Iterative Oblivious Pseudo-Random Functions and Applications

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Abstract. We consider the problem of a client querying an encrypted binary tree structure, outsourced to an untrusted server. While the server must not learn the contents of the binary tree, we also prevent the client from maliciously crafting a query that traverses the tree out-of-order. That is, the client should not be able to retrieve nodes outside one contiguous path from the root to a leaf. Finally, the server should not learn which path the client accesses, but is guaranteed that the access corresponds to one valid path in the tree. This is an extension of protocols such as structured encryption, where it is only guaranteed that the tree’s encrypted data remains hidden from the server.

To this end, we initiate the study of Iterative Oblivious Pseudorandom Functions (iOPRFs), new primitives providing two-sided, fully malicious security for these types of applications. We present a first, efficient iOPRF construction secure against both malicious clients and servers in the standard model, based on the DDH assumption. We demonstrate that iOPRFs are useful to implement different interesting applications, including an RFID authentication protocol and a protocol for private evaluation of outsourced decision trees. Finally, we implement and evaluate our full iOPRF construction and show that it is efficient in practice.

1 Introduction

Structured encryption allows a data owner to encrypt data arranged in a data structure and store it on an untrusted server \cite{structured-elec}. A crucial property of structured encryption is that the data owner can later compute a special decryption key for the server which permits the server to decrypt and parse a well defined component of the data structure, saving the owner from having to individually download and traverse each element themselves. A typical example for structured encryption is data arranged in a graph encrypted and outsourced to a server, and the owner computing keys for decryption of sub-graphs \cite{structured-elec}. Computation of decryption keys is possible despite the owner retaining only a constant-sized master key. Keyword-searchable encryption can be implemented as a special-case of structured encryption where the graph is composed of many linked lists, one for each keyword, containing all the documents that match that keyword.
1.1 New Applications

In this paper, we introduce a twist to the standard application scenario of structured encryption. A third party, separate from the data owner and server, which we call the client, can ask the data owner for permission to retrieve a specific component of the owner’s data structure. The owner is said to delegate access to this portion of their data to the client. However, the data owner and client do not trust each other, and the client does not want to reveal to the owner which part of the data structure they are interested in. At the same time, the owner wants to restrict the client’s access to a specific component of their data structure and might even put constraints on that component, e.g., where it begins, how many elements it contains, etc. This new setting of mutually untrusted data owner, server, and client has several interesting applications. One can imagine a data owner outsourcing a medical database with patient records to an untrusted cloud. A researcher (client) conducting a study gets access to a specific set of patient records (the component) without leaking which set of patients is affected to the owner or the database. At the same time, the researcher is confined within one component of data structure and cannot arbitrarily browse patient records.

In this work, we focus on tree data structures, but in return offer more powerful confinement control for the data owner than standard structured encryption. In addition to decryption keys enabling decryption of a sub-tree for the client, the data owner can also compute keys which enable the client to access only one path, from the root of the tree to a leaf. Moreover, the client can ask to decrypt a path in an iterative, adaptive fashion instead of querying the owner for the whole path at once. Adaptive queries are necessary to support iterative scenarios where the client will parse the tree node by node, obliviously asking the owner to decrypt a single child node in the tree only after fetching and decrypting the parent node. For example, after decrypting one node of a binary tree, the client can obliviously query the owner for the decryption key of either the left or right child, depending on the current node’s data content. At the same time, the data owner wants to ensure that the client can only ask to decrypt one single node which is a child of the current node, so that the client is confined to decrypting exactly one path and cannot arbitrarily “jump around” in the data structure.

While we later present details on two specific applications for tree data structures, one for RFID authentication and one for privacy-preserving decision tree evaluation, we stress that techniques in this paper are general and useful in other scenarios, too. As soon as data is tree-structured (XML data, databases using B+ trees or hash maps, hash trees, search trees, heaps, …) and should be adaptively parsed, our techniques will be required. We also note that our techniques can be used to realize maliciously secure, adaptive $k$-out-of-$n$ oblivious transfer [8] and oblivious keyword search [25]. We discuss applications in more detail in Section 8.

1.2 Technical Challenges

A straightforward approach to providing adaptive queries might be for the data owner to apply an Oblivious Pseudo-Random Function (OPRF) as the PRF to encrypt nodes. For a tree of height $\ell$, owner and client run $\ell$ instances of the OPRF such that the client always learns the key for the next node on the path they are interested in, and the
owner learns nothing. To actually fetch a node from the server in an oblivious fashion, the client could employ standard PIR or OT protocols. However, this approach is only secure against semi-honest clients that stick to the rule of asking for the decryption key of one child node of the current node. The difficulty lies in making parsing the tree structure secure against a fully-malicious client without reverting to general, yet expensive techniques like maliciously secure two-party computation and general Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proofs.

1.3 Our contributions

Consequently, we introduce the notion of iterative Oblivious Pseudo-Random Functions (iOPRFs) and the first candidate constructions. An iOPRF is an $\ell$ round two party protocol between a sender and a receiver. The intuition behind iOPRFs is that the receiver adaptively queries $\ell$ input bits $x_i$ in $\ell$ rounds such that in the end they learn outputs $\text{PRF}_K(x_1), \ldots, \text{PRF}_K(x_1 \ldots x_\ell)$ for key $K$ chosen by the sender, and the sender learns nothing. If such an iOPRF is used to encrypt the nodes, then fetching a wrong node is useless for the client, as they cannot decrypt it anyways.

Our new candidate iOPRF construction is based on a careful adaptation of the PRF by Naor and Reingold [39]. We first augment the Naor and Reingold PRF to become an iterative Pseudo-Random Function (iPRF) which has the property that, for input strings with the same prefix, its generated output also shares the same prefix. We then present our main construction, an iOPRF which is secure against malicious sender and malicious receiver. We achieve malicious security by using efficient ZK proofs for DH-based statements over elliptic curves and avoid costly maliciously secure oblivious transfer (OT). We implement and benchmark our new iOPRF construction to show its practicality and efficiency.

In summary, the technical highlights of this paper are:

- The definition of the new cryptographic primitives of iPRF and iOPRF which extends repeated OPRF constructions with security constraints on the client’s input.
- A candidate construction which is efficient and provably secure under the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption in the standard model.
- To show its practicality, we implement our construction and evaluate its performance. The implementation is available for download [2].
- The integration of our primitive into several example applications, such as RFID authentication and privacy-preserving decision tree evaluation.

2 Background and Related Work

Before introducing iPRFs, iOPRFs, and their constructions, we briefly revisit seminal PRF and OPRF schemes and some useful security definitions. They will be helpful in understanding the intuition behind iPRFs and iOPRFs.

While there exist many different PRFs [4] [12] [17] [20] [36] [39] and OPRFs [4] [11] [13] [26] [28] [34], we present the DH-based techniques by Naor and Reingold [39] and Freedman et al. [18], as our constructions are built on their main idea.
Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group of prime order $p$ where the DDH assumption holds, and $g$ is a random generator of $\mathbb{G}$. For a security parameter $\lambda$, we set $|p| = \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

**Construction 1 (Naor and Reingold Function).** For any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, consider function family (ensemble) $F_K(x) : (\mathbb{Z}_p)^{\ell+1} \times \{0,1\}^\ell \to \mathbb{G}$, where key $K$ is defined as sequence $K = (\alpha_0, \ldots, \alpha_\ell)$ of $\ell$ random elements $\alpha_i$ from $\mathbb{Z}_p$. For any $\ell$ bit input $x = x_1 \ldots x_\ell$, function $F_K$ is defined by

$$F_K(x) = (g^{\alpha_0})_{\prod_{i=1}^\ell \alpha_i}.$$

Function $F_K$ holds the following important randomness property. We will come back to it later in the proof of our own construction.

**Definition 1 (Naor and Reingold Pseudo-Randomness).** For any $\ell \in \mathbb{N}$, function family $F_K(x) : (\mathbb{Z}_p)^{\ell+1} \times \{0,1\}^\ell \to \mathbb{G}$ has pseudo-random output, if for every PPT distinguisher $D$, there exists a negligible function $\epsilon$ such that for sufficiently large $\lambda$

$$|\Pr[D^{F_K(\cdot)}(1^\lambda) = 1] - \Pr[D^{R(\cdot)}(1^\lambda) = 1]| = \epsilon(\lambda),$$

where $K \xleftarrow{\$} (\mathbb{Z}_p)^{\ell+1}$, and $R$ is a randomly chosen function from the set of functions with domain $\{0,1\}^\ell$ and image $\mathbb{G}$.

**Theorem 1 (Theorem 4.1 of [39]).** If the DDH-Assumption holds, then $F_K$ from Construction 1 has pseudo-random output.

Observe that $F_K$ from Construction 1 is not a pseudo-random function. The standard PRF textbook definition (which we omit here) requires indistinguishability of PRF output from output of a random function which $F_K$ does not provide. However, $F_K$ can trivially be converted into a PRF. If $H_\lambda$ is a family of pairwise independent hash functions, and $h \xleftarrow{\$} H_\lambda$, then $\hat{F}_K(\cdot) = h(F_K(\cdot))$ is a PRF by a standard argument of the leftover hash lemma [21]. We will use the same argument later for our techniques and thus concentrate only on the pseudo-randomness property of Definition 1.

**Definition 2 (OPRF).** Let $F_K$ be a pseudo-random function family. An OPRF is a 2-party protocol between a sender and a receiver realizing the following ideal functionality. A trusted third party receives a key $K \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ from the sender and input $x \in \{0,1\}^\ell$ from the receiver and sends $F_K(x)$ to the receiver.

**Construction 2 (OPRF$_K(x)$ from [13]).** During initialization, sender $S$ chooses key $K = (\alpha_0, \ldots, \alpha_\ell)$ by randomly sampling $\ell + 1$ scalars $\alpha_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. To evaluate receiver $R$’s input $x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell)$, parties perform the following steps.

1. $S$ randomly selects $(r_1, \ldots, r_\ell), r_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$.
2. $S$ and $R$ engage in $\ell$ rounds of $\binom{\ell}{2}$-OT. In round $i$, the server’s input to OT is $(r_i, r_i \cdot \alpha_i)$, and the receiver’s input is $x_i$. So, depending on $x_i$, the receiver gets either $z_i = r_i$ or $z_i = r_i \cdot \alpha_i$. 
3. \( S \) sends \( \hat{y} = g^{\prod_{i=1}^N z_i} \) to \( R \), and \( R \) outputs \( \text{OPRF}_K(x) = \hat{y}^{\prod_{i=1}^N z_i} \).

Freedman et al. \cite{18} present a proof sketch for Construction \cite{2}. Effectively, this OPRF assembles the Naor and Reingold function \( F_K \) on input \( x \) in \( \ell \) rounds. If the DDH assumptions holds, and the underlying OT is secure and does not simultaneously leak \( r_i \) and \( r_i \cdot \alpha_i \), Construction \cite{2} is an OPRF (semi-honest model).

### 3 iPRF and \( \text{iOPRF} \) Definition

In this paper we introduce the notion of iterative pseudo-random functions (iPRF) and iterated oblivious pseudo-random functions (iOPRF).

