Lattice analysis on MiNTRU problem.

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Abstract. In ASIACRYPT 2019, Genise et al. describe [GGH$^+$19] a new somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. The security relies on an inhomogeneous and non-structured variant of the NTRU assumption that they call MiNTRU. To allow for meaningful homomorphic computations, they use overstretched parameters, but they do not provide an analysis of their new assumption against the state-of-the-art attack of Kirchner and Fouque [KF17] for overstretched modulus. We show that the parameters of [GGH$^+$19] do not satisfy the desired security by actually conducting the known analysis. We also report a successful break of the smallest set of parameters in around 15 hours of computations while they are claimed to reach 100 bits of security.

1 Introduction

Introduced by Hoffstein, Pipher and Silverman [HPS98], the NTRU problem is informally the following: given a polynomial $h := f/g \mod q \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/\Phi$ where $f, g \in \mathbb{Z}[X]$ are secret with small coefficients and $\Phi$ is a power-of-two cyclotomic polynomial, recover the pair $(f, g)$. It is believed to be (quantumly) hard, and its variants have been popular choices to design efficient post-quantum schemes: among others, NIST round 2 candidates (KEMs [ZCH$^+$19, BCLv19], signatures [DDLL13, PFH$^+$19]), an IBE scheme [DLP14], multilinear maps [GGH13, LSS14, ACLL15] and homomorphic encryption schemes [LATV12, BLLN13].

The so-called "overstretched" variant uses a huge modulus $q$ compared to the dimension $2n$ of the underlying lattices. An application of this variant was used to construct homomorphic encryption [LATV12, BLLN13] and a candidate of multilinear map [GGH13, LSS14, ACLL15]. However, this largeness of $q$ induced a disastrous security loss for such schemes. Cheon, Jeong and Lee [CJL16] and Albrecht, Bai and Ducas [ABD16] independently presented the subfield attack on the overstretched NTRU problem, which was already a huge blow to the security level for the proposed parameters. Soon after, Kirchner and Fouque [KF17] showed that the attack boils down to pure lattice reduction of a well-chosen sublattice of the NTRU lattice $A_q := \{(u, v) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n} : vh - u \equiv 0 \mod q\}$. The crux of the attack is to observe that $(f, g)$ is a very short vector of this lattice, and that together with its Galois conjugates, it spans a rank $n$ sublattice of very small volume. Because the volume $\text{Vol}(A_q) = q^n$ is very large in the overstretched case, this gap between volumes has to be compensated in some way: short vectors found by lattice reduction over

$$B_{\text{NTRU}} = \begin{pmatrix} qI_n & 0 \\ h & I_n \end{pmatrix}$$

will necessarily belong to the lattice spanned by the secret $(f, g)$. Moreover, because the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization preserves volume during basis reduction, such
short vectors are likely to be detected in large enough sublattices. This intuition can be made more formal using a lemma of Pataki and Tural [PT08] guaranteeing that the product of the smallest Gram-Schmidt is smaller than the volume of any sublattice of $\mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B}_{\text{NTRU}})$, combined with the Geometric Series Assumption. This allowed Kirchner and Fouque to improve the practical efficiency of the attack, dealing a killing blow to the overstretched NTRU schemes. Additionally, it showed that the algebraic structure provided by the cyclotomic ring had little impact on the concrete security in the overstretched case. The only benefit of the structure is to actually ensure that, as long as one short vectors is obtained, then an entire full-rank sublattice is deduced by action of the Galois conjugates; on an anecdotal level, it also helps in estimating the volume of the small sublattice. But ultimately, only geometric properties and the existence of a "large rank but very small volume" sublattice are core to the attack.

In ASIACRYPT 2019, Genise et al. describe [GGH +19] a new somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme. The authors relies on an inhomogeneous and non-structured variant of the NTRU assumption that they call MiNTRU. Let the so-called gadget matrix be $\mathbf{G} = [\mathbf{I}_n | \ldots | 2^{\log q - 1} \mathbf{I}_n] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, with $m = n \log q$. Then, the variant of the MiNTRU problem considered by [GGH +19] is the following: given $A := \mathbf{S}^{-1} \cdot (\mathbf{G} - \mathbf{E}) \mod q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ where $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ and $\mathbf{E} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ are binary random matrices, recover the pair $(\mathbf{S}, \mathbf{E})$. For their most efficient set of parameters, the authors claims 100 bits of security, but in order to support meaningful homomorphic computations, this scheme also uses overstretched parameters. Yet, the authors do not provide any analysis of the impact of the sublattice attack against their scheme.

