Lockable Signatures for Blockchains: Scriptless Scripts for All Signatures

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Abstract—Payment Channel Networks (PCNs) have given a huge boost to the scalability of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies: Beyond improving the transaction rate, PCNs enabled cheap cross-currency payments and atomic swaps. However, current PCNs proposals either heavily rely on special scripting features of the underlying blockchain (e.g. Hash Time Lock Contracts) or are tailored to a handful of digital signature schemes, such as Schnorr or ECDSA signatures. This leaves us in an unsatisfactory situation where many currencies that are being actively developed and use different signature schemes cannot enjoy the benefits of a PCN.

In this work, we investigate whether we can construct PCNs assuming the minimal ability of a blockchain to verify a digital signature, for any signature scheme. In answering this question in the affirmative, we introduce the notion of lockable signatures, which constitutes the cornerstone of our PCN protocols. Our approach is generic and the PCN protocol is compatible with any digital signature scheme, thus inheriting all favorable properties of the underlying scheme that are not offered by Schnorr/ECDSA (e.g. aggregatable signatures or post-quantum security).

While the usage of generic cryptographic machinery makes our generic protocol impractical, we view it as an important feasibility result as it may serve as the basis for constructing optimized protocols for specific signature schemes. To substantiate this claim, we design a highly efficient PCN protocol for the special case of Boneh-Lynn-Shacham (BLS) signatures. BLS signatures enjoy many unique features that make it a viable candidate for a blockchain, e.g. short, unique, and aggregatable signatures. Yet, prior to our work, no PCN was known to be compatible with it (without requiring an advanced scripting language). The cost of our PCN is dominated by a handful of calls to the BLS algorithms. Our concrete evaluation of these basic operations shows that users with commodity hardware can process payments with minimal overhead.

Index Terms—Payment Channel Networks, Scriptless Scripts, BLS Signatures

I. INTRODUCTION

Decentralized payments have become a reality with the advent of blockchain based cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc. Users can now make payments among each other without relying on a trusted central bank, but instead rely on a public distributed ledger and a transaction scheme that helps determine the validity of a payment publicly. However, a major drawback of these cryptocurrencies is their low scalability due to a low transaction rate. Traditional payment services like Visa, Mastercard, etc, support order of 3 magnitude more payments than even the most prominent cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, Ethereum, etc. This is because, a large amount of payments in these currencies are fighting for a few spots on the blockchain, where they are validated and used to update the state of the system.

Off-chain payments were proposed as a solution to this problem where users no longer need to register every payment on the blockchain. Instead, they can make several payments locally and only register their final balances on the chain. Payment Channels (PC) [1] and its generalization Payment Channel Networks (PCN) [1]–[4] are such off-chain (or layer 2) payment solutions that help improve the scalability of these cryptocurrencies. In a PC protocol, two users Alice and Bob open a payment channel by posting a single transaction on the blockchain. This transaction locks some amount of coins in this channel, referred to as channel capacity. Alice and Bob can then make several payments locally by adjusting the balance of the channel, without registering any of them on the chain. Once the payment phase ends, a closing transaction that finalises the balances of Alice and Bob in the channel is posted on the chain, thus closing the channel. Given several payments can be made at the price of only two transactions on the chain, this is a dramatic boost to the number of payments when the number of on-chain payments is limited. Consequently, PCs have been practically deployed in major currencies like Bitcoin [5], Ethereum [6], and Ripple [7].

Payment Channel Networks. A PCN generalizes the notion of a PC and allows payments between users Alice and Bob that do not directly share a PC, through a chain of intermediate users that connects Alice with Bob, referred to as payment path. PCNs also enable payments across different currencies in a secure way: As an example, PCNs can be used to perform atomic swaps of coins in different currencies. The first proposals of PCNs were based on a special scripting feature of the blockchain, called Hash Time-Lock Contracts (HTLCs) [1], [2]: parties setup payments along the payment path such that each of these payments is successful if a pre-image of a hash value is released before some time \( t \). However, this approach has several major limitations:

1) It suffers from wormhole attacks [3], where the adversary can “skip” an honest intermediate user in the payment path, thereby stealing his PCN participation fee.

2) It is compatible only with those blockchains that support advanced scripts and several existing cryptocurrencies like Monero [8], Mimblewimble [9], Ripple [10], or Zcash [11] (shielded
addresses) are therefore left out.

3) It results in larger transactions and consequently larger ledgers.

4) It lacks on-chain privacy as PCN transactions of a single payment are linkable with each other.

5) Finally, PCN transactions are clearly distinguishable from standard payments one-to-one payments, thus hampering the fungibility of the coins.

To amend this, Malavolta et al. [3] proposed PCN protocols without relying on any special scripts, also referred to as scriptless scripts [12], that simultaneously solved all the above issues. They presented two protocols exploiting the algebraic structure of Schnorr and ECDSA signatures. More recently, those techniques have been adapted to the lattice settings [13], barring a few limitations in terms of on-chain privacy, as discussed in [14].

Unfortunately, the techniques from [3] do not seem to extend to PCN protocols for other popular signature schemes that are of great interest to the cryptocurrency space as discussed below. For instance, recently there has been a lot of interest in developing new currencies or adapting existing currencies [15], [16], with transaction schemes that use BLS signatures [17] and its variants [18], that offer useful properties, such as key and signature aggregation, which have the potential to drastically reduce the size of the ledger. Furthermore, the looming threat of quantum computers has motivated a large body of research in lattice-based [13], [19]–[21] and hash-based [22] signatures, and subsequent development of new currencies based on these signatures [23]–[26]. It is plausible to foresee a near future where all blockchains will have to move to a signature scheme with post-quantum security.

Therefore, to enjoy all the benefits of PCNs based on scriptless scripts in all existing (and possibly future) cryptocurrencies, we require a PCN protocol that does not rely on advanced scripts and can handle any signature scheme. This motivates us to ask the following question:

Can we construct a PCN assuming only the bare minimal ability of a blockchain to verify a signature?

In this work we give a positive answer to the above question, for any signature scheme. Before delving into the description of our approach, we explain the challenges that arise when trying to construct PCN generically, without assuming any algebraic structure of the signature scheme.

A. Challenges in Constructing PCNs

Let us recall the high-level idea of the PCN protocol from [3]. They consider a setting with \( n \) parties \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) where \( P_1 \) is the sender and \( P_n \) is the receiver. Neighbouring parties \( P_i \) and \( P_{i+1} \) (for \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n-1\} \)) in this path have open channels between them. Their PCN protocol consists of two phases: A lock and a release phase. To make a payment of \( v \) coins, \( P_1 \), together with each pair of intermediate users, sets up a payment lock as follows: For \( i \in \{1, \ldots, n-1\} \), \( P_i \) and \( P_{i+1} \) set up a payment transaction denoted by \( tx_{pay,i} \) paying \( v \) coins from their channel to \( P_{i+1} \), along with a partial signature \( \sigma_i \) on this transaction. The partial signature \( \sigma_i \) is not a valid signature on \( tx_{pay,i} \) but can be transformed into a valid signature \( \sigma_i \) provided that a certain release information \( k_i \) is available. Generating partial signatures requires exploiting the algebraic structure of Schnorr or ECDSA signatures, where the sender “injects” some randomness in the signing process that causes the signature to be partial or incomplete. Things are set in such a way that if \( P_{i+1} \) obtains \( \sigma_{i+1} \), he can locally recompute \( k_i \) and learn the valid signature \( \sigma_i \).

Once the payment locks are setup until party \( P_n \), the sender \( P_1 \) initiates the release phase by revealing the release information for the \( n \)-th partial signature to \( P_n \). A cascade of payment release happens until party \( P_2 \), which concludes one payment of \( v \) coins from \( P_1 \) to \( P_n \). There are two main properties that are satisfied by this locking mechanism:

1) Atomicity: Even if \( P_i \) and \( P_{i+1} \) collude, they cannot transform the lock \( \sigma_i \) into the valid signature \( \sigma_i \) without the help of the sender (\( P_1 \)). They may of course generate a new valid signature \( \sigma_i' \neq \sigma_i \), but only \( \sigma_i \) can help release the \((i-1)\)-th lock. Therefore no two colluding intermediate neighbours \( P_i \) and \( P_{i+1} \) can initiate the payment release ahead of time. This assures the sender that no intermediate user \( P_{i+1} \) can steal his \( v \) coins, that were intended for \( P_n \).

2) Balance Security: Even if all parties but \( P_i \) are malicious, \( P_i \) is guaranteed that a valid signature on a transaction \( tx_{pay,i+1} \) will always allow it to recover a valid signature on \( tx_{pay,i} \). This is to ensure that intermediate users never lose coins. The protocol enforces this by having intermediate users checking whether the randomness injected by the sender is consistent across different instances of the partial signing protocol.

To ensure both of the properties above, their protocol heavily relies on the ability of the sender to inject consistent randomness in the signing protocol, which in turn leverages the special algebraic structure of Schnorr/ECDSA signatures.

Failed Attempts. We illustrate the pitfalls of extending this approach with the case of BLS signatures, where the signatures are unique for a given message under a given key. In this case, two colluding intermediate users \( P_i \) and \( P_{i+1} \) can always collude to generate the one and only valid signature \( \sigma_i \) on \( tx_{pay,i} \). This means \( P_i \) and \( P_{i+1} \) can release the lock at any time and effectively steal \( v \) coins from \( P_i \). Similar problems persist for non-unique signature where there is no way for a third party (in our case the sender) to meaningfully and consistently inject some randomness in the signing process to make the signatures partial and at the same time verifiable.

One could think of setting up the locks backwards (starting from \( P_n \) until \( P_2 \)) thereby preventing colluding users from initiating the release phase like above. However, such a backwards lock setup strategy suffers from a different issue: Assume that locks up to the \( i \)-th one have been setup starting from the \( n \)-th lock. If user \( P_{n-1} \) and \( P_n \) collude and initiate a release phase, the cascade follows until the \( i \)-th lock which results in party \( P_i \) paying \( P_{i+1} \) via \( tx_{pay,i} \). If the sender \( P_1 \) aborts the lock phase now, an honest intermediate \( P_i \) loses \( v \) coins and has effectively paid the receiver \( P_n \).
A Fairness Problem. In general, the source of difficulty in designing PCNs seems to be rooted in enforcing fairness (a weaker form of guaranteed output delivery) in the locking protocol: We want to ensure that either all parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ learn a valid signature on the corresponding transaction, or none does. This makes it especially tricky to design general purpose solution for this problem, as fairness is notoriously difficult to achieve. Even using powerful cryptographic tools, such as general-purpose multi-party computation (MPC), does not seem to trivialize the problem since fairness for MPC is, in general, impossible to achieve [27]. The aim of this work is to evade this fairness barrier and to construct a PCN protocol that is compatible with any signature scheme.

B. Our Contribution

The contributions of this work are summarized as follows.

Generic Solution. We construct the first PCN protocol (Section V-B) that is compatible with any signature scheme. The signature scheme shall satisfy the notion of strong Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attacks (sEUF-CMA), which is the de-facto definition of security for digital signatures. Our scheme does not assume any scripting language for the underlying blockchain, besides the ability to verify a signature and the timestamp of a transaction. This enables, in principle, interoperable payments across chains with any signature scheme (unique, aggregatable, post-quantum secure, etc.). Our PCN protocol also guarantees on-chain privacy for the users in the payment path of the PCN, that is on par with the state of the art proposals [2, 3]. To achieve this, we introduce and construct lockable signatures (Section IV), a new cryptographic tool which may be independent interest.

We wish to clarify that we view our generic protocol as an initial feasibility result and it may not be efficient enough to be deployed in practice, due to the high costs associated with the cryptographic machinery that are used. Apart from the computational overhead, the price to pay for such a generality is that of a slight increase in the number of on-chain transactions per PC. Specifically, in the worst case, parties involved in a payment in our PCN need to post 2 transactions on the chain to close their channels, instead of 1 as in prior works. Nevertheless, we believe that our approach sheds light on the necessary assumptions needed to construct PCNs and can serve as the blueprint to design efficient protocols specific to many signature schemes.

Efficient Protocol for BLS. Following the blueprint of our generic protocol, we construct the first practically efficient PCN protocol fully compatible with the BLS signature scheme (Section V-C), that has unique and aggregatable signatures. Additionally, our BLS-based protocol also inherits the security and privacy properties of our generic protocol. Prior to our work, supporting PCNs for BLS signatures required complex scripts like HTLCs whose disadvantages were discussed above.

Our protocol makes only a handful of calls to the basic BLS algorithms, and does not require any heavy cryptographic machinery. Our efficiency analysis (Section VI) shows that the cost incurred by PCN users is minimal and the protocol can be run on today’s low-end devices.

C. Related Work

As off-chain scalability solutions, Payment Channels and Payment Channel Networks [1–4] have been proposed and extensively studied. Typical proposals [1, 2] use special scripts like HTLCs, that let a user get paid if he produces a pre-image of a certain hash value before a specific time (payment expiry time). While these protocols are also “universal” (i.e. are compatible with any signature scheme), they fall short in achieving the properties of scriptless scripts, due to their reliance on special scripts and the syntactic difference between standard an PCN transactions. Malavolta et al. [3] propose a PCN protocol that does not rely on HTLC and offers better on-chain privacy using a new tool called Anonymous Multi Hop Locks (AMHL). However, their protocol is tailor for transaction schemes that use Schnorr and ECDSA signatures. Similar techniques were used by Esgin, Esroy and Erkin [13] for a specific lattice based signature scheme, which is a variant of [21]. Egger, Moreno-Sanchez and Maffei [4] propose a PCN protocol compatible with a wide-variety of network topologies. Unfortunately, they lack on-chain privacy of the parties involved and also have increased number of transactions that go on-chain per party in the worst case. As a result, in their proposal it is easy to differentiate between PCN and non-PCN transactions, which heavily affects the fungibility of the coins. Bolt [28] is a payment channel protocol specially tailored for Zcash [11], which uses zk-SNARKs [29]–[31]. A generalisation of PC with complex conditional payments is a state channel [32]–[34] that requires highly expressive scripting functionalities from the underlying blockchain (like Ethereum) and are therefore not scriptless. Other works in these settings study the notion of non-source routing, where the payment is routed locally by each intermediate node [35]. In contrast, our approach is inherently tied to source routing.

Comparison with Adaptor Signatures. A related (stronger) notion to lockable signatures is that of adaptor signatures [36]. Similarly to lockable signatures, adaptor signatures allow one to compute a pre-signature (the analogue of the lock) with respect to some NP-relation, and the witness of such a relation can be then used to recover the full (valid) signature. However, the crucial difference is that the pre-signature can be computed without knowing the witness of the given relation, which makes adaptor signatures a more versatile primitive than lockable signatures. On the flip side, adaptor signatures do not seem to be easily realizable for signature schemes without algebraic structure.

In summary, none of these proposals can simultaneously (i) generically handle all signature schemes without using special scripts, (ii) guarantee on-chain privacy and (iii) improve fungibility of the coins, as they either rely on specific signature schemes or leak information on-chain about the parties and the payments made in the PCN.
In this section we give a brief overview of the techniques we employ to construct a generic scriptless-script PCN protocol compatible with any signature scheme. At the core of our solution we have two main techniques: A local 3-party channel (at the transaction layer) and lockable signatures, a new cryptographic abstraction that we introduce (at the cryptographic layer). We detail each of our technique individually first, then describe how they are put together in our PCN protocol. Finally, we discuss how to construct a highly efficient protocol for the case of BLS signatures, bypassing the need for heavy cryptographic machinery.