Informally, an iPRF is a keyed function with bit strings \( x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell) \) of length \( \ell \) as input. It outputs \( \ell \) bit strings \( v_i \), each of length \( \lambda \). Besides that each \( v_i \) is indistinguishable from a randomly chosen bit string, the crucial property which we target is that, for two bit strings \( x \) and \( x' \) sharing the same length \( k \) bit prefix, the first \( k \) outputs \( (v_1, \ldots, v_k) \) of iPRF will be the same.

Similar to OPRFs, an iOPRF is a two party protocol, where a receiver gets iPRF\(_K(x)\) for their input \( x \), and the sender with input key \( K \) does not learn \( x \). However, unlike standard OPRFs, iOPRFs run in \( \ell \) rounds as required by the application scenarios we consider. In round \( i \), the receiver adaptively inputs \( x_i \) such that eventually they receive all \( \ell \) outputs from iPRF\(_K(x)\), where \( x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell) \) is as specified during the \( \ell \) rounds.

#### 3.1 iPRF

**Definition 3 (iPRF).** For inputs \( x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell) \in \{0,1\}^\ell \) and randomly chosen keys \( K = (K_1, \ldots, K_\ell) \in \{0,1\}^{\ell \cdot \lambda} \), an iterative pseudo-random function family iPRF\(_K(x)\) is a sequence of mutually independent random families

\[
iPRF_K(x) = (f_{K_1}^0(x_1), \ldots, f_{K_\ell}^0(x_1 \ldots x_\ell)),
\]

where each \( f_{K_1, \ldots, K_\ell}^i(x_1 \ldots x_i) : \{0,1\}^{i \cdot \lambda} \times \{0,1\}^i \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda \) is a pseudo-random function family with key \((K_1, \ldots, K_i)\) from \( K \) and input \((x_1 \ldots x_i)\) from \( x \). Concatenated output \( V_\lambda = v_1 || \ldots || v_\ell \), \( v_i = f_{K_1, \ldots, K_\ell}^i(x_1 \ldots x_i) \) is a family of mutually independent random variables (a probability ensemble) of bit strings of length \( \ell \cdot \lambda \).

Definition 3 implies that each probability ensemble \( v_i = \{(v_i)_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) of length \( \lambda \) bit strings is computationally indistinguishable from an ensemble \( u_i \) describing uniformly random bit strings of length \( \lambda \). However, probability ensemble \( V_\lambda = v_1 || \ldots || v_\ell \) is not indistinguishable from an ensemble of uniformly random bit strings of length \( \lambda \cdot \ell \). Instead, if any two inputs \( x \) and \( x' \) share the same prefix of length \( i \), then the first \( i \) outputs \( (v_1, \ldots, v_i) \) of iPRF\(_K(x)\) will equal those of iPRF\(_K(x')\). Mutual independence means that \( v_i \) does not depend on (combinations of) other \( v_{i \neq j} \).

Besides being PRFs, we do not require anything else from underlying functions \( f^i \). Note that, in general, PRFs do not need to be length-preserving \cite{19}. 

Simple Constructions Observe that the hashed Naor and Reingold PRF \( F \) from Construction 1 is not an iPRF and cannot easily be converted into an iPRF. First, to support \( \lambda \cdot \ell \) outputs, \( \lambda \) for each input bit \( x_i \), one might try and create an iPRF out of \( \hat{F}_K(x_1, \ldots, x_{\ell}) \), where \( K_1 = \alpha_1, \ldots, K_\ell = \alpha_\ell \). However, this is in fact not an iPRF, as exemplified by inputs like \( x = (10 \ldots 0) \). There, we have \( \hat{F}_K(1) = \hat{F}_{K_1,0}(10) = \ldots = \hat{F}_{K_\ell,0}(10 \ldots 0) \), so the output repeats starting from the 2\textsuperscript{nd} invocation of \( \hat{F}_K \). In general, for any input \( x = \text{PREFIX}||0\ldots0 \) ending with a sequence of zeros, \( \hat{F}_K(x) \) will be equal to \( \hat{F}_K(\text{PREFIX}) \) violating mutual independence of the \( v_i \) in Definition 3.

Many simple construction from symmetric key PRFs for an iPRF could be based on variable input length PRFs such as HMAC and a collision resistant hash function \( H \). For example, consider \( \text{iPRF}_K(x) = (\text{HMAC}_{H(K_1)}(x_1), \ldots, \text{HMAC}_{H(K_\ell)}(x_1 \ldots x_\ell)) \). While this and other variations and adoptions of standard symmetric key PRF-based set-ups (also PRG-based PRFs [20]) might result in valid iPRFs, we dismiss them in favor of our new Construction 3 (Section 4), as it offers several advantages. First, it builds on the Naor and Reingold pseudo-randomness, so we can prove malicious security by an elegant, formal reduction from DDH to the iPRF property. More importantly, its key advantage is that you can use it as a building block to construct an efficient iOPRF which also supports delegation and verifiability. As we will see, the iOPRF offers malicious security with highly efficient, practical ZK proofs, i.e., without reverting to reductions of expensive general ZK proofs.

3.2 iOPRF

Definition 4 (\( \pi_{\text{iOPRF}} \)). Let \( \text{iPRF}_K \) be an iterative pseudo-random function family. An iterative oblivious pseudo-random function is an \( \ell \)-round probabilistic protocol \( \pi_{\text{iOPRF}} \) between a sender \( S \) with input key \( K \in \{0,1\}^{\lambda \cdot \ell} \) and receiver \( R \) with input bit string \( x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell) \in \{0,1\}^\ell \) with the following properties.

1. Protocol \( \pi_{\text{iOPRF}} \) realizes the ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{iOPRF}} \) shown in Figure 2. This is a reactive functionality allowing queries from \( R \) in a total of \( \ell \) rounds. After \( \ell \) rounds, \( R \) has received \( v_1, \ldots, v_\ell = \text{iPRF}_K(x), |v_i| = \lambda \) from a trusted third party TTP. Sender \( S \) sends \( K_1 \) in round 1, but receives nothing from \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{iOPRF}} \). We denote receiver \( R \)'s output \( v_1, \ldots, v_\ell \) by \( \text{iOPRF}_K(x) \).

