Stronger Multilinear Maps from Indistinguishability Obfuscation

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Abstract

We show how to construct new multilinear maps from subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and standard assumptions. In particular, we show how to construct multilinear maps with arbitrary predetermined degree of multilinearity where each of the following assumptions hold: SXDH, exponent-DDH (for both symmetric and asymmetric multilinear maps), and all other assumptions implied by these assumptions (including $k$-party-DDH and $k$-Lin and its variants). Our constructions almost identically achieve the full functionality of the “dream version” definition of multilinear maps as defined in the initial work of Garg et al. (Eurocrypt’13). Our work substantially extends a previous line of works including that of Albrecht et al. (TCC’16) and Farshim et al. (PKC’18), which showed how to build multilinear maps endowed with weaker assumptions (such as multilinear DDH and other related assumptions) from iO.

Coupled with the exciting breakthrough work of Jain et al. (STOC’21), which shows how to build iO from well-founded assumptions, and the works of Gay et al. (STOC’21) and Brakerski et al., which show how to build iO from circular security assumptions, our work can be used to build strong multilinear maps from such assumptions. This at least partially solves another long-standing open problem about the existence of cryptographic multilinear maps for degree $> 2$.

Moreover, a number of works have shown how to build iO from multilinear maps endowed with hardness assumptions; one example would be the work of Lin and Tessaro (Crypto’17) which shows how to construct iO from subexponentially secure SXDH-hard multilinear maps and some (subexponentially secure) plausible assumptions. Coupled with any one of these constructions, our results here can be seen as formally proving the equivalence of iO and multilinear maps/graded encodings (modulo subexponential reductions and standard assumptions, some of which must have subexponential security) for the first time. Finally, our results also establish the equivalence of many multilinear maps of different degrees and even with different assumptions (again modulo subexponential reductions and other relatively standard assumptions): if a multilinear map is powerful enough to build iO, then it can also be used to build all of the maps that we construct here.

1 Introduction

Indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [BGI+01] is a powerful primitive that offers enormous potential in terms of cryptographic constructions. In fact, almost every cryptographic primitive can be built from iO (and some other mild assumptions). This includes many strong primitives such as functional encryption [GGH+13b], multi-party noninteractive key exchange [BZ14], and much more [SW14, GGHR14, HSW14, BP15]. Due to its many applications, iO has been given its own “complexity world” called obfustopia [GPSZ17].

The story of realizing iO from concrete assumptions began with multilinear maps: Garg et al. [GGH+13b] proposed the first candidate construction of iO based on the construction of a graded encoding (a generalization of multilinear maps) due to Garg, Gentry, and Halevi [GGH13a]. This spurred a huge interest in building new multilinear maps/graded encodings, and several other candidate schemes were proposed subsequently [CLT13, GGH15, Zim15, AB15].

However, many of these candidate constructions of multilinear maps were cryptanalyzed, starting with the work of Cheon et al. [CHL+15] on the cryptanalysis of the multilinear map defined in [CLT13]. More attacks on multilinear
maps and their implied iO constructions followed [MSZ16, HJ16, CLLT16], breaking all of the original multilinear map schemes. Subsequent attempts to “immunize” the existing constructions against these attacks [CLT15, BMSZ15, GMM+16] were also shown to be vulnerable [MSZ16, CGH17]. To our knowledge, there is only one currently published multilinear map that has not been attacked [MZ18].

The multitude of attacks against multilinear maps seemed to convince the cryptographic community to focus on alternative ways of constructing iO. One such approach that has received considerable attention was building iO based on functional encryption (FE). The authors of [AJ15, BV15] showed that subexponentially secure single-key compact FE (in conjunction with some other standard assumptions) implies iO. They also showed how to construct single-key compact FE from many-key FE. These works, together with some previous works [GGH+13b, Wat15] that showed how to build many-key FE from iO and standard assumptions, established an equivalence between (subexponentially secure) compact FE and iO (modulo certain plausible assumptions).

This naturally led to a proliferation of attempts to realize compact FE (and thus iO). A series of works [Lin16, LV16, LT17, AS17] showed how to realize compact FE based on low-degree multilinear maps and additional novel techniques such as local PRGs. In fact, in [LT17], the authors showed a construction of compact FE from bilinear maps and 2-blockwise local PRGs, which seemingly paved the way for a secure iO construction from standard assumptions. However, Lombardi and Vaikuntanathan [LV17] and Barak et al. [BBKK18] independently showed that 2-blockwise local PRGs could never be constructed securely, implying that such iO constructions cannot be securely instantiated.

But these attacks on FE-based iO constructions seemed to be temporary setbacks rather than a fundamental barrier. Almost all of the recent works on iO [Agr19, AM18, AJL+19, JLMS19] have continued down the compact FE road based on newer assumptions such as perturbation resilient generators. A more recent result of Brakerski et al. [BDGMM20a] shows how to build iO from a new primitive called split FHE. Their construction is based on plausible assumptions, but relies on a heuristic security argument. While some of these new assumptions are not yet well-understood, they appear to be more and more “standard-looking.” It is true that some of these recent results have been cryptanalyzed [AP20], but, unlike multilinear map constructions, most have not been broken.

Recent iO Results. Very recently, there have been a collection of exciting breakthrough results on new iO constructions. In particular, Jain et al. [JLS20] proposed a new construction of iO from well-founded assumptions, which includes the learning with errors (LWE) assumption [Reg05], the symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption (SXDH) [BGdMM05], a version of the learning parity with noise (LPN) assumption [Ale03] over a large modulus, and the existence of a boolean PRG in NC$^0$ with superlinear stretch. Like much of the previous work, this construction goes through functional encryption and does not use multilinear maps at all. This is the first work to build iO entirely from assumptions that have been previously studied by the cryptography and theory communities and has led the cryptographic community to generally believe that iO can be realized.

Subsequently, Gay and Pass [GP20] proposed a variant of the [BDGMM20a] scheme that only relies on the LWE assumption, the decisional composite residuosity assumption [DJ01], and a circular security assumption on the Gentry-Sahai-Waters FHE scheme [GSW13] and the Damgard-Jurik encryption scheme [DJ01]. In a follow-up work, Brakerski et al. showed how to construct iO while relying only on the circular-security of certain LWE-based schemes [BDGMM20b].

These recent breakthrough results indicate that we most likely can, in fact, securely realize iO—and maybe even from fully standard assumptions (i.e. just plain LWE) in the future. Unfortunately, they say nothing about the existence of multilinear maps.

1.1 Multilinear Maps and iO

The reported attacks on multilinear maps/graded encodings, together with the exciting new constructions of iO that do not involve multilinear maps, have meant that multilinear maps/graded encodings have received considerably less attention in recent years. A natural question to ask is: are multilinear maps (endowed with certain hardness

1Throughout this paper, we use multilinear maps and graded encodings interchangeably. Unless otherwise specified, multilinear maps refer to “graded” multilinear maps and not “one-shot” multilinear maps.

2More generally, [LT17] showed a construction of iO from $k$-linear maps and $k$-blockwise local PRGs (plus some standard assumptions). The scheme is not known to be broken for $k \geq 3$.

3We refer the reader to [HB15] for a survey of multilinear maps and iO.
We refer the reader to [GLSW15] for a detailed discussion on this issue.

Building Multilinear Maps from iO. We already know how to build iO from many “source group” hardness assumptions over multilinear maps/graded encodings. Gentry et al. [GLSW15] showed how to build iO from a multilinear map where the multilinear subgroup decision assumption holds over the source group. Lin and Vaikuntanathan [LV16] and Lin [Lin17] also showed constructions of iO from multilinear maps with source group assumptions (and some other relatively standard assumptions).

Unfortunately, the above constructions need to assume subexponential hardness of the underlying multilinear maps in order to achieve iO, but this seems somewhat inherent and hard to avoid. Even the functional encryption-based constructions of iO have a similar drawback and must assume subexponential hardness at some point in the reduction. We refer the reader to [GLSW15] for a detailed discussion on this issue.

Building Multilinear Maps from iO. On the other hand, only a few works have tried to build multilinear maps from iO. The first result in this direction was the construction of a self-bilinear map with auxiliary information [YYHK14]. While this enabled richer applications such as multi-party noninteractive key exchange (NIKE), the authors did not consider decisional assumptions that could potentially imply iO.

Subsequently, the authors of [AFH16] showed how to construct from iO (and some other reasonably standard assumptions) a “one-shot” (i.e., not graded) multilinear map where the multilinear DDH assumption holds. The authors of [FHHL18] further modified the construction in [AFH16] to build a graded multilinear map where the multilinear DDH assumption holds. Unfortunately, we note that the multilinear DDH assumption is a “target group” assumption, and we do not know how to build iO from such assumptions.

So the state of the art is currently the following: we know how to build multilinear maps/graded encodings endowed with target group assumptions from iO and (relatively) standard assumptions. But we only know how to build iO from multilinear maps/graded encodings with certain source group assumptions. This obviously implies that certain multilinear maps are at least as strong as iO, but the lack of constructions of “strong” multilinear maps with source-group hardness also apparently suggests that multilinear maps with such source group assumptions could be strictly stronger than iO.

“Source” and “Target” Group Assumptions. Suppose we consider an asymmetric multilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \ldots \times \mathbb{G}_\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ where each group is of order $q$. Examples of hardness assumptions over the “source group” include the SXDH assumption, which informally states that for each group $\mathbb{G}_i$, given some generator $g_i \in \mathbb{G}_i$, it is hard to distinguish between the tuples $(g_i, g_i^a, g_i^b, g_i^{ab})$ and $(g_i, g_i^a, g_i^b, g_i^c)$, where $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ are chosen uniformly at random.¹

Next, let’s consider a symmetric multilinear map $e : \mathbb{G}_1^\ell \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ where both $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ are of order $q$. An example of an assumption in the target group would be the multilinear DDH assumption, which informally states that, given a generator $g \in \mathbb{G}$ and $\ell + 1$ group elements $g^{a_1}, \ldots, g^{a_\ell}, g^{a_{\ell+1}}$ which are encodings of random elements $a_1, \ldots, a_\ell, a_{\ell+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, the term $e(g, g, \ldots, g)^{a_1 \cdots a_\ell a_{\ell+1}}$ is computationally indistinguishable from a uniformly random element in $\mathbb{G}_T$.

There are no known constructions of iO based on multilinear map endowed with only a target group assumption. This may be explained as follows: typically iO constructions based on multilinear maps involve encoding elements in the source groups. As a result, the security proofs explicitly require indistinguishability assumptions over the source groups. In other words, assumptions over the target groups are, in general, seemingly insufficient when arguing security of such iO constructions.

1Note that SXDH can only be valid in an asymmetric multilinear map. Furthermore, there are subtleties when defining SXDH over high-degree multilinear maps, and not all definitions may be equivalent to what we outline here. We explain this in detail in the body of the paper.
Further Difficulties and diO. There also seem to be many strong barriers for building multilinear maps with “source group” assumptions from iO. For instance, suppose that we want to build an asymmetric multilinear map endowed with the SXDH assumption. This would require us to publish circuits $C_A$ and $C_M$ that add and multiply encodings of elements. Assume for the moment that we only want to publish a “one-shot” zero-test circuit $C_Z$ that computes whether or not a level-$\ell$ product is zero.

A natural approach might be to use obfuscation to try to hide secret information inside the circuits $C_A$, $C_M$ and $C_Z$ that would make it possible to process the encodings appropriately. However, we have the following difficulty: what if the adversary performs a sequence of addition and multiplication operations involving the SXDH challenge terms that results in a zero-encoding when the SXDH is “real”, and a non-zero-encoding when the SXDH challenge is “random?” The zero-test circuit must behave differently on the resultant encoding in these two cases. Hence, standard iO (even piO) is seemingly insufficient here since the obfuscated programs do not have identical outputs on all inputs.

If we want to obfuscate programs that are not functionally equivalent on certain inputs, then we seemingly require the stronger notion of differing inputs obfuscation [ABG+13] (diO). Unfortunately, there are some impossibility results on diO for general circuits [BSW16, GGHW17], and only a few instances of diO for certain restricted class of circuits are known to be secure based on regular iO [BCP14]. So any iO-based construction of a multilinear map scheme with a plausible source group assumption seemingly needs to bypass diO lower bounds, which appears nontrivial.

Other Work. There has been some other work that attempts to unify the notions of multilinear maps and iO. In [PS15], Paneth and Sahai introduced the notion of polynomial jigsaw puzzles, which are an abstraction of multilinear maps. They show that iO is unconditionally equivalent to polynomial jigsaw puzzles. Unfortunately, in hindsight it is unclear whether polynomial jigsaw puzzles accurately model multilinear maps with source group assumptions.

For instance, the authors of [AS15] show a black-box separation of iO from collision-resistant hash functions (CRHFs). On the other hand, any multilinear map where SXDH holds implies a simple CRHF [Dam88] in one of the source groups. So any construction of multilinear maps from iO seemingly requires additional assumptions that are at least strong enough to imply a CRHF.

In this paper, we ask the following fundamental question, the answer to which would have many implications for future work on iO and related primitives:

Are multilinear maps with useful source group assumptions stronger than iO? Or are they (up to subexponential security reductions and modulo certain standard assumptions) equivalent primitives?

1.2 Our Contributions

In this paper we answer this question by showing, perhaps surprisingly, that subexponentially secure iO in conjunction with some other standard assumptions implies multilinear maps endowed with most of the well-known (prime order) source group assumptions. More precisely, suppose that the following cryptographic primitives exist:

- A probabilistic iO [CLTV15] scheme for X-Ind samplers (implied by subexponentially secure standard iO and subexponentially secure puncturable PRFs in $\mathcal{NC}^1$).

- Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) with message space $\mathbb{Z}_q$ for some (large) prime $q$ with perfect decryption correctness and well-distributed homomorphic evaluation outputs.$^1$

- A dual-mode, simulation-extractable non-interactive zero knowledge argument system (e.g., Groth-Sahai [GS08]).

- A language $\mathcal{L}$ for which the membership problem is hard and whose “yes” instances have unique witnesses (such a language is implied by any DDH-hard group).

Given these primitives and some additional assumptions (specified below), we show how to build the following multilinear maps/graded encodings for any arbitrary (polynomial) predetermined degree of multilinearity:

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$^1$By well-distributed, we mean that the output of homomorphic evaluation of a function is identically distributed as the output of the encryption algorithm on the same function of the message. This kind of FHE is not known from the LWE assumption, but can be constructed from iO and standard assumptions [CLTV15].
• An asymmetric multilinear map that is SXDH-hard, assuming additionally the existence of any DDH-hard group $G$ of prime order.

• An asymmetric multilinear map that is exponent-DDH-hard, assuming additionally the existence of any exponent-DDH-hard group of prime order.

• An $n$-degree symmetric multilinear map that is $(n + 1)$-exponent-DDH-hard, assuming additionally the existence of any power-DDH-hard group of prime order.

On the Ingredients. We note that all of the aforementioned ingredients for our constructions, with the exception of piO, may be considered reasonably standard cryptoprimitives. In addition, the variant of piO needed for our constructions can be built from any “regular” iO scheme and puncturable PRF in $\mathcal{NC}^1$ with subexponential security using the tools from [CLTV15]. We also note that this set of assumptions is a subset of those required by [FHHL18].

Other Source Group Assumptions. The EDDH assumption implies a whole host of other source group assumptions, including $k$-party-DDH, Casc, SCasc, $k$-Lin, $k$-ILin, and, of course, multilinear DDH. Hence, our constructions immediately imply multilinear map schemes where these other assumptions hold as well. We refer the reader to [EHK+13] for the details of these assumptions and their inter-relationships.

Supported Features. Our multilinear maps almost identically achieve the full “dream version” of features that are defined and discussed in [GGH13a] and thus should be usable in any application of multilinear maps. The only feature that our constructions do not achieve is deterministic encodings, which would otherwise enable “classic/ideal” multilinear map functionality.

1.3 Implications and Discussion

Our work has a number of interesting implications for iO and multilinear maps that we discuss below.

iO and Multilinear Maps. Coupled with existing work (e.g. [LT17]), our work shows that multilinear maps and iO are equivalent up to subexponential security reductions and modulo certain reasonably standard assumptions. This means that iO is tied as tightly to multilinear maps as it is to compact FE (building iO from compact FE also, to our knowledge, currently requires subexponential security).

Using the very recently proposed constructions of iO from well-founded assumptions [JLS20] and circular security assumptions [GP20, BDGM20b] in conjunction with our work, one can also build multilinear maps from well-founded assumptions, which seemingly answers an almost twenty-year old question on the existence of multilinear maps beyond degree 2 [BS03].

Simpler Constructions from MMaps. One benefit of our work is simpler feasibility results for primitives that are only known from iO or multilinear maps. As an example, consider multi-party noninteractive key exchange (NIKE). Boneh and Silverberg’s construction of NIKE from multilinear maps [BS03] is very simple and has an almost immediate proof of security. On the other hand, Boneh and Zhandry’s construction of NIKE from iO [BZ14], while elegant, is quite complicated and the proof is not so simple. In many cases, cryptosystems are simpler and easier to build from multilinear map assumptions than iO.

Our construction of multilinear maps from iO is not particularly efficient. However, almost all of the currently known constructions of iO are also inefficient. In fact, iO is used extensively for feasibility results on complex cryptoprimitives or implications with respect to cryptographic complexity, where concrete efficiency is not the main focus. For feasibility results—where we are only trying to prove the existence of some primitive from some assumption(s), and mostly ignoring efficiency—our construction of multilinear maps still might be incredibly useful. For new constructions, we could prove the security of the construction based on a multilinear map and base security on good assumptions through our reduction from iO in this paper. Later, we could try to build a more efficient scheme. As we have stated before, almost all of the results on applications of iO have focused on feasibility rather than efficiency, so, while we do think efficiency of iO is an interesting problem going forward, we do not consider the lack of efficiency in our construction a glaring weakness.
In fact, it may be possible to build multilinear maps that are as efficient as iO constructions, perhaps by attempting to build them directly from the assumptions that are known to imply iO. If this is the case, we may eventually see more than just feasibility results from multilinear maps.

**Bootstrapping Multilinear Maps.** An interesting aspect of our work is that it paves the way for “bootstrapping” low-degree multilinear maps into multilinear maps with arbitrarily large degree endowed with similar hardness assumptions (albeit under subexponential security assumptions). For instance, the authors of [LT17] showed that assuming 3-blockwise local PRGs and some other relatively standard primitives, SXDH-hard trilinear maps imply iO. Under subexponential security assumptions, our work would then allow such an SXDH-hard trilinear map to be “bootstrapped” into an SXDH-hard multilinear map of any (predetermined) degree via iO.

In fact, we can “bootstrap” to multilinear maps endowed with potentially stronger assumptions such as 2-exponent-DDH. We can even “bootstrap” asymmetric multilinear maps into symmetric ones, and vice versa, as long as the initial multilinear map we start with is powerful enough to imply iO. Our work implies that many of the (seemingly very different) multilinear maps that are strong enough to imply iO are, up to subexponential security reductions and standard assumptions, equivalent in a computational hardness sense. This provides yet another motivation for building low-degree multilinear maps from standard assumptions.

**Open Questions.** Our work gives rise to many interesting open problems. For example, it is not immediately clear as to how our techniques could be extended to build multilinear maps endowed with composite-order group assumptions (e.g., the multilinear subgroup hiding assumption as defined in [GLSW15]). In addition, our proof techniques struggle to handle multilinear map assumptions with multiple correlated challenge terms (like the joint-SXDH assumption). This leaves open the question of whether or not iO implies multilinear maps endowed with such assumptions. We also leave it open to investigate if techniques/arguments similar to those presented in [Fre10] would enable us to build cryptographic applications originally based on composite-group assumptions using our proposed prime-order multilinear map constructions.

Another interesting question pertains to multilinear maps with unbounded multilinearity: does iO imply multilinear maps that are endowed with useful hardness assumptions as well as an unbounded degree of multilinearity (or even if such maps exist)? The self-bilinear map from [YYHK14] does not seem to support hardness assumptions of the nature considered in this work (we refer the reader to [YYHK14] for detailed discussions).

Finally, attempting to build multilinear maps directly from some of the assumptions used to build iO in a recent line of works [JLS20, GP20, BDGM20b] seems to be an interesting and potentially promising open problem. Currently, a paper that built a multilinear map “from scratch” using known works in the literature would be several hundred pages long. Is it possible to build something much simpler directly from well-founded assumptions?

## 2 Technical Overview

In this section we give an overview of our multilinear map/graded encoding constructions and some of the key ideas that we use. The starting points of our construction are the works of [AFH+16] and [FHHL18]. Since [FHHL18] is a generalization of [AFH+16], we will typically refer to it when discussing the ideas present in both works.

We will use our construction of an asymmetric multilinear map where the SXDH assumption holds as a working example throughout most of this overview, as it is the simplest of our constructions. We assume some basic understanding of multilinear maps/graded encodings. The reader may refer to Section 3 for some preliminary background on multilinear maps and other cryptographic primitives.

### 2.1 Construction Overview

We provide a high-level overview of our construction of an SXDH-hard asymmetric multilinear map (MMap)/graded encoding from iO and other cryptographic assumptions. Our construction and proofs are quite involved, so we cannot mention all of the steps or techniques here. In Appendix 5, we present a more detailed version of our MMap construction. Appendix 6 presents our full proof of SXDH-hardness with a detailed outline of all of the steps. Rather than mimic the same presentation here, we describe the proof ideas in a more intuitive manner. While this description does not linearly
follow how the proof is actually presented in the body of the paper, it captures the main technical ideas. We point out that additional intuition, technical overviews, and proof intuition are presented throughout Appendices 5 and 6 for the ease of understanding.

We will start by sketching out what the encodings of our multilinear map look like, and then explain our circuits for multilinear map operations.

**Non-Unique Representations.** We begin by noting that our encodings are *not unique*: there will be (potentially) multiple ways to represent and encode some plaintext element \( \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) (\( q \) being a prime with \( O(\lambda) \) bits, where \( \lambda \) is the security parameter). Note that by non-unique representation, we are not simply referring to the randomized nature of our encodings (e.g., randomness of encryption used to generate parts of the encoding), but to the non-unique nature of the actual “representation” of the plaintext element underlying an encoding.

More precisely, we will use a “slotted” representation of \( \alpha \) for our encodings, the exact form of which will depend on the assumption that we are trying to prove. For our construction of an SXDH-hard asymmetric MMap, we will represent an element \( \alpha \) as a four-tuple of the form \((\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)\) with the restriction that, for some fixed \( a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) (sampled at setup), we have

\[
\alpha = \alpha_0 + a \cdot \alpha_1 + b \cdot \alpha_2 + c \cdot \alpha_3 \mod q.
\]

The reader may observe this representation is structurally similar to a DDH tuple. For our “real” construction of an SXDH-hard MMap, we will only use the \( \alpha_0 \) component to encode elements. However, we will use the full slotted representation in certain hybrid arguments in the proof of SXDH.

**Encoding Structure.** Each encoding in our construction consists of two FHE ciphertexts that are encryptions of the underlying plaintext element \( \alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q \) and the “level” of the encoding under different public-key/secret-key pairs (the double encryption is a necessary component of the proof as explained later), a description of the “level” of the encoding which we denote \( i \), and two NIZK proofs \( \pi_0 \) and \( \pi_1 \) that prove, in a sense, the encoding is valid (we will explain these in more detail later). We can express this as:

\[
\text{Encode} (\alpha, i) = (\text{FHE.Enc}_{pk_0} (\alpha, i), \text{FHE.Enc}_{pk_1} (\alpha, i), 1, \pi_0, \pi_1).
\]

We have already explained the representation(s) that may be used when encoding an element \( \alpha \). The description of the level of an encoding in our SXDH-hard multilinear map is a binary vector \( i \in \{0, 1\}^n \), where \( n \) is the degree of the multilinearity of the map. Top-level encodings corresponding to each of the groups \( G_1, ..., G_n \) are denoted by \( i \) with one non-zero entry. Addition preserves the level set, so \( i \) remains unchanged, while multiplication (which can only be done between level sets that have an empty intersection) of two elements with level sets \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) results in a new level set \( i' = i_1 + i_2 \). Other multilinear maps (e.g., symmetric constructions) may have simpler level descriptions.

**Normal and Oblique Representations.** Before we explain our proofs \( \pi_0 \) and \( \pi_1 \), we need to explain more about the nature of our encodings. When encoding an element \( \alpha \), depending on whether we use only the \( \alpha_0 \) component or all four components \((\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)\), we classify the encoding representation into “normal,” “partially oblique,” and “oblique.” The tuple \( \alpha = (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3) \) is said to be in “normal form” if

\[
(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3) = (\alpha^*, 0, 0, 0)
\]

for some \( \alpha^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q \). Otherwise, it is said to be in “oblique form.” Depending on the forms of the tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts in the encoding, we classify an encoding into one of three representations:

- **Normal representation:** Both FHE ciphertexts encrypt tuples that are in normal form.
- **Partially oblique representation:** Exactly one of the FHE ciphertexts encrypts a tuple that is in normal form, while the other encrypts a tuple that is in oblique form.
- **Oblique representation:** Both FHE ciphertexts encrypt tuples that are in oblique form.
Appendix 8), the exact statement that we prove using \( \pi \) which we denote (we define these languages formally in our preliminaries).

(e.g. Groth-Sahai [GS08]). In particular, we need a NIZK proof system that is perfectly sound and extractable in the binding mode, and perfectly witness indistinguishable and perfectly zero-knowledge in the hiding mode. In our ‘real’ construction, all of our proofs will be done in the binding mode. We will use hiding mode for certain hybrid arguments.

The Proof \( \pi_1 \). Since it is simpler, we will start by discussing \( \pi_1 \). Informally, \( \pi_1 \) is a proof of consistency. It proves that both FHE ciphertexts encode the same \( \alpha \), as per the definition of consistency presented earlier. However, the actual proof is a bit more complicated. In particular, the proof \( \pi_1 \) is a proof that either the FHE ciphertexts are encoded consistently or the prover has knowledge of a unique witness \( \text{wit}_y \) associated with an instance \( y \) of some language \( L \) with hard membership. Informally, this language has the property that if we sample \( y \) randomly from \( L \), it is computationally hard to infer if \( y \in L \) or not, but each \( y \) that is a “yes” instance has a unique membership witness \( \text{wit}_y \) (we define these languages formally in our preliminaries).

In our actual scheme, we choose to use a non-accepting \( y \) value, so this ’or’ branch can never be satisfied due to the perfect soundness in the binding mode of our NIZK proof system. However, this extra ‘or’ branch is necessary for our proofs and is activated in some of our hybrid schemes and circuits. We explain the intuition behind these kinds of proofs in more detail later in this overview, as well as in the main body of the paper.

The Proof \( \pi_0 \). Our proof \( \pi_0 \) is a little bit more complicated. It uses \( 2n \) additional instances of the hard language \( L \), which we denote \( z_{j,b} \) for \( j \in [n] \) and \( b \in \{0,1\} \). Informally, in \( \pi_0 \) we prove that both FHE ciphertexts encrypt the same level-set \( i = (i_1, \ldots, i_n) \) as described “in the clear” in the encoding, and the fact that (at least) one of the following conditions holds:

- Either both FHE ciphertexts encode the same \( \alpha \) in normal representation (i.e., the corresponding plaintexts are identical to each other).
- Or there exists some \( j \in [1,n] \) such that \( z_{j,0} \in L \) and \( i_j = 0 \).
- Or there exists some \( j \in [1,n] \) such that \( z_{j,1} \in L \) and \( i_j = 1 \).

So, to summarize, \( \pi_0 \) proves that either an encoding is in the normal form or that the prover possesses a unique membership witness corresponding to an instance of the hard language \( L \). At a first glance, using \( 2n \) instances of \( L \) might seem like overkill (and, in fact, our first attempt at a construction only used one instance). However, using \( 2n \) instances of \( L \) helps us to have fine-grained control over what particular types of oblique encoding are allowed. For instance, if we set \( z_{1,1} \) to be an “yes” instance of \( L \) and all other zs to be “no” instances (and put our proofs in binding mode), then our scheme will effectively only allow oblique encodings for encodings that “include” level 1 (i.e. the first group of the multilinear map, such that \( i_1 = 1 \)). As we will show later, this is crucial to our proof.

As before, these alternative ‘or’ branches never get used in our actual construction. They only are active in hybrid stages of our proof. All of our encodings in the actual construction will be in normal form and all of our proofs will be in binding mode.

We briefly remark here that in some of our other MMap constructions (e.g. our symmetric MMap construction in Appendix 8), the exact statement that we prove using \( \pi_0 \) varies considerably from what we have presented here. These changes are essentially dictated by the nature of the MMap itself (symmetric/asymmetric) as well as the corresponding hardness assumption that we wish to prove. More intuition and technical insights into why such changes are necessary are detailed in Appendix 8.
Addition, Inversion and Multiplication. For addition and inversion of encodings at the same level, as well as for multiplying encodings at appropriate levels, we generate probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscations of circuits that broadly adhere to the following strategy:

- Verify the proofs $\pi_0$ and $\pi_1$ of both encodings to make sure they are valid (if not, abort).
- Use the FHE secret keys to decrypt the ciphertexts and retrieve the underlying input plaintexts.
- Perform the desired operation over the input plaintexts and create a valid encoding of the output plaintext at the appropriate level.

In some of our proof hybrids, we will want to “forget” some of the FHE secret keys and switch to computing addition, inversion, and multiplication homomorphically (without decryption). At a high level, such switches will allow us to transform one or more encodings from normal to oblique representation and vice versa. These steps will, of course, involve using the ‘or’ branches of our NIZK proofs. At the same time, these steps will also require the ability to compute the MMap operations directly over the FHE ciphertexts in the input encoding(s), without the knowledge of the corresponding secret keys. This is precisely why we need to use FHE (rather than some simpler form of encryption).

Multiplying Oblique Encodings. It is important to note here that multiplication of two encodings that are both in the oblique representation is impossible to compute unless the elements $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ used for the oblique representation are explicitly hardwired into the obfuscated multiplication circuit. This is the case for our ‘real’ scheme.

However, for reasons relevant to the proof of SXDH, in some of our hybrid arguments, we will want to not publish $a, b, c$, and instead give out a tuple $(g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$. This means that we cannot multiply two elements in oblique form. However, in such hybrid arguments, we ensure that it is impossible to ever multiply two encodings that are both in oblique form. We expand more on this subsequently.

Extraction and Zero-Test. For extraction, we generate a probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation of a circuit that works as follows:

- Verify the proofs $\pi_0$ and $\pi_1$ to make sure the encoding is constructed correctly (if not, abort).
- Use the FHE secret keys to decrypt (at least one of) the ciphertexts and recover $\alpha = (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)$.
- Output $g^{\alpha_0 + a\alpha_1 + b\alpha_2 + c\alpha_3}$ where $g \in \mathbb{G}$ is the generator of a DDH-hard group of order $q$.

Given the aforementioned extraction circuit, zero-test follows trivially. Note that we can extract and zero-test encodings at every level – an essential feature of the “dream” version of MMaps defined in [GGH13a]. Furthermore, we only (technically) need one of the two FHE secret keys in order to successfully extract. This follows from our proof of consistency $\pi_1$, which proves that the ciphertexts encode the same $\alpha$. Looking ahead, we will exploit this in our reduction.

Comparison with Previous Works. We present a high-level comparison of our construction with those in [AFH+16] and [FHHL18]. In these papers, the authors also encode elements using two FHE ciphertexts and use a zero knowledge proof (that they can relax by using a witness to an instance of a hard language problem in an ‘or’-style proof, like we do) to argue that the proofs are consistent. While our encodings and obfuscated circuits are somewhat semantically similar, our actual techniques and proof strategies differ significantly.

To begin with, our encoding strategy can be seen as a significantly more complicated generalization of the approaches in [AFH+16] and [FHHL18]. The core differences between our construction and these previous works stem from how we choose to encode a plaintext element $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. In [AFH+16], the authors encode each plaintext element $\alpha$ as a linear function, which inherently limits their functionality to a “one-shot” MMap. The authors of [FHHL18] generalize this representation to univariate polynomials of fixed degree, which allows them to achieve a graded MMap construction.

Our encoding strategy here can be seen as a much larger further generalization, where we allow a bigger class of functions. This generalization plays a crucial role in achieving MMap constructions with stronger (source group)
assumptions, as compared to the previous works. However, our more general encoding strategy also leads to additional requirements in the scheme: in particular, we must use two (more complicated) zero-knowledge proofs \( \pi_0, \pi_1 \) instead of a single zero-knowledge proof as in \([AFH+16]\) and \([FHHL18]\). Our proofs of security are also substantially more complicated than those of these previous works.

In another prior work, Agrikola and Hofheinz \([AH18]\) used a generalization of the encoding strategies in \([AFH+16]\) and \([FHHL18]\), albeit towards a different goal - to construct a mathematical group in which an interactive variant of the very general Uber assumption holds. While their encoding strategies are conceptually similar to ours at a high level, the core techniques differ significantly.

2.2 Proof Intuition

We now present a high-level overview of the proof strategy for our SXDH-hard MMap construction. The proof can be broadly divided into three steps: (a) transforming the encodings in the SXDH challenge from normal representation to oblique representation such that these are computationally indistinguishable, (b) embedding a DDH challenge (over the group \( G \)) into the transformed encodings, and (c) switching the encodings back to the normal representation. The idea behind step (b) is as follows: when the DDH instance over the group \( G \) is real (respectively, random), the transformed encodings constitute a real (respectively, random) SXDH instance over the MMap.

We will start by explaining our core proof goal at a high level. Then we will explain how some of our techniques for completing the proof work.

Overall Goal: Embedding a DDH Challenge. The core idea behind our proof is to embed a DDH challenge in our encodings: the “real” SXDH distribution will correspond to a “real” DDH term embedded in our encodings, and the “random” SXDH distribution will correspond to a “random” DDH term embedded. How exactly this works is a little bit complicated, and necessitates our use of oblique encodings to switch between “real” and “random” SXDH challenge encodings. Recall that the SXDH assumption requires that the following indistinguishability holds for a “top-level” level-set \( i \):

\[
(\text{Encode } (\alpha, i), \text{Encode } (\beta, i), \text{Encode } (\alpha \cdot \beta, i)) \approx (\text{Encode } (\alpha, i), \text{Encode } (\beta, i), \text{Encode } (\gamma, i)),
\]

where \( \alpha, \beta, \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \). In our SXDH-hard MMap construction, we encode an element \( \alpha \) as a tuple of the form \((\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3)\) with the restriction that for some fixed \( a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q \),

\[
\alpha = \alpha_0 + a \cdot \alpha_1 + b \cdot \alpha_2 + c \cdot \alpha_3 \mod q.
\]

In our construction we consider two kinds of possible ways of representing an element \( \alpha \) - the normal representation and the oblique representation. In the first case, we encode \( \alpha \) using only \( \alpha_0 \), while the remaining slots are unused (this is actually what is done in the real construction). In an oblique representation, all terms may be arbitrary as long as the resultant encoding value is consistent. Many of the hybrid arguments in our proof of security rely crucially on this oblique encoding strategy.

How might we do this? We can use the exponents \( a, b, \) and \( c \) to help here by directly tying them to the SXDH (and corresponding DDH) challenge. In particular, we will use these elements to encode a challenge that can either be “real” or “random” depending on the choices we make. More precisely, we can sample \( a \) and \( b \) uniformly from \( \mathbb{Z}_q \), and, in the “real” case, set \( c = ab \), and in the random case, sample \( c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \). Our challenge elements will quite literally be \( \text{Encode } (a, i), \text{Encode } (b, i), \) and \( \text{Encode } (c, i) \) where \( i \) denotes the level-set at which we want to encode the challenge.

Note that this distribution of encodings is correct for an SXDH challenge. Moreover, we can use either one of the following representations for the challenge encodings:

\[
((a, 0, 0, 0), (b, 0, 0, 0), (c, 0, 0, 0)) \quad \text{or} \quad ((0, 1, 0, 0), (0, 0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 0, 0)).
\]

\(^1\)Some SXDH definitions require this level-set to be a \textit{top-level} “group” (i.e. \( l_j = 1 \) for some \( j \) and \( l_k = 0 \) for all \( k \neq j \)), others require that it hold for \textit{any} level-set, and still others require that it hold for \textit{all} level-sets. We discuss these nuances when defining SXDH, but for now assume that this level-set is top-level.
Of course, an SXDH adversary should not be able to tell whether \( c = ab \) or \( c \) is random. If we give out these terms in the clear (even to the obfuscator!), then proving security becomes difficult. However, it turns out we do not have to give \( a, b, \) and \( c \) out directly in all of our hybrid arguments: we can give them out in the form of a DDH tuple \( (g, g^a, g^b, g^c) \) and work with the oblique encodings, which, as we showed above, are themselves independent of \( a, b, \) and \( c \) (even if these are needed for the evaluation). We can continue to compute (almost) all of our multilinear map algorithms using just this DDH tuple, and we can argue that, since the outputs are the same whether or not we use the DDH tuple or the terms \( a, b, \) and \( c \) in the clear for our multilinear map algorithms, the obfuscated programs for our circuits can “forget” \( a, b, \) and \( c \) themselves and use the DDH tuple at this step without any adversary being able to tell. This allows us to show that any adversary that can break this (crucial) step of our proof of SXDH can be used to break DDH. We elaborate on this below.

**Group Embedding.** Working with the tuple \( (g, g^a, g^b, g^c) \), rather than the exponents \( a, b, \) and \( c \) themselves, is a little bit tricky. However, we can (mostly) compute all of the required algorithms, which we show next.

**Addition and Inversion.** To begin, observe that addition and inversion of encodings do not require the knowledge of the exponents \( a, b \) and \( c \). In particular, given an encoding of \( x = (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) \) and \( y = (y_0, y_1, y_2, y_3) \), the reduction can exploit the homomorphic properties of the group to compute encodings in the following way:

\[
x + y = (x_0 + y_0, x_1 + y_1, x_2 + y_2, x_3 + y_3), \quad -x = (-x_0, -x_1, -x_2, -x_3).
\]

To see why this works, note that

\[
g^{x_0+ax_1+bx_2+cx_3} \cdot g^{y_0+ay_1+by_2+cy_3} = g^{(x_0+y_0)+a(x_1+y_1)+b(x_2+y_2)+c(x_3+y_3)}.
\]

**Extraction and Zero-Testing.** Extraction and zero-testing are also relatively simple to handle given only the DDH tuple of \( (g, g^a, g^b, g^c) \) instead of \( a, b, \) and \( c \). Given an encoding of \( x = (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) \), the extraction circuit outputs

\[
g^x = g^{x_0+a\cdot x_1+b\cdot x_2+c\cdot x_3} = g^{x_0} \cdot g^{a\cdot x_1} \cdot g^{b\cdot x_2} \cdot g^{c\cdot x_3}.
\]

Note that this is a valid extraction algorithm, since all representations of \( x \) extract to the same group element. Furthermore, this is very simple to compute (just group exponentiation and multiplication) given an encoding and a DDH tuple.

**Multiplication.** Multiplication of encodings given only the DDH tuple requires some more care, and the difficulty of multiplication in this case is the root cause of the complexity of our construction and proofs. To begin with, observe that given an oblique encoding of \( x = (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) \) and a normal encoding of \( y = (y_0, 0, 0, 0) \), we can exploit the homomorphic properties of the group to compute an encoding of the following product:

\[
x \cdot y = (x_0 \cdot y_0, x_1 \cdot y_0, x_2 \cdot y_0, x_3 \cdot y_0).
\]

This still does not require the knowledge of the constants \( a, b, \) and \( c \) and holds true since

\[
e \left( g^{x_0+ax_1+bx_2+cx_3}, y_0 \right) = g^{(x_0+ax_1+bx_2+cx_3)y_0} = g^{x_0y_0+ax_1y_0+bx_2y_0+cx_3y_0}.
\]

On the other hand, if the encoding of \( y \) also uses the oblique representation (i.e., all slots can be used to encode the plaintext element), then evaluating the cross-product terms would require knowledge of the exponents \( a, b, \) and \( c \). This would be a problem for us, because our multiplication circuit would not work for certain encodings if we only had the DDH tuple and not the “secret” exponents. So, we have a slight dilemma: we need to enable oblique encodings for (at least) the challenge encodings so that we do not need the secret exponents \( a, b, \) and \( c \) in the clear, but we also need to ensure that we never have to multiply two oblique encodings (necessitating some kind of restriction on the oblique encodings).
Fixing Multiplication. We can avoid this issue by modifying what elements are allowed to be in oblique form. Note that all of the challenge elements, by definition, are in a (top-level) level set $i$, for some binary vector $i$ such that there exists an index $j$ such that $i_j = 1$ and $i_k = 0$ for all $k \neq j$. If we ensured that only elements where $i_j = 1$ could be encoded obliquely, then we would never have to multiply two obliquely encoded elements: multiplying two elements that have a level in common is forbidden by the definition of an asymmetric multilinear map, so we could never multiply two elements for which both had $i_j = 1$. Allowing oblique encodings for elements where $i_j = 1$ also still allows us to obliquely encode the challenge elements, since $i_j = 1$ for them by the definition of the SXDH assumption.

This, it turns out, is exactly what we do. If we go back to the definition of our encodings, we can see that our proof $\pi_0$ pertains to what form encodings take. Now we sample the language instances $z_{j, b}$ for $j \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$ in a manner that ensures that, at the key step of our hybrid argument, oblique encodings are only allowed for encodings such that the level-set $i$ satisfies $i_j = 1$. At a high level, this would involve sampling only $z_{j, 1}$ as a “yes” instance and all others as “no” instances. We can use the proof $\pi_0$ to enforce that any valid encoding must either be in normal representation, or correspond to a level-set $i$ such that $i_j = 1$. This constitutes the core technical idea that allows us to complete the proof. In the next section, we present more details of how to actually implement this idea.

2.3 Proof Techniques and Details

The above proof intuition explains the overall strategy for our proof. However, it does not explain many of the details of the construction, or how our overall proof is structured. We attempt to close some of those gaps here. We additionally point out that Appendix 6 also provides a substantial amount of intuition into how our proof hybrids are arranged at a high level, and why we choose to arrange them in this manner. In particular, the description of the “outer hybrids” in Appendix 6.1 serves as a high-level proof overview with much more technical detail than in this overview, and we encourage readers with questions about material in this section to refer to Appendix 6.1 for clarification.

Overall Proof Structure. We start by describing the overall structure of our proof. This is not the exact structure of our hybrids (some of the steps below constitute multiple hybrids), but the overall flow is the same.

1. We start with our actual construction, with a “random” SXDH challenge tuple. The multilinear map circuits (add, invert, multiply, and extract) have access to the secret exponents $a$, $b$, and $c$.

2. We switch the first FHE ciphertext of our challenge encodings to oblique form. This involves a step where we “forget” the secret keys corresponding to the first FHE ciphertexts in the tuples.

