Correlation-Intractable Hash Functions via Shift-Hiding

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Abstract

A hash function family \( H \) is correlation intractable for a \( t \)-input relation \( R \) if, given a random function \( h \) chosen from \( H \), it is hard to find \( x_1, \ldots, x_t \) such that \( R(x_1, \ldots, x_t, h(x_1), \ldots, h(x_t)) \) is true. Among other applications, such hash functions are a crucial tool for instantiating the Fiat-Shamir heuristic in the plain model, including the only known NIZK for NP based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem (Peikert and Shiehian, CRYPTO 2019).

We give a conceptually simple and generic construction of single-input CI hash functions from shift-hiding shiftable functions (Peikert and Shiehian, PKC 2018) satisfying an additional one-wayness property. This results in a clean abstract framework for instantiating CI, and also shows that a previously existing function family (PKC 2018) was already CI under the LWE assumption.

In addition, our framework transparently generalizes to other settings, yielding new results:

- We show how to instantiate certain forms of multi-input CI under the LWE assumption. Prior constructions either relied on a very strong “brute-force-is-best” type of hardness assumption (Holmgren and Lombardi, FOCS 2018) or were restricted to “output-only” relations (Zhandry, CRYPTO 2016).
- We construct single-input CI hash functions from indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and one-way permutations. Prior constructions relied essentially on variants of fully homomorphic encryption that are impossible to construct from such primitives. This result also generalizes to more expressive variants of multi-input CI under iO and additional standard assumptions.

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1 Introduction

The random oracle model [BR94] is a powerful but controversial paradigm in cryptography in which the proof of security of a cryptographic scheme assumes that a certain publicly computable function $H$ that is used in the scheme behaves like a random function to the adversary. The random oracle model is hugely influential in designing concretely efficient cryptosystems, but is inherently problematic theoretically: how could a public, and therefore completely predictable, function behave in all aspects like a random function? Indeed, Canetti, Goldreich and Halevi [CGH98] demonstrated cryptographic schemes that one could prove secure in the random oracle model, but which are insecure no matter how one tries to instantiate the oracle with a concrete function (or even a function chosen at random from an exponential-size family). Nevertheless, this negative result and the notions introduced therein led to a long line of research that asked what concrete properties of a random oracle are instantiable in the standard model (see, e.g., [CMR98] for an early work in this direction), and opened the door to groundbreaking positive results two decades later [CCR16, KRR17, CCRR18, HL18, CCH+19, PS19].

The key notion introduced in [CGH98] is that of correlation intractability (CI), which captures a general and powerful form of cryptographic hardness for a hash family $H$. For any binary relation $R(x, y)$, a hash family $H$ is correlation-intractable for $R$ if it is computationally hard (given a hash function $h \leftarrow H$) to find an input $x$ such that $R(x, h(x))$ is true. For this definition to make sense, we require that the relation $R$ is sparse: for any $x$, all but a negligible fraction of $y$ do not satisfy the relation with $x$.

For decades, there was little progress on building correlation-intractable hash functions in the standard model outside of a few extremely simple cases (such as one-way functions). However, there has been much recent work [CCR16, KRR17, CCRR18, HL18, CCH+19, PS19, BKM20, LV20] on instantiating restricted but expressive variants of CI. Namely, these works made the following simplifications:

- Starting with [CCR16, HL18], additional efficiency requirements were placed on the relation $R$. For example, one can require that $R(x, y)$ is decidable in (bounded) polynomial time.

- Starting with [CCH+19], the relation $R$ was further specialized to represent an efficiently computable function $f$. A hash family $H$ is CI for $f$ if it is hard, given $h$, to find an input $x$ such that $h(x) = f(x)$.

While these restrictions may seem extreme, these limited forms of CI remain expressive and powerful. In particular, even CI for efficiently computable functions has implications for the instantiability of the Fiat-Shamir transform [FS87] in the standard model [DNRS99, BLV03, CCR16] for constant-round public-coin interactive proof systems. Most notably, [CCH+19, PS19] construct hash families $H$ that are CI for efficiently computable functions under standard cryptographic assumptions related to the learning with errors (LWE) problem, and use these hash families to build the first lattice-based non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems for NP.