2. For all adversaries \( A \) in the real world, there exists a simulator \( \text{Sim}_R \) in the ideal world such that \( R \)'s view \( \text{REAL}_{\pi_{\text{iOPRF}},A}(x, K) \) in the real world is computationally indistinguishable from \( R \)'s view \( \text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}_{\text{iOPRF}},\text{Sim}_R(x)}(x, K) \) in the ideal world.

```plaintext
// Let iPRF be an iterative pseudo-random function family
1 for i = 1 to \ell do
2 \hspace{1em} R \rightarrow TTP : x_i;
3 \hspace{1em} S \rightarrow TTP : K_i; // K = (K_1, \ldots, K_\ell)
4 \hspace{1em} TTP \rightarrow R : v_i such that (v_1, \ldots, v_\ell) = iPRF_K(x_1 \ldots x_\ell);
5 end

Fig. 1. Ideal Functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{iOPRF}} \)
3. For all adversaries $A$ in the real world, there exists a simulator $\text{Sim}_S$ in the ideal world such that $S$’s view $\text{REAL}_{\pi_{\text{OPRF},A,S}}(K)$ in the real world is computationally indistinguishable from $S$’s view $\text{IDEAL}_{F_{\text{OPRF,Sim}_S}}(K)$ in the ideal world.

The crucial difference of iOPRFs in contrast to regular OPRFs is that at the end of the protocol execution, $R$ has received not one but $\ell$ PRF values $v_i$ with $(v_1, \ldots, v_\ell) = \text{iPRF}_K(x)$. For two inputs $x$ and $x'$ with the same length $i$ bit prefix, values $v_1, \ldots, v_i$ will be the same. Note that receiver $R$ can specify their input adaptively during $\ell$ rounds. Before sending $x_i$, $R$ has learned $v_{i-1}$ from $F_{\text{OPRF}}$. Still, $R$ receives output strings matching an iPRF, so they cannot combine outputs from different iOPRF executions with different input. For example, knowledge of $\text{iOPRF}_K(10 \ldots)$ and $\text{iOPRF}_K(01 \ldots)$ should not allow $R$ to learn anything about $\text{iOPRF}_K(11 \ldots)$. Against a fully-malicious $R$, this cannot be accomplished easily with regular OPRFs. One might try and run $\ell$ instances of the OPRF, but the challenge is that one would have to force $R$ to link their input during the $i^{th}$ instance of the OPRF to the $(i-1)^{th}$ instance. Our iOPRF in Section §5 offers a solution to this challenge.

**Verifiability** An important aspect of OPRFs which we also require for iOPRFs is that of verifiability, see Jarecki et al. [28] for technical details. Essentially, verifiability implies that $S$ proves to $R$ that $R$’s output $(v_1, \ldots, v_\ell)$ has been computed correctly. Towards providing malicious security, verifiability is especially important when the iOPRF is run multiple times, as $S$ could cheat by using different keys for different protocol runs. We refer to [28] for a treatment with more formal definitions in the context of OPRFs which also hold for iOPRFs. For our constructions, we will prove that $R$’s output has been correctly computed by using a key which $S$ has been committed to before.

Observe that the original Freedman et al. [18] OPRF (Construction 1) is not maliciously secure and thus does not offer verifiability. Even if OT as a building block would be secure against a malicious adversary, it is unclear how to verify that the sender has used the same key $K$ for different OPRF protocol runs.

**Efficiency** The last crucial property we require is that iOPRFs are efficient with respect to their communication and computational complexity. Efficiency is important in practice, as a client can perform $q \geq 1$ queries to decrypt $q$ paths in the owner’s data structure. For each query, after all $\ell$ rounds, an iOPRF has output $\ell$ bit strings of length security parameter, so the data exchanged between $S$ and $R$ and the number of computations involved to realize the iOPRF should be linear in $\ell$. Communication and computational complexities of an iOPRF are asymptotically optimal if, after any $q$ queries, they are both in $O(q \cdot \ell)$. Our main contribution (Construction 5) has optimal communication and computational complexities.

### 3.3 Delegation for iPRFs and iOPRFs

Informally, a PRF $F$ with domain $D$ is delegatable, if for some subset $D' \subset D$ you can (efficiently) compute a sub-key $K'$ from key $K$ and another PRF $F'$ from $F$, such that $F'_K(x)$ equals $F_K$ on all $x \in D'$, but is random everywhere else. There exists a rich theory on delegatable PRFs, see Kiayias et al. [31] for details.

In the context of iPRFs, we are particularly interested in delegating iterative PRF computation for strings $x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell)$ sharing the same fixed prefix. That is, a party $P_1$
knowing key $K$ specifies a prefix $x^* = (x_1^* \ldots x_i^*)$, computes $K'$ and $iPRF'$, and gives $(iPRF', K')$ to party $P_2$. Party $P_2$ is then capable of computing $iPRF_K(x)$ for all bit strings $x$ having the same prefix $x^*$. At the same time, for all bit strings $x$ with a different prefix than $x^*$, $K'$ does not help $P_2$ in distinguishing the first $i$ outputs of $iPRF_K(x)$ from the output of random bit strings. We formalize this intuition in Definition 5.

**Definition 5.** Let $iPRF$ be an iterative pseudo-random function on length $\ell$ bit input strings with random key $K$. We call an $iPRF$ delegatable, iff

1. There exists a PPT transformation algorithm $T$, which on input $(iPRF, K, x_1^* \ldots x_i^*)$ outputs $(iPRF', K')$, where $iPRF' : \{0, 1\}^{\lambda(\ell - i)} \times \{0, 1\}^{\ell - i} \to \{0, 1\}^{\lambda(\ell - i)}$ and
   \[ \forall x' = (x_1^* \ldots x_{\ell-i}^*) : iPRF'_K(x') = \text{SUFFIX}_{\ell-i}(iPRF_K(x_1^* \ldots x_i^* \ldots x_{\ell-i}^*)). \]
   Here, $\text{SUFFIX}_{\ell-i}(\cdot \cdot \cdot)$ denotes the last $\ell - i$ PRF outputs, each of length $\lambda$ bit, of $iPRF_K(\cdot \cdot \cdot)$.

2. For all PPT distinguishers $D$ and randomly chosen $K$, there exists a negligible function $\epsilon$ such that for sufficiently large $\lambda$ we have
   \[ \forall x^* = (x_1^* \ldots x_i^*), \forall x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell), x_1 \ldots x_i \neq x_1^* \ldots x_i^* : \]
   \[ |Pr[(v_1, \ldots, v_\ell) = iPRF_K(x) : D(1^\lambda, iPRF', K', x, v_1, \ldots, v_\ell) = 1]| = \epsilon(\lambda), \]
   where $U_\lambda$ is the probability ensemble of random bit strings of length $\lambda$, $K$ is a randomly chosen key for $iPRF$, and $(iPRF', K')$ are output by $T(iPRF, K, x_1^* \ldots x_i^*)$.

A delegatable $iOPRF$ is an $iOPRF$ where the underlying $iPRF$ supports delegation.

**Discussion**  Note that knowledge of $K'$ and the first $i$ values of the output $(v_1, \ldots, v_\ell)$ of $iPRF_K(x)$ does permit $P_2$ to enumerate all suffixes of strings $x$ which share the same length $i$ prefix as $x$. At first, this property might look like a severe restriction to the value of this type of delegation, but we will show in Section 5 that it has very interesting real-world applications.

We implicitly require delegation non-triviality (bandwidth efficiency 31). For example, $P_1$ could delegate the capability to evaluate strings with prefix $x^*$ by computing $iPRF_K(x)$ for all strings $x$ with prefix $x^*$ and sending the output to $P_2$. Tuple $(iPRF', K')$ should be smaller in size than the concatenation of all strings with prefix $x^*$.

Finally, we point out that delegation can be extended from $iPRFs$ to $iOPRFs$ in the natural way. If $P_1$ gives $(iPRF', K')$ to $P_2$, then $P_2$ is also able to run a 2-party protocol with another party $P_3$, where $P_3$ correctly receives $iOPRF_K(x') = iPRF'_K(x')$ for input $x'$ with prefix $x^*$ while $P_2$ learns nothing about $x'$.

4 New iPRF Construction

We present our new constructions for both $iPRF$ and $iOPRF$ (Section 5). To ease readability, we omit an important technicality in the description and proofs: our $iPRF$ and $iOPRF$ constructions do not output sequences of pseudo-random bit strings of length $\lambda$, but pseudo-random elements of DDH group $G$. Yet, converting elements to bit strings
follows from a standard application of the leftover hash lemma \[21\]. As \(|p| \geq \lambda\), we have \(|G| \geq 2^\lambda\), and we silently assume in the following that each party implicitly hashes the output of \(\text{iPRF}\) and \(\text{iOPRF}\) using any pairwise independent family of hash functions.

**Construction 3 (Our iPRF).** For any \(\ell \in \mathbb{N}\), choose a random generator \(g\) and a key \(K = (K_1, \ldots, K_\ell)\) by sampling \(\ell\) pairs of random scalars \(K_i = (\alpha_i, \beta_i) \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p)^2\). For any \(\ell\) bit input \(x = x_1 \ldots x_\ell\), we define function family \(\text{iPRF}_K(x_1, \ldots, x_\ell) = (f^1(\alpha_1, \beta_1)(x_1), \ldots, f^\ell(\alpha_\ell, \beta_\ell)(x_1, \ldots, x_\ell))\), where

\[
f^i_{(\alpha_i, \beta_i), \ldots, (\alpha, \beta_i)}(x_1 \ldots x_\ell) \text{ def } g^{\prod_{x_i=1} \alpha_i \prod_{x_i=0} \beta_i} = g^{\prod_{j=1} x_i^j (1-x_i)^j}.
\]

We can rewrite expression \(g^{\prod_{j=1} x_i^j (1-x_i)^j}\) as \(g^{\prod_{j=1} x_i (1-x_i) + \beta_j (1-x_j)}\). This representation of \(f^i\) will be very useful during the presentation of our new techniques later.

### 4.1 iPRF Analysis

To show that Construction\(^3\) is actually an iPRF according to Definition\(^3\), it is sufficient to show that each \(f^i\) is still a pseudo-random function. Mutual independence follows directly from the construction and the random choice of each \((\alpha_i, \beta_i)\).

**Theorem 2.** If the DDH-Assumption holds, then for every \(i \leq \ell\) and for every PPT distinguisher \(D\), there exists a negligible function \(\epsilon\) such that for sufficiently large \(\lambda\)

\[
Pr[D^{f^i(\alpha_1, \beta_1), \ldots, (\alpha_i, \beta_i)}(\cdot) = 1] - Pr[D^{R^i}(\cdot) = 1] = \epsilon(\lambda),
\]

where the \((\alpha_1, \ldots, \beta_1), \ldots, (\alpha_i, \beta_i)\) are chosen randomly as in Construction\(^3\) and \(R^i\) is a randomly chosen function from the set of functions with domain \(\{0, 1\}^i\) and image \(\mathbb{G}\).

**Proof.** This follows because \(f^i\) is essentially taking the output from the PRF in Construction\(^1\) and adding additionally adding extra random exponents, which maintains its character as a PRF. We can show this via reduction.

First, fix any \(i \leq \ell\) and consider \(f^i\). We prove the claim by reduction, showing that if \(D\) exists which can distinguish between \(f^i\) and a random function \(R^i\), then we can build \(D'\) which can distinguish between \(F_K\) from Construction\(^1\) (on \(i\) bit inputs and \(i\) element keys) and a random function \(R\) (on \(i\) bit inputs). This would violate \(F_K\)’s pseudo-random output property of Definition\(^1\).

Assume that \(D\) exists that can violate the inequality from Theorem\(^2\). We create \(D'\) as follows. First, \(D'\) creates and stores a uniformly random sequence \((\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_\ell)\) as in Construction\(^5\). Additionally, it queries its oracle for \(g' = \text{PRF}(0)\) which is \(g^{\infty}\) if it is interacting with the real instance. This will be given to \(D\) as \(\text{PRF}(0)\). \(D'\) can use results from its oracle, which will always include \(\alpha_0\), to satisfy queries from \(D\). \(D'\) then runs \(D\) as a subroutine. Each time \(D\) queries the oracle for an evaluation on input \(y \in \{0, 1\}^i\), \(D'\) does the following:
1. Query their own oracle on input $y$ and receive back $z$.
2. Calculate $z' = z \prod_{k=0}^{\beta} \alpha_i$.
3. Return $z'$ to $D$.

Eventually, $D'$ outputs the same as $D$. If $D'$ is interacting with PRF $F_K$, then the $z'$ values $D'$ gives to $D$ will be identical to function $f'$, due to $D'$ being able to multiply in the extra $\beta$ components. If $D'$ is interacting with a real random function, then the responses they give to $D$ will be distributed identically to a random function, since $z$ is the result of a random function and $D'$ is raising it to fixed powers. Therefore, if $D$ has a distinguishing advantage, so will $D'$. $D'$ has the same advantage that $D$ does, rendering the reduction tight.