3. We switch the second FHE ciphertext of our challenge encodings to oblique form. This step is almost identical to the previous step in terms of the proof.

4. We modify our circuits to enforce the special restrictions on oblique encodings described above, where oblique encodings are only allowed for terms that contain the level-set of the challenge elements.

5. Our circuits “forget” $a$, $b$, and $c$, and use the tuple $(g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$ instead when needed in the circuit algorithms. Note that the DDH tuple itself is a “random” tuple where $c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ uniformly at random.

6. We switch the DDH tuple from “random” to “real” (i.e. $c = ab$). As a result, the challenge encodings, which are in oblique representation, get automatically switched from “random” to “real” SXDH encodings over our MMap.

7. We run all of the above steps except for (5) in reverse and “clean up.”

The overview above accurately describes our high-level hybrid structure. In the actual proof, these high-level or “outer” hybrids are often sub-divided into sequences of “inner” hybrids to deal with the interplay between the NIZK proof system and the piO scheme. In the rest of this subsection, we will look at a few steps/hybrids of the proof in more detail. We believe that these will provide intuition for how the proofs work.
**OR Proofs with Hard Languages.** One of the key ingredients in our proof that we use repeatedly is what we call an “OR proof.” Suppose we have some “hard” language \( L \) where we can efficiently sample both “yes” and “no” instances of \( L \). Furthermore, we require that (a) it is hard to efficiently distinguish between “yes” and “no” instances of \( L \), that each “yes” instance of \( L \) has a unique language membership witness, and that there is an efficient verification function of the form \( R_\ell : \text{instance } \times \text{witness } \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \). We define these languages formally in definition 3.2 and note that the existence of such \( L \) follow from the existence of DDH-hard groups.

Our OR proofs will typically be statements of the following form:

- **Either** an MMap encoding satisfies some property (e.g., consistency or normal representation).

- **Or** there is a witness \( \text{wit}_x \) for an instance \( x \) of \( L \) such that \( R_\ell (x, \text{wit}_x) = 1 \).

These OR proofs allow us to subtly change things in our security proofs while still allowing us to use \( \piO \) (which requires input/output equivalence of programs up to “randomness”). The interplay between the language \( L \) and our zero knowledge proof system is key to these OR proofs’ usefulness.

Recall that we require a dual-mode \( \text{NIZK} \) proof system that is perfectly sound and extractable in the binding mode, and perfectly witness indistinguishable and perfectly zero-knowledge in the hiding mode. Our proofs will typically start out in binding mode. The perfect binding property allows us to ensure that, if \( x \notin L \), then such a proof will never verify in binding mode unless the property check passes.

Next, suppose that we have an MMap circuit that, when handling the OR proof(s) in the input encoding(s), uses an extraction trapdoor \( t_{\text{ext}} \) to extract a language-membership witness \( \text{wit}_x \) for \( x \) from a verifying proof of membership for \( x \). Now consider an alternative version of the same circuit that is identical except that it uses a hardwired language-membership witness \( \text{wit}'_x \) for the same \( x \). Since instances of \( L \) have unique witnesses, then we know that the extracted witness \( \text{wit}_x \) must be the same as the hardwired witness \( \text{wit}'_x \). Therefore, the output distribution of these two programs is identical. Now, if needed in some hybrid of the proof, we could make this switch, and invoke \( \piO \) security against X-IND samplers to argue that the obfuscations of the two circuit versions are computationally indistinguishable.

We also extensively use hiding mode in our OR proofs. In particular, suppose we have two versions of an MMap circuit that are identical except that they generate valid proofs with different witnesses as part of the output encodings. For example, the first version generates a verifying proof of consistency, while the second version generates a verifying membership proof for some \( x \in L \). Since the \( \text{NIZK} \) proof system is perfectly witness indistinguishable in the hiding mode, the output distributions of both versions of the circuit are identical. So yet again, if needed in some hybrid of the proof, we could make this switch, and invoke \( \piO \) security against X-IND samplers to argue that the obfuscations of the two circuit versions are computationally indistinguishable.

Finally note that we can switch our \( \text{NIZK} \) proof systems between hiding mode and binding mode in a computationally indistinguishable manner. This follows from the fact that the public parameters of our \( \text{NIZK} \) proof system can be selected independently from (and before) the rest of the construction (circuits, etc.) is generated. We exploit this in several hybrids of our proof.

**Enabling Oblique Encodings.** With our OR proofs in mind, we can describe how we enable oblique encodings in our construction. Below, we describe how we enable oblique encodings for all terms (which turns out to be the first step in our overall proof). Each of these steps is rather complicated and consists of a number of sub-steps, which we outline below. We assume the challenge terms are in some level \( i = (i_1, \ldots, i_n) \) such that \( i_j = 1 \) for some \( j \in [n] \).

1. We start with the obfuscated circuits of the actual scheme, and “random” challenge encodings in normal form. All of our language instances are unsatisfiable and our proof systems are in binding mode and generate witnesses using extraction trapdoors.

2. We change the language instances \( z_{j,0} \) and \( z_{j,1} \) to be members. Note that this is a simple step in the proof, since we can simulate the rest of the components of the multilinear map given the language instances.

3. We modify the obfuscated MMap circuits so that they directly use the hardwired witnesses \( \text{wit}_{z_{j,0}} \) and \( \text{wit}_{z_{j,1}} \) for these instances in order to generate verifying proofs \( \pi_0 \) as part of their output encodings. We note that this effectively allows all encodings to be oblique.
4. We switch the proofs $\pi_0$ of the challenge encodings to language-membership proofs using the witness $\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}$, rather than proving normal representation using some other witness (in particular, the FHE secret keys).

While step 2 is simple, steps 3 and 4 are more complicated: in order to switch witnesses, we need to switch our NIZK proof system to hiding mode. Our NIZK proof system is only guaranteed to have perfect witness indistinguishability in hiding mode, so steps 3 and 4 are actually realized via a sequence of smaller sub-steps, relying a combination of piO-security and NIZK properties (in particular, the indistinguishability of the hiding and binding modes, and perfect witness indistinguishability in hiding mode).

Later in the proof, when we only want to enable oblique encodings for elements such that $i_j = 1$, we will use a similar argument, but only modify the proofs and witnesses for elements where $i_j = 1$.

**Indistinguishability of Encoding Representations.** One of the core steps in our proof is switching the FHE ciphertexts (one at a time) from encodings in normal form to encodings in oblique form (so that we can eventually embed a DDH challenge). Each of these steps is rather complicated and consists of a number of sub-steps, which we outline below. We only describe the first FHE ciphertext switch below, as the second is almost identical to the first. As before, we assume the challenge terms are in some level $i = (i_1, \ldots, i_n)$ such that $i_j = 1$ for some $j \in [n]$.

1. We start by assuming that our circuits use the appropriate hardwired witnesses to output valid oblique encodings, as discussed above. The FHE ciphertexts in the challenge encodings themselves are still in the normal form. However, the proofs of normal form encoding have been replaced with proofs of language membership, as discussed earlier.

2. We next change the language instance $y$ (used in $\pi_1$) to be a satisfying or “yes” instance in $L$.

3. Our circuits “forget” the secret key for the first FHE ciphertext in the encodings. We evaluate addition and multiplication homomorphically on the first FHE ciphertext, which allows us to create new encodings that are correctly distributed. In the extract circuit, we just use the second FHE ciphertext (for which we still have the secret keys) and ignore the first FHE ciphertext. At a high level, we justify these steps by invoking piO security and the perfect soundness of the NIZK proof system in the binding mode).

4. We modify the MMap circuits so that they always use the witness $\text{wit}_y$ to generate proofs for $\pi_1$ rather than proving the consistency check natively (i.e. by using the secret keys of the FHE scheme). This is a crucial step that requires multiple hybrids and involves many alterations to the obfuscated MMap circuits (all of which are justified by invoking piO security and the perfect witness indistinguishability of the NIZK proof system in hiding mode).

5. We switch the proofs $\pi_1$ of the challenge encodings to language-membership proofs using the witness $\text{wit}_y$, rather than proving consistency using the FHE secret keys. In this step, we again crucially rely on the perfect witness indistinguishability of the NIZK proof system in hiding mode.

6. At this point, all of the MMap circuits and the challenge encodings have essentially “forgotten” the secret key for the first FHE ciphertext. So we can switch the first FHE ciphertext in each of the challenge tuples from normal form to the special oblique form described earlier.

7. We repeat all of the above steps except for step 6 in the reverse order.

There are several points in the above outline that merit explanation. To begin with, forgetting the first FHE secret key in the MMap circuits (step 3) is tricky. The need to compute additions, inversions, and multiplications of encodings without secret keys is why we need to use FHE rather than a more basic form of encryption. We first note that the output distributions of the addition, inversion, multiplication, and extraction circuits are correct. However, proving this turns out to have some subtle difficulties.
By the definition of FHE, adding and multiplying two FHE ciphertexts results in a valid FHE ciphertext. But in order to apply piO, we actually need the results of homomorphically adding or multiplying two FHE ciphertexts to be identically distributed to a fresh ciphertext—otherwise the output distributions are not the same. In addition, we need decryption to always work. This means that our FHE scheme must have perfect correctness and a property we call “well-distributedness of output of FHE.Eval” (called “compactness” in [FHL18]). While LWE-based FHE schemes do not have these properties, piO-based FHE schemes such as the one in [CLTV15] do satisfy these requirements, so we can assume that FHE with these properties exists. This allows us to justify that the output distributions of the addition and multiplication circuits remain unaltered. The justification for the inversion circuit is essentially identical.

Extraction is simpler: we can just ignore the first FHE ciphertext in each tuple with regards to extraction since we can learn all of the information we need to compute the extracted value from the second FHE ciphertext. We rely on the perfect soundness guarantees of the NIZK proof system in the binding mode to argue that an adversary cannot fool the extraction circuit into accepting encodings that have inconsistent encodings. So the output distribution of the extraction circuit also remains unchanged.

Next, step 4 entails that the MMap circuits be suitably modified so that they no longer check the input encodings for consistency when deciding which witness to use for the output proof $\pi_1$. Since we are potentially switching proof witnesses here, we crucially rely on the perfect witness indistinguishability of the NIZK proof system in the hiding mode. However, our proof hybrids are designed in a manner that the adversary cannot exploit this relaxation to design valid encodings where the FHE ciphertexts do not encode the same element. In particular, we rely on the indistinguishability of the NIZK system in the binding and hiding modes for this guarantee to hold.

Finally, we note that at the conclusion of step 5, a simulator can simulate the obfuscated MMap circuits and the challenge encodings without any information about the secret key corresponding to the first FHE encryption in each encoding. This allows us to switch the first FHE ciphertext in each challenge encoding from normal to oblique form in step 6.

**Forgetting the Secret Exponents.** Once the challenge encodings have been switched from normal to oblique representation entirely, we require yet another “forgetting” step - one which essentially forms the core of our proof of SXDH-hardness. We need the MMap circuits to “forget” the secret exponents $a$, $b$ and $c$ sampled at setup and used for consistency checks/extraction over oblique encodings. More specifically, we wish to switch to MMap circuits that are only hardwired with the tuple $(g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$ rather than the exponents themselves without changing any functionality. This is a rather involved step in our proof since it involves applying piO to some carefully constructed circuits.

We explain the circuit switches and how to apply piO to them in greater detail. As explained earlier, the addition and inversion circuits do not require the knowledge of the secret exponents to add/invert encodings in oblique representation. Similarly, the extraction circuit can compute the extraction output on an oblique encoding $x = (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3)$ as:

$$g^* = g^{x_0+a\cdot x_1+b\cdot x_2+c\cdot x_3} = g^{x_0} \cdot g^{a\cdot x_1} \cdot g^{b\cdot x_2} \cdot g^{c\cdot x_3},$$

which is efficiently computable given only the tuple $(g, g^a, g^b, g^c)$. So the key focus here is our MMap multiplication circuit.

We can describe our MMap multiplication circuit in a very particular way: we use the following “if tree” to handle multiplication between encodings:

- **If** both FHE ciphertexts are in normal form, multiply using the trivial algorithm.
- **Else If** the first FHE ciphertext is in normal form and the second is in oblique form, use the oblique multiplication algorithm (that doesn’t need the values of $a$, $b$, and $c$).
- **Else If** the FHE second ciphertext is in normal form and the first is in oblique form, use the oblique multiplication algorithm with the order of ciphertexts reversed.
- **Else** use the multiplication algorithm that uses the exponents $a$, $b$, and $c$ in the clear.
At a high level, what does this convoluted representation of our multiplication circuit buy us? Suppose that in some hybrid, we force all the NIZK proofs in any valid encoding to be binding. Additionally, we fix $j^* \in [n]$ and sample the language instances $z_{j,b}$ for $j \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$ such that only $z_{j^*, 1}$ is an “yes” instance and every other instance is a “no” instance. This would enforce that any valid encoding must either be in the normal representation or must correspond to a level $i = (i_1, \ldots, i_n)$ such that $i_{j^*} = 1$. In other words, any two valid encodings in oblique representation must be incompatible for multiplication.

It is easy to see that in such a scenario, the final Else branch of the MMap multiplication circuit—the only part of the circuit that needs to use the exponents $a, b,$ and $c$ in the clear—is never satisfied. Due to the perfect soundness of our NIZK proofs in the binding mode, no adversary (even computationally unbounded) can craft an input to our multiplication circuit that satisfies this branch. So, if we create a modified MMap multiplication circuit that is identical to the real circuit except that it does not contain the last Else branch, the outputs remain unchanged. Hence, the piO obfuscations of these circuits are computationally indistinguishable. This allows us to “forget” the secret exponents $a, b,$ and $c$ from our MMap circuits, and allows us hardware these circuits with a DDH challenge instance and still preserve the functionality we need.

Of course, the above description is a simplification: our actual multiplication circuit is more complicated as some components of the output encoding need to be computed homomorphically, and we have omitted dealing with the NIZK proofs in the description above. But the intuition behind forgetting the secret exponents is exactly as described above.

### 2.4 Other Graded Encodings

So far, we have focused on our construction of an SXDH-hard asymmetric MMap. However, it turns out that understanding the SXDH-secure construction is almost sufficient for understanding all of the other constructions: our other construction of asymmetric MMaps (where the exponent-DDH assumption holds) fits in the same overall proof framework.

In particular, in all of our proofs of MMap security, we start with a “basic” group assumption (i.e. over a group without any kind of pairing), embed it in our challenge encodings, and show that any adversary that breaks the multilinear map assumption can be used to break the “basic” group assumption. In fact, this proof framework can be viewed as a generic tool that allows us to achieve asymmetric MMaps with most of the well-known (prime order) source group assumptions [EHK+13].

Note that a technical requirement in the proof framework outlined above is that the adversary is restricted from multiplying challenge encodings (or encodings derived from challenge encodings) as is the case with the SXDH assumption. This ensures that the reduction is not required to handle cross-product terms when obliquely embedding a hard problem instance into the challenge encodings.

This restriction no longer applies when we want to construct a symmetric MMap endowed with hardness assumptions. This causes some difficulty in our proofs: we need to be able to multiply challenge encodings with each other, which is not something that our proof structure can handle. At a high level, we get around this issue by strengthening the hardness assumption on the basic group $\mathbb{G}$ used in the construction.

An example of this is the following: recall that the $(\ell + 1)$-EDDH assumption over a degree-$\ell$ symmetric MMap requires that the following indistinguishability holds for any level:

$$
(\text{Encode}(\alpha), \text{Encode}(\alpha^{\ell+1})) \approx (\text{Encode}(\alpha), \text{Encode}(\alpha^*)),
$$

where $\alpha, \alpha^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$. Since the adversary can pair challenge encodings at the same level, in this case an adversary can compute all encodings of the form $\text{Encode}(\alpha^{i+(\ell+1)j})$ for all $i + j < \ell$. If we wanted to put these challenge terms “in the exponent” of a basic group like in our asymmetric constructions, we would need to provide all terms of the form $g^{\alpha^{i+(\ell+1)j}}$ for all $i + j < \ell$ for some $g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$. We can obviously not simulate this in a “basic” group given only $g^\alpha, g^{\alpha^*}$. So we instead resort to obliquely embedding an instance of a hardness assumption that would allow the reduction to simulate all possible cross-product terms resulting from such pairings. More specifically, we assume that the reduction is provided with a challenge set of group elements of one of the following forms:

$$
\left(g, \left\{g^{\alpha^{i+(\ell+1)j}}\right\}_{i+j \in [\ell]}\right) \text{ or } \left(g, \left\{g^{\alpha^*(\alpha^*)^j}\right\}_{i+j \in [\ell]}\right),
$$
where \( g \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \) and \( \alpha, \alpha^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \). Note that both sets of these terms are consistent with what an adversary could check using the multilinear map. We refer to this indistinguishability assumption as the “cross-product” \( \text{CP-}(\ell + 1)-\text{EDDH} \) assumption over the group \( \mathbb{G} \). In the main body of the paper, we prove that this assumption is implied by the power-DDH assumption [KY18] over the group \( \mathbb{G} \).

Finally, it is worth noting that the \( (\ell + 1)-\text{EDDH} \) assumption over a degree-\( \ell \) symmetric multilinear map implies many of the most commonly studied and used assumptions over symmetric multilinear maps. For a full discussion and reductions between all of the assumptions, we refer the reader to [EHK+13].

3 Preliminaries

We begin by defining some standard cryptographic definitions and assumptions. This section contains all of our non-multilinear map related definitions; those we defer to section 4. We also show some relationships between (simple) group-based assumptions.

3.1 Cryptographic Background

In this subsection, we present background material on cryptoprimitives that are used throughout this paper.

Dual-Mode NIZK Proof System. For our constructions, we need dual-mode NIZK proof systems with special properties. Concretely, we need NIZK proof systems that are

- perfectly complete in both modes;
- perfectly extractable and perfectly sound in the binding mode;
- perfectly zero knowledge and perfectly witness indistinguishable in the hiding mode.

We remark that the pairing-based proof system of Groth and Sahai [GS08] suffices for our applications. We recall the definition of a dual-mode NIZK proof system with the aforementioned properties, adopting the definition from [FHHL18].

Let \( \text{Setup} \) be an algorithm that outputs \( \text{pp} \) on input \( 1^\lambda \). We assume that \( R \) is an algorithm to check that a ternary relation \( R(\text{pp}, x, w) \) holds.\(^1\) A dual-mode extractable NIZK proof for \( \text{Setup} \) and \( R \) is a tuple of algorithms as follows:

- \( \text{Bcrs}(\text{pp}) \): Outputs a binding mode \( \text{crs} \) along with an extraction trapdoor \( \text{td}_e \).
- \( \text{Hcrs}(\text{pp}) \): Outputs a hiding mode \( \text{crs} \) along with a simulation trapdoor \( \text{td}_z \).
- \( \text{P}(\text{pp}, \text{crs}, x, w) \): Outputs a proof \( \pi \) for an instance \( x \) with witness \( w \).
- \( \text{V}(\text{pp}, \text{crs}, x, \pi) \): Outputs 1/0 for accept/reject.
- \( \text{Ext}(\text{td}_e, x, \pi) \): Outputs a witness given a trapdoor, an instance, and a proof.
- \( \text{S}(\text{td}_z, x) \): Outputs a simulated proof given a trapdoor and an instance.

These algorithms should satisfy the following properties:

- Indistinguishability of modes: If \( \text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \), then \( \text{Bcrs}(\text{pp}) \approx \text{Hcrs}(\text{pp}) \).

\(^1\)We overload the notation \( R \) to note both the relation and algorithm for simplicity.
• Perfect completeness: For any \( pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \), any \((\text{crs}, *) \leftarrow \text{Bcrs}(pp)\), any \((pp, x, w)\) that satisfies the relation, and any proof \( \pi \leftarrow \text{P}(pp, \text{crs}, x, w) \) it holds that \( V(pp, \text{crs}, x, \pi) = 1 \). In addition, this property should also hold for any choice of hiding crs.

• Perfect soundness in the binding mode: For any \( pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \), any \((\text{crs}, *) \leftarrow \text{Bcrs}(pp)\), and any \( x \) for which there is no witness to satisfy the relation, we require that \( V(pp, \text{crs}, x, \pi) = 0 \) for any \( \pi \).

• Perfect extraction in the binding mode: For any \( pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \), any \((\text{crs}, \text{td}_x) \leftarrow \text{Bcrs}(pp)\), and any \( (x, \pi) \) for which \( V(pp, \text{crs}, x, \pi) = 1 \), we require that \( R(pp, x, w) = 1 \) for any witness \( w \) generated as \( w \leftarrow \text{Ext}(\text{td}_x, x, \pi) \).

• Perfect witness indistinguishability in the hiding mode: For any \( pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \), any \((\text{crs}, *) \leftarrow \text{Hcrs}(pp)\), and any pair \((x, w_b)\) that satisfies the relation (with respect to pp) for \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), the distribution of \( P(pp, \text{crs}, x, w_0) \) is identical to that of \( P(pp, \text{crs}, x, w_1) \).

• Perfect zero knowledge in the hiding mode: For any \( pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \), any \((\text{crs}, \text{td}_x) \leftarrow \text{Hcrs}(pp)\), and any pair \((x, w)\) that satisfies the relation (with respect to pp), the distribution of \( P(pp, \text{crs}, x, w) \) is identical to that of \( S(\text{td}_x, x) \).

**Fully-Homomorphic Encryption.** Here we mention the definition of fully homomorphic encryption [Gen09] for bits. The following definition naturally generalizes to an arbitrary message space (say \( \mathbb{Z}_q \)). We remark that in the following definition we assume that the evaluation key is included as part of the public key.

**Definition 3.1.** A fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme (for bits) is a tuple of four algorithms \((\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Eval})\) such that the tuple \((\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})\) is a CPA-secure PKE scheme and the evaluation algorithm \(\text{Eval}\) satisfies homomorphism and compactness properties as defined below:

- **CPA security:** If \((pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)\) then for any messages \(m_0\) and \(m_1\) we have
  \[
  \text{Enc}(pk, m_0) \approx \text{Enc}(pk, m_1).
  \]

- **Homomorphism:** For any (boolean) function \(f : \{0, 1\}^{\ell} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\) and any sequence of \(\ell\) messages \(m_1, \ldots, m_\ell\) if \((pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)\) and \(c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_i)\) then
  \[
  \Pr[\text{Dec}(sk, \text{Eval}(pk, c_1, \ldots, c_\ell)) = f(m_1, \ldots, m_\ell)] = 1.
  \]

- **Compactness:** There exists a polynomial \(p(\lambda)\) such that the output of \(\text{Eval}\) has \(p(\lambda)\) bits, and \(p(\lambda)\) is independent of size of \(f\) and the number of inputs.

We remark that for our constructions we need an FHE scheme with the following two properties. Such an FHE scheme can be realized under from sub-exponentially hard iO and one-way functions [CLTV15].

- **Perfect correctness:** For any message \(m\) in the message space \(\mathcal{M}\), it holds that
  \[
  \Pr[\text{Dec}(sk(\text{Enc}(pk, m))) = m] = 1,
  \]
  where \((pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)\).

- **Well-distributedness of output of Eval algorithm:** For any (boolean) function \(f : \mathcal{M}^{\ell} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}\) and any sequence of \(\ell\) messages \(m_1, \ldots, m_\ell\) if \((pk, sk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)\) and \(c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk, m_i)\), it holds that
  \[
  \text{Enc}(pk, f(m_1, \ldots, m_\ell)) \equiv \text{Eval}(\text{Enc}(pk, m_1), \ldots, \text{Enc}(pk, m_\ell))
  \]
  where \(\equiv\) means that the two distributions are identically distributed and each encryption uses a fresh and independent randomness.
Languages with Hard-Membership. We provide the definition of language family with hard membership property. A hard language with the following properties can be based on any DDH-hard group. We refer the reader to [FHHL18] for more details.

Definition 3.2. A language family with hard membership is a tuple of three algorithms \((\text{Gen}, \text{Sam}, \text{R})\) with the following syntax:

- **Gen:** On input \(1^\lambda\) outputs some public parameter \(\text{pp}\).
- **Sam:** On input \(\text{pp}\) and a bit \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), it uniformly samples a YES/NO instance of the language depending on the bit \(b\).
- **R:** On inputs \((\text{pp}, x, w)\) outputs a bit which denotes whether \(x\) belongs to the language or not.

We require the following properties:

- **Correctness:** For any \(\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)\) and any \(x \leftarrow \text{Sam}(1)\) (respectively \(x \leftarrow \text{Sam}(\text{pp})\)), there exists (respectively, does not exist) a witness \(w\) such that \(\text{R}(\text{pp}, x, w) = 1\) (respectively, \(\text{R}(\text{pp}, x, w) = 0\)).
- **Security:** If \(x_0 \leftarrow \text{Sam}(0)\) and \(x_1 \leftarrow \text{Sam}(1)\) then \(x_0 \approx x_1\).
- **Uniqueness:** For any \(\text{pp} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)\), any \(x \leftarrow \text{Sam}(1)\), and any pair of witnesses \(w, w'\) if \(\text{R}(\text{pp}, x, w) = \text{R}(\text{pp}, x, w') = 1\) then \(w = w'\).

Indistinguishability Obfuscation. We recall the definition of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) from [BGI+01].

Definition 3.3. A PPT algorithm \(\text{Obf}\) is an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit family \(C_\lambda\) with input space \(\{0, 1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}\) if:

- **Correctness:** For every circuit \(C \in C_\lambda\) and every input \(x \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}\) we have:
  \[
  \Pr[C(x) = C'(x) : C' \leftarrow \text{Obf}(C)] = 1,
  \]
  where the probability is taken over the randomness of \(\text{Obf}\) algorithm.
- **Security:** For any PPT attacker \(\mathcal{A}\) and for any two functionally equivalent circuits \(C_0 \in C_\lambda\) and \(C_1 \in C_\lambda\) such that \(|C_0| = |C_1|\), it holds that:
  \[
  |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\lambda, C_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\lambda, C_1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).
  \]

Probabilistic Indistinguishability Obfuscation. We recall the definition of probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation (pIO) for a class of samplers from [CLTV15].

Definition 3.4. We say that \(\text{pIO}\) is an indistinguishability obfuscator for a class of samplers \(\mathcal{S}\) over the (randomized) circuit family \(C\) if it satisfies the following properties:

- On input a circuit \(C\) and security parameter \(\lambda\), outputs a deterministic circuit \(\overline{C}\) of size \(\text{poly}(|C|, \lambda)\).
- For every PPT attacker \(\mathcal{A}\), every circuit \(C\), and string \(\text{str}\), consider the following experiments:
  - \(\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(C, \text{str})\): \(\mathcal{A}\) participates in an unbounded number of iterations, and in iteration \(i\), \(\mathcal{A}\) chooses an \(x_i\); if \(x_i\) is equal to any of the previously chosen input \(x_j\) (for \(j < i\)) abort. Otherwise, \(\mathcal{A}\) gets \(C(x_i; r_i)\) using fresh randomness \(r_i\). Finally, \(\mathcal{A}\) outputs a bit \(b\).
  - \(\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(C, \text{str})\): Let \(\overline{C} = \text{pIO}(C; r)\). Run \(\mathcal{A}\) as in the previous experiment except that in each iteration, provide \(\mathcal{A}\) with \(\overline{C}(x_i)\).

We require that for any PPT attacker \(\mathcal{A}\), every circuit \(C\), and every polynomial-length string \(\text{str}\) it holds that:
\[
|\Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\text{Exp}_0} = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}_{\text{Exp}_1} = 1]| \leq \text{negl}.
\]
We now introduce a new assumption called the cross-product-EDDH assumption, or CP-EDDH assumption in short. At

\[ \text{Definition 3.9.} \]

and above the terms in the standard \( \text{assumption in the sense that indistinguishability holds even in the presence of some additional cross-product terms over a high level, for any } k > 1 \text{ over a group } G \).

We also recall the definition of \( X \text{-IND} \) samplers from [CLTV15].

**Definition 3.5.** The class \( S^{X \text{-IND}} \) of (static-input) \( X \text{-IND} \) samplers for a circuit family \( C \) contains all circuit samplers \( D = \{ D_{\lambda} \} \) for \( C \) with the following property: For every \( \lambda \), there is a set \( X' = X'_{\lambda} \) of size at most \( X(\lambda) \leq 2^\lambda \) such that

- With overwhelming probability over the choice of \( (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow D_{\lambda} \), for every \( x' \notin X' \), it holds that \( C_0(x', r) = C_1(x', r) \) for every random string \( r \).
- For every PPT adversary \( A = (A_1, A_2) \), the advantage of \( A \) in the following experiments is \( \negl \cdot X^{-1} \):
  1. \( (x, st) \leftarrow A_1(1^\lambda) \).
  2. \( (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow D \).
  3. \( y \leftarrow C_b(x) \) where \( b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \).
  4. \( b' \leftarrow A(st, C_0, C_1, z, x, y) \).

The advantage of \( A \) is defined to be \( \Pr[b = b'] - 1/2 \).

**Definition 3.6.** Let \( X \) be a by function such that \( X \leq 2^\lambda \). We say that a uniform PPT algorithm \( X \cdot \piO \) is an \( X \cdot \piO \) for randomized circuits if it is a \( \piO \) for the class of \( X \text{-IND} \) samplers \( S^{X \text{-IND}} \) over \( C \) that includes all randomized circuits of size at most \( \lambda \).

Finally, we note that \( X \text{-IND} \piO \) can be realized from sub-exponentially hard iO (see §2.6 of [CLTV15] for details).

### 3.2 Hardness Assumptions over Generic Groups

In this section, we describe some hardness assumptions over generic pairing-free prime order groups. We begin by recalling certain standard assumptions; we refer the reader to [EHK+13] for more background information on these assumptions.

**Definition 3.7.** (The Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Assumption). We say that the DDH assumption holds over a group \( G \) of prime order \( q \) if letting \( g \leftarrow G \) and \( \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^* \), we have:

\[ (g, g^{\gamma_1}, g^{\gamma_2}, g^{\gamma_1 \cdot \gamma_2}) \approx (g, g^{\gamma_1}, g^{\gamma_2}, g^{\gamma_3}) \, . \]

**Definition 3.8.** (The Exponent-DDH (EDDH) Assumption). We say that the \( k \)-EDDH assumption holds over a group \( G \) of prime order \( q \) if letting \( g \leftarrow G \) and \( \gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^* \), we have:

\[ (g, g^{\gamma}, g^{\gamma k}) \approx (g, g^{\gamma}, g^{\delta}) \, . \]

**Definition 3.9.** (The Power-DDH Assumption). [KY18, BMZ19] We say that the \( k \)-power-DDH assumption holds over a group \( G \) of prime order \( q \) if letting \( g \leftarrow G \) and \( \gamma, \delta_0, \delta_1, \ldots, \delta_k \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^* \), we have:

\[ (g, g^{\gamma}, g^{\gamma 2}, g^{\gamma 3}, \ldots, g^{\gamma k}) \approx (g^{\delta_0}, g^{\delta_1}, g^{\delta_2}, \ldots, g^{\delta_k}) \, . \]

We now introduce a new assumption called the cross-product-EDDH assumption, or CP-EDDH assumption in short. At a high level, for any \( k > 1 \), one can view the \( k \)-CP-EDDH assumption as a strengthening of the standard \( (k+1) \)-EDDH assumption in the sense that indistinguishability holds even in the presence of some additional cross-product terms over and above the terms in the standard \( (k+1) \)-EDDH assumption. We formally define this assumption below.
Definition 3.10. (The Cross-Product (CP)-EDDH Assumption). We say that the $k$-CP-EDDH assumption holds over a group $G$ of prime order $q$ if letting $g \leftarrow G$ and $\gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, we have:

\[
\left( \left\{ g_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{\gamma_{\ell, \ell'} + (k + 1) \cdot \ell} \right\}_{\ell, \ell' \in [0, k]} \right) \equiv_c \left( \left\{ g_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{\gamma_{\ell, \ell'} \cdot \ell'} \right\}_{\ell, \ell' \in [0, k]} \right).
\]

Finally, we state and prove the following lemma.

Lemma 3.11. The $k$-CP-EDDH assumption is implied by the $k(2)$-power-DDH assumption.

Proof. At a high level, our approach is to show that whenever the $k(k + 2)$-power-DDH assumption holds, both the “left” and “right” distributions of group elements in the $k$-CP-EDDH assumption are, in fact, computationally indistinguishable from a $k(k + 1)/2$-sized set of uniformly randomly sampled group elements. This immediately implies that these two distributions are computationally indistinguishable from each other, as desired.

We begin by showing that the first of these implications. More specifically, we show that whenever the $k(k + 2)$-power-DDH assumption holds, the “left” distribution of group elements in the $k$-CP-EDDH assumption is computationally indistinguishable from a $k(k + 1)/2$-sized set of uniformly randomly sampled group elements. First of all, observe that by the $k(k + 2)$-power-DDH assumption, we have:

\[
(g, g^\gamma, g^{\gamma^2}, \ldots, g^{\gamma^{k(k + 1)}}) \equiv_c (g^{\delta_0}, g^{\delta_1}, \ldots, g^{\delta_{k(k + 2)}}),
\]

which can be equivalently stated as:

\[
\left( \left\{ g^{\gamma_{\ell, \ell'} + (k + 1) \cdot \ell} \right\}_{\ell, \ell' \in [0, k]} \right) \equiv_c \left( \left\{ g^{\delta_{\ell, \ell'} + (k + 1) \cdot \ell} \right\}_{\ell, \ell' \in [0, k]} \right).
\]

Note that we merely changed the manner in which the indices for the various elements are represented. We note that this implies indistinguishability for any particular subset of the $(\ell, \ell')$-tuples, which include those that satisfy $(\ell + \ell') \in [0, k]$. In particular, we have:

\[
\left( \left\{ g^{\gamma_{\ell, \ell'} + (k + 1) \cdot \ell} \right\}_{\ell, \ell' \in [0, k]} \right) \equiv_c \left( \left\{ g^{\delta_{\ell, \ell'} + (k + 1) \cdot \ell} \right\}_{\ell, \ell' \in [0, k]} \right)
\]

where the left-hand side of the above equation is just the “left” distribution in the $k$-CP-EDDH assumption. At this point we have established that whenever the $k(k + 2)$-power-DDH assumption holds, the “left” distribution of group elements in the $k$-CP-EDDH assumption is computationally indistinguishable from a $k(k + 1)/2$-sized set of uniformly randomly sampled group elements.

Next, we show that whenever the $k(k + 2)$-power-DDH assumption holds, the “right” distribution of group elements in the $k$-CP-EDDH assumption is computationally indistinguishable from a $k(k + 1)/2$-sized set of uniformly randomly sampled group elements. Observe that by a hybrid application of the $k$-power-DDH assumption (which is trivially implied by the $k(k + 2)$-power-DDH assumption), we have

\[
\left( \left\{ g^{\gamma_{\ell, \ell'} \cdot \ell'} \right\}_{(\ell, \ell') \in [0, k]} \right) \equiv_c \left( \left\{ g^{\delta_{\ell, \ell'} \cdot \ell'} \right\}_{(\ell, \ell') \in [0, k]} \right) \equiv_c \left( \left\{ g^{\delta_{\ell, \ell'} \cdot (k + 1) \cdot \ell'} \right\}_{(\ell, \ell') \in [0, k]} \right).
\]

Finally, by the DDH assumption (which is again trivially implied by the $k(k + 2)$-power-DDH assumption), we have

\[
\left( \left\{ g^{\delta_{\ell, \ell'} \cdot \ell'} \right\}_{(\ell, \ell') \in [0, k]} \right) \equiv_c \left( \left\{ g^{\delta_{\ell, \ell'} \cdot (k + 1) \cdot \ell'} \right\}_{(\ell, \ell') \in [0, k]} \right).
\]

where the distribution on the right consists of a $k(k + 1)/2$-sized set of uniformly randomly sampled group elements. At this point we have established that whenever the $k(k + 2)$-power-DDH assumption holds, the “right” distribution of
group elements in the $k$-CP-EDDH assumption is computationally indistinguishable from a $k(k + 1)/2$-sized set of uniformly randomly sampled group elements.

Combining the aforementioned results immediately yields the implication that the $k$-CP-EDDH assumption whenever the $k(k + 2)$-power-DDH assumption holds, as desired.

4 Multilinear Maps

In this section, we define multilinear maps (graded encodings) and some of their properties. While most of this section is standard and thus not new to a reader familiar with the area, we do emphasize that we have some new material. In particular, we need to delve into the security games of asymmetric multilinear maps and related assumptions such as SXDH in ways that, to our knowledge, have not been previously explored. In particular, we address certain definitional ambiguities surrounding polynomial-degree multilinear maps and associated hardness assumptions that we have not seen addressed explicitly in previous works.

We start by defining some basic notation around multilinear maps. Traditionally, a (symmetric) multilinear map has been defined in the literature as a deterministic function $e : G^n \rightarrow G_T$ where plaintexts $\alpha$ were encoded as $g^\alpha$ for some generator $g \in G$, with the property that $e(g^{\alpha_1}, \ldots, g^{\alpha_n}) = e(g, \ldots, g)^{\prod_{i=1}^n \alpha_i}$. Unfortunately we cannot construct such nice and simple multilinear maps, as our constructions will have randomized encodings. Moreover, we will build multilinear maps with the additional property that such maps can be partially computed, or “graded.” Technically speaking, we will build graded encodings, but we will follow the literature and use the terms “graded encoding” and “multilinear map” interchangeably.

We refer to elements of multilinear maps as encodings, which encode some value. Each encoding is present at a given level of the multilinear map, which, informally speaking, refers to how many multiplications (and, in the asymmetric case, with which elements) it takes to reach the encoding from “top-level” encodings. We explain this below.

Level-$i$ Encoding, Symmetric Case. For a degree $n$ multilinear map, we define a level-0 encoding to be a plaintext element. We define a level-1 encoding to be an encoding of some element in the source group. For $1 \leq i \leq n$, we define a level-$i$ encoding to be the product of $i$ level-1 encodings, so that a level-$n$ encoding is an encoding in the target group.

Symmetric Multilinear Map. We are now ready to define a symmetric multilinear map. Our definitions are inspired by [GGH13a]. Let $R$ be a ring and let $0_R$ be the zero element for the ring.

Definition 4.1. (Symmetric Multilinear Map.) A symmetric multilinear map (MMap) consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

- **Setup$(1^\lambda, 1^n)$**: Takes as input the security parameter $\lambda$ and the degree of multilinearity $n$, and outputs public parameters $pp$.

- **Encode$(pp, a, i)$**: Takes as input the public parameters $pp$, a plaintext element $a \in R$ and a level $i \in [0, n]$, and outputs the encoding $[a]_i$.

- **Add$(pp, [a]_i, [b]_i)$**: Takes as input the public parameters $pp$ and two encodings $[a]_i$ and $[b]_i$ corresponding to a valid level $i \in [0, n]$, and outputs either the encoding $[a + b]_i$ or $\bot$ (in case one or more of the input encodings are invalid or the encodings are not at the same level).

- **Inv$(pp, [a]_i)$**: Takes as input the public parameters $pp$ and an encoding $[a]_i$ corresponding to a valid level $i \in [0, n]$, and outputs either the encoding $[(-1)_R \cdot a]_i$ or $\bot$ (in case the input encoding is invalid).
• **Mult**(pp, [a]_{i_1}, [b]_{i_2}): Takes as input the public parameters pp and two encodings [a]_{i_1} and [b]_{i_2} such that 
  \(i_1 + i_2 \leq n\), and outputs either the encoding \([a.b]_{i_1+i_2}\) or \(\perp\) (in case one or more of the input encodings are invalid or \(i_1 + i_2 > n\)).

• **Ext**(pp, [a]_i): Takes as input the public parameters pp and an encoding [a]_i corresponding to a valid level \(i\), and outputs either \(s \in \{0, 1\}^n\) or \(\perp\) (in case the input encoding is invalid). For any two valid encodings that encode the same plaintext element \(a \in R\) at the same level \(i\), we require that the output of Ext be identical.

• **ZeroTest**(pp, [a]_i): Takes as input the public parameters pp and an encoding [a]_i corresponding to a valid level \(i\), and outputs \(b \in \{0, 1, \perp\}\), where:
  - \(1\) indicates that \(a = 0_R\).
  - \(0\) indicates that \(a \neq 0_R\).
  - \(\perp\) indicates that the encoding is invalid.

*Remark 4.2.* Note that equality-checking of encodings at any valid level follows implicitly from the addition, inversion and zero-test operations at the same level, so for some applications we may not need the extract algorithm. However, we can achieve it in our constructions so we provide it here for completeness.

We can now move on to our definition of an asymmetric multilinear map. Traditionally, asymmetric multilinear maps were defined in a similar way as symmetric multilinear maps—as functions \(e : G_1 \times \ldots \times G_n \rightarrow G_T\) where plaintexts \(\alpha\) were encoded as \(g_i^\alpha\) for some generators \(g_i \in G_i\), with the property that \(e(g_1^{\alpha_1}, \ldots, g_n^{\alpha_n}) = e(g_1, \ldots, g_n)^{\prod_{i=1}^n \alpha_i}\). As with symmetric multilinear maps, we will not construct or define this kind of map, but instead build (randomized) graded encodings.

**Level-i Encoding, Asymmetric Case.** Denoting the level of an encoding in an asymmetric multilinear map is more complicated than in the symmetric case. We cannot simply use an integer to indicate the level of an encoding because we need to keep track of which “groups” have been multiplied in order to generate the encoding.

To do this, we define a “level-vector” \(i \in \{0, 1\}^n\). Informally, speaking, the level-vector \(i\) has a one in position \(j\) if and only if the encoding corresponding to the level set vector resulted from some product that included an element from the \(j\)th “level one” encoding set (i.e. \(G_j\)), where the “level-one” encoding corresponds to a level-vector with a single non-zero entry.

We denote \(\vec{0}_n\) and \(\vec{1}_n\) to be the all-zeroes and all-ones vectors of length \(n\), respectively. With this in mind, we can define a level-\(\vec{0}_n\) encoding to be a plaintext element as we did before. For two level-vectors \(i_1, i_2 \in \{0, 1\}^n\), we say that \(i_1 \leq i_2\) if every entry of \(i_2\) is smaller than or equal to its corresponding entry (coordinate-wise) in \(i_1\).

A level-vector \(i \in \{0, 1\}^n\) is said to represent a valid level if \(\vec{0}_n \leq i \leq \vec{1}_n\). We say two level-vectors \(i_1\) and \(i_2\) are *pairing-compatible* if \(i_1 + i_2 \leq \vec{1}_n\). We note that our definition of level-sets implicitly enforces the closure restriction of pairing-compatibility as discussed in [LV16], so we do not need to worry about closure of pairing-compatibility here.

**Asymmetric MMap.** We can now define an asymmetric multilinear map. Let \(R\) be a ring and let \(0_R\) be the zero element for the ring.