Our contribution. We show that the current choice of parameters of MiNTRU problem are far from giving the claimed security. As expected, it amounts to applying several sublattice attacks for suitable parameters, the rest of the attack having negligible cost overall. For the smallest parameter sets proposed by [GGH +19], we ran the attack successfully in around 15 hours of computations with fplll/BKZ 2.0 in Sagemath on a single core of a personal laptop. As it involves different lattices, the full lattice phase can be parallelized easily and would recover the encryption key $\mathbf{S}$ in essentially this amount of time. This completely breaks the scheme as we can now decrypt any cipher. For the sake of completeness, we give a quick reminder of the analysis and provide experimental results for smaller parameters in the overstretched ranges. We hope to make it clear that overstretched parameters should be avoided when designing NTRU-based schemes.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Lattices

A lattice $\mathcal{L}$ is a discrete subgroup of $\mathbb{R}^m$. It is usually represented by a basis, that is, a set of linearly independent vectors $\mathbf{b}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_k$. The integer $k$ is called the rank of $\mathcal{L}$. Next we state a useful heuristics and lemmas related to a lattice.

3 This heuristic states that after lattice reduction, the Gram-Schmidt of the outputted basis decrease geometrically.
4 Actually, they rely on a decisional version of this problem.
Heuristic 1 (Gaussian heuristic). For any lattice \( \mathcal{L} \) of rank \( k \), we have

\[
\lambda_1(\mathcal{L}) = \sqrt{\frac{k}{2\pi e}} \cdot \text{Vol}(\mathcal{L})^{1/k}.
\]

The Geometric Series Assumption is nowadays a standard heuristic assumption to predict the behaviour of lattice block-reduction algorithms. It has been backed-up by extensive experimental results [Ajt06], and expresses that the Gram-Schmidt vectors after reduction decrease in a geometric manner.

Heuristic 2 (Geometric Series Assumption (GSA)). Let \( \mathcal{L} \) be a rank \( k \) lattice with basis \( b_1, \ldots, b_k \). After execution of BKZ with block-size \( \beta \), the norms of the Gram-Schmidt vectors satisfy

\[
\|b^*_i\| = \delta^2_{\beta} \cdot \|b^*_{i+1}\|,
\]

for \( 1 \leq i \leq k - 1 \), and where \( \delta_{\beta} = \left( \frac{\beta}{2\pi e (\pi \beta)^{1/2}} \right)^{1/(2(\beta-1))} \).

The quantity \( \delta_{\beta} \) is known as the \( \beta \)-root Hermite factor. It is used to get estimations on Gram-Schmidt norms.

Lemma 2.1 (Heuristic). Let \( k \geq 1 \) be an integer, and \( B \in \mathbb{Z}^{2k \times 2k} \) be a basis. For \( \beta \) a divisor of \( k \), let \( b^*_1, \ldots, b^*_{2k} \) be the rows of the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of \( B \) after performing lattice reduction in block-size \( \beta \). If the Geometric Series Assumption holds, we have

\[
\delta_{\beta}^{-k(3k+1)} \cdot \|b^*_1\|^k = \prod_{i=1}^{k} \|b^*_{i+1}\|,
\]

where \( \delta_{\beta} \) is the \( \beta \)-Hermite Factor.