### 4.2 Delegation

We achieve delegation for Construction $3$ using the following transformation algorithm $T$.

On input: $(g, ((\alpha_1, \beta_1), \ldots, (\alpha_\ell, \beta_\ell)), x^*_1 \ldots x^*_\ell)$,

$T$ outputs: $(g', ((\alpha_{i+1}, \beta_{i+1}), \ldots, (\alpha_\ell, \beta_\ell)))$, where $g' = g \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \alpha_i^{x^*_i} \beta_i^{1-x^*_i}$.

Observe that $g'$ is effectively a precomputed partial-iPRF for input $(x^*_1 \ldots x^*_\ell)$. So, if party $P_1$ sends $(g', ((\alpha_{i+1}, \beta_{i+1}), \ldots, (\alpha_\ell, \beta_\ell)))$ to $P_2$, $P_2$ can then compute iPRF outputs $(v_{i+1}, \ldots, v_\ell)$ for any input string $x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell)$ which has $(x^*_1 \ldots x^*_\ell)$ as a prefix by computing $v_k = g \prod_{j=i+1}^{\ell} \alpha_j^{x^*_j} \beta_j^{1-x^*_j}$.

**Lemma 1.** Construction $3$ with transformation $T$ is a delegatable iPRF.

**Proof.** We prove this by straightforward reduction. Let $\text{iPRF}_K$ be Construction $3$ for inputs $x$ of length $\ell + 1$ bits, and let $\text{iPRF}_K^*$ be Construction $3$ for inputs $x$ of length $\ell$ bits. Let prefix $x^*$ be any length $\ell$ bit string, and $K$ and $K^*$ are randomly chosen keys.

Assume there exists distinguisher $D$ which can distinguish the first $\ell$ outputs from $\text{iPRF}_K$ with a prefix different from $x^*$ with non-negligible probability from $\ell$ random bit strings.

We build distinguisher $D'$ who will be able to distinguish the $\ell$ outputs from $\text{iPRF}_K^*$ from $\ell$ randomly chosen bit strings.

1. If $D$ queries for delegation of length $\ell$ prefix $x^*$, $D'$ will query their challenger for $x^*$ and will get back $z$ which is either $(v_1, \ldots, v_\ell) = \text{iPRF}_K(x^*)$ or $\ell$ random bit strings $(r_1, \ldots, r_\ell)$.
2. $D'$ generates a random pair $(\alpha_{\ell+1}, \beta_{\ell+1}) \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p)^2$. It computes transformation $(g' = z, (\alpha_{\ell+1}, \beta_{\ell+1}))$ and sends it to $D$.
3. When $D$ queries for $x$ with a different prefix than $x^*$, $D$ forwards $x$ to their challenger, forwards the response to $D$ and outputs whatever $D$ outputs.
If \( D' \) is receiving the output of a \( \widehat{\iPRF}^{K} \), then the values it gives to \( D \) will be identically distributed to correct outputs of a delegated \( \iPRF \), with the effective key of \( K \) concatenated with the random \((\alpha_{\ell+1}, \beta_{\ell+1})\). If \( D' \) is receiving random strings \((r_1, \ldots, r_\ell)\), then \( D \) is also getting random strings. Therefore, \( D \)'s view is distributed identically to its distinguishing game. If \( D' \) has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing, then \( D' \) will have the same advantage in distinguishing \( \iPRF \) output from random strings.

4.3 Warm-up: simple \( \iOPRF \) with One-Sided Security

Our \( \iPRF \) from Construction 3 can be computed as an \( \iOPRF \) with only one-sided security, i.e., malicious receiver or semi-honest (or malicious, but only focusing on violating privacy) sender, using a similar approach as the \( \iOPRF \) by Freedman et al. (Construction 2). Let \( \OT(b, y_0, y_1) \) denote any \( (2^1) \) oblivious transfer protocol which is one-sided simulatable or even maliciously secure. Sender \( S \) holds \( y_0 \) and \( y_1 \) from \( \mathbb{Z}_p \), receiver \( R \) holds \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), and \( R \) obliviously retrieves \( y_b \) from \( S \). Let \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_\ell) \) be \( R \)'s input. Our first OT-based construction for a \( \pi \iOPRF \) protocol gives an \( \iOPRF \) with one-sided security and works as follows.

Construction 4 (One-Sided Secure \( \iOPRF \)).

- \( S \) generates \( \ell \) random scalars \( r_i \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathbb{Z}_p \).
- For each \( 1 \leq i \leq \ell \), \( R \) and \( S \) execute \( \OT(x_i, r_i, r_i, r_i) \), \( R \) stores the result as \( z_i \).
- \( S \) sends to \( R \) the sequence \( C = (C_1, \ldots, C_\ell) \) where \( C_i = g^{\prod_{j=1}^{\ell} z_j} \).
- \( R \) recovers \( \iPRF \) output sequence \( (v_1, \ldots, v_\ell) \) by calculating \( v_i = C_i^{\prod_{j=1}^{\ell} z_j} \).

**Correctness:** For all \( 1 \leq i \leq \ell \), we have

\[
v_i = C_i^{\prod_{j=1}^{\ell} z_j} = g^{\prod_{j=1}^{\ell} r_j \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} z_j} = g^{\prod_{j=1}^{\ell} (r_j r_j)^{1-x_j}} = g^{\prod_{j=1}^{\ell} (\alpha_j r_j)^{1-x_j}} \cdot (\beta_j r_j)^{1-x_j} \cdot x_j \quad (1)
\]

To prove security for Construction 4, we could make a similar argument as Freedman et al. [18], but rely on a one-sided simulatable OT. However, we refrain from presenting more details, as this \( \iOPRF \) anyways provides only one-sided security and conversion to malicious security would be difficult. One would need to prove correct computation of the \( C_i \) and expensive maliciously secure OT with ZK proofs that the sender’s input \((r_i, r_i, r_i)\) matches previous commitments to \( \alpha_i \) and \( \beta_i \). This is very different from standard committed or verifiable OT [15, 27, 32].

5 Construction 5: DH-based \( \iOPRF \)

We now present a new \( \pi \iOPRF \) protocol which realizes the ideal \( \iOPRF \) functionality \( F_{\iOPRF} \) from Figure 1.
We now describe details of Construction 5 by its formal π, i.e., first its initialization and then its iterative processing.

Elgamal Encryption We will use additive Elgamal encryption with private keys \( sk \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) and public keys \( pk = g_1^{sk} \). Ciphertext \( c \) to encrypt \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) is \( c = (c[0], c[1]) = (g_1^r, pk^x \cdot g_2^m) \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(m) \), where \( r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \).

Pedersen Commitments A Pedersen commitment \( \text{com}(m) \in G \) to message \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) is defined as \( \text{com}(m) = g_1^m \cdot g_2^m \), where \( r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \). To open \( \text{com}(m) \), reveal tuple \( (m, r) \). Pedersen commitments are perfectly hiding and computationally binding.

5.2 High-Level Intuition

In round \( i \) of \( \ell \) rounds, sender \( S \) will receive two ciphertexts \( V_i \) and \( D_i \) from receiver \( R \). During the course of the protocol, one of these ciphertexts will contain the iOPRF output and one acts as a “dummy”, to keep \( S \) from learning input bits \( x_i \) of \( R \). They are interchanged between rounds depending on the input bits.

For each round, using the \( i \)th round’s keys \((\alpha_i, \beta_i)\), \( S \) will then “apply” \( \alpha_i \) to \( V_i \) and \( \beta_i \) to \( D_i \), and send the results back to \( R \). In preparation for the next round \((i + 1)\), if \( x_{i+1} \neq x_i \), \( R \) will swap \( V_i \) and \( D_i \) for the next round. After \( \ell \) rounds, \( V_\ell \) will have the keys applied which correspond to the input bits of \( R \), and \( D_\ell \) will have the complementary combination of keys applied. \( V_0 \) is initialized as an encryption of 1, so \( V_\ell \) will contain the correct iOPRF output, whereas \( D_0 \) is initialized as an encryption of 0 so it will not contain any information.

5.3 Technical Details

For some input string \( x \equiv (x_1 \ldots x_\ell) \), we define the output of \( \pi_{\text{iOPRF}} \) for the receiver as \( (v_1, \ldots, v_\ell) = \text{iOPRF}_R(x) \) with \( v_\ell = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} (\alpha_i x_j + \beta_j (1-x_j)) \) and \( K = \{(\alpha_i, \beta_i)\}_{i=1}^{\ell} \).

We now describe details of Construction 5 by its formal \( \pi_{\text{iOPRF}} \) interface (Definition 4), i.e., first its initialization and then its iterative processing.

\( \pi_{\text{iOPRF}} \) Initialization Sender \( S \) randomly chooses secret key \( K = ((\alpha_1, \beta_1), \ldots, (\alpha_\ell, \beta_\ell)) \), \( (\alpha_i, \beta_i) \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2 \).

\( S \) also commits to \( K \) by computing \( 2\ell \) Pedersen commitments \( \text{com}(\alpha_i), \text{com}(\beta_i) \). \( S \) sends them to \( R \) and proves knowledge of plaintexts in ZK (see §6.3).

Receiver \( R \) computes a random Elgamal private key \( sk \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \) and public key \( pk = g_1^{sk} \), and sends \( pk \) to \( S \). Receiver \( R \) proves knowledge of \( sk \) using a standard Schnorr ZK proof of knowledge (see §6.3).

Receiver \( R \) computes \( V_0 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(1) \) and \( D_0 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(0) \), sends them to \( S \) and proves that these are encryptions of 1 and 0 (see §6.3 below).
Iterative Processing in $\ell$ Rounds

In round $i \in \{1, \ldots, \ell\}$, for $S$’ input bit $x_i$:

1. **Receiver shuffles:**
   
   (a) For input bit $x_i$, $R$ computes Pedersen commitment $\text{com}(x_i)$ and proves that $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$ (see §6.3). Similarly, $R$ computes $\text{com}(1 - x_i)$ and proves that $(1 - x_i) \in \{0, 1\}$ (see §6.3). Finally, $R$ proves that the sum of plaintexts behind $\text{com}(x_i)$ and $\text{com}(1 - x_i)$ equals 1 (see §6.3).

   (b) Receiver $R$ chooses $r, r', r'', r''' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and computes Elgamal ciphertexts
   
   
   $$
   c_i = (g_1^i \cdot V_{i-1}[0]^{x_i}, pk^r \cdot V_{i-1}[1]^{x_i})
   $$
   $$
   c'_i = (g_1^i \cdot V_{i-1}[0]^{1-x_i}, pk^{r'} \cdot V_{i-1}[1]^{1-x_i})
   $$
   $$
   d_i = (g_1^{r''} \cdot D_{i-1}[0]^{x_i}, pk^{r''} \cdot D_{i-1}[1]^{x_i})
   $$
   $$
   d'_i = (g_1^{r'''} \cdot D_{i-1}[0]^{1-x_i}, pk^{r'''} \cdot D_{i-1}[1]^{1-x_i})
   $$
   
   and sends $(c_i, c'_i, d_i, d'_i)$ to $S$.

   (c) Receiver $R$ proves correctness of the above computations in ZK. Specifically, $(c_i, c'_i, d_i, d'_i)$ result from correct exponentiation with $x_i$ (or $1 - x_i$) from $\text{com}(x_i)$ (or $\text{com}(1 - x_i)$), and multiplication with a random power of $g_1$ and $pk$, i.e., re-randomization (homomorphic addition of encryption of 0). See §6.3 below for details. Both parties compute

   $$
   T_i = (c_i[0] \cdot d'_i[0], c_i[1] \cdot d'_i[1])
   $$
   $$
   U_i = (c'_i[0] \cdot d_i[0], c'_i[1] \cdot d_i[1]).
   $$

   In the first round, after this step, $T_1$ is an encryption of 1 and $U_1$ is an encryption of 0 if $x_1 = 1$. If $x_1 = 0$, then $T_1$ is an encryption of 0 and $U_1$ is an encryption of 1. However, sender $S$ does not know which of the two is the case.

2. **Sender computes PRF:** For $r, r' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, $S$ computes the two Elgamal ciphertexts

   $$
   X_i = (g_1^i \cdot T_i[0]^{\alpha_i}, pk^{r'} \cdot T_i[1]^{\alpha_i})
   $$
   $$
   Y_i = (g_1^{r''} \cdot U_i[0]^{\beta_i}, pk^{r''} \cdot U_i[1]^{\beta_i}),
   $$

   sends $(X_i, Y_i)$ to $R$, and proves correct exponentiation (scalar multiplication of plaintexts) with $\alpha_i$ and $\beta_i$ coming from previous commitments $\text{com}(\alpha_i), \text{com}(\beta_i)$ and re-randomization of ciphertexts (see §6.3).

3. **Receiver shuffles back:** For $r, r', r'', r''' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, $R$ computes

   $$
   P_i = (g_1^i \cdot X_i[0]^{x_i}, pk^{r'} \cdot X_i[1]^{x_i})
   $$
   $$
   P'_i = (g_1^{r''} \cdot X_i[0]^{1-x_i}, pk^{r''} \cdot X_i[1]^{1-x_i})
   $$
   $$
   Q_i = (g_1^{r'''} \cdot Y_i[0]^{x_i}, pk^{r'''} \cdot Y_i[1]^{x_i})
   $$
   $$