**Definition 4.3. (Asymmetric Multilinear Map.)** An asymmetric multilinear map (MMap) consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

• **Setup**(1^\(\lambda\), 1^n): Takes as input the security parameter \(\lambda\) and the degree of multilinearity \(n\), and outputs public parameters pp.

• **Encode**(pp, a, i): Takes as input the public parameters pp, a plaintext element \(a \in R\) and a valid level-vector \(i\), and outputs the encoding \([a]_i\).
We begin by defining the main hardness assumption over symmetric multilinear maps that we use in this paper. We can only hope to compute $\alpha, \alpha$ where

$$\alpha, \alpha$$

Comparison with “Dream Version” Definitions. Note that our definition of symmetric/asymmetric multilinear map with input ring $R$ below.

- **Add(pp, $[a]_i, [b]_i$):** Takes as input the public parameters pp and two encodings $[a]_i$ and $[b]_i$ corresponding to a valid level-vector $i$, and outputs either the encoding $[a + b]_i$ or $\perp$ (in case one or more of the input encodings are invalid or the level-vectors are not identical).

- **Inv(pp, $[a]_i$):** Takes as input the public parameters pp and an encoding $[a]_i$ corresponding to a valid level-vector $i$, and outputs either the encoding $[(-1)_R \cdot a]_i$ or $\perp$ (in case the input encoding is invalid).

- **Mult(pp, $[a]_{i_1}, [b]_{i_2}$):** Takes as input the public parameters pp and two encodings $[a]_{i_1}$ and $[b]_{i_2}$ such that $i_1 + i_2 \leq \bar{1}_N$, and outputs either the encoding $[a \cdot b]_{i_1 + i_2}$ or $\perp$ (in case one or more of the input encodings are invalid or $i_1 + i_2 \not\leq \bar{1}_n$).

- **Ext(pp, $[a]_i$):** Takes as input the public parameters pp and an encoding $[a]_i$ corresponding to a valid level-vector $i$, and outputs either $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ or $\perp$ (in case the input encoding is invalid). For any two valid encodings that encode the same plaintext element $a \in R$ with the same level-vector $i$, we require that the output of Ext be identical.

- **ZeroTest(pp, $[a]_i$):** Takes as input the public parameters pp and an encoding $[a]_i$ corresponding to a valid level-vector $i$, and outputs $b \in \{0, 1, \perp\}$, where:
  - $1$ indicates that $a = 0_R$.
  - $0$ indicates that $a \neq 0_R$.
  - $\perp$ indicates that the encoding is invalid.

Comparison with “Dream Version” Definitions. Note that our definition of symmetric/asymmetric multilinear maps almost identically achieves the full “dream version” of features that are defined and discussed in [GGH13a] and thus should be usable in any application of multilinear maps. The only technical difference is that we permit sampling an encoding for a specific plaintext value $a \in R$, while the authors of [GGH13a] provide an algorithm to sample a random $a \leftarrow R$ along with its encoding.

### 4.1 Symmetric Multilinear Map Assumptions

We begin by defining the main hardness assumption over symmetric multilinear maps that we use in this paper.

The $(n + 1)$-EDDH Assumption. We define the $(n + 1)$-exponential DDH (or EDDH in short) assumption over symmetric multilinear maps. Suppose that we have a multilinear map of degree $n$. Informally, the $(n + 1)$-EDDH assumption states that an encoding of some random element and an encoding of that element raised to the $n + 1$th power are indistinguishable from two encodings of random elements. Note that this is plausible since, for some encoding $[\alpha]_1$, we can only hope to compute $[\alpha^n]_n$ using the multilinear map.

As discussed in [EHK13], we note that the $(n + 1)$-EDDH assumption implies many of the most commonly studied assumptions over (symmetric) multilinear maps. We do not define them all here or go into detail about these reductions, but instead encourage the reader to refer to that paper. We formally define the $(n + 1)$-EDDH assumption below.

**Definition 4.4.** ($(n + 1)$-EDDH Assumption.) The $(n + 1)$-EDDH assumption over a degree-$n$ symmetric multilinear map with input ring $R$ requires that the following computational indistinguishability holds:

$$([\alpha]_1, [\alpha^{n+1}]_1) \approx_c ([\alpha]_1, [\alpha^*]_1),$$

where $\alpha, \alpha^* \leftarrow R$, and $[\alpha]_1, [\alpha^{n+1}]_1$ and $[\alpha^*]_1$ are all level-1 encodings.
4.2 Asymmetric Multilinear Map Assumptions

We next define our asymmetric multilinear map assumptions. Unfortunately, defining assumptions on asymmetric multilinear maps is much more complicated than doing so for symmetric multilinear maps. We will explain the details in this section.

**k-EDDH Assumption.** We start by presenting the $k$-EDDH assumption for asymmetric multilinear maps. Like the $(n + 1)$-EDDH assumption we defined earlier for symmetric assumption, the $k$-EDDH assumption for asymmetric maps does involve giving out an encoding of some element $\alpha$ as well as an encoding of $\alpha^k$. However, in the asymmetric case, we require that they be at the same level-set of the multilinear map. This extra restriction allows the assumption to (potentially) be valid for any $k \geq 2$, rather than only viable for $k > n$.

**Definition 4.5.** ($k$-EDDH Assumption.) Consider a degree-$n$ asymmetric multilinear map over some ring $R$. Let $\alpha_i, \alpha_i^* \leftarrow R$ be sampled uniformly at random for $i \in [1, n]$. In addition, let $u_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ denote the vector with $i^{th}$ coordinate one and all other coordinates zero.

The $k$-EDDH assumption over a degree-$n$ multilinear map requires that the following computational indistinguishability holds:

$$\left( [\alpha_1]_{u_1}, [\alpha_1^k]_{u_1} \right), \ldots, \left( [\alpha_n]_{u_n}, [\alpha_n^k]_{u_n} \right) \approx \left( [\alpha_1]_{u_1}, [\alpha_1^*]_{u_1} \right), \ldots, \left( [\alpha_n]_{u_n}, [\alpha_n^*]_{u_n} \right).$$

Note that in the above definition we give out random, independent challenge encodings in each of the $n$ top-level vector-sets (i.e. source groups). This allows us to generate an encoding of $\alpha$ and $\alpha^k$ in any level-vector using multiplication by the identity element encoded at different levels. The definition is similar in spirit to the definition of SXDH in [Lin17].

**SXDH Assumption.** Intuitively, the SXDH assumption says that, on a multilinear map, “DDH” is hard in every “source group” [BS03, Rot13]. We generalize this definition to graded encodings and formalize it definition below.

**Definition 4.6.** (SXDH Assumption.) Consider a degree-$n$ asymmetric multilinear map over some ring $R$. Let $\alpha_{i,0}, \alpha_{i,1}, \alpha_{i,2} \leftarrow R$ be sampled uniformly at random for $i \in [1, n]$. In addition, let $u_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ denote the vector with $i^{th}$ coordinate one and all other coordinates zero.

The SXDH assumption over a degree-$n$ multilinear map requires that the following indistinguishability holds:

$$\left( [\alpha_{1,0}]_{u_1}, [\alpha_{1,1}]_{u_1}, [\alpha_{1,0} \cdot \alpha_{1,1}]_{u_1} \right), \ldots, \left( [\alpha_{n,0}]_{u_n}, [\alpha_{n,1}]_{u_n}, [\alpha_{n,0} \cdot \alpha_{n,1}]_{u_n} \right) \approx \left( [\alpha_{1,0}]_{u_1}, [\alpha_{1,2}]_{u_1} \right), \ldots, \left( [\alpha_{n,0}]_{u_n}, [\alpha_{n,1}]_{u_n}, [\alpha_{n,2}]_{u_n} \right).$$

Note that in the above definition we give out random, independent DDH-style challenge encodings for each of the $n$ top-level vector-sets (i.e. source groups). This is equivalent to the definition in [Lin17], although we explicitly provide challenges in every top level and they do not. We also point out the (seemingly obvious) fact that this flavor of the assumption allows us to generate an SXDH challenge in any arbitrary level-set.

We note that some papers on graded encodings are either unclear about specifically on which vector-sets “DDH” must hold or define SXDH such that “DDH” must hold on every vector set [LV16]. We call this assumption *uber-SXDH* and define it below. We mainly include this for completeness.

**Definition 4.7.** (Uber-SXDH Assumption.) The uber-SXDH assumption over a degree-$n$ asymmetric MMap requires that the following indistinguishability holds for all valid level-vectors $i$ such that $0_n < i \leq 1_n$:

$$\left( [\alpha_0]_i, [\alpha_1]_i, [\alpha_0 \cdot \alpha_1]_i \right) \approx \left( [\alpha_0]_i, [\alpha_1]_i, [\alpha^*_i]_i \right),$$

where $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha^* \leftarrow R$. 

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This definition may seem identical to regular SXDH, and it is reducible using a simple hybrid argument to and from our SXDH definition for constant-degree multilinear maps. However, for large-degree multilinear maps, the assumptions are seemingly not equivalent: the Uber-SXDH assumption becomes an exponential family of assumptions (one for every possible level-vector, for a total of \(2^n\)).

To see why this is the case, consider the following black-box adversary \(A\). Suppose \(A\) has some randomly selected level-vector \(v\) hard-coded inside it. When given an SXDH challenge tuple, \(A\) first checks if the level-vector is equal to \(v\). If it is, then it somehow magically can tell whether the tuple is random or not. If not, then it aborts and outputs \(\perp\). Since \(A\) is a black box, we cannot learn the value of \(v\) except by randomly querying. So \(A\) cannot be used to break the regular SXDH game efficiently if \(n\) is polynomial in \(\lambda\), because it will be impossible to find \(v\) efficiently by random guessing, which is the best we can do with our black-box adversary \(A\). However, the existence of \(A\) clearly breaks the Uber-SXDH assumption, because there is some level-vector--\(v\)--where an adversary can distinguish between the two classes of tuple.

For most practical purposes, though, the two assumptions are interchangeable: the “proper” SXDH assumption implies that “DDH” is hard in any level-set, even if the adversary can decide on a challenge level-vector after seeing the public parameters of the multilinear map. This follows from the fact that every possible level-set can be derived through multiplication from one of the SXDH challenge level-vectors \(u_1, \ldots, u_n\). In addition, a simple hybrid argument can extend this to any polynomial number of adversarially-chosen level-sets, which is good enough for polynomial-time reductions. However, a proper reduction from any level-set to all level-sets would still require a loss proportional to the number of level sets, so we unfortunately cannot say that these assumptions are equivalent under polynomial reductions.

We point out, however, that these assumptions are indeed equivalent under subexponential reductions. We also emphasize here that all known iO constructions from instance-independent assumptions do require subexponential reductions anyway; so equivalence under subexponential reductions suffices for almost all applications that we are interested in here.

We further note that our definitions are similar to [Lin17]) and borrow from the bilinear SXDH definition of [ABBC10], which also outputs a DDH challenge in each source group. We note that the Uber-SXDH assumption is more similar in flavor to the definitions from [CLL+13], although they are of course equivalent for bilinear maps. Finally, we encourage the reader to peruse [BMZ19] for an interesting discussion on how minute changes in group-based cryptographic definitions can make substantial differences in security.

5 An Asymmetric MMap Construction

In this section, we show how to construct an asymmetric MMap given the following cryptoprimitives:

- A probabilistic-iO scheme \(\piO = (\piO.\text{Obf}, \piO.\text{Eval})\) against X-\text{IND} samplers as in Definition 3.4 (Section 3).
- A fully-homomorphic encryption scheme
  \[
  \text{FHE} = (\text{FHE.\text{Gen}}, \text{FHE.\text{Enc}}, \text{FHE.\text{Dec}}, \text{FHE.\text{Eval}}),
  \]
  such that the message space is \(\mathbb{Z}_q\) for some prime \(q = \text{poly}(\lambda)\) (\(\lambda\) being the security parameter) satisfying both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1 (Section 3) Note that this kind of FHE is not known from the LWE assumption, but can be constructed from iO and standard assumptions [CLTV15].
- A dual-mode NIZK proof system \(\text{NIZK} = (\text{NIZK.\text{Setup}}, \text{NIZK.\text{Prove}}, \text{NIZK.\text{Verify}})\) as in Definition 3.1 (Section 3) that is:
  - perfectly complete in both modes;
  - perfectly extractable and perfectly sound in the binding mode;
  - perfectly zero knowledge and perfectly witness indistinguishable in the hiding mode.
An example of such a dual-mode NIZK proof system is the Groth-Sahai NIZK proof system [GS08].

- A language with hard-membership as described in Definition 3.2 (Section 3). For simplicity of representation, we represent such a language by a pair of sets \( (X, L) \) such that \( L \subseteq X \) and:
  1. Given \( x \in X \) it is computationally hard to decide if \( x \in L \).
  2. For each \( y \in L \), there exists a unique membership witness \( \text{wit}_y \).

- A (pairing-free) group \( G \) of prime order \( q \).

In Appendix 6 we show that SXDH is hard over our proposed MMap construction if DDH is hard over the group \( G \). Subsequently, in Appendix 7, we show that for any \( k \geq 2 \), \( k \)-exponent-DDH (abbreviated as \( k \)-EDDH) is hard over our proposed MMap construction if \( k \)-EDDH is hard over the group \( G \). Note that for \( k \geq 2 \), \((k + 1)\)-exponent DDH implies a host of other assumptions such as \( k \)-Lin and \((k + 1)\)-power-DDH (PDDH).

### 5.1 Setup

The setup algorithm for our MMap construction takes as input the security parameter \( 1^\lambda \) and a second parameter \( 1^n \) for the degree of multilinearity an does the following:

1. The setup algorithm samples two key-pairs for the FHE scheme as:
   \[ (pk_0, sk_0), (pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{FHE.Gen}(1^\lambda), \]
   and publishes the key pairs \((pk_0, pk_1)\) as part of the public parameters for the MMap scheme.

2. The setup algorithm uniformly samples \( g_0 \leftarrow G \) and \( \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \) and sets:
   \[ g_1 = g_0^{\gamma_1}, \quad g_2 = g_0^{\gamma_2}, \quad g_3 = g_0^{\gamma_3}. \]
   The element \( g_0 \) is published as part of the public parameters for the MMap scheme, while the remaining group elements (and the corresponding exponents) are kept secret for reasons that are relevant to the proof of security (we elaborate on this subsequently).

3. The setup algorithm also samples a pair of NIZK CRS strings in the binding mode (along with the corresponding extraction trapdoors) as:
   \[ (crs_0, t_{\text{ext}, 0}), (crs_1, t_{\text{ext}, 1}) \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding}). \]
   The languages for which statements are proven under these CRS strings are described subsequently in Section 5.2. The setup algorithm publishes \((crs_0, crs_1)\) as part of the public parameters for the MMap scheme.

4. The setup algorithm uniformly samples a total \((2n + 1)\) elements from the set \( X \) that are all non-members for the subset \( L \). More formally, it samples
   \[ y, z_{1,0}, z_{1,1}, z_{2,0}, z_{2,1}, \ldots, z_{n,0}, z_{n,1} \leftarrow X \setminus L, \]
   and publishes these as part of the public parameters for the MMap scheme.

5. Finally, the setup algorithm generates four probabilistically obfuscated circuits of the form
   \[ \bar{C}_{\text{Add}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(C_{\text{Add}}), \quad C_{\text{Inv}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(C_{\text{Inv}}), \]
   \[ \bar{C}_{\text{Mult}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(C_{\text{Mult}}), \quad C_{\text{ext}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(C_{\text{ext}}) \]
   where \( \bar{C}_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Inv}}, C_{\text{Mult}}, \) and \( C_{\text{ext}} \) are the circuits for adding, inverting, multiplying, and extracting from encodings at any given “non-zero” level. We describe these circuits in details subsequently. We only briefly mention here that these circuits embed the following elements:
The FHE secret keys sk₀ and sk₁.
- The NIZK extraction trapdoors t_{ext,0} and t_{ext,1}.
- The tuple of exponents (γ₁, γ₂, γ₃) and the tuple of group elements (g₀, g₁, g₂, g₃).

For reasons that are relevant to the proof of security, these circuits are not made public in the clear. Instead, the setup algorithm only publishes the piO-obfuscated versions of these circuit as part of the public parameters for the MMap scheme.

5.2 Encodings

Recall from Section 4 that we denote 0_n and 1_n to be the all-zeroes and all-ones vectors of length n, respectively. Also recall that for two level-vectors 1, 2 ∈ {0, 1}^n, we say that 1 ≤ 2 if every entry of 2 is less than or equal to its corresponding entry (coordinate-wise) in 1. A level-vector i ∈ {0, 1}^n is said to represent a valid level if 0_n ≤ i ≤ 1_n. Finally, recall that we describe two level-vectors i₁ and i₂ as pairing-compatible if i₁ + i₂ ≤ 1_n.

We now describe the procedure of encoding a plaintext element at any level i such that 0_n ≤ i ≤ 1_n. In our construction, level-0_n encodings are treated slightly different from encodings at other “non-zero” levels, and are equipped with their own set of algorithms for encoding, manipulation, extraction and zero-testing. We informally mention these for the sake of completeness.

Level-Zero Encodings. We set the level-0_n encoding of a given plaintext element a ∈ ℤ_q to be a itself. Adding and multiplying two level-0_n encodings (equivalently, additively inverting a level-0_n encoding) are simply done via addition and multiplication (equivalently, additive inversion) in ℤ_q, respectively.

Multiplying a level-0_n encoding with any other encoding at some level i should result in an encoding at level-i. This is implemented with a shift-and-add algorithm built on top of the standard encoding addition algorithm described subsequently in Section 5.3.

Extracting a level-0_n encoding a ∈ ℤ_q outputs g₀, where g₀ ∈ G is part of the public description of the MMap, as described earlier. As will be clear later, this is consistent with the extraction algorithm for any other level i. Zero-testing follows trivially from the extraction algorithm.

Level-i Encodings. We now describe the procedure of encoding a plaintext element at any “non-zero” encoding level i such that 0_n < i ≤ 1_n. An encoding of a plaintext element a ∈ ℤ_q at level i is a tuple of the form (ct₀, ct₁, i, π₀, π₁), where ct₀ and ct₁ are FHE encryptions of a tuple of the form:

\((a_{0,0}, a_{1,0}, a_{2,0}, a_{3,0}, 1)\) , \((a_{0,1}, a_{1,1}, a_{2,1}, a_{3,1}, 1)\).

under the public key-secret key pairs (pk₀, sk₀) and (pk₁, sk₁) respectively, and π₀ and π₁ are verifying proofs under crs₀ and crs₁ respectively, for statements described subsequently.

Normal and Oblique Representation. For b ∈ \{0, 1\}, the tuple \((a_{0,b}, a_{1,b}, a_{2,b}, a_{3,b}, 1)\) is said to be in “normal form” if

\((a_{0,b}, a_{1,b}, a_{2,b}, a_{3,b}, 1) = (a, 0, 0, 0, i)\)

for some a ∈ ℤ_q. Otherwise, it is said to be in “oblique-form”. Depending on the forms of the tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts, we classify an encoding into one of three representations:

- **Normal representation**: Both tuples are in normal form.
- **Partially oblique representation**: Exactly one of the tuples is in normal form, while the other is in oblique form. Unless otherwise specified, we assume that the second tuple is in normal form.
- **Oblique representation**: Both tuples are in oblique form.
**Consistency.** Recall that the setup algorithm samples a tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) and hardwires these into the MMap circuits that are described subsequently. Recall also that we have
\[
g_1 = g_0^{g_1} , \quad g_2 = g_0^{g_2} , \quad g_3 = g_0^{g_3} .
\]
We define “consistency” of encodings with respect to this tuple of group elements. In particular, we say that an encoding is “consistent” if the tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts satisfy the following condition:
\[
a_{0,0} + \sum_{\ell \in \{1,2,3\}} \gamma_\ell \cdot a_{0,\ell} = a_{0,1} + \sum_{\ell \in \{1,2,3\}} \gamma_\ell \cdot a_{\ell,1},
\]
or equivalently, the following condition:
\[
\prod_{\ell \in [0,3]} g_\ell^{a_{\ell,0}} = \prod_{\ell \in [0,3]} g_\ell^{a_{\ell,1}}.
\]

**Implications of Consistency Definition.** Looking ahead, this definition of consistency has implications for the extraction/zero-testing procedure of our MMap construction. In particular, suppose that an encoding is in the normal representation (and is hence consistent) and has FHE ciphertexts encrypting the tuple \((a, 0, 0, 0)\), while another consistent encoding is in the oblique representation and has an FHE ciphertext encrypting the tuple \((a_0, a_1, a_2, a_3)\). We say that these two are encodings of the “same” plaintext element if we have:
\[
a = a_0 + \sum_{\ell \in \{1,2,3\}} \gamma_\ell \cdot a_\ell,
\]
or equivalently, we have:
\[
g_0^a = \prod_{\ell \in [0,3]} g_\ell^{a_\ell}.
\]
We design our extraction procedure to produce the same canonical bit-string on both of these encodings. Similarly, the zero-testing procedure produces the same output on both of these encodings.

It turns out that this definition of consistency also has implications for the proof of security. In particular, in certain hybrids of the proof of SXDH (similarly, \(k\)-EDDH), we will exploit the fact that encodings of the same element can, in fact, have both normal and oblique representations, and that we can “switch” between these representations in a computationally indistinguishable manner without altering the corresponding outputs of extraction/zero-testing.

**The NIZK Proof \(\pi_0\).** \(\pi_0\) is a verifying NIZK proof of “normal representation.” Informally, it proves under \(\text{crs}_0\) that one of the following statements must be true:

1. Either the given encoding is in the normal representation, i.e., the tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts satisfy \(a_{0,0} = a_{0,1}\) and \(a_{\ell,0} = a_{\ell,1} = 0\) for \(\ell \in \{1, 2, 3\}\), and that both FHE ciphertexts encrypt the same level \(i\) as in the encoding itself.
2. Or there exists some \(j \in [n]\) such that \(i_j = 0\) and \(z_{j,0} \in \mathcal{L}\).
3. Or there exists some \(j \in [n]\) such that \(i_j = 1\) and \(z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}\).

Intuitively, \(\pi_0\) enforces that whenever an encoding at level \(i\) is not in the normal representation, it must provide a verifying proof of language-membership of some \(\mathcal{X}\)-instance \(z_{j,b}\) in the public parameter of the MMap scheme such that \(i_j = b\). Formally, \(\pi_0\) is a verifying NIZK proof under \(\text{crs}_0\) of the \(\text{OR}\) relation \(R_0\) defined in Figure 1 (\(\mathcal{K}_{\text{FHE}}\) being the set of all valid key pairs under the FHE scheme).

**Remark 5.1.** Note that when proving the first \(\text{OR}\) branch corresponding to the FHE ciphertexts (described formally as \(R_{0,0}\) in Figure 1), one of two witnesses could be used: either the FHE secret keys \(\text{sk}_0\) and \(\text{sk}_1\), or the encryption randomnesses used to generate the FHE ciphertexts. For the other two branches (described formally as \(R_{0,1}\) in Figure 1), it suffices to use the corresponding language membership witness.
The NIZK Proof $\pi_1$ is a verifying NIZK proof of “consistency.” Recall that an encoding is “consistent” if both FHE ciphertexts in the encoding represent the “same” plaintext element (irrespective of whether the encoding is in normal representation or (partially) oblique representation). Informally, $\pi_1$ proves under crs$_t$ that one of the following statements must be true with respect to the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ (and the corresponding exponents $(\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3)$) embedded inside the MMap circuits:

1. Either both FHE ciphertexts in the encoding represent the “same” plaintext element, i.e., we must have:

$$a_{0,0} + \sum_{\ell \in \{1,2,3\}} \gamma_\ell \cdot a_{\ell,0} = a_{0,1} + \sum_{\ell \in \{1,2,3\}} \gamma_\ell \cdot a_{\ell,1},$$

i.e., equivalently, we have:

$$\prod_{\ell \in [0,3]} g_\ell^{a_{0,0}} = \prod_{\ell \in [0,3]} g_\ell^{a_{0,1}}.$$
In order to encompass such specially designed encodings, we relax “validity” to enforce that an encoding has verifying NIZK proofs $\pi_0$ and $\pi_1$. More formally, an encoding $(\mathsf{ct}_0, \mathsf{ct}_1, i, \pi_0, \pi_1)$ is said to be “valid” if both of the
following hold simultaneously:

\[
\text{NIZK.Verify}(\text{crs}_0, (\text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \text{i}, \{z_{j,b}\}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}, \pi_0) = 1,
\]

and

\[
\text{NIZK.Verify}(\text{crs}_1, (\text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \text{i}, y), \pi_1) = 1.
\]

**Remark 5.5.** We stress again that when each of the \(\lambda\)-elements in the public parameters of the MMap scheme is a non-member, i.e., when \(z_{j,b} \notin \mathcal{L}\) for each \((j, b) \in [n] \times \{0,1\}\) and \(y \notin \mathcal{L}\), then the special OR branches represented by \(\mathcal{R}_{0,1}\) and \(\mathcal{R}_{1,1}\) can never be satisfied. In other words, in the “real” version of our MMap scheme, any “valid” encoding must be in the normal representation and must be consistent. This is a statistical property, not a computational one. We only use the special OR branches for the proof of security. As mentioned earlier, during certain hybrids in the proof of security, we will switch one or more of these elements from members to non-members, thereby allowing certain special encodings (e.g., the challenge encodings in the SXDH game) to remain “valid” while either being in the oblique representation or being inconsistent (or both). However, we will rely on the properties of the dual-mode NIZK proof systems to ensure that an adversary cannot generate such encodings while passing all validity checks.

### 5.3 Addition and Inversion of Encodings

We now describe the procedure for adding two encodings, and for (additive) inversion of an encoding. Suppose we have two encodings at the same level \(i\) of the form:

\[
(\text{ct}_0, i, \pi_{0,1}, \pi_{1,1}), \quad (\text{ct}_0, i, \pi_{0,2}, \pi_{1,2}).
\]

Figure 4 details the operation of the encoding-addition circuit \(C_{\text{Add}}\). Note that it embeds multiple secrets, including the FHE secret keys \(\text{sk}_0\) and \(\text{sk}_1\), as well as the extraction trapdoors \(t_{\text{ext},0}\) and \(t_{\text{ext},1}\) for the NIZK. Hence, the circuit is not made public as is; we only make available an obfuscated version of the circuit obtained by running the evaluation algorithm of the probabilistic iO scheme piO on it. The same holds for the encoding-inversion circuit \(C_{\text{Inv}}\), which is described in Figure 5.

**Overview of Addition.** At a high level, we add the two input encodings by exploiting the fully-homomorphic nature of the encryption scheme. More concretely, we homomorphically evaluate the circuit \(C_{\text{Add,FHE}}\) (described in Figure 3) on the corresponding ciphertext components of the two input encodings to generate the ciphertext components for the output encoding. This circuit checks if the input encodings (assumed without loss of generality to be in the oblique representation) correspond to the same level and if yes, adds them component-wise. It then outputs the resulting encoding in the same level. We also generate proofs for normal representation and consistency of the output encoding using the tuple of secret keys \((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)\) as witness, unless otherwise dictated by the input encodings (in which case we use the extracted witnesses from the proofs in the input encodings to generate the proofs for the output encoding).

**Overview of Inversion.** The approach for inverting an input encoding is very similar, except that we homomorphically evaluate the circuit \(C_{\text{Inv,FHE}}\) (also described in Figure 3) on the ciphertext components of the input encoding. This circuit takes the input encoding (assumed without loss of generality to be in the oblique representation), additively inverts it component-wise, and outputs the resulting encoding in the same level. As in the case of addition, we again generate proofs for normal representation and consistency of the output encoding using the tuple of secret keys \((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)\) as witness, unless otherwise dictated by the input encoding (in which case we again use the extracted witnesses from the proofs in the input encoding to generate the proofs for the output encoding).

**Checks.** For technical reasons that are relevant to the proof of security, we check the following in both the addition and inversion circuits:

1. The validity of the proofs \((\pi_{0,1}, \pi_{1,1})\) and \((\pi_{0,2}, \pi_{1,2})\) that are provided as part of the input encodings to the addition circuit (equivalently, the proofs \(\pi_0\) and \(\pi_1\) that are provided as part of the input encoding to the inversion circuit).
2. Whether the input encodings are in the normal representation as per the relation $R_{0,0}$ described earlier (“IF” conditions in step 5 of $C_{\text{Add}}$ and $C_{\text{Inv}}$).

3. Whether the input encodings are consistent as per the relation $R_{1,0}$ described earlier (“IF” conditions in step 7 of $C_{\text{Add}}$ and $C_{\text{Inv}}$).

Note that validity is publicly verifiable using crs$_0$ and crs$_1$, while verifying normal representation and consistency requires explicit knowledge of the FHE secret keys $sk_0$ and $sk_1$.

**Proof in the Output Encoding.** The proofs $\pi_0^*$ and $\pi_1^*$ in the output encoding are generated based on the checks for normal representation and consistency as described above. Note that unless all the input encodings are invalid, the addition and inversion circuits output $\bot$. In this case, no output encoding is generated, and hence no proofs $\pi_0^*$ and $\pi_1^*$ are generated. Hence, we focus on the cases where the input encodings are valid. In these cases, the proofs $\pi_0^*$ and $\pi_1^*$ are generated as follows:

- **If** the input encodings to the addition circuit are in the normal representation, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding is guaranteed to be in the normal representation. Similarly, if the input encoding to the inversion circuit is in the normal representation, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding is guaranteed to be in the normal representation. Hence, in these cases, the proof $\pi_0^*$ for the output encoding is a proof of normal representation, generated using the witness $(sk_0, sk_1)$.

- **If** a special case arises where one (or both) of the input encodings to the addition circuit is (are) in the (partially) oblique representation, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding will be in the (partially) oblique representation. Similarly, if the input encoding to the inversion circuit is in the (partially) oblique representation, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding will be in the (partially) oblique representation. In these cases, the proof $\pi_0^*$ for the output encoding must be a proof of language membership, and requires an appropriate language-membership witness.

However, note that since the input encodings are valid, it must be the case that the corresponding input proofs for these encodings were generated the appropriate language-membership witness. In this case, we rely on the perfect extractability of the NIZK proof system in the binding mode to extract the corresponding witness from the input proof(s), and reuse the same for generating the output proof $\pi_0^*$.

- **Again**, if the input encodings to the addition circuit are both consistent, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding is guaranteed to be consistent. Similarly, if the input encoding to the inversion circuit is consistent, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding is guaranteed to be consistent. Hence, in these cases, the proof $\pi_1^*$ for the output encoding is a proof of consistency, generated again using the witness $(sk_0, sk_1)$.

- **If** a special case arises where one (or both) of the input encodings to the addition circuit is (are) inconsistent, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding will be inconsistent. Similarly, if the input encoding to the inversion circuit is inconsistent, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding will be inconsistent. In these
1. Output $\bot$ if either $i_1$ and $i_2$ are non-identical or correspond to "invalid" levels, i.e., if $i_1 \neq i_2$ or $i_1 > \bar{i}_0$. Else, set $i = i_1$ and proceed.

2. Output $\bot$ if for any $k \in \{1, 2\}$, we have
   \[ \text{NIZK.Verify}(\text{crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, \{z_{j,k}\}_{j \in [n], k \in \{0,1\}}, \pi_{0,k}) = 0. \]

3. Output $\bot$ if for any $k \in \{1, 2\}$, we have
   \[ \text{NIZK.Verify}(\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, y), \pi_{1,k}) = 0. \]

4. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, set $ct_b^* = \text{FHE.Eval}(pk_y, ct_{0,1}, ct_{0,2}, \text{CAdd}, \text{FHE}).$

5. If for some $k \in \{1, 2\}$, $R_{0.0}(\text{ct}_{0,k}, \text{ct}_{1,k}, i, pk_0, pk_1, (sk_0, sk_1)) = 0$, then:
   a. Extract $(j, \text{wit}_y) = \text{NIZK.FExt}(\text{crs}_{0.0}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}, ct_{1,1}, i, \{z_{j,k}\}_{j \in [n], k \in \{0,1\}}, \pi_{0,k})$.
   b. If $R_C(z_{j,k}, \text{wit}_y) = 0$, output $\bot$.
   c. Else, generate $\pi_{0,j}^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}_{0.0}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}^*, ct_{1,1}^*, i, \{z_{j,k}\}_{j \in [n], k \in \{0,1\}}, (j, \text{wit}_y))$.

6. Else, generate $\pi_{0,j}^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}^*, ct_{1,1}^*, i, \{z_{j,k}\}_{j \in [n], k \in \{0,1\}}), (sk_0, sk_1))$.

7. If for some $k \in \{1, 2\}$, we have $R_{1,0}(\text{ct}_{0,k}, \text{ct}_{1,k}, i, pk_0, pk_1, (sk_0, sk_1)) = 0$, then:
   a. Extract $\text{wit}_y = \text{NIZK.FExt}(\text{crs}_{1.1}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}, ct_{1,1}, i, y), \pi_{1,k})$.
   b. If $R_C(y, \text{wit}_y) = 0$, output $\bot$.
   c. Else, generate $\pi_{1,j}^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}^*, ct_{1,1}^*, i, y), \text{wit}_y)$.

8. Else, generate $\pi_{1,j}^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}^*, ct_{1,1}^*, i, y), (sk_0, sk_1))$.

9. Output $(ct_b^*, ct_{1,1}^*, i, \pi_{0,j}^*, \pi_{1,j}^*)$.

Figure 4: Circuit $C_{\text{Add}}$

cases, the output proof $\pi_y^*$ for the output encoding must be a proof of language membership for $y$, and requires an appropriate language-membership witness $\text{wit}_y$.

However, note again that since the input encodings are valid, it must be the case that the corresponding input proofs for these encodings were generated using the corresponding language-membership witness $\text{wit}_y$. Hence, we can again rely on the perfect extractability of the NIZK proof system in the binding mode to extract the corresponding witness from the input proof(s), and reuse the same for generating the output proof $\pi_y^*$.

Remark 5.6. The checks for normal representation and consistency in steps 5 and 7 of $C_{\text{Add}}$ and $C_{\text{Inv}}$ are included for technical reasons that are relevant to the proof of security. In particular, we emphasize the following:

- Checking the "IF" condition in step 7 of $C_{\text{Add}}$ (and $C_{\text{Inv}}$) requires the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ sampled at setup, which is hardwired into both circuits. Note, however, that the exponents $\alpha_1$, $\alpha_2$ and $\alpha_3$ are not hardwired for this check, and are hence not hardwired into either circuit.

- When each element $z_{j,k}$ for $j \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$ is a non-member for the language $L$ and $\text{crs}_0$ is in the binding mode, the "IF" condition in step 5 of $C_{\text{Add}}$ (and $C_{\text{Inv}}$) is never satisfied. Similarly, when the element $y$ is a non-member for the language $L$ and $\text{crs}_1$ is in the binding mode, the "IF" condition in step 7 of $C_{\text{Add}}$ (and $C_{\text{Inv}}$)
We now describe the procedure for multiplying two encodings at “compatible” levels with respect to the challenges for Step 2 was already provided in Section 2; here we present some more detailed insights): when generating the output proofs of encodings into two keys steps:

- **Step-1:** Homomorphically evaluate the ciphertexts CT₀ and CT₁ corresponding to the output encoding.
- **Step-2:** Generate the proofs π₀ and π₁ for the output encoding.

**Challenges Involved.** We now present some detailed observations regarding the challenges for both steps (an overview with respect to the challenges for Step 2 was already provided in Section 2; here we present some more detailed insights):

is never satisfied. These observations follow from the perfect soundness guarantee of the NIZK proof system. However, the condition may be satisfied during some hybrid in the proof of security, when some element zᵢ,ᵢ is “switched” to a member of \( \mathcal{L} \) (or, equivalently, when y is “switched” to a member of \( \mathcal{L} \)).

### 5.4 Multiplication of Encodings

We now describe the procedure for multiplying two encodings at “compatible” levels \( i₁ \) and \( i₂ \) (recall that we say two level-sets \( i₁ \) and \( i₂ \) are “compatible” with respect to multiplication or pairing whenever \( i₁ + i₂ ≤ Iₙ \)). Suppose we have two encodings of the form:

\[
(CT_{1,0}, CT_{1,1}, i₁, π₁), (CT_{2,0}, CT_{2,1}, i₂, π₂).
\]

At a high level, we multiply the two input encodings by again exploiting the fully-homomorphic nature of the encryption scheme. However, compared to addition and inversion, multiplication of two encodings is more involved and requires some careful decision-making regarding the format of the output encoding, as well as which witness to use when generating the output proofs \( π₀ \) and \( π₁ \). Based on the aforementioned observations, we divide the multiplication of encodings into two keys steps:

1. **Step-1:** Homomorphically evaluate the ciphertexts CT₀ and CT₁ corresponding to the output encoding.
2. **Step-2:** Generate the proofs \( π₀ \) and \( π₁ \) for the output encoding.

Figure 5: Circuit C_{inv}
• Suppose that both input encodings are in the normal representation, i.e., they both contain verifying proofs of normal representation, using as witness the tuple of secret keys \((sk_0, sk_1)\). In this case, the output encoding upon multiplication is also in the normal representation, and can be computed without the knowledge of the secret exponents \(\gamma_1, \gamma_2\) and \(\gamma_3\). Additionally, the output proof \(\pi_0^\ast\) can be generated as a verifying proof of normal representation using the tuple of secret keys \((sk_0, sk_1)\) as witness.

• When exactly one (or both) of the input encodings is in oblique representation, then the output encoding upon multiplication can be computed in oblique representation without the knowledge of the secret exponents \(\gamma_1, \gamma_2\) and \(\gamma_3\). However, generating the proof \(\pi_0^\ast\) for the output encoding is not as straightforward. Suppose w.l.o.g. that the first input encoding in level \(i_1\) is in oblique representation, and consider the following scenarios:

  – Suppose that the first input encoding has a verifying proof of language membership of \(z_{j,1}\) using witness \((j, \text{wit}_z)\) such that \(i_{1,j} = 1\). In this case, we know that the output encoding must correspond to a level \(i^* = i_1 + i_2\) such that \(i^*_{1,j} = 1\). Hence, in this case, we can use the first circuit \(C_{\text{Mult,FHE},0}\) for homomorphic evaluation of the output encoding in oblique representation, and we can re-use the witness \((j, \text{wit}_z)\) extracted from the first input encoding to generate a verifying proof \(\pi_0^\ast\) for language membership of \(z_{j,1}\) as part of the output encoding.

  – Now, suppose that the first input encoding has a verifying proof of language membership of \(z_{j,0}\) using witness \((j, \text{wit}_z)\) such that \(i_{1,j} = 0\). However, the output encoding may correspond to a level \(i^* = i_1 + i_2\) such that \(i^*_{1,j} = 1\). In such a case, we cannot re-use the witness \((j, \text{wit}_z)\) extracted from the first input encoding to generate a verifying proof \(\pi_0^\ast\) for the output encoding, since we will need to prove language membership of \(z_{j,1}\) and not \(z_{j,0}\).

So, in the second case we need to use a different approach - We explicitly use the knowledge of the secret exponents \(\gamma_1, \gamma_2\) and \(\gamma_3\) to transform the output encoding back to normal representation. This allows us to generate the output proof \(\pi_0^\ast\) as a proof for normal representation using the tuple of secret keys \((sk_0, sk_1)\) as witness.

• Finally, consider the case when both input encodings are in the oblique representation. Here again, there are two sub-cases to consider.

  – Suppose w.l.o.g that the first ciphertext of the first encoding and the second ciphertext of the second encoding encrypt tuples in oblique representation, while the remaining ciphertexts encrypt tuples in normal representation. Again, in this sub-case, the output encoding upon multiplication can be computed in oblique representation without the knowledge of the secret exponents \(\gamma_1, \gamma_2\) and \(\gamma_3\). However, generating the proof \(\pi_0^\ast\) for the output encoding presents the same potential challenges as before. So we handle ciphertext generation in this sub-case (and other similar sub-cases) in the same way as the previous case.

  – Alternatively, suppose w.l.o.g that the first ciphertext of the first encoding and the first ciphertext of the second encoding encrypt tuples in oblique representation, while the remaining ciphertexts encrypt tuples in normal representation. Now, the output encoding upon multiplication cannot be computed (in either normal or oblique representation) without the knowledge of the secret exponents \(\gamma_1, \gamma_2\) and \(\gamma_3\). Hence, in this sub-case (and other similar sub-cases), we explicitly use the knowledge of the secret exponents \(\gamma_1, \gamma_2\) and \(\gamma_3\) to transform the output encoding back to normal representation. The output proof \(\pi_0^\ast\) can now be generated as a proof for normal representation using the tuple of secret keys \((sk_0, sk_1)\) as witness.
Generating Output Proof $\pi_0^*$. For generating the output proof $\pi_0^*$, we use the following simple approach:

- Suppose that there exists an input encoding in oblique representation that has a verifying proof of language membership of $z_{j,1}$ using witness $(j, \text{wit}_z)$ such that $i_{1,j} = 1$. In this case, we know that the output encoding must correspond to a level $i^* = i_1 + i_2$ such that $i_{1,j}^* = 1$. Hence, in this case, we extract and re-use the witness $(j, \text{wit}_z)$ from the first input encoding to generate a verifying proof $\pi_0^*$ for language membership of $z_{j,1}$ as part of the output encoding.

- In all other cases, homomorphically evaluating the circuit $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$ on the input encodings must, by design, output ciphertexts that are in normal representation. Hence, in all other cases, we use the tuple of secret keys $(sk_0, sk_1)$ to generate a verifying proof $\pi_0^*$ for normal representation.

Generating Output Proof $\pi_1^*$. For generating the output proof $\pi_1^*$, we use an approach similar to that in the addition/inversion circuits. In particular, observe the following:

The Circuit for (Homomorphic) Multiplication. Based on the aforementioned observations, we design the circuit $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$ (described in Figure 6). This circuit is homomorphically evaluated on the corresponding FHE ciphertext components of the two input encodings to generate the FHE ciphertext component for the output product encoding. Note the following:

- The circuit $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$ takes as input two flag variables flag$_1$ and flag$_2$. For each $k \in \{1, 2\}$, the flag variable flag$_k$ is set as follows: if flag$_k = 0$, then it indicates that the $k_{th}$ encoding in level $i_k$ is in (partially) oblique representation and has a verifying NIZK proof $\pi_{0,k}$ using $(i_k, \text{wit}_z)$, where $i_{k,k} = 0$ and $\text{wit}_z$ is a language-membership witness for $z_{i_k,0}$. In all other cases, flag$_k$ is set to 1.

- If at least one input tuple is in normal form and the other input has the flag variable set to 1, then the circuit $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$ does not require to use the secret exponents $\gamma_1, \gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$. In this case, the output tuple may be either in normal form or in oblique form depending on the nature of the other input tuple. This is captured in Steps 1 and 2 of the circuit $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$.

