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Paper 2020/1458

Analysis of Ascon, DryGASCON, and Shamash Permutations

Cihangir Tezcan

Abstract

Ascon, DryGASCON, and Shamash are submissions to NIST's lightweight cryptography standardization process and have similar designs. We analyze these algorithms against subspace trails, truncated differentials, and differential-linear distinguishers. We provide probability one 4-round subspace trails for DryGASCON-256, 3-round subspace trails for \DryGASCON-128, and 2-round subspace trails for \Shamash permutations. Moreover, we provide the first 3.5-round truncated differential and 5-round differential-linear distinguisher for DryGASCON-128. Finally, we improve the data and time complexity of the 4 and 5-round differential-linear attacks on Ascon.

Note: Published version is available at https://www.ijiss.org/ijiss/index.php/ijiss/article/view/762

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. International Journal of Information Security Science
Keywords
lightweight cryptographyauthenticated encryptioncryptanalysis
Contact author(s)
cihangir @ metu edu tr
History
2020-11-19: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1458
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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