Let us recall the [CCH+19, PS19] constructions at a high level. [CCH+19] gives a generic construction using fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) [Gen09, BV11]. The construction is simple: a hash function $h \leftarrow H$ is parameterized by a FHE ciphertext $Enc(g)$ for some (dummy) function
To evaluate \( h(x) \), simply homomorphically evaluate \( g \) on \( x \) to obtain some ciphertext of the form \( \text{Enc}(g(x)) \). One can show that this hash family is CI for a function \( f \) if the FHE scheme is circular secure: since \( g \) is computationally hidden, we can replace it in the security proof with a function \( g^*(x) = \text{Dec}_{sk}(f(x)) + 1 \) specifically designed to avoid \( f(x) \) at the ciphertext level.

While this construction is both simple and generic, it has the significant drawback that it relies on the circular security (rather than semantic security) of the FHE, and therefore cannot be proven secure under the plain LWE assumption. Peikert and Shi [PS19] then gave an ingenious construction of CI based on plain LWE. Their construction uses the algebra of the [GSW13] FHE scheme to give a special-purpose variant of the [CCH+19] approach that avoids reliance on circular security. However, this requires making a number of changes to the hash function: at a high level, they “downgrade” plain LWE-based GSW ciphertexts after evaluation to Regev “ciphertexts” (where the plaintext space is \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) and decryption correctness is only approximate) with circular dependencies. This results in a LWE-based CI hash family, but loses the conceptual simplicity of the [CCH+19] construction.

### 1.1 Our Results and Techniques

Our main result is a new framework for constructing CI hash functions using a cryptographic primitive called shift-hiding shiftable functions (SHSFs) [PS18], a twist on private constrained pseudorandom functions [BW13,BGI14,KPTZ13]. A SHSF family is a function family \( \{F_{msk}\} \) that additionally supports the ability to delegate a constrained key \( sk_f \) that enables computation of the map \( x \mapsto F_{msk}(x) + f(x) \), without revealing the “shift function” \( f \). Shift-hiding shiftable functions were originally introduced for the purpose of constructing private constrained PRFs, but have since found several other applications [PS20,DVW20].

In a nutshell, we show that SHSFs are intimately tied to correlation intractability via an extremely short proof. We further develop this framework in three directions.

1. We obtain a conceptually simple construction of CI for functions based on LWE. This construction can replace the FHE-based approach of [CCH+19,PS19] and shows that the prior function family of [PS18] (constructed for an entirely different purpose) was already a good CI hash family.

2. We show that our construction transparently generalizes to new variants of multi-input CI, which is currently poorly understood.

3. We give additional instantiations of our framework (which are new, in both the single- and multi-input settings) using indistinguishability obfuscation and other standard assumptions.

Moreover, we believe that our framework and new approach to constructing CI hash functions may be useful for future progress on and understanding of this primitive.

**Lifting CI.** We begin with a description of (1). Our main technique is a lifting theorem (Theorem 3.1) that allows us to construct CI hash functions for complex relations starting from CI hash functions for simpler relations. In the single-input setting, it states that any SHSF family (for a
function class $\mathcal{F}$) satisfying a very weak form of correlation intractability is essentially already a CI hash family for $\mathcal{F}$.

**Theorem 1.1** (Informal). Suppose that $\text{SHSF} = \{F_{\text{msk}}\}$ is a family of SHSFs for a function class $\mathcal{F}$, and suppose that $F_{\text{msk}}$ satisfies either of the following two one-wayness properties:

- Given $\text{msk}$, it is hard to find an element in $F_{\text{msk}}^{-1}(0)$, or
- Given $\text{msk}$ and a uniformly random target $r$, it is hard to find an element in $F_{\text{msk}}^{-1}(r)$.