A. Transaction Layer: Local 3-Party Channel

Recall that the fairness problem arose in the lock phase because of colluding neighbours $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ in a payment path $(P_1, \ldots, P_n)$. Since $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ share a payment channel, collectively they possess all the information necessary to sign any transaction. The way prior works \cite{3} bypassed this obstacle, was to allow the sender $P_1$ to contribute to the randomness of the lock $\tilde{\sigma}_i$ between $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$. The lock is carefully set such that the input of the sender is hard to compute given the lock, and the valid signature $\sigma_i$ can only be recovered with the help of the sender. We would like to mimic this approach but by only making generic use of the signature scheme, without relying on any particular feature of the signature scheme.

Local Channel. Our idea is to let parties locally convert their 2-party payment channels into a 3-party payment channel. As shown in Figure 1, parties $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ share a channel denoted by 2-PC$_i$ (a public key shared between $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$), with a capacity of $v$ coins and channel expiry time $t_i$. The sender in this case plays the role of a special party $P_0$ who, along with $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$, generates a 3-party payment channel 3-PC$_i$ (a public key shared between $P_0, P_i, P_{i+1}$). To do this, Parties $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ generate a special setup transaction $tx_{\text{Setup},i}$ that sends $v' \leq v$ coins from 2-PC$_i$ to 3-PC$_i$, while the extra amount $v - v'$ is sent to some channel between $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ and is omitted for clarity. Transaction $tx_{\text{Setup},i}$ expires at $t_i - T$ (where $T$ is a system parameter) and once $tx_{\text{Setup},i}$ expires, $v'$ coins are transferred back to 2-PC$_i$, the 2-party channel between $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$.

Notice that, to spend from 3-PC$_i$, all of $P_0, P_i, P_{i+1}$ have to agree and generate a signature together on the spending transaction. This way the sender ($P_0$) has an input on spending from 3-PC$_i$ that is hard to compute by a coalition of $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$. We stress that $tx_{\text{Setup},i}$ is only kept locally by the parties $P_0, P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ and not posted on the chain, hence the name local 3-party channel. An added advantage of this approach is that intermediate parties need not lock all the ($v$) coins from their payment channel for the purposes of PCN payments. They can decide how many coins ($v' \leq v$) they want to lock for payments in the form of a 3-party channel with the sender $P_0$. This way the remaining coins $v - v'$ are available for the intermediate parties which they can use in any way they want.

The notion of a local 3-party channel is reminiscent of the concept of virtual channels \cite{37}, however their purposes are very different: A virtual channel allows two parties to exchange coins via a (trustless) intermediary without communicating with it for every payment. On the other hand, a local 3-party channel requires (and enforces) the active interaction of all 3 participants.

B. Cryptographic Layer: Lockable Signatures

The one remaining piece of the puzzle for constructing a generic PCN is the functionality of party $P_1$ being able to obtain a valid signature on a transaction, provided party $P_{i+1}$ releases a valid signature on another transaction. To capture this functionality, we introduce the notion of lockable signatures, a new cryptographic abstraction. Intuitively, lockable signatures enable a user to generate a lock $\ell k$ using the Lock algorithm, that hides a signature $\sigma$ (the locked signature) with the help of another signature $\tilde{\sigma}$ (the locking signature). Here $\sigma$ is a signature on a message $m$ signed using the secret key $sk$, while $\tilde{\sigma}$ is a signature on a message $\tilde{m}$ signed using the secret key $\tilde{sk}$. Note that the locked and the locking signatures may even be from different signature schemes.

In terms of security we want that the lock $\ell k$ is hiding, which intuitively says that no information about the locked signature $\sigma$ is revealed via the lock (if $\tilde{\sigma}$ is not revealed). We also want a guarantee that, given a correctly generated lock $\ell k$ and the valid signature $\tilde{\sigma}$ on the message $\tilde{m}$ under the public key $pk$ (whose corresponding secret key is $sk$), one should be able to run an efficient Unlock procedure that outputs $\sigma$. We refer to this security notion as unlockability.
We show that extracting an individual signature from such a
Applications of Lockable Signatures. For
\(tx\) valid signature for
\(\ell\) is posted on the blockchain. We can then generate a lock
transaction of this primitive. Consider the scenario where we want a
our main result, we provide a toy example for the applicability
BLS-based protocol.
locks. This feature will greatly increase the practicality of our
aggregate signature. I.e., BLS lockable signatures have a built-in
is well-formed, by simply checking the validity of the BLS
\(\tilde{\sigma}\) simply computes
\(\tilde{\sigma} \cdot \sigma = \Pi \text{Sign}(\tilde{\sigma}, \tilde{\sigma})\) leveraging the
lock phase. In this phase, the sender
\(P_1\) plays the role of a special party
\(P_0\) and creates a local 3-party channel
\(3\text{-PC}_i\) (using \(tx_{\text{Setup},i}\)) with parties
\(P_i, P_{i+1}\) for
\(i \in \{1, \ldots, n-1\}\), as shown in Figure 2. To do this, parties
\(P_0, P_1, P_i, P_{i+1}\) run an
\(\Pi_{\text{DGS}}\). The lock
and computes the lock
\(\ell_k := \sigma \cdot H(\sigma) \leftarrow \text{Lock}(\sigma, \sigma)\)
and is returned to party
\(P_i\). Here, we have:
• The keys
\(sk_{i-1}\) and
\(sk_i\) are the shared secret key between
\(P_0, P_{i-1}\) and
\(P_i, P_{i+1}\), respectively, established during the
payment setup phase.
• The transaction
\(tx_{\text{pay},i-1}\) (analogously
\(tx_{\text{pay},i}\)) spends
\(v\) coins from
\(pk_{i-1}\) or
\(3\text{-PC}_i\) to some key
\(pk_i\) of party
\(P_i\).
• The signature
\(\sigma_{i-1}\) is the signature on the transaction
\(tx_{\text{pay},i-1}\) under the public key
\(pk_{i-1}\) or
\(3\text{-PC}_i\).
The recipient finally obtains
\(\ell_{k_{i-1}}\) generated with the help of
\(P_0, P_{n-1}\) and
\(P_{n+1}\) (which is again impersonated by the
sender). Notice the expiry times of the payment transactions
are set such that
\(tx_{\text{pay},i-1}\) expires
\(\Delta\) time units after
\(tx_{\text{pay},i}\) expires. This is to ensure
\(P_i\) has sufficient time
\(\Delta\) units) to get paid from
\(tx_{\text{pay},i+1}\) after it pays
\(P_{i+1}\) using
\(tx_{\text{pay},i}\).
The payment release phase is triggered when the sender \((P_0, P_{n+1})\) jointly generates \(s_n\) along with the receiver \(P_n\). The receiver can unlock \(\ell_{k_n-1}\) using Unlock to obtain \(s_{n-1}\) and returns it to \(P_{n-1}\). This procedure continues until party \(P_2\) who unlocks \(\ell_k\) and learns \(\sigma_1\). Every party \(P_i\) (except the sender) has two transactions \(tx_{\text{Setup},i-1}\) and \(tx_{\text{pay},i-1}\) (that spends from \(tx_{\text{Setup},i-1}\)) along with valid signatures on both, concluding one payment of \(v\) coins from \(P_1\) to \(P_n\).

For subsequent payments between the same sender and the receiver via the same payment path \(P_1, \ldots, P_n\), the parties can re-use the setup phase and only overwrite the lock information by re-running the lock phase.

**Security.** Intuitively, the unlockability of the lockable signatures guarantees that no adversary can return a valid signature \(\sigma_i\) on \(tx_{\text{pay},i}\) under \(pk_i\) to an honest party \(P_i\), such that when \(P_i\) tries to unlock \(\ell_{k_i-1}\) with \(\sigma_i\), he gets an invalid signature. This ensures the adversary cannot steal the funds of an honest \(P_i\), no matter how many other parties it corrupts.

The hiding property of the lockable signatures ensures that no adversary can unlock \(\ell_k\) (for any \(i\)) to reveal a valid signature \(\sigma_i\) on \(tx_{\text{pay},i}\), before the sender initiates the release phase. This ensures that no adversary corrupting an intermediate party in the payment path can steal the funds of the sender. Our construction is secure against wormhole attacks \([3]\) following a similar argument.

It is important to notice that we consider the standard notion of MPC where the adversary can abort at any time and deny the honest parties from seeing their output (i.e., we do not assume fairness). This means that some extra care is needed to ensure that adversarial aborts do not cause the honest parties to lose coins. To convey some intuition, consider two cases.

- **Abort before all locks are established:** the participants will also abort the execution. The hiding property of the locks guarantees that the signatures on the transactions remain hidden and the honest parties do not lose money.

- **Abort after all locks are established:** the honest parties can “unlock” their signatures by just accessing the blockchain (and using some local information). The unlockability property guarantees that this process never fails.

**Efficient BLS-Based PCN.** We obtain an efficient BLS-based PCN protocol by exploiting the structure of the keys and the signature. In the setup phase, we substitute the usage of a general purpose MPC with a non-interactive protocol where the shared public key is set to be the aggregate of individual public keys of the parties. That is,

\[
\text{pk}_i := \text{pk}_i^{(0)} \cdot \text{pk}_i^{(i)} \cdot \text{pk}_i^{(i+1)}
\]

where \(\text{pk}_i^{(0)}\), \(\text{pk}_i^{(i)}\) and \(\text{pk}_i^{(i+1)}\) are the keys of \(P_0, P_i\) and \(P_{i+1}\) respectively. Each key has an associated NIZK proof, proving knowledge of the corresponding secret key, to prevent rogue key attacks \([39]\).

Since BLS signatures are aggregatable, we have that the signature \(\sigma_i\) on \(tx_{\text{pay},i}\) under \(\text{pk}_i\) is just an aggregate of \(\sigma_i^{(0)}, \sigma_i^{(i)}\) and \(\sigma_i^{(i+1)}\), where each of these are themselves signatures on \(tx_{\text{pay},i}\) generated by the respective parties using their respective secret key shares. As discussed above, signatures are locked by simply computing a chain of aggregates

\[
(\sigma_1 \cdot \sigma_2 \cdot \sigma_3 \cdot \ldots \cdot \sigma_{n-1} \cdot \sigma_n)
\]
i.e., \(\ell_k := \sigma_1 \cdot \sigma_{i+1}\), whose well-formedness can be readily tested using the aggregate verification algorithm of BLS. This allows us to forego entirely the usage of general purpose MPC, thus obtaining a concretely efficient protocol.

**III. Preliminaries**

We denote by \(\lambda \in \mathbb{N}\) the security parameter and by \(x \leftarrow A(\lambda)\) the output of the algorithm \(A\) on input in using \(r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda\) as its randomness. We often omit this randomness and only mention it explicitly when required. The notation \([n]\) denotes a set \(\{1, \ldots, n\}\) and \([i, j]\) denotes the set \(\{i, i+1, \ldots, j\}\). We consider probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) machines as efficient algorithms.

**A. Universal Composability**

To model security and privacy in the presence of concurrent executions we resort to the universal composability framework from Canetti \([40]\) extended to support a global setup \([41]\). We refer the reader to \([40]\) for a comprehensive discussion. We consider the setting of static corruptions, where the adversary must declare ahead of time which parties he wish to corrupt. We denote the environment by \(E\). For a real protocol \(\Pi\) and an adversary \(A\) we write \(EXEC_{\tau, \mathcal{A}, E}\) to denote the ensemble corresponding to the protocol execution. For an ideal functionality \(F\) and an adversary \(S\) we write \(EXEC_{F, S, E}\) to denote the distribution ensemble of the ideal world execution.

**Definition 1 (Universal Composability):** A protocol \(\tau\) UC-realizes an ideal functionality \(F\) if for any PPT adversary \(A\) there exists a simulator \(S\) such that for any environment \(E\) the ensembles \(EXEC_{\tau, A, E}\) and \(EXEC_{F, S, E}\) are computationally indistinguishable.

We require the cryptographic primitives with UC security.

**Digital Signatures.** A digital signature scheme allows one to authenticate a message with respect to a public key. Formally, it consists of the following triple of efficient algorithms: A key generation algorithm \(KGen(1^\lambda)\) that takes as input the security parameter \(1^\lambda\) and outputs the public/secret key pair \((pk, sk)\). The signing algorithm \(\text{Sign}(sk, m)\) inputs a secret key and a message \(m \in \{0, 1\}^\star\) and outputs a signature \(\sigma\). The verification algorithm \(\text{Vf}(pk, m, \sigma)\) outputs 1 if \(\sigma\) is a valid signature on \(m\) under the public key \(pk\), and outputs 0 otherwise. We require standard notions of correctness and unforgeability for the signature scheme \([42]\). Unforgeability is formally referred to as existential unforgeability under chosen message attack (EUF-CMA), says that a PPT adversary cannot forge a fresh signature on a fresh message of its choice given only the public key and access to a signing oracle (that returns a valid signature on a message of his choice). A stronger notion is that of strong unforgeability (sEUF-CMA) that says the forgery can consist only of a fresh signature, irrespective of whether the message was previously queried to the signing
oracles or not. Such a notion is known to be equivalent to the UC formulation of security [43].

In this work we only consider signature schemes with a deterministic signing algorithm. This is however without loss of generality, as shown by the following (well known) lemma.

Lemma 1: Let \((K\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Vf})\) be a signature scheme with probabilistic \(\text{Sign}\) algorithm. Then there exists a signature scheme \((K\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}^*, \text{Vf})\) where \(\text{Sign}^*\) is deterministic.

Proof of (Sketch): The new signing algorithm \(\text{Sign}^*\) is defined to be \(\text{Sign}(sk, m; \text{PRF}(sk, m))\), where \(\text{PRF}\) is a cryptographic pseudorandom function.

Commitment Schemes. A commitment scheme is a digital analogue of sealing a message inside an envelope. Formally, it consists of the following tuple of efficient algorithms: A commitment generation algorithm \(\text{Commit}(1^\lambda, m)\) that takes as input a security parameter and a message \(m\) to commit to, and outputs a commitment \(c\) and a corresponding opening information \(d\). The opening algorithm \(\text{Open}(c, d)\) takes as input a commitment \(c\) and a opening information \(d\) and outputs the committed message \(m\) or outputs a special symbol \(\bot\) if \(d\) is not the valid opening information for the commitment \(c\). In addition to the standard binding and hiding properties (who’s UC formalization can be found in [40]), we require that the commitment scheme has unique openings. I.e. for all commitments there exists a single valid message that causes the Open algorithm to accept.

Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proofs. Let \(R : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}\) be a n NP-witness-relation with corresponding NP-language \(L := \{ x : \exists w \text{ s.t. } R(x, w) = 1\}\). A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) [44] system for the relation \(R\) is initialized with a setup algorithm \(\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)\) that, on input the security parameter, outputs a common reference string \(\text{crs}\) and a trapdoor \(td\). A prover can show the validity of a statement \(x\) with a witness \(w\) by invoking \(\mathcal{P}(\text{crs}, x, w)\), which outputs a proof \(\pi\). The proof \(\pi\) can be efficiently checked by the verification algorithm \(\mathcal{V}(\text{crs}, x, \pi)\). We require a NIZK system to be (1) zero-knowledge, where the verifier does not learn more than the validity of the statement \(x\), and (2) simulation sound extractable, if there exists an extractor algorithm \(E\) that on input the common reference string \(\text{crs}\) and a trapdoor information \(td\), the statement \(x\) and the proof \(\pi\), and outputs a witness \(w\) such that \((x, w) \in R\) with high probability. For formal UC-style definition of security we refer the reader to [45].