Proof. By successive applications of the GSA, we have for all indices \( i \) where this makes sense that

\[
\prod_{i=1}^{\beta} \|b^*_i\| = \delta_{\beta}^{2k^2} \prod_{i=1}^{\beta} \|b^*_{i+\beta}\|
\]

for two successive blocks. Hence for two blocks “at distance \( k \)”, this gives

\[
\prod_{i=1}^{\beta} \|b^*_i\| = \delta_{\beta}^{2k^2} \prod_{i=1}^{\beta} \|b^*_{i+i}\|.
\]

(2.1)

We now cut the \( 2k \) Gram-Schmidt vectors in successive blocks of size \( \beta \) and use Equation (2.1) to obtain the second inequality:

\[
\prod_{i=1}^{k} \|b^*_i\| = \delta_{\beta}^{k/\beta} \prod_{j=1}^{k/\beta} \delta_{\beta}^{2k^2} \prod_{i=1}^{\beta} \|b^*_{i+(j-1)\beta+i}\|
\]

\[
= \delta_{\beta}^{2k^2} \prod_{i=1}^{k} \|b^*_{i+i}\|.
\]

(2.2)

The result is obtained by successive applications of the GSA in the above equality.

\[\square\]

Lemma 2.2 (Pataki-Tural). Let \( \mathcal{L} \) be a full rank lattice in \( \mathbb{R}^n \) and \( b_1, \ldots, b_n \) be a basis of \( \mathcal{L} \). For any rank \( d \leq n \) sublattice \( \mathcal{L}' \) of \( \mathcal{L} \), we have

\[
\min_{S \subseteq [n]} \prod_{|S|=d} \|b^*_i\| \leq \text{Vol} \mathcal{L}'.
\]
2.2 Binary matrices

The target scheme samples binary secret keys and encryption noise. This section gathers some results that will help in assessing the power of our attack.

Lemma 2.3. Let $m \geq n \geq 1$ be integers and $X \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n \times m}$ be a random binary matrix with i.i.d. entries, and assume it has full rank. We have $\det E[XX^t] = \left(\frac{m}{4}\right)^n \cdot (n+1)$.

Proof. If $x, y$ are Bernoulli vectors of length $m$ with i.i.d entries, then $E[\|x\|^2] = m/2$ and $E[\langle x, y \rangle] = m/4$. Hence, if $X$ has full rank, then $E[XX^t]$ is the $n \times n$ matrix with $m/2$ on its diagonal, and $m/4$ everywhere else. Stated in other words, $E[XX^t] - (m/4)I_n$ has rank 1: this means $m/4$ is an eigenvalue of multiplicity $n-1$ of $E[XX^t]$. Using that the trace is the sum of the eigenvalues, we see that the last eigenvalue of $E[XX^t]$ is $(n+1)m/4$. We conclude by using that the determinant is the product of the eigenvalues. \qed

We can use this lemma to estimate the volume of a lattice with a random binary basis; for example, if $m = 2n$, we expect that $\text{Vol}(L(X)) \approx \sqrt{n} \cdot (n/2)^{n/2}$. We will use an asymptotic estimate on the smallest singular value of a random binary square matrix (which are in particular subgaussians). More precise results are known but they give more than we actually need for our attack. Indeed, the next statement is verified pretty well in experiments, which is enough for us.

Proposition 2.4 (Adapted from [Ver07]). Let $S$ be an $n \times n$ Bernoulli matrix, and let $s$ be its smallest singular values. Then with high probability, we have $s \approx 1/\sqrt{n}$. In particular, when the latter even happens, we have $\|S^{-1}\|_{\infty} \approx n$.

2.3 The attacked scheme

We recall the Genise et al.’s construction in a nutshell. For a complete construction, we refer to the original paper [GGH+19]. We note that the semantic security of this scheme is implied by hardness of decisional-MiNTRU assumption.

First choose integers $n, m, q$ and a binary uniform distribution $\chi$. Then two secret matrices $S$ and $E$ are sampled from $\chi^{n \times n}$ and $\chi^{n \times m}$, respectively, until $S$ is invertible in modulus $\mathbb{Z}_q$. Given the secret matrices and a message matrix $M \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$ encryption $C$ of $M$ is defined by

$$C := S^{-1} \cdot (M \cdot G + E) \pmod{q},$$

where $G$ is a gadget matrix of the form $[I_n] \ldots [2^{\log q - 1} \cdot I_n] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.