- If both input tuples are in oblique representation, or if both input tuples have flag variables set to 0, or if exactly one input tuple is in oblique representation but has its flag set to 0, then the circuit $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$ forces the output to be in normal representation, irrespective of the representation of the input tuples. As shown in Step 3 of the circuit $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$, this requires explicitly using the secret exponents $\gamma_1, \gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$.

\begin{equation}
C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}(\{(\alpha_{1,1})_{\ell \in [0,3]}, i_1\}, \{(\alpha_{2,2})_{\ell \in [0,3]}, i_2\}, (\gamma_0 = 1, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3, \theta_n), (\text{flag}_1, \text{flag}_2, 0, 0, \theta_n))):
\end{equation}

1. If $(a_{1,1}, a_{2,1}, a_{3,1}) = (0, 0, 0)$ and flag$_2 = 1$, then output $((\alpha_{0,1} \cdot \alpha_{\ell,2})_{\ell \in [0,3]}, (i_1 + i_2))$.
2. Else if $(a_{1,2}, a_{2,2}, a_{3,2}) = (0, 0, 0)$ and flag$_1 = 1$, then output $((\alpha_{0,2} \cdot \alpha_{\ell,1})_{\ell \in [0,3]}, (i_1 + i_2))$.
3. Else output $((\alpha^* = \prod_{\ell, \ell' \in [0,3]} \alpha_{\ell,1}^{*} \cdot \alpha_{\ell',2} \cdot \gamma_{\ell} \cdot \gamma_{\ell'}},$ where $\gamma_0 = 1$ is used for ease of representation.

Figure 6: Circuits $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$.

\[a^* = \prod_{\ell, \ell' \in [0,3]} a_{\ell,1}^{*} \cdot a_{\ell',2} \cdot \gamma_{\ell} \cdot \gamma_{\ell'},\]
• If the input encodings to the multiplication circuit are both consistent, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding is guaranteed to be consistent. Hence, in this case, the proof $\pi^*_1$ for the output encoding is a proof of consistency, generated using the witness $(\text{SSk}_0, \text{SSk}_1)$.

• If a special case arises where one (or both) of the input encodings to the multiplication circuit is (are) inconsistent, the homomorphically evaluated output encoding will be inconsistent. In this case, the output proof $\pi^*_1$ for the output encoding must be a proof of language membership for $y$, and requires an appropriate language-membership witness $\text{wit}_y$.

However, note again that since the input encodings are valid, it must be the case that the corresponding input proofs for these encodings were generated using the corresponding language-membership witness $\text{wit}_y$. Hence,
we can again rely on the perfect extractability of the NIZK proof system in the binding mode to extract the corresponding witness from the input proof(s), and reuse the same for generating the output proof $\pi_1^*$.

**Putting Everything Together.** Figure 7 puts the aforementioned ideas together to formally describe the operation of the encoding-multiplication circuit $C_{\text{Mult}}$. Note that it again embeds multiple secrets, including the FHE secret keys $sk_0$ and $sk_1$, as well as the extraction trapdoors $t_{\text{ext},0}$ and $t_{\text{ext},1}$ for the NIZK. Hence, the circuit is not made public as is; we only make available an obfuscated version of the circuit obtained by running the evaluation algorithm of the probabilistic iO scheme piO on it.

Similar to the addition and inversion procedures described previously, the checks in steps 6 and 8 of $C_{\text{Mult}}$ are included for technical reasons that are relevant to the proof of security. In particular, we emphasize that when each element $z_{j,b}$ for $j \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0,1\}$ is a non-member for the language $L$, then under a binding $crs_0$, the “If” condition in step 6 of $C_{\text{Mult}}$ is never satisfied. Similarly, when the element $y$ is a non-member for the language $L$, then under a binding $crs_1$, the “If” condition in step 8 of $C_{\text{Mult}}$ is never satisfied. These observations follow from the perfect soundness guarantee of the NIZK proof system in the binding mode.

Looking ahead, in certain hybrids of our proof of SXDH, we do allow the “If” condition in step 6 to be satisfiable. In these hybrids, for some $j \in [n]$, we deliberately switch either $z_{j,1}$ or both $z_{j,0}$ and $z_{j,1}$ in the public parameter from a non-member to a member for $L$. Similarly, in certain other hybrids, the element $y$ is deliberately switched from a non-member to a member of $L$, thereby allowing the “If” condition may be satisfied.

### 5.5 Extraction and Zero-Testing

**Extraction.** We now describe the procedure for extracting a canonical string from an encoding. Suppose we have an encoding at the level $i$ of the form:

$$(ct_0, ct_1, i, \pi_0, \pi_1).$$

The extraction circuit uses $sk_0$ and $sk_1$ to recover the plaintext elements $\{a_{\ell,0}, a_{\ell,1}\}_{\ell \in [0,3]}$ underlying the FHE ciphertexts $ct_0$ and $ct_1$, and provided that these are consistent as per relation $R_1$ described earlier, outputs

$$g^* = \prod_{\ell \in [0,3]} g_{\ell,0}^{a_{\ell,0}} = \prod_{\ell \in [0,3]} g_{\ell,1}^{a_{\ell,1}}.$$

Figure 8 details the operation of the extraction circuit $C_{\text{ext}}$. Note that it again embeds multiple secrets, including the FHE secret keys $sk_0$ and $sk_1$, as well as the extraction trapdoors $t_{\text{ext},0}$ and $t_{\text{ext},1}$ for the NIZK. Hence, the circuit is not made public as is; we only make available a piO-obfuscated version of the circuit.

Once again, similar to the addition, inversion and multiplication procedures described previously, the checks in steps 6 and 7 of $C_{\text{ext}}$ are included for technical reasons that are relevant to the proof of security. In particular, we emphasize that when each element $z_{j,b}$ for $j \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0,1\}$ is a non-member for the language $L$, then under a binding $crs_0$, the “If” condition in step 6 of $C_{\text{ext}}$ is never satisfied. Similarly, when the element $y$ is a non-member for the language $L$, then under a binding $crs_1$, the “If” condition in step 7 of $C_{\text{ext}}$ is never satisfied. These observations again follow from the perfect soundness guarantee of the NIZK proof system in the binding mode.

Looking ahead, in certain hybrids of our proof of SXDH, we do allow the “If” conditions in step 6 and 7 to be satisfiable. In these hybrids, the extraction algorithm checks that the correct language-membership witnesses have been used to satisfy the corresponding OR branches in the statements being proved.

**Zero-Testing Encodings.** Given the aforementioned extraction procedure, zero-testing an encoding at any given level is trivial. We simply apply the extraction procedure to the encoding, and check if the extracted group element $g^*$ is equal to identity element in the group $G$ (i.e, $g^0$ for any $g \in G$).

### 6 Proof of SXDH Hardness

In this section, we prove that solving SXDH is hard over our proposed MMap construction if solving DDH is hard over the group $G$. More specifically we state and prove the following theorem:
Before we describe the outer hybrids, we describe a few conditions that remain invariant throughout the outer hybrids:

1. Output ⊥ if \( i \) is an “invalid level”, i.e., \( i > 1 \).
2. Output ⊥ if \( \text{NIKZ}.\text{Verify}(\text{crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0, ct_1, i, \{ z_{j,b} \}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}, \pi_0) = 0 \).
3. Output ⊥ if \( \text{NIKZ}.\text{Verify}(\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0, ct_1, i, y), \pi_1) = 0 \).
4. For \( b \in \{0,1\} \), recover \( \{ a_{x,b} \}_{x \in [0,3], i_b} = \text{FHE}.\text{Dec}(sk_0, ct_0) \).
5. Compute \( g^* = \prod_{b \in [0,3]} g^x_{a,b} \).
6. If \( R_{0,0}((ct_0, ct_1, i, pk_0, pk_1), (sk_0, sk_1)) = 0 \), then:
   (a) Extract \( (j, \text{wit}_{x_j}) = \text{NIKZ}.\text{Ext}(t_{x,0,0}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0, ct_1, i, \{ z_{j,b} \}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}, \pi_0) \).
   (b) If \( R_z(z_j, \text{wit}_{x_j}) = 0 \), output ⊥.
7. If \( R_{1,0}((ct_0, ct_1, i, pk_0, pk_1), (sk_0, sk_1)) = 0 \), then:
   (a) Extract \( \text{wit}_y = \text{NIKZ}.\text{Ext}(t_{x,1,1}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0, ct_1, i, y), \pi_1) \).
   (b) If \( R_z(y, \text{wit}_{y}) = 0 \), output ⊥.
8. Output \( g^* \).

Figure 8: Circuit \( C_{ext} \)

**Theorem 6.1.** The SXDH assumption holds over our proposed MMap construction provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme is IND-CPA secure and satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in \( L \) is computationally hard to decide and members of \( L \) have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.
- The DDH assumption holds over the group \( G \).

The proof proceeds through a sequence of hybrids, which we refer to as the “outer hybrids”. These outer hybrids are first described in Appendix 6.1. Subsequently, in Appendix 6.2, we prove each pair of consecutive outer hybrids to be computationally indistinguishable from each other. Each such proof requires an additional set of hybrids, which we refer to as the “inner hybrids.”

## 6.1 Outer Hybrids

We begin by describing the outer hybrids for our proof. Outer hybrid 0 corresponds to the game where the challenger provides the adversary with encodings of uniformly random elements in a level-set that is chosen by the adversary. The final outer hybrid corresponds to the game where the challenger provides the adversary with a valid SXDH instance, i.e., encodings of elements sampled according to the real SXDH distribution, in the same level-set chosen by the adversary. Before we describe the outer hybrids, we describe a few conditions that remain invariant throughout the outer hybrids:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Outer Hybrid</th>
<th>MMap Circuits</th>
<th>( z_{j,0} )</th>
<th>( z_{j,1} )</th>
<th>( (g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3) )</th>
<th>Challenge Encodings</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0</td>
<td>( C_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \notin \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \notin \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>( \hat{C}_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Random</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>( \hat{C}_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Partially oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>( \hat{C}_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>( \hat{C}_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \notin \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>( \hat{C}_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \notin \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>DDH</td>
<td>SXDH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>( \hat{C}_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>DDH</td>
<td>SXDH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>( \hat{C}_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>DDH</td>
<td>SXDH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>( \hat{C}_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>DDH</td>
<td>SXDH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>( C_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \notin \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \notin \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>DDH</td>
<td>SXDH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>( C_{op} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \notin \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \notin \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>SXDH</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Overview of the outer hybrids in the proof of SXDH. Changes between subsequent hybrids are highlighted in red. Throughout, \( crs_0 \) and \( crs_1 \) are binding, \( y \notin \mathcal{L} \), and the challenge encodings are consistent with respect to extraction. We use the shorthands \( C_{op} \) and \( \hat{C}_{op} \) for the tuples \((C_{Add}, C_{Inv}, C_{Mult}, C_{ext})\) and \((\hat{C}_{Add}, \hat{C}_{Inv}, \hat{C}_{Mult}, \hat{C}_{ext})\), respectively, where the second set of circuits are described in detail subsequently.

- The NIZK CRS strings \( crs_0 \) and \( crs_1 \) are in binding mode, as in the real MMap scheme, in all the outer hybrids.
- The element \( y \) in the public parameter is a non-member for the language \( \mathcal{L} \), as in the real MMap scheme, in all the outer hybrids.
- The challenge encodings provided to the adversary are consistent with respect to extraction (as formalized by the relation \( R_1 \) described earlier) in all the outer hybrids. However, as we shall see later, they may be switched from the normal to oblique representation and vice-versa.

Table 1 provides an overview of the outer hybrids, which we now describe in details.

**Outer Hybrid 0.**  In this hybrid, the MMap is set up exactly as in the real scheme described earlier. Let \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) be the tuple of group elements hardwired into each of the MMap circuits, such that \( g_i = g_0^{\mu_i} \) for \( i \in \{1, 2, 3\} \). Let \( \mu \) be a uniformly sampled element in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \). The SXDH adversary is provided with encodings of the tuple of elements:

\[
(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3) = (\mu, \mu \cdot \gamma_1, \mu \cdot \gamma_2, \mu \cdot \gamma_3),
\]

where the encodings are generated in normal form (formalized by relation \( R_0 \) described earlier) corresponding to the level-set \( I \) chosen by the SXDH adversary. For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts
in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 2. Along with the FHE encryptions, each encoding also contains a NIZK proof \(\pi_0\) for normal representation under the binding \(\text{crs}_0\), and a NIZK proof \(\pi_1\) for consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \(\text{crs}_1\).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>(c_0) encrypts</th>
<th>(c_1) encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for (\pi_0)</th>
<th>Witness for (\pi_1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>([\alpha_0])</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, 1))</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, 1))</td>
<td>((\sk_0, \sk_1))</td>
<td>((\sk_0, \sk_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>([\alpha_1])</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, 1))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, 1))</td>
<td>((\sk_0, \sk_1))</td>
<td>((\sk_0, \sk_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>([\alpha_2])</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, 1))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, 1))</td>
<td>((\sk_0, \sk_1))</td>
<td>((\sk_0, \sk_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>([\alpha_3])</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, 1))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, 1))</td>
<td>((\sk_0, \sk_1))</td>
<td>((\sk_0, \sk_1))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 0

**Outer Hybrid 1.** In this hybrid, we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is generated:

1. Fix \(j \in [n]\) such that for the challenge level-set \(i\), we have \(i_j = 1\). We switch the elements \(z_{j,0}\) and \(z_{j,1}\) in the public parameters from non-members to members for \(\mathcal{L}\), i.e., we now sample \(z_{j,0}, z_{j,1} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}\), along with their (unique) membership-witnesses \(\text{wit}_{z_{j,0}}\) and \(\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}\), respectively.

2. We switch the circuits for addition, inversion, multiplication and extraction as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\mathcal{C}_{\text{Add}} & \mapsto \mathcal{\hat{C}}_{\text{Add}}, \\
\mathcal{C}_{\text{Inv}} & \mapsto \mathcal{\hat{C}}_{\text{Inv}}, \\
\mathcal{C}_{\text{Mult}} & \mapsto \mathcal{\hat{C}}_{\text{Mult}}, \\
\mathcal{C}_{\text{ext}} & \mapsto \mathcal{\hat{C}}_{\text{ext}},
\end{align*}
\]

The switched circuits are described in Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12, respectively. At a high level, we make the following key alterations:

- We hardwire the witnesses \(\text{wit}_{z_{j,0}}\) and \(\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}\) into the modified addition and inversion circuits \(\mathcal{\hat{C}}_{\text{Add}}\) and \(\mathcal{\hat{C}}_{\text{Inv}}\), and remove the extraction trapdoor \(t_{\text{ext},0}\) from both these circuits. Instead of extracting the membership witness from the input encodings, we directly use these hardwired witnesses to generate proofs of membership for the output encodings.

- We hardwire the witness \(\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}\) into the modified multiplication circuit \(\mathcal{\hat{C}}_{\text{Mult}}\), and remove the extraction trapdoor \(t_{\text{ext},0}\) from it. Instead of extracting the membership witness from the input encoding, we directly use the hardwired witness to generate proofs of membership for the output encodings. Note that we only need one witness for the multiplication circuit; the witness \(\text{wit}_{z_{j,0}}\) is not used (the reader may observe that the original multiplication circuit would not have extracted \(\text{wit}_{z_{j,0}}\) either).

- Finally, we remove the extraction trapdoor \(t_{\text{ext},0}\) from the modified extraction circuit \(\mathcal{\hat{C}}_{\text{ext}}\).

**Remark 6.2.** By switching both \(z_{j,0}\) and \(z_{j,1}\) to members of \(\mathcal{L}\), we effectively allow valid encodings in any level to be represented using the oblique representation. In particular, valid oblique encodings in any level set \(i'\) can, in theory, prove membership of \(z_{j,i'}\) using the corresponding witness \(\text{wit}_{z_{j,i'}}\).

**Remark 6.3.** Note that The element \(y\) continues to be a non-member for \(\mathcal{L}\) and \(\text{crs}_1\) is still generated in the binding mode. Hence, any valid encoding must still satisfy consistency as per relation \(R_{1,0}\) described earlier.
1. Output ⊥ if either $i_1$ and $i_2$ are non-identical or correspond to “invalid” levels, i.e., if $i_1 \neq i_2$ or $i_1 > i_2$. Else, set $i = i_1$ and proceed.

2. Output ⊥ if for any $k \in \{1, 2\}$, we have

\[ \text{NIZK.Verify}((\text{crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, \{z_{j,k}\}_{j \in [n], k \in \{0,1\}}, \pi_{0, k}) = 0. \]

3. Output ⊥ if for any $k \in \{1, 2\}$, we have

\[ \text{NIZK.Verify}((\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, y, \pi_{1, k}) = 0. \]

4. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, set $ct_{b, i}^* = \text{FHE.Eval}(pk_y, ct_{0,1}, ct_{b, 2}, C_{\text{Add, FHE}})$.

5. If for some $k \in \{1, 2\}$, we have $R_{0,0}((ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, pk_0, pk_1), (sk_y, sk_k)) = 0$, then:

   (a) // Omitted, depends on $b_{ext, 0}$.

   (b) Generate $\pi_{0, i}^* \gets \text{NIZK.Prove}((\text{crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,i}^*, ct_{0,i}^*, i, \{z_{j,k}\}_{j \in [n], k \in \{0,1\}}, (j, wit_{z_{j,i}}))$.

6. Else, generate $\pi_{0, i}^* \gets \text{NIZK.Prove}((\text{crs}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,i}^*, ct_{0,i}^*, i, \{z_{j,k}\}_{j \in [n], k \in \{0,1\}}, (sk_y, sk_k))$.

7. If for some $k \in \{1, 2\}$, we have $R_{1,0}((ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, pk_0, pk_1), (sk_y, sk_k)) = 0$, then:

   (a) Extract $wit_{y} = \text{NIZK.Ext}(\text{Gen}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}, ct_{1,1}, i, y), \pi_{1, k})$.

   (b) If $R_L(y, wit_{y}) = 0$, output ⊥...

   (c) Else, generate $\pi_{1, i}^* \gets \text{NIZK.Prove}((\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,i}^*, ct_{0,i}^*, i, y), wit_{y})$.

8. Else, generate $\pi_{1, i}^* \gets \text{NIZK.Prove}((\text{crs}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,i}^*, ct_{0,i}^*, i, y), (sk_y, sk_k))$.

9. Output $(ct_{0,i}^*, ct_{1,i}^*, i, \pi_{0, i}^*, \pi_{1, i}^*)$.

---

Figure 9: Circuit $C_{\text{Add}}$

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>$ct_0$ encrypts</th>
<th>$ct_1$ encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_0$</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$[a_0]$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, wit_{z_{j,i}})$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_k)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[a_1]$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, wit_{z_{j,i}})$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_k)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[a_2]$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, wit_{z_{j,i}})$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_k)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[a_3]$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, wit_{z_{j,i}})$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_k)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 1

Additionally, we make the following change to the manner in which the challenge encodings are generated: for each challenge encoding, the NIZK proof $\pi_0$ now proves (under the binding $\text{crs}_0$) that $z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}$ as opposed to proving that the encoding is in the normal representation. This is explicitly described in Table 3.
### Table 4: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>$c_{t_0}$ encrypts</th>
<th>$c_{t_1}$ encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_0$</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$[a_0]$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, 1)$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, 1)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(s_{k_0}, s_{k_1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[a_1]$</td>
<td>$(0, \mu, 0, 0, 1)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, 1)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(s_{k_0}, s_{k_1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[a_2]$</td>
<td>$(0, 0, \mu, 0, 1)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, 1)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(s_{k_0}, s_{k_1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[a_3]$</td>
<td>$(0, 0, 0, \mu, 1)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, 1)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(s_{k_0}, s_{k_1})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 10: Circuit $\tilde{C}_{\text{inv}}$

**Outer Hybrid 2.** This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 1, except that the challenge SXDH encodings are no longer in normal form. In particular, the first FHE ciphertext in each encoding now encrypts an oblique representation of the underlying plaintext element. For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 4. As in outer hybrid 1, each encoding also contains a NIZK proof $\pi_0$ for $z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}$ under the binding $\text{crs}_0$, and a NIZK proof $\pi_1$ for consistency under the binding $\text{crs}_1$. The changes from outer hybrid 1 are highlighted in red.

**Outer Hybrid 3.** This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 2, except that the challenge SXDH encodings are now entirely in oblique form. In particular, the second FHE ciphertext in each encoding now also encrypts an oblique representation of the underlying plaintext element. Each encoding continues to have a NIZK proof $\pi_0$ for $z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}$.
The changes from outer hybrid 2 are highlighted in red.

\[ C_{\text{Mult}}((\mathbf{ct}_0, \mathbf{ct}_1), (\mathbf{sk}_0, \mathbf{sk}_1)) \]\n
1. Output \( \bot \) if \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) are "pairing-incompatible", i.e., \( i_1 + i_2 > \Gamma_n \).

2. Output \( \bot \) if for any \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), we have
   \[ \text{NIZK.Verify}\left(\text{crs}_0, (\mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, \mathbf{ct}_0, \mathbf{ct}_1, i_k, \{ z_{j,b} \}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0, 1\}}, \pi_{0,k} \right) = 0. \]

3. Output \( \bot \) if for any \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), \( \text{NIZK.Verify}\left(\text{crs}_1, (\mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, \mathbf{ct}_0, \mathbf{ct}_1, i_k, y), \pi_{1,k} \right) = 0. \)

4. For \( k \in \{1, 2\} \) set
   \[ \text{flag}_k = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i_{k,j} = 0, \\ 1 & \text{otherwise}. \end{cases} \]

   // Omitted use of \( i_{0,0} \) above.

5. For \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), set \( \mathbf{ct}_b^* = \text{FHE.Eval}(\mathbf{pk}_b, \mathbf{ct}_0, \mathbf{ct}_1, \mathbf{ct}_{b,\gamma}, \mathbf{ct}_{b,\text{tag}}, C_{\text{Mult},\text{FHE}}) \), where
   \[ \begin{align*} 
   \mathbf{ct}_{b,\gamma} &= \text{FHE.Enc}(\mathbf{pk}_0, (0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3, \vec{u}_n)), \\
   \mathbf{ct}_{b,\text{tag}} &= \text{FHE.Enc}(\mathbf{pk}_0, (\text{flag}_b, \text{flag}_{b,\gamma}, 0, \vec{u}_n)). 
   \end{align*} \]

6. If there exists some \( k \in \{1, 2\} \) such that:
   \[ R_{1,0}((\mathbf{ct}_0, \mathbf{ct}_1), i_k, \mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, (\mathbf{sk}_0, \mathbf{sk}_1)) = 0 \text{ and } i_{k,j} = 1, \]
   then generate
   \[ \pi_0^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}\left(\text{crs}, (\mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, \mathbf{ct}_0^*, \mathbf{ct}_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), \{ z_{j,b} \}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0, 1\}}, (y, \text{wit}_{i_{k,j}}) \right) \]

7. Else, generate
   \[ \pi_0^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}\left(\text{crs}, (\mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, \mathbf{ct}_0^*, \mathbf{ct}_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), \{ z_{j,b} \}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0, 1\}}, (\mathbf{sk}_0, \mathbf{sk}_1) \right) \]

8. If for some \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), we have \( R_{1,0}((\mathbf{ct}_0, \mathbf{ct}_1), i_k, \mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, (\mathbf{sk}_0, \mathbf{sk}_1)) = 0 \), then:
   
   (a) Extract \( \text{wit}_y = \text{NIZK.Ext}(\pi_{0,1}, (\mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, \mathbf{ct}_0, \mathbf{ct}_1, i_k, y), \pi_{1,k}) \).
   
   (b) If \( R_c(y, \text{wit}_y) = 0 \), output \( \bot \).
   
   (c) Else, generate \( \pi_1^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}\left(\text{crs}_1, (\mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, \mathbf{ct}_0^*, \mathbf{ct}_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), y), \text{wit}_y \right) \).

9. Else, generate \( \pi_1^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}\left(\text{crs}, (\mathbf{pk}_0, \mathbf{pk}_1, \mathbf{ct}_0^*, \mathbf{ct}_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), y), (\mathbf{sk}_0, \mathbf{sk}_1) \right) \).

10. Output \( (\mathbf{ct}_0^*, \mathbf{ct}_1^*, i, \pi_0^*, \pi_1^*) \).

Figure 11: Circuit \( C_{\text{Mult}} \)

under the binding \( \text{crs}_0 \), and a NIZK proof \( \pi_1 \) for consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \( \text{crs}_1 \). For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 5. The changes from outer hybrid 2 are highlighted in red.
Witness for

This follows from the definition of our extraction procedure over oblique encodings, and the corresponding circuit over the group \(G\).

Before concretely describing outer hybrid 4, we provide some informal intuition for what we wish to achieve in this hybrid. Looking ahead, in outer hybrid 5, we wish to switch the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) hardwired into the MMap circuits from a uniformly random tuple of group elements to a uniformly random DDH tuple, albeit with the same base element \(g_0\). More formally, we wish to uniformly sample \(\gamma_1, \gamma_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q\), and set

\[
(g_1, g_2, g_3) = (g_0^{\gamma_1}, g_0^{\gamma_2}, g_0^{\gamma_1\gamma_2}).
\]

Note that by the end of outer hybrid 3, the challenge encodings have already been switched to the oblique representation. So, as soon we switch the the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) from a uniformly random tuple of group elements to a uniformly random DDH tuple, it immediately also switches the challenge encodings from random to SXDH. This follows from the definition of our extraction procedure over oblique encodings, and the corresponding circuit description.

However, switching \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) from a uniformly random tuple of group elements to a uniformly random DDH tuple would also change the outputs of the extraction circuit on (adversarially generated) encodings in the oblique representation. Hence, we cannot rely on \(\pi^0\) security for this step. Instead, we wish to rely on the DDH assumption over the group \(G\) to make this switch.
This presents us with one particular obstacle - the multiplication circuit $\hat{C}_{\text{Mult}}$ explicitly uses the knowledge of the exponents $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$. A closer look reveals that the knowledge of the exponents is necessary to handle one particular branch inside the multiplication circuit - the one that is activated when two (valid) input encodings that correspond to “pairing-compatible” levels $i_1$ and $i_2$ are both in the oblique representation. If we could somehow ensure this branch can never be activated by a pair of valid input encodings, we could rely on piO security to remove this branch (and hence the secret exponents) from the multiplication circuit. At this point, all of the circuits would only embed the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$, and we can invoke the DDH assumption over the group $G$ to make the switch from random tuple to DDH tuple.

The role of outer hybrid 4 is to affect changes to the public parameters of the MMap scheme such that no two (valid) input encodings that correspond to “pairing-compatible” levels $i_1$ and $i_2$ can both be in the oblique representation. To this end, suppose we exploit the hardness of deciding language-membership in $L$.

Based on the aforementioned intuition, we now formally describe outer hybrid 4. In particular, we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is generated:

1. We switch back the element $z_{j,0}$ in the public parameters from a member to a non-member for $L$, i.e., we now sample $z_{j,0} \leftarrow X \setminus L$. The element $z_{j,1}$ continues to be a member for $L$, i.e., we continue to sample $z_{j,1} \leftarrow L$, along with the (unique) membership-witness $\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}$.

2. We switch the circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication as follows:

$$\hat{C}_{\text{Add}} \mapsto \hat{\hat{C}}_{\text{Add}}, \quad \hat{C}_{\text{Inv}} \mapsto \hat{\hat{C}}_{\text{Inv}}, \quad \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \mapsto \hat{\hat{C}}_{\text{Mult}}.$$  

The switched circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication are described in Figures 13, 14, and 16, respectively.

The following observations about the modified MMap circuits are worth highlighting:

1. The modified circuits (in particular, the addition and inversion circuits $\hat{\hat{C}}_{\text{Add}}$ and $\hat{\hat{C}}_{\text{Inv}}$) only have the witness $\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}$ for the membership of $z_{j,1}$ in $L$ hardwired into them. Since $z_{j,0}$ is no longer a member, it does not have a membership witness.

2. The modified multiplication circuit $\hat{\hat{C}}_{\text{Mult}}$ no longer has the exponents $\gamma_1$, $\gamma_2$ and $\gamma_3$ hardwired into it. It only has the group elements $g_0$, $g_1$, $g_2$ and $g_3$ hardwired, similar to the addition and inversion circuits.
following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is generated:

Outer Hybrid 6. This hybrid can be viewed as a “reverse” counterpart to outer hybrid 4. In particular, we make the alterations described in Figure 15.

Figure 13: Circuit $C_{\text{Add}}$

3. The modified multiplication circuit $\hat{C}_{\text{Mult}}$ in turn homomorphically evaluates a modified circuit $\hat{C}_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$, described in Figure 15.

4. The extraction circuit remains unchanged, i.e., we continue to use the extraction circuit $\hat{C}_{\text{ext}}$.

Finally, note that the element $y$ continues to be a non-member for $L$ and $\text{crs}_1$ is still generated in the binding mode. Hence, any valid encoding must still satisfy consistency with respect to extraction.

Outer Hybrid 5. This hybrid is identical to outer hybrid 4 except that we switch the tuple $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ hardwired into the MMap circuits $\hat{C}_{\text{Add}}, \hat{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}}$ and $\hat{C}_{\text{ext}}$ (note that the extraction circuit was not modified in outer hybrid 4) from a uniformly random tuple of group elements to a uniformly random DDH tuple, albeit with the same base element $g_0$. More formally, we uniformly sample $\gamma_1, \gamma_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q^4}$, and set

$$(g_1, g_2, g_3) = (g_0^{\gamma_1}, g_0^{\gamma_2}, g_0^{\gamma_1+\gamma_2}).$$

Outer Hybrid 6. This hybrid can be viewed as a “reverse” counterpart to outer hybrid 4. In particular, we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is generated:
Outer Hybrid 7. This hybrid can be viewed as a “reverse” counterpart to outer hybrid 3. In particular, the challenge SXDH encodings are now switched back to a partially oblique form. In particular, the second FHE ciphertext in
1. Output ⊥ if \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) are "pairing-incompatible", i.e., \( i_1 + i_2 > \bar{I}_n \).

2. Output ⊥ if for any \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), we have
\[
\text{NIZK}.\text{Verify}(\text{crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{1,k,i}, \{z_{j,b}\}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}, \pi_{0,k}) = 0.
\]

3. Output ⊥ if for any \( k \in \{1, 2\}, \text{NIZK}.\text{Verify}(\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{1,k,i}, \{z_{j,b}\}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}, \pi_{1,k}) = 0.
\]

4. For \( k \in \{1, 2\} \) set
\[
\text{flag}_k = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i_{k,j} = 0, \\ 1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}
\]

// Omitted use of \( t_{\text{ext},0} \) above.

5. For \( b \in \{0,1\} \), set \( ct_b^* = \text{FHE}.\text{Eval}(pk_b, ct_{0,1}, ct_{0,2}, ct_{0,\text{flag}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult},\text{FHE}}) \), where
\[
ct_{0,\text{flag}} = \text{FHE}.\text{Enc}(pk_0, (\text{flag}_1, \text{flag}_2, 0, \bar{b}_n)).
\]

// Omitted use of the secret exponents \((\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3)\) above.

6. If there exists some \( k \in \{1, 2\} \) such that:
\[
R_{1,0}((ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i_k, pk_0, pk_1), (sk_0, sk_1)) = 0 \text{ and } i_{k,j} = 1,
\]
then generate
\[
\pi_0^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,j}^*, ct_{1,j}^*, (i_1 + i_2), \{z_{j,b}\}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}, (j, \text{wit}_{j,i,j,k})).
\]

7. Else, generate
\[
\pi_0^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,j}^*, ct_{1,j}^*, (i_1 + i_2), \{z_{j,b}\}_{j \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}, (sk_0, sk_1)).
\]

8. If for some \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), we have \( R_{1,0}((ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i_k, pk_0, pk_1), (sk_0, sk_1)) = 0 \), then:
   (a) Extract \( \text{wit}_y = \text{NIZK}.\text{Ext}(t_{\text{ext},1}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}, ct_{1,1}, i_k, y), \pi_{1,k}).
   
   (b) If \( R_{L}(y, \text{wit}_y) = 0 \), output ⊥.
   
   (c) Else, generate \( \pi_1^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,j}^*, ct_{1,j}^*, (i_1 + i_2), y), \text{wit}_y)).

9. Else, generate \( \pi_1^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK}.\text{Prove}(\text{crs}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,j}^*, ct_{1,j}^*, (i_1 + i_2), y), (sk_0, sk_1)).
\]

10. Output \((ct_{0,j}^*, ct_{1,j}^*, 1, \pi_0^*, \pi_1^*)\).

Figure 16: Circuit \( \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \)

Each encoding now encrypts a normal representation of the underlying plaintext element. Each encoding continues to have a NIZK proof \( \pi_0 \) for \( z_{j,1} \in L \) under the binding \( \text{crs}_0 \), and a NIZK proof \( \pi_1 \) for consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \( \text{crs}_1 \). For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 6. The changes from outer hybrid 6 are highlighted in red.
**Outer Hybrid 8.** This hybrid can be viewed as a “reverse” counterpart to outer hybrid 2. In particular, the challenge SXDH encodings are now switched back entirely to the normal form. In particular, the first FHE ciphertext in each encoding now also encrypts a normal representation of the underlying plaintext element. Each encoding continues to have a NIZK proof $\pi_0$ for $z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}$ under the binding $\text{crs}_0$, and a NIZK proof $\pi_1$ for consistency with respect to extraction under the binding $\text{crs}_1$. For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 7. The changes from outer hybrid 7 are highlighted in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>$\mathbb{cl}_0$ encrypts</th>
<th>$\mathbb{cl}_1$ encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_0$</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_0]$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}_{j,1})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_1]$</td>
<td>$(0, \mu, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}_{j,1})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_2]$</td>
<td>$(0, 0, \mu, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}_{j,1})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_3]$</td>
<td>$(0, 0, 0, \mu, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1 \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}_{j,1})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 7

**Outer Hybrid 9.** This hybrid can be viewed as a “reverse” counterpart to outer hybrid 1. In particular, we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is set up:

1. We switch back the elements $z_{j,0}$ and $z_{j,1}$ in the public parameters from members to non-members for $\mathcal{L}$, i.e., we now sample $z_{j,0}, z_{j,1} \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L}$. Note that this is exactly as in the real MMap scheme.

2. We switch back the circuits for addition, inversion, multiplication and extraction as follows:

   $\hat{C}_{\text{Add}} \mapsto C_{\text{Add}}$, $\hat{C}_{\text{Inv}} \mapsto C_{\text{Inv}}$, $\hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \mapsto C_{\text{Mult}}$, $\hat{C}_{\text{ext}} \mapsto C_{\text{ext}}$

   In particular, the circuits are now exactly as in the real MMap scheme, with the exception that the tuple $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ hardwired inside these circuits continues to be a DDH tuple (and the corresponding secret exponents hardwired into the multiplication circuit are $\gamma_1, \gamma_2$ and $\gamma_1 \cdot \gamma_2$).

   Additionally, we make the following change to the manner in which the challenge encodings are generated: for each encoding, the NIZK proof $\pi_0$ under the binding $\text{crs}_0$ now proves that the encoding is in the normal representation using
the witness \((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)\), as opposed to proving that \(z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}\). For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 8. The changes from outer hybrid 8 are highlighted in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>(c_{\alpha_0}) encrypts</th>
<th>(c_{\alpha_1}) encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for (\pi_0)</th>
<th>Witness for (\pi_1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha_0)</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha_1)</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha_2)</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(\alpha_3)</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_1 \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma_1 \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 9

Note that via the outer hybrids 6 through 9, we have “reversed” all of the alterations made to the MMap scheme and the challenge encodings in the outer hybrids 1 through 4. As a result, in outer hybrid 9, the MMap parameters as well as the challenge encodings are now identical to the “real” MMap scheme (as in outer hybrid 0), except that the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) hardwired into the MMap circuits \(C_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Inv}}, C_{\text{Mult}}\) and \(C_{\text{ext}}\) is a DDH tuple as opposed to a random tuple - a “switch” we introduced in outer hybrid 5.

**Outer Hybrid 10.** This is the final outer hybrid. In this hybrid, we switch back the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) hardwired into the MMap circuits \(C_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Inv}}, C_{\text{Mult}}\) and \(C_{\text{ext}}\) from a uniform DDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple, albeit with the same base element \(g_0\) (and the corresponding secret exponents hardwired into the multiplication circuit are switched from \((\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_1 \cdot \gamma_2)\) to uniformly random \((\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3)\)). In other words, the MMap circuits are now exactly as in the “real” scheme (as in outer hybrid 0).

### 6.2 Indistinguishability of Outer Hybrids

In this section, we argue that the outer hybrids are computationally indistinguishable from each other. Each argument in turn involves a sequence of inner hybrids, as described below.

**Outer Hybrids 0 and 1.** We first argue that outer hybrids 0 and 1 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 6.4.** The outer hybrids 0 and 1 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in \(\mathcal{L}\) is computationally hard to decide and members of \(\mathcal{L}\) have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.
Overview. At a high level, we use this sequence of inner hybrids to make appropriate switches to the public parameters and the MMap circuits so that a valid encoding can be in the (partially) oblique representation. To begin with, we exploit the hardness of deciding language-membership in $L$ to switch the elements $z_{j,0}$ and $z_{j,1}$ in the public parameters from non-members to members for $L$. This effectively allows any valid encoding corresponding to any valid level-set to be in the (partially) oblique representation. Next, we switch the proofs $\pi_0$ in the challenge SXDH encodings from proofs of normal representation to proofs of language-membership for $z_{j,1}$ (recall that the challenge SXDH encodings are generated in a level set $i$ such that $i_j = 1$). Looking ahead, in outer hybrids 2 and 3, we will exploit this “change-of-witness” for $\pi_0$ to eventually switch the challenge SXDH encodings from normal to oblique representation.

Note, however, that switching witnesses for the proof $\pi_0$ in the challenge encodings is non-trivial. In particular, $crs_0$ is in the binding mode, and to switch witnesses, we would first need to switch $crs_0$ to hiding mode. But switching $crs_0$ to hiding mode would further require us to get rid of the extraction trapdoor $ext_0$ hardwired into the MMap circuits, which we achieve via an additional sequence of inner hybrids. In particular, we replace $ext_0$ with hardwired witnesses of language-membership for $z_{j,0}$ and $z_{j,1}$ in the MMap circuits. We rely on a combination of security features from the piO scheme, the NIZK proof system and the hard-membership language $L$ to argue that this replacement can be made in a computationally indistinguishable manner. The details of the corresponding inner hybrids are presented next.

Inner Hybrid 0-0. This hybrid is identical to outer hybrid 0.

Inner Hybrid 0-1. In this hybrid, we switch $z_{j,0}$ and $z_{j,1}$ in the public parameter of the MMap from uniform non-members to uniform members of $L$. By the hardness of deciding language-membership in $L$, inner hybrid 0-1 is computationally indistinguishable from inner hybrid 0-0 (more formally, we require two sub-hybrids - one for switching each of the elements $z_{j,0}$ and $z_{j,1}$ from uniform non-members to uniform members of $L$; we avoid this for brevity).

Table 9: Overview of the inner hybrids in the proof of indistinguishability of outer hybrids 0 and 1. Changes between subsequent hybrids are highlighted in red. Throughout, $crs_0$ is binding, $z_{j,1}, y \notin L$, $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ is a random tuple of group elements, and the challenge encodings are both in normal representation as well as consistent with respect to extraction. We use the shorthands $C_{op}$ and $\tilde{C}_{op}$ for the tuples $(C_{Add}, C_{Inv}, C_{Mult}, C_{ext})$ and $(\tilde{C}_{Add}, \tilde{C}_{Inv}, \tilde{C}_{Mult}, \tilde{C}_{ext})$, respectively, where the first set consists of the “real” MMap circuits, while the second set consists of the modified circuits as described in the previous subsection.

Proof. To prove this lemma, we use a sequence of inner hybrids. The first of these inner hybrids is identical to outer hybrid 0, while the last is identical to outer hybrid 1. Table 9 provides an overview of these inner hybrids.
**Inner Hybrid 0-2.** In this hybrid we switch to using the modified MMap circuits \( \hat{C}_{Add}, \hat{C}_{Inv}, \hat{C}_{Mult} \) and \( \hat{C}_{ext} \). In particular, we hardwire the witnesses \( wit_{z_{j,0}} \) and \( wit_{z_{j,1}} \) for the membership of \( z_{j,0} \) and \( z_{j,1} \) into the circuits, and remove the extraction trapdoor \( t_{ext,0} \) from all of the circuits. We claim that this change does not change the functionality of the MMap circuits at all.

To begin with, observe that in order to reach the extraction step, the input encoding(s) to each circuit must pass the validity checks for \( \pi_0 \). Since \( crs_0 \) is binding in both inner hybrids 0-1 and 0-2, any valid encoding that passes this test must either contain a verifying proof of normal representation, or must contain a verifying proof of language-membership for \( z_{j,0} \) or \( z_{j,1} \). Now observe the following:

- In the case where the encoding contains a verifying proof of normal representation, the first **If** condition in the addition and inversion circuits, the **Else** **If** conditions in the multiplication circuit, and the first **If** condition in the extraction circuit are never satisfied, and the proof \( \pi_0 \) for the output encoding is generated using the witness \((sk_0, sk_1)\). Hence, in this case, the outputs of the original and modified MMap circuits are identical.

- In the case where the encoding contains a verifying proof of language-membership for \( z_{j,0} \) or \( z_{j,1} \), these conditions may be satisfied (if one or more of the input encodings to each circuit are in the oblique representation). In this case, to generate the proof \( \pi_0 \) for the output encoding, the circuits \( C_{Add}, C_{Inv} \) and \( C_{Mult} \) use the extracted witness, while the circuits \( \hat{C}_{Add}, \hat{C}_{Inv} \) and \( \hat{C}_{Mult} \) use the hardwired witness. Since the NIZK system has perfect extractability in the binding mode, extraction always succeeds in the original MMap circuits. Since \( L \) has unique membership witnesses, the extracted and hardwired witnesses must be identical. Hence, even in this case, the outputs of the original and modified MMap circuits are identical.

At this point, the transition can be justified by invoking the security of the piO scheme against \( X \)-\( IND \) samplers (once for each MMap circuit).

**Inner Hybrid 0-3.** In this hybrid we switch the string \( crs_0 \) in the public parameter from binding to hiding mode. Hence proofs generated under \( crs_0 \) will be perfectly witness indistinguishable in this hybrid. This hop can be justified by the CRS indistinguishability of the dual-mode NIZK proof system, and the fact that the modified MMap circuits \( \hat{C}_{Add}, \hat{C}_{Inv}, \hat{C}_{Mult} \) and \( \hat{C}_{ext} \) do not use the extraction trapdoor \( t_{ext,0} \) any longer.