Multi-Party Computation. The aim of a secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocol is for the participating parties to securely compute some function \(f\) of their private inputs. In terms of properties, we require correctness that states that the parties’ output is that which is defined by the function. We then require privacy that states that the only information learned by the parties in the computation is that specified by the function output. For a comprehensive treatment of the UC definition of MPC we refer the reader to [46]. In this work we require the existence of MPC protocols that are:

- Secure against an active adversary corrupting up to \(n - 1\) of the \(n\) players, where the set of corrupted parties is determined ahead of time (static corruption).
- Secure with aborts, i.e. the definition allows the adversary to decide which of the honest parties obtain the output of the computation.

The latter requirement implies that we do not assume that the MPC protocol achieves any form of fairness or guaranteed output delivery. These is arguably the most common flavor of MPC, for which many general-purpose efficient protocols are known (see e.g. [47] and follow-up works).

Synchrony and Communication. We assume synchronous communication between users, where the execution of the protocol happens in rounds. We model this via an ideal functionality \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{clock}}\) as it is done in [37], [38], where all honest parties are required to indicate that they are ready to proceed to the next round before the clock proceeds. The clock functionality that we consider is fully described in [41]. This means that all entities are always aware of the given round. We also assume the existence of secure message transmission channels between users modelled by \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{sm}}\).

Blockchain. We assume the existence of a blockchain \(\mathcal{B}\) (just as in [2], [3], [6]) that we model as a trusted append-only bulletin board: The corresponding ideal functionality \(\mathcal{F}_B\) maintains the chain \(\mathcal{B}\) locally and updates it according to the transactions between users. The functionality is also parameterized by a transaction scheme which also specifies a signature scheme, that lets any user generate key pairs and can post a signed transaction transferring coins from one user to another. We use the notation \(tx := tx(A, B, v)\) to denote a transaction that sends \(v\) coins from address \(A\) to address \(B\). At any point in the execution, any user \(U\) can send a distinguished message read to \(\mathcal{F}_B\), who sends the whole transcript of \(\mathcal{B}\) to \(U\). We refer the reader to [49] for a formal definition of this functionality. Our \(\mathcal{F}_B\) functionality also offers a timelock interface, where a particular transaction can be assigned a expiry time \(t\). If the global clock is past the expiry time \(t\), it means that the transaction has expired and its effect on user balances, is revoked.

B. Bilinear Maps

Let \((G_0, G_1, G_t)\) be three groups of order \(q\), where \(q\) is a \(\lambda\) bit prime. A pairing function \(\epsilon\) is an efficiently computable function \(\epsilon : G_0 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_t\), where \(g_0\) and \(g_1\) are generators of \(G_0\) and \(G_1\) respectively. The pairing operation is bilinear if for all \(u \in G_0, v \in G_1, a, b \in Z\), we have \(\epsilon(u^a, v^b) = \epsilon(u, v)^{ab}\). The pairing operation is non-degenerate if \(\epsilon(g_1, g_2) \neq 1\).

BLS Signature Scheme. Let \(H\) be a hash function \(H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G_0\). We briefly recall the BLS aggregatable signature [17] in Figure 3. It is well known that the scheme has unique signature and it is strongly unforgeable in the random oracle model if the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem is hard over the bilinear group. In Appendix B we recall the aggregate extraction assumption from [38] (Definition 4.3), which in a later work, Coron and Naccache [49] showed is equivalent to the CDH assumption.

We introduce a new hard problem that we call chained aggregate extraction problem, that says that an adversary who
with each other into a single value. Formal security proof of
ExpChAgExt
(referred to as the locked
signature is computationally hidden.
has to know the locking signature and otherwise the locked
locking is equivalent to the CDH assumption.
the theorem can be found in Appendix B.
k
problem is equivalent to the aggregate extraction problem, when
some polynomial
poly
a negligible function
G
is given a chain of aggregate values, cannot extract any of
the aggregated values in polynomial time. This assumption
significantly simplifies our security analysis of our BLS based
PCN protocol. We formally define the problem below.
Definition 2 (Chained Aggregate Extraction Problem): The
chained aggregate extraction problem for a bilinear pairing
group \( G_0, G_1, G_t \) of order \( q \) is said to be hard if there exists
a negligible function negl, for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \) and \( n = \text{poly}(\lambda) \)
for some polynomial poly, and all PPT adversaries \( A \), it holds that,
\[
\Pr_{\text{ExpChAgExt}_{A, G_0, G_1, G_t}(1^\lambda)}[\text{ExpChAgExt} = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]
where \( \text{ExpChAgExt} \) is defined in Figure 4.
In Theorem 3.1 we show that the chained aggregate extraction
problem is equivalent to the aggregate extraction problem, when
\( k = 2 \), where \( k \) denotes the number of signatures aggregated
with each other into a single value. Formal security proof of
the theorem can be found in Appendix B.
Theorem 3.1: For \( k = 2 \), the aggregate extraction assumption
\text{(Definition 5)} is equivalent to the Chained Aggregate Extraction
assumption \text{(Definition 2)}.
Corollary 1: The Chained Aggregate Extraction assumption
is equivalent to the CDH assumption.

IV. LOCKABLE SIGNATURES

A lockable signature scheme allows one to lock a signature
(referred to as the locked signature) on a message with respect to
another signature (referred to as the locking signature), possibly
on a different message. The two signatures can verify against
two different public keys. To learn the locked signature, one
has to know the locking signature and otherwise the locked
signature is computationally hidden.

A. Definitions

Below we formally define the interfaces, notion of correctness
and the properties of interest of a lockable signature.
Definition 3 (Lockable Signatures): A lockable signature
scheme \( L_5 \) is defined with respect to a signature scheme \( \Pi_{DS} \)
and consists of PPT algorithms \( \text{Lock, Unlock} \) defined below.
\( \ell k \leftarrow \text{Lock}(\sigma, \bar{\sigma}) \): The lock algorithm takes as input two
signatures \( \langle \sigma, \bar{\sigma} \rangle \) and returns a lock \( \ell k \).
\( \bar{\sigma} \leftarrow \text{Unlock}(\ell k, m, pk, m^\prime, \bar{\sigma}, \ell k) \): The unlock algorithm takes
as input two public keys \( \langle pk, pk \rangle \), a pair of messages \( \langle m, m^\prime \rangle \),
a signature \( \bar{\sigma} \), and a lock \( \ell k \), and outputs a signature \( \sigma \).
Definition 4 (Correctness): A lockable signature scheme \( L_5 \) is
\text{correct} if for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \), all pairs of messages \( \langle m, m^\prime \rangle \in \{0,1\}^\lambda \), for all key pairs \( \langle pk, sk \rangle \) and \( \langle pk, sk \rangle \)
in the image of \( KGen \) it holds that
\[
\Pr_{\text{Vf}(pk, m, \bar{\sigma})}[\text{Vf}(pk, m, \bar{\sigma}, m^\prime, \bar{\sigma}, \ell k) = 1] = 1
\]
where \( \sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, m) \), \( \bar{\sigma} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk, m^\prime) \), and \( \ell k \leftarrow \text{Lock}(\sigma, \bar{\sigma}) \).

Below we define the security notions for lockable signatures.
As discussed before, we consider without loss of generality
only signatures where the signing algorithm is deterministic.
In all of the security notions, we assume that the Lock algorithm
is executed honestly. Looking ahead to our main protocol, this
assumption is justified by the fact that the algorithm is always
executed as part of an MPC protocol where at least one of
the participants is honest.

Unlockability. The unlockability property ensures that a cor-
rectly generated lock can be unlocked to reveal a valid locked
signature, when provided with a valid locking signature. We
capture this intuition in the form of an experiment \( \text{EU-CMA} \)
in Figure 5. Here the adversary gets to choose the messages
\( \langle m, m^\prime \rangle \) while it has access to a signing oracle for the key
\( sk \). The experiment generates a lock \( \ell k \) honestly by running
\( \text{Lock}(\sigma, \bar{\sigma}) \) and gives the lock to the adversary. Here signature
\( \sigma \) is generated as \( \sigma \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.\text{Sign}(sk, m) \) and signature \( \bar{\sigma} \) as
\( \bar{\sigma} \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.\text{Sign}(sk, m^\prime) \). The adversary returns a candidate
locking signature \( \sigma^* \) which is used to unlock the lock \( \ell k \)
and obtain a candidate locked signature \( \sigma' \). The adversary wins
the experiment if \( \sigma^* \) is a valid signature on the message \( m \)
under \( pk \) (condition \( b_0 \)) while \( \sigma' \) is an invalid signature on
the message \( m^\prime \) under \( pk \) (condition \( b_1 \)). A lockable signature
scheme is said to satisfy unlockability if the adversary wins
the above experiment at most with negligible probability in the
security parameter.
Definition 5 (Unlockability): A lockable signature scheme \( L_5 \) is
\text{unlockable} if there exists a negligible function \text{negl} such that
for all \( \lambda \in \mathbb{N} \) and for all PPT adversaries \( A \) it holds that
\[
\Pr_{\text{EU-CMA}_{A, L_5}(\lambda)}[1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)
\]
where the experiment \( \text{EU-CMA} \) is defined in Figure 5.
Fig. 5: Experiments for unlockability and hiding of lockable signatures

Fig. 6: Generic (left) and BLS-based (right) constructions of Lockable Signatures

and the hash of the locking signature $\hat{\sigma}$. Provided the hash of the locking signature $H(\hat{\sigma})$ is a random string with high entropy, we can see that intuitively the locked signature $\sigma$ is hidden inside the lock, similar to a one-time pad. The release procedure is an xor of $H(\hat{\sigma})$ and the lock, similar to the decryption of a one-time pad.

In the theorem below, we prove that our generic construction satisfies unlockability (Definition 5) and hiding (Definition 6), as defined before. In favor of a simpler analysis, we model the hash function $H$ as a random oracle, however we note that one could also set $H$ to be a hardcore function (for polynomially-many bits) and security would follow with a similar argument.

**Theorem 4.1 (Unlockability & Hiding):** Let $\Pi_{DS} = (KGen, Sign, Vf)$ be a strongly unforgeable digital signature scheme. Then $LS = (\text{Lock}, \text{Unlock})$ is unlockable and hiding in the random oracle model.

**Proof 2: Unlockability.** Note that the only way the adversary can win the experiment is to find a valid signature $\sigma^*$ on $\tilde{m}$ such that $H(\sigma^*) \neq H(\Pi_{DS}.\text{Sign}(\tilde{sk}, \tilde{m}))$. Since $H$ is deterministic, this implies that $\sigma^* \neq \Pi_{DS}.\text{Sign}(\tilde{sk}, \tilde{m})$, which contradicts the strong unforgeability of $\Pi_{DS}$.

**Hiding.** The simulator $\tilde{\text{Sim}}$ simply returns a binary string of the appropriate length sampled uniformly at random. Observe that the adversary $A$ is not allowed to query $\tilde{m}$ to the signing oracle $\Pi_{DS}.\text{Sign}(\tilde{sk}, \cdot)$, and consider the following two cases. In the first case, $A$ manages to guess $\Pi_{DS}.\text{Sign}(\tilde{sk}, \tilde{m})$ correctly and queries the random oracle on then the value $H(\Pi_{DS}.\text{Sign}(\tilde{sk}, \tilde{m}))$. In this case the $A$ can distinguish between the simulated lock and an honestly generated one. However, given that $\Pi_{DS}$ is unforgeable, this case happens only with negligible probability negligible (A). In the second case, $A$ does not guess $\Pi_{DS}.\text{Sign}(\tilde{sk}, \tilde{m})$ and therefore the value $H(\Pi_{DS}.\text{Sign}(\tilde{sk}, \tilde{m}))$ is uniformly distributed. In this case, the success probability of the adversary is exactly 1/2.

**BLS-Based Construction.** We present an alternative construction of lockable signatures $LS := (\text{Lock}, \text{Unlock})$ for the BLS signature scheme $\Pi_{BLS} := (KGen, Sign, Vf, Agg, VfAgg)$ in Figure 6(right). While this scheme satisfies a weaker notion of hiding (as defined in Appendix A), it will allow us to construct a much more efficient PCN, without the need to resort to complex cryptographic machinery. Intuitively, a lockable signature consists of an aggregate of two signatures, and the security comes from the hardness of extracting signatures from aggregates.
Unlockability follows unconditionally from the uniqueness of BLS signatures. The scheme only satisfies a weaker notion of hiding (i.e. only the search version of the problem is hard), which is captured by the chained aggregate extraction assumption (Definition 2). Loosely speaking, weak hiding ensures that an adversarial party cannot extract a valid signature from a lock, before the corresponding locking signature is revealed. In our protocol (see Section V-C), this is sufficient to ensure that an adversarial party in the payment path cannot steal the funds of honest parties in the same path.

V. PAYMENT CHANNEL NETWORKS

In this section we describe two constructions for Payment Channel Networks (PCNs) from lockable signatures: The first construction is generic, i.e. individual payment channels in the payment path can be based on any signature scheme. Our second construction is an efficient instantiation of the generic construction, tailored for the case where the individual payment channels are based on BLS signatures.

A. Definition of PCN

We recall the notion of a PCN as an ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \) as proposed in \([2]\). Payment channels in the chain \( \mathbb{B} \) are of the form \( (c_{(u_0,u_1)},v,t,f) \), where \( c_{(u_0,u_1)} \) is a unique channel identifier for the channel between users \( u_0 \) and \( u_1 \), \( v \) is the capacity of the channel, \( t \) is the expiration time of the channel and \( f \) is the associated fee. Note that any two users may have multiple channels open simultaneously. The functionality maintains two additional internal lists \( \mathcal{L} \) (to keep track of the closed channels) and \( \mathcal{P} \) (to record the off-chain payments in an open channel). Entries in \( \mathcal{P} \) are of the form \( (c_{(u_0,u_1)},v,t,h) \), where \( c_{(u_0,u_1)} \) is the corresponding identifier, \( v \) is the amount of credit used, \( t \) is the expiration time of the channel, and \( h \) is the identifier of the entry.

The functionality provides the users with interfaces open, close, and pay, which are used to open a channel, close the channel, and make payments using the channel, respectively. \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \) initializes a pair of empty lists \( \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{L} \). Users can query \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \) to open channels and close them to any valid state in \( \mathcal{P} \). On input a value \( v \) and a set of payment channels \( c_{(u_0,u_1)}, \ldots, c_{(u_0,u_{n+1})} \) from some user \( u_0 \), \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \) checks whether the path has enough capacity (step 1) and initiates the payment. Each intermediate user can either allow the payment or deny it. Once the payment has reached the receiver, each user can again decide to interrupt the flow of the payment (step 2), i.e. pay instead of the sender. Finally \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \) informs the involved nodes of the success of the operation (step 3) and adds the updated state to \( \mathcal{P} \) for the corresponding channels.

In terms of off-chain privacy, we model a slightly weaker notion than the functionality from \([2]\): Each user \( u_i \), in addition to learning the channel identifiers \( c_{(u_{i-1},u_i)} \) and \( c_{(u_{i+1},u_i)} \) of its neighbours \( u_{i-1} \) and \( u_{i+1} \), also learns the channel identifiers \( c_{(u_{i-2},u_{i-1})} \) and \( c_{(u_{i+2},u_{i+1})} \) of its neighbours’ neighbours \( u_{i-2} \) and \( u_{i+2} \). In other words, any intermediate user \( u_i \) learns the identity of the sender \( u_0 \) and of the two nodes that precede and succeed him in the payment path. For completeness, we describe the modified ideal functionality in Figure 10.

