

Deep Learning based Analysis of the Key Scheduling Algorithm of PRESENT cipher

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Abstract

The lightweight block cipher PRESENT has become viable for areas like IoT (Internet of Things) and RFID tags, due to its compact design and low power consumption, while providing a sufficient level of security for the aforementioned applications. However, the key scheduling algorithm of a cipher plays a major role in deciding how secure it is. In this paper we test the strength of the key scheduling algorithm (KSA) of the 80-bit key length variant of PRESENT by attempting to retrieve the main key register from the final round key register, using deep learning.

1 Introduction

PRESENT is a lightweight block cipher developed in 2007 by the joint collaboration of Orange Labs (France), Ruhr University Bochum (Germany) and the Technical University of Denmark, designed by the Bogdanov et al in 2007 [Bog+07]. Due to its compact size (almost 2.5 times the size of AES [Sta06]), it was also included in the international standard for the lightweight cryptography by the International Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission. PRESENT employs the substitution/permutation (S/P) network and key scheduling for a 31-round encryption.

Several attacks have been conducted in the past to test its security. In 2014, a truncated differential attack on 26-round PRESENT was suggested [BN14]. Using biclique cryptanalysis several full-round attacks were also done on 80 bit PRESENT cipher in [Lee14] and [FDS16]. A set of results of the KSA of PRESENT are combined into a single number to showcase the strength of the cipher in [HPA11]. A statistical saturation attack was also done by Collard in [CS09].

With advances in the field of Deep Learning, Deep Learning techniques have shown to give better results compared to other machine learning techniques. Aron Gohr proposed a neural network based differential distinguisher for round-reduced Speck in [Goh19]. A similar study was conducted by Baksi et al in [Bak+20]

on Gimli cipher and Gimli Hash. The mentioned studies by Gohr and Baksi further inspired the application of deep learning based differential distinguishers on round reduced PRESENT cipher by Jain et al in [JKM20].

Contribution: In this study we test the strength of the KSA of PRESENT by attempting to extract the main keystream of the cipher from the last round key.

Organisation: The paper first discusses Deep Learning in section 2. Followed by the cipher PRESENT and its encryption algorithm in section 3, and a discussion on its KSA in section 4. Section 5 presents our approach to extract the main keystream. Results are shown in section 6 and our study is concluded in section 7.

2 Deep Learning Network

Deep Learning(DL) is a sub-field of machine learning (ML) inspired by the structure and function of the brain. It allows machines to solve complex problems even when using diverse, unstructured and inter-connected data sets. DL can be used for various complex tasks such as object detection, speech recognition, medical diagnosis and so on. As the amount of training data increases, so does the performance of a DL model. Fig-1 shows a comparison between the performance DL and other ML models for increasing amount of data.




Figure 1: Other algorithms vs Deep learning

In Deep Learning technique we create an Artificial Neural Network(ANN) and train that ANN model on the provided dataset. A basic ANN model is basically divided in 3 parts, (i) Input Layer, (ii) Hidden Layers, (iii) Output Layer. Training of a DL model includes two process. Firstly, forward propagation in which the output is generated and second, backward propagation in which first the error is calculated between the target value and the output of the model, and after that the weights are updated in order to minimize the error in next forward propagation. This whole iteration is referred as one EPOCH. The weights are updated as shown below:

$$w_{new} = w_{old} - a * \frac{\partial L(y)}{\partial w_{old}}$$

where w_{new} and w_{old} are new and old weights respectively, $L(y)$ is the loss and a is the learning rate. Model for this experiment is trained for a total of 3 iteration(EPOCH = 3). As the layers in a simple DL network are linear so to improve the efficiency non linearization is done with the help of Activation functions (such as ReLU, Sigmoid, SOFTMAX, etc). The process of forward propagation and then propagating backward is a complex

task and so is its coding. To simplify it, optimizer is used which completes this whole process for a single iteration. In this experiment Adam optimizer is taken into account and Mean Square Error(MSE) function $L(y) = \frac{1}{2} * (Y_{target} - Y)^2$ (where Y_{target} and Y are the target output and output from the model respectively) is used to calculate the loss with learning rate of 0.001.