**Inner Hybrid 0-4.** In this hybrid we switch the proof \( \pi_0 \) in each challenge encoding from using the witness \((sk_0, sk_1)\) to prove normal representation to using the witness \((j, wit_{z_{j,1}})\) for proving the membership of \( z_{j,1} \) in \( L \). Note that we still generate proofs that are valid, albeit using a different witness. This hop can be justified by the perfect witness-indistinguishability of the NIZK proof system in the hiding mode.

**Inner Hybrid 0-5.** In this hybrid we switch the string \( crs_0 \) in the public parameter back to binding mode from hiding mode. This hop can be justified by the CRS indistinguishability of the dual-mode NIZK proof system, and the fact that all proofs in the challenge encodings are valid.

Observe that in inner hybrid 0-5, the public parameters of the MMap and the challenge encodings are distributed exactly as in outer hybrid 1. This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.4.

**Outer Hybrids 1 and 2.** We now argue that outer hybrids 1 and 2 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 6.5.** The outer hybrids 1 and 2 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against \( X \)-\( IND \) samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of \( Eval \), as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in \( L \) is computationally hard to decide and members of \( L \) have unique witnesses for membership.
• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner Hybrid</th>
<th>(crs₀, crs₁)</th>
<th>MMap Circuits</th>
<th>y</th>
<th>Challenge Encodings</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-0</td>
<td>(Binding, Binding)</td>
<td>˜C_{op}</td>
<td>y ∉ L</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-1</td>
<td>(Binding, Hiding)</td>
<td>˜C_{op,0}</td>
<td>y ∈ L</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>(Binding, Hiding)</td>
<td>˜C_{op,0}</td>
<td>y ∈ L</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Partially oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>(Binding, Binding)</td>
<td>˜C_{op}</td>
<td>y ∉ L</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Partially oblique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 10: Overview of the inner hybrids in the proof of indistinguishability of outer hybrids 1 and 2. Changes between subsequent hybrids are highlighted in red. Throughout, crs₀ is in binding mode, z_{j,0}, z_{j,1} ∈ L, and (g₀, g₁, g₂, g₃) is a random tuple of group elements. We use the shorthands ˜C_{op} and ˜C_{op,0} for the tuples (˜C_{Add}, ˜C_{Inv}, ˜C_{Mult}, ˜C_{ext,0}) and (˜C_{Add}, ˜C_{Inv}, ˜C_{Mult}, ˜C_{ext,0}), respectively, where the second set of circuits are described in detail subsequently.

Proof. To prove this lemma, we use another sequence of inner hybrids. The first of these inner hybrids is identical to outer hybrid 1, while the last is identical to outer hybrid 2. Table 10 provides an overview of these inner hybrids.

Overview. At a high level, we use this sequence of inner hybrids to transform the challenge SXDH encodings from normal representation to partially oblique representation. In particular, the plaintext underlying the first FHE ciphertext c_{l,0} in each of the challenge encodings is transformed from the normal form to the oblique form, while the plaintext underlying the second FHE ciphertext c_{l,1} in each of the challenge encodings continues to be in the normal form. Ideally, we would like to exploit FHE semantic security with respect to the key pair (sk₀, pk₀) to enable this switch. However, such a reduction is not immediately obvious. This is because sk₀ is embedded into each of the MMap circuits, and is used in an essential way for consistency checks, output proof generation, and extraction. Additionally, sk₀ is also used as witness for the proof π₁ of consistency in each of the challenge SXDH encodings.

We enable this reduction by introducing some additional hybrids. In particular, inner hybrid 1-1 affects changes to the public parameters and the MMap circuits to ensure that sk₀ can be removed (in a computationally indistinguishable manner) from each of the circuits, and also from the proofs in the challenge SXDH encodings. Once this is achieved, inner hybrid 1-2 proceeds as outlined earlier; namely, it exploit FHE semantic security with respect to the key pair (sk₀, pk₀) to transform the plaintext underlying the first FHE ciphertext c_{l,0} in each of the challenge encodings from the normal form to the oblique form. Finally, inner hybrid 1-3 “reverses” the alterations to the public parameters and the MMap circuits made by inner hybrid 1-1. Thus, at the end of inner hybrid 1-3, the challenge SXDH encodings are in the partially oblique representation, as desired. The crux of the proof thus lies in realizing inner hybrid 1-1. We borrow certain proof techniques from [FHHH18] for this purpose.

We now provide a brief overview of the techniques underlying the switch from outer hybrid 1 (equivalently, inner hybrid 1-0) to inner hybrid 1-1. To begin with, observe that so long as crs₁ is in binding mode and the element y in the public parameters is a non-member for L, any valid encoding must be consistent, meaning that both FHE ciphertexts in the encoding must encode the “same” plaintext element, irrespective of representation. Hence, the extraction circuit can use sk₁ instead of sk₀ for extraction without changing the output distribution in any way. This allows us to remove sk₀ from the extraction circuit; the corresponding indistinguishability argument follows from piO security against X-IND samplers.
Next, we exploit the hardness of deciding language-membership in \( \mathcal{L} \) to switch the element \( y \) in the public parameters from a non-member to a member for \( \mathcal{L} \). This effectively allows any valid encoding to be “inconsistent”, so long as it contains a verifying proof \( \pi_1 \) of language-membership for \( y \). We use this trick to “suspend” any consistency checks in the MMap circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication; we simply hardwire the unique language-membership witness \( \text{wit}_y \) into these circuits and use it directly for generating proofs of language-membership as part of the output encodings. This allows us to remove \( \text{sk}_0 \) from these circuit as well. However, the corresponding indistinguishability argument is significantly more complicated, and relies on multiple security properties of the NIZK system (mode indistinguishability, perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode) as well as piO security against \( X \)-IND samplers.

Finally, we switch the proofs \( \pi_1 \) in the challenge SXDH encodings from proofs of consistency to proofs of language-membership for \( y \). Here, we again rely on a combination of security properties of the NIZK system (mode indistinguishability and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode), as well as piO security against \( X \)-IND samplers. At this point, the secret key \( \text{sk}_0 \) has been removed from each of the MMap circuits, and also from the proofs in the challenge SXDH encodings, as desired.

We now describe the inner hybrids more formally below.

**Inner Hybrid 1-0.** As already mentioned, this is identical to outer hybrid 1.

**Inner Hybrid 1-1.** In this hybrid, we make the following alterations:

1. We switch the string \( \text{crs}_1 \) from binding to hiding mode.

2. We switch the element \( y \) in the public parameters from a non-member to a member for \( \mathcal{L} \), i.e., we now sample \( y \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \) along with a (unique) membership-witness \( \text{wit}_y \).

3. We switch the circuits for addition, inversion, multiplication and extraction as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}} & \mapsto \tilde{C}_\text{Add}, \\
\tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}} & \mapsto \tilde{C}_\text{Inv}, \\
\tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} & \mapsto \tilde{C}_\text{Mult}, \\
\tilde{C}_\text{ext} & \mapsto \tilde{C}_{\text{ext},0}.
\end{align*}
\]

4. Additionally, we make the following change to the manner in which the challenge encodings are generated: for each encoding, the NIZK proof \( \pi_1 \) under \( \text{crs}_1 \) now proves that \( y \in \mathcal{L} \) using the witness \( \text{wit}_y \) as opposed to proving consistency.

The modified circuits are described in Figures 17, 18, 19, and 20, respectively. At a high level, in each of these switched circuits, we hardwire the witness \( \text{wit}_y \) for the membership of \( y \) in \( \mathcal{L} \) and avoid using the second extraction trapdoor \( t_{\text{ext},1} \) inside the second \textbf{If} branch, which checks for consistency. In other words, we suspend all consistency checks in all MMap circuits.

Note that the modified circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication, namely \( \tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} \), are hardwired with neither \( \text{sk}_0 \) nor \( \text{sk}_1 \). The modified extraction circuit \( \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}, \beta} \) is only hardwired with \( \text{sk}_1 - \beta \) and not \( \text{sk}_\beta \). More specifically, \( \tilde{C}_{\text{ext},0} \) is only hardwired with \( \text{sk}_1 \) and not \( \text{sk}_0 \).

We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 6.6.** The inner hybrids 1-0 and 1-1 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against \( X \)-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of \( \text{Eval} \), as described in Definition 3.1.
• Membership in $\mathcal{L}$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $\mathcal{L}$ have unique witnesses for membership.

• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we use an additional layer of inner hybrids. The first of these inner hybrids is identical to outer hybrid 1, while the last is identical to outer hybrid 2. Table 11 provides an overview of these inner hybrids. We
would like to note here that these sequence of hybrids closely resemble those used by the authors of [FHHL18] in the proof of Lemma 6.2 in their paper.

**Overview.** We had previously presented a brief overview of the techniques underlying the switch from outer hybrid 1 (equivalently, inner hybrid 1-0) to inner hybrid 1-1. For the ease of the reader, we recall the overview here - it essentially summarizes the key switches made across this additional layer of inner hybrids.

Recall that in outer hybrid 1 (and hence in inner hybrid 1-0), crs1 is in binding mode and the element \( y \) in the public parameters is a non-member for \( \mathcal{L} \). This enforces that any valid encoding must be consistent, meaning that both FHE ciphertexts in the encoding must encode the "same" plaintext element, irrespective of representation. Hence, the extraction circuit can use \( \mathsf{sk}_0 \) instead of \( \mathsf{sk}_1 \) for extraction without changing the output distribution in any way. This allows us to remove \( \mathsf{sk}_0 \) from the extraction circuit; the corresponding indistinguishability argument follows from pIO security against \( X\text{-IND} \) samplers.

Next, we switch the element \( y \) in the public parameters from a non-member to a member for \( \mathcal{L} \) (we rely on the hardness of deciding language-membership in \( \mathcal{L} \) for this switch). This effectively allows any valid encoding to be "inconsistent", so long as it contains a verifying proof \( \pi_1 \) of language-membership for \( y \). This in turn enables most crucial step across these inner hybrids - "suspension" of any consistency checks in the MMap circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication. Instead of checking for consistency, we simply hardwire the unique language-membership witness \( w_{\pi_1} \) into these circuits and use it directly for generating proofs of language-membership as part of the output encodings. This allows us to remove \( \mathsf{sk}_0 \) from the circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication. The corresponding indistinguishability argument relies on multiple security properties of the NIZK system (mode indistinguishability, perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode) as well as pIO security against \( X\text{-IND} \) samplers.

The final step is to remove \( \mathsf{sk}_0 \) from the proofs of consistency in the challenge SXDH encodings. To this end, we switch the proofs \( \pi_1 \) in the challenge SXDH encodings from proofs of consistency to proofs of language-membership

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner Hybrid</th>
<th>(crs0, crs1)</th>
<th>MMap Circuits</th>
<th>( y ) Challenge Encodings</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-0-0</td>
<td>(Binding, Binding)</td>
<td>( \mathcal{C}_{\text{op}} )</td>
<td>( \langle \mathsf{sk}<em>0, \mathsf{sk}<em>1, w</em>{\pi_1,0}, w</em>{\pi_1,1}, \pi_{\text{ext},1} \rangle ) ( y \not\in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Witness for ( \pi_0 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-0-1</td>
<td>(Binding, Binding)</td>
<td>( \mathcal{C}_{\text{op}} )</td>
<td>( \langle \mathsf{sk}<em>0, \mathsf{sk}<em>1, w</em>{\pi_1,0}, w</em>{\pi_1,1}, \pi_{\text{ext},1} \rangle ) ( y \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Witness for ( \pi_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-0-2</td>
<td>(Binding, Binding)</td>
<td>( \mathcal{C}_{\text{op}} )</td>
<td>( \langle \mathsf{sk}<em>0, \mathsf{sk}<em>1, w</em>{\pi_1,0}, w</em>{\pi_1,1}, w_{\pi_1,y} \rangle ) ( y \not\in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>( \mathsf{sk}_0, \mathsf{sk}_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-0-3</td>
<td>(Hiding, Binding)</td>
<td>( \mathcal{C}_{\text{op}} )</td>
<td>( \langle \mathsf{sk}<em>0, \mathsf{sk}<em>1, w</em>{\pi_1,0}, w</em>{\pi_1,1}, w_{\pi_1,y} \rangle ) ( y \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>L-harness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-0-4</td>
<td>(Hiding, Binding)</td>
<td>( \mathcal{C}<em>{\text{op}} ) except Witnesses for output ( \pi</em>{\text{ext},0} ) are either ( z_{1,0} ) or ( z_{1,1} )</td>
<td>( \langle \mathsf{sk}<em>0, \mathsf{sk}<em>1, w</em>{\pi_1,0}, w</em>{\pi_1,1}, w_{\pi_1,y} \rangle ) ( y \not\in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Witness for ( \pi_0 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-0-5</td>
<td>(Hiding, Binding)</td>
<td>( \mathcal{C}<em>{\text{op}} ) except Witnesses for output ( \pi</em>{\text{ext},0} ) are either ( z_{1,0} ) or ( z_{1,1} )</td>
<td>( \langle \mathsf{sk}<em>0, \mathsf{sk}<em>1, w</em>{\pi_1,0}, w</em>{\pi_1,1}, w_{\pi_1,y} \rangle ) ( y \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Witness for ( \pi_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-0-6</td>
<td>(Hiding, Hiding)</td>
<td>( \mathcal{C}<em>{\text{op}} ) except Witnesses for output ( \pi</em>{\text{ext},0} ) are either ( z_{1,0} ) or ( z_{1,1} )</td>
<td>( \langle \mathsf{sk}<em>0, \mathsf{sk}<em>1, w</em>{\pi_1,0}, w</em>{\pi_1,1}, w_{\pi_1,y} \rangle ) ( y \not\in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Witness for ( \pi_0 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-0-7</td>
<td>(Hiding, Hiding)</td>
<td>( \mathcal{C}_{\text{op},0} )</td>
<td>( \langle \mathsf{sk}<em>1, w</em>{\pi_1,0}, w_{\pi_1,1}, w_{\pi_1,y} \rangle ) ( y \in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Witness for ( \pi_1 )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-0-8</td>
<td>(Hiding, Hiding)</td>
<td>( \mathcal{C}_{\text{op},0} )</td>
<td>( \langle \mathsf{sk}<em>1, w</em>{\pi_1,0}, w_{\pi_1,1}, w_{\pi_1,y} \rangle ) ( y \not\in \mathcal{L} )</td>
<td>Witness for ( \pi_0 )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 11: Overview of the hybrids in the proof of indistinguishability of inner hybrids 1-0 and 1-1. Changes between subsequent hybrids are highlighted in red. Throughout, \( z_{1,0} \in \mathcal{L} \) and \( (g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3) \) is a random tuple of group elements. We use the shorthands \( \mathcal{C}_{\text{op}} \) and \( \mathcal{C}_{\text{op},0} \) for the tuples \( (\mathcal{C}_{\text{Add}}, \mathcal{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \mathcal{C}_{\text{Mult}}, \mathcal{C}_{\text{ext}}) \) and \( (\mathcal{C}_{\text{Add},0}, \mathcal{C}_{\text{Inv},0}, \mathcal{C}_{\text{Mult},0}, \mathcal{C}_{\text{ext},0}) \), respectively, where the second set of circuits are described in detail subsequently.
for \( y \). Here, we again rely on a combination of security properties of the NIZK system (mode indistinguishability and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode), as well as piO security against \( X \)-IND samplers. At this point, the secret key \( \mathsf{sk}_0 \) has been removed from each of the MMap circuits, and also from the proofs in the challenge SXDH encodings, as desired.

Below, we describe the inner hybrids formally.

1. **Inner Hybrid 1-0-0**: This hybrid is identical to inner hybrid 1-0.

2. **Inner Hybrid 1-0-1**. In this hybrid, we switch \( y \) in the public parameter of the MMap from a uniform non-member to a uniform member of \( \mathcal{L} \). By the hardness of deciding membership in the set \( \mathcal{L} \), inner hybrid 1-0-1 is computationally indistinguishable from inner hybrid 1-0-0.

3. **Inner Hybrid 1-0-2**. In this hybrid we take a first step towards switching to using the MMap circuits \( \tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}} \) as described in Figures 17, 18, 19 and 20, respectively. In particular, we make the following modification to the MMap circuits \( \check{C}_{\text{Add}}, \check{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \check{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) and \( \check{C}_{\text{ext}} \): we hardwire the witness \( \mathsf{wit}_y \) for the membership of \( y \) into the circuits, and remove the extraction trapdoor \( t_{\text{ext},1} \) from all of the circuits. We claim that this change does not change the functionality of the MMap circuits at all. The proof of this claim is very similar to the proof of inner hybrid 0-2 (in the proof of Lemma 6.4).

To begin with, observe that in order to reach the extraction step, the input encoding(s) to each circuit must pass the validity checks for \( \pi_1 \). Since \( \mathsf{crs}_1 \) is binding in both inner hybrids 1-0-1 and 1-0-2, any valid encoding that passes this test must either contain a verifying proof of consistency, or a verifying proof of language-membership for \( y \). Now observe the following:

- In the case where the encoding contains a verifying proof of consistency, the second \textbf{If} condition in each MMap circuit is never satisfied, and the proof \( \pi_1^* \) for the output encoding is generated using the witness \( (\mathsf{sk}_0, \mathsf{sk}_1) \). Hence, in this case, the outputs of the MMap circuits are identical across the inner hybrids 1-0-1 and 1-0-2.

- In the case where the encoding contains a verifying proof of language-membership for \( y \), the second \textbf{If} condition in each MMap circuit may be satisfied (if the input encoding is inconsistent). In this case, to generate the proof \( \pi_1^* \) for the output encoding, the circuits in inner hybrid 1-0-1 use the extracted witness for the language-membership of \( y \), while the circuits in the inner hybrid 1-0-2 use the hardwired witness for the language-membership of \( y \). Since the NIZK system has perfect extractability in the hiding mode, extraction always succeeds in the circuits in inner hybrid 1-0-1. Since \( \mathcal{L} \) has unique membership witnesses, the extracted and hardwired witnesses must be identical. Hence, even in this case, the outputs of the MMap circuits are identical across the inner hybrids 1-0-1 and 1-0-2.

At this point, the transition can be justified by invoking the security of the piO scheme against \( X \)-IND samplers (once for each MMap circuit).

4. **Inner Hybrid 1-0-3**. In this hybrid we switch the strings \( \mathsf{crs}_0 \) in the public parameter from binding to hiding mode. Hence proofs generated under \( \mathsf{crs}_0 \) will be perfectly witness indistinguishable in this hybrid. This hop can be justified by the CRS indistinguishability of the dual-mode NIZK proof system, and the fact that the modified MMap circuits \( \check{C}_{\text{Add}}, \check{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \check{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) and \( \check{C}_{\text{ext}} \) do not use the extraction trapdoors \( t_{\text{ext},0} \).

5. **Inner Hybrid 1-0-4**. In this hybrid we take a second step towards switching to using the MMap circuits \( \tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}} \) as described in Figures 17, 18, 19 and 20, respectively. In particular, we make the following modification: we \textit{always} generate the proof \( \pi_0^* \) for the output encoding in the addition, inversion and multiplication circuits using either the hardwired witness \( \mathsf{wit}_{z_{j,0}} \) for the language-membership of \( z_{j,0} \) or the
hardwired witness $\text{wit}_{z_j,1}$ for the language-membership of $z_{j,1}$ (depending on the output level set), irrespective of whether the original encoding was in normal representation or oblique representation.

We claim that this does not change the output distribution of the MMap circuits. To see this, observe that if the inputs to the MMap circuits are valid, then all proofs $\pi^*_0$ generated by the circuits continue to remain valid. The only item that changes is the witness used to generate these proofs, irrespective of whether the original encoding was in normal representation or oblique representation. So there is a (potential) change of witnesses used to generate the proof $\pi^*_0$ for the output encoding.

However recall that $\text{crs}_0$ is in hiding mode in both inner hybrids 1-0-3 and 1-0-4; hence, by the perfect witness-indistinguishability of the NIZK proof system in the hiding mode, the distributions of these proofs, and hence the outputs of the MMap circuits, remain unaltered. Hence, this transition can be justified by invoking the security of the piO scheme against $X$-IND samplers (once for each of the three MMap circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication).

Note that this is a slightly different flavor of piO argument as compared to the one used in inner hybrid 1-0-2. In inner hybrid 1-0-2, $\text{crs}_0$ was generated in the binding mode, and we relied on the perfect extractability of the NIZK proof system in the binding mode to argue that the output distributions of the circuits remain unaltered. On the other hand, in the current hybrid, $\text{crs}_0$ is generated in the hiding mode, and we use a different property of the NIZK proof system, namely perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode, to argue that the output distributions of the circuits remain unaltered. Looking ahead, in all of our proof hybrids that rely on piO security, we will generally use arguments with one of these two flavors.

6. **Inner Hybrid 1-0-5.** In this hybrid we switch the string $\text{crs}_0$ in the public parameter back from hiding to binding mode. Hence proofs generated under $\text{crs}_0$ will be perfectly sound and extractable in this hybrid. This hop can be justified by the CRS indistinguishability of the dual-mode NIZK proof system, and the fact that the modified MMap circuits $\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}$ and $\tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}$ always produce valid proofs $\pi^*_0$ for their output encodings in the inner hybrid 1-0-4 (and hence in this inner hybrid as well).

7. **Inner Hybrid 1-0-6.** In this hybrid we switch the string $\text{crs}_1$ in the public parameter from binding to hiding mode. Hence proofs generated under $\text{crs}_1$ will be perfectly witness indistinguishable in this hybrid. This hop can be justified by the CRS indistinguishability of the dual-mode NIZK proof system, and the fact that the modified MMap circuits $\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}$ and $\tilde{C}_{\text{ext}}$ do not use the extraction trapdoor $t_{\text{ext},1}$ any longer.

8. **Inner Hybrid 1-0-7.** In this hybrid, we completely switch to using the MMap circuits $\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}$ and $\tilde{C}_{\text{ext}}$ as described in Figures 17, 18, 19 and 20, respectively.

Specifically, the only additional change from inner hybrid 1-0-6 is that we let the addition, inversion and multiplication circuits to always use the hardwired witness $\text{wit}_y$ to generate the proof $\pi^*_1$ in the output encodings, irrespective of whether the input encodings are consistent. Hence, these circuits need no longer perform the explicit checks for the relation $R_1$. This in turn means that they need neither $sk_0$ nor $sk_1$ any longer.

We claim (via an argument essentially similar to that used in hybrid 1-0-4) that these modifications do not change the output distributions of the MMap circuits. To see this, observe the following:

- The string $\text{crs}_0$ is still in the binding mode, and hence any input encoding that passes the validity test for $\pi_0$ must either have a verifying proof of normal representation (and hence consistency), or a verifying proof for the language-membership of $z_{j,0}$. The witnesses used for these proofs have not changed from inner hybrid 1-0-6.
• All proofs $\pi_1$ generated in inner hybrid 1-0-6 are verifying, and hence all encodings output by the MMap circuits are valid. Indeed, we have only changed the witnesses used for the proof $\pi_1$. By the perfect witness-indistinguishability of the NIZK proof system in the hiding mode, the distributions of these proofs remain unaltered.

Note that even in the original scheme, one could generate “valid” encodings that are “inconsistent” provided that they could produce a verifying proof of membership for $y$ in $\mathcal{L}$. Hence, our suspension of consistency checks does not introduce any new functionality or change the existing functionality of the MMap circuits - it simply showcases how to use the OR branches in our NIZK statements as a proof construct.

At this point, we can argue that the output distributions of the MMap circuits remain unaltered across inner hybrids 1-0-6 and 1-0-7, and the transition can be justified by invoking the security of the piO scheme against X-IND samplers (once for each MMap circuit).

9. Inner Hybrid 1-0-8. In this hybrid we switch the proof $\pi_1$ in each challenge encoding from using the witness $(\mathsf{sk}_0, \mathsf{sk}_1)$ to prove consistency to using the witness $\mathsf{wit}_y$ for proving the membership of $y$ in $\mathcal{L}$. Note that we still generate proofs that are valid, and the only item that changes is the witness used to generate these proofs; hence, by the perfect witness-indistinguishability of the NIZK proof system in the hiding mode, the distributions of these proofs remain unaltered. This allows us to justify this final hop. Note that the MMap circuits remain unchanged in this step. Hence, we do not need to invoke any form of piO security here.

Observe that in inner hybrid 1-0-8, the public parameters of the MMap and the challenge encodings are distributed exactly as in inner hybrid 1-1. This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.6.

Inner Hybrid 1-2. In this hybrid, we switch the challenge encodings from normal representation to partially oblique representation. More specifically, we switch the plaintext tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts in each challenge encoding as follows:

$$
\begin{align*}
[\alpha_1] : (\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, 0) &\longrightarrow (0, \mu, 0, 0, 0) \\
[\alpha_2] : (\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, 0) &\longrightarrow (0, 0, \mu, 0, 0) \\
[\alpha_3] : (\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, 0) &\longrightarrow (0, 0, 0, \mu, 0)
\end{align*}
$$

Remark 6.7. Note here that $\mu$ is simply a re-randomizing term; we are effectively switching the plaintext tuple underlying the first FHE ciphertexts in each challenge encoding from the normal form to an appropriately chosen oblique form. However, this switch does not violate consistency; each of the challenge encodings still contain FHE ciphertexts that represent the “same” plaintext element. In particular, we have:

$$
\begin{align*}
g_{0}^{\mu \cdot \gamma_1} \cdot g_{1}^{0} \cdot g_{2}^{0} \cdot g_{3}^{0} &= g_{0}^{0} \cdot g_{1}^{\mu} \cdot g_{2}^{0} \cdot g_{3}^{0} \\
g_{0}^{\mu \cdot \gamma_2} \cdot g_{1}^{0} \cdot g_{2}^{0} \cdot g_{3}^{0} &= g_{0}^{0} \cdot g_{1}^{0} \cdot g_{2}^{\mu} \cdot g_{3}^{0} \\
g_{0}^{\mu \cdot \gamma_3} \cdot g_{1}^{0} \cdot g_{2}^{0} \cdot g_{3}^{0} &= g_{0}^{0} \cdot g_{1}^{0} \cdot g_{2}^{0} \cdot g_{3}^{\mu}
\end{align*}
$$

In other words, for each of the challenge encodings, extraction using either the first or the second ciphertext yields the same outcome.

We now argue that inner hybrid 1-1 is computationally indistinguishable from inner hybrid 1-2 assuming that FHE is CPA-secure. More specifically, we rely on multi-challenge FHE CPA-security, which is polynomially equivalent to single-challenge FHE CPA-security.
To see this, suppose that there exists a PPT adversary $A$ that can distinguish between the inner hybrids 1-1 and 1-2 with non-negligible probability. We construct a PPT algorithm $B$ that can break the multi-challenge CPA-security of the FHE scheme with non-negligible probability. From the challenger in the multi-challenge FHE CPA-security game, $B$ receives a public key $pk_0$. It then sets up the public parameters for the MMap as follows:

1. $B$ samples a different key-pair for the FHE scheme as:

$$\langle pk_1, sk_1 \rangle \leftarrow \text{FHE.Gen}(1^\lambda)$$

$B$ then samples $g_0 \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$ and $\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, and sets:

$$g_1 = g_0^{\gamma_1}, \quad g_2 = g_0^{\gamma_2}, \quad g_2 = g_0^{\gamma_3}.$$  

Finally, $B$ samples a pair of NIZK CRS strings in the hiding mode as:

$$\text{crs}_0, \text{crs}_1 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{hiding}).$$

Since $B$ samples the secret exponents $(\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3)$ on its own, it can use them as is throughout the reduction. In particular, we do not rely on the hardness of DDH over the group $\mathbb{G}$ at all in this reduction.

2. Next $B$ uniformly samples a total $(n + 1)$ elements from the set $X$ that are all non-members for the subset $L$ and one element that is a member for $L$. More formally, it samples

$$z_{1,0}, z_{1,1}, \ldots, z_{j-1,0}, z_{j-1,1}, z_{j+1,0}, z_{j+1,1}, \ldots, z_{n,0}, z_{n,1} \leftarrow X \setminus L,$$

$$y, z_{j,0}, z_{j,1} \leftarrow L,$$

where $z_{j,0}$ has unique membership-witness $\text{wit}_{z_{j,0}}$, $z_{j,1}$ has unique membership-witness $\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}$, and $y$ has unique membership-witness $\text{wit}_y$.

3. Finally, $B$ sets up the MMap circuits $\overline{C}_{\text{Add},0}, \overline{C}_{\text{Inv},0}, \overline{C}_{\text{Mult},0}$ and $\overline{C}_{\text{ext},0}$ exactly as described in Figures 17, 18, 19 and 20, respectively. Note that the extraction circuit is only hardwired with $sk_1$ and not $sk_0$, while the remaining circuits are hardwired with neither $sk_0$ nor $sk_1$. Hence $B$ does not require the knowledge of $sk_0$ to create these circuits. It then computes and outputs four probabilistically indistinguishability-obfuscated circuits of the form

$$\overline{C}_{\text{Add}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(\overline{C}_{\text{Add},0}), \quad \overline{C}_{\text{Inv}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(\overline{C}_{\text{Inv},0}),$$

$$\overline{C}_{\text{Mult}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(\overline{C}_{\text{Mult},0}), \quad \overline{C}_{\text{ext}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(\overline{C}_{\text{ext},0}).$$

Next, $B$ sets up the challenge encodings as follows:

1. $B$ samples $\mu \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and provides the following pairs of challenge plaintexts to the challenger in the multi-challenge FHE CPA-security game:

$$\text{Pair-1: } (\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, 1), \quad (0, \mu, 0, 0, 1),$$

$$\text{Pair-2: } (\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, 1), \quad (0, 0, \mu, 0, 1),$$

$$\text{Pair-3: } (\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, 1), \quad (0, 0, 0, \mu, 1).$$

In response, it receives from the challenger a tuple of ciphertexts $(ct_1^*, ct_2^*, ct_3^*)$ under $pk_0$ and sets:

$$ct_{0,0} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_0, (\mu, 0, 0, 0, 1)),$$

$$ct_{0,1} = ct_1^*, \quad ct_{0,2} = ct_2^*, \quad ct_{0,3} = ct_3^*.$$
2. \( B \) then generates the following FHE ciphertexts:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{ct}_{1,0} &= \text{FHE.Enc}(\text{pk}_1, (\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)), \\
\text{ct}_{1,1} &= \text{FHE.Enc}(\text{pk}_1, (\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i)), \\
\text{ct}_{1,2} &= \text{FHE.Enc}(\text{pk}_1, (\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)), \\
\text{ct}_{1,3} &= \text{FHE.Enc}(\text{pk}_1, (\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, i)).
\end{align*}
\]

3. \( B \) then generates the following proofs for each \( \ell \in [0, 3] \):

\[
\begin{align*}
\pi_{0,\ell} &= \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}_0, (\text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1, \text{ct}_{0,\ell}, \text{ct}_{1,\ell}, i, \{z_j, 1\}_{j \in [0, m]}, (j, \text{wit}_{z_j, 1})), \\
\pi_{1,\ell} &= \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}_1, (\text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1, \text{ct}_{0,\ell}, \text{ct}_{1,\ell}, i, y, \text{wit}_y)).
\end{align*}
\]

4. Finally, for each \( \ell \in [0, 3] \), \( B \) generates the encoding \([\alpha_\ell]\) as:

\[
[\alpha_\ell] = \left( \text{ct}_{0,\ell}, \text{ct}_{1,\ell}, i, \pi_{0,\ell}, \pi_{1,\ell} \right).
\]

\( B \) then provides \( A \) with the MMap public parameters and the challenge encodings. Eventually, \( A \) outputs a bit \( b^* \). \( B \) outputs the same bit \( b^* \). Now, observe the following:

- Suppose that \( B \) received from the challenger the FHE encryptions of the first plaintext tuple in each pair under \( \text{pk}_0 \). In this case, the view of \( A \) is exactly as in inner hybrid 1-1.

- On the other hand, suppose that \( B \) from the challenger FHE encryptions of the second plaintext tuple in each pair under \( \text{pk}_0 \). In this case, the view of \( A \) is exactly as in inner hybrid 1-2.

Hence the advantage of \( B \) in breaking the multi-challenge CPA-security of the FHE scheme is the same as the advantage of \( A \) in distinguishing the inner hybrids 1-1 and 1-2. This allows us to justify this hop.

**Inner Hybrid 1-3.** In this hybrid, we make the following alterations:

1. We switch the strings \( \text{crs}_0 \) and \( \text{crs}_1 \) back to binding mode from hiding mode.

2. We switch the element \( y \) in the public parameters back to a non-member from a member for \( \mathcal{L} \), i.e., we now sample \( y \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \notin \mathcal{L} \).

3. We switch back the circuits for addition, inversion, multiplication and extraction as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\tilde{C}_{\text{Add},0} &\mapsto \hat{C}_{\text{Add}}, \\
\tilde{C}_{\text{Mult},0} &\mapsto \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}}, \\
\tilde{C}_{\text{Inv},0} &\mapsto \hat{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \\
\tilde{C}_{\text{ext},0} &\mapsto \hat{C}_{\text{ext}}.
\end{align*}
\]

4. Additionally, we make the following change to the manner in which the challenge encodings are generated: for each encoding, the NIZK proof \( \pi_1 \) under \( \text{crs}_1 \) now proves that the encoding is consistent using the witness \((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)\).

**Lemma 6.8.** The inner hybrids 1-2 and 1-3 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against \( \mathcal{X} \)-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
• The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of $\text{Eval}$, as described in Definition 3.1.

• Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.

• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. The proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as the proof of Lemma 6.6, albeit in the reverse order, and is hence not detailed. In fact, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 6.6 is that the challenge encodings are now in the partially oblique representation. However, the proof of Lemma 6.6 was agnostic to representation of the challenge encodings; hence we can just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Observe that in inner hybrid 1-3, the public parameters of the MMap and the challenge encodings are distributed exactly as in outer hybrid 2. This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.5.

Outer Hybrids 2 and 3. We now argue that outer hybrids 2 and 3 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

Lemma 6.9. The outer hybrids 2 and 3 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

• The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.

• The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of $\text{Eval}$, as described in Definition 3.1.

• Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.

• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner Hybrid</th>
<th>(crs₀, crs₁)</th>
<th>MMap Circuits</th>
<th>$y$</th>
<th>Challenge Encodings</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-0</td>
<td>(Binding, Binding)</td>
<td>$\tilde{C}_{\text{op}}$</td>
<td>$y \notin L$</td>
<td>Random Partially oblique</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}_{z_1,1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>(Binding, Hiding)</td>
<td>$\tilde{C}_{\text{op,1}}$</td>
<td>$y \in L$</td>
<td>Random Partially oblique</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}_{z_1,1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>(Binding, Hiding)</td>
<td>$\tilde{C}_{\text{op,1}}$</td>
<td>$y \in L$</td>
<td>Random Oblique</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}_{z_1,1})$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>(Binding, Binding)</td>
<td>$\tilde{C}_{\text{op}}$</td>
<td>$y \notin L$</td>
<td>Random Oblique</td>
<td>$(j, \text{wit}_{z_1,1})$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 12: Overview of the inner hybrids in the proof of indistinguishability of outer hybrids 2 and 3. Changes between subsequent hybrids are highlighted in red. Throughout, $z_{j,1} \in L$, and $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ is a random tuple of group elements. We use the shorthands $\tilde{C}_{\text{op}}$ and $\tilde{C}_{\text{op,1}}$ for the tuples $(\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}})$ and $(\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{ext,1}})$, respectively.
Proof. To prove this lemma, we use another sequence of inner hybrids. The first of these inner hybrids is identical to outer hybrid 2, while the last is identical to outer hybrid 3. Table 12 provides an overview of these inner hybrids. As is evident from the description of the hybrids, they are essentially identical to the inner hybrids used in the proof of Lemma 6.5, with the exception that we need to use the modified circuits \( \tilde{C}_{\text{Add},1}, \tilde{C}_{\text{inv},1}, \tilde{C}_{\text{mult},1}, \) and \( \tilde{C}_{\text{ext},1} \) (hardwired with only \( sk_0 \) and not \( sk_1 \)), and we rely on analogous versions of Lemma 6.6 and Lemma 6.8 for \( \beta = 1 \) as opposed to \( \beta = 0 \). Apart from this, the proof of indistinguishability of these inner hybrids are essentially identical to those in the proof of Lemma 6.5, and are hence not detailed.

Outer Hybrids 3 and 4. We now argue that outer hybrids 3 and 4 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

Lemma 6.10. The outer hybrids 3 and 4 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The \( \piO \) scheme is indistinguishability-secure against \( X\text{-IND} \) samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of \( \text{Eval} \), as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in \( L \) is computationally hard to decide and members of \( L \) have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner Hybrid</th>
<th>( c_{\text{sk}} )</th>
<th>MMMap Circuits</th>
<th>( z_{j,0} )</th>
<th>( z_{j,1} )</th>
<th>Challenge Encodings</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-1 Binding</td>
<td>( \tilde{C}_{\text{op}} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \in L )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in L )</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>( (j, \text{sk}, z_{j,0}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-3 Binding</td>
<td>( \tilde{C}_{\text{op}} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \notin L )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in L )</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>( (j, \text{sk}, z_{j,0}) )</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-4 Binding</td>
<td>( \tilde{C}_{\text{op}} )</td>
<td>( z_{j,0} \notin L )</td>
<td>( z_{j,1} \in L )</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
<td>( (j, \text{sk}, z_{j,0}) )</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 13: Overview of the inner hybrids in the proof of indistinguishability of outer hybrids 3 and 4. Changes between subsequent hybrids are highlighted in red. Throughout, \( c_{\text{sk}} \) is in binding mode, \( y \notin L \), and \( (g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3) \) is a random tuple of group elements. We use the shorthands \( \tilde{C}_{\text{op}} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{\text{op}} \) for the tuples \( (\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}}) \) and \( (\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{op}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}}) \), respectively, where the second set of circuits are described in detail subsequently.

Proof. To prove this lemma, we use another sequence of inner hybrids. The first of these inner hybrids is identical to outer hybrid 3, while the last is identical to outer hybrid 4. Table 13 provides an overview of these inner hybrids. At a high level, the sequence of inner hybrids affect changes to the public parameters and circuit descriptions such that no two (valid) input encodings that correspond to “pairing-compatible” levels \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) can both in the oblique representation.

To begin with, we exploit the hardness of deciding language-membership in \( L \) to switch back the element \( z_{j,0} \) in the public parameters from a member to a non-member for \( L \), while \( z_{j,1} \) remains a member. This effectively enforces the restriction that any valid encoding corresponding to a level-set \( i \) such that \( i' = 0 \) must be in the normal representation. Only valid encodings corresponding to level-sets \( i' \) such that \( i'_j = 1 \) are allowed to be in the (partially)
oblique representation. As a result, no two valid encodings that correspond to “pairing-compatible” levels \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \) can both be in the oblique representation, since it cannot be the case that \( i_1, j = 1 \) and \( i_2, j = 1 \) simultaneously.

At this point, we exploit rely on piO security against \( X \)-IND samplers to remove the special branch from the multiplication circuit that required the knowledge of the secret exponents \( \gamma_1, \gamma_2 \) and \( \gamma_3 \). In other words, at the end of outer hybrid 4, the secret exponents do not appear in any of the MMap circuits. The details of the inner hybrids are now presented below.

**Inner Hybrid 3-1.** In this hybrid we switch back to using the original MMap circuits \( C_{Add}, C_{Inv}, C_{Mult} \) and \( C_{ext} \). In particular, we no longer hardwire the witnesses \( \text{wit}_{z_{1,0}} \) and \( \text{wit}_{z_{1,1}} \) for the membership of \( z_{j,0} \) and \( z_{j,1} \) into the circuits, and hardwire the extraction trapdoor \( t_{ext,0} \) into all of the circuits. We claim that this change does not change the functionality of the MMap circuits at all.

To begin with, observe that in order to reach the extraction step, the input encoding(s) to each circuit must pass the validity checks for \( \pi_0 \). Since \( crs_0 \) is binding in both inner hybrids 3-0 and 3-1, any valid encoding that passes this test must either contain a verifying proof of normal representation, or must contain a verifying proof of language-membership for \( z_{j,0} \) or \( z_{j,1} \). Now observe the following:

- In the case where the encoding contains a verifying proof of normal representation, the first \textbf{If} condition in the addition and inversion circuits, the \textbf{Else If} conditions in the multiplication circuit, and the first \textbf{If} condition in the extraction circuit are never satisfied, and the proof \( \pi_0^* \) for the output encoding is generated using the witness \((sk_0, sk_1)\). Hence, in this case, the outputs of the original and modified MMap circuits are identical.

- In the case where the encoding contains a verifying proof of language-membership for \( z_{j,1} \), these conditions may be satisfied (if one or more of the input encodings to each circuit are in the oblique representation). In this case, to generate the proof \( \pi_0^* \) for the output encoding, the circuits \( C_{Add}, C_{Inv} \) and \( C_{Mult} \) use the extracted witness, while the circuits \( \tilde{C}_{Add}, \tilde{C}_{Inv} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{Mult} \) use the hardwired witness. Since the NIZK system has perfect extractability in the binding mode, extraction always succeeds in the original MMap circuits. Since \( L \) has unique membership witnesses, the extracted and hardwired witnesses must be identical. Hence, even in this case, the outputs of the original and modified MMap circuits are identical.

At this point, the transition can be justified by invoking the security of the piO scheme against \( X \)-IND samplers (once for each MMap circuit).

**Inner Hybrid 3-2.** In this hybrid, we switch \( z_{j,0} \) in the public parameter of the MMap from a uniform member to a uniform non-member of \( L \). By the hardness of deciding membership in the set \( L \), inner hybrid 3-2 is computationally indistinguishable from inner hybrid 3-1.

**Inner Hybrid 3-3.** In this hybrid, we switch to using a set of circuits that are essentially identical to the MMap circuits \( \tilde{C}_{Add}, \tilde{C}_{Inv}, \tilde{C}_{Mult} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{ext} \), except that they only hardwire the witness for \( z_{j,1} \) (and not both \( z_{j,0} \) and \( z_{j,1} \)). These circuits do not use the extraction trapdoor \( t_{ext,0} \). We claim that this change does not change the functionality of the MMap circuits at all.

