Paper 2020/425
Friet: An Authenticated Encryption Scheme with Built-in Fault Detection
Thierry Simon and Lejla Batina and Joan Daemen and Vincent Grosso and Pedro Maat Costa Massolino and Kostas Papagiannopoulos and Francesco Regazzoni and Niels Samwel
Abstract
In this work we present a duplex-based authenticated encryption scheme Friet based on a new permutation called Friet-P. We designed Friet-P with a novel approach for cryptographic permutations and block ciphers that takes fault-attack resistance into account and that we introduce in this paper. In this method, we build a permutation $f_C$ to be embedded in a larger one, $f$ . First, we define $f$ as a sequence of steps that all abide a chosen error-correcting code $C$, i.e., that map $C$-codewords to $C$-codewords. Then, we embed $f_C$ in $f$ by first encoding its input to an element of $C$, applying $f$ and then decoding back from $C$. This last step detects a fault when the output of $f$ is not in $C$. We motivate the design of the permutation we use in Friet and report on performance in soft- and hardware. We evaluate the fault-detection capabilities of the software and simulated hardware implementations with attacks. Finally, we perform a leakage evaluation. Our code is available at https://github.com/thisimon/Friet.git.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2020
- Keywords
- design of cryptographic primitivesfault injection countermeasuresside channel attacklightweight implementations
- Contact author(s)
- thierry simon 13 @ gmail com
- History
- 2020-05-12: revised
- 2020-04-15: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/425
- License
-
CC BY