3 Lattice based analysis

3.1 Overview

In this section, we describe an attack algorithm to recover a secret key of the scheme described in Section 2.3. The attack runs in two phases. First, lattice reduction is performed over (possibly several) lattices $\Lambda_q(C_0)$ defined by ciphertexts. This is the
most costly part, and we will analyze heuristically its behaviour in the next section. At the end of this lattice phase, we will recover a matrix $X' = [S', E'] \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}$ with short rows, generating a full-rank sublattice of $\mathcal{L}(X)$. In particular, we know that there is $T \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times n}$ such that $S' = T \cdot S$. If $S$ is a binary matrix, we expect by Lemma 2.4 that the rows of $T$ have a size not too larger than those of $S'$. Therefore, if we have $S' \cdot C_i \mod q = T \cdot (2^i M - E_i)$ for each $i$’s, then we recover $T = \lceil 2^{-i} S' \cdot C_i \rceil$ for some $i$, by rounding each entries to the closest integer.

### 3.2 Analysis of the lattice phase

Suppose we have a ciphertext $C = S^{-1} \cdot (G \cdot M - E) \mod q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ of a known message matrix $M \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$, where $S$ in the secret encryption key and $E$ is encryption randomness. From the scheme description with the same notation in the Section 2.3,

For $1 \leq i \leq \log q$, we denote by $E_i$ and $C_i$ $i$-th $n \times n$ block matrix of $E$ and $C$, respectively. We first focus on the first block matrix $C_0 = S^{-1} \cdot (M - E_0) \mod q$, and more precisely on the NTRU lattice $\Lambda_q(C_0) = \{(u, v) \in \mathbb{Z}^{2n} : uC_0 - v = 0 \mod q \}$. It is checked that it admits the basis matrix

$$B := \begin{pmatrix} q \cdot I_n & 0_n \\ \hline C_0 & I_n \end{pmatrix},$$

and by construction each row of $X := [S \mid M - E_0]$ belongs to this lattice. If the size of $M$ is short, then the rows of $X$ are short vectors of $\Lambda_q(C_0)$. As mentioned before, the goal of the lattice phase is to recover $S$ up to an integer transformation matrix $T$.

When the dimension of $B$ is large, it is unlikely that a lattice reduction algorithm on the full matrix $B$ will terminate fast enough to qualify as an efficient attack. Thus we follow the Kirchner and Fouque’s approach [KF17] in order to reduce the dimension of the problem to a practical range. The main idea is to extract a suitable submatrix and to perform a lattice reduction algorithm on the submatrix. More precisely, the basis matrix $B$ can be divided into blocks as

$$B = \begin{pmatrix} q \cdot I_{n-k} & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & q \cdot I_k & 0 & 0 \\ C_{00} & C_{01} & I_k & 0 \\ C_{10} & C_{11} & 0 & I_{n-k} \end{pmatrix},$$

where $C_{ij}$ is the corresponding block matrix of the matrix $C_0$, and we consider the central lower triangular submatrix

$$B' = \begin{pmatrix} q \cdot I_k & 0_k \\ C_{01} & I_k \end{pmatrix}.$$

We let $b'_1, \ldots, b'_k$ be the basis obtained by performing lattice reduction in block size $\beta$ over $B'$.

We heuristically assume that the output basis follow the Geometric Series Assumption (GSA). It implies in particular that the $k$ last Gram-Schmidt vectors are the smallest ones. By Pataki-Tural’s lemma, this product is bounded by the volume

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of any rank $k$ sublattice $\mathcal{L}$. Combining with Lemma 2.1, we have for such a lattice that
\[ \delta^{-k(3k+1)} \cdot \|b_1'\|^k \leq \text{Vol} \mathcal{L}. \]