To begin with, observe that in order to reach the extraction step, the input encoding(s) to each circuit must pass the validity checks for \( \pi_0 \). Since \( crs_0 \) is binding in both inner hybrids 3-2 and 3-3, any valid encoding that passes this test must either contain a verifying proof of normal representation, or must contain a verifying proof of language-membership for \( z_{j,1} \) (\( z_{j,0} \) is no longer a member of the language \( L \)). Now observe the following:

- In the case where the encoding contains a verifying proof of normal representation, the first \textbf{If} condition in the addition and inversion circuits, the \textbf{Else If} conditions in the multiplication circuit, and the first \textbf{If} condition in the extraction circuit are never satisfied, and the proof \( \pi_0^* \) for the output encoding is generated using the witness \((sk_0, sk_1)\). Hence, in this case, the outputs of the original and modified MMap circuits are identical.
• In the case where the encoding contains a verifying proof of language-membership for \( z_{j,1} \), these conditions may be satisfied (if one or more of the input encodings to each circuit are in the oblique representation). In this case, to generate the proof \( \pi_0^* \) for the output encoding, the circuits \( C_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Inv}} \) and \( C_{\text{Mult}} \) use the extracted witness, while the circuits \( \hat{C}_{\text{Add}}, \hat{C}_{\text{Inv}} \) and \( \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) use the hardwired witness. Since the NIZK system has perfect extractability in the binding mode, extraction always succeeds in the original MMap circuits. Since \( \mathcal{C} \) has unique membership witnesses, the extracted and hardwired witnesses must be identical. Hence, even in this case, the outputs of the original and modified MMap circuits are identical. \( \square \)

At this point, the transition can be justified by invoking the security of the piO scheme against X-IND samplers (once for each MMap circuit). Note that by this hybrid, the addition and inversion circuits are already identical to \( \hat{C}_{\text{Add}} \) and \( \hat{C}_{\text{Inv}} \), respectively, while the extraction circuit is identical to \( \hat{C}_{\text{ext}} \), exactly as in inner hybrid 3-4.

**Inner Hybrid 3-4.** In this hybrid, we switch the multiplication circuit to \( \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) (Figure 15). In particular, we switch to using the modified homomorphic evaluation circuit \( \hat{C}_{\text{Mult,FHE}} \) (Figure 15). We also remove the hardwired secret exponents, i.e., the multiplication circuit is now hardwired with \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) instead of \((g_0, \gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3)\). We claim that this does not change the functionality of the multiplication circuit at all.

We claim that the output distribution of the homomorphic evaluation circuit does not change despite the modifications made to it. Observe that in order to reach the Else If statement in Step 3 of the homomorphic evaluation circuit \( \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) (Figure 15), at least one input encoding needs to be in oblique representation with a verifying proof of language membership for \( z_{j,0} \). However, the input encoding(s) must also pass the validity checks for \( \pi_0^* \) prior to the homomorphic evaluation. Since \( crs_0 \) is binding in both inner hybrids 3-3 and 3-4, any valid encoding that passes this test must either contain a verifying proof of normal representation, or must contain a verifying proof of language-membership for \( z_{j,1} \) (\( z_{j,0} \) is no longer a member of the language \( \mathcal{L} \)). This immediately implies that Step 3 of the homomorphic evaluation circuit cannot be reached by any pair of valid input encodings. Hence, changing this step by removing the secret exponents from it does not change the output of the evaluated circuit.

At this point, we rely on the well-distributedness of the output of the FHE evaluation algorithm FHE.Eval to argue that the output distribution of the overall multiplication circuit \( \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) also remains unchanged (since the output proofs are still generated in exactly the same way), and the transition can be justified by invoking the security of the piO scheme against X-IND samplers. Note that we crucially rely here on the well-distributedness of the output of FHE.Eval. While this kind of FHE is not known from the LWE assumption, it can be constructed from iO and standard assumptions [CLTV15].

Observe that in inner hybrid 3-4, the public parameters of the MMap and the challenge encodings are distributed exactly as in outer hybrid 4. This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.10.

**Outer Hybrids 4 and 5.** We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 6.11.** The outer hybrids 4 and 5 are computationally indistinguishable provided that the DDH assumption holds over the group \( \mathbb{G} \).

**Proof.** At a high level, in this step, we provide a reduction that switches the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) hardwired into the MMap circuits from a uniformly random tuple of group elements to a uniformly random DDH tuple, albeit with the same base element \( g_0 \). Since the MMap circuits in outer hybrid 4 do not embed the secret exponents \((\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3)\), the reduction can simulate the piO-obfuscated MMap circuits, as well as the challenge SXDH encodings, exactly as in outer hybrid 4. The formal proof is now detailed below.

Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary \( \mathcal{A} \) that can distinguish between the outer hybrids 4 and 5 with non-negligible probability. We construct a PPT algorithm \( \mathcal{B} \) that can break the DDH assumption over the group \( \mathbb{G} \) with non-negligible probability. As part of its input DDH challenge, \( \mathcal{B} \) receives a tuple of group elements of the form \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\), and sets up the public parameters for the MMap as follows:
1. \( B \) samples two key-pairs for the FHE scheme as:
\[
(pk_0, sk_0), (pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{FHE.Gen}(1^\lambda),
\]
and a pair of binding NIZK CRS strings (along with the corresponding extraction trapdoors) as:
\[
(crs_0, t_{\text{ext},0}), (crs_1, t_{\text{ext},1}) \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding}).
\]

2. Next \( B \) samples
\[
z_{1,0}, z_{1,1}, \ldots, z_j-1,0, z_j-1,1, z_j,0, z_j+1,0, z_j+1,1, \ldots, z_n,0, z_n,1 \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L},
\]
\[
z_{j,1} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \quad , \quad y \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L},
\]
where \( z_{j,1} \) has unique membership-witness \( \text{wit}_{z_{j,1}} \).

3. Finally, \( B \) sets up the MMap circuits \( \hat{C}_{\text{Add}}, \hat{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) and \( \hat{C}_{\text{ext}} \) exactly as described in Figures 13, 14, 16 and 12, respectively, except for the fact that it hardwires its input tuple \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) into each of these circuits. It then computes and outputs four probabilistically indistinguishability-obfuscated circuits of the form
\[
\hat{C}_{\text{Add}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\hat{C}_{\text{Add}}), \quad \hat{C}_{\text{Inv}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\hat{C}_{\text{Inv}}),
\]
\[
\hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\hat{C}_{\text{Mult}}), \quad \hat{C}_{\text{ext}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\hat{C}_{\text{ext}}).
\]
In particular, note that creating the multiplication circuit \( \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) does not require hardwiring the actual secret exponents in \( \mathbb{Z}_q \); hence the knowledge of the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) suffices in this case.

Next, \( B \) sets up the challenge encodings in the oblique representation as follows (refer to Table 5 for how the challenge encodings are formatted in oblique representation in outer hybrid 3):

1. \( B \) samples \( \mu \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \) and generates the following FHE ciphertexts for each \( b \in \{0, 1\} \):
\[
ct_{b,0} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_0, (\mu, 0, 0, 0, 1)), \quad ct_{b,1} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_0, (0, \mu, 0, 0, 1)),
\]
\[
ct_{b,2} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_0, (0, 0, \mu, 0, 1)), \quad ct_{b,3} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_0, (0, 0, 0, \mu, 1)).
\]

2. \( B \) generates the following proofs for each \( \ell \in [0, 3] \):
\[
\pi_{0,\ell} = \text{NIZK.Prove}(crs_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,\ell}, ct_{1,\ell}, i, \{z_{j,1}\}_{j \in [0, n]}), (j, \text{wit}_{z_{j,1}})),
\]
\[
\pi_{1,\ell} = \text{NIZK.Prove}(crs_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,\ell}, ct_{1,\ell}, i, y, (sk_0, sk_1))).
\]

3. Finally, for each \( \ell \in [0, 3] \), \( B \) generates the encoding \([\alpha_{\ell}]\) as:
\[
[\alpha_{\ell}] = (ct_{0,\ell}, ct_{1,\ell}, i, \pi_{0,\ell}, \pi_{1,\ell}).
\]

\( B \) then provides \( A \) with the MMap public parameters and the challenge encodings. Eventually, \( A \) outputs a bit \( b^* \). \( B \) outputs the same bit \( b^* \). Now, observe the following:

- Suppose that \( B \) receives as input a tuple of uniformly random group elements of the form \((g_0, g_0^{z_{1,1}}, g_0^{z_{2,1}}, g_0^{z_{3,1}})\). In this case, the view of \( A \) is exactly as in outer hybrid 3.
- On the other hand, when \( B \) receives as input a DDH tuple of the form \((g_0, g_0^{z_{1,1}}, g_0^{z_{2,1}}, g_0^{z_{3,1} \cdot z_{2,1}})\), the view of \( A \) is exactly as in outer hybrid 4.

Hence the advantage of \( B \) in breaking DDH over the group \( \mathbb{G} \) is the same as the advantage of \( A \) in distinguishing the outer hybrids 3 and 4. This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.10.
Outer Hybrids 5 and 6. We now argue that outer hybrids 5 and 6 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

Lemma 6.12. The outer hybrids 5 and 6 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $\mathcal{L}$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $\mathcal{L}$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. The proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 6.10, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed. In fact, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 6.10 is that in Lemma 6.10, the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ hardwired into the MMap circuits were uniformly random, while in the proof of this lemma, they are distributed as a uniform DDH tuple. However, the proof of Lemma 6.10 was agnostic to the nature of this tuple; hence we can just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Outer Hybrids 6 and 7. We state and prove the following lemma:

Lemma 6.13. The outer hybrids 6 and 7 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $\mathcal{L}$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $\mathcal{L}$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. Once again, the proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 6.9, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed. In fact, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 6.9 is that in Lemma 6.9, the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ hardwired into the MMap circuits were uniformly random, while in the proof of this lemma, they are distributed as a uniform DDH tuple. However, the proof of Lemma 6.9 was agnostic to the nature of this tuple; hence we can again just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Outer Hybrids 7 and 8. We state the following lemma:

Lemma 6.14. The outer hybrids 7 and 8 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
• Membership in $\mathcal{L}$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $\mathcal{L}$ have unique witnesses for membership.

• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. Once again, the proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 6.5, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed. In fact, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 6.5 is that in Lemma 6.5, the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ hardwired into the MMap circuits were uniformly random, while in the proof of this lemma, they are distributed as a uniform DDH tuple. However, the proof of Lemma 6.5 was agnostic to the nature of this tuple; hence we can again just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Outer Hybrids 8 and 9. We state the following lemma:

**Lemma 6.15.** The outer hybrids 8 and 9 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

• The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.

• The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of $\text{Eval}$, as described in Definition 3.1.

• Membership in $\mathcal{L}$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $\mathcal{L}$ have unique witnesses for membership.

• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. Once again, the proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 6.4, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed. In fact, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 6.4 is that in Lemma 6.4, the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ hardwired into the MMap circuits were uniformly random, while in the proof of this lemma, they are distributed as a uniform DDH tuple. However, the proof of Lemma 6.4 was agnostic to the nature of this tuple; hence we can again just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Outer Hybrids 9 and 10. We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 6.16.** The outer hybrids 9 and 10 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

• The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.

• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode.

Proof. In this hybrid, we switch the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ hardwired into the MMap circuits as follows: we switch the the tuple of exponents $(\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3 = \gamma_1 \cdot \gamma_2)$ from a triplet corresponding to a DDH tuple to a triplet corresponding to a random tuple, i.e., $\gamma_3$ is now sampled uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Effectively, this switches the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ from a uniform DDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple, albeit with the same base element $g_0$. At a high level, this is the last “clean-up” step that reverses the alteration made to the distribution of $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ in outer hybrid 5.

We argue below that this switch does not alter the output distribution of these circuits from outer hybrid 9 to outer hybrid 10. Once this is established, the indistinguishability argument follows immediately under the assumption that the piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers (once for each MMap circuit). Informally, this indistinguishability is argued as follows. Observe that in outer hybrid 9, all the OR branches corresponding to the
NIZK proof systems $\pi_0$ and $\pi_1$ have been effectively turned off. This is because all of the $X'$-elements in the public parameters of the MMap scheme are, in fact, sampled as non-members. Hence, any valid encoding must be in normal representation and must be consistent, which in turn implies that outcomes of the MMap circuits (in particular the extraction algorithm) are now agnostic of the distribution of the group elements $g_1, g_2$ and $g_3$. Hence, switching the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ from a DDH tuple to a random tuple does not alter the output distributions of these circuits. We expand on this more formally below.

We first focus on the MMap circuits $C_{\text{Add}}$ and $C_{\text{Inv}}$. Observe that switching $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ from a uniform DDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple only (potentially) affects the outcome of the “If” condition in step 7 of each of these circuits. Note however that in both outer hybrids 9 and 10, $crs_0$ is in binding mode, each $z_{j,b}$ in the public parameter is a non-member for $j \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and $y$ in the public parameter is also a non-member. Hence, it follows from the perfect soundness of the dual-mode NIZK proof system that any input encoding(s) for which these circuits do not output $\perp$ and terminate before step 7 must be both in normal representation and consistent. This in turn guarantees that the outcome of the “If” condition in step 7 must be “false”. Hence, the output distributions of the MMap circuits $C_{\text{Add}}$ and $C_{\text{Inv}}$ in outer hybrids 9 and 10 are identical.

Next, we focus on the MMap circuit $C_{\text{Mult}}$. Observe that switching $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ from a uniform DDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple potentially affects the outcome of the “Else If” condition in step 3 of the circuit $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$ (Figure 6), which is evaluated homomorphically in Step 5 of $C_{\text{Mult}}$. Note however that in both outer hybrids 9 and 10, $crs_0$ is in binding mode, each $z_{j,b}$ in the public parameter is a non-member for $j \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and $y$ in the public parameter is also a non-member. Hence, it follows from the perfect soundness of the dual-mode NIZK proof system that any input encoding(s) for which these circuits do not output $\perp$ and terminate before step 7 must be both in normal representation and consistent. Hence, the “Else If” condition in step 3 of the circuit $C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}$ can never be satisfied by a pair of valid input encodings. This in turn implies that the output distributions of the MMap circuit $C_{\text{Mult}}$ in outer hybrids 9 and 10 are identical.

Finally, we focus on the MMap extraction circuit $C_{\text{ext}}$. Observe that switching $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ from a uniform DDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple potentially affects the outcome of the extraction circuit. However, note yet again that in both outer hybrids 9 and 10, $crs_0$ is in binding mode, each $z_{j,b}$ in the public parameter is a non-member for $j \in [n]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and $y$ in the public parameter is also a non-member. Hence, it follows from the perfect soundness of the dual-mode NIZK proof system that any input encoding(s) for which the circuit does not output $\perp$ and terminate before the extraction step is executed must be both in normal representation and consistent. Observe also that the base element $g_0$ in the tuple of group elements remains unaltered across outer hybrids 9 and 10. It follows immediately that the outcome of extraction on a given encoding in normal representation in both hybrids is identical. In other words, the output distributions of $C_{\text{ext}}$ in outer hybrids 9 and 10 are identical.

This concludes the proof of Lemma 6.16, and hence the proof of Theorem 6.1.

7 Achieving Exponent-DDH Hardness

In this section, we prove that for any $k \geq 2$, solving $k$-EDDH is hard over our proposed MMap construction if solving $k$-EDDH is hard over the group $\mathbb{G}$. More specifically we state and prove the following theorem:

**Theorem 7.1.** For any $k \geq 2$, the $k$-EDDH assumption holds over our proposed MMap construction provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme is secure and satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $\mathcal{L}$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $\mathcal{L}$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.
- The $k$-EDDH assumption holds over the group $\mathbb{G}$.  

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Similarities and Differences with SXDH-Hardness Proof. The proof shares an identical hybrid structure with the proof of SXDH-hardness in Appendix 6. In fact, the only difference between the two proofs lies in how we embed a $k$-EDDH instance into the plaintext tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts in the challenge encodings, as opposed to an SXDH instance. This really happens via the following two alterations in the reduction:

- Recall that in the proof of SXDH-hardness, we used a sequence of hybrids to switch between normal and oblique representations for the challenge encodings. In particular, we switched between the following representations for each of the challenge encodings:

\[
\begin{align*}
[\alpha_1] &: (\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i), (\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i) \rightarrow (0, \mu, 0, 0, i), (0, \mu, 0, 0, i), \\
[\alpha_2] &: (\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i), (\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i) \rightarrow (0, 0, \mu, 0, i), (0, 0, \mu, 0, i), \\
[\alpha_3] &: (\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, i), (\mu \cdot \gamma_3, 0, 0, 0, i) \rightarrow (0, 0, 0, \mu, i), (0, 0, 0, \mu, i).
\end{align*}
\]

In particular, the oblique representation of the challenge encodings used all of the available slots. In the proof of $k$-EDDH hardness, we again use an identical sequence of hybrids to switch between normal and oblique representations for the challenge encodings; however, the oblique representations for the challenge encodings do not use the final slot in the tuple any longer (also, we have one less challenge encoding to deal with – this follows from the definition of the $k$-EDDH assumption):

\[
\begin{align*}
[\alpha'_1] &: (\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i), (\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i) \rightarrow (0, \mu, 0, 0, i), (0, \mu, 0, 0, i), \\
[\alpha'_2] &: (\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i), (\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i) \rightarrow (0, 0, \mu, 0, i), (0, 0, \mu, 0, i).
\end{align*}
\]

- Recall that in the proof of SXDH-hardness, the outer hybrid 5 switched the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ embedded in the MMap circuits from a uniformly random tuple to a DDH tuple, and the outer hybrid 10 “cleaned this up” by switching the tuple back to random. In the proof of $k$-EDDH-hardness, the outer hybrid 5 only switches the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2)$ from a uniformly random tuple to a $k$-EDDH tuple, while the final element $g_3$ remains unchanged (in fact the final element $g_3$ is no longer used in an essential manner in the proof). This again follows from the definition of the $k$-EDDH assumption. The outer hybrid 10 performs the corresponding “clean up” operation by switching the tuple $(g_0, g_1, g_2)$ back to uniform.

We now point out that the outer hybrids in the proof of SXDH-hardness are technically agnostic of the plaintext tuples underlying FHE ciphertexts in the challenge encodings. Really, the only hybrids where the plaintext tuples are somewhat relevant are the inner hybrid 1-2 (implementing the switch from normal to partially oblique representation) and the inner hybrid 2-2 (implementing the switch from partially oblique to fully oblique representation). However, these hybrids rely on FHE semantic security, and hence the reduction goes through in exactly the same way irrespective of the actual plaintext message underlying the FHE ciphertexts.

The only significant differences arise in outer hybrids 5 and 10, as mentioned above. Hence, we focus mainly on the details of these two outer hybrids in the description below. We also outline the remaining outer hybrids for the sake of completeness; however, the workings of the corresponding inner hybrids are essentially identical to that in the proof of SXDH-hardness, and are not detailed.

7.1 Outer Hybrids

We begin by describing the outer hybrids for our proof. Outer hybrid 0 corresponds to the game where the challenger provides the adversary with encodings of uniformly random elements in a level-set that is chosen by the adversary. The final outer hybrid corresponds to the game where the challenger provides the adversary with a valid $k$-EDDH instance, i.e., encodings of elements sampled according to the real $k$-EDDH distribution, in the same level-set chosen by the adversary. Before we describe the outer hybrids, we describe a few conditions that remain invariant throughout the outer hybrids:
Table 14 provides an overview of the outer hybrids, which we now describe in details.

The NIZK CRS strings crs₀ and crs₁ are in binding mode, as in the real MMap scheme, in all the outer hybrids.

The element y in the public parameter is a non-member for the language L, as in the real MMap scheme, in all the outer hybrids.

The challenge encodings provided to the adversary are consistent with respect to extraction (as formalized by the relation R₁ described earlier) in all the outer hybrids. However, as we shall see later, they may be switched from the normal to oblique representation and vice-versa.

The term g₉ in the tuple (g₀, g₁, g₂, g₉) hardwired into the MMap circuits is sampled uniformly throughout.

Table 14 provides an overview of the outer hybrids, which we now describe in details.

**Outer Hybrid 0.** In this hybrid, the MMap is set up exactly as in the real scheme described earlier. Let (g₀, g₁, g₂, g₉) be the tuple of group elements hardwired into each of the MMap circuits, such that g₉ = g₀² for ℓ ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Let µ be a uniformly sampled element in Zₚ. The k-EDDH adversary is provided with encodings of the tuple of elements:

\[(α₀, α₁, α₂) = (μ, μ · γ₁, μ · γ₂),\]
where the encodings are generated in normal form (formalized by relation $R_0$ described in Appendix 5) corresponding to the level-set $i$ chosen by the $k$-EDDH adversary. For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 15. Along with the FHE encryptions, each encoding also contains a NIZK proof $\pi_0$ for normal representation under the binding $\text{crs}_0$, and a NIZK proof $\pi_1$ for consistency with respect to extraction under the binding $\text{crs}_1$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>$c_0$ encrypts</th>
<th>$c_1$ encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_0$</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_0]$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_1)$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_1]$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_1)$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_2]$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_1)$</td>
<td>$(sk_0, sk_1)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 15: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 0

**Outer Hybrid 1.** In this hybrid, we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is generated:

1. Fix $j \in [n]$ such that for the challenge level-set $i$, we have $i_j = 1$. We switch the elements $z_{j,0}$ and $z_{j,1}$ in the public parameters from non-members to members for $L$, i.e., we now sample $z_{j,0}, z_{j,1} \leftarrow L$, along with their (unique) membership-witnesses $\text{wit}_{z_{j,0}}$ and $\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}$, respectively.

2. We switch the circuits for addition, inversion, multiplication and extraction as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
C_{\text{Add}} &\mapsto \hat{C}_{\text{Add}}; & C_{\text{Inv}} &\mapsto \hat{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \\
C_{\text{Mult}} &\mapsto \hat{C}_{\text{Mult}}; & C_{\text{ext}} &\mapsto \hat{C}_{\text{ext}},
\end{align*}
\]

The switched circuits are described in Figures 9, 10, 11, and 12, respectively. At a high level, we make the following alterations (these are essentially identical to those in outer hybrid 1 of the proof of SXDH-hardness):

- We hardwire the witnesses $\text{wit}_{z_{j,0}}$ and $\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}$ into the modified addition and inversion circuits $\hat{C}_{\text{Add}}$ and $\hat{C}_{\text{Inv}}$, and remove the extraction trapdoor $t_{\text{ext},0}$ from both these circuits. Instead of extracting the membership witnesses from the input encodings, we directly use these hardwired witnesses to generate proofs of membership for the output encodings.

- We hardwire the witness $\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}$ into the modified multiplication circuit $\hat{C}_{\text{Mult}}$, and remove the extraction trapdoor $t_{\text{ext},0}$ from it. Instead of extracting the membership witness from the input encoding, we directly use the hardwired witness to generate proofs of membership for the output encodings. Note that we only need one witness for the multiplication circuit; the witness $\text{wit}_{z_{j,0}}$ is not used (the reader may observe that the original multiplication circuit would not have extracted $\text{wit}_{z_{j,0}}$ either).

- Finally, we remove the extraction trapdoor $t_{\text{ext},0}$ from the modified extraction circuit $\hat{C}_{\text{ext}}$.

Additionally, we make the following change to the manner in which the challenge encodings are generated: for each challenge encoding, the NIZK proof $\pi_0$ now proves (under the binding $\text{crs}_0$) that $z_{j,1} \in L$ as opposed to proving that the encoding is in the normal representation. This is explicitly described in Table 16.
Table 16: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>$c_0$ encrypts</th>
<th>$c_1$ encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_0$</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_0]$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{w}t_{z_{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_1]$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{w}t_{z_{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_2]$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{w}t_{z_{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outer Hybrid 2. This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 1, except that the challenge encodings are no longer in normal form. In particular, the first FHE ciphertext in each encoding now encrypts an oblique representation of the underlying plaintext element. For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 17. As in outer hybrid 1, each encoding also contains a NIZK proof $\pi_0$ for $z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}$ under the binding crs$_0$, and a NIZK proof $\pi_1$ for consistency under the binding crs$_1$. The changes from outer hybrid 1 are highlighted in red.

Table 17: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 2 (note that the final plaintext slot is unused across the challenge encodings).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>$c_0$ encrypts</th>
<th>$c_1$ encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_0$</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_0]$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{w}t_{z_{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_1]$</td>
<td>$(0, \mu, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_1, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{w}t_{z_{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_2]$</td>
<td>$(0, 0, \mu, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu \cdot \gamma_2, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{w}t_{z_{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outer Hybrid 3. This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 2, except that the challenge encodings are now entirely in oblique form. In particular, the second FHE ciphertext in each encoding now also encrypts an oblique representation of the underlying plaintext element. Each encoding continues to have a NIZK proof $\pi_0$ for $z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}$ under the binding crs$_0$, and a NIZK proof $\pi_1$ for consistency with respect to extraction under the binding crs$_1$. For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 18. The changes from outer hybrid 2 are highlighted in red.

Table 18: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 3 (note again that the final plaintext slot is unused across the challenge encodings).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>$c_0$ encrypts</th>
<th>$c_1$ encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_0$</th>
<th>Witness for $\pi_1$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_0]$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(\mu, 0, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{w}t_{z_{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_1]$</td>
<td>$(0, \mu, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(0, \mu, 0, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{w}t_{z_{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$[\alpha_2]$</td>
<td>$(0, 0, \mu, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(0, 0, \mu, 0, i)$</td>
<td>$(j, \text{w}t_{z_{j,1}})$</td>
<td>$(\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Outer Hybrid 4. In this hybrid, we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is generated (again, these are essentially identical to those in outer hybrid 4 of the proof of SXDH-hardness):
1. We switch back the element \( z_{j,0} \) in the public parameters from a member to a non-member for \( \mathcal{L} \), i.e., we now sample \( z_{j,0} \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L} \). The element \( z_{j,1} \) continues to be a member for \( \mathcal{L} \), i.e., we continue to sample \( z_{j,1} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \), along with the (unique) membership-witness \( \text{wit}_{z_{j,1}} \).

2. We switch the circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication as follows:

\[
\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}} \mapsto \tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}} \mapsto \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} \mapsto \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}.
\]

The switched circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication are described in Figures 13, 14, and 16, respectively. Finally, note that the element \( y \) continues to be a non-member for \( \mathcal{L} \) and \( \text{crs}_1 \) is still generated in the binding mode. Hence, any valid encoding must still satisfy consistency with respect to extraction.

**Outer Hybrid 5.** This hybrid is identical to outer hybrid 3 except that we switch the group elements \( g_0, g_1 \) and \( g_2 \) hardwired into the modified MMap circuits \( \tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}} \) from uniformly random to a randomly sampled \( k \)-EDDH tuple, albeit with the same base element \( g_0 \). More formally, we uniformly sample \( \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \), and set

\[
(g_1, g_2) = (g_0^\gamma, g_0^k).
\]

Note that the final element \( g_3 \) continues to be uniformly randomly sampled.

**Outer Hybrid 6.** In this hybrid, we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is generated (again, these are essentially identical to those in outer hybrid 6 of the proof of SXDH-hardness):

1. We switch the element \( z_{j,0} \) in the public parameters from a non-member to a member for \( \mathcal{L} \), i.e., we now sample \( z_{j,0} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \), along with a (unique) membership-witness \( \text{wit}_{z_{j,0}} \). The element \( z_{j,1} \) continues to be a member for \( \mathcal{L} \), i.e., we continue to sample \( z_{j,1} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \), along with the (unique) membership-witness \( \text{wit}_{z_{j,1}} \).

2. We switch the circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication as follows:

\[
\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}} \mapsto \tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}} \mapsto \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} \mapsto \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}.
\]

**Outer Hybrid 7.** This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 4, except that the challenge \( k \)-EDDH encodings are now switched back to a partially oblique form. In particular, the second FHE ciphertext in each encoding now encrypts a normal representation of the underlying plaintext element. Each encoding continues to have a NIZK proof \( \pi_0 \) for \( z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L} \) under the binding \( \text{crs}_0 \), and a NIZK proof \( \pi_1 \) for consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \( \text{crs}_1 \). For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 19. The changes from outer hybrid 4 are highlighted in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>cL0 encrypts</th>
<th>cL1 encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for ( \pi_0 )</th>
<th>Witness for ( \pi_1 )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>([\alpha_0])</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}}))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>([\alpha_1])</td>
<td>((0, \mu, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}}))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>([\alpha_2])</td>
<td>((0, 0, \mu, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma^k, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}}))</td>
<td>((\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_2))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 19: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 7 (note again that the final plaintext slot is unused across the challenge encodings).
Outer Hybrid 8. This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 5, except that the challenge encodings are now switched back entirely to the normal form. In particular, the first FHE ciphertext in each encoding now also encrypts a normal representation of the underlying plaintext element. Each encoding continues to have a NIZK proof \(\pi_0\) for \(z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}\) under the binding \(\text{crs}_0\), and a NIZK proof \(\pi_1\) for consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \(\text{crs}_1\). For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 20. The changes from outer hybrid 5 are highlighted in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>(c_{l0}) encrypts</th>
<th>(c_{l1}) encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for (\pi_0)</th>
<th>Witness for (\pi_1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[(a_0)]</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}}))</td>
<td>((s_{k0}, s_{k1}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[(a_1)]</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}}))</td>
<td>((s_{k0}, s_{k1}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[(a_2)]</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma^k, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma^k, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((j, \text{wit}<em>{z</em>{j,1}}))</td>
<td>((s_{k0}, s_{k1}))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 20: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 8.

Outer Hybrid 9. This hybrid is identical to outer hybrid 8, except that we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is set up (again, these are essentially identical to those in outer hybrid 8 of the proof of SXDH-hardness):

1. We switch back the elements \(z_{j,0}\) and \(z_{j,1}\) in the public parameters from members to non-members for \(\mathcal{L}\), i.e., we now sample \(z_{j,0}, z_{j,1} \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L}\). Note that this is exactly as in the real MMap scheme.

2. We switch back the circuits for addition, inversion, multiplication and extraction as follows:

\[
\hat{C}_{\text{Add}} \mapsto C_{\text{Add}}, \quad \hat{C}_{\text{Inv}} \mapsto C_{\text{Inv}}, \\
\hat{C}_{\text{Mult}} \mapsto C_{\text{Mult}}, \quad \hat{C}_{\text{ext}} \mapsto C_{\text{ext}}.
\]

In particular, the circuits are now exactly as in the real MMap scheme, with the exception that the tuple \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) hardwired inside these circuits continues to be a \(k\)-EDDH tuple (and the corresponding secret exponents hardwired into the multiplication circuit are \(\gamma\) and \(\gamma^k\)).

Additionally, we make the following change to the manner in which the challenge encodings are generated: for each encoding, the NIZK proof \(\pi_0\) under the binding \(\text{crs}_0\) now proves that the encoding is in the normal representation using the witness \((s_{k0}, s_{k1})\), as opposed to proving that \(z_{j,1} \in \mathcal{L}\). For ease of understanding, we explicitly lay out what the FHE ciphertexts in each of the encodings actually encrypt in Table 21. The changes from outer hybrid 8 are highlighted in red.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Encoding</th>
<th>(c_{l0}) encrypts</th>
<th>(c_{l1}) encrypts</th>
<th>Witness for (\pi_0)</th>
<th>Witness for (\pi_1)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>[(a_0)]</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((s_{k0}, s_{k1}))</td>
<td>((s_{k0}, s_{k1}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[(a_1)]</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((s_{k0}, s_{k1}))</td>
<td>((s_{k0}, s_{k1}))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>[(a_2)]</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma^k, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((\mu \cdot \gamma^k, 0, 0, 0, i))</td>
<td>((s_{k0}, s_{k1}))</td>
<td>((s_{k0}, s_{k1}))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 21: Overview of Challenge Encodings in Outer Hybrid 9
Outer Hybrid 10. This hybrid is identical to outer hybrid 9 except that we switch the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2)$ hardwired into the MMap circuits $C_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Inv}}, C_{\text{Mult}}$ and $C_{\text{Ext}}$ from a uniform $k$-EDDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple, albeit with the same base element $g_0$ (and the corresponding secret exponents hardwired into the multiplication circuit are switched from $\gamma$ and $\gamma^k$ to uniformly random). In other words, the MMap circuits are now exactly as in the real scheme.

7.2 Indistinguishability of Outer Hybrids

In this section, we argue that the outer hybrids are computationally indistinguishable from each other. A majority of the arguments are very similar to those used in the proof of Theorem 6.1, and are hence not detailed. We expand on the arguments that are specific to $k$-EDDH.

Outer Hybrids 0 and 1. We first argue that outer hybrids 0 and 1 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

Lemma 7.2. The outer hybrids 0 and 1 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of $\text{Eval}$, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. The proof of this lemma uses a sequence of inner hybrids that are essentially identical to those used in the proof of Lemma 6.4. Hence, we do not detail them. In fact, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 6.4 is that the challenge encodings use different plaintext tuples for the corresponding FHE ciphertexts. However, the proof of Lemma 6.4 was agnostic to the plaintext tuples underlying the challenge encodings; hence we can just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments exactly as in the proof of Lemma 6.4.

Outer Hybrids 1 and 2. We now argue that outer hybrids 1 and 2 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

Lemma 7.3. The outer hybrids 1 and 2 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of $\text{Eval}$, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. The proof of this lemma uses a sequence of inner hybrids that are essentially identical to those used in the proof of Lemma 6.5. Hence, we do not detail them. In fact, once again, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 6.5 is that the challenge encodings use different plaintext tuples for the corresponding FHE ciphertexts. However, the proof of Lemma 6.5 was agnostic to the plaintext tuples underlying the challenge encodings; hence we can just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments exactly as in the proof of Lemma 6.5.
**Outer Hybrids 2 and 3.** We now argue that outer hybrids 2 and 3 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 7.4.** The outer hybrids 2 and 3 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

**Proof.** Once again, to prove this lemma, we use another sequence of inner hybrids that are essentially identical to those used in the proof of Lemma 6.9. Hence, we do not detail them. As before, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 6.9 is that the challenge encodings use different plaintext tuples for the corresponding FHE ciphertexts, and the proof of Lemma 6.9 is agnostic to the nature of these plaintext tuples.

**Outer Hybrids 3 and 4.** We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 7.5.** The outer hybrids 3 and 4 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

**Proof.** Once again, to prove this lemma, we use another sequence of inner hybrids that are essentially identical to those used in the proof of Lemma 6.10. Hence, we do not detail them. As before, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 6.10 is that the challenge encodings use different plaintext tuples for the corresponding FHE ciphertexts, which the proof of Lemma 6.10 is agnostic to.

**Outer Hybrids 4 and 5.** We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 7.6.** The outer hybrids 4 and 5 are computationally indistinguishable provided that the $k$-EDDH assumption holds over the group $G$.

**Proof.** This is the first outer hybrid that differs significantly from the proof of SXDH-hardness in the sense that we rely on a different assumption over the group $G$; hence the reduction is also different and is detailed here. At a high level, in this step, we provide a reduction that switches the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2)$ hardwired into the MMap circuits from a uniformly random tuple of group elements to a uniformly random $k$-EDDH tuple, albeit with the same base element $g_0$. Since the MMap circuits in outer hybrid 4 do not embed the secret exponents $(\gamma_1, \gamma_2)$, the reduction can simulate the piO-obfuscated MMap circuits, as well as the challenge $k$-EDDH encodings, exactly as in outer hybrid 4. The formal proof is now detailed below.
Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary $A$ that can distinguish between the outer hybrids 3 and 4 with non-negligible probability. We construct a PPT algorithm $B$ that can break the $k$-EDDH assumption over the group $G$ with non-negligible probability. As part of its input $k$-EDDH challenge, $B$ receives a tuple of group elements of the form $(g_0, g_1, g_2)$, and sets up the public parameters for the MMap as follows:

1. $B$ samples two key-pairs for the FHE scheme as:
   $$\langle pk_0, sk_0 \rangle, \langle pk_1, sk_1 \rangle \leftarrow \text{FHE.Gen}(1^\lambda),$$
   and a pair of binding NIZK CRS strings (along with the corresponding extraction trapdoors) as:
   $$\langle crs_0, t_{\text{ext}, 0} \rangle, \langle crs_1, t_{\text{ext}, 1} \rangle \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding}).$$

2. Next $B$ samples
   $$z_{1,0}, z_{1,1}, \ldots, z_{j-1,0}, z_{j-1,1}, z_{j,0}, z_{j+1,0}, z_{j+1,1}, \ldots, z_{n,0}, z_{n,1} \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L},$$
   $$z_{j,1} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}, \quad y \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L},$$
   where $z_{j,1}$ has unique membership-witness $\text{wit}_{z_{j,1}}$.

3. Finally, $B$ sets up the MMap circuits $\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}$ and $\tilde{C}_{\text{ext}}$ (the extraction circuit does not change from outer hybrid 2, as in the proof of SXDH-hardness) exactly as described in Figures 13, 14, 16 and 12, respectively, except for the fact that it hardwires the tuple $(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)$ into each of these circuits, where $g_0, g_1$ and $g_2$ are part of the input challenge, and $g_3$ is uniformly sampled from the group $G$ (this element is not part of the reduction, and has no technical impact on the proof). It then computes and outputs four probabilistically indistinguishability-obfuscated circuits of the form
   $$\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}), \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}),$$
   $$\tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}), \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\tilde{C}_{\text{ext}}).$$

Next, $B$ sets up the challenge encodings in the oblique representation as follows (refer to Table 18 for how the challenge encodings are formatted in oblique representation in outer hybrid 3):

1. $B$ samples $\mu \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and generates the following FHE ciphertexts for each $b \in \{0, 1\}$:
   $$ct_{b,0} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_b, (\mu, 0, 0, 0, 1)), \quad ct_{b,1} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_b, (0, \mu, 0, 0, 1)),$$
   $$ct_{b,2} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_b, (0, 0, \mu, 0, 1)).$$
   Note again that unlike in the proof of SXDH-hardness, the final plaintext slot remains unused. This is essentially dictated by the nature of the reduction.

2. $B$ generates the following proofs for each $\ell \in \{0, 2\}$:
   $$\pi_{0,\ell} = \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}_0, \langle pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,\ell}, ct_{1,\ell}, i, \{z_{j,1}\}_{j \in [0, n]} \rangle, \langle j, \text{wit}_{z_{j,1}} \rangle),$$
   $$\pi_{1,\ell} = \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}_1, \langle pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,\ell}, ct_{1,\ell}, i, y \rangle, \langle sk_0, sk_1 \rangle).$$
3. Finally, for each $\ell \in [0, 2]$, $B$ generates the encoding $[\alpha_\ell]$ as:

$$[\alpha_\ell] = (ct_{0,\ell}, ct_{1,\ell}, i, \pi_0, \ell, \pi_1).$$

$B$ then provides $A$ with the MMap public parameters and the challenge encodings. Eventually, $A$ outputs a bit $b^*$. $B$ outputs the same bit $b^*$. Now, observe the following:

- Suppose that $B$ receives as input a tuple of uniformly random group elements of the form $(g_0, g_0^{g_1}, g_0^{g_2})$. In this case, the view of $A$ is exactly as in outer hybrid 4.

- On the other hand, when $B$ receives as input a DDH tuple of the form $(g_0, g_0^{g_1}, g_0^{g+})$, the view of $A$ is exactly as in outer hybrid 5.

Hence the advantage of $B$ in breaking $k$-EDDH over the group $G$ is the same as the advantage of $A$ in distinguishing the outer hybrids 4 and 5. This concludes the proof of Lemma 7.6.

Outer Hybrids 5 and 6. We now argue that outer hybrids 5 and 6 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 7.7.** The outer hybrids 5 and 6 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

**Proof.** The proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 7.5, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed. In fact, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 7.5 is that in Lemma 7.5, the tuple of group elements $(g_0, g_1, g_2)$ hardwired into the MMap circuits were uniformly random, while in the proof of this lemma, they are distributed as a uniform $k$-EDDH tuple. However, the proof of Lemma 7.5 was agnostic to the nature of this tuple; hence we can just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Outer Hybrids 6 and 7. We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 7.8.** The outer hybrids 6 and 7 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.

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• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. The proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 7.4, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed. Again, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 7.4 is that in Lemma 7.4, the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) hardwired into the MMap circuits were uniformly random, while in the proof of this lemma, they are distributed as a uniform \(k\)-EDDH tuple. However, yet again, the proof of Lemma 7.4 was agnostic to the nature of this tuple; hence we can just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Outer Hybrids 7 and 8. We state the following lemma:

Lemma 7.9. The outer hybrids 7 and 8 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

• The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against \(X\)-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.

• The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of \(\text{Eval}\), as described in Definition 3.1.

• Membership in \(L\) is computationally hard to decide and members of \(L\) have unique witnesses for membership.

• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. The proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 7.3, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed. Again, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 7.3 is that in Lemma 7.3, the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) hardwired into the MMap circuits were uniformly random, while in the proof of this lemma, they are distributed as a uniform \(k\)-EDDH tuple. However, yet again, the proof of Lemma 7.3 was agnostic to the nature of this tuple; hence we can just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Outer Hybrids 8 and 9. We state the following lemma:

Lemma 7.10. The outer hybrids 8 and 9 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

• The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against \(X\)-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.

• The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of \(\text{Eval}\), as described in Definition 3.1.

• Membership in \(L\) is computationally hard to decide and members of \(L\) have unique witnesses for membership.

• The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

Proof. Again, the proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 7.2, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed.

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Outer Hybrids 9 and 10. We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 7.11.** The outer hybrids 9 and 10 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode.

**Proof.** In this hybrid, we switch the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) hardwired into the MMap circuits as follows: we switch the tuple of exponents \((\gamma_1, \gamma_2)\) from a tuple of the form \((\gamma, \gamma^k)\) to a uniformly random tuple, i.e., \(\gamma_2\) is now sampled uniformly at random from \(\mathbb{Z}_q\). Effectively, this switches the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) from a uniform \(k\)-EDDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple, albeit with the same base element \(g_0\). At a high level, this is the last “clean-up” step that reverses the alteration made to the distribution of \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) in outer hybrid 5.

We argue below that this switch does not alter the output distribution of these circuits from outer hybrid 9 to outer hybrid 10. Once this is established, the indistinguishability argument follows immediately under the assumption that the piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers (once for each MMap circuit). The argument is very similar to that presented in the proof of Lemma 6.16, but is presented for the sake of completeness.

Informally, this indistinguishability is argued as follows. Observe that in outer hybrid 9, all the OR branches corresponding to the NIZK proof systems \(z_0\) and \(z_1\) have been effectively turned off. This is because all of the \(X\)-elements in the public parameters of the MMap scheme are, in fact, sampled as non-members. Hence, any valid encoding must be in normal representation and must be consistent, which in turn implies that outcomes of the MMap circuits (in particular the extraction algorithm) are now agnostic of the distribution of the group elements \(g_1\) and \(g_2\). Hence, switching the tuple of group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) from a \(k\)-EDDH tuple to a random tuple does not alter the output distributions of these circuits.

We first focus on the MMap circuits \(C_{\text{Add}}\) and \(C_{\text{Inv}}\). Observe that switching \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) from a uniform \(k\)-EDDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple only (potentially) affects the outcome of the “\(\text{IF}\)” condition in step 7 of each of these circuits. Note however that in both outer hybrids 9 and 10, \(c_{\text{rs}0}\) is in binding mode, each \(z_{j,b}\) in the public parameter is a non-member for \(j \in [n]\) and \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), and \(y\) in the public parameter is also a non-member. Hence, it follows from the perfect soundness of the dual-mode NIZK proof system that any input encoding(s) for which these circuits do not output \(\bot\) and terminate before step 7 must be both in normal representation and consistent. This in turn guarantees that the outcome of the “\(\text{IF}\)” condition in step 7 must be “false”. Hence, the output distributions of the MMap circuits \(C_{\text{Add}}\) and \(C_{\text{Inv}}\) in outer hybrids 9 and 10 are identical.