B. Construction I: PCNs for all Signatures

We now describe our generic construction of PCN using lockable signatures. Consider the setting where party \( P_1 \) wants to send \( v \) coins to party \( P_n \) via off-chain payments. We denote by \( j\text{-PC} \) a payment channel involving \( j \)-many parties, i.e. where the secret key is shared among \( j \) users. We assume that neighbouring parties in \( P_1, \ldots, P_n \) have payment channels between them, namely, \( P_i \) has a payment channel 2-PC with \( P_{i+1} \) for \( i \in [n-1] \). Using this network of payment channels, \( P_1 \) wishes to route \( v \) coins to \( P_n \).

For ease of understanding, we make the following simplifying assumptions: First, we assume the participation fee for each party in the payment path \( f_i := 0 \). Second, we assume that every payment channel 2-PC for \( i \in [n-1] \) in the path from \( P_1 \) to \( P_n \) is based on the same signature scheme \( \Pi_{DS} \). Our construction can be easily tweaked to support a different signature scheme for each payment channel in the payment path, provided that the signature schemes satisfy the requirements necessary to construct a lockable signature (namely, strong unforgeability and deterministic signing).

1) Overview: Our protocol assumes the existence of the following cryptographic tools: (i) A digital signature scheme \( \Pi_{DS} \) with the corresponding lockable signature algorithms LS, (ii) a UC-secure commitment scheme (Commit, Open) with unique openings, and (iii) a UC-secure MPC protocol \( \Gamma \) for general functions.

We also assume the transaction expiry functionality from the underlying blockchain that invalidates a transaction if the transaction is unspent and a pre-specified time has passed. In Section V-D, we discuss how this can be realized in practice.

Our generic PCN protocol formally described in Figure 7 proceeds in three phases, namely, a (one-time) setup phase, a lock phase and a release phase.

Setup Phase. The sender \( P_1 \) plays the role of a (special) party \( P_0 \) and sets up a local 3-party payment channel with each successive pair of users. To do this, party \( P_0 \) along with parties \( P_1, P_2, \ldots, P_n \) (for \( i \in [n-1] \)), run an MPC protocol \( \Gamma \) to generate (i) a new joint public key \( PK_1 \) for the corresponding secret key \( sk_1 \), (ii) a commitment \( c_1 \) to the opening information \( d_1 \) (corresponding to the commitment \( c_1 \)). The commitment \( c_1 \) will force the parties to use consistent inputs (i.e. shares of the secret key) in the MPC run during the locking phase. Once the MPC successfully terminates, party \( P_1 \) and \( P_2 \) jointly generate a transaction \( \text{txSetup}_i \) that transfers \( v \) coins from 2-PC (sending address) to the newly generated joint key \( PK_1 \), referred to as 3-PC (recipient address).

Note that in an honest run of the protocol, this setup transaction \( \text{txSetup}_i \) is never published on the chain and only kept among the parties \( P_0, P_1, P_2 \) locally. It acts as a safeguard for the sender \( P_1 \) who wants to ensure that no two intermediate parties \( P_i, P_{i+1} \) can release the payments without his permission. Additionally, if the payment channel
2-PC$_i$’s expiry time was $t_i$, the setup transaction $tx_{Setup,i}$ is set to have a expiry time $t_{Setup,i} = t_i - T$, where $T$ is some system parameter. This is to ensure that even if the sender $P_1$ (or $P_0$) goes offline and coins from $tx_{Setup,i}$ remain unspent, parties $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ can still get back the locked coins from $tx_{Setup,i}$. Once they get the coins back to 2-PC$_i$ from 3-PC$_i$, they can make payments in the remaining time $T$ after which the channel 2-PC$_i$ itself expires.

**Lock Phase.** Parties $P_0, P_1, P_1, P_1, P_{i+1}$ (for $i \in [2, n-1]$), run the MPC $\Gamma$ to set up the lock $\ell k_{i-1}$ that is received by $P_i$. The locked signature in $\ell k_{i-1}$ is $\sigma_{i-1}$, which is a signature on the transaction $tx_{pay,i-1}$ under the key $pk_{i-1}$ (or 3-PC$_{i-1}$). Here the transaction $tx_{pay,i-1}$ pays $v$ coins from 3-PC$_{i-1}$ to a key $pk_i$ of party $P_i$. A critical requirement of the MPC protocol is that it must ensure that the locked signature $\sigma_{i-1}$ in the lock $\ell k_{i-1}$ is actually the locking signature for lock $\ell k_{i-2}$, and so on. This is done by checking that the parties provide as input valid shares of the secret key contained in the commitment $c_i$, which is verified inside of the MPC protocol.

For the final lock, party $P_0, P_0, P_1, P_n$ and (a special) party $P_{n+1}$ (again played by the sender $P_1$) setup the lock $\ell k_{n-1}$ whose locking signature $\sigma_n$ is a signature on some (arbitrary) message $tx_{pay,n}$ under the public key $pk_n$ (shared among $P_0, P_{n+1}$ and $P_n$).

Notice that $tx_{pay,i-1}$ expires $\Delta$ time units after $tx_{pay,i}$. This is to ensure that party $P_i$ has enough time in the release phase (described below), to learn $\sigma_{i-1}$ and get paid by $tx_{pay,i-1}$ after $P_{i+1}$ gets paid by $tx_{pay,i}$. This requirement is the same as what is required in [2].

**Release Phase.** Once the payment locks have been established until the recipient $P_n$, the sender $P_1$ along with the receiver $P_n$, jointly unlock $\ell k_{n-1}$. This is done by running the MPC protocol $\Gamma$ to compute $\sigma_n$ on $tx_{pay,n}$ using their $(P_0, P_n, P_{n+1})$ shares of the secret key $sk_n$.

$P_n$ learns $\sigma_n$ using which it reveals the signature $\sigma_{i-1}$ on $tx_{pay,n-1}$, by executing the Unlock algorithm. Party $P_n$ then sends $\sigma_{i-1}$ to party $P_{n-1}$ using which $P_{n-1}$ can unlock $\ell k_{n-2}$, and so on. The cascade ends with party $P_2$ learning $\sigma_1$, thus concluding one payment of $v$ coins from $P_1$ to $P_n$.

We stress that in case all parties are honest, then no information about the payment is posted on the blockchain. Thus subsequent payments can happen by simply overwriting this information (i.e. the locks). On the other hand, if any party $P_i$ wants to close the channel with $P_{i-1}$, it can post the transactions $tx_{Setup,i-1}$ and $tx_{pay,i-1}$ along with valid signatures for both transactions before either of them expire.

**Security Analysis.** The following theorem states the security of our protocol and we defer the proof to Appendix [C].

**Theorem 5.1:** Let LS be a hiding and an unlockable lockable signature scheme with respect to the signature scheme $\Pi_{DS}$ that is strongly unforgeable. Let $(Commit, Open)$ be a UC-secure commitment scheme and $\Gamma$ be a UC-secure MPC for general functions. Then, the PCN described in Figure [7] with access to $(F_{\mathcal{S}}, F_{\text{stmt}}, F_{\text{clock}})$ UC-realizes the functionality $F_{\text{PCN}}$ (Figure [10]).

### C. Construction II: PCNs for BLS Signatures

We now describe our BLS-based PCN protocol where the settings are identical to Section V-B. However, the structure and properties of BLS signatures will allow us to design a PCN with significant efficiency improvements. For example, the joint generation of a shared public key can be done “non-interactively” by simply setting $pk = pk_0 \cdot pk_1$ and $sk = sk_0 + sk_1$. Then a valid signature under $pk$ is an aggregate of a signature under $pk_0$ and a signature under $pk_1$.

1) **Overview:** As before, we describe the payment protocol in three (setup, locking, and release) phases. A formal description of our scheme can be found in Figure 8.

**Setup Phase.** During this phase, parties $P_0, P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ (for $i \in [n-1]$), jointly generate $pk_i$ such that each party has a 3-out-of-3 share of the corresponding secret key $sk_i$. Similar to the generic construction, $P_0$ and $P_{n+1}$ are special parties whose role is played by the sender $P_i$. To prevent rogue key attacks [9], each party proves the knowledge of its secret share using a NIZK for the language, $\mathcal{L}_{\text{DL}} := \{\text{stmt} = pk : \exists sk \ s.t. \ (pk := g_1^{sk})\}$. Since BLS signatures are unique to the message and the public key, we do not need an explicit commitment to the secret key.

**Lock Phase.** Our interactive payment lock phase between $P_0, P_{n-1}, P_{n-1}$ (for $i \in [n-1]$), proceeds in rounds. At the end of $P_i$ obtains a lock $\ell k_{i-1} := \sigma_{i-1} \cdot \sigma_i$ where $\sigma_{i-1}$ is a valid signature on $tx_{pay,i-1}$ under 3-PC$_{i-1}$ and $\sigma_i$ is a valid signature on $tx_{pay,i}$ under 3-PC$_i$. The interactions are designed to ensure that it is infeasible for $P_{i+1}$ to produce $\sigma_i$ without colluding with $P_0$ and $P_i$. Similarly, $P_{i-1}$ cannot output $\sigma_{i-1}$ without colluding with $P_0$ and $P_i$. At the end of the locking phase, parties $P_0, P_{n-1}, P_n$ and $P_{n+1}$ establish a lock $\ell k_{n-1} := \sigma_{n-1} \cdot \sigma_n$, where $\sigma_n$ is a signature on some (arbitrary) message $tx_{pay,n}$ generated by $P_0$ and $P_n$.

**Release Phase.** This phase is initiated by $P_0$ by computing $\sigma_n$. Starting from $P_n$, all parties can progressively start unlocking their signatures: for $i \in [n, 2]$ party $P_i$ learns $\sigma_{i-1}$ by simply computing $\ell k_{i-1} / \sigma_i$, i.e. by extracting $\sigma_{i-1}$ from the aggregate of the two signatures. Note that the uniqueness of the signature allows us to ensure that the extraction is always successful for intermediate users.

**Security Analysis.** The following theorem establishes the security of our BLS-based PCN protocol and we defer the proof to Appendix [D].

**Theorem 5.2:** Let $(\mathcal{P}_{\text{NIZK, Ck}}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{NIZK, Ck}})$ be a UC secure NIZK and let $(\mathcal{G}_0, \mathcal{G}_1, \mathcal{G}_\ell)$ be a CDH-hard bilinear group. Then the PCN protocol described in Figure 8 with access to $(F_{\mathcal{S}}, F_{\text{stmt}}, F_{\text{clock}})$ UC-realizes the functionality $F_{\text{PCN}}$ (Figure 10) in the random oracle model.

### D. On the Transaction Expiry Functionality

For our PCN protocols we assume that the blockchain offers an expiration functionality, where transactions can be set to expire after some time. In practice, the standard way to realise such an expiry time of a transaction $tx_A$ is to set an $\text{LockTime}$ field in the script of another transaction $tx_B$ that spends from
Input: For $i \in [n-1]$, parties $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ share a payment channel 2-PC$_i$ with channel expiry $t_i$. For each channel 2-PC$_i$, party $P_i$ has a secret signing key $sk_{P,i}^{(i)}$ and party $P_{i+1}$ has a secret signing key $sk_{P,i+1}^{(i+1)}$. All parties are aware of the system parameters $\Delta \in \mathbb{N}$ and $T \in \mathbb{N}$. We consider party $P_0$ the sender of the payment, to play the role of a $P_0$ in the below protocol.

**Payment Setup Phase**

Parties $P_0, P_1, P_{i+1}$ for $i \in [n-1]$ do the following:

1. They engage in the execution of the MPC protocol $\Gamma$ for the following functionality:
   - Compute $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.KGen(1^\lambda)$ and $(c_i, d_i) \leftarrow \Pi_{C}.Commit(1^\lambda, sk_i)$.
   - Sample uniformly at random $(sk_i^{(0)}, sk_i^{(i)}, sk_i^{(i+1)})$ and $(d_i^{(0)}, d_i^{(i)}, d_i^{(i+1)})$ such that $sk_i = sk_i^{(0)} + sk_i^{(i)} + sk_i^{(i+1)}$ and $d_i = d_i^{(0)} + d_i^{(i)} + d_i^{(i+1)}$.
   - Return $(pk_i, c_i, sk_i^{(0)}, d_i^{(0)}), (pk_i, c_i, sk_i^{(i)}, d_i^{(i)}), (pk_i, c_i, sk_i^{(i+1)}, d_i^{(i+1)})$ to $P_0, P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$, respectively.

2. Parties $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ do the following:
   - Generate $tx_{Setup,i} = tx(2\text{-}PC_i, 3\text{-}PC_i, v_i)$ with transaction expiry time $t_{Setup,i} = t_i - T$, where $3\text{-}PC_i := pk_i$.
   - Run the MPC protocol $\Gamma$ to generate $\sigma_{s,i} \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.Sign(sk_{P,i}^{(i)}, sk_{P,i+1}^{(i+1)}, tx_{Setup,i})$.
   - Send $(tx_{Setup,i}, \sigma_{s,i}, t_{Setup,i})$ to $P_0$.

**Payment Lock Phase**

Parties $P_0, P_{i-1}, P_i, P_{i+1}$ for $i \in [2, n-1]$ generate a payment lock for party $P_i$ by doing the following:

1. Particles $P_0, P_{i-1}, P_i, P_{i+1}$ generate $tx_{pay,i-1} = tx(3\text{-}PC_{i-1}, pk_i^*, v)$ with payment expiry time $t_{i-1}$ and parties $P_0, P_i, P_{i+1}$ generate $tx_{pay,i} = tx(3\text{-}PC_i, pk_{i+1}^*, v)$ with payment expiry time $t_i$, such that $t_{i-1} = t_i + \Delta$.

2. Party $P_0$ sends $(3\text{-}PC_{i-1}, c_{i-1})$ to party $P_{i+1}$ and sends $(3\text{-}PC_i, c_i)$ to party $P_{i-1}$.

3. Parties $P_0, P_{i-1}, P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ engage in the MPC protocol $\Gamma$, to compute $\ell_{k_{i-1}} \leftarrow \text{Lock}(\sigma_{s-1,i}, \sigma_i)$, where $\sigma_{s-1,i} \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.Sign(sk_{i-1}, tx_{pay,i-1})$ and $\sigma_i \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.Sign(sk_i, tx_{pay,i})$. Specifically, the MPC takes as input $(pk_{i-1}, c_{i-1}, pk_i, c_i)$ from all parties these parties and as private inputs $\{(sk_{i-1}^{(0)}, d_{i-1}^{(0)}), (sk_i^{(0)}, d_i^{(0)})\}$ from $P_0$, $(sk_{i-1}^{(i-1)}, d_{i-1}^{(i-1)})$ from $P_{i-1}$, $\{(sk_{i-1}^{(i)}, d_{i-1}^{(i)}), (sk_i^{(i)}, d_i^{(i)})\}$ from $P_i$ and $(sk_i^{(i+1)}, d_i^{(i+1)})$ from $P_{i+1}$. The MPC computes the following functionality:
   - Check whether $sk_{i-1}^{(0)} + sk_{i-1}^{(i-1)} + sk_i^{(i-1)} = \Pi_{C}.Open(d_{i-1}^{(0)} + d_{i-1}^{(i-1)} + d_{i}^{(i)}, c_{i-1})$ and $sk_i^{(0)} + sk_i^{(i)} + sk_i^{(i+1)} = \Pi_{C}.Open(d_i^{(0)} + d_i^{(i)} + d_i^{(i+1)}, c_i)$ and abort otherwise.
   - Compute $\sigma_{s-1} \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.Sign(sk_{i-1}^{(0)} + sk_{i-1}^{(i-1)} + sk_i^{(i-1)}, tx_{pay,i-1})$.
   - Compute $\sigma_i \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.Sign(sk_i^{(0)} + sk_i^{(i)} + sk_i^{(i+1)}, tx_{pay,i})$.
   - Return $\ell_{k_{i-1}} = \text{Lock}(\sigma_{s-1,i}, \sigma_i)$ to $P_i$.