Then, the shifted evaluation algorithm of $\text{SHSF}$ describes a hash family $\mathcal{H}$ that is correlation-intractable for all functions $f \in \mathcal{F}$.

The CI hash function is extremely simple to describe. Hash keys are shifted keys $sk_Z$ for the all-zero function $Z$, and hash function evaluation is simply the shifted evaluation using $sk_Z$ which computes exactly the function $F_{\text{msk}}$. (Philosophically, the CI hash family constructed in this theorem is a form of “obfuscated PRF evaluation” although shift-hiding functions are decidedly more complex to construct than PRFs.) The proof of Theorem 1.1 is also simple.

**Proof Sketch.** If an adversary $A$, given a hash key $sk_Z$, finds an input $x$ such that

$$\text{Hash}(x) := F_{sk_Z}(x) = f(x),$$

then by the shift-hiding property of SHSF, $A$ also produces such an $x$ when given $sk_f$ instead of $sk_Z$. In that case, $A$ solves the equation

$$f(x) = F_{sk_f}(x) = F_{\text{msk}}(x) + f(x),$$

which is equivalent to the equation $F_{\text{msk}}(x) = 0$. This yields a 0-inversion attack on $F_{\text{msk}}$. The “random target” version of the theorem holds by the same argument, using a shifted key $sk_f$, for the function $f_r(x) = f(x) - r$. \qed

We note that Theorem 1.1 could be proved under a weaker one-wayness assumption, namely, that it is hard to find an input $x$ such that $F_{\text{msk}}(x) = 0$, given a shifted key $sk_f$ for any pre-specified $f$ (as opposed to being given msk in the clear). However, we phrase Theorem 1.1 under the assumption that $F_{\text{msk}}$ is one-way (given msk in the clear) because this is a clean, $f$-independent security property, which also makes it more amenable to instantiation/proof. In our constructions below, we prove the stronger one-wayness property of $F_{\text{msk}}$.

**Instantiation from LWE.** Given Theorem 1.1, it remains to construct an SHSF family satisfying this one-wayness property. We show that a variant of the Peikert-Shiehian SHSF [PS18] satisfies this.

**Theorem 1.2** (Informal, see Theorem 4.1). Assuming the hardness of standard lattice problems ($\text{LWE}$ and 1-dimensional $\text{SIS}$ variants), the [PS18] SHSF is one-way.\footnote{Compared to [PS18], (1) our construction is slightly modified for ease of proof, and (2) particular parameter settings are required.}
We now sketch our proof assuming some knowledge of LWE-based cryptography.

**Proof Sketch.** In the Peikert-Shiehian SHSF construction, $msk = s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is an LWE secret, and

\[ F_{msk}(x) = [sA_x + u \cdot G^{-1}(A_x)]_p \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\mu \]

where $G \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ is the gadget matrix, $u \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ is a uniformly random row vector, $A_x \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \mu}$ is a matrix constructed out of (uniformly random) matrices $A_1, \ldots, A_\ell$ using the gadget homomorphisms from [BGG14], and $[\cdot]_p$ denotes the rounding operation that (roughly speaking) keeps the top $\log p$ bits of the argument and discards the rest. By [PS18], this family is shift-hiding under the LWE assumption and (computationally) correct under the 1D-SIS assumption (Definition 2.15).

If the adversary finds an $x$ such that $F_{msk}(x) = 0$, there are two cases; the first case is when $G^{-1}(A_x)$ is non-zero. This gives an approximate subset sum solution for the instance $sG + u$, that is,

\[ (sG + u)G^{-1}(A_x) \in q\mathbb{Z}^\mu + [\frac{-q}{p}, \frac{q}{p}]^\mu. \]

This violates (on whichever column of $G^{-1}(A_x)$ is nonzero) a natural one-dimensional variant of SIS (Definition 2.12) that we show is as hard as worst-case lattice problems provided that $p$ is large enough\(^2\) (see Section 2.3.1).