   Q'_i = (g_1^{r''''} \cdot Y_i[0]^{1-x_i}, pk^{r''''} \cdot Y_i[1]^{1-x_i})
   $$

   and sends $(P_i, P'_i, Q_i, Q'_i)$ together with ZK proofs of correct computation (see §6.3) to $S$. 

\[\pi_{\text{OPRF}}\]
Both $S$ and $R$ compute $V_i = (P_i[0] \cdot Q'_i[0], P_i[1] \cdot Q'_i[1])$ and $D_i = (P'_i[0] \cdot Q_i[0], P'_i[1] \cdot Q_i[1])$.

In round $i$, after this step, $V_i$ is an encryption of $i\text{PRF}_K(x_1, \ldots, x_i)$, and $U_i$ is an encryption of 0. When computing $T_{i+1}$ and $U_{i+1}$, these values will be used instead of the encryptions of 0 and 1 and the iterative computation of the PRF continues.

Since both parties compute $V_i$ and $U_i$, $R$ cannot cheat and substitute for a value of his choice.

4. Receiver $R$ computes and outputs one iPRF value $v_i = V_i[1]/V_i[0]$.

**Discussion** Observe that, in the last step, $R$ can never decrypt additively homomorphic Elgamal ciphertext $(V_i[0], V_i[1])$ and thus compute an $\alpha_i$ or $\beta_i$. As $\alpha_i$ or $\beta_i$ are in the exponent and due to the hardness DLOG, $R$ can only compute $v_i = g^{2^{\alpha_i}}$ or $v_i = g^{2^{\beta_i}}$. If $R$ wants to run several executions of Construction 5 and wants that $S$ uses the same key, then $R$ will verify that commitments sent by $S$ during initialization do not change between executions. This leads to verifiability. Also note that communication complexity and computational complexity are both in $O(\ell)$ per query, i.e., asymptotically optimal.

6 Security Analysis

We prove security of Construction 5 using simulation in the standard model. The simulation uses several efficient Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge hybrids introduced first. To ease readability, we actually present Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (HVZK) versions of the proofs, but one can convert these to maliciously verifier Zero-Knowledge proofs of knowledge using the following two general transformations [23]. We stress that we have evaluated and benchmarked the full malicious verifier ZK proofs of knowledge in Section 7, i.e., including the two transformations.

6.1 Zero Knowledge (instead of HVZK)

All our efficient ZK proofs below are three-move (“Sigma”) ZK proofs. Recall that a three-move ZK proof comprises messages $(t, e, s)$, where first message $t$ is a commitment from $P$ sent to $V$, $e$ is $V$’s challenge sent to $P$, and $s$ is the final message sent from $P$ to $V$.

To make these proofs zero-knowledge instead of only HVZK, we send an additional message before first message $t$ of the regular three-move proof. In this new first message, $V$ sends a Pedersen commitment $\text{com}(e) = g_1^e \cdot g_2^s$ to their random challenge $e$ to $V$. The proof continues with $V$ sending their regular commitment $t$ of the regular three-move proof and $V$ opening $\text{com}(e)$ by sending $(e, r)$. If $\text{com}(e)$ matches $(e, r)$, $P$ finally sends last message $s$ of the regular proof. Verifier $V$ accepts, if $t$ and $s$ of the regular proof match $e$.

This technique allows a simulator $\text{Sim}$ simulating $P$ to cheat in the ZK proof. More specifically, after receiving $\text{com}(e)$, $\text{Sim}$ internally computes a valid ZK proof $(t', e', s')$, assuming a random challenge $e'$. $\text{Sim}$ sends $t'$ to $V$ and receives $(e, r)$. If $(e, r)$ matches $\text{com}(e)$, $\text{Sim}$ rewinds $V$ to the point after $V$ has sent $\text{com}(e)$. Knowing $e$, $\text{Sim}$
computes a \( t \) and \( s \), such that \((t, e, s)\) will be accepted by \( V \). How exactly \( t \) and \( s \) are chosen depends on the statement we want to prove, but are typically straightforward for the Schnorr-style proofs we use below. We show an example in §6.3.

6.2 Witness Extraction for Pedersen Commitments

To transform our ZK proofs to ZK proofs of knowledge, we rely on the extractability of commitments. Pedersen commitments are trapdoor commitments which means that a party knowing a trapdoor \( \rho \) can open a commitment \( \text{com}(\cdot) \) to any plaintext they want (equivocable). We use this property for witness extraction in three-move ZK proofs as follows.

Before starting the actual ZK proof by the first message \( t \) from the prover to the verifier, we send the following two messages.

1. Prover \( P \) sends to verifier \( V \): \( \hat{g} = g^\rho \) for random \( \rho \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p \).
2. Verifier \( V \) will use this \( \hat{g} \) instead of \( g^2 \) for the computation of the commitment to challenge \( e \). That is, \( V \) computes and sends back commitment \( \text{com}(e) = g^r \cdot \hat{g}^e \) for their random challenge \( e \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) as in the previous section.

The ZK proof then continues as usual with \( P \) sending \( t \) and \( V \) opening \( \text{com}(e) \) by sending \((e, r)\). If \((e, r)\) match \( \text{com}(e) \), \( P \) sends final message \( s \) and \( \rho \) to \( V \). Only if both is correct, the last ZK proof message \( s \) matches \( P \)'s commitment \( t \) and challenge \( e \), and \( \rho \) matches \( \hat{g} = g^\rho \), \( V \) accepts.

This setup enables a simulator \( \text{Sim} \) simulating \( V \) to extract the witness from \( P \). After receiving trapdoor \( \rho \) from \( P \), \( \text{Sim} \) rewinds \( P \) until after the point were \( P \) sends \( t \) to \( V \). Knowing trapdoor \( \rho \), \( \text{Sim} \) can open \( \text{com}(e) \) to any \( e' \neq e \) they want by solving \( r + \rho \cdot e = r' + \rho \cdot e' \) for \( r' \), i.e., they compute \( r' = r + \rho \cdot (e - e') \). Running two executions of the ZK proof with the same input and messages from \( P \) but different challenges extracts the witness of the ZK proof. Details on which \( e \) to send in each execution again depend on the exact three-move ZK proof, but are typically obvious. We refer to Hazay and Lindell [23] for more details.

In conclusion, these two transformation will render our three-move ZK proofs be- low into (fully-maliciously secure) ZK proofs of knowledge. We name each proof below with a hybrid which we will use in the main proof later. So, for example, the hybrid for the proof of encryption is called \( f^{\text{enc}}_k \).

6.3 ZK Building Blocks

Before presenting our main proof of Construction 5 we introduce the following ZK proofs that we use as building blocks.

\( f^{\text{enc}}_k \): **Proof of Encryption/Commitment to \( m \)** To prove that an encryption \( c = (c[0], c[1]) = (g^r_1, pk^r) \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(0) \) is an encryption of \( m = 0 \), \( P \) proves that \((g_1, c[0], pk, c[1]) \) is a DDH tuple. You can prove that tuple \((u_1 = g_1, u_2 = g^r_1, u_3 = g^{k \cdot r}, u_4 = g^{k \cdot r}) \) is a DDH tuple using the Chaum and Pedersen [13] protocol as follows.
1. $P$ sends $(t_1 = u_1^\rho, t_2 = u_2^\rho)$ for $\rho \gets \mathbb{Z}_p$ to $V$.
2. $V$ sends $e \gets \mathbb{Z}_p$ to $P$.
3. $P$ sends $s = \rho + e \cdot r$ to $V$.
4. $V$ accepts if $u_1^t = u_2^\rho \cdot t_1$ and $u_3^s = u_4^\rho \cdot t_2$.

This proof has an important property. Instead of showing that some ciphertext encrypts $m = 0$, we can easily generalize it to show encryption of arbitrary $m$. Specifically, we set $c'[1] = \frac{c[1]}{g_2^m}$ and run the proof with $m = 0$ for new Elgamal ciphertext $(c[0], c'[1])$.

Finally, observe that Pedersen commitments are similarly structured as the right-hand side $c[1]$ of an Elgamal ciphertext, just without the secret key. Thus, to prove a Pedersen commitment com$(m)$ to $m$, parties divide com$(m)$ by $g_2^m$ and run a Schnorr proof for $r$ used in the commitment ($P$ sends $t = g_1^\rho, V$ sends $e, P$ sends $s = \rho + e \cdot r$, and $V$ accepts if $g_1^{\frac{s}{\rho \com (m)} \cdot t}$)

$f_{zk}^{\text{pop}}$: Proof for Knowledge of Plaintext  
For $\com (m) = g_1^\rho \cdot g_2^m$, prover $P$ can prove that they know $m$.

1. $P$ sends $t = g_1^{\rho_1} \cdot g_2^{\rho_2}$ for $\rho_1, \rho_2 \gets \mathbb{Z}_p$ to $V$.
2. $V$ sends $e \gets \mathbb{Z}_p$ to $P$.
3. $P$ sends $s_1 = \rho_1 + e \cdot r$ and $s_2 = \rho_2 + e \cdot m$ to $V$.
4. $V$ checks whether $g_1^{s_1} \cdot g_2^{s_2} = \com (m)^e \cdot t$.

$f_{zk}^{\text{bit}}$: Proof of Plaintext Bit  
For a commitment com$(x_i)$, prover $P$ can prove that $x_i$ is a bit, i.e., $x_i \in \{0, 1\}$. This is an application of the one-out-of-two (OR) technique [24]. Essentially, $P$ proves that either $x_i = 1$ which implies proving that com$(x_i)$ equals $g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_2$ for some $r_1$, or $x_i = 0$ which implies proving that com$(x_i)$ equals $g_1^{x_2}$ for some $r_2$. Proving that com$(x_i)$ equals $g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_2$ is equivalent to proving that $\frac{\com (x_i)}{g_2}$ equals $g_1^{x_1}$.

$P$ will prove that they know (I) an $r$ such that $g_1^{r} = \frac{\com (x_i)}{g_2}$ or (II) an $r$ such that $g_1^{r} = \com (x_i)$. These are essentially two standard Schnorr proofs. The trick is that $P$ chooses $e_1$ and $e_2$ such that, for the verifier’s challenge $e$, we have $e = e_1 + e_2$. Prover $P$ proves knowledge of $r_1$ for (I) using challenge $e_1$ and knowledge of $r_2$ for (II) using challenge $e_2$. Thus, $P$ can choose either $e_1$ or $e_2$ before sending their first message of the ZK proof and cheat in one proof. Without loss of generality, let $x_i = 1$, so $P$ will cheat in proof (II). This works as follows.

1. $P$ sends $t_1 = g_1^{\rho_1}$ and $t_2 = \com (x_i)^{-e_2} \cdot g_2^{e_2}$, where $\rho, s_2 \gets \mathbb{Z}_p$, to $V$.
2. $V$ sends $e \gets \mathbb{Z}_p$ to $P$.
3. $P$ calculates $e_1 = e - e_2$, sends $e_1, e_2, s_1 = \rho_1 + e_1 \cdot r$, and $s_2$ to $V$.
4. $V$ checks $e = e_1 + e_2, g_1^{r_2} \frac{\com (x_i)}{g_2} = \frac{\com (x_i)}{g_2} \cdot t_1$ and $g_1^{s_2} \frac{\com (x_i)}{g_2} \cdot t_2$. 

\( f_{zk}^{\text{com}}: \text{Proof of Sum of Plaintexts equals} 1 \) For commitments \( \text{com}(x) = g_1^x \cdot g_2^x \) and \( \text{com}(1 - x) = g_1^{1-x} \cdot g_2^{1-x} \), \( P \) shows that the sum of plaintexts equals 1.

1. \( P \) and \( V \) compute \( \text{com}(1) = \text{com}(x) \cdot \text{com}(1 - x) = g_1^x \cdot g_2^x \).
2. \( P \) proves that \( \text{com}(1) \) is a commitment to 1 (see §6.3).

\( f_{zk}^{\text{ExR}}: \text{Proof of Exponentiation and Re-Encryption} \) One can efficiently prove correctness of combinations of linear operations in one step. We present the example for the correctness of exponentiation of two elements \((A, B)\) from group \( \mathbb{G} \) with a committed value \( x \) and then multiplying \( A^x \) by \( g_1^r \) and \( B^x \) by \( pk^r \) from our protocol. So, this can be used to prove correct exponentiation (homomorphic scalar multiplication) of an Elgamal ciphertext by a previously committed scalar \( x \) and subsequent re-randomization of the result (homomorphic addition of Elgamal encryption of 0).

Specifically, given two group elements \((A, B)\) and commitment \( \text{com}(x) = g_1^x \cdot g_2^x \), prove correctness that \((C = g_1^3 \cdot A^x, D = pk^r \cdot B^x)\) are the result of exponentiation with \( x \) and multiplying with \( g_1^r \) and \( pk^r \), \( r, r' \in Z_p \), known to \( P \).

1. \( P \) sends \( t_1 = g_1^{e_1} \cdot A^{e_2}, t_2 = pk^{e_1} \cdot B^{e_2}, t_3 = g_1^{e_3} \cdot g_2^{e_2} \) to \( V \).
2. \( V \) sends \( e \in Z_p \) to \( P \).
3. \( P \) sends \( s_1 = \rho_1 + e \cdot r', s_2 = \rho_2 + e \cdot x, \) and \( s_3 = \rho_3 + e \cdot r \) to \( V \).
4. \( V \) checks whether \( g_1^{e_1} \cdot A^{e_2} \cdot C^e \cdot t_1, pk^{e_1} \cdot B^{e_2} \cdot D^e \cdot t_2, \) and \( g_1^{e_3} \cdot g_2^{e_2} \cdot \text{com}(x)^e \cdot t_3 \).