4. Parties $P_0, P_{n-1}, P_n, P_{n+1}$ where $P_{n+1}$ is party $P_1$, run the above steps that returns $\ell_{k_{n-1}} := \text{Lock}(\sigma_{s-1,n}, \sigma_n)$ to $P_n$. Here $\sigma_{s-1,n} \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.Sign(sk_{n-1}, tx_{pay,n-1})$ and $\sigma_n \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.Sign(sk_n, tx_{pay,n})$. Transaction $tx_{pay,n}$ is some message known to $P_0$ and $P_n$ and $sk_n$ is a secret key shared among $P_0, P_{n} \text{ and } P_n$.

**Payment Release Phase**

The sender (parties $P_0, P_{n+1}$) initiates the payment release by jointly generating $\sigma_n \leftarrow \Pi_{DS}.Sign(sk_n, tx_{pay,n})$ with $P_n$ via the MPC protocol $\Gamma$. Parties $P_i$ for $i \in [n, 2]$ do the following:

1. Release the locks by computing $\sigma_{s-1,i} \leftarrow \text{Unlock}(3\text{-}PC_i, tx_{pay,i}, \sigma_i, 3\text{-}PC_{i-1}, tx_{pay,i-1}\ell_{k_{i-1}})$.

2. Store $(tx_{Setup,i-1}, \sigma_{s-1,i}, tx_{pay,i-1}, \sigma_{s-1})$ to post on the blockchain if the case arises.

Fig. 7: Generic Payment Channel Network Protocol run between parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$.
We consider party $P_1$ the sender of the payment, to play the role of a $P_0$ in the below protocol.

**Payment Setup Phase**

Parties $P_0, P_i, P_{i+1}$ for $i \in [n-1]$ (Party $P_{n+1}$, is just a copy of party $P_n$) do the following:

1) Each party $P_j$, $j \in \{0, i, i+1\}$, executes the following steps:
   - Sample $(pk^{(i)}_i, sk^{(i)}_i) \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS}.KGen(1^\lambda)$
   - Generate $\pi^{(i)}_i \leftarrow \Pi_{NIZK.CDL}(pk^{(i)}_i, sk^{(i)}_i)$ and send $(pk^{(i)}_i, \pi^{(i)}_i)$ to other parties
   - Verify if the proof $\pi^{(i)}_k$, $k \in \{0, i, i+1\}/j$ of other parties is correct by checking $\Pi_{NIZK.CDL}(pk^{(k)}_i, \pi^{(k)}_i) = 1$. If any one of the proof does not verify, the party aborts.
   - The final public key is $pk_i \leftarrow \prod_{j \in \{0, i, i+1\}} pk^{(j)}_i$
   - Return $(pk_i, sk^{(0)}_i)$, $(pk_i, sk^{(i+1)}_i)$ and $(pk_i, sk^{(i+1)}_i)$ to $P_0, P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$, respectively.

2) Parties $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ do the following:
   - Generate $tx_{\text{Setup}, i} = tx(2-\text{PC}_i, 3-\text{PC}_i, v_i)$ with transaction expiry time $t_{\text{Setup}, i} = t_i - T$, where $3-\text{PC}_i := pk_i$ generates $\ell_{i-1}$ and sends $\ell_{i-1}$ to $P_{i+1}$ and aborts otherwise.
   - Send $(tx_{\text{Setup}, i}, \sigma_{s,i}, t_{\text{Setup}, i})$ to $P_0$ and $P_0$ verifies if the transaction is correctly formed and checks if $\Pi_{BLS.V}(2-\text{PC}_i, tx_{\text{Setup}, i}, \sigma_{s,i}) = 1$, and aborts otherwise.

**Payment Lock Phase**

Parties $P_0, P_i, P_{i+1}$ for $i \in [2, n-1]$ generate a payment lock for party $P_i$ by doing the following:

1) Parties $P_0, P_{i-1}, P_i$ generate $tx_{\text{pay}, i-1} = tx(3-\text{PC}_i-1, pk^*_i, v)$ with payment expiry time $t_{i-1}$ and parties $P_0, P_i, P_{i+1}$ generates $tx_{\text{pay}, i} = tx(3-\text{PC}_i, pk^{(i+1)}_i, v)$ with payment expiry time $t_i$, such that $t_{i-1} = t_i + \Delta$.
2) Party $P_0$ sends $3-\text{PC}_i-1$ to party $P_{i+1}$ and sends $3-\text{PC}_i$ to party $P_{i-1}$.
3) Parties $P_0, P_{i-1}, P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ engage in the following interactive protocol to compute $\ell_{k-1} \leftarrow \text{Lock}(\sigma_{i-1}, \sigma_i)$ where $\sigma_{i-1} \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Sign}}(sk^{(i-1)}_i, tx_{\text{pay}, i-1})$ and $\sigma_i \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Sign}}(sk^{(i)}_i, tx_{\text{pay}, i})$. The common input all parties is $(pk_{i-1}, pk_i)$ and as private inputs $P_0$ has $(sk^{(0)}_i, sk^{(0)}_i)$, $P_{i-1}$ has $(sk^{(i-1)}_i, sk^{(i-1)}_i)$ and $P_{i+1}$ has $(sk^{(i+1)}_i, sk^{(i+1)}_i)$.

   - (Round 1): $P_{i-1}$ generates $\sigma^{(i-1)}_{i-1} \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Sign}}(sk^{(i-1)}_{i-1}, tx_{\text{pay}, i-1})$ and sends $\sigma^{(i-1)}_{i-1}$ to $P_i$. Party $P_i$ aborts if $\Pi_{BLS.\text{V}}(pk^{(i-1)}_{i-1}, tx_{\text{pay}, i-1}, \sigma^{(i-1)}_{i-1}) = 0$ and continues otherwise.

   - (Round 2): $P_{i+1}$ generates $\sigma^{(i+1)}_{i+1} \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Sign}}(sk^{(i+1)}_{i+1}, tx_{\text{pay}, i})$ and sends $\sigma^{(i+1)}_{i+1}$ to $P_i$. Party $P_i$ aborts if $\Pi_{BLS.\text{V}}(pk^{(i+1)}_{i+1}, tx_{\text{pay}, i}, \sigma^{(i+1)}_{i+1}) = 0$ and continues otherwise.

   - (Round 3): $P_0$ generates $\sigma^{(0)}_0 \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Sign}}(sk^{(0)}_0, tx_{\text{pay}, i-1})$ and $\sigma^{(0)}_0 \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Sign}}(sk^{(0)}_i, tx_{\text{pay}, i})$. It computes $\sigma' \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Agg}}(\sigma^{(0)}_0, \sigma^{(0)}_i)$ and sends $\sigma'$ to $P_i$. Party $P_i$ aborts if $\Pi_{BLS.\text{V}}(pk^{(0)}_0, pk^{(0)}_i, tx_{\text{pay}, i-1}, tx_{\text{pay}, i}, \sigma') = 0$ and continues otherwise.

   - Party $P_i$ generates signatures $\sigma^{(i)}_{i-1} \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Sign}}(sk^{(i)}_{i-1}, tx_{\text{pay}, i-1})$ and $\sigma^{(i)}_i \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Sign}}(sk^{(i)}_i, tx_{\text{pay}, i})$. It then sets $\ell_{k-1} := \Pi_{BLS.\text{Agg}}(\sigma^{(i-1)}_0, \sigma^{(i)}_0, \sigma^{(i-1)}_i, \sigma^{(i-1)}_i, \sigma^{(i)}_i)$.

4) Parties $P_0, P_{n-1}, P_n, P_{n+1}$ where $P_{n+1}$ is party $P_1$, run the above steps that returns $\ell_{k-1} := l_1 \cdot l_2$ to $P_n$ where $l_1 := \sigma_{n-1}$ and $l_2 := \sigma_n$. Here $\sigma_{n-1}$ is a signature on transaction $tx_{\text{pay}, n-1} := tx(3-\text{PC}_n-1, pk^*_n, v)$ and $\sigma_n \leftarrow \Pi_{BLS.\text{Sign}}(sk_n, tx_{\text{pay}, n})$ is a signature on some message $tx_{\text{pay}, n}$ (known to $P_0, P_{n+1}$ and $P_n$) under public key $pk_n$.

The sender (parties $P_0, P_{n+1}$) initiates the payment release by jointly generating $\sigma_n$ with $P_n$. Parties $P_i$ for $i \in [1, 2]$ do the following:

1) Check if $\Pi_{BLS.\text{V}}(pk_i, tx_{\text{pay}, i}, \sigma_i) = 1$ and if so, release the locks by computing $\sigma_{i-1} := \ell_{k-1}/\sigma_{i-1} = \Pi_{BLS.\text{UnLock}}(pk^{(i)}_{i-1}, tx_{\text{pay}, i}, pk_i, tx_{\text{pay}, i}, \sigma_i, \ell_{k-1})$.

2) Store $(tx_{\text{Setup}, i-1}, \sigma_s, i-1, tx_{\text{pay}, i-1}, \sigma_{i-1})$ to post on the blockchain if the case arises.

**Fig. 8:** BLS based Payment Channel Network Protocol run between parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$.
Our BLS-based PCN protocol and we further note that the same trade-off is common to other works in the literature (e.g. [3]).

**Efficiency and Comparison.** We consider an $n$ party payment path for the PCN. Given that the PCN protocols of [3] also follows a similar structure, we compare the timing cost of the operations performed in each phase: The payment setup, payment lock, and payment release. We measured the costs on a local machine with 1.8 GHz Octa-Core Intel Core i7-8550U processor and 16 GB 2133 MHz LPDDR3 memory. We used the python libraries charm [56] and BLS signature library blspy [57] for evaluating the ECDSA/Schnorr-based PCN protocol [3] and our BLS-based PCN protocol, respectively. We ran the operations 10K times and the measurements (taken as the average) are reported in Table II. From [2], [3], we can also see that multi-hop HTLC based payments where $n = 5$, takes about 5 seconds to complete with a communication cost of 17 MB. This is much more expensive than the scriptless variants. For extensive comparisons with non-private PCN protocols and HTLC based protocols we refer the reader to [3].

In measuring the efficiency of the payment setup phase we also consider the time to sign a revoke transaction $tx_{revoke,i}$ for every $tx_{Setup,i}$ (recall that $tx_{revoke,i}$ was used to realize the expiry of the 3-party channel $3$-PC$_i$). Notice that the payment lock phase is interactive, with 3 rounds of messages being sent to party $P_i$ who sets the lock $\ell_k_{i-1}$. While we do not consider the network latency in our measurements, this does not constitute the efficiency bottleneck of our approach.

**TABLE I**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>$P_{\text{NIZK,DL}_i}$</th>
<th>$\mathcal{V}_{\text{NIZK,DL}_i}$</th>
<th>$\Pi_{\text{BLS,Gen}_i}$</th>
<th>$\Pi_{\text{BLS,Sign}_i}$</th>
<th>$\Pi_{\text{BLS,Off}_i}$</th>
<th>$\Pi_{\text{BLS,Off}_i}$</th>
<th>$\Pi_{\text{BLS,Off}_i}$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$P_i$</td>
<td>$n + 1$</td>
<td>$2n$</td>
<td>$n + 1$</td>
<td>$n$</td>
<td>$n - 1$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$P_{i+1}$</td>
<td>$2$</td>
<td>$4$</td>
<td>$2$</td>
<td>$2$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td>$0$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| $tx_A$. Transaction $tx_B$ is accepted on the chain only if the number in its $n$LockTime field is larger than or equal to the current chain height. Therefore, if $tx_A$ is on the chain and remains unspent until the expiry time (the number in $n$LockTime field of $tx_B$), transaction $tx_B$ can be posted on the chain thereby spending from $tx_A$.

Although the setup transaction $tx_{Setup,i}$ is only kept locally and never posted on the chain, a malicious sender $P_i$ may post $tx_{Setup,i}$ on the blockchain and go offline. Parties $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ would end up locking their funds in 3-PC$_i$ forever. To prevent such a DoS attack, each party may generate a revoke transaction $tx_{revoke,i} := tx_{3\text{-PC}_i, 2\text{-PC}_i, v_i}$ with its $n$LockTime set such that it is enforceable only after time $t_{\text{Setup},i}$. This feature is available in most scripting languages. The revoke transaction $tx_{revoke,i}$ in this case can be posted on the blockchain after time $t_{\text{Setup},i}$ and the parties $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$ can get their funds back.

We could also adapt our protocol according to a recent work [51], which would let us eliminate the need for the $n$LockTime script entirely, while using time-lock puzzles [52] and a script to delay the spending of the output of a transaction, relative to the time of posting that transaction on chain.

**E. On the Privacy our PCN Protocols**

In both of our PCN protocols, the keys involved in the same payment path are not correlated to the eyes of an external observer. Thus, they achieve the same notion of on-chain privacy as in existing proposals based on scriptless scripts [3]. For off-chain privacy, our generic protocol reveals to the intermediate node $P_i$ the identity of (i) the sender $P_0$, (ii) its neighbours $P_{i-1}$ and $P_{i+1}$, and (iii) the neighbours’ neighbours $P_{i-2}$ and $P_{i+2}$, in that session. On the other hand, in our BLS-based protocol the corrupted intermediate user only learn the identities of the sender and of the direct neighbours (same as in [3]).

**VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EFFICIENCY ANALYSIS**

We implemented our BLS-based PCN protocol and we compare its performance against the Schnorr and ECDSA based PCN protocols from [3].

**Instantiations.** The three PCN protocols under consideration make use of a NIZK ($P_{\text{NIZK,DL}_i}, \mathcal{V}_{\text{NIZK,DL}_i}$) for $\mathcal{DL}$ which we instantiate with the Schnorr identification scheme [53] and make non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir transformation [54]. While this scheme is not known to be UC-secure (the classical proof [55] is in the stand-alone model) we view this as a reasonable compromise in favor of a more efficient protocol.

1Bitcoin scripting language offers this feature with the script CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY.

**TABLE II**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Setup</td>
<td>Time Comm.</td>
<td>1.75 n</td>
<td>1.91 n</td>
<td>19.43 n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>128 n</td>
<td>128 n</td>
<td>242 n</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lock</td>
<td>Time Comm.</td>
<td>4.58 $(n-1)$</td>
<td>38.81 $(n-1)$</td>
<td>13.78 $(n-1)$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>256 $(n-1)$</td>
<td>416 $(n-1)$</td>
<td>196 $(n-1)$</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Release</td>
<td>Time Comm.</td>
<td>0.0009 n</td>
<td>1.95 n</td>
<td>0.39 n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The more expensive setup phase for our BLS-based PCN protocol comes from the generation of a 3-party local channel. We provide a more detailed overview of the operations that constitute the setup phase and their computational costs in Table II. For the lock phase, our BLS-based protocol performs significantly better when compared to the ECDSA/Schnorr variants: The signature and key aggregation property of BLS signatures help significantly reduce the communication costs,
while the uniqueness property of the signatures help in saving computation, as we discuss below.

