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Paper 2020/306

Leakage Assessment in Fault Attacks: A Deep Learning Perspective

Sayandeep Saha and Manaar Alam and Arnab Bag and Debdeep Mukhopadhyay and Pallab Dasgupta

Abstract

Generic vulnerability assessment of cipher implementations against fault attacks (FA) is a research area which is still largely unexplored. The security assessment for FA becomes especially interesting in the presence of countermeasures, as countermeasure structures are not very well-formalized so far, and on several occasions, they fail to fulfil their sole purpose of preventing FAs. In this paper, we propose a general, simulation-based, statistical yes/no test to assess information leakage in the context of FAs. The fascinating feature of the proposed test is that it is oblivious to the structure of the countermeasure/cipher under test, and detects fault-induced leakage solely by observing the ciphertext distributions. Unlike a recently proposed approach, which utilizes t-test and its higher-order variants for detecting leakage at different moments of ciphertext distributions, in this work we present a Deep Learning (DL) based leakage assessment method. Our DL-based method is not specific to moment-based leakages only and thus, can expose leakages in several cases where t-test based technique either fails or demands a prohibitively large number of ciphertexts. Experimental evaluation over a representative set of countermeasures establishes that the DL-based method mostly outperforms the t-test based leakage assessment in terms of the number of ciphertexts required. Further, we present a novel analysis technique to interpret the leakages from the DL models, which is highly desirable for a sound vulnerability assessment. In another vertical of this work, we enhance the leakage assessment test methodology for recently proposed Statistical-Ineffective-Fault-Analysis (SIFA) and establish the efficacy by verifying different countermeasures including a publicly available hardware implementation of a SIFA countermeasure. In the third vertical, we enhance the test for verifying FA-assisted leakages from so-called “non-cryptographic” parts of an implementation. As concrete proof of this, we validate a well-accepted automotive security module called Secure Hardware Extension (SHE) for which the test figured out non-trivial vulnerabilities.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Contact author(s)
sayandeep iitkgp @ gmail com,alam manaar @ gmail com,amiarnabbolchi @ gmail com,dmcseiitkgp @ gmail com
History
2021-05-25: last of 2 revisions
2020-03-12: received
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Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/306
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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