We now argue that a lattice $\mathcal{L}(B')$ includes a $k$-rank sublattice $\mathcal{L}$ such that $\text{Vol}(\mathcal{L}) \leq \text{Vol}(\mathcal{L}(X))$, and uses it as an upper bound of $\|b_1'\|$ in the equation above. The Hermite normal form of the matrix $X \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times 2n}$ is likely to be
\[
\begin{pmatrix}
x_{11} & x_{12} & \det(M - E_0) & 0 & 0 \\
x_{21} & x_{22} & x_{23} & I_{k-1} & 0 \\
x_{31} & x_{32} & x_{33} & 0 & I_{n-k}
\end{pmatrix},
\]
where the $x_{ij}$'s are the corresponding block matrices. In particular, each block matrix $x_{i2}$ has $k$ columns. Considering the $k \times 2k$ submatrix $X':=\left(\begin{array}{c}
x_{12} \\
x_{22}
\end{array}\right)$, we then see that 1) $\text{Vol}(\mathcal{L}(X')) \leq \text{Vol}(\mathcal{L}(X))$ and 2) each row of $X'$ are included in the lattice $\mathcal{L}(B')$. To sum-up, we must have $\|b_1'\| \leq \delta^{-k(3k+1)} \cdot \text{Vol}(\mathcal{L}(X'))^{1/k}$.

On the other hand, let $\mathcal{L}^\perp$ be the orthogonal projection of $\mathcal{L}(B')$ into the space spanned by $X'$. The Gaussian Heuristic in $\mathcal{L}^\perp$ gives us
\[ \lambda_1(\mathcal{L}^\perp)^k = \left(\frac{n}{2\pi e}\right)^{k/2} \cdot q^k \cdot \text{Vol}(\mathcal{L}(X')) \]
If $\|b_1'\| < \lambda_1(\mathcal{L}^\perp)$, then it means that $b_1' \in \mathcal{L}(X')$. To understand when this happens, we assume by contradiction that $\|b_1'\| \geq \lambda_1(\mathcal{L}^\perp)$. Combining everything so far, this implies that
\[ \delta^{-k(3k+1)} \cdot \left(\frac{n}{2\pi e}\right)^{k/2} \cdot q^k \leq \text{Vol}(\mathcal{L}(X'))^2, \]
and we are now looking for $(k, \beta)$ violating this condition. For such a pair, we can conclude that the last $k$ entries in $b_1'$ (appropriately padded with zeros) gives a vector in $\mathcal{L}(S)$. Observe that the smaller $\text{Vol}(\mathcal{L}(X'))$ is compared to $q$, the smaller $k$ and $\beta$ will be.

In practice: In practice we start by selecting the $2k$ central rows of $B$ and perform lattice reduction. Next, we repeat this process by selecting the $n-k, \ldots, n$-th rows and the $n + k + 1, \ldots, n + 2k$-th rows instead, and so on until the full matrix has been covered. This gives several linearly independent lattice vectors in $\mathcal{L}(S)$. If we do not have enough to span a full rank sublattice, we can continue with another cipher of a small message $M$. For example, we can start by encrypting the identity matrix, then encrypting any permutation matrix until $n$ linearly independent shortish vectors have been found in $\mathcal{L}(S)$. It is clear that all these lattice steps can be parallelized, so it boils down to see the practical cost of the first lattice reduction. As claimed, we end this phase with a matrix $S'$ generating a full-rank sublattice. Experimentally, the behaviour of lattice reduction is in fact even more optimistic:
reducing the central subalttice for \( k, \beta \) large enough, one finds in fact \( k \) short vectors among the \( k \) first vectors of the reduced basis, the \( k \) next ones being far greater (as again, the overall volume should be preserved).

We now explain how to compute parameters \((k, \beta)\) which satisfy the condition 3.1. To check the condition, we need to estimate \( \text{Vol}(L(X')) \). In the worst case, \( \text{Vol}(L(X')) \) is the same as \( \text{Vol}(L(X)) \), so we replace it with \( \text{Vol}(L(X)) \approx n\cdot(n/2)^{n/2} \) under the Lemma 2.3. In other words, we aim at satisfying the following condition:

\[
\delta_{\beta}^{-k(3\delta+1)} \cdot \left( \frac{n}{2\pi e} \right)^{k/2} \cdot q^k \geq n \cdot (n/2)^n. \tag{3.2}
\]

It allows to violate the condition 3.1. According to the [GN08,Che], the root Hermite factor the LLL and BKZ algorithm with block size \( \beta \) can be estimated. When given parameters of \( n \) and \( q \), we fix root Hermite factor. After then, we search for the smallest \( k \) that satisfies the condition 3.1.