Optimizations. We observe that, in the execution of two consequent locking phase, each intermediate party \( P_i \) has to generate two pairs signatures \( \sigma_{i-1} \) on \( tx_{pay,i-1} \) and \( \sigma_i \) on \( tx_{pay,i} \), respectively. Since BLS signatures are unique, we can safely generate each signature exactly once. Furthermore, reduce the cost of the sender by half, leveraging a similar observation. A naive implementation of our protocol (Figure 8) would require the sender to run \( \Pi_{BLS} \) Sign and \( \Pi_{BLS} \) Agg, 2n times each, twice for each lock, during the lock phase. However, since the sender has to send signatures on the same transaction twice with respect to the same secret key, he only needs to run the signing algorithm once and re-send the same signature. For additional clarity, we report the computation cost in the payment lock phase in terms of the number of signature operations of a BLS signature in Table III.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>( \Pi_{BLS} ) Sign</th>
<th>( \Pi_{BLS} ) VF</th>
<th>( \Pi_{BLS} ) Agg</th>
<th>( \Pi_{BLS} ) VF Agg</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( P_i )</td>
<td>n + 1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>n − 1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( P_{i+1} )</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

VII. Conclusion

In this work we introduced the notion of lockable signatures as the cornerstone to construct PCNs. As a result we obtain a PCN protocol that does not require any special scripts and is compatible with any signature scheme. Our approach expands the scope of PCNs to signature schemes with extra properties (e.g. aggregatable, post-quantum secure, etc.) and facilitates payments across different chains. Our BLS-based PCN protocol is the first that is fully compatible with the BLS signature scheme and makes lightweight use of cryptographic tools, thus offering competitive performances. As an exciting next step, we plan to explore the large scale adoption of our BLS-based construction as to study the benefits offered by the signature aggregation in the context of PCNs.

Acknowledgments

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[51] “Personal communication,” To appear at CCS 2020,


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**Open Channel:** On input \((\text{OpChannel}, c_{(u,u')}, v, u', t, f)\) from a user \(u\), the functionality checks whether \(c_{(u,u')}\) is well-formed (contains valid identifiers and it is not a duplicate) and eventually sends \((c_{(u,u')}, v, t, f)\) to \(u'\), who can either abort or authorize the operation. In the latter case, the functionality appends the tuple \((c_{(u,u')}, v, t, f)\) to \(\mathbb{B}\) and the tuple \((c_{(u,u')}, v, t, h)\) to \(\mathcal{P}\), for some random \(h\). The functionality returns \(h\) to \(u\) and \(u'\).

**Close Channel:** On input \((\text{CChannel}, c_{(u,u')}, h)\) from either user \(u\) or \(u'\), the ideal functionality parses \(\mathbb{B}\) for an entry \((c_{(u,u')}, v, t, f)\) and \(\mathcal{P}\) for an entry \((c_{(u,u')}, v', t', h)\), for \(h \neq \bot\). If \(c_{(u,u')} \in \mathcal{L}\) or either \(t\) or \(t'\) is past the current time, the functionality aborts. Otherwise the functionality adds \((c_{(u,u')}, u', v', t')\) to \(\mathbb{B}\) and adds \((c_{(u,u')}, h)\) to \(\mathcal{L}\). The functionality then notifies other parties with the message \((c_{(u,u')}, \bot, h)\).

**Pay:** On input \((\text{payChannel}, v, c_{(u_0,u_2)}, \ldots, c_{(u_n,u_{n+1})}, (t_0, \ldots, t_n))\) from a user \(u_0\), the functionality executes the following interactive protocol:

- For all \(i \in \{1, \ldots, n+1\}\), it samples a random \(h_i\) and parses \(\mathbb{B}\) for an entry of the form \((c_{(u_{i-1},u_i)}, v_i, t_i, f_i)\). If such an entry does exist, it sends the tuple \((u_0, h_{i-i}, h_i, h_{i+1}, h_{i+2}, c_{(u_{i-2},u_{i-1})}, c_{(u_{i-1},u_i)}, c_{(u_{i},u_{i+1})}, c_{(u_{i+1},u_{i+2})}, v - \sum_{j=1}^n f_j, t_{i-2}, t_{i-1}, t_i, t_{i+1})\) to the user \(u_i\) via an anonymous channel (for the specific case of the receiver the tuple is only \((h_{i+1}, c_{(u_{i},u_{i+1})}, v, t_n))\). Then it checks whether for all entries of the form \((c, v', t', h)\) in \(\mathcal{P}\) it holds that \(v' \geq v - \sum_{j=1}^n f_j\) and that \(t_i \geq t_i\). If this is the case it adds \(d_i = (c_{(u_{i-1},u_i)}, (v_i - (v - \sum_{j=1}^n f_j), t_i, \bot))\) to \(\mathcal{P}\), where \((c_{(u_{i-1},u_i)}, v_i, t_i, h_i)\) is the entry with the lowest \(v_i\). If any of the conditions above is not met, it removes from \(\mathcal{P}\) all the entries \(d_i\) added in this phase and aborts.

- For all \(i \in \{(n+1), \ldots, 1\}\), it queries all \(u_i\) with \((h_i, h_{i+1})\), through an anonymous channel. Each user can reply with either \(T\) or \(\bot\). Let \(j\) be the index of the user that returns \(\bot\) such that for all \(i > j\) : \(u_i\) returned \(T\). If no user returned \(\bot\) we set \(j = 0\).

- For all \(i \in \{j+1, \ldots, n\}\) the ideal functionality updates \(d_i \in \mathcal{P}\) (defined as above) to \((\bot, \bot, -\), \(h_i)\) and notifies the user of the success of the operation with with some distinguished message (\(\text{success}, h_i, h_{i+1}\)). For all \(i \in \{0, \ldots, j\}\) (if \(j \neq 0\)), it removes \(d_i\) from \(\mathcal{P}\) and notifies the user with the message \((\bot, h_i, h_{i+1})\).

**Fig. 10:** Ideal functionality \(\mathcal{F}_{\text{PCN}}\) for PCNs (with weaker off-chain privacy).

**Fig. 11:** Aggregate Extraction experiment

\[
\text{ExpAgExt}_{A,G_0,G_1,G_2}(1^k, k) \\
x_i, y_i \leftarrow Z_k, \forall i \in [k] \\
\sigma \leftarrow \sum_{i \in [k]} x_i y_i \\
\langle \sigma', t' \rangle \leftarrow A((g_1^{x_i}, g_2^{y_i})_{i \in [k]}, \sigma) \\
b_0 := (0 \neq t' \in [k]) \\
b_i := \langle \sigma'' = g_0^{\sum_{j=1}^{i} x_j y_j} \rangle \\
\text{return } b_0 \wedge b_1
\]

for \(\ell \in [2, n-1]\) do

\[
r_{\ell+1}, s_{\ell+1} \leftarrow Z_k \\
g_{\ell+1} := (g_{\ell-1} \cdot g_{r_{\ell+1}}^{r_{\ell+1}})^{r_{\ell+1}} \\
\ell+1 := (H_{\ell-1} \cdot g_{\ell+1})^{r_{\ell+1}} \\
\sigma' := \sigma_{\ell-1} \cdot H_{\ell+1}
\]

It invokes the adversary \(A\) with inputs \((\{G_i, H_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\sigma_i\}_{i \in [n-1]})\). It receives a \((\sigma^{*}, j^{*})\) as output from \(A\). Reduction \(R\) checks if \(j^{*} \in [n]\), if not it aborts.

If \(j^{*}\) is odd, reduction \(R\) first computes \(F := H_1^{(r_3 + s_3 r_4 + s_4 r_5 + \cdots + s_r r_{r+1})^{r_{r+1}}}\). The reduction \(R\) outputs \((\sigma^{*}/F, 1)\) as its output to its own challenger.

If \(j^{*}\) is even, reduction \(R\) first computes \(F := H_2^{(r_3 + s_3 r_4 + \cdots + s_r r_{r+1})^{r_{r+1}}}\). The reduction \(R\) outputs \((\sigma^{*}/F, 2)\) as its output to its own challenger.

**Proof 3 (Proof of Theorem 3.7):** We will prove that the hardness of aggregate extraction assumption holds if and only if the hardness of chained aggregate extraction assumption holds.

**Only if.** We first show that "only if" condition holds. That is, aggregate extraction assumption for \(k = 2\) implies the chained aggregate extraction assumption. Assume towards the contrary that chained aggregate extraction assumption does not hold. This means there exists a PPT adversary \(A\) that wins the \(\text{ExpChAgExt}\) experiment with non-negligible probability. We construct a reduction algorithm \(R\) that participates in the \(\text{ExpAgExt}\) experiment while making use of \(A\) as a sub-routine.

The reduction \(R\) gets as input \((\{G_i, H_i\}_{i \in [2]}, \sigma)\). It sets \(\sigma_1 := \sigma\) and does the following.

To see why the view of \(A\) is correctly simulated, notice that \((r_3, s_3, r_4, s_4, \ldots, r_n, s_n)\) are chosen uniformly at random from \(\mathbb{Z}_{p}^*\), the values \((\{G_i, H_i\}_{i \in [n]}\) are uniformly distributed. By induction, we have the base case \(G_1 := g_1^{x_i}, H_1 := g_0^{y_i}, G_2 := g_1^{x_2}, H_2 := g_0^{y_2}, \sigma_1 := g_0^{y_1x_2+y_2x_1}\). By induction hypothesis, we have \(G_i := g_1^{x_i}, H_i := g_0^{y_i}, \sigma_{i-1} := g_0^{x_{i-1}y_i+x_i-1y_i-1}\).
Let was given as input with non-negligible probability, the reduction whatever signature A functionality real world execution protocol while interacting with the ideal protocol in Figure 7 securely US-realizes the PCN functionality.

By induction, we can see that the simulation by the reduction R is faithful to the execution in the experiment ExpChAgExt.

Let us analyse the case for j* is odd (the even case of analogously) why the reduction R’s output wins the experiment ExpAgExt. Notice that,

\[ G_{i+1} := g_{i+1} \left( \sum_{i=0}^{r-i-1} x_{i+1} \right) \]

where \( x_{i+1} := \frac{x_{i-1} + r_{i+1}}{s_{i+1}} \)

\[ H_{i+1} := g_{0}^{y_{i+1}} \]

\[ \sigma_{i} := \sigma_{i-1} \cdot H_{i} \rightarrow_{i+1} := g_{0}^{y_{i+1} \cdot x_{i} \cdot s_{i}} \]

\[ := g_{0}^{y_{i} \cdot x_{i} \cdot s_{i+1}} \]

Thus, \( \sigma^*/F := g_{0}^{y_{i+1}} \). Therefore (\( \sigma^*/F, 1 \)) is a winning output from R with respect to ExpAgExt.

Clearly R is efficient. Therefore, given our initial assumption that A outputs a winning (\( \sigma^*, j^* \)) with non-negligible probability in ExpAgExt, we have that R wins the experiment ExpChAgExt with the same non-negligible probability. But this means R is a PPT algorithm that breaks the aggregate extraction assumption, which is a contradiction. Hence it must be the case that no such PPT A can exist. This concludes the "only if" direction.

Proving this direction is trivial. Here we build a reduction algorithm R that plays in ExpChAgExt and runs a sub-routine A that is participating in ExpAgExt with k = 2. The reduction R receives a chained aggregate challenge and simply chooses one of the \( n - 1 \) aggregates at random and gives it to A. Now, whatever signature A outputs, R outputs the same signature along with the index of the chosen aggregate. It is easy to see that the simulation by R for the adversary A is faithful to ExpAgExt. If A outputs a valid extraction for the aggregate it was given as input with non-negligible probability, the reduction R is able to win ExpChAgExt with the same non-negligible probability. By contradiction, this proves the "if" direction.

C. Security Analysis of PCN Protocol for Any Signature

Proof 4 (Proof of Theorem 5.1): We now prove that our protocol in Figure 7 securely US-realizes the PCN functionality from Figure 10.

We describe a simulator S that handles subset of parties \( P_{1}, \ldots, P_{n} \) that are corrupted by a PPT A and simulates the real world execution protocol while interacting with the ideal functionality \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \). We have a static corruption where the environment \( E \) at the beginning of a session specifies the corrupted parties and the honest parties. The simulator S faithfully impersonates the honest parties. For operations exclusively among corrupted users, the environment does not expect any interaction with the simulator. Similarly, communications exclusively among honest nodes happen through secure channels and therefore the attacker does not gather any additional information other than the fact that the communication took place. For simplicity, we omit these operations in the description of our simulator. The random oracle H is simulated by S via lazy-sampling. The operations to be simulated for a PCN are described in the following.

Channel opening and channel closing follows immediately from the analysis from [2]. For the sake of completeness, we describe here the two cases taken in verbatim from [2].

Channel Opening. Let \( u_{1} \) be the user that initiates the request. We have two cases to analyze:

1) Corrupted \( u_{1} \): simulator S receives a \( (c(u_{1}, u_{2}), \beta, t, f) \) request from the adversary on behalf of \( u_{1} \) and initiates a two-user agreement protocol with A to convey upon a local fresh channel identifier \( c(u_{1}, u_{2}) \). If the protocol successfully terminates, S sends \( (open, c(u_{1}, u_{2}), \beta, t, f) \) to \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \), which eventually returns \( (c(u_{1}, u_{2}), h) \).

2) Corrupted \( u_{2} \): S receives a message \( (c(u_{1}, u_{2}), v, t, f) \) from \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \) engages the adversary A in a two-user-agreement protocol on behalf of \( u_{1} \) for the opening of the channel. If the execution is successful, S sends an accepting message to \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \) which returns \( (c(u_{1}, u_{2}), h) \), otherwise it outputs \( \bot \).

If the opening was successful the simulator initializes an empty list \( \mathcal{P}_{c(u_{1}, u_{2})} \) and appends the value \( (h, v, \bot, T) \).

Channel Closing. Let \( u_{1} \) be the user that initiates the request. We have two cases to analyze:

1) Corrupted \( u_{1} \): S receives a closing request from the adversary on behalf of \( u_{1} \), then it fetches \( \mathcal{P}_{c(u_{1}, u_{2})} \) for some value \( (h, v, m, \sigma) \). If such a value does not exist then it aborts. Otherwise it sends \( (close, c(u_{1}, u_{2}), h) \) to \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \).

2) Corrupted \( u_{2} \): S receives \( c(u_{1}, u_{2}), h, \bot \) from \( \mathcal{F}_{PCN} \) and simply notifies A of the closing of the channel \( c(u_{1}, u_{2}) \).

Channel Payment. In describing S’s operations for channel payment, we begin by describing a series of hybrid executions, where we begin with a real world execution and gradually change the simulation in these hybrids and then we argue about the proximity of neighbouring experiments. Simulator S’s execution for the payment operation is defined as the final hybrid’s execution. Below we describe the hybrid executions first and later argue about their proximity. Note that the switching of hybrid executions is performed over every session, but one at a time and we only discuss here a single time for simplicity and readability.

Hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_{0} \): This is the same as the real execution of the protocol in Figure 7.

Hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_{1} \): This is the same as the above execution except now the the MPC protocol in the payment setup phase is simulated using \( S_{mpc,1} \) for the corrupted parties.

Hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_{2} \): This is the same as in \( \mathcal{H}_{1} \) except now the MPC protocol for generating \( \sigma_{u} \) in the payment setup phase is simulated using \( S_{mpc,2} \).
Hybrid $H_3$: This is the same as in $H_2$ except now for all $i \in [2, n]$, the MPC protocol run between parties $P_0, P_{i-1}, P_i, P_{i+1}$ for generating $\ell_{k_{i-1}}$ is simulated on behalf of the honest parties using $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-3}}$. The simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-3}}$ simulates the view for the corrupted parties in the lock protocol.

Hybrid $H_4$: This is the same as in $H_3$ except now the MPC protocol in the release phase for generating $\sigma_i$ is replaced with a simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-4}}$. The simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-4}}$ simulates the view for the corrupted parties in the protocol for generating $\sigma_i$.

Hybrid $H_5$: Is the same execution as $H_4$, except now the function output (given as input to the MPC simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-3}}$) is computed differently. Specifically, for all $i \in [2, n]$, we no longer perform the following checks:

- $\text{sk}_{i-1}^{(i)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i}^{(i)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i-1}^{(i+1)} \equiv \Pi_{c} \text{Open}(d_{i-1}^{(i)} \oplus d_{i-1}^{(i+1)} \oplus d_{i}^{(i)}, c_{i-1})$
- $\text{sk}_{i}^{(i)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i}^{(i)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i+1}^{(i+1)} \equiv \Pi_{c} \text{Open}(d_{i}^{(i)} \oplus d_{i}^{(i)} \oplus d_{i+1}^{(i+1)}, c_{i})$

Instead, check if xor of the secret keys input by the adversary for the MPC protocol is equal to the xor of the adversarial keys obtained from the setup. Specifically, if for instance $P_{i-1}, P_i, P_{i+1}$ are corrupted and $P_0$ is honest, we have the following checks:

- $\text{sk}_{i-1}^{(i-1)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i+1}^{(i)} \equiv \text{sk}_{i}^{(i)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i}^{(i)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i-1}^{(i+1)}$ and $d_{i-1}^{(i)} + d_{i}^{(i)} + d_{i+1}^{(i)}$ where $(\text{sk}_{i-1}^{(i-1)}, d_{i-1}^{(i)})$ and $(\text{sk}_{i+1}^{(i)} + d_{i+1}^{(i+1)})$ were received by the adversary as output from the payment setup phase on behalf of corrupt $P_{i-1}$ and $P_i$.
- $\text{sk}_{i}^{(i)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i+1}^{(i+1)} \equiv \text{sk}_{i}^{(i)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i}^{(i)} \oplus \text{sk}_{i+1}^{(i+1)}$ and $d_{i}^{(i)} + d_{i}^{(i)} + d_{i+1}^{(i+1)}$ where $(\text{sk}_{i}^{(i)}, d_{i}^{(i)})$ and $(\text{sk}_{i+1}^{(i+1)}, d_{i+1}^{(i+1)})$ were received by the adversary as output from the payment setup phase on behalf of corrupt $P_i$ and $P_{i+1}$.

Here $(\text{sk}_{i-1}^{(i-1)}, d_{i-1}^{(i-1)}), (\text{sk}_{i+1}^{(i)}, d_{i+1}^{(i+1)}), (\text{sk}_{i}^{(i)}, d_{i}^{(i)}), (\text{sk}_{i}^{(i)}, d_{i+1}^{(i+1)})$ are the inputs that the adversary sends to the MPC protocol. The simulator extracts these inputs by interacting with the ideal functionality of the MPC protocol of Lock. The simulator uses $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-3}}$ to simulate the MPC of the Lock algorithm with this new check. The rest of the execution follows as the previous hybrid.

Hybrid $H_6$: Is the same execution as $H_5$, except now for all $i \in [n - 1]$ the shares of the opening information that adversary receives in the payment setup phase are switched to random strings. Specifically, if for example, $P_0, P_i, P_{i+1}$ are corrupt and $P_0$ is honest, $d_{i}^{(i)}, d_{i+1}^{(i)}$ that the adversary receives from the setup are switched to random strings.

Hybrid $H_7$: Is the same execution as $H_6$, except now for all $i \in [n - 1]$ the commitment $c_i$ that is generated by the payment setup phase are replaced with commitments to $0^n$, provided one of $P_0, P_i, P_{i+1}$ is honest on whose behalf $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-1}}$ simulates.

Hybrid $H_8$: Is the same execution as $H_7$ except now for all $i \in [n - 1]$ the public key $pk_i$ is randomly sampled and the adversarial shares of the secret key of the $pk_i$ are generated randomly provided one of $P_0, P_i, P_{i+1}$ is honest on whose behalf $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-1}}$ simulates.

Hybrid $H_9$: Is the same execution as $H_8$, except now for all $i \in [n - 1]$ the lock $\ell_k$ is hardcoded in the simulation by hardcoding first the signatures $\sigma_i$ and $\sigma_{i+1}$ in the simulation. Here $\sigma_i$ is a signature on $tx_{\text{pay},i}$ under the key $pk_i$ and $\sigma_{i+1}$ is a signature on $tx_{\text{pay},i+1}$ under the key $pk_{i+1}$.

Hybrid $H_{10}$: Is the same execution as $H_9$, except now for an honest $P_i$, if in some $q_i$-th session, the adversary outputs $\sigma^*$ such that $\Pi_{DS}.Vf(3-P\text{C}_{i+1}, tx_{\text{pay},i}, \sigma^*) = 1$, $\sigma^* \leftarrow \text{Unlock}(3-P\text{C}_i, tx_{\text{pay},i}, \sigma^*, 3-P\text{C}_{i-1}, tx_{\text{pay},i-1}, \ell_{k_{i-1}})$ and $\Pi_{DS}.Vf(3-P\text{C}_{i-1}, tx_{\text{pay},i-1}, \sigma^*) = 0$, the simulation aborts by outputting a special symbol $\text{abort}_1$. This abort happens when the adversary outputs a valid signature such that honest user $P_i$ pays the adversary through $tx_{\text{pay},i}$ but is unable to unlock a valid signature on $tx_{\text{pay},i-1}$ that pays to $P_i$.

Hybrid $H_{11}$: Is the same execution as $H_{10}$ except now, if in some $q_i$-th session, before an honest sender ($P_0$ or $P_0$) initiates the payment release, adversary $A$ outputs a signature $\sigma^*$ such that $\Pi_{DS}.Vf(3-P\text{C}_{i-1}, tx_{\text{pay},i-1}, \sigma_{i-1}) = 1$ the simulation aborts by outputting a special symbol $\text{abort}_2$. This abort happens when the adversary is able to unlock a lock correctly before the sender $P_i$ initiates the unlock process.

Hybrid $H_{12}$: Is the same execution as $H_{11}$ except now, for an honest sender $P_1$ (or $P_0$) and an honest intermediate party $P_i$ and the simulation aborts by outputting a special symbol $\text{abort}_3$ if in some $q_i$-th session, the adversary outputs $\sigma_j$ for some $j \in [i - 2]$ before $P_i$ outputs $\sigma_{i-1}$ such that $\Pi_{DS}.Vf(pk_{i}, tx_{\text{pay},i}, \sigma_{i}) = 1$, $\Pi_{DS}.Vf(pk_{i-1}, tx_{\text{pay},i-1}, \sigma_{i-1}) = 1$ and $\Pi_{DS}.Vf(pk_{i}, tx_{\text{pay},j}, \sigma_{j}) = 1$.

Simulator $\mathcal{S}$: The execution of the simulator is defined as the execution in $H_{12}$ while it interacts with the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{PCN}}$. Specifically, if the $i$-th payment (i.e., $i \in [2, n]$) is confirmed $\mathcal{S}$ adds the entry $(h_i, v^* - v_{i-1}, tx_{\text{pay},i-1}, \sigma_{i})$ to $\mathcal{L}_{c(i_{u_{i-1}})}$ where $v_{i-1}$ is the amount in $tx_{\text{pay},i-1}$ and $v^*$ is the current capacity of $c(i_{u_{i-1}})$.

Below we discuss the indistinguishability arguments and we use the notation $\approx_c$ to denote computational indistinguishability for a PPT algorithm.

$H_0 \approx_c H_1$ and $H_1 \approx_c H_2$ and $H_2 \approx_c H_3$ and $H_3 \approx_c H_4$: the indistinguishability follow from the security of the MPC protocols in the payment setup phase. Security of the MPC protocol for the derivation of keys guarantees the existence of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-1}}$, the security of the MPC protocol for the signature generation guarantees the existence of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-2}}$, the security of the MPC protocol for the lock generation algorithm, which guarantees the existence of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-3}}$ and finally the security of the MPC protocol for generating $\sigma_n$ guarantees the existence of $\mathcal{S}_{\text{mpc-4}}$.

$H_4 \equiv H_5$: Notice that given the commitment scheme $\Pi_c$ is perfectly binding with unique openings, the old checks (in $H_4$) pass if and only if the new checks (in $H_5$) pass. This means that the function computed by the MPC simulator in both hybrids is equivalent and therefore the two hybrids $H_4$ and $H_5$ are identical.
\[ \mathcal{H}_5 \equiv \mathcal{H}_6: \] Notice that in \( \mathcal{H}_6 \) as in \( \mathcal{H}_5 \) the adversary simply sees random shares of the opening information of commitment \( c_i \) for \( i \in [n-1] \). Therefore the view of the adversary in this hybrid is identical to its view in \( \mathcal{H}_5 \).

\[ \mathcal{H}_6 \approx_c \mathcal{H}_7: \] Given that the only difference between the hybrids is how the commitments \( c_i \) for \( i \in [n-1] \) are generated, the indistinguishability of the two hybrids \( \mathcal{H}_6 \) and \( \mathcal{H}_7 \) follows from the computational hiding property of the commitment scheme \( \Pi_C \).

\[ \mathcal{H}_7 \equiv \mathcal{H}_8: \] Notice that in \( \mathcal{H}_8 \), as in the real protocol the adversary simply sees random shares of secret keys. Therefore the view of the adversary in this hybrid is identical to its view in \( \mathcal{H}_7 \).

\[ \mathcal{H}_8 \equiv \mathcal{H}_9: \] Notice that the change made in hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_9 \) does not affect the functionality of the computation. We only change the way the output of the simulated MPC is generated and therefore the execution in \( \mathcal{H}_8 \) and \( \mathcal{H}_9 \) are identical.

\[ \mathcal{H}_9 \approx_c \mathcal{H}_{10}: \] The only change in hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_{10} \) is the abort in the simulation with the special symbol \( \text{abort}_1 \). Notice that this event occurs when the adversary outputs \( \sigma^* \) such that \( \Pi_{DS} \cdot VF(3-\text{PC}_{i+1}, \text{tx}_{pay,i}, \sigma^*) = 1 \), \( \sigma' \leftarrow \text{Unlock}(3-\text{PC}_i, \text{tx}_{pay,i}, \sigma^*, 3-\text{PC}_{i-1}, \text{tx}_{pay,i-1}, \ell_k) \) and \( \Pi_{DS} \cdot VF(3-\text{PC}_{i-1}, \text{tx}_{pay,i-1}, \sigma^*) = 0 \). We now show that the probability with which this abort event occurs is at most negligible in the security parameter, i.e., \( \Pr[\text{abort}_1|\mathcal{H}_{10}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \). To show this, we construct a reduction \( \mathcal{R} \) against the unforgeability property of the lockable signatures.

We in fact reduce to a weaker notion of unforgeability where the adversary in EU-n-CMA is only given oracle access to \( \text{Sign}(sk, \cdot) \) (apart from the \( \text{Sign}(sk, \cdot) \) and the public keys \((pk, pk)\) instead of \((sk, pk)\)). In this regard consider the reduction \( \mathcal{R} \) that is given as input public keys \((pk, pk)\). The reduction guesses the session \( q_1 \) where the adversary triggers the abort \( \text{abort}_1 \) and it guesses an index \( i \in [n] \) where this event occurs. It simulates the execution of \( \mathcal{H}_{10} \) faithfully except it sets \( pk_{i-1} = pk \) and \( pk_i = pk \). The reduction outputs \( tx_{pay,i-1} \) and \( tx_{pay,i} \) to its challenger and obtains a lock \( \ell_k \). The reduction sets \( \ell_k = \ell_k \) and hardcodes in the simulation as done in \( \mathcal{H}_{10} \). The adversary participating in the hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_{10} \) outputs a signature \( \sigma^* \) and the reduction \( \mathcal{R} \) outputs the same.

Clearly the reduction \( \mathcal{R} \) runs in polynomial time as it only performs efficient simulation operations. Notice that the winning conditions of EU-n-CMA are precisely the conditions that lead to an abort \( \text{abort}_1 \) in hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_9 \). It is easy to see that if the adversary triggers the abort event \( \text{abort}_1 \) with non-negligible probability in session \( q_1 \), the reduction also succeeds in winning EU-n-CMA with the same non-negligible probability. Since this is a contradiction, it must be the case that \( \text{abort}_1 \) occurs with negligible probability.

\[ \mathcal{H}_{10} \approx_c \mathcal{H}_{11}: \] Notice that the only difference between the hybrids is in the abort event \( \text{abort}_2 \) in \( \mathcal{H}_{11} \). The abort event occurs if in some \( q_2 \)-th session the adversary is able to output a valid signature \( \sigma^* \) on \( tx_{pay,i} \) under \( pk_i \) for some \( i \in [n] \). We will show that the probability with which the abort event is triggered is bound by a negligible probability with the help of Lemma 2.

**Lemma 2:** There exists a negligible function \( \text{negl} \) such that \( \Pr[\text{abort}_2|\mathcal{H}_{11}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \)

**Proof 5:** To show this, we consider the following hybrid executions. Note that these hybrid execution are only designed to show that the abort event \( \text{abort}_2 \) occurs with negligible probability. In other words, these hybrids do not feature in our main line of hybrids as we have above.

**Hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_{11,i,j}, j \in [0, n-1] \):** Is the same execution as \( \mathcal{H}_{11} \) where the sender has not yet initiated the release phase in the \( q_2 \)-th session, except now the last \( j \) locks are generated by the simulator by hardcoding the \( \ell_k \) in the simulator \( \mathcal{S}_{mpc,3} \) where the lock \( \ell_k \leftarrow \text{Sim}(pk_j, pk_{j+1}) \).

\[ \mathcal{H}_{11,j} \approx_c \mathcal{H}_{11,j+1}: \] Notice that the hybrid \( \mathcal{H}_{11,0} = \mathcal{H}_{11} \) and the indistinguishability of hybrids \( \mathcal{H}_{11,j} \) and \( \mathcal{H}_{11,j+1} \) follows immediately from the hiding property of lockable signatures. To show this we construct a reduction algorithm \( \mathcal{R} \) that plays in the hiding experiment \( \mathcal{EHi-CMA} \) and runs a distinguisher (of the hybrids) as a sub-routine. The reduction gets as input \((pk, pk)\) and sets \( pk_{n-j-1} = pk \) and \( pk_{n-j} = pk \). The reduction outputs \((tx_{pay,n-j-1}, tx_{pay,n-j})\) to its challenger and obtains a lock \( \ell_k \) which it sets as \( \ell_k = \ell_k \). The reduction hardcodes \( \ell_k = \ell_k \) in its simulation of the payment lock phase for parties \( P_0, P_{n-j-1}, P_{n-j}, P_{n-j+1} \). Rest of the simulation by \( \mathcal{R} \) is according to \( \mathcal{H}_{11,j} \). The distinguisher outputs a bit \( b' \) and the reduction outputs the same bit to its challenger.