**Proof of Construction**\(^{[5]}\) We now turn to our main proof, showing that Construction\(^{[5]}\) is a secure iOPRF. We prove in the hybrid model, using ZK hybrids with their abbreviations as introduced in the previous section. Recall that, in the hybrid model, ZK hybrids are run by separate trusted third parties. Yet, during simulation, it is the simulator who takes the role of the TTP and thus automatically gets the adversary’s inputs and can also cheat, see Lindell \(^{[37]}\) for details.

**Theorem 3.** Assume that Construction\(^{[3]}\) is an iterative pseudo-random function family \( \text{iPRF}_K(\cdot) \). Then, Construction\(^{[5]}\) is an iOPRF, realizing functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}} \) in the \( (f_{\text{enc}}, f_{\text{dec}}, f_{\text{pop}}, f_{\text{bit}}, f_{\text{sum}}, f_{\text{ExR}}, f_{zk}) \) hybrid-model.

**Proof.** First, observe that Construction\(^{[5]}\) is correct. Let \( x \) be the receiver’s input, and \( K \) the key chosen by the sender. If both sender and receiver are honest, then the sender outputs nothing, and the receiver outputs whatever \( A \) outputs. We will show that a simulator \( \text{Sim} \) can be constructed from both the perspective of \( S \) and \( R \) such that the adversary \( A \)’s view is indistinguishable from real executions of the protocol. Thus we show that neither a compromised \( S \) nor a compromised \( R \) learn anything from the real execution of Construction\(^{[5]}\) beyond what is specified by the ideal functionality in Figure\(^{[1]}\).

In our presentation below, we will use the term “Sim aborts” as a shorthand for Sim sending abort to the TTP, simulating its party aborting to \( A \), and then outputting whatever \( A \) outputs.
In both cases below, the simulator will faithfully act as a verifier for ZKPs when interacting with $A$ as necessary, aborting if the proof does not verify correctly. We omit these messages for readability since they require no special knowledge or behavior from the simulator. Our strategy will broadly be to:

- Replace Elgamal ciphertexts sent by $R$ with encryptions of zero (arbitrarily chosen). Due to Elgamal’s IND-CPA property, these ciphertexts will be indistinguishable from the real protocol for $A$. Since $S$ receives no output from the real execution of the protocol, ciphertexts do not have to conform to any expectations.
- Replace computation of $X_i$ and $Y_i$ by $S$ in the real protocol with an encryption of the output of the iOPRF received from the TTP. Sim does not know $K_i = (\alpha_i, \beta_i)$ and so cannot faithfully compute $X_i$ or $Y_i$, but it knows from the TTP what output $v_i$ should. Consequently, Sim crafts these values accordingly to simulate the real protocol and “cheat” in ZKPs where Sim acts as the prover (see, e.g., § 6.1).

Together, this will allow the simulator to generate a view which is indistinguishable from a real execution, thus proving that our construction is secure according to Definition 4.

Note that also for all ZKPs with Sim as a prover, Sim acts as the TTP and “cheats” to convince $A$. In many instances, Sim could honestly prove to $A$, so “cheating” is not really. Yet, for ease of exposition, we assume that all proofs are simulated this way.

**Case 1:** We assume that $A$ has compromised $S$ and build simulator Sim taking the role of $S$ in the ideal world, internally simulating a receiver to $A$ which it only has black box access to.

Sim starts $A$ and receives $2\ell$ commitments $(\text{com}(\alpha_i), \text{com}(\beta_i))$ from $A$. Sim also receives corresponding $(\alpha_i, \beta_i)$ together with random coins from $f_{\text{pop}}$ sent from $A$ to $f_{\text{pop}}$. If these do not match the commitments, Sim aborts.

Sim also generates an Elgamal key pair $(sk, pk)$, sends $pk$ to $A$, and simulates $f_{\text{enc}}$. Also, Sim generates $V_0 = \text{Enc}_{sk}(0)$ and $D_0 = \text{Enc}_{sk}(0)$, sends them to $A$, and simulates $f_{\text{enc}}$.

During the $i^{th}$ round,

1. Sim sends two independent commitments of zero and simulates $f_{\text{bit}}$ and $f_{\text{sum}}$.
2. Sim also computes and sends $(c_i, c'_i, d_i, d'_i)$, all encryptions of zero, to $A$ and simulates $f_{\text{ExR}}$.
3. Sim receives $(X_i, Y_i)$ from $A$ as well as $(\alpha_i, \beta_i)$ and random coins from $f_{\text{ExR}}$. If $\alpha_i \neq \alpha'_i$ or $\beta_i \neq \beta'_i$ or if random coins do not match computations specified in Construction 5 then Sim aborts. If they match, Sim forwards $K_i = (\alpha_i, \beta_i)$ to the TTP.
4. Sim sends $P_i, P'_i, Q_i, Q'_i$, encryptions of zero, to $A$ and simulates $f_{\text{ExR}}$.

Sim outputs what $A$ outputs. During simulation, whenever $A$ aborts, Sim also aborts.

**Indistinguishable views** In the protocol, there are three types of messages that Sim sends to $A$: Pedersen commitments, Elgamal ciphertexts, and ZKP messages. All of the Elgamal ciphertexts are freshly encrypted (or re-encrypted) using fresh randomness. They are thus indistinguishable from any other Elgamal encryption, regardless of any a
priori knowledge that \( \mathcal{A} \) might have. As stated above, the ZKPs are simulated and are thus also indistinguishable from a real execution. Finally, the commitments are perfectly hiding and are never revealed during the protocol, so they are also indistinguishable from the commitments of a real execution.

**Case 2**: We assume that \( \mathcal{A} \) has compromised \( R \) and build simulator \( \text{Sim} \) as follows.

\( \text{Sim} \) starts \( \mathcal{A} \). \( \text{Sim} \) randomly selects \( \ell \) pairs \( (\alpha'_i, \beta'_i) \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p)^2 \), commits to them, sends commitments to \( \mathcal{A} \), and proves knowledge of \( (\alpha'_i, \beta'_i) \) using \( f_{ZK}^{\text{pop}} \).

\( \text{Sim} \) receives \( pk \) from \( \mathcal{A} \) and \( (sk', pk') \) from \( f_{\text{sec}}^{\text{enc}} \) which \( \mathcal{A} \) has sent. If \( pk \neq pk' \) or \( g_i^{sk'} \neq pk \), \( \text{Sim} \) aborts. Also, \( \text{Sim} \) receives \( (V_0, D_0) \) from \( \mathcal{A} \) and \( \mathcal{A} \)'s random coins from \( f_{\text{sec}}^{\text{enc}} \). If random coins do not match encryptions of 1 (\( V_0 \)) or 0 (\( D_0 \)), \( \text{Sim} \) aborts. During the \( i \)-th round,

1. \( \text{Sim} \) receives \( (\text{com}(x_i), \text{com}(1-x_i)) \) from \( \mathcal{A} \) and \( (x_i', 1-y_i') \) with the commitments’ random coins from \( f_{\text{sec}}^{\text{enc}} \). If \( x_i' \) or \( 1-y_i' \) and random coins do not match commitments, \( \text{Sim} \) aborts. In the same way, \( \text{Sim} \) receives \( z \) and a random coin for the commitment from sum hybrid \( f_{\text{sec}}^{\text{hyb}} \). If \( z \neq 1 \) or \( z \neq x_i' + 1 - y_i' \) or the random coin does not match the commitment, \( \text{Sim} \) aborts. If everything matches, \( \text{Sim} \) knows \( \mathcal{A} \)'s input \( (x_i, 1-x_i) \).

\( \text{Sim} \) receives \( (c_i, c_i', d_i, d_i') \) from \( \mathcal{A} \) and random coins and \( (x_i', 1-y_i') \) from \( f_{\text{sec}}^{\text{ExR}} \). If \( (x_i', 1-y_i') \) do not match the ones from the previous step or if any of the computations do not match \( (c_i, c_i', d_i, d_i') \), \( \text{Sim} \) aborts.

\( \text{Sim} \) computes \( (T_i, U_i) \) as in Construction \([5]\).

2. \( \text{Sim} \) queries the TTP for \( x_i' \) and gets back \( v_i \). If \( x_i = 1 \), \( \text{Sim} \) sets \( X_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(v_i) \) and \( Y_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(0) \). If \( x_i = 0 \), \( \text{Sim} \) sets \( X_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(0) \) and \( Y_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(v_i) \). \( \text{Sim} \) sends \( (X_i, Y_i) \) to \( \mathcal{A} \) and cheats in \( f_{\text{sec}}^{\text{ExR}} \), convincing \( \mathcal{A} \) that \( (X_i, Y_i) \) are the result of raising \( T_i \) and \( U_i \) to \( \alpha_i' \) and \( \beta_i' \) and then re-encrypting.

3. Finally, \( \text{Sim} \) receives \( (P_i, P_i', Q_i, Q_i') \) from \( \mathcal{A} \) and random coins and \( (x_i', 1-y_i') \) from \( f_{\text{sec}}^{\text{ExR}} \). Again, \( \text{Sim} \) verifies correct computation of \( (P_i, P_i', Q_i, Q_i') \) and whether \( (x_i', 1-y_i') \) match previously received values. If anything does not match, \( \text{Sim} \) aborts.

\( \text{Sim} \) computes \( (V_i, D_i) \) as in Construction \([5]\).

\( \text{Sim} \) outputs what \( \mathcal{A} \) outputs. During simulation, whenever \( \mathcal{A} \) aborts, also \( \text{Sim} \) aborts.

**Indistinguishable views** As before, the commitments are perfectly hiding and are not revealed and so are indistinguishable from commitments of a real protocol execution. ZKPs are also simulated as before and are indistinguishable for the same reason.

The only part that is different in this case is the returned values of \( X_i \) and \( Y_i \), which have to decrypt to the correct output of the iOPRF in order to match the real protocol. Fortunately, \( \text{Sim} \) can query the TTP for the correct output and generate encryptions that match that output. In the real protocol, \( S \) reencrypts \( X_i \) and \( Y_i \) before returning them to \( R \), and so they are indistinguishable from the fresh encryptions generated by \( \text{Sim} \).

As \( R \) verifies whether \( S \) sends the same commitments to \( (\alpha_i, \beta_i) \) during multiple executions of Construction \([5]\), we trivially achieve verifiability.
7 Implementation

To show practicality of Construction 5 including its ZK proofs, we have implemented and benchmarked its performance in several realistic network settings. We stress that our implementation is a full implementation of Construction 5 with all Zero-Knowledge Proofs of Knowledge of Appendix 6, i.e., including witness extractability and security against fully malicious verifiers. Sender and receiver instances communicate via standard TCP sockets.

### Table 1. Cost breakdown

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ℓ</th>
<th>CPU (ms)</th>
<th>Communication (kB)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total runtime (ms)</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sender</td>
<td>Receiver</td>
<td>LAN1</td>
<td>WAN1</td>
<td>LAN1</td>
<td>WAN1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>11.7</td>
<td>26.1</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>2425</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>51.4</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>4571</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>34.6</td>
<td>76.6</td>
<td>512</td>
<td>6707</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
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<td>101.9</td>
<td>679</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>202</td>
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<td>127.1</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>248</td>
<td>69.0</td>
<td>152.4</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>13128</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Our implementation is done in C and uses OpenSSL for elliptic curve operations on NIST curve secp224r1. The source code is available for download [2]. We benchmark our implementation on a 4.1 GHz Core i5-10600k. As network latency is typically the bottleneck in multi-round secure two-party computation protocols, we benchmark Construction 5 in different settings with different network latencies. To precisely control network latency between sender and receiver instances, we use Linux’ standard tc-netem tool. Figure 2 shows benchmark results averaged over 50 executions, and Table 1 presents the cost breakdown.