Next, we focus on the MMap circuit \(C_{\text{Mult}}\). Observe that switching \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) from a uniform \(k\)-EDDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple only (potentially) affects the outcome of the “\(\text{Else IF}\)” condition in step 3 of the circuit \(C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}\) (Figure 6), which is evaluated homomorphically in Step 5 of \(C_{\text{Mult}}\). Note however that in both outer hybrids 9 and 10, \(c_{\text{rs}0}\) is in binding mode, each \(z_{j,b}\) in the public parameter is a non-member for \(j \in [n]\) and \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), and \(y\) in the public parameter is also a non-member. Hence, it follows from the perfect soundness of the dual-mode NIZK proof system that any input encoding(s) for which these circuits do not output \(\bot\) and terminate before step 7 must be both in normal representation and consistent. Hence, the “\(\text{Else IF}\)” condition in step 3 of the circuit \(C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}\) can never be satisfied by a pair of valid input encodings. This in turn implies that the output distributions of the MMap circuit \(C_{\text{Mult}}\) in outer hybrids 9 and 10 are identical.

Finally, we focus on the MMap extraction circuit \(C_{\text{Ext}}\). Observe that switching \((g_0, g_1, g_2)\) from a uniform \(k\)-EDDH tuple to a uniformly random tuple potentially affects the output of the extraction circuit. However, note yet again that in both outer hybrids 9 and 10, \(c_{\text{rs}0}\) is in binding mode, each \(z_{j,b}\) in the public parameter is a non-member for \(j \in [n]\) and \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), and \(y\) in the public parameter is also a non-member. Hence, it follows from the perfect soundness of the dual-mode NIZK proof system that any input encoding(s) for which the circuit does not output \(\bot\) and terminate before the extraction step is executed must be both in normal representation and consistent. Observe also that the base element \(g_0\) in the tuple of group elements remains unaltered across outer hybrids 9 and 10. It follows immediately that the outcome of extraction on a given encoding in normal representation in both hybrids is identical. In other words, the output distributions of \(C_{\text{Ext}}\) in outer hybrids 9 and 10 are identical.

This concludes the proof of Lemma 7.11, and hence the proof of Theorem 7.1.
8 A Symmetric MMap Construction

In the previous sections, we showed how to construct an asymmetric MMap endowed with “source-group” hardness assumptions such as SXDH and $k$-EDDH from (sub-exponentially secure) iO and other standard cryptographic assumptions. In this section, we use similar techniques to construct a symmetric MMap, also endowed with “source-group” hardness assumptions. Of course, over an $n$-degree symmetric MMap with $n \geq 2$, SXDH and $k$-EDDH for $k \leq n$ are trivially broken; so the “source-group” hardness assumption that we can realistically hope to prove $(n+1)$-EDDH. This is precisely what we achieve.

In the process, we introduce some new techniques for encoding plaintext elements and a set of hardness assumptions over generic prime order groups that are stronger than plain DDH and $k$-EDDH (although implied by other well-accepted assumptions previously studied in the literature). These changes are necessitated by fundamental differences between the nature of asymmetric and symmetric multilinear maps, as illustrated subsequently.

The Ingredients. Our construction of symmetric multilinear maps relies on the same set of cryptographic assumptions as its asymmetric counterpart. We list the requirements here for the sake of completeness.

- A probabilistic-iO scheme $\piO = (\piO.\text{Obf}, \piO.\text{Eval})$ against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4 (Section 3).
- A fully-homomorphic encryption scheme $\text{FHE} = (\text{FHE}.\text{Gen}, \text{FHE}.\text{Enc}, \text{FHE}.\text{Dec}, \text{FHE}.\text{Eval})$, such that the message space is $\mathbb{Z}_q$ for some prime $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ ($\lambda$ being the security parameter) satisfying both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of $\text{Eval}$, as described in Definition 3.1 (Section 3) Note that this kind of FHE is not known from the LWE assumption, but can be constructed from iO and standard assumptions [CLTV15].
- A dual-mode NIZK proof system $\text{NIZK} = (\text{NIZK}.\text{Setup}, \text{NIZK}.\text{Prove}, \text{NIZK}.\text{Verify})$ as in Definition 3.1 (Section 3) that is:
  - perfectly complete in both modes;
  - perfectly extractable and perfectly sound in the binding mode;
  - perfectly zero knowledge and perfectly witness indistinguishable in the hiding mode.
An example of such a dual-mode NIZK proof system is the Groth-Sahai NIZK proof system [GS08].
- A language with hard-membership as described in Definition 3.2 (Section 3). For simplicity of representation, we represent such a language by a pair of sets $(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{L})$ such that $\mathcal{L} \subset \mathcal{X}$ and:
  1. Given $x \in \mathcal{X}$ it is computationally hard to decide if $x \in \mathcal{L}$.
  2. For each $y \in \mathcal{L}$, there exists a unique membership witness $\text{wit}_y$.
- A (pairing-free) group $\mathbb{G}$ of prime order $q$.

In Appendix 9 we show that $(n+1)$-EDDH is hard over our proposed MMap construction if the $n$-“cross-product”-EDDH (or $n$-CP-EDDH in short) is hard over the group $\mathbb{G}$. Recall from Appendix 3 that the $n$-CP-EDDH assumption holds over a (prime-order) group $\mathbb{G}$ if letting $g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$ and $\gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, we have:

$$\left\{ g_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{\ell \cdot (n+1) \cdot \ell'} \right\}_{(\ell + \ell') \in [0, n]} \approx \left\{ g_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{\ell \cdot \delta \cdot \ell'} \right\}_{(\ell + \ell') \in [0, n]}.$$
Also recall from Appendix 3 that the \( n \)-CP-EDDH is implied by the \((n + 1)^2\)-power-DDH assumption.

At a high level, one can view the \( n \)-CP-EDDH assumption as a strengthening of the standard \((n + 1)\)-EDDH assumption in the sense that indistinguishability holds even in the presence of some additional cross-product terms over and above the terms in the standard \((n + 1)\)-EDDH assumption. We subsequently provide more intuition into why the symmetric version of our MMap construction needs to rely on this stronger assumption over the group \( G \).

**Differences with Our Asymmetric MMap Construction.** At a high level, our symmetric MMap construction is very similar to the asymmetric MMap construction presented in Appendix 5, except for the following key differences that we discuss informally here. The main difference stems from the fact that we must use a different strategy in our proofs to embed group elements into the challenge encodings.

In our construction of asymmetric multilinear maps, we heavily relied on the fact that it was impossible to multiply different challenge terms. For instance, recall that, informally speaking, the SXDH assumption over multilinear maps says that an adversary cannot distinguish between \((\{\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_1 \cdot \gamma_2\}) and \((\{\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3\})\), where \(\gamma_1, \gamma_2 \) and \(\gamma_3\) are sampled uniformly at random, and are encoded in *one* of the source groups of the multilinear maps. Importantly, due to the nature of the multilinear map, a user can *never* multiply these challenge elements together. Our entire proof strategy for asymmetric multilinear maps was predicated on this fact: we could only encode the challenge elements obliquely because we never had to multiply them with each other.

We expand more on this observation here for the ease of exposition. In our asymmetric MMap construction, for an element represented obliquely as \( (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3) \), the actual “value” of the element was:

\[
\alpha^* = \alpha_0 + \gamma_1 \cdot \alpha_1 + \gamma_2 \cdot \alpha_2 + \gamma_3 \cdot \alpha_3.
\]

Consequently, we embedded a tuple of group elements

\[
(g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3) = \left( g_0, g_0^{\gamma_1}, g_0^{\gamma_2}, g_0^{\gamma_3} \right)
\]

into the MMap circuits, and given the encoding of an element represented obliquely as \( (\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2, \alpha_3) \), the extraction circuit would produce the output

\[
g^* = (g_0)^{\alpha} = (g_0)^{\alpha_0} \cdot (g_1)^{\alpha_1} \cdot (g_2)^{\alpha_2} \cdot (g_3)^{\alpha_3}.
\]

However, when using this style of encoding, multiplying two encodings in the oblique representation is a challenge, and requires the explicit knowledge of the secret exponents \( (\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3) \). Hence, these secret exponents had to hardwired into the “real” multiplication circuit.

However, at some point in the proof of SXDH-hardness described in Appendix 6 (more concretely, outer hybrid 5), we had to switch the tuple \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) from a uniformly random tuple with random exponents \( (\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_3) \) to a uniformly random DDH tuple with exponents \( (\gamma_1, \gamma_2, \gamma_1 \cdot \gamma_2) \). This was the crux of our proof because it transformed the challenge SXDH encodings (represented obliquely) from “random” to “real”. This required us to introduce an additional hybrid (more concretely, outer hybrid 4) that removed these exponents from the multiplication circuit in a computationally indistinguishable manner, without recalling all of the technical details, we merely highlight the fact that this hybrid ensured that no two “pairing-compatible” level-sets can have valid encodings in the oblique representation. This ensured that two encodings in the oblique representation (including, obviously, the challenge encodings themselves) could not be multiplied.

Unfortunately, such a restriction cannot be imposed by definition in the case of a symmetric MMap, which does not support the concept of “pairing-compatible level-sets.” In particular, suppose we consider the \((k + 1)\)-EDDH assumption over a symmetric multilinear map of degree \( k \). In this case, in the “real” case we are given a tuple \((g^x, g^{x+1})\) for a randomly sampled element \( g \) in the source group \( G \). Unlike the asymmetric multilinear map case, users of the symmetric multilinear map can multiply these challenge elements together. This is a problem for our simulation, because, at least in some of our hybrids, we cannot use a traditional oblique representation. Given challenge elements \( g^x \) and \( g^{x+1} \), we will need to be able to answer (graded) queries (informally) of the form \( e(g^x, g^{x+1}) = g^{x+2} \). This is impossible for us to simulate just given \( g^x \) and \( g^{x+1} \), so we will need to use a different strategy.
A Stronger Assumption. Our solution to this conundrum is just to use a stronger (but still reasonable) assumption over our group $G$. How might we do this? Note that in the “real” $(n + 1)$-EDDH game, these pairings of challenge elements take the form

$$h_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{x_{\ell} + x_{\ell'}}$$

for all $\ell + \ell' \leq k$. In the “random” $(n + 1)$-EDDH game, they take the form

$$h_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{x_{\ell} + y_{\ell'}}$$

for some random $y \in Z_q^*$. What if we just assume that we have a group where it is hard to distinguish terms of this form? If we formulate a challenge that uses all of these terms, then we can again use a normal/oblique form dichotomy for encoding elements. Once again, we can encode elements in normal form using only the first term. Our tuples will need $(n + 1)^2$ “slots” in order for us to be able to represent all of the possible cross-terms in an oblique encoding, which is less efficient than our previous multilinear map constructions but still acceptable. However, this actually simplifies a portion of our proof: now we can multiply two terms in oblique form, unlike in our asymmetric multilinear map proofs.

The reader will notice that this assumption that we allude to above is precisely the $n$-CP-EDDH assumption as described earlier and is in fact implied by the power-DDH assumption [KY18, BMZ19] (as established formally in Appendix 3). This provides some intuitive explanation for why we rely on the $n$-CP-EDDH assumption for achieving $(n + 1)$-EDDH hardness over our symmetric MMap construction. The corresponding changes in the encoding strategy does necessitate some changes to the structure of our proof, which we outline next.

“All-or-Nothing” Approach to Representation. In the asymmetric MMap construction and the corresponding proof of SXDH (and $k$-EDDH), we used an OR-proof technique to restrict the “validity” of encodings in (partially) oblique representation to particular level-sets. In other words, depending on the public parameters for the MMap scheme, either all valid encodings were in the normal representation, or valid encodings in certain level-sets were allowed to be in the oblique representation. In the symmetric MMap construction, where no such level-sets exist, such restrictions cannot be imposed. Hence, we opt for an “all-or-nothing” approach - depending on the public parameters for the MMap scheme, either all valid encodings must be in the normal representation, or all valid encodings are allowed to be in the oblique representation. This also means that it now suffices to have a single element $z \in X$ in the public parameters in order to “switch-on” or “switch-off” this OR branch, as opposed to $2n$ elements $(z_{1,0}, z_{1,1}), \ldots, (z_{n,0}, z_{n,1})$ in the asymmetric construction.

“Well-Formedness” of Encodings. The aforementioned change presents certain challenges when multiplying encodings. In the asymmetric construction, we ensured that any two “allowed” level-sets for oblique representation must be incompatible with respect to multiplication. Since we cannot enforce such a restriction in the symmetric setting, we opt for a different restriction, called “well-formedness”, that must be satisfied irrespective of whether the encoding is in normal or oblique representation. Any encoding in normal representation is well-formed by default. On the other hand, any pair of oblique encodings can be multiplied provided that they are well-formed. Informally, well-formedness requires that an encoding at any level arises from legally pairing an appropriate set of valid level-1 encodings, and that such pairing does not violate the constraints imposed by the definitions of symmetric MMaps (e.g., no more than $n$ level-1 elements could have been paired together). Formally, this entails certain restrictions on the number of “slots” that an encoding can use in the oblique representation, as is described subsequently.

8.1 Setup

The setup algorithm for our MMap construction takes as input the security parameter $1^\lambda$ and a second parameter $1^n$ for the degree of multilinearity. It samples two key-pairs for the FHE scheme as:

$$(pk_0, sk_0), (pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{FHE.Gen}(1^\lambda).$$
Unlike the asymmetric construction, the setup algorithm for our symmetric MMap construction uniformly samples $\gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$, and creates a tuple of $n(n+1)/2$ group elements in $\mathbb{G}$ as:

$$g_{\ell', \ell} = g^{\delta_{\ell'}} \cdot \delta_{\ell}$$

for each $\ell, \ell' \in [0, n]$ such that $\ell + \ell' \leq n$.

As explained subsequently, this change is motivated by the specific hardness assumption, namely $n$-CP-EDDH, that we wish rely on to prove the $(n+1)$-EDDH assumption our symmetric MMap construction.

The setup algorithm also samples a pair of binding NIZK CRS strings (along with the corresponding extraction trapdoors) as:

$$(\text{crs}_0, t_{\text{ext}, 0}), (\text{crs}_1, t_{\text{ext}, 1}) \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding}).$$

The languages for which statements are proven under these CRS strings are described subsequently in Section 8.2. Next the setup algorithm uniformly samples a pair of non-member elements as:

$$y, z \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L}.$$  

Finally, the setup algorithm computes and outputs four probabilistically indistinguishability-obfuscated circuits of the form

$$\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(C_{\text{Add}}), \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(C_{\text{Inv}}),$$

$$\tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(C_{\text{Mult}}), \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}} = \piO.\text{Obf}(C_{\text{ext}}),$$

where $C_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Inv}}, C_{\text{Mult}},$ and $C_{\text{ext}}$ are the circuits for adding, inverting, multiplying, and extracting from encodings at any given “non-zero” level. Note that while the names for these circuits are overloaded from the asymmetric MMap construction for ease of representation, their descriptions are not exactly identical to their counterparts described previously. We describe these circuits in details subsequently. However, as before, these circuits also embed certain elements that we want to keep secret:

- The FHE secret keys $sk_0$ and $sk_1$.
- The NIZK extraction trapdoors $t_{\text{ext}, 0}$ and $t_{\text{ext}, 1}$.
- The tuple of group elements $\{g_{\ell, \ell'}\}_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]}$ (only $g_{0,0}$ is made publicly available for reasons relevant to the proof of security; recall that this is similar to our asymmetric MMap construction where only $g_0$ was made public).

As in the asymmetric MMap construction, the public description of our symmetric MMap contains $\piO$-obfuscated versions of these circuits. In other words, the public parameters $pp$ for our symmetric MMap construction consists of the following tuple:

$$pp = (pk_0, pk_1, \text{crs}_0, \text{crs}_1, g_{0,0}, y, z, \tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}}).$$

8.2 Encodings

We describe the procedure of encoding a plaintext element at any level $i$ such that $i \in [0, n]$. In our construction, level-0 encodings are treated slightly differently from encodings at other “non-zero” levels, and are equipped with their own set of algorithms for encoding, manipulation, extraction and zero-testing. We informally mention these for the sake of completeness.

Level-Zero Encodings. We set the level-0 encoding of a plaintext element $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ to be $a$ itself. Adding/multiplying two level-0 encodings (equivalently, additively inverting a level-0 encoding) is simply done via addition/multiplication (equivalently, additive inversion) in $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

Multiplying a level-0 encoding with any other encoding at some level $i$ should result in an encoding at level-$i$. This is implemented with a shift-and-add algorithm built on top of the standard encoding addition algorithm described subsequently.

Extracting a level-0 encoding $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ outputs $g_{0,0}^a$, where $g_{0,0} \in \mathbb{G}$ is the publicly available group element sampled at setup that is also embedded inside each MMap circuit. As will be clear later, this is consistent with the extraction algorithm for any other level $i$. Zero-testing follows trivially from the extraction algorithm.
Level-i Encodings. We now describe the procedure of encoding a plaintext element at any “non-zero” encoding level $i$ such that $i \in [n]$. An encoding of a plaintext element $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ at level-vector $i$ is a tuple of the form $(\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, \pi_0, \pi_1)$, where:

- $\text{ct}_0$ and $\text{ct}_1$ are FHE encryptions of a tuple of the form:
  $$\{(a_{\ell, \ell', 0})_{\ell, \ell' \in [0, n]}, i\}, \quad \{(a_{\ell, \ell', 1})_{\ell, \ell' \in [0, n]}, i\}.$$  

under the public key-secret key pairs $(pk_0, sk_0)$ and $(pk_1, sk_1)$ respectively.

For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, the tuple $\{(a_{\ell, \ell', b}, i)\}$ is said to be in “normal form” if

$$\{a_{\ell, \ell', b} = 0\}_{(\ell, \ell') \neq (0, 0)}.$$  

Otherwise, it is said to be in “oblique-form.” As before, depending on the forms of the tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts, we classify an encoding into one of three representations - “normal”, “partially oblique” and “oblique.”

We also introduce the concept of a “well-formed encoding.” An encoding at level $i \in [n]$ is said to be “well-formed” if the tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts satisfy the following condition:

$$a_{\ell, \ell', b} = 0 \text{ for each } \ell, \ell' \in [0, n] \text{ such that } \ell + \ell' > i.$$  

Also recall that the setup algorithm privately samples a tuple of group elements $(\{g_{\ell, \ell'}\})$ and hardwires these into the MMap circuits that are described subsequently. We say that an encoding is “consistent” if the tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts satisfy the following condition:

$$\prod_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]} (g_{\ell, \ell'})^{a_{\ell, \ell', 0}} = \prod_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]} (g_{\ell, \ell'})^{a_{\ell, \ell', 1}}.$$  

- $\pi_0$ is a verifying NIZK proof of “normal representation”. Informally, it proves under $\text{crs}_0$ that one of the following statements must be true: either the encoding is in normal representation or $z \in L$. Formally, $\pi_0$ is a verifying NIZK proof under $\text{crs}_0$ of the OR relation $R_0$ defined below:

**Relation $R_0$:**

$R_0((\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, pk_0, pk_1, \text{wit}) = 1$ if and only if:

- Either $\text{wit} = (sk_0, sk_1)$ and $(pk_0, sk_0), (pk_1, sk_1) \in K_{\text{FHE}}$ and $\text{FHE.}\text{Dec}(sk_0, \text{ct}_0) = \text{FHE.}\text{Dec}(sk_1, \text{ct}_1) = (a, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, i)$ for some $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$.

- Or $\text{wit} = (a, r_0, r_1)$ for some $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and for each $b \in \{0, 1\}$, we have:
  $$\text{FHE.}\text{Enc}(pk_0, (a, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, i); r_b) = \text{ct}_0.$$  

**OR Relation $R_0$:**

$R_0((\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, pk_0, pk_1, \text{wit}) = R_0((\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, pk_0, pk_1, \text{wit}) \lor R_L(z, \text{wit})$.  

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We now describe the procedure for adding two encodings, and for (additive) inversion of an encoding. Suppose we have

Figure 22 details the operation of the encoding-addition circuit $C_{\text{Add}}$. Note that it embeds multiple secrets, including the FHE secret keys $sk_0$ and $sk_1$, as well as the extraction trapdoors $t_{\text{ext},0}$ and $t_{\text{ext},1}$ for the NIZK. Hence, the circuit is

8.3 Addition and Inversion of Encodings

We now describe the procedure for adding two encodings, and for (additive) inversion of an encoding. Suppose we have two encodings at the same level $i$ of the form:

$$(\text{ct}_{0,1}, \text{ct}_{1,1}, i, \pi_{0,1}, \pi_{1,1}) ; \quad (\text{ct}_{0,2}, \text{ct}_{1,2}, i, \pi_{0,2}, \pi_{1,2}).$$

Note that when $z \not\in \mathcal{L}$ and $y \not\in \mathcal{L}$, any valid encoding must be in the normal representation, and hence must also be well-formed and consistent. So having the additional proof $\pi_1$ might appear redundant. However, looking ahead, during certain hybrids in the proof of security, we will relax one or more of the language non-membership conditions to allow encodings corresponding to certain designated level sets to be in oblique representation. In such a case, the proof $\pi_1$ would allow us to enforce well-formedness and consistency irrespective of whether the encoding is in the normal representation or in the oblique representation.

8.3 Addition and Inversion of Encodings

We now describe the procedure for adding two encodings, and for (additive) inversion of an encoding. Suppose we have two encodings at the same level $i$ of the form:

$$(\text{ct}_{0,1}, \text{ct}_{1,1}, i, \pi_{0,1}, \pi_{1,1}) ; \quad (\text{ct}_{0,2}, \text{ct}_{1,2}, i, \pi_{0,2}, \pi_{1,2}).$$

Figure 22 details the operation of the encoding-addition circuit $C_{\text{Add}}$. Note that it embeds multiple secrets, including the FHE secret keys $sk_0$ and $sk_1$, as well as the extraction trapdoors $t_{\text{ext},0}$ and $t_{\text{ext},1}$ for the NIZK. Hence, the circuit is

Relation $R_1$:

$R_1((\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, \text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1), \text{wit}) = 1$ if and only if:

- Either $\text{wit} = (\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1)$ and $(\text{pk}_0, \text{sk}_0), (\text{sk}_1, \text{sk}_1) \in \mathcal{K}_{\text{FHE}}$ and for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, we have

$$\text{FHE.Dec}(\text{sk}_b, \text{ct}_b) = (\{a_{\ell, \ell'}, \pi\}_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]}, i),$$

such that for we have

$$a_{\ell, \ell'}, b = 0 \text{ for each } \ell, \ell' \in [0, n] \text{ such that } \ell + \ell' \geq i,$$

and we have

$$\prod_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]} (g_{\ell, \ell'})^{a_{\ell, \ell'}, 0} = \prod_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]} g_{\ell, \ell', 1} = g_{0, 0}^n.$$  

- Or $\text{wit} = (\{a_{\ell, \ell', 0}, a_{\ell, \ell', 1}\}_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]}, r_0, r_1)$ and for each $b \in \{0, 1\}$, we have

$$\text{FHE.Enc}(\text{pk}_b, (\{a_{\ell, \ell', b}\}_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]}, 1); r_b) = \text{ct}_b,$$

such that for we have

$$a_{\ell, \ell'}, b = 0 \text{ for each } \ell, \ell' \in [0, n] \text{ such that } \ell + \ell' \geq i,$$

and we have

$$\prod_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]} (g_{\ell, \ell'})^{a_{\ell, \ell', 0}, a_{\ell, \ell', 1}} = \prod_{\ell + \ell' \in [0, n]} (g_{\ell, \ell'})^{a_{\ell, \ell', 1}, a_{\ell, \ell', 1}}.$$  

OR Relation $\bar{R}_1$:

$$\bar{R}_1((\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, \text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1, y), \text{wit}) = R_1((\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, \text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1), \text{wit}) \lor R_L(y, \text{wit}).$$

- $\pi_1$ is a verifying NIZK proof of “well-formedness” and “consistency” that holds irrespective of whether the encoding is in normal representation or (partially) oblique representation. Informally, it proves under $\text{crs}_1$ that one of the following statements must be true: either the encoding is well-formed and consistent, or $y \in \mathcal{L}$. Formally, $\pi_1$ is a verifying NIZK proof under $\text{crs}_1$ of the OR relation $\bar{R}_1$ defined above (R_L is as defined earlier):

An encoding $(\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, \pi_0, \pi_1)$ is said to be “valid” if both of the following hold simultaneously:

$$\text{NIZK.Verify}(\text{crs}_0, (\text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, z), \pi_0) = 1,$$

and

$$\text{NIZK.Verify}(\text{crs}_1, (\text{pk}_0, \text{pk}_1, \text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, i, y), \pi_1) = 1.$$  

Note that when $z \not\in \mathcal{L}$ and $y \not\in \mathcal{L}$, any valid encoding must be in the normal representation, and hence must also be well-formed and consistent. So having the additional proof $\pi_1$ might appear redundant. However, looking ahead, during certain hybrids in the proof of security, we will relax one or more of the language non-membership conditions to allow encodings corresponding to certain designated level sets to be in oblique representation. In such a case, the proof $\pi_1$ would allow us to enforce well-formedness and consistency irrespective of whether the encoding is in the normal representation or in the oblique representation.
not made public as is; we only make available an obfuscated version of the circuit obtained by running the evaluation algorithm of the probabilistic iO scheme $\piO$ on it. The same holds for the encoding-inversion circuit $C_{\text{inv}}$, which is described in Figure 23.

At a high level, we add the two input encodings by exploiting the fully-homomorphic nature of the encryption scheme. More concretely, we homomorphically evaluate the circuit $C_{\text{add,FHE}}$ (described in Figure 21) on the corresponding ciphertext components of the two input encodings to generate the ciphertext components for the output encoding. We also generate proofs for normal representation and well-formedness + consistency of the output encoding using the tuple of secret keys $(sk_0, sk_1)$ as witness, unless otherwise dictated by the input encodings (in which case we use the extracted witnesses from the proofs in the input encodings to generate the proofs for the output encodings).

The checks in steps 5 and 7 of $C_{\text{add}}$ and $C_{\text{inv}}$ are included for technical reasons that are relevant to the proof of security. In particular, we emphasize the following:

1. Checking the “If” condition in step 7 of $C_{\text{add}}$ and $C_{\text{inv}}$ requires the tuple of group elements $\{g_{\ell,\ell'}\}$ sampled at setup, and we implicitly assume that it is embedded in both circuits. We omit explicitly describing it for the sake of brevity.

2. When the element $z$ is a non-member for the language $L$, then under a binding $\text{crs}_0$, the “If” condition in step 5 of $C_{\text{add}}$ is never satisfied. This follows from the perfect soundness guarantee of the NIZK proof system. However, the condition may be satisfied during some hybrid in the proof of security, when we deliberately switch $z$ to a member of $L$.

3. When the element $y$ is a non-member for the language $L$, then under a binding $\text{crs}_1$, the “If” condition in step 7 of $C_{\text{add}}$ is never satisfied. This again follows from the perfect soundness guarantee of the NIZK proof system. However, the condition may be satisfied during some hybrid in the proof of security, when we deliberately switch $y$ to a member of $L$. 

Figure 21: Circuits $C_{\text{add,FHE}}$ and $C_{\text{inv,FHE}}$ for the symmetric MMap
We now describe the procedure for multiplying two encodings at levels \( FHE \) secrets, including the

\[
C_{Add}(\{sk_0, pk_0, crs_0, t_{ext,0}\} \in \{0,1\}, \{g_{x',y'}\}((ct_{1,0}, ct_{1,1}, i_1, \pi_{0,1}, \pi_{1,1}), (ct_{0,2}, ct_{1,2}, i_2, \pi_{0,2}, \pi_{1,2}))):
\]

1. Output \( \perp \) if for any \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), \( NIZK.\text{Verify}(crs_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, z), \pi_{0,k}) = 0 \).
2. Output \( \perp \) if for any \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), \( NIZK.\text{Verify}(crs_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, y), \pi_{1,k}) = 0 \).
3. For \( b \in \{0, 1\} \), set \( ct''_b = \text{FHE.\text{Eval}}(pk_y, ct_{b,1}, ct_{b,2}, C_{Add,FHE}) \).
4. For \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) and \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), recover \( (\{x_{b, x', k, b} \} \in \{0,1\}, i) = \text{FHE.\text{Dec}}(sk_a, ct, h_k) \).
5. If for some \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), \( R_0((sk_0, sk_1), (ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, pk_0, pk_k)) = 0 \), then:
   a. Extract \( \text{wit}_z = \text{NIZK.\text{Ext}}(t_{ext,0}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}, ct_{1,1}, i, z), \pi_{0,k}) \).
   b. If \( R_1(z, \text{wit}_z) = 0 \), output \( \perp \).
   c. Else, generate \( \pi''_0 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.\text{Prove}}(crs_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct''_0, ct''_i, i, z), \text{wit}_z) \).
6. Else, generate \( \pi''_0 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.\text{Prove}}(crs, (pk_0, pk_1, ct''_0, ct''_i, i, z), (sk_0, sk_1)) \).
7. If for some \( k \in \{1, 2\} \), we have \( R_1((sk_0, sk_1), (ct_{0,k}, ct_{1,k}, i, pk_0, pk_k)) = 0 \), then:
   a. Extract \( \text{wit}_y = \text{NIZK.\text{Ext}}(t_{ext,1}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0,1}, ct_{1,1}, i, y), \pi_{1,k}) \).
   b. If \( R_1(y, \text{wit}_y) = 0 \), output \( \perp \).
   c. Else, generate \( \pi''_1 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.\text{Prove}}(crs_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct''_0, ct''_i, i, y), \text{wit}_y) \).
8. Else, generate \( \pi''_1 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.\text{Prove}}(crs, (pk_0, pk_1, ct''_0, ct''_i, i, y), (sk_0, sk_1)) \).
9. Output \( (ct''_0, ct''_1, i, \pi''_0, \pi''_1) \).

Figure 22: Circuit \( C_{Add} \) for the symmetric MMap

### 8.4 Multiplication of Encodings

We now describe the procedure for multiplying two encodings at levels \( i_1 \) and \( i_2 \), respectively such that \( i_1 + i_2 \leq n \).

Suppose we have two encodings of the form:

\[
(\text{ct}_{1,0}, \text{ct}_{1,1}, i_1, \pi_1), (\text{ct}_{2,0}, \text{ct}_{2,1}, i_2, \pi_2).
\]

Figure 25 details the operation of the encoding multiplication circuit \( C_{Mult} \). Note that it again embeds multiple secrets, including the FHE secret keys \( sk_0 \) and \( sk_1 \), as well as the extraction trapdoors \( t_{ext,0} \) and \( t_{ext,1} \) for the NIZK. Hence, the circuit is not made public as is; we only make available an obfuscated version of the circuit obtained by running the evaluation algorithm of the probabilistic iO scheme piO on it.
well-formed. Hence, evaluation using the circuit subsequently, we ensure in our MMap construction as well as in the proof of SXDH that any "valid" encoding must be ⊥ encoding. Note that the circuit outputs corresponding ciphertext components of the two input encodings to generate the ciphertext components for the output encryption scheme. More concretely, we homomorphically evaluate the circuit \( C \) at a high level, we multiply the two input encodings by again exploiting the fully-homomorphic nature of the encryption scheme. More concretely, we homomorphically evaluate the circuit \( C_{\text{Mult. FHE}} \) (described in Figure 24) on the corresponding ciphertext components of the two input encodings to generate the ciphertext components for the output encoding. Note that the circuit outputs ⊥ unless both the input encodings are well-formed. However, as described subsequently, we ensure in our MMap construction as well as in the proof of SXDH that any "valid" encoding must be well-formed. Hence, evaluation using the circuit \( C_{\text{Mult. FHE}} \) never outputs ⊥.

Finally, similar to the addition and inversion circuits, we also generate proofs for normal representation and well-formedness + consistency of the output encoding using the tuple of secret keys (\( \mathsf{sk}_0, \mathsf{sk}_1 \)) as witness, unless otherwise
\[ C_{\text{Mult}} \{ (sk_0, pk_0, crs_0, \text{setup}) \in \{ 0, 1 \} : \{ (g_{\ell, t}) \} ((c_0, 1, c_1, 1, i_1, \pi_0, 1, \pi_1, 1), (c_{\ell, 2}, c_{\ell, 2}, i_2, \pi_0, 2, \pi_1, 2)) : \]

1. Output \( \perp \) if for any \( k \in \{ 1, 2 \}, \text{NIZK.Verify}(crs_0, (pk_0, pk_1, c_{\ell, 1, k}, c_{\ell, 1, k}, i_1, z), \pi_0, k) = 0. \)
2. Output \( \perp \) if for any \( k \in \{ 1, 2 \}, \text{NIZK.Verify}(crs_1, (pk_0, pk_1, c_{\ell, 1, k}, i_1, y), \pi_1, k) = 0. \)
3. For \( b \in \{ 0, 1 \}, \) set: \( \text{ct}_b^* = \text{FHE.Eval}(pk_b, \text{ct}_{0, 1}, \text{ct}_{0, 2}, C_{\text{Mult,FHE}}). \)
4. For \( b \in \{ 0, 1 \} \) and \( k \in \{ 1, 2 \}, \) recover \(( \{ n_{\ell, t', k, \ell} \} + e' \in [0, n], i_k \) = \text{FHE.Dec}(sk_b, \text{ct}_{0, k}). \)
5. If for some \( k \in \{ 1, 2 \}, \) \( R_0((sk_0, sk_1), (c_{\ell, 0, k}, c_{\ell, 1, k}, i_1, pk_0, pk_1)) = 0, \) then:
   (a) Extract \( \text{wit}_z = \text{NIZK.Ext}((c_{\ell, 0, k}, c_{\ell, 1, k}, i_1, z), \pi_0). \)
   (b) If \( R_1((z, \text{wit}_z)) = 0, \) output \( \perp. \)
   (c) Else, generate \( \pi_0^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(crs_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0^*, ct_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), z), \text{wit}_z). \)
6. Else, generate \( \pi_0^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(crs, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0^*, ct_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), z), (sk_0, sk_1)). \)
7. If for some \( k \in \{ 1, 2 \}, \) we have \( R_1((sk_0, sk_1), (c_{\ell, 0, k}, c_{\ell, 1, k}, i_1, pk_0, pk_1)) = 0, \) then:
   (a) Extract \( \text{wit}_y = \text{NIZK.Ext}((c_{\ell, 1, 1}, (pk_0, pk_1, c_{\ell, 1, 1}, i_2, y), \pi_1). \)
   (b) If \( R_1((y, \text{wit}_y)) = 0, \) output \( \perp. \)
   (c) Else, generate \( \pi_1^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(crs_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0^*, ct_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), y), \text{wit}_y). \)
8. Else, generate \( \pi_1^* \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(crs, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0^*, ct_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), y), (sk_0, sk_1)). \)
9. Output \((ct_0^*, ct_1^*, i_1, \pi_0^*, \pi_1^*). \)

Figure 25: Circuit \( C_{\text{Mult}} \) for the symmetric MMap

dicted by the input encodings (in which case we use the extracted witnesses from the proofs in the input encodings to generate the proofs for the output encodings).

Similar to the addition and inversion procedures described previously, the checks in steps 5 and 7 of \( C_{\text{Inv}} \) are included for technical reasons that are relevant to the proof of security. In particular, we emphasize the following:

- Checking the “IF” condition in step 7 of \( C_{\text{Mult}} \) requires the tuple of group elements \( \{ g_{\ell, t'} \} \) sampled at setup, and we implicitly assume that it is embedded in the \( C_{\text{Mult}} \) circuit. We omit explicitly describing it for the sake of brevity.

- When the element \( z \) is a non-member for the language \( L \), then under a binding \( crs_0 \), the “IF” condition in step 5 of \( C_{\text{Inv}} \) is never satisfied. This follows from the perfect soundness guarantee of the NIZK proof system, and ensures that no pair of valid input encodings (even adversarially created) can result in the homomorphic evaluation of \( C_{\text{Mult,FHE}} \) outputting \( \perp. \)

Looking ahead, in certain hybrids of our proof of SXDH, we do allow the “IF” condition in step 5 to be satisfiable for encodings corresponding to certain level sets. In these hybrids, we switch exactly \( z \) from a non-member to a member for \( L \). Note, however, that in this case, any valid encoding that is allowed to deviate from the normal representation must still be well-formed and consistent.

- When the element \( y \) is a non-member for the language \( L \), then under a binding \( crs_1 \), the “IF” condition in step 7 of \( C_{\text{Add}} \) is never satisfied. This again follows from the perfect soundness guarantee of the NIZK proof system. However, the condition may be satisfied during some hybrid in the proof of security, when we deliberately switch \( y \) to a member of \( L \).
The extraction circuit uses the
We now describe the procedure for extracting a canonical string from an encoding. Suppose we have an
8.5 Extraction and Zero-Testing
FHE the outputs
• Similar to the addition, inversion and multiplication procedures described previously, the checks in steps 5 and 6 of Figure 26 details the operation of the extraction circuit C_{ext}. Note that it again embeds multiple secrets, including the FHE secret keys $\mathbf{s}0$ and $\mathbf{s}1$, as well as the extraction trapdoors $t_{ext,0}$ and $t_{ext,1}$ for the NIZK. Hence, the circuit is not made public as is; we only make available an obfuscated version of the circuit obtained by running the evaluation algorithm of the probabilistic iO scheme piO on it.

Figure 26: Circuit C_{ext} for the symmetric MMap

8.5 Extraction and Zero-Testing

**Extraction.** We now describe the procedure for extracting a canonical string from an encoding. Suppose we have an encodings at the level $i$ of the form:

$$(\mathbf{c}0, \mathbf{c}1, i, \pi_0, \pi_1).$$

The extraction circuit uses the FHE secret keys $\mathbf{s}0$ and $\mathbf{s}1$ to recover the plaintext elements $\{a_{t',t'}\}_{t,t'\in[0,n]}$ underlying the FHE ciphertexts $\mathbf{c}0$ and $\mathbf{c}1$, and provided that these are consistent as per relation $R_1$ described earlier, outputs

$$g^* = \prod_{t,t'\in[0,n]} (g_{t,t'})^{\alpha_{t,t'}}.$$ 

When the element $z$ is a non-member for the language $\setL$, then under a binding $\mathbf{crs}_0$, the “IF” condition in step 5 of $C_{ext}$ is never satisfied. This again follows from the perfect soundness guarantee of the NIZK proof system. However, the condition may be satisfied during some hybrid in the proof of security, when some element $z$ is a member of $\setL$.

When the element $y$ is a non-member for the language $\setL$, then under a binding $\mathbf{crs}_1$, the “IF” condition in step 6 of $C_{ext}$ is never satisfied. This follows from the perfect soundness guarantee of the NIZK proof system. However, the condition may be satisfied during some hybrid in the proof of security, when the element $y \in \setX$ is a member of $\setL$. 

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Zero-Testing Encodings. Given the aforementioned extraction procedure, zero-testing an encoding at any given level is trivial. We simply apply the extraction procedure to the encoding, and check if the extracted group element $g^*$ is equal to $g^0$ for any $g \in G$.

9 Proof of $(n + 1)$-EDDH Hardness

In this section, we prove that solving $(n + 1)$-EDDH is hard over our proposed MMap construction if solving CP-EDDH is hard over the group $G$. More specifically we state and prove the following theorem:

Theorem 9.1. The $(n + 1)$-EDDH assumption holds over our proposed MMap construction provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against $X$-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme is IND-CPA secure and satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.
- The $n$-CP-EDDH assumption holds over the group $G$.

Similarities and Differences with SXDH-Hardness Proof over Asymmetric MMap. The proof shares an almost identical hybrid structure with the proof of SXDH-hardness over our proposed asymmetric MMap construction (Appendix 6). The only major difference in hybrid structure between the two proofs arises from the fact that in the asymmetric proof, we had three kinds of outer hybrids:

- Outer hybrids where all valid encodings were forced to be in the normal representation.
- Outer hybrids where all valid encodings were allowed to be in the (partially) oblique representation.
- Outer hybrids where valid encodings in only certain designated level-sets were allowed to be in the (partially) oblique representation.

At a high level, in the proof of $(n + 1)$-EDDH-hardness over our symmetric MMap, we again have outer hybrids of the first and second kind, but not of the third kind. In other words, we have a more “all-or-nothing” flavor when it comes to valid encodings being allowed to be in the (partially) oblique representation; we do not impose any intermediate hybrids where we restrict this to a specific subset of levels; indeed, the very definition of symmetric multilinear maps does not really support the idea of “pairing-compatible level-sets” and makes it impossible to impose such restrictions.

Now we focus on how this affects the outer hybrid structure and proof strategy for $(n + 1)$-EDDH-hardness over our symmetric MMap construction. To begin with, this reduces the number of outer hybrids we actually require in the proof. Recall that in the proof of SXDH-hardness over our asymmetric MMap construction, we used a pair of dedicated outer hybrids (4 and 6) to switch from all valid encodings being allowed to be in the (partially) oblique representation to valid encodings in only certain designated level-sets being allowed to be in the (partially) oblique representation, and vice-versa. Since we do not impose such restrictions now, we do not need these two outer hybrids in the proof of $(n + 1)$-EDDH over our symmetric MMap construction (and the corresponding piO-based arguments to realize these switches).

However, the outer hybrids 4 and 6 in the proof of SXDH-hardness did more than just switch the level-sets where valid encodings were allowed to be in the (partially) oblique representation. Outer hybrid 4 also allowed us to get rid of the branch in the multiplication circuit that depended on the knowledge of the secret exponents underlying the tuple of
group elements \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) in order to multiply two encodings in the (partially) oblique representation. This allowed us to switch \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) from a uniformly random tuple to a DDH tuple in outer hybrid 5, following which, outer hybrid 6 restored this branch. These steps constituted the crux of our proof of SXDH-hardness; in particular, switching the tuple \((g_0, g_1, g_2, g_3)\) from random to DDH effectively also switched the challenge encodings from random to “real” SXDH instances.

How do we get around this issue in the proof of \((n + 1)\)-EDDH-hardness over our symmetric MMap, especially given the fact that we cannot have outer hybrids enforcing similar restrictions on the levels where valid encodings are allowed to be in the (partially) oblique representation? The answer, as it turns out, lies in one key difference between the multiplication circuits used in our asymmetric and symmetric MMap constructions.

