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Paper 2020/940

Directly revocable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption from lattices

Fei Meng

Abstract

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a promising type of cryptosystem achieving fine-grained access control on encrypted data. Revocable attribute-based encryption (RABE) is an extension of ABE that provides revocation mechanisms when user's attributes change, key exposure, and so on. In this paper, we propose two directly revocable ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption (DR-ABE) schemes from lattices, which support flexible threshold access policies on multi-valued attributes, achieving user-level and attribute-level user revocation, respectively. Specifically, the revocation list is defined and embedded into the ciphertext by the message sender to revoke a user in the user-level revocable scheme or revoke some attributes of a certain user in the attribute-level revocable scheme. We also discuss how to outsource decryption and reduce the workload for the end user. Our schemes are proved to be secure in the standard model, assuming the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Access controlAttribute-based encryptionDirect revocationDecryption outsourcingLattice-based cryptosystem.
Contact author(s)
mengfei_sdu @ 163 com
History
2020-07-31: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/940
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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