3 PRESENT block cipher

PRESENT employs an S/P(substitution and permutation) network. S-box used in this cipher is a 4-bit to 4-bit mapping keeping in mind the optimized hardware requirements. This algorithm includes 31 rounds of encryption using key of 80 and 128 bits. In this we will discuss about the 80-bits key version. A block diagram showing the structure of PRESENT is shown in Fig-2.




Figure 2: Structure of PRESENT

Algorithm 1: PRESENT Algorithm

```

GenerateRoundKey()
i=1
while 1 ≤ i ≤ 31 do
    addRound Key(STATE, Ki)
    sBox Layer(STATE)
    pLayer(STATE)
    i=i+1
end
addRoundKey(STATE, K32)

```

In each round, the Key is first XORed to introduce a round key K ($1 \leq i \leq 32$), after which the plain text is passed through the sBOX (non linear substitution layer) Layer and the pLayer (permutation layer). The non-linear layer uses a single 4-bit S-box S which is applied 16 times in parallel in each round. The algorithm for PRESENT is shown in Algorithm-1. The following subsections explains the terms used in the algorithm.

3.1 Terminology

1. **addRound Key:** In this, the key $K_i = k_{i_{63}} \dots k_{i_0}$ for $1 \leq i \leq 32$ and current STATE $b_{63} \dots b_0$, are XORed with each other bit by bit :

$$b_t \rightarrow b_t \oplus k_t^i$$

2. **sBox Layer:** S-box used in this cipher is a 4-bit to 4-bit mapping $S : F_2^4 \rightarrow F_2^4$. The non-linear layer uses a single 4 X 4 S-box S which is applied 16 times in parallel. The action of this box in hexadecimal notation is given in Table-1. For sBox Layer the current STATE $b_{63} \dots b_0$ is considered as sixteen 4-bit words $w_{15} \dots w_0$ where $w_i = b_{4 \times i + 3} \parallel b_{4 \times i + 2} \parallel b_{4 \times i + 1} \parallel b_{4 \times i}$ for $0 \leq i \leq 15$ and the output nibble $S[w_i]$ provides the updated STATE values.

x	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	A	B	C	D	E	F
S[x]	C	5	6	B	9	0	A	D	3	E	F	8	4	7	1	2

Table 1: sBox mapping

3. **pLayer:** Bit permutation in the PRESENT is done according to the table given below. i^{th} bit of the STATE is moved to the position P(i) as given by the permutation box in Table-2.

i	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
P(i)	0	16	32	48	1	17	33	49	2	18	34	50	3	19	35	51
i	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
P(i)	4	20	36	52	5	21	37	53	6	22	38	54	7	23	39	55
i	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47
P(i)	8	24	40	56	9	25	41	57	10	26	42	58	11	27	43	59
i	48	49	50	51	52	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63
P(i)	12	28	44	60	13	29	45	61	14	30	46	62	15	31	47	63

Table 2: pBox mapping

4 Key Scheduling Algorithm

The KSA of any cipher plays an important role in determining its strength. As the size of Key increases so does the complexity, reducing its chances to get attacked and decrypted easily. PRESENT cipher accepts key sizes of either 80-bits or 128-bits. In this paper we will discuss only the KSA for 80-bits key version of PRESENT.




Figure 3: Key Updation in PRESENT

First, the user inputs the 80-bit key in the key register (K). After this for each round (i) the left-most 64-bits of the current key register are taken as the round key (k_r) for that round.

$$K_r = k_{63}k_{62}\dots k_0 = K_{79}K_{78}\dots K_{16}$$

After every round (i) the key register is rotated by 61-bit positions to the left. Then the rotated key register is updated by passing the leftmost 4 bits through the S-Box and the round-counter value (i) is XORed with bits $K_{19}K_{18}K_{17}K_{16}K_{15}$ of K with the least significant bit of round-counter on the right. Fig-3 shows how the key updation for 80-bit PRESENT variation.