We measure total run time for values of \( \ell \) ranging from 1 to 32. Note that \( \ell = 32 \) would support binary tree data structures with \( 2^{32} \) different paths and \( 2^{31} - 1 \) (8.6 billion) nodes. We vary latency assuming LAN scenarios with standard Gigabit Ethernet (0.5 ms RTT) or WiFi (2 ms RTT) and WAN scenarios for intra-continental communication (30 ms RTT) and inter-continental communication (70 ms RTT) [40]. We also show an evaluation with 0 ms RTT, however even this number is still dominated by the TCP communication overhead. We found that the computation alone in our protocol, including all EC computation and ZKPs, is approximately 3 ms per iOPRF iteration.

Each iOPRF evaluation for a tree data structure with \( 2^{20} \) nodes needs about 170 ms of CPU time per party with our (unoptimized) implementation. As soon as we introduce higher latency, CPU time contributes little to total runtime, and communication latency becomes the main performance obstacle. For example, in the WAN1 scenario with intra-continental communication between sender and receiver, total runtime is about 9 s of which less than 4% is spent with computation, and the remainder is consumed by network latency.

We conclude from Figure 2 that even for large values of \( \ell \) and for high latency network connections, Construction 5 has only a few seconds of runtime which is practical for many scenarios.

In Appendix C, we discuss why alternative approaches to realize the iOPRF functionality perform worse than Construction 5.

8 Applications

**OPRF applications** Before presenting applications specific to iOPRFs, we briefly highlight that iOPRFs are maliciously-secure OPRFs and can consequently also be used to realize maliciously-secure adaptive \( k \)-out-of-\( n \) OT and oblivious keyword search [8, 25]. There, a sender encrypts each document \( i \) with a key \( K_i \) that is derived from the document’s keyword \( W_i \), i.e., \( \kappa_i = \text{OPRF}_{K_i}(W_i) \). The sender sends resulting ciphertexts to the receiver. Now, sender and receiver evaluate the iOPRF such that the receivers gets \( \kappa = \text{iOPRF}_{K}(W) \) for any keyword \( W \) the receiver is interested in. Using \( \kappa \), the receiver can decrypt all documents matching \( W \). For more details, we refer to Jarecki and Liu [25]. Note that if we “structure” keywords along the paths of a binary tree, we can allow some party to derive, for example, all keywords that start with the same prefix.

**iOPRF specific applications** An immediate application specific to our iOPRF (but not OPRFs!) is to force correct compliance of clients in structured encryption by allowing them to only query a contiguous path in the graph data. This can be accomplished by
adding a layer of encryption inside of existing structured encryption solutions such that each data element is also encrypted with a key derived from one iteration of the iOPRF. After the structured encryption protocol is complete, an iOPRF protocol is executed which will allow for final decryption of the results only if they are on a contiguous path.

To hide from the server which path is queried, the client can fetch each node using Private Information Retrieval or maliciously secure OT. Also in scenarios with structured encryption, the iOPRF’s delegation feature can be used to delegate control over well-specified sub-trees of the original data to other parties. The delegate can then act as a data owner on their sub-tree, serving requests from clients with the same security property as the original data owner.

To understand the usefulness of iOPRFs, we now consider a specific implementation of RFID tag authentication which uses a limited form of structured encryption.

8.1 RFID

Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) applications comprise a large quantity of RFID tags attached to precious goods and RFID readers which are connected to a central backend database. The goal is that readers can properly identify tags using wireless communication in the presence of adversaries.

An adversary observing wireless tag-reader interaction or being able to interact with tags themselves should not be able to identify or trace tags or even fabricate new tags or clone tags to counterfeit goods. The main technical challenge is that RFID tags are extremely resource restricted and can merely compute a cryptographic hash function. While readers can perform more powerful operations, they typically feature low storage (no state), but have network connectivity, e.g., to connect to a central database. RFID security has been a very active area of research, see Juels [29] for an overview.

In a typical scenario, the reader wants to know whether a tag and therewith the good it is attached to is valid, by interacting first with the tag and then with the database. Typically, the tag stores a unique key, and the reader performs a challenge-response type of authentication, using the database which knows all tags’ keys. However, previous work has assumed that database and readers are within the same trust domain, as the database learns which tag the reader is querying for. This is an unnecessary strong and often unrealistic requirement. To protect tag privacy and internal details of supply or distribution chains, the database should not learn which tag the reader is querying for. For example, if several readers successively query for the same tag, the database knows that a specific tag has traveled between these readers. At the same time, the database does not want to give unrestricted access to the reader or allow queries which leak more information than necessary for the identification of a single tag per query. If the reader would receive more information, the danger would be that a reader fabricates tags.

To mitigate these problems, we show how we can extend a prominent RFID security protocol from the literature, the one by Molnar et al. [38], by a simple application of our iOPRF.

High-Level Idea In the original work by Molnar et al., the database prepares a binary key tree of height \( \ell \) storing random keys in nodes. Leaves in the tree are enumerated
by their path from the root to the leaf. For example, the left most leaf is represented by the bit string of $\ell$ zero bits. A tag is uniquely identified by its ID, a bit string $x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell)$. During initialization, a tag with ID $x$ receives all keys from the root to the leaf represented by $x$. During tag identification, the tag chooses a random $r$, “encrypts” $r$ with each of their keys, and sends the resulting sequence of ciphertexts to the reader. The reader can access the database and query keys. The reader checks which path in the tree decrypts and ends up with a specific ID (leaf). As you can see, this protocol does not protect the tag from a prying database. A simple solution of just sending the whole key tree to the reader might overburden the reader’s storage capabilities and also impose a security risk: having access to all keys, the reader could fabricate an arbitrary number of tags.

Our modification to the [Molnar et al.] protocol simply consists of exchanging the way keys in the tree are computed. In our case, the keys are outputs of the iOPRF which will allow the reader to query the database for exactly one contiguous path. As a result, we hide from the database which tag the reader is querying for, and the database knows that the reader only gets one path of secrets from the tree and will be able to identify exactly one tag with it.

Technical Details

Let $N = 2^\ell$ be the total number of tags in the system. Each tag uniquely corresponds to a leaf of a height $\ell$ binary key tree. To identify a tag, a reader can communicate with the database which stores all keys of the key tree.

Preliminaries

The database knows a secret key $K$ and populates binary key tree $T$ as follows. First, nodes in this key tree are indexed by bit strings following the intuitive notation that the left child (“0”) of some node indexed by bit string $\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i$ is index by $\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i0$, and the right child (“1”) is indexed by $\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i1$. By convention, the root is indexed by empty bit string $\epsilon$.

Database Initialization

Root node $\epsilon$ stores random key $K_\epsilon \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$. The left child of the root stores key $K_0 = \text{iOPRF}_K(0)$, and the right child stores key $K_1 = \text{iOPRF}_K(1)$. For a node $\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i$, the left child stores key $K_{\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i0} = \text{iOPRF}_K(\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i0)$, and its right child stores key $K_{\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i1} = \text{iOPRF}_K(\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i1)$.

During authentication of tag $x$, the database will run $\text{iOPRF}_K(\cdot)$ as the sender, and the reader will be the receiver with input bit strings $x = (x_1 \ldots x_\ell)$ as follows.

Tag Initialization

During initialization of a new tag $x$, the database stores a sequence of $(\ell + 1)$ keys $K$ on the tag: one for each node on the path from the root $K_\epsilon$ of tree $T$ to leaf $K_x = K_{x_1 \ldots x_\ell}$. The tag also stores its own ID $x$.

Secure Tag Identification

Each tag identifies itself to a reader using a variation of the [Molnar et al.] protocol:

- Tag $x$ chooses $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and sends $r$ together with a hash of $r$ and each of their $(\ell + 1)$ keys and the next bit, respectively. More formally, the tag sends $\text{Trace} = (r, T_0 = H(r, K_\epsilon, x_1), \ldots, T_\ell = H(r, K_{x_1 \ldots x_\ell-1}, x_\ell), H(r, K_{x_1 \ldots x_\ell}))$. 

The difference to the original protocol is that we also include next bit $x_i$ into each hash. This allows the reader to check which node to query for during the next iteration. Otherwise, the reader would have to retrieve both children of the current node, revealing “one more key” per level of the tree to the reader.

- The reader uses the iOPRF as the receiver and the database as the sender to identify the tag as follows.
  
  - The database begins by sending $K_e$ to the reader.
  - The reader checks whether either $H(r, K_e, 0)$ or $H(r, K_e, 1)$ matches $T_0$.
  - Depending on the outcome, the reader iteratively continues and queries either the left child ($H(r, K_e, 0)$ matches) or the right child ($H(r, K_e, 1)$ matches) of the root with the iOPRF, compute keys, checks which matches etc.

As you can see, the security we are aiming for asks only for a (delegatable) OPRF. Our iOPRF supports delegation, but can do more. We could also ask as an additional security requirement that the reader should only learn “one path”, i.e., one tag per interaction with the database.

Due to space limitations, we have moved the security analysis to Appendix B.

**Delegation** As iOPRFs are delegatable, we also support scenarios where a main database delegates the information to identify tags of, e.g., different countries or regions to different sub-databases. We abstain from presenting lengthy details, but delegation [14] with iOPRFs would bring the advantage that if keys from one regional sub-database are stolen and thus tags in that region can be fabricated, tags and their identification in other sub-databases are still secure.

### 8.2 Private Decision Tree Evaluation

Another application where we can apply an iOPRF is in the area of private evaluation of decision trees. There, the goal is to allow a client holding a feature vector to query an outsourced decision tree held by a server, resulting in the client receiving the machine learning classification of their feature vector without the owner of the decision tree learning what their input was. We refer to Kiss et al. [33] for an overview.

The protocol by Wu et al. [42] accomplishes this with two main techniques:

