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Paper 2020/425

Friet: An Authenticated Encryption Scheme with Built-in Fault Detection

Thierry Simon and Lejla Batina and Joan Daemen and Vincent Grosso and Pedro Maat Costa Massolino and Kostas Papagiannopoulos and Francesco Regazzoni and Niels Samwel

Abstract

In this work we present a duplex-based authenticated encryption scheme Friet based on a new permutation called Friet-P. We designed Friet-P with a novel approach for cryptographic permutations and block ciphers that takes fault-attack resistance into account and that we introduce in this paper. In this method, we build a permutation $f_C$ to be embedded in a larger one, $f$ . First, we define $f$ as a sequence of steps that all abide a chosen error-correcting code $C$, i.e., that map $C$-codewords to $C$-codewords. Then, we embed $f_C$ in $f$ by first encoding its input to an element of $C$, applying $f$ and then decoding back from $C$. This last step detects a fault when the output of $f$ is not in $C$. We motivate the design of the permutation we use in Friet and report on performance in soft- and hardware. We evaluate the fault-detection capabilities of the software and simulated hardware implementations with attacks. Finally, we perform a leakage evaluation. Our code is available at https://github.com/thisimon/Friet.git.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2020
Keywords
design of cryptographic primitivesfault injection countermeasuresside channel attacklightweight implementations
Contact author(s)
thierry simon 13 @ gmail com
History
2020-05-12: revised
2020-04-15: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/425
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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