The second case is when the adversary finds an $x$ such that $G^{-1}(A_x) = 0$, which implies that $A_x = 0$. We show that the adversary cannot make this happen without violating SIS (again!) Roughly speaking, we use the fact that if we *program* the matrices $A_i = AR_i + h_iG$ where $R_i$ are matrices with small entries and $h$ is the description of a constant function with image $y \neq 0 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\ell$, the following equation holds for each column $a_{x}^{(j)}$ of $A_x$ due to the gadget homomorphisms of Boneh et al. [BGG14]:

\[ a_{x}^{(j)} = Ar_{x}^{(j)} + y_ju_1 \]

(where $u_1$ is the first standard basis vector) for some $r_{x}^{(j)}$ that is a function of $R_1, \ldots, R_\ell$. We know by assumption that $A_x = 0$. Since $y \neq 0$, this means that the adversary found a valid solution $R_x = [r_{x}^{(1)} \ldots r_{x}^{(\mu)}]$ to the (inhomogenous) SIS problem $AR_x = -u_1y^\top \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \mu}$, which is hard assuming that worst-case lattice problems are hard. This finishes the proof of one-wayness. \(\square\)

Combining Theorem 1.2 with Theorem 1.1, we already recover a similar result to [PS19]. That is, assuming the hardness of standard lattice problems, there exists a hash family that is correlation-intractable for all bounded-size functions. By appealing to [CCH19], this also gives a lattice-based NIZK argument system for NP. However, our approach leverages this new, conceptually simple connection to SHSFs and shows that [PS18] were “most of the way” to LWE-based CI. Besides the extremely simple bootstrapping theorem, the missing piece was whether a natural PRF construction [PS18] satisfies a one-wayness property given $msk$ in the clear. A similar question was previously studied for the GGM PRF family [CK16], but does not appear to have been addressed for other concrete PRF families.

Next, we describe how our techniques extend to give new feasibility results in two different directions:

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\(^2\)Some care must be taken to set parameters so that the SHSF security reductions still hold for this choice of $p$. 

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• They immediately generalize to setting of multi-input CI, and
• They allow for new generic instantiations based on indistinguishability obfuscation.

We remark that constructing (single- or multi-input) CI hash functions even assuming indistinguishability obfuscation is far from straightforward. Indeed, the initial works [CCR16, KRR17, HL18] in this line all made non-standard assumptions in addition to iO. Non-standard assumptions were required until the work of [CCH+19] which constructed single-input CI hash functions under circular-secure LWE. However, they only managed to do this for a tiny subset of relations that [CCR16, KRR17] achieved. In particular, replicating the results of [KRR17] or even [CCR16] assuming only iO (plus standard assumptions) is a challenging open problem.

1.2 Applications: Multi-Input CI from LWE and CI from iO

So far, we have only discussed single-input CI; that is, we considered CI for relations with a single input $x$ and single corresponding output $y$. However, there is a natural generalization of CI to relations with many input-output pairs: a hash family $H$ is defined to be CI for a relation $R(x_1, \ldots, x_t, y_1, \ldots, y_t)$ if it is computationally hard (given a hash function $h \leftarrow H$) to find inputs $x_1, \ldots, x_t$ such that $(x_1, \ldots, x_t, h(x_1), \ldots, h(x_t)) \in R$. In contrast to the single-input case, multi-input correlation intractability (for any $t \geq 2$) is a far less well-understood primitive. Perhaps the simplest nontrivial example of multi-input CI is for the relation $R$ where $R(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2) = 1$ if and only if $y_1 = y_2$ but $x_1 \neq x_2$. A CI hash family for $R$ is precisely a collision-resistant hash function. However, most multi-input relations do not correspond to security notions that are simple-to-understand or previously studied. CI for more general multi-input relations also has interesting applications, including:

1. As a useful tool for the untrusted setup of public parameters [CCR16, Zha16]: Multi-input CI hash functions allow $n$ parties $P_1, \ldots, P_n$ with inputs $x_1, \ldots, x_n$ to compute public outputs $y_i = H(x_i)$ that can be used to generate public parameters for a multi-party protocol. Correlation intractability of $H$ is necessary to ensure that a “bad CRS” is not accidentally (or maliciously) agreed on.