1. Each node of the decision tree stores one value which will be compared against one feature of the client’s feature vector. To enable this, the client encrypts their feature vector with additively homomorphic encryption using the client’s public key and sends ciphertexts to the server. For each node of the tree, the server computes homomorphic DGK [16] comparisons “<” of one of the client’s encrypted features with the specific node’s value and sends encrypted comparison outcomes back to the client. Therewith, the client can identify the path in the tree and the leaf node corresponding to their input.
2. Once the correct leaf node is identified, the client uses oblivious transfer to retrieve it and compute the final classification.
This protocol works for semi-honest clients, but it does not prevent a malicious client from retrieving leaf nodes which do not actually correspond to the result of their classification. This is because the server is not able to verify that the client traverses a contiguous path in the tree or that the OT they perform corresponds to that path if they did. Consequently, Wu et al. suggest an augmented version of the protocol that can handle malicious clients using a new conditional oblivious transfer, but a maliciously-secure version could also be constructed simply by replacing OT with our iOPRF.

Each node in the tree could be encrypted using keys derived from the iOPRF evaluation of their index, meaning that the client would have to traverse a path in the tree all the way to the leaf in order to decrypt it. The only necessary modification for this approach to work is a small number of additional ZKPs to “bind” the results of the homomorphic evaluation to the input of the iOPRF. When constructed this way, the client can use much more efficient (maliciously secure) private information retrieval [9] instead of the expensive conditional OT designed by Wu et al. [42]. For space reasons, we list only the main technical modifications necessary (in Appendix A).

9 Conclusion

In this paper, we have introduced the concept of an iterable oblivious pseudo-random function and presented a construction which is provably secure in the standard model under the DDH assumption. We have fully implemented and evaluated this construction and shown that it is efficient in practice, comparable to similar protocols. We have also presented several applications for iOPRF protocols that demonstrate their usefulness, particularly in applications where (two-sided) malicious security is necessary.

Bibliography


A Decision Trees

As an alternative to their paper, we summarize here the changes necessary to convert the semi-honest secure protocol from [42] to a fully-malicious-secure version using iOPRF. We will reference our modifications in contrast with their protocol (Figure 1 in [42]).

1. In step 1, the client proves that their input encryptions are bits. This also happens in the maliciously-secure version from the original paper.
2. In step 2, the negation of the intended DGK comparisons [16] are also computed. This way the client has a “successful” comparison one way or the other to use in their proof to the server that they are behaving correctly.
3. In step 4, the server additionally encrypts each node of the tree with a symmetric key derived from an iOPRF. The keys are chosen such that each node can be decrypted by an iOPRF evaluation that corresponds to that node’s location in the binary tree, adjusted for the randomly flipped comparisons. The goal here is to restrict the client to only being able to decrypt the nodes corresponding to the contiguous path in the tree resulting from its comparisons.

4. In step 5, the client uses PIR [9] to retrieve the target leaf node instead of conditional OT. The client additionally runs an iOPRF protocol to retrieve the symmetric key necessary to decrypt their chosen leaf node. In execution of this protocol, they also prove in ZK that the input to the iOPRF corresponds to the correct results of the comparison protocol (see Appendix A.1).

A.1 Binding Homomorphic Comparisons to iOPRF Input

Since the client now executes two DGK comparisons per level of the tree, the original intended one and its negation, they now always have a “successful” comparison at every level, which tells them which direction to go in the tree. The main idea behind the proofs that will bind the client to the correct path is that they can use the encryption of zero that results from a successful comparison as evidence to the server that they are going in the direction they are supposed to.

At each level of the tree \(k \in [d]\), the client creates a ciphertext \(c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{pk}(0)\) and generates a commitment \(\text{com}\) to \(x_k = 1\) if the comparison at that node was true and \(x_k = 0\) if its negation was true. This corresponds to the direction their comparison at level \(k\) in the shuffled tree tells them to go on the next level. They then must prove that there exists an \(i\) such that \(c\) (the encryption of zero) is plaintext-equivalent to either \(ct_{k,1}\) or \(ct'_{k,1}\) (the result of the negated comparison), and that if it is \(ct_{k,1}\) then \(\text{com}\) is 1, or if it is \(ct'_{k,1}\) then \(\text{com}\) is 0. Then, \(\text{comm}\) is used as the commitment in the iOPRF protocol. This binds the output of the comparison to the input of the iOPRF, completing the proof.

Let \(a \equiv b\) signify that \(a\) and \(b\) are encryptions of the same value and \(a \equiv 0, 1\) signify that \(a\) is an encryption of 0 or 1. The statement being proven can then be written as follows

\[
(c \equiv ct_{k,1} \lor \ldots \lor c \equiv ct_{k,t}) \land \text{com} \equiv 1
\]

\[\lor\]

\[
(c \equiv ct'_{k,1} \lor \ldots \lor c \equiv ct'_{k,t}) \land \text{com} \equiv 0
\]

We do not produce a full ZK proof for this statement, as it can be efficiently designed in the same way we design ZK proofs in Section 6 (plaintext equivalence is equivalent to a proof of DDH tuple, one-out-of-two technique for the \(\lor\), parallel proofs for \(\land\) etc.). For more details on efficient composition of ZK proofs, see also Camenisch and Stadler [7].
B RFID Security Analysis

To summarize security requirements, we briefly describe a reactive, ideal functionality \( F \). The database sends their input, keys \( K_\epsilon, K_0, K_1, \ldots, K_{1\ldots1} \), all \((2N - 1)\) keys of the key tree, to a TTP; and the reader sends an empty bit string. Then, the TTP sends \( K_\epsilon \) to the reader, and nothing to the database. The internal state \( s \) of TTP is initialized to the empty bit string. Then, the RFID reader and TTP additionally interact in a total of \( \ell \) rounds. In round \( i \), let the internal state be bit string \( s = \gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_{i-1} \). The reader sends bit \( \gamma_i \), and TTP responds with \( K_{\gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i} \) and updates its state to \( s = \gamma_1 \ldots \gamma_i \).

**Lemma 2.** In the random oracle model, the modified Molnar et al. protocol securely realizes ideal functionality \( F \).

As the proof of Lemma 2 is straightforward, we only summarize it in a draft.

**Proof (Sketch).** We build a simulator for the case of a compromised reader. The simulator for the case of a compromised database works accordingly.

1. Simulator \( \text{Sim} \) begins by preparing an initially empty key-value table \( \text{RO} \) to implement a standard random oracle functionality \( H(\cdot) \). During simulation, whenever any party calls \( H(k) \) for some input \( k \), this functionality will check whether pair \((k, v)\) is already in table \( \text{RO} \) and responds with \( v \) in that case. Otherwise, \( H \) generates a random string \( v \) of length \( \lambda \), sends \( v \) back to the caller, and places \((k, v)\) in \( \text{RO} \).
2. Also, \( \text{Sim} \) generates a random key \( K = ((\alpha_1, \beta_1), \ldots, (\alpha_\ell, \beta_\ell)) \) for iOPRF. \( \text{Sim} \) sends \( \epsilon \) to TTP and receives \( K_\epsilon \) which it forwards to \( \mathcal{A} \).
3. \( \text{Sim} \) and \( \mathcal{A} \) run Construction 5 with \( \text{Sim} \) as the sender and \( \mathcal{A} \) as the receiver. During the \( i \)th iteration of Construction 5:
   - (a) \( \text{Sim} \) extracts \( \mathcal{A} \)'s input \( x_i \) from the Pedersen commitment, forwards it to TTP, and receives back \( K_{x_1 \ldots x_i} \).
   - (b) \( \text{Sim} \) adds key-value pair \((g_2 \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} \alpha_j^{x_j \beta_j \beta_1^{-x_j}}, K_{x_1 \ldots x_i})\) to table \( \text{RO} \).

Observe that \( \mathcal{A} \)'s view in the simulation is indistinguishable from their view in a real protocol execution.

Note that \( \mathcal{A} \) can perform an input-substitution attack, i.e., query for some path which does not match the tag they are currently interacting with. Without the ability to perform public key cryptography on the tag, the strongest security for the database one can guarantee is that the reader can get one path, identifying one tag and thus can fabricate or clone at most one tag per interaction.

C Discussion: Performance of Related Approaches

iOPRFs must be interactive, requiring an interaction per iteration, and interactivity turns out to be the runtime bottleneck. Yet, we argue that such interaction is still more efficient than alternatives.
For example, we could construct a single round iOPRF protocol using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE). However, we would then have to evaluate \( \ell \) one-way functions inside the FHE circuit and prove their correct computation. We expect such computations would be too long to be practical even on very powerful hardware. Another alternative would be general cryptographic primitives which allow iterative one-way functions. Recent Multi-Linear Maps could be used for this purpose. However, there exist no secure multi-linear map for generic constructions, let alone efficient ones. Lastly, the sender could compute the iPRF for all possible inputs by the receiver and the receiver could select one using oblivious transfer. Another example of obliviously evaluating such a function are distributed point functions \([5]\) which would avoid oblivious transfer. However, in both cases the server would need to evaluate \( 2^\ell \) functions rendering this approach quickly infeasible. In conclusion, our iOPRF avoids the pitfalls of non-interactive design alternatives providing practical performance.

Finally, one could envision realizing an iOPRF using general maliciously MPC frameworks such as MP-SPDZ \([30]\) or efficient maliciously secure 2PC \([41]\). However, it is sender-receiver interactivity which turns out to be the main challenge. Evaluation of an arithmetic (SPDZ) or Boolean (2PC) circuit cannot be stopped, its output revealed, and then continued with new input. Instead, sender and receiver would need to securely evaluate \( \ell \) different circuits. After evaluating circuit \( i \), the receiver learns the \( i \)th output, and specifies the \((i+1)^{th}\) input, and both parties evaluate another circuit. Inside the circuit, the sender and receiver would need to somehow prove to each other that they continue the evaluation with correct data which is not trivial. For example, the circuit would need to output an (encrypted) state to the sender after each iteration which the circuit then verifies in the next round based on additional information output to the receiver. The sender would also need to prove that they are using the same key as one they have committed to, previously. Recall that evaluation of cryptographic primitives inside a circuit is very expensive, even using fast maliciously secure 2PC. For example, Wang et al. \([41]\) report 85 ms for the evaluation of a single SHA2 circuit (amortized over 1024 circuits) in a scenario with latency comparable to LAN1. This is already more expensive than one full round of Construction 5.