### 3.3 Recovering the secret key

At this stage, we assume that \( S' = T \cdot S \) and \( M \) are known. Our next goal is to recover \( T \), from which \( S \) is easily deduced. Noting that the size of \( 2^i T \) may be larger than \( q \), we claim that we can compute \( T \cdot (2^i M - E_i) \) over the integers for all \( i \). First, we can always chose \( M \) small enough (e.g. \( M = I_n \)) so that \( D_0 := S' C_0 \mod q = T \cdot (M - E_0) \) holds over the integers. Observe that the matrix \( 2E_i - E_{i+1} \) is small for all \( i \), so that we can also compute \( D_i := S'(2C_i - C_{i+1}) \mod q = T \cdot (2E_i - E_{i+1}) \). We then readily check that \( T \cdot (2^i M - E_i) = \sum_{0 \leq j \leq i} 2^{i-j} D_j \) over the integers too, giving our claim. Lastly, recall that \( r = \log q - 1 \) is an integer. According to result of the Section 3 and with Lemma 2.4, we know that \( \|S'||\infty \leq \frac{n}{\sqrt{2\pi}} \cdot \frac{\text{Vol}(L(X))^{1/\pi} \cdot q}{\text{Vol}(L(X))^{1/\pi}} \), so that we expect that \( \|TE_r||\infty \leq \|S'||\infty \|S'^{-1}\|\infty E_r||\infty \leq q/4 \). Therefore, rounding the entries of \( T \cdot (2^i M - E_r)/2^r \) recovers \( T \cdot M \), as well as \( T \) as long as \( M \) was invertible.

### 4 Experiments and practical attack

In Table 1, we give experimental results for several smaller parameter sets. When the block-size is 2, the LLL algorithm was used instead of the BKZ algorithm. The parameter \( 2k \) represents the number of rows of the matrices used in the lattice reduction phase. In all experiments we succeeded in recovering the secret key \( S \).

According to our aforementioned parameter selection, the BKZ algorithm with a block size of 20 is required for a successful attack when dimensions \( n \) are \( 2^8 \) and \( 2^9 \). However, in our experiments, the LLL algorithm was enough to recover \( S \). One can see that the LLL algorithm overperforms.

| \( \log n \) | \( \log q \) | block size \( \beta \) | \# of rows, \( 2k \) | \( \max \log (\|U \cdot S||\infty) \) | \( \max \log (\|U||\infty) \) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 | 22 | 2 | 24 | 7.2479 | 6.9773 |
| 7 | 27 | 2 | 50 | 9.2192 | 10.4888 |
| 8 | 32 | 20(2) | 100 | 12.4571 | 11.7507 |
| 9 | 37 | 20(2) | 216 | 15.2833 | 13.4098 |

Table 1. Experimental results of the several parameters of MiNTRU problem.
The practical attack: The smallest parameters of [GGH+19] are $n = 2^{10}$, $q = 2^{42}$. The secret key $S$ and the encryption noise $E$ are random binary matrices of size $n \times n \log q$. For these parameters, a security level of $\approx 100$ bits is claimed. We started by computing an encryption of $I_n$, and run lattice reduction using the cipher and taking $k = 280$ and $\beta = 20$. We used Sagemath 9.0 and its version of BKZ 2.0 included in fplll (version 0.5.1). This is a floating point implementation, and we selected a precision of 180 bits since else, the Gram-Schmidt computations tended to go in “infinite loop in Babai” state. After around 15 hours of computations on a personal laptop, we obtained $k$ shortish vectors with a log-norm of roughly 22, all in the lattice $L(S)$. The code for this attack can be found at http://github.com/awallet/Overstretched. Observe that with 4 cores, more than $n$ such vectors can be found (either by taking other rows, or using another cipher). The log-norm of the transformation matrix $T$ is then expected to be way below $q/4$, so we are essentially assured that the full attack will work out. This means that these parameters are broken. The other sets of parameters are not as practical, and the gap between $q$ and $n$ is even worse, so that the attack is likely to succeed for smaller $k$’s and $\beta$’s (relatively to the overall dimension). Overall, we conclude that the scheme does not reach meaningful security guarantees, and that overstretched parameters should definitely be avoided.

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References