Clearly the reduction \( \mathcal{R} \) is efficient. To argue about the success probability, notice that if \( b = 0 \) in \( \mathcal{EHi-CMA} \) the reduction \( \mathcal{R} \) simulates \( \mathcal{H}_{11,j+1} \) and if \( b = 1 \), the reduction \( \mathcal{R} \) simulates \( \mathcal{H}_{11,j} \). Therefore if the distinguisher outputs \( b' = b \) with non-negligible probability more than half, the reduction succeeds with the same non-negligible probability more than half, which is a contradiction to the hiding property of the lockable signatures.

By standard hybrid argument we have that \( \mathcal{H}_{11,0} \approx_c \mathcal{H}_{11,n-1} \). Notice that in \( \mathcal{H}_{11,n-1} \), every lock is generated via \( \text{Sim} \) and no information about signatures or honest party’s secret keys is available in the view of the adversary. Since \( \mathcal{H}_{11} \) is indistinguishable from \( \mathcal{H}_{11,n-1} \), provided that the sender \( P_1 \) has not initiated the release phase in \( q_2 \), we have that the probability with which the adversary triggers abort event \( \text{abort}_2 \) in \( \mathcal{H}_{11} \) must be the same in \( \mathcal{H}_{11,n-1} \) except with a negligible difference. For the adversary to trigger \( \text{abort}_2 \) in \( \mathcal{H}_{11,n-1} \), it has to output \( \sigma^* \) on \( tx_{pay,i} \) under \( pk_i \) for some \( i \in [n] \).

We now show that the probability with which the adversary can do this in \( \mathcal{H}_{11,n-1} \) is at most negligible in the security parameter, i.e., \( \Pr[\text{abort}_2|\mathcal{H}_{11,n-1}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \), by reducing the occurrence of the event to the unforgeability of the signature scheme. We construct a reduction algorithm \( \mathcal{R}' \) that guesses the \( q_2 \)-th session and some index \( i^* \in [n] \). It receives as input a public key \( pk \) and simulates the view for the adversary \( A \) faithfully as in \( \mathcal{H}_{11,n-1} \) except that it sets \( pk_{i^*} := pk \). If the adversary outputs a \( \sigma^* \) on \( tx_{pay,i^*} \) under public key \( pk_{i^*} \),
reduction $R'$ simply outputs $(tx_{pay,i},\sigma^*)$ as its forgery in the EUF-CMA game. Clearly $R'$ is efficient and if $A$ outputs such a valid signature and a message with non-negligible probability, clearly $R'$ wins EUF-CMA with the same non-negligible probability. This is a contradiction and therefore bounds the probability with which abort$_2$ is triggered to be negligible. This proves that abort$_2$ happens in $H_{11,n-1}$ with negligible probability and since $H_{11} \approx H_{11,n-1}$, we have that abort$_2$ happens in $H_{10}$ only with negligible probability. This proves our initial claim that $H_{10} \approx H_{11}$.

$H_{11} \approx H_{12}$: The only difference between the hybrids is the abort event abort$_3$ in $H_{12}$. We show that the abort event happens only with negligible probability in $H_{12}$. Notice that the abort event abort$_3$ is triggered in $H_{12}$ if in some session $q_3$, for an honest sender $P_1$ and an honest intermediate party $P_i$, the adversary outputs $\sigma_j$ on $tx_{pay,j}$ for some $j \in [i-2]$ before $P_i$ outputs $\sigma_{i-1}$. Consider the following sub-hybrids

Hybrid $H_{12,j}$, $j \in [0,i-1]$: Is the same execution as $H_{12}$ where the sender has initiated the release phase in the $q_3$-th session, except now the last $j$ locks from the lock $\ell_{k-1}$, are generated by the simulator by hardcoding the $\ell_{kj}$ in the simulator $S_{mpc,3}$ where the lock $\ell_{kj} \leftarrow \text{Sim}(pk_{kj}, pk_{kj+1})$. Notice that $H_{12} = H_{12.0,0}$.

$H_{12,0} \approx H_{12,1}$: In $H_{12,1}$ the lock $\ell_{k-1}$ is switched to being generated by Sim. To see the indistinguishability, notice that the adversary does not have access to the lock $\ell_{k-1}$ and $P_i$ does not output $\sigma_{i-1}$ in this session. Therefore from the view of the adversary both hybrids are computationally indistinguishable.

By a similar argument as in Lemma 2 we can show that $H_{12,j} \approx H_{12,j+1}$, and specifically $H_{12} \approx H_{12,i-1}$. Given that all the locks $\ell_{k1}, \ldots, \ell_{k-1}$ in $H_{12,i-1}$ are simulated by Sim and are therefore completely independent of $\sigma_{i-1}$ and the honest party $P_i$’s secret information. Given the sender has not initiated the release phase for party $P_i$ yet, the scenario is similar to the case in the hybrid $H_{11}$. Again from a similar argument as in Lemma 2 we can show that $Pr[\text{abort}_3 | H_{12,i-1}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Since $H_{12} \approx H_{12,i-1}$, we have $Pr[\text{abort}_3 | H_{12}] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Therefore the hybrids $H_{11}$ and $H_{12}$ are computationally indistinguishable.

Our final simulator $S$ for the channel payment is defined as the execution in $H_{12}$ and this concludes the proof.

D. Security Analysis of PCN Protocol for BLS Signatures

Proof 6 (Proof of Theorem 5.2): We now prove that our protocol in Figure 8 securely UC-realizes the PCN functionality from Figure 10.

We describe a simulator $S$ that handles subset of parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ that are corrupted by a PPT $A$ and simulates the real world execution protocol while interacting with the ideal functionality $F_{PCN}$.

For details about the operations of the simulator $S$ in the simulation specifically in channel opening and channel closing operations of $F_{PCN}$, we refer the reader to the initial part of the analysis in Appendix C. We directly explain the simulation in the channel payment operation of $F_{PCN}$.

Channel Payment. In describing $S$’s operations for channel payment, we begin by describing a series of hybrid executions, where we begin with a real world execution and gradually change the simulation in these hybrids and then we argue about the proximity of neighbouring experiments. Simulator $S$’s execution for the payment operation is defined as the final hybrid’s execution. Below we describe the hybrid executions first and later argue about their proximity. Note that the switching of hybrid executions is performed over every session, but one at a time and we only discuss here a single time for simplicity and readability.

Hybrid $H_0$: This is the same as the real execution of the protocol in Figure 8.

Hybrid $H_1$: This is the same as the above execution except now for all honest parties (one by one) in the payment setup phase, the NIZK proof for $\mathcal{L}_{DL}$ is simulated using a simulator $S_{\text{NIZK,$\mathcal{C}$}}$..

Hybrid $H_2$: Is the same execution as $H_1$, except now the simulator extracts the witnesses from the NIZK proofs output by the corrupted parties during the payment setup phase. To do this, the simulator uses the simulation-sound extractor $E$ that takes as input the statement, the proof of the corrupted parties and a trapdoor, and outputs the witness for the statement. UC secure NIZK-PoK extractors are provided with a trapdoor [58]. Here the witnesses of corrupted parties correspond to their shares of the secret key of a common 3-party public key.

Hybrid $H_3$: Is the same execution as $H_2$, except now the simulator aborts by outputting a special symbol abort$_1$ if in some $q_1$-th session of the protocol, the adversary outputs a $\sigma_i$, such that $\sigma_{i-1} \leftarrow \text{Unlock}(pk_{i-1}, tx_{pay,i-1}, pk_i, tx_{pay,i}, \sigma_i, \ell_{k-1})$ and it holds that $\Pi_{\text{BLS},Vf}(pk_i, tx_{pay,i}, \sigma_i) = 1$ and $\Pi_{\text{BLS},\text{Vf}}(pk_{i-1}, tx_{pay,i-1}, \sigma_{i-1}) = 0$. This abort happens when the adversary outputs a valid signature such that an honest $P_i$ pays the adversary through $tx_{pay,i}$ but is unable to unlock a valid signature on $tx_{pay,i-1}$ that pays to $P_i$.

Hybrid $H_4$: Is the same execution as $H_3$, except now the simulator aborts by outputting a special symbol abort$_2$ if in some $q_2$-th session of the protocol, the adversary outputs a signature $\sigma_i$ such that $\Pi_{\text{BLS},Vf}(pk_i, tx_{pay,i}, \sigma_i) = 1$ before a honest $P_i$ (or $P_0$) initiates the payment release phase. This abort happens when the adversary is able to unlock a lock correctly before the sender $P_i$ initiates the release phase.

Hybrid $H_5$: is the same execution as $H_4$, except now we have an honest sender $P_1$ and an honest intermediate party $P_i$ and the simulation aborts by outputting a special symbol abort$_3$ if in some $q_3$-th session of the protocol, the adversary outputs $\sigma_j$ (for some $j \in [i-2]$) before $P_i$ outputs $\sigma_{i-1}$ such that $\Pi_{\text{BLS},Vf}(pk_{i-1}, tx_{pay,i-1}, \sigma_{i-1}) = 1$ and $\Pi_{\text{BLS},Vf}(pk_{i-2}, tx_{pay,i-2}, \sigma_{i-2}) = 1$.

Simulator $S$: The execution of the simulator is defined as in the execution of $H_5$ while it interacts with the ideal functionality $F_{PCN}$.

Below we discuss the indistinguishability arguments. $H_0 \approx H_1$: The hybrids are computationally indistinguishable following from the zero-knowledge property of the NIZK proof.
which guarantees the existence of a simulator $S_{\text{NIZK},L_0}$. Here we assume a NIZK proof that has a straight-line simulation and therefore no rewinding is necessary during the simulation by $S_{\text{NIZK},L_0}$.

$\mathcal{H}_1 \approx \mathcal{H}_2$: The indistinguishability follows from the simulation sound non-interactive extractability of the NIZK proof, that guarantees the existence of an extractor $E$.

$\mathcal{H}_2 \equiv \mathcal{H}_3$: The probability  that $\text{abort}_1$ happens in $\mathcal{H}_3$ is 0. Notice that the locks are of the form $\ell_{k_{i-1}} := \sigma_{i-1} \cdot \sigma_i$ and an honest $P_i$ only accepts $\ell_{k_{i-1}}$ as valid if $\Pi_{\text{BLS}, \mathcal{VfAgg}}(\{pk_{i-1}, pk_i\}, \{tx_{\mathcal{P}ay,i}, tx_{\mathcal{P}ay,i+1}\}, \ell_{k_{i-1}}) = 1$. Given the uniqueness of BLS signatures (there exists exactly one valid signature for a given message under a given public key) and the aggregate verification ensures that valid signatures $\sigma_{i-1}$ and $\sigma_i$ are aggregated together in $\ell_{k_{i-1}}$, we have $\Pr[\text{abort}_1 | \mathcal{H}_3] = 0$. Hence the hybrids are identical.

$\mathcal{H}_3 \approx \mathcal{H}_4$: The only difference between the hybrids is the abort event $\text{abort}_2$ in $\mathcal{H}_4$. We will show that the probability that simulation aborts with $\text{abort}_2$ in $\mathcal{H}_4$ is negligible. To show this, we reduce such an abort event to the chained aggregate extraction assumption (Definition 3). That is, we show that if in some $q_2$-th session, the adversary is able to trigger the abort event $\text{abort}_2$ in $\mathcal{H}_4$, then we can construct a reduction $R$ that uses this adversary as a sub-routine and breaks the chained aggregate extraction assumption.

Consider a reduction algorithm $R$ that receives as input $\{(G_i, H_i) \in [n], \{\tilde{\sigma}_i\} \in [n-1]\}$. It guesses the session $q_2$ from a polynomial number of sessions where the abort event occurs. The reduction simulates the execution as in $\mathcal{H}_4$ to the adversary. To do this, the reduction sets party $P_h$’s public keys during the setup phase (of the $q_2$-th session) as $pk_i^{(0)} := G_i$ for $i \in [n]$. It uses the simulator $S_{\text{NIZK},L_{\text{ch}}}$ to generate simulated proofs and uses the extractor $E$ to extract the adversarial secret keys $sk_i^{(i)}$, $sk_i^{(i+1)}$ (for $i \in [2, n-1]$). It simulates random oracle queries to $H$ in the following way. Whenever the adversary queries $tx_{\mathcal{P}ay,i}$ (for $i \in [n]$), the reduction sets $H(tx_{\mathcal{P}ay,i}) := H_i$. When generating $\ell_{k_{i-1}}$ for $i \in [2, n-1]$, the reduction $R$ plays the role of $P_i$ and sets $\sigma_i' := \tilde{\sigma}_i$ sends the aggregate signature $\sigma_i'$ to party $P_i$ (corrupted by the adversary). The adversary outputs $\sigma_i$. The reduction computes $\sigma_i^{(0)} := \sigma_i / (\sigma_i^{(i)} \cdot \sigma_i^{(i+1)})$. The reduction can do this by first computing $\sigma_i^{(i)}$ and $\sigma_i^{(i+1)}$ as it knows the adversary’s secret keys $sk_i^{(i)}$ and $sk_i^{(i+1)}$. The reduction $R$ then outputs $(\sigma_i^{(0)}, i)$ to its challenger. Clearly the reduction is efficient as it only performs polynomial time operations and it faithfully simulates the view of hybrid execution $\mathcal{H}_4$. It is easy to see that if the adversary outputs a valid $\sigma_i$ with non-negligible probability, the reduction $R$ successfully wins in the experiment $\text{ExpChAgExt}$ with a non-negligible probability. This is a contradiction to the chained aggregate extraction assumption and concludes the argument.

$\mathcal{H}_4 \approx \mathcal{H}_5$: The only difference between the hybrids is the abort event $\text{abort}_3$ in $\mathcal{H}_5$. We show that the abort event happens only with negligible probability in $\mathcal{H}_5$. To do this, let us assume that the abort event happens. We have an honest sender $P_1$ and an honest intermediate $P_i$. For simplicity lets assume that every other party in the payment path is corrupted by the adversary. Let $q_3$-th session be the one where the adversary triggers the abort event. To trigger the abort event, the adversary outputs a valid $\sigma_i$ and $\sigma_{j}$ for some $j \in [i-2]$ before $P_i$ can output $\sigma_{i-1}$. Notice that the adversary has $\ell_{k_{i}} := \sigma_i \cdot \sigma_{i+1}$ and $\ell_{k_{i-2}} := \sigma_{i-2} \cdot \sigma_{i-1}$. The adversary has no further access to $\sigma_{i-1}$ from any lock other than $\ell_{k_{i-2}}$. Therefore we can view $P_1, \ldots, P_{i-1}$ as an independent instance of the payment path, where the adversary corrupts every party except $P_1$ the sender. To trigger the abort event, the adversary has to produce $\sigma_{j}, j \in [i-2]$ before $P_1$ initiates the release phase at $P_{i-1}$. We can show that this event only occurs with negligible probability with a reduction to the chained aggregate extraction assumption analogous to the previous hybrid. This implies that the probability the abort event $\text{abort}_3$ occurs is also negligible.

Our final simulator $S$ for the channel payment is defined as the execution in $\mathcal{H}_5$ and this concludes the proof.