The multiplication circuit in our symmetric MMap construction (Figure 25) can actually multiply two encodings in the (partially) oblique representation without the knowledge of the secret exponents underlying the tuple of group elements \(\{g_{\ell},\ell'\}\). The slot-based representation that we use for our symmetric MMap construction (which is significantly more complicated as compared to that in our asymmetric MMap construction) is designed specifically to support this. In particular, the tuple \(\{g_{\ell},\ell'\}\) has sufficiently many cross-terms to allow extraction even if the multiplication circuit multiplied two fully obliquely represented encodings without the knowledge of the underlying exponents, which was not the case in our asymmetric construction.

In other words, the proof of \((n + 1)\)-EDDH-hardness over our symmetric MMap construction does not need the additional “multiplication-branch handling” outer hybrids; the tuple \(\{g_{\ell},\ell'\}\) can be switched from a “random” CP-EDDH instance to a “real” CP-EDDH instance over the group \(G\) as soon as the challenge \((n + 1)\)-EDDH encodings have been transformed from normal to fully oblique representation (which is achieved through the same sequence of outer hybrids as in the proof of SXDH-hardness). This effectively switches the challenge encodings from random to “real” \((n + 1)\)-EDDH encodings, as desired.

It is important to note here that we do not get this somewhat simpler outer hybrid structure for free; in a way, we “pay” for it by: (a) using a significantly more complicated encoding structure in our symmetric MMap construction, and also (b) by relying on the CP-EDDH assumption, which is stronger than the more standard DDH assumption. Note that the CP-EDDH assumption is, in fact, implied by the power-DDH assumption, which is a reasonably standard assumption and has been studied before [KY18, BMZ19]; nonetheless, both of these assumptions are stronger than DDH.

In what follows, we outline the outer hybrids used in the proof of \((n + 1)\)-EDDH-hardness over our symmetric MMap construction.

### 9.1 Outer Hybrids

We begin by describing the outer hybrids for our proof. Outer hybrid 0 corresponds to the game where the challenger uniformly samples \(\gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q\) and provides the adversary with level-1 encodings of the form

\[ [\mu], [\gamma], [\delta], 1, \]

where \(\mu, \gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q\) are uniformly sampled. The final outer hybrid corresponds to the game where the challenger provides the adversary with a valid \((n + 1)\)-EDDH instance, i.e., it uniformly samples \(\mu, \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q\) and provides the adversary with level-1 encodings of the form

\[ [\mu], [\gamma], [\gamma^{n+1}], 1, \]

where \(\mu, \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q\) are uniformly sampled. Before we describe the outer hybrids, we describe a few conditions that remain invariant throughout the outer hybrids:

- The NIZK CRS strings \(\text{crs}_0\) and \(\text{crs}_1\) are in binding mode, as in the real MMap scheme, in all the outer hybrids.
- The element \(y\) in the public parameter is a non-member for the language \(L\), as in the real MMap scheme, in all the outer hybrids.
Table 22: Overview of the outer hybrids in the proof of \((n + 1)\)-EDDH. Changes between subsequent hybrids are highlighted in red. Throughout, \(crs_0\) and \(crs_1\) are binding, \(y \notin L\), and the challenge encodings are well-formed and consistent with respect to extraction. We use the shorthands \(C_{op}\) and \(\tilde{C}_{op}\) for the tuples \(\langle C_{Add}, C_{inv}, C_{Mult}, C_{ext} \rangle\) and \(\langle \tilde{C}_{Add}, \tilde{C}_{inv}, \tilde{C}_{Mult}, \tilde{C}_{ext} \rangle\), respectively, where the second set of circuits are described in details subsequently.

- The challenge encodings provided to the adversary are well-formed and consistent (as formalized by the relation \(R_1\) described earlier) in all the outer hybrids. However, as we shall see later, they may be switched from the normal to oblique representation and vice-versa.

Table 22 provides an overview of the outer hybrids, which we now describe in details.

**Outer Hybrid 0.** In this hybrid, the MMap is set up exactly as in the real scheme described earlier. Let \(\{g_{\ell, \ell'}\}\) be the tuple of group elements hardwired into each of the MMap circuits, such that:

\[
g_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{\gamma \cdot \delta'} \quad \text{for each } \ell, \ell' \in [0, n] \text{ such that } \ell + \ell' \leq n,
\]

where \(g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}\) and \(\gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q\) are uniformly sampled. Let \(\mu\) be a uniformly sampled element in \(\mathbb{Z}_q\). The \((n + 1)\)-EDDH adversary is provided with level-1 encodings of the tuple of elements:

\[
(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \alpha_2) = (\mu, \mu \cdot \gamma, \mu \cdot \delta),
\]

where the encodings are generated in normal form (formalized by relation \(R_0\) described earlier). In particular, the plaintexts underlying the FHE ciphertexts corresponding to \(\alpha_0, \alpha_1\) and \(\alpha_2\) are of the form

\[
(\mu, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (\mu, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1),
\]

\[
(\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1),
\]

\[
(\mu \cdot \delta, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (\mu \cdot \delta, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1).
\]
Along with the FHE encryptions, each encoding also contains a NIZK proof \( \pi_0 \) for normal representation under the binding \( \text{crs}_0 \), and a NIZK proof \( \pi_1 \) for well-formedness and consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \( \text{crs}_1 \).

**Outer Hybrid 1.** In this hybrid, we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is generated:

1. We switch the element \( z \) in the public parameters from a non-member to a member for \( \mathcal{L} \), i.e., we now sample \( z \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \), along with a (unique) membership-witness \( \text{wit}_z \).

2. We switch the circuits for addition, inversion, multiplication and extraction as follows:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{C}_\text{Add} & \mapsto \hat{\text{C}}_\text{Add}, & \quad \text{C}_\text{Inv} & \mapsto \hat{\text{C}}_\text{Inv}, \\
\text{C}_\text{Mult} & \mapsto \hat{\text{C}}_\text{Mult}, & \quad \text{C}_\text{Ext} & \mapsto \hat{\text{C}}_\text{Ext}.
\end{align*}
\]

The switched circuits are described in Figures 27, 28, 29, and 30, respectively. The modifications made to the circuits are essentially analogous to those made in outer hybrid 1 of the SXDH-hardness proof in Appendix 6. At a high level, in each of these switched circuits, we hardwire the witness \( \text{wit}_z \) for the membership of \( z \) in \( \mathcal{L} \) and avoid using the first extraction trapdoor \( t_{\text{ext},0} \) inside the first \textbf{If} branch, which checks for normal encoding. In other words, we “allow” valid encodings to be encoded using the oblique representation.

Note that the element \( y \) continues to be a non-member for \( \mathcal{L} \) and \( \text{crs}_1 \) is still generated in the binding mode. Hence, any (potentially adversarially generated) valid encoding must still satisfy consistency with respect to extraction.

Additionally, we make the following change to the manner in which the challenge encodings are generated: for each encoding, the NIZK proof \( \pi_0 \) under the binding \( \text{crs}_0 \) now proves that \( z \in \mathcal{L} \) as opposed to proving that the encoding is in the normal representation.
We represent the encodings as a vector with these as the first three indices for ease of representation. As in outer
where the non-zero entries in both plaintexts correspond to the indices

Outer Hybrid 2. This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 1, except that the challenge \((n + 1)\)-EDDH encodings
are no longer in normal form. In particular, the first FHE ciphertext in each encoding now encrypts an oblique form
of the underlying plaintext element. The representations of the plaintexts corresponding to \(\alpha_0\), \(\alpha_1\) and \(\alpha_2\) are of the form

\[
(\mu, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (\mu, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \\
(0, \mu, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \\
(0, 0, \mu, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (\mu \cdot \delta, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1).
\]

where the non-zero entries in the second plaintext correspond to the indices \((\ell, \ell') = (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)\), respectively.
We represent the encodings as a vector with these as the first three indices for ease of representation. As in outer
hybrid 1, each encoding also contains a NIZK proof \(\pi_0\) for \(z \in \mathcal{L}\) under the binding \(\text{crs}_0\), and a NIZK proof \(\pi_1\) for
well-formedness and consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \(\text{crs}_1\).

Outer Hybrid 3. This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 2, except that the challenge \((n + 1)\)-EDDH encodings
are now entirely in oblique form. In particular, the representations of the plaintexts corresponding to \(\alpha_0, \alpha_1\) and \(\alpha_2\) are of the form

\[
(\mu, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (\mu, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \\
(0, \mu, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (0, \mu, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \\
(0, 0, \mu, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (0, 0, \mu, 0, \ldots, 0, 1).
\]

where the non-zero entries in both plaintexts correspond to the indices \((\ell, \ell') = (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)\), respectively. Each
encoding continues to have a NIZK proof \(\pi_0\) for \(z \in \mathcal{L}\) under the binding \(\text{crs}_0\), and a NIZK proof \(\pi_1\) for well-formedness
and consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \(\text{crs}_1\).

Figure 28: Circuit \(\hat{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{inv}}\) for the symmetric MMap.

1. Output \(\bot\) if NIZK.Verify(\(\text{crs}_0\), (pk\(_0\), pk\(_1\), ct\(_0\), i, z), \(\pi_0\)) = 0.
2. Output \(\bot\) if NIZK.Verify(\(\text{crs}_1\), (pk\(_0\), pk\(_1\), ct\(_0\), i, y), \(\pi_1\)) = 0.
3. For \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), set \(ct\(_i^*\) = \text{FHE.Eval}(pk\(_0\), ct\(_0\), C_{\text{Aid}, \text{FHE}})\).
4. For \(b \in \{0, 1\}\), recover \(\{(\alpha_{\ell}', \ell') \in [0, n] : i\}) = \text{FHE.Dec}(sk\(_0\), ct\(_0\)).
5. If \(R_0((sk\(_0\), sk\(_1\)), (ct\(_0\), ct\(_1\), i, pk\(_0\), pk\(_1\))) = 0\), then:
   (a) // Omitted, depends on \(t_{\text{ext}, 0}\).
   (b) Generate \(\pi^*_0 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}_0, (pk\(_0\), pk\(_1\), ct\(_0^*, i, z), \text{wit}_z)\).
6. Else, generate \(\pi^*_0 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}, (pk\(_0\), pk\(_1\), ct\(_0^*, i, z), (sk\(_0\), sk\(_1\)))\).
7. If \(R_1((sk\(_0\), sk\(_1\)), (ct\(_0\), ct\(_1\), i, pk\(_0\), pk\(_1\))) = 0\), then:
   (a) Extract \(\text{wit}_y = \text{NIZK.Ext}(t_{\text{ext}, 1}, (pk\(_0\), pk\(_1\), ct\(_0\), ct\(_1\), i, y), \pi_1)\).
   (b) If \(R_C(y, \text{wit}_y) = 0\), output \(\bot\).
   (c) Else, generate \(\pi^*_1 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}_1, (pk\(_0\), pk\(_1\), ct\(_0^*, i, y), \text{wit}_y)\).
8. Else, generate \(\pi^*_1 \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Prove}(\text{crs}, (pk\(_0\), pk\(_1\), ct\(_0^*, i, y), (sk\(_0\), sk\(_1\)))\).
9. Output \((ct\(_0^*, ct\(_1^*, i, \pi^*_0), \pi^*_1))\).
1. Output ⊥ if for any \( k \in \{1, 2\}, \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Verify}(\text{crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_2, ct_0, i_k, z), \pi_{0,k}) = 0.\)

2. Output ⊥ if for any \( k \in \{1, 2\}, \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Verify}(\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_2, ct_1, i_k, y), \pi_{1,k}) = 0.\)

3. For \( b \in \{0, 1\}, \) set \( \text{ct}_b^* = \text{FHE} \cdot \text{Eval}(pk_y, ct_0, b, C_{\text{FHE}}).\)

4. For \( b \in \{0, 1\} \) and \( k \in \{1, 2\}, \) recover \( \{(a, \ell, t, k) \mid \ell + t \in [0, n], i_k = \text{FHE} \cdot \text{Dec}(sk_y, ct_0, b).\}

5. If for some \( k \in \{1, 2\}, \) \( R_b((sk_0, sk_1), (ct_0, k, ct_1, i_k, pk_0, pk_1)) = 0, \) then:
   
   (a) // Omitted, depends on \( t_{\text{test}, 0}.\)
   
   (b) Generate \( \pi^*_0 = \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Prove}(\text{crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0^*, (i_1 + i_2), z), \text{wit}_0).\)

6. Else, generate \( \pi^*_0 = \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Prove}(\text{crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0^*, (i_1 + i_2), z), (sk_0, sk_k)).\)

7. If for some \( k \in \{1, 2\}, \) we have \( R_b((sk_0, sk_1), (ct_0, k, ct_1, i_k, pk_0, pk_1)) = 0, \) then:
   
   (a) Extract \( \text{wit}_y = \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Ext}(t_{\text{test}, 1}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0, i_k, i_2, y), \pi_{1,k}).\)
   
   (b) If \( R_{c_2}(y, \text{wit}_y) = 0, \) output ⊥.
   
   (c) Else, generate \( \pi^*_1 = \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Prove}(\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), y), \text{wit}_0).\)

8. Else, generate \( \pi^*_1 = \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Prove}(\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_1^*, (i_1 + i_2), y), (sk_0, sk_1)).\)

9. Output \((ct_0^*, ct_1^*, i, \pi_0^*, \pi_1^*).\)

Figure 29: Circuit \( \tilde{C}_{\text{Mul}} \) for the symmetric MMap

1. Output ⊥ if \( \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Verify}(\text{crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0, i, z), \pi_0) = 0.\)

2. Output ⊥ if \( \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Verify}(\text{crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0, i, y), \pi_1) = 0.\)

3. For \( b \in \{0, 1\}, \) recover \( \{(a_{b,e'}, t, z) \mid e' \in [0, n], i_k = \text{FHE} \cdot \text{Dec}(sk_y, ct_0, b).\}

4. Compute \( g^* = \prod_{e' \in [0, n]} (g_{e,e'})(g_{e,e'}^{-1}).\)

5. // Omitted, depends on \( t_{\text{test}, 0}.\)

6. If \( R_{c_1}((sk_0, sk_1), (ct_0, ct_1, i, pk_0, pk_1)) = 0, \) then:
   
   (a) Extract \( \text{wit}_y = \text{NIZK} \cdot \text{Ext}(t_{\text{test}, 1}, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_0, i, y), \pi_1).\)
   
   (b) If \( R_{c_2}(y, \text{wit}_y) = 0, \) output ⊥.

7. Output \( g^*.\)

Figure 30: Circuit \( \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}} \) for the symmetric MMap

**Outer Hybrid 4.** This hybrid is identical to outer hybrid 3 except that we switch the tuple of group elements \((g_{e,e'})\) hardwired into the modified MMap circuits \( \tilde{C}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} \) and \( \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}} \) to a valid CP-EDDH tuple. More formally, we hardwire a tuple of group elements \((g_{e,e'})\) into each of the modified MMap circuits, such that:

\[ g_{e,e'} = g^{e + (n + 1) e'} \]

for each \( e, e' \in [0, n] \) such that \( e + e' \leq n, \)

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where \( g \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \) and \( \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \) are uniformly sampled.

**Outer Hybrid 5.** This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 4, except that the challenge \((n+1)\)-EDDH encodings are now switched back to a partially oblique form. In particular, the representations of the plaintexts corresponding to \( \alpha_0, \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are of the form

\[
(\mu, 0, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1), \quad (\mu, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1),
\]

\[
(\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1), \quad (\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), \quad (\mu \cdot \gamma^{n+1}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).
\]

where the non-zero entries in both plaintexts correspond to the indices \((\ell, \ell') = (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)\), respectively. Each encoding continues to have a NIZK proof \( \pi_0 \) for \( z \in \mathcal{L} \) under the binding \( \text{crs}_0 \), and a NIZK proof \( \pi_1 \) for well-formedness and consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \( \text{crs}_1 \).

**Outer Hybrid 6.** This hybrid is identical to the outer hybrid 5, except that the challenge \((n+1)\)-EDDH encodings are now switched back entirely to the normal form. In particular, the representations of the plaintexts corresponding to \( \alpha_0, \alpha_1 \) and \( \alpha_2 \) are of the form

\[
(\mu, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1), \quad (\mu, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1),
\]

\[
(\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1), \quad (\mu \cdot \gamma, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), \quad (\mu \cdot \gamma^{n+1}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1).
\]

where the non-zero entries in both plaintexts correspond to the indices \((\ell, \ell') = (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1)\), respectively. Each encoding continues to have a NIZK proof \( \pi_0 \) for \( z \in \mathcal{L} \) under the binding \( \text{crs}_0 \), and a NIZK proof \( \pi_1 \) for well-formedness and consistency with respect to extraction under the binding \( \text{crs}_1 \).

**Outer Hybrid 7.** This hybrid is identical to outer hybrid 5, except that we make the following alterations to the manner in which the MMap is set up:

1. We switch back the element \( z \) in the public parameters from a member to a non-member for \( \mathcal{L} \), i.e., we now sample \( z \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L} \). Note that this is exactly as in the real MMap scheme.

2. We switch back the circuits for addition, inversion, multiplication and extraction as follows:

\[
\tilde{C}_{\text{Add}} \mapsto C_{\text{Add}}, \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{Inv}} \mapsto C_{\text{Inv}},
\]

\[
\tilde{C}_{\text{Mult}} \mapsto C_{\text{Mult}}, \quad \tilde{C}_{\text{ext}} \mapsto C_{\text{ext}}.
\]

In particular, the circuits are now exactly as in the real MMap scheme, with the exception that the tuple \( \{g_{\ell, \ell'}\} \) hardwired inside these circuits continues to be a CP-EDDH tuple.

Additionally, we make the following change to the manner in which the challenge encodings are generated: for each encoding, the NIZK proof \( \pi_0 \) under the binding \( \text{crs}_0 \) now proves that the encoding is in the normal representation using the witness \( (\text{sk}_0, \text{sk}_1) \), as opposed to proving that \( z \in \mathcal{L} \).

**Outer Hybrid 8.** This hybrid is identical to outer hybrid 7 except that we switch the tuple of group elements \( \{g_{\ell, \ell'}\} \) hardwired into the MMap circuits \( C_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Inv}}, C_{\text{Mult}} \) and \( C_{\text{ext}} \) from a uniform CP-EDDH tuple back to a tuple as in the real scheme. More formally, we hardwire a tuple of group elements \( \{g_{\ell, \ell'}\} \) into each of the modified MMap circuits, such that:

\[
g_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{\gamma^\ell \cdot \delta^{\ell'}} \quad \text{for each } \ell, \ell' \in [0, n] \text{ such that } \ell + \ell' \leq n,
\]

where \( g \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \) and \( \gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \) are uniformly sampled.
9.2 Indistinguishability of Outer Hybrids

In this section, we argue that the outer hybrids are computationally indistinguishable from each other. The proofs use essentially the same arguments as in the proof of SXDH-hardness for our asymmetric MMap construction. In fact, the only significant differences between the two proofs arise in: (a) the formatting of the plaintext tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts in the challenge encodings, and (b) the nature of the group elements embedded into each MMap circuit, which are sampled according to the “random” distribution in the \(n\)-CP-EDDH assumption.

To begin with, as in the proof of SXDH-hardness over our asymmetric MMap construction, the outer hybrids in the proof of \((n + 1)\)-EDDH-hardness over our symmetric MMap construction are technically agnostic of the plaintext tuples underlying FHE ciphertexts in the challenge encodings. Really, the only hybrids where the plaintext tuples are somewhat relevant are the outer hybrid 2 (implementing the switch from normal to partially oblique representation) and the outer hybrid 3 (implementing the switch from partially oblique to fully oblique representation). However, the corresponding steps in these hybrids rely on FHE semantic security, and hence the reduction goes through in exactly the same way irrespective of the actual plaintext message underlying the FHE ciphertexts.

The only significant differences arise in outer hybrids 4 and 8, where we switch between “real” and “random” distributions of group elements as mandated by the \(n\)-CP-EDDH assumption. Hence, we focus mainly on the details of these two outer hybrids in the description below. We also outline the remaining indistinguishability lemmas for the sake of completeness; however, as already mentioned, the workings of the corresponding inner hybrids are essentially identical to that in the proof of SXDH-hardness over the asymmetric MMap construction, and are hence not detailed.

Outer Hybrids 0 and 1. We first argue that outer hybrids 0 and 1 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 9.2.** The outer hybrids 0 and 1 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of \(\text{Eval}\), as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in \(L\) is computationally hard to decide and members of \(L\) have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

**Proof.** The proof of this lemma uses a sequence of inner hybrids that are technically very similar to those used in the proof of Lemma 6.4. The inner hybrids are listed in Table 23. As one can see, these inner hybrids share an essentially identical structure with those in Table 9. The corresponding arguments for their indistinguishability are also essentially identical.

At a high level, we use this sequence of inner hybrids to make appropriate switches to the public parameters and the MMap circuits so that a valid encoding can be in the (partially) oblique representation. To begin with, we exploit the hardness of deciding language-membership in \(L\) to switch the element \(z\) in the public parameters from a non-member to a member for \(L\). This effectively allows any valid encoding corresponding to any level to be in the (partially) oblique representation. Next, we switch the proofs \(\pi_0\) in the challenge \((n + 1)\)-EDDH encodings from proofs of normal representation to proofs of language-membership for \(z\). Looking ahead, in outer hybrids 2 and 3, we will exploit this “change-of-witness” for \(\pi_0\) to eventually switch the challenge \((n + 1)\)-EDDH encodings from normal to oblique representation.

Note, however, that switching witnesses for the proof \(\pi_0\) in the challenge encodings is non-trivial. In particular, \(crs_0\) is in the binding mode, and to switch witnesses, we would first need to switch \(crs_0\) to hiding mode. But switching \(crs_0\) to hiding mode would further require us to get rid of the extraction trapdoor \(t_{\text{ext},0}\) hardwired into the MMap circuits, which we achieve via an additional sequence of inner hybrids. In particular, we replace \(t_{\text{ext},0}\) with hardwired witnesses of language-membership for \(z\) in the MMap circuits. As in the proof of SXDH-hardness, we again rely on a combination
Table 23: Overview of the inner hybrids in the proof of indistinguishability of outer hybrids 0 and 1. Changes between subsequent hybrids are highlighted in red. Throughout, \(crs_1\) is binding, \(y \notin \mathcal{L}\), \([g_{\ell,\ell'}]\) is a “random” \(n\)-CP-EDDH tuple, and the challenge encodings are both in normal representation as well as consistent with respect to extraction. We use the shorthands \(C_{op}\) and \(\tilde{C}_{op}\) for the tuples \((C_{Add}, C_{Inv}, C_{Mult}, C_{ext})\) and \((\tilde{C}_{Add}, \tilde{C}_{Inv}, \tilde{C}_{Mult}, \tilde{C}_{ext})\), respectively, where the first set consists of the “real” MMap circuits, while the second set consists of the modified circuits as described in the previous subsection.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner Hybrid</th>
<th>(crs_0)</th>
<th>MMap Circuits</th>
<th>(z)</th>
<th>Challenge Encodings</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0-0</td>
<td>Binding</td>
<td>(C_{op})</td>
<td>(z \notin \mathcal{L})</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-1</td>
<td>Binding</td>
<td>(C_{op})</td>
<td>(z \in \mathcal{L})</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-2</td>
<td>Binding</td>
<td>(\tilde{C}_{op})</td>
<td>(z \in \mathcal{L})</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-3</td>
<td>Hiding</td>
<td>(\tilde{C}_{op})</td>
<td>(z \in \mathcal{L})</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-4</td>
<td>Hiding</td>
<td>(\tilde{C}_{op})</td>
<td>(z \in \mathcal{L})</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-5</td>
<td>Binding</td>
<td>(\tilde{C}_{op})</td>
<td>(z \in \mathcal{L})</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

of security features from the piO scheme, the NIZK proof system and the hard-membership language \(\mathcal{L}\) to argue that this replacement can be made in a computationally indistinguishable manner. In particular, the piO-based arguments justifying this witness-hardwiring step require that the element \(z\) has a unique language-membership witness and that any valid encoding in the oblique representation must have a verifying proof of language-membership created using this unique witness. This is a property that we do have; it is guaranteed by the nature of the hard language \(\mathcal{L}\) that we assumed for both the asymmetric and symmetric MMap constructions.

The remaining details of the inner hybrids are essentially identical to their counterparts in proof of SXDH-hardness over our asymmetric MMap construction, and are hence not described here.

**Outer Hybrids 1 and 2.** We now argue that outer hybrids 1 and 2 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 9.3.** The outer hybrids 1 and 2 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against \(X\)-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of \(\text{Eval}\), as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in \(\mathcal{L}\) is computationally hard to decide and members of \(\mathcal{L}\) have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

**Proof.** The proof of this lemma uses a sequence of inner hybrids that are technically very similar to those used in the proof of Lemma 6.5. The inner hybrids are listed in Table 24. As one can see, these inner hybrids share an essentially identical structure with those in Table 10. The corresponding arguments for their indistinguishability are also essentially identical.

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At a high level, we use this sequence of inner hybrids to transform the challenge (n + 1)-EDDH encodings from normal representation to partially oblique representation. In particular, the plaintext underlying the first FHE ciphertext $c_{0}$ in each of the challenge encodings is transformed from the normal form to the oblique form, while the plaintext underlying the second FHE ciphertext $c_{1}$ in each of the challenge encodings continues to be in the normal form. Ideally, we would like to exploit FHE semantic security with respect to the key pair $(s_{K_{0}}, p_{K_{0}})$ to enable this switch. However, such a reduction is not immediately obvious. This is because $s_{K_{0}}$ is embedded into each of the MMap circuits, and is used in an essential way for consistency checks, output proof generation, and extraction. Additionally, $s_{K_{0}}$ is also used as witness for the proof $\pi_{1}$ of consistency in each of the challenge SXDH encodings.

We enable this reduction by introducing some additional hybrids. In particular, inner hybrid 1-1 affects changes to the public parameters and the MMap circuits to ensure that $s_{K_{0}}$ can be removed (in a computationally indistinguishable manner) from each of the circuits, and also from the proofs in the challenge SXDH encodings. Once this is achieved, inner hybrid 1-2 proceeds as outlined earlier; namely, it exploit FHE semantic security with respect to the key pair $(s_{K_{0}}, p_{K_{0}})$ to transform the plaintext underlying the first FHE ciphertext $c_{0}$ in each of the challenge encodings from the normal form to the oblique form. Finally, inner hybrid 1-3 “reverses” the alterations to the public parameters and the MMap circuits made by inner hybrid 1-1. Thus, at the end of inner hybrid 1-3, the challenge SXDH encodings are in the partially oblique representation, as desired. The crux of the proof thus lies in realizing inner hybrid 1-1. We borrow essentially identical proof techniques from inner hybrid 1-1 in the proof of SXDH-hardness over our asymmetric MMap construction for this purpose.

For the sake of completeness, we provide a brief overview of the techniques underlying the switch from outer hybrid 1 (equivalently, inner hybrid 1-0) to inner hybrid 1-1. To begin with, observe that so long as $crs_{1}$ is in binding mode and the element $y$ in the public parameters is a non-member for $L$, any valid encoding must be consistent, meaning that both FHE ciphertexts in the encoding must encode the “same” plaintext element, irrespective of representation. Hence, the extraction circuit can use $s_{K_{1}}$ instead of $s_{K_{0}}$ for extraction without changing the output distribution in any way. This allows us to remove $s_{K_{0}}$ from the extraction circuit; the corresponding indistinguishability argument follows from piO security against $X$-IND samplers.

Next, we exploit the hardness of deciding language-membership in $L$ to switch the element $y$ in the public parameters from a non-member to a member for $L$. This effectively allows any valid encoding to be “inconsistent”, so long as it contains a verifying proof $\pi_{1}$ of language-membership for $y$. We use this trick to “suspend” any consistency checks in the MMap circuits for addition, inversion and multiplication; we simply hardwire the unique language-membership witness $\text{wit}_{y}$ into these circuits and use it directly for generating proofs of language-membership as part of the output encodings. This allows us to remove $s_{K_{0}}$ from these circuit as well. However, the corresponding indistinguishability
argument is significantly more complicated, and relies on multiple security properties of the NIZK system (mode indistinguishability, perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode) as well as piO security against X-IND samplers. As already mentioned, we rely here on essentially the same proof techniques as used for inner hybrid 1-1 in the proof of SXDH-hardness over our asymmetric MMMap construction.

Finally, we switch the proofs $\pi_1$ in the challenge SXDH encodings from proofs of consistency to proofs of language-membership for $y$. Here, we again rely on a combination of security properties of the NIZK system (mode indistinguishability and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode), as well as piO security against X-IND samplers. At this point, the secret key $sk_0$ has been removed from each of the MMMap circuits, and also from the proofs in the challenge SXDH encodings, as desired.

The remaining technical details of these inner hybrids are essentially identical to their counterparts in proof of SXDH-hardness over our asymmetric MMMap construction, and are hence not described here. In particular, the only significant differences between the two proofs arises in the formatting of the plaintext tuples underlying the FHE ciphertexts in the challenge encodings, which is a result of the difference in the number of encoding slots used by the asymmetric (a simple four-slot encoding strategy) and symmetric (a significantly more involved $n(n+1)/2$-slot encoding strategy) MMMap constructions. However, the proofs of the inner hybrids are technically agnostic of this. In particular, the only inner hybrid where the plaintext tuples are somewhat relevant is the inner hybrid 1-2 (implementing the switch from normal to partially oblique representation). However, this hybrid relies on FHE semantic security, and hence the reduction goes through in exactly the same way irrespective of how the actual plaintext messages underlying the FHE ciphertexts are formatted.

Outer Hybrids 2 and 3. We now argue that outer hybrids 2 and 3 are computationally indistinguishable from each other. In particular, we state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 9.4.** The outer hybrids 2 and 3 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

**Proof.** The proof of this lemma uses a sequence of inner hybrids that are technically very similar to those used in the proof of Lemma 6.9. The inner hybrids are listed in Table 25. As one can see, these inner hybrids share an essentially identical structure with those in Table 12. The corresponding arguments for their indistinguishability are also essentially identical.

As is evident from the description of the hybrids, these inner hybrids are essentially identical to the inner hybrids used in the proof of Lemma 9.3, with the exception that we need to use the modified circuit $\tilde{C}_{ext,1}$ (hardwired with only $sk_0$ and not $sk_1$), and we rely on analogous versions of Lemma 6.6 and Lemma 6.8 for $\beta = 1$ as opposed to $\beta = 0$. Apart from this, the proof of indistinguishability of these inner hybrids are essentially identical to those in the proof of Lemma 9.3, and are hence not detailed.

Outer Hybrids 3 and 4. We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 9.5.** The outer hybrids 3 and 4 are computationally indistinguishable provided that the $n$-CP-EDDH assumption holds over the group $G$. 

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Table 25: Overview of the inner hybrids in the proof of indistinguishability of outer hybrids 2 and 3. Changes between subsequent hybrids are highlighted in red. Throughout, crs0 is in binding mode, $z \in \mathcal{L}$, and $\{g_\ell, g_{\ell'}\}$ is a “random” $n$-CP-EDDH tuple. We use the shorthands $\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Add}}$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Mult}}, \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{ext}}$ for the tuples $(\hat{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Add}}, \hat{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Inv}}, \hat{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Mult}}, \hat{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{ext}})$ and $(\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Mult}}, \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{ext}})$, respectively, where the second set of circuits are created essentially identically to their counterparts in the proof of SXDH-hardness over our asymmetric MMap construction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inner Hybrid</th>
<th>(crs0, crs1)</th>
<th>MMMap Circuits</th>
<th>$y$</th>
<th>Challenge Encodings</th>
<th>Remark</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2-0</td>
<td>(Binding, Binding)</td>
<td>$\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{op}}$</td>
<td>$y \not\in \mathcal{L}$</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Normal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-1</td>
<td>(Binding, Hiding)</td>
<td>$\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{op}, 1}$</td>
<td>$y \in \mathcal{L}$</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Partially oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-2</td>
<td>(Binding, Hiding)</td>
<td>$\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{op}, 1}$</td>
<td>$y \in \mathcal{L}$</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Oblique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>(Binding, Binding)</td>
<td>$\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{op}}$</td>
<td>$y \not\in \mathcal{L}$</td>
<td>Random</td>
<td>Oblique</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Proof. At a high level, in this step, we provide a reduction that switches the tuple of group elements $\{g_\ell, g_{\ell'}\}$ hardwired into the MMMap circuits from a “random” CP-EDDH instance to a “real” CP-EDDH instance. Since the MMMap circuits in outer hybrid 3 do not embed the corresponding secret exponents, the reduction can simulate the piO-obfuscated MMMap circuits, as well as the challenge $(n + 1)$-EDDH encodings, exactly as in outer hybrid 3. The formal proof is now detailed below.

Suppose that there exists a PPT adversary $A$ that can distinguish between the outer hybrids 3 and 4 with non-negligible probability. We construct a PPT algorithm $B$ that can break the CP-EDDH assumption over the group $G$ with non-negligible probability. We construct a PPT algorithm $B$ that can break the CP-EDDH assumption over the group $G$ with non-negligible probability. We construct a PPT algorithm $B$ that can break the CP-EDDH assumption over the group $G$ with non-negligible probability. We construct a PPT algorithm $B$ that can break the CP-EDDH assumption over the group $G$ with non-negligible probability. We construct a PPT algorithm $B$ that can break the CP-EDDH assumption over the group $G$ with non-negligible probability. We construct a PPT algorithm $B$ that can break the CP-EDDH assumption over the group $G$ with non-negligible probability.

1. $B$ samples two key-pairs for the FHE scheme as:

$$(pk_0, sk_0), (pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \text{FHE.Gen}(1^\lambda),$$

and a pair of binding NIZK CRS strings (along with the corresponding extraction trapdoors) as:

$$(crs_0, t_{\text{ext}, 0}), (crs_1, t_{\text{ext}, 1}) \leftarrow \text{NIZK.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding}).$$

2. Next $B$ uniformly samples

$$y \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{L}, \quad z \leftarrow \mathcal{L},$$

where $z$ has unique membership-witness wit$_z$.

3. Finally, $B$ sets up the MMMap circuits $\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Add}}, \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Inv}}, \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Mult}}$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{ext}}$ exactly as described in Figures 27, 28, 29 and 30, respectively, except for the fact that it hardwires its input tuple $\{g_\ell, g_{\ell'}\}$ into each of these circuits. It then computes and outputs four probabilistically indistinguishability-obfuscated circuits of the form

$$\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Add}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Add}}), \quad \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Inv}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Inv}}),$$

$$\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Mult}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{Mult}}), \quad \tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{ext}} = \text{piO.Obf}(\tilde{\mathcal{C}}_{\text{ext}}).$$

Next, $B$ sets up the challenge encodings in the oblique representation as follows:

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1. \( B \) samples \( \mu \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \) and generates the following FHE ciphertexts for each \( b \in \{0, 1\} \):

\[
ct_{b, 0} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_b, (\mu, 0, 0, \ldots, 0, 1)), \\
ct_{b, 1} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_b, (0, \mu, 0, \ldots, 0, 1)), \\
ct_{b, 2} = \text{FHE.Enc}(pk_b, (0, 0, \mu, \ldots, 0, 1)).
\]

2. \( B \) generates the following proofs for each \( \ell \in \{0, 1, 2\} \):

\[
\pi_{0, \ell} = \text{NIZK.Prove(crs}_0, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0, \ell}, ct_{1, \ell}, 1, \text{wit}_z), \\
\pi_{1, \ell} = \text{NIZK.Prove(crs}_1, (pk_0, pk_1, ct_{0, \ell}, ct_{1, \ell}, 1, y), (sk_0, sk_1)).
\]

3. Finally, for each \( \ell \in \{0, 1, 2\} \), \( B \) generates the encodings for \( \alpha_\ell \) as:

\[
[\alpha_\ell] = \left( ct_{0, \ell}, ct_{1, \ell}, 1, \pi_{0, \ell}, \pi_{1, \ell} \right).
\]

\( B \) then provides \( A \) with the MMap public parameters and the challenge encodings. Eventually, \( A \) outputs a bit \( b^* \). \( B \) outputs the same bit \( b^* \). Now, observe the following:

- Suppose that \( B \) receives as input a tuple of uniformly random group elements \( \{g_{\ell, \ell'}\} \) such that

\[
g_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{\gamma_{\ell} \cdot \delta_{\ell'}} \text{ for each } \ell, \ell' \in [0, n] \text{ such that } \ell + \ell' \leq n,
\]

where \( g \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \) and \( \gamma, \delta \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \) are uniformly sampled. In this case, the view of \( A \) is exactly as in outer hybrid 3.

- On the other hand, suppose that \( B \) receives as input a CP-EDDH tuple of the form \( \{g_{\ell, \ell'}\} \) such that

\[
g_{\ell, \ell'} = g^{\gamma_{\ell} + (n+1) \cdot \ell'} \text{ for each } \ell, \ell' \in [0, n] \text{ such that } \ell + \ell' \leq n,
\]

where \( g \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \) and \( \gamma \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \) are uniformly sampled. In this case, the view of \( A \) is exactly as in outer hybrid 4. 

Hence the advantage of \( B \) in breaking CP-EDDH over the group \( \mathbb{G} \) is the same as the advantage of \( A \) in distinguishing the outer hybrids 3 and 4. This concludes the proof of Lemma 9.5.

**Outer Hybrids 4 and 5.** We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 9.6.** The outer hybrids 4 and 5 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in \( L \) is computationally hard to decide and members of \( L \) have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

**Proof.** The proof of this lemma uses a sequence of inner hybrids that are technically very similar to those used in the proof of Lemma 6.11. Hence, we do not detail them.
Outer Hybrids 5 and 6. We state the following lemma:

**Lemma 9.7.** The outer hybrids 5 and 6 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

**Proof.** The proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 9.4, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed. In fact, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 9.4 is that in Lemma 9.4, the tuple of group elements $\{g_{ll, l'}\}$ hardwired into the MMap circuits constituted a “random” $n$-CP-EDDH instance, while in the proof of this lemma, they are distributed as a “real” $n$-CP-EDDH instance. However, the proof of Lemma 9.4 was agnostic to the nature of this tuple; hence we can again just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Outer Hybrids 6 and 7. We state the following lemma:

**Lemma 9.8.** The outer hybrids 6 and 7 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The FHE scheme satisfies both perfect correctness and well-distributedness of output of Eval, as described in Definition 3.1.
- Membership in $L$ is computationally hard to decide and members of $L$ have unique witnesses for membership.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies CRS indistinguishability, perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode, and perfect soundness and perfect witness-indistinguishability in the hiding mode as in Definition 3.1.

**Proof.** Once again, the proof of this lemma uses essentially the same inner hybrids as in the proof of Lemma 9.3, albeit in reverse order, and is hence not detailed. In particular, the only difference between the proof of this lemma and the proof of Lemma 9.3 is that in Lemma 9.3, the tuple of group elements $\{g_{l, e}\}$ hardwired into the MMap circuits constituted a “random” $n$-CP-EDDH instance, while in the proof of this lemma, they are distributed as a “real” $n$-CP-EDDH instance. However, the proof of Lemma 9.3 was agnostic to the nature of this tuple; hence we can again just apply all of the corresponding hybrid arguments in the reverse order.

Outer Hybrids 7 and 8. We state and prove the following lemma:

**Lemma 9.9.** The outer hybrids 7 and 8 are computationally indistinguishable provided that all of the following assumptions hold:

- The piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against X-IND samplers as in Definition 3.4.
- The dual-mode NIZK proof system satisfies perfect soundness and perfect extractability in the binding mode.
Proof. In this hybrid, we switch the tuple of group elements \( \{g_{\ell, e'}\} \) hardwired into the MMap circuits \( C_{\text{Add}} \), \( C_{\text{Inv}} \), \( C_{\text{Mult}} \) and \( C_{\text{ext}} \) from a “real” \( n \)-CP-EDDH tuple to a “random” \( n \)-CP-EDDH tuple, albeit with the same base element \( g_0, 0 \). At a high level, this is the last “clean-up” step that reverses the alteration made to the distribution of \( \{g_{\ell, e'}\} \) in outer hybrid 4.

We argue below that this switch does not alter the output distribution of these circuits from outer hybrid 7 to outer hybrid 8. Once this is established, the indistinguishability argument follows immediately under the assumption that the piO scheme is indistinguishability-secure against \( X \)-IND samplers (once for each MMap circuit). Informally, this indistinguishability is argued as follows. Observe that in outer hybrid 7, all the OR branches corresponding to the NIZK proof systems \( \pi_0 \) and \( \pi_1 \) have been effectively turned off. This is because all of the \( \pi' \)-elements \( y \) and \( z \) in the public parameters of the MMap scheme are, in fact, sampled as non-members. Hence, any valid encoding must be in normal representation and must be consistent, which in turn implies that outcomes of the MMap circuits (in particular the extraction algorithm) are now agnostic of the distribution of the group elements \( \{g_{\ell, e'}\} \). Hence, switching the tuple of group elements \( \{g_{\ell, e'}\} \) from a “real” \( n \)-CP-EDDH tuple to a random \( n \)-CP-EDDH tuple does not alter the output distributions of these circuits. We expand on this more formally below.

We first focus on the MMap circuits \( C_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Inv}} \) and \( C_{\text{Mult}} \). Observe that switching \( \{g_{\ell, e'}\} \) from a uniform CP-EDDH tuple to a tuple distributed as in the real scheme only (potentially) affects the outcome of the “IF” condition in step 7 of each of these circuits. Note however that in both outer hybrids 7 and 8, \( crs_0 \) is in binding mode and the element \( z \) in the public parameter is a non-member for \( L \). Hence, it follows from the perfect soundness of the dual-mode NIZK proof system that any input encoding(s) for which these circuits do not output \( \bot \) and terminate before step 7 must be in normal representation and well-formed and consistent. This in turn guarantees that the outcome of the “IF” condition must be “true”. Hence, the output distributions of the MMap circuits \( C_{\text{Add}}, C_{\text{Inv}} \) in \( C_{\text{Mult}} \) in outer hybrids 7 and 8 are identical.

Finally, we focus on the MMap extraction circuit \( C_{\text{ext}} \). Observe that switching \( \{g_{\ell, e'}\} \) from a uniform CP-EDDH tuple to a tuple distributed as in the real scheme potentially affects the output of the extraction circuit. However, note yet again that in both outer hybrids 7 and 8, \( crs_0 \) is in binding mode and the element \( z \) in the public parameter is a non-member for \( L \). Hence, it follows from the perfect soundness of the dual-mode NIZK proof system that any input encoding(s) for which the circuit does not output \( \bot \) and terminate before the extraction step is executed must be in normal representation and well-formed and consistent. Observe also that the base element \( g_0 \) in the tuple of group elements remains unaltered across outer hybrids 7 and 8. It follows immediately that the outcome of extraction on a given encoding in normal representation in both hybrids is identical. In other words, the output distributions of \( C_{\text{ext}} \) in outer hybrids 7 and 8 are identical. This concludes the proof of Lemma 9.9, and hence the proof of Theorem 9.1.

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References