5 Data Generation and Construction of Deep Learning model

Data generation is an important task as without the proper data, model can not be trained in an efficient manner. To prepare the data set, we generate an 80-bit main keystream randomly and then pass it through the Key Scheduling Algorithm of PRESENT to obtain the final round 64-bit key. Similarly, a dataset of 1,00,000 randomly generated samples are created and stored in the form of an array. Then a DL model is created to be trained on this dataset as described below (as shown in Fig-4):

1. Input layer containing 64 neurons, each neuron for the individual bit of the final round key.
2. 3 fully connected hidden layers of 32 neurons, 16 neurons, 8 neurons respectively each activated by the Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) function.
3. Output layer is activated by the SOFTMAX activation function, and consists of 2 neurons to match the one hot vectors for the predicted bit (0 as [1 0] and 1 as [0 1]).

Once the model is created, the samples were passed in a batch size of 200 as input and trained accordingly. The trained model is then tested by passing 40,000 randomly generated samples of the main keystream and last round key, and accuracies are noted down for each bit. The obtained bit-wise accuracies are shown in Table-3.




Figure 4: Neural Network Structure

X and Y representing the probability of [0 1] respectively at any i^{th} position in main keystream.

6 Result

i^{th} position of the master key, which we are trying to predict, may have either bit '0' or bit '1'. Now, if the key scheduling algorithm is perfectly designed with keeping in mind the cryptographic design, it should behave randomly. This means, no model should be able to predict the occurrence of i^{th} bit of master key with better than $1/2$ probability. This equivalently means, in only 50% validation samples, a model would do the correct prediction.

On the other hand, the meaning of prediction accuracy for a bit position of the master key being significantly deviating from 0.5 is that the algorithm is not strong enough to ensure randomness. The results obtained in our case are shown in Table-3. The results clearly show that correctly predicting the individual bits of the main keystream with a high probability is not possible with such a method employing deep learning. This shows the resistance of the PRESENT cipher KSA against deep learning based attacks. The key scheduling algorithm is not vulnerable to our deep learning method and it is strong enough in providing the desired security to crypto algorithm of PRESENT cipher.

n^{th} Bit	Accuracy	n^{th} Bits	Accuracy	n^{th} Bit	Accuracy	n^{th} Bit	Accuracy
1	0.514	21	0.481	41	0.478	61	0.489
2	0.499	22	0.482	42	0.491	62	0.491
3	0.475	23	0.523	43	0.511	63	0.493
4	0.493	24	0.497	44	0.508	64	0.512
5	0.512	25	0.511	45	0.507	65	0.489
6	0.489	26	0.476	46	0.534	66	0.508
7	0.501	27	0.525	47	0.492	67	0.507
8	0.508	28	0.494	48	0.487	68	0.534
9	0.505	29	0.489	49	0.468	69	0.476
10	0.508	30	0.479	50	0.493	70	0.525
11	0.479	31	0.492	51	0.478	71	0.511
12	0.492	32	0.506	52	0.485	72	0.485
13	0.507	33	0.527	53	0.52	73	0.487
14	0.479	34	0.508	54	0.542	74	0.493
15	0.522	35	0.518	55	0.491	75	0.481
16	0.533	36	0.478	56	0.479	76	0.482
17	0.478	37	0.511	57	0.52	77	0.523
18	0.53	38	0.485	58	0.49	78	0.497
19	0.526	39	0.487	59	0.498	79	0.511
20	0.529	40	0.493	60	0.513	80	0.52

Table 3: Test accuracy of getting n^{th} Bit in main keystream.

7 Conclusion

In this work we have analysed the cryptographic strength for key scheduling algorithm of PRESENT cipher and tested if it can be decrypted easily applying DL attacks. Through our results, we have shown that the KSA is strong enough to support the crypto algorithm of PRESENT as expected in any cryptographic design and provides enough security for the applications requiring secure, low cost, low resource, and compact block ciphers. Our analysis is based on a deep learning model and there is a scope of applying other types of DL algorithms to assess the vulnerabilities in PRESENT cipher.

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