2. As a hash function in proof-of-work protocols [CCR16, CCRR18]: In the bitcoin protocol [Nak08], a miner succeeds in adding a block to the blockchain when she finds an $x$ such that $y = H(x || B_i)$ starts with a specified number of zeroes (here, $B_i$ is the $i$-th block and once found, $y$ is placed in the next block $B_{i+1}$). A very desirable property in this setting is that a single miner (or collection of colluding miners) cannot find multiple consecutive blocks with significantly less effort than finding them sequentially. This property can be formalized as a quantitatively precise variant of multi-input CI. For example, in the case of two consecutive blocks, simplifying the setting a little, we require a 2-input CI for the relation

\footnotetext{As noted in [CCR16], CI following the (poly, negl) security definition framework is insufficient for this application. Instead, these protocols desire a concrete “moderately small” probability of breaking CI and a tight gap between honest and adversarial parties’ probabilities of doing so in a fixed runtime. We do not attempt to address this subtlety in this work.}
\( R \) where \( R(x_1, x_2, y_1, y_2) = 1 \) iff \( y_1 \) and \( y_2 \) start with a pre-specified number \( \ell \) of zeroes, and \( y_1 \) is a suffix of \( x_2 \).

Unfortunately, multi-input CI has so far proved hard to achieve. In particular, the constructions of [CCR16, KRR17, CCR18, CCH+19, PS19, BKM20] are only known to achieve single-input CI. Holmgren and Lombardi [HL18] do achieve multi-input CI for a large class of relations that they call \textit{locally sampleable} relations. However, they require both an indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) scheme [BGI+01] as well as an “optimally-secure” one-way product function [HL18]. While iO can now be achieved under relatively standard assumptions [JLS21, GP21, BDGM20, WW21], the latter is a very strong “brute force is optimal”-type assumption. Zhandry [Zha16] constructed a hash family satisfying a very special form of multi-input CI called “output intractability”. Output intractability is a form of CI for relations \( R(x_1, \ldots, x_t, y_1, \ldots, y_t) \) that depend only on the \( y_i \), which captures some variants of application (1) above. On the plus side, the construction is based on the exponential hardness of the Diffie-Hellman problem.\(^4\) To summarize, multi-input CI is either known for a small class of relations under standard assumptions, or for a larger class of relations under very strong assumptions. We refer the reader to Section 1.3 for more details and further comparisons.

Multi-Input CI via Shift-Hiding. One consequence of our shift-hiding technique is a collection of feasibility results for multi-input correlation intractability based on standard assumptions. We obtain two flavors of results: constructions from standard (lattice) assumptions, and constructions from indistinguishability obfuscation.

Our results are obtained via a generalization of our lifting theorem (Theorem 1.1) to multi-input relations. This gives us three new constructions of multi-CI hash functions under different assumptions:

- Our first construction considers the shifted linear relation
  \[
  \mathcal{R}_{\text{lin}} = \{(x_1, \ldots, x_t, y_1, \ldots, y_t) : \sum w_i y_i = \sum w_i f(x_i) \pmod p\}
  \]
  where \( p \) is some large integer (roughly \( 2^\lambda \)), \( w_i \) are small weights and \( f \) is an arbitrary polynomial-time computable function. We construct a multi-input CI hash function for \( \mathcal{R}_{\text{lin}} \) under the same lattice assumptions as in the single-input case (all approximation ratios are larger by a factor of \( t \)).

- Our second and third constructions consider the shifted general relation
  \[
  \mathcal{R} = \{(x_1, \ldots, x_t, y_1, \ldots, y_t) : \mathcal{R}_0(y_1 - f(x_1), \ldots, y_t - f(x_t)) = 1\}
  \]
  where \( \mathcal{R}_0 \) is any polynomial-time decidable relation. In particular, our second construction achieves a multi-input CI hash function for \( \mathcal{R} \) under subexponential iO, subexponential OWFs, and (sufficiently) lossy functions.

