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Paper 2020/992

Single-Trace Attacks on the Message Encoding of Lattice-Based KEMs

Bo-Yeon Sim and Jihoon Kwon and Joohee Lee and Il-Ju Kim and Taeho Lee and Jaeseung Han and Hyojin Yoon and Jihoon Cho and Dong-Guk Han

Abstract

We propose single-trace side-channel attacks against lattice-based KEMs, the current candidates of the NIST's standardization project. More specifically, we analyze the message encoding in the encapsulation of lattice-based KEMs to obtain the ephemeral session keys, concluding that a single trace leakage allows a whole key recovery: our implementation on a ChipWhisperer UFO STM32F3 target board shows 100% success rates for Crystals-Kyber and Saber regardless of optimization level, and more than a 79% success rate for FrodoKEM. We further show that our attack methodologies are not restricted to the above algorithms but widely applicable to other NIST PQC candidates, including LAC, NewHope, NTRU Prime, and NTRU.

Note: We submitted the paper to Asiacrypt 2020 and received the final notification on 16 Aug 2020 (unfortunately, it was not accepted). We submitted the revised paper to IEEE ACCESS again and finished posting it.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IEEE ACCESS
DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2020.3029521
Keywords
Side-channel attackLattice-based cryptographyKey encapsulation mechanismMessage encodingSingle-trace attack
Contact author(s)
qjdusls @ kookmin ac kr,christa @ kookmin ac kr
History
2020-12-18: last of 2 revisions
2020-08-18: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/992
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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