128-bit key must require similar or more resources than those required for an attack against a hash function (e.g. AES-128).

The attack cost for block cipher is estimated as $D$ (Total gates \times Depth) based on Grassl’s implementation of an AES quantum circuit [26]. For the case of AES-128, it was estimated to be $2^{171}(D)$ quantum gates. For hash functions, there is no attack cost estimate for quantum gates (only for classic gates). As an alternative, we estimated the attack cost $D$ for hash functions by applying the estimation method in block cipher [27], [28] to SHA-256 and SHA-3. Amy et al. [29] presented techniques to estimate the cost of quantum preimage attacks for SHA-256 and SHA3. We followed the method in [29] by estimating the cost of attacks on the 256-bit input message as well. Quantum resources for SHA-2 and SHA3 are shown in Table V. In [29], resources were analyzed at the T+Clifford level by decomposing Toffoli gates. SHA3 was also analyzed as a resource at the NCT (NOT, CNOT, and Toffoli) level, but SHA-256 was not, so it was extrapolated based on the T+Clifford level.

In oracle, the hash function is executed twice due to (hashing + reverse). The resources of Table IV \times 2 and Table V \times 2 were used except for qubits. Resources using a single multi-controlled NOT gate to compare the generated hash value to a known hash value were omitted for simplicity.
The optimal number of Grover search iterations was $\lceil \frac{\pi}{2} \sqrt{\frac{N}{2^D}} \rceil$. For a 256-bit input message, the oracle was repeated $\lceil \frac{\pi}{2} 2^{128} \rceil$ times. Finally, the resources for the attack were estimated as shown in Table IV. Since the total gates is the sum of all gates at the T+Clifford level, Tables IV and V of the NCT level were decomposed into the T+Clifford level and estimated, as shown in Table VI. We decomposed the Toffoli gate into 7 T gates + 9 Clifford gates [30], as in [29].

It can be seen that the attack costs for the 256-bit hash functions for PHOTON-Beetle, Sparkle, Xoodyak, and Ascon (ESCH-256) were lower than those for SHA-256 and SHA3, which were the NIST security requirements. Note that the number of qubits was not counted in $D$. This should be taken into account. Increasing the number of rounds of permutation, which is the most costly in terms of hash functions, will be one of the ways to satisfy the post-quantum security strength.

### Table IV: Quantum resources required for Lightweight hash functions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Qubits</th>
<th>Toffoli gates</th>
<th>CNOT gates</th>
<th>X gates</th>
<th>Depth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHOTON</td>
<td>18,944</td>
<td>18,432</td>
<td>315,328</td>
<td>10,369</td>
<td>3,371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCON</td>
<td>35,136</td>
<td>55,296</td>
<td>159,232</td>
<td>97,346</td>
<td>2,487</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xoodyak</td>
<td>14,464</td>
<td>13,824</td>
<td>50,944</td>
<td>27,754</td>
<td>760</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCH256</td>
<td>769</td>
<td>37,200</td>
<td>113,360</td>
<td>10,559</td>
<td>95,033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCH384</td>
<td>1,025</td>
<td>71,424</td>
<td>217,792</td>
<td>20,248</td>
<td>182,421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Input message length = 256 bits

### Table V: Quantum resources required for SHA-256 and SHA-3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Qubits</th>
<th>Toffoli gates</th>
<th>CNOT gates</th>
<th>X gates</th>
<th>Depth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SHA-256 [29] (Extrapolation)</td>
<td>2,402</td>
<td>57,184</td>
<td>133,984</td>
<td>.</td>
<td>528,768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHA-3 [29]</td>
<td>3,200</td>
<td>84,480</td>
<td>332,679,60</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10,128</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Input message length = 256 bits

### Table VI: Comparison of performance.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Algorithm</th>
<th>Total gates</th>
<th>Depth</th>
<th>$D$</th>
<th>Security requirements</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PHOTON</td>
<td>1.850 - 2.147</td>
<td>1.292 - 2.430</td>
<td>1.201 - 2.288</td>
<td>1.244 - 2.296 (SHA-256) or 1.574 - 2.295 (SHA3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASCON</td>
<td>1.71 - 2.148</td>
<td>1.907 - 2.439</td>
<td>1.63 - 2.288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xoodyak</td>
<td>1.797 - 2.146</td>
<td>1.164 - 2.138</td>
<td>1.046 - 2.288</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCH256</td>
<td>1.077 - 2.148</td>
<td>1.139 - 2.145</td>
<td>1.227 - 2.293</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Input message length = 256 bits, $D = \text{Total gates} \times \text{Depth}$

### ACKNOWLEDGMENT

W. Lee and S. O. Hwang were supported by the Brain Pool Program through the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) funded by the Ministry of Science and ICT (2019H1D3A101102607, 50%). This work of K. Jang, G. Song, H. Kim, and H. Seo was partly supported by Institute for Information & communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government(MSIT) (<Q>Crypton>, No.2019-0-00033, Study on Quantum Security Evaluation of Cryptography based on Computational Quantum Complexity, 10%) and partly supported by Institute for Information & communications Technology Promotion(IITP) grant funded by the Korea government(MSIT) (No.2018-0-00264, Research on Blockchain Security Technology for IoT Services, 10%) and partly supported by Institute of Information & communications Technology Planning & Evaluation (IITP) grant funded by the Korea government(MSIT) (No.2021-0-00540, Development of Fast Design and Implementation of Cryptographic Algorithms based on GPU/ASIC, 10%) and partly supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea(NRF) grant funded by the Korea government(MSIT) (No. NRF-2020R1F1A1048478, 20%).

### VI. CONCLUSION

Conducting high throughput data integrity checks is essential to protect communications in IoT systems. In this study, we proposed techniques to optimize the four lightweight hash functions finalists in the NIST standardization competition (PHOTON-Beetle, Ascon, Xoodyak and Sparkle). All four candidates achieved high hashing throughput (70 Gbps to 1000 Gbps) on a GPU platform, which can be used to perform high performance data integrity checks in IoT systems. Implementing these four hash functions on a quantum computer was analyzed using IBM ProjectQ. Further, we estimated the cost of a Grover preimage attack and compared it with NIST’s post-quantum security requirements. Our work contributes to the analysis of hash functions by a quantum computer. The output from this article can be used to protect IoT communication (high throughput integrity check) as well as analyze the vulnerabilities of these hash functions against brute-force attack [31].

### REFERENCES


Seong Oun Hwang (Senior Member, IEEE) received the B.S. degree in mathematics from Seoul National University, in 1993, the M.S. degree in information and communications engineering from the Pohang University of Science and Technology, in 1998, and the Ph.D. degree in computer science from the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, in 2004, South Korea. He worked as a Software Engineer with LG-CNS Systems, Inc., from 1994 to 1996. He worked as a Senior Researcher with the Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), from 1998 to 2007. He worked as a Professor with the Department of Software and Communications Engineering, Hongik University, from 2008 to 2019. He is currently a Professor with the Department of Computer Engineering, Gachon University. His research interests include cryptography, cybersecurity, and artificial intelligence. He is an Editor of ETRI Journal.

Hwajeong Seo received the B.S., M.S. and Ph.D degrees in Computer Engineering at Pusan National University. He is currently an assistant professor in Hansung university. His research interests include cryptographic engineering.