\(^4\)Moreover, given an inverse-subexponential lower bound on the sparsity of the relation, Zhandry’s construction is secure under (the more standard) sub-exponential DDH.
Our Generalized Lifting Theorem. Given any output-only relation $R_0$, we say that a hash family $H$ is $R_0$-output intractable if it is hard (given $h$) to find distinct inputs $x_1, \ldots, x_t$ such that $(y_1, \ldots, y_t) \in R_0$ for $y_i = h(x_i)$. Output intractability as a standalone property (like collision-resistance) is known to be instantiable based on standard cryptographic assumptions (e.g., lossy functions [PW08]) as we discuss in Section 1.3. Our generalization of Theorem 1.1 states that SHSFs that are output-intractable lead to interesting new CI constructions.

Theorem 1.3 (Also see Theorem 3.1). Suppose that SHSF is a shift-hiding shiftable function family. Assume that it is hard, given $msk$, to find distinct $x_1, \ldots, x_t$ such that $R_0(y_1, \ldots, y_t) = 1$ where $y_i = F_{msk}(x_i)$ and $R_0$ is some polynomial-time computable relation. Then, there is a CI hash family for the shifted output relation

$$R = \{(x_1, \ldots, x_t, y_1, \ldots, y_t) : R_0(y_1 - f(x_1), \ldots, y_t - f(x_t)) = 1\}$$

The proof of Theorem 1.3 follows from that of the single-input CI case mutatis mutandis. Thus, all that remains is to construct SHSFs that are output-intractable. We show three constructions.

Instantiation from LWE. To obtain a form of multi-input CI from LWE, we combine Theorem 1.3 with a generalization of Theorem 1.2:

Theorem 1.4. Under standard lattice assumptions, there exists a SHSF family SHSF satisfying the following form of correlation intractability: for every nonzero vector $w \in \{-1, 0, 1\}^t$, it is hard (given $msk$) to find $t$ distinct inputs $x_1, \ldots, x_t$ such that

$$\sum_i w_i \cdot F_{msk}(x_i) = 0,$$

where the sum is computed modulo some (large enough) integer $p$.

Our modification of the Peikert-Shiehian [PS18] construction satisfies this more general form of output intractability (for small linear equations), although the proof (in “Case 2” above) is more complicated (see Section 4.5). Note that this is a strict generalization of both single-input CI for functions (where $t = 1, w = 1$) and collision-resistance (where $t = 2, w = (-1, 1)$ and $f$ is the constant function). Previously, this form of correlation intractability was only known assuming iO and (extremely hard) one-way product functions [HL18].

Instantiation from IO + lossiness. Our second construction achieves correlation intractability for shifted $R_0$-output relations for a large class of $R_0$ simultaneously (as opposed to linear $R_0$ as in the LWE case above). It can be thought of as a (non-black-box) combination of our approach with a construction due to Zhandry [Zha16] of output-intractable hash functions.

Theorem 1.5. Assume the existence of subexponential iO, subexponential OWFs, and lossy functions with input domain $\{0, 1\}^n$ with a range of size $\leq 2^t$ in lossy mode. Then, there exists a hash family $H$ that is CI for all (efficiently decidable) shifted $t$-ary output relations with sparsity at most $2^{-t\ell}$.

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5For the relation $\sum_i w_i y_i = 0$ implicitly described above, it is enough to assume that the inputs $x_i$ are not all equal for the relation to be sparse. We elaborate on this weakening of output intractability as compared to [Zha16, HL18] in Section 2.
As a corollary, we conclude that additionally assuming the existence of extremely lossy functions [Zha16], there is a hash family $\mathcal{H}$ that is CI for all (efficiently decidable) shifted $t$-ary output relations with sparsity $2^{-\omega(t)}$. As another corollary, we note that by combining Theorem 1.5 with [CCH+19], we obtain a construction of dual-mode NIZKs for NP based on iO, (injective) lossy functions, and lossy encryption. This closely matches the assumptions used in the work [HU19] but with a simpler construction. The corollary follows because the hash family from Theorem 1.5 satisfies “somewhere statistical correlation intractability.”

A Separation between Single-Input and Multi-Input CI. Finally, we show that single-input and multi-input CI hash functions are fundamentally different primitives by demonstrating a separation between them. This follows from our third new CI instantiation, which is interesting even in the single-input setting.

Theorem 1.6. Assume the existence of subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation, subexponentially secure one-way functions, and a hash family $\mathcal{H}$ such that $\mathcal{H}$ is $R_0$-output intractable, and for a random input $X$, $h_k(X)$ is $2^{-n}$-indistinguishable from uniform (even given $k$). Then, there exists a hash family that is CI for shifted $R_0$-relations.

This theorem says that assuming subexponential iO and one-way functions, shifted-CI for $R_0$ can be constructed (semi-)generically from output intractability for $R_0$. Theorem 1.6 is proved by combining Theorem 1.3 with a construction of an $R_0$-output intractable SHSF using iO, puncturable PRFs, and an output-intractable hash function satisfying the above statistical requirement.

We note that as a corollary to Theorem 1.6, we obtain a construction of single-input CI for all efficient functions from iO and one-way permutations.

Corollary 1.7. If subexponential iO, subexponential OWFs, and (polynomially-secure) OWPs exist, then there exists a hash family that is CI for all efficient functions, that is, relations $R(x, y)$ which is true iff $y = f(x)$.

Corollary 1.7 follows from Theorem 1.6 by setting the output-intractable hash function $\mathcal{H}$ to be $h_k(x) := f(x) + k$, where $f$ is a one-way permutation and $k$ is a uniformly random key. This construction is notable in that it separates single-input correlation intractability (theoretically) from two-input correlation intractability: due to an impossibility result of Asharov-Segev [AS15], it is known that there is no (black-box) construction of CRHF from iO and one-way permutations (even with exponential security). A similar separation was shown in [HL18], but the “positive result” required assuming optimally hard one-way functions along with iO to obtain CI for all efficient functions (and more). In contrast, our construction is based on assumptions in the quantitatively standard regime.

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6 As is common [GR13], one must be careful about which definitions of “one-way permutation” suffice for this result. In our proof (which suffices for the separation), we assume that the one-way permutation has domain $\{0,1\}^n$. It turns out that the proof can be made to work for discrete log-based one-way permutations, but does not appear to work for the (trapdoor) permutations constructed based on iO [BPW16].

7 It suffices for $f$ to be a OWF whose output distribution is close to uniform, e.g., a surjective regular OWF.
1.3 Additional Related Work Discussion

Multi-Input Correlation Intractability  We summarize what was previously known regarding multi-input correlation intractability:

- For subexponentially sparse output relations $R$, output intractability for $R$ can be constructed based on lossy functions (following Zha16), but relying on less extreme forms of lossiness). Based on “extremely lossy functions”, Zhandry [Zha16] constructs a hash family that is CI for all sparse (efficiently decidable) output relations.\(^8\)

- Similarly to Zhandry [Zha16], the construction $x \mapsto p(H_k(x))$ (where $H_k$ is a sufficiently shrinking collision-resistant hash function and $p$ is sampled from a $t$-wise independent hash family) also yields output intractability for subexponentially sparse (and efficiently decidable) output relations.

- Holmgren and Lombardi [HL18] construct output-intractable hash functions for all sparse (even inefficient) $R$ based on “one-way product functions” (OWPFs), OWFs satisfying a quantitatively extreme assumption about the hardness of inverting many one-way function challenges in parallel. OWPFs (in different parameter regimes) are existentially incomparable to lossy functions and CHRFs. Under sufficiently strong assumptions, these hash families achieve quantitatively better security than is possible for the previous two constructions.

- Holmgren and Lombardi [HL18] also construct correlation-intractable hash families for relations $R(x, y)$ that include all shifted output relations. However, they rely on both indistinguishability obfuscation and OWPFs (as above).

Comparison with Peikert-Shiehian [PS19]. [PS19] constructs single-input CI based on the LWE (or SIS) assumption. Their construction improves upon the construction of [CCH+19] based on circular-secure FHE: by making use of special properties of the [GSW13] (and related) FHE schemes, they can remove the need for a circular ciphertext $\text{Enc}(sk, sk)$ in a specific GSW-based construction. By comparison, we show that any SHSF that is one-way is also CI for bounded functions, and that (essentially) the [PS18] SHSF is one-way. It does not seem easy to abstract out a simple, generic property of the [PS19] hash function that implies multi-input correlation intractability.

Given our generalization to multi-input CI, it is also reasonable to ask whether the [PS19] hash function also satisfies a form of multi-input CI. In fact, it appears likely that it satisfies CI for shifted-sum relations (just like our construction). However, a proof of this fact requires some of our analysis in the security proof of our multi-input CI construction (Theorem 1.4).

Comparison with Brakerski-Koppula-Mour [BKM20]. We also note that our construction shares some conceptual similarity to the recent CI construction of [BKM20]. We highlight the similarity here:

---

\(^8\)This is a special case of Zhandry’s actual result; we refer the reader to [Zha16] for more details.
In [BKM20], they show that a hash function \( x \mapsto h_k(x) - r \) (for a random \( r \)) is CI for a (low-degree) function \( f \) by writing down an indistinguishable key distribution \( k_f \) so that \( h_{k_f}(x) - f(x) \) lies in some sparse set \( S_f \). Then, \( h_{k_f}(x) - f(x) = r \) typically has no (information theoretic) solution.

In our construction, we show that a hash function \( x \mapsto h_k(x) - r \) is CI for \( f \) by writing down an indistinguishable key distribution \( k_f \) so that \( h_{k_f}(x) - f(x) \) is the evaluation of a PRF \( \text{PRF}_s(x) \). Then, as long as it is computationally hard to find a PRF inverse \( F_s^{-1}(r) \) (i.e. as long as \( F_s \) is one-way), we can conclude that the equation \( h_{k_f}(x) - f(x) = r \) is computationally hard to solve.

2 Preliminaries

Some of the preliminaries below are adapted from [HL18, CCH+19].

2.1 Hash Functions and Correlation Intractability

Definition 2.1. For a pair of efficiently computable functions \((\nu(\cdot), \mu(\cdot))\), a hash family with input length \( \nu \) and output length \( \mu \) is a collection \( \mathcal{H} = \{ h_\lambda : \{0,1\}^{\kappa(\lambda)} \times \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\mu(\lambda)} \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) of keyed hash functions, along with a pair of p.p.t. algorithms:

- \( \mathcal{H}.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \) outputs a hash key \( k \in \{0,1\}^{\kappa(\lambda)} \) describing a hash function \( h \).
- \( \mathcal{H}.\text{Hash}(k, x) \) computes the function \( h_\lambda(k, x) = h(x) \). We may use the notation \( h(x) \) to denote hash evaluation when the hash family is clear from context.

Following [HL18, CCH+19], we consider the security notion of correlation intractability [CGH98] for multi-input relations.

Definition 2.2 (Multi-Input Correlation Intractability). For a given relation ensemble \( R = \{ R_\lambda \subseteq (\{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)})^{t(\lambda)} \times (\{0,1\}^{\mu(\lambda)})^{t(\lambda)} \} \), a hash family \( \mathcal{H} = \{ h_\lambda : \{0,1\}^{\kappa(\lambda)} \times \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\mu(\lambda)} \}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \) is said to be \( R \)-correlation intractable with security \((s, \delta)\) if for every \( s \)-size adversary \( A = \{A_\lambda\} \),

\[
\Pr_{k \leftarrow \mathcal{H}.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda), x \leftarrow A(k)} (x, y = (h(x_1), \ldots, h(x_t))) \in R = O(\delta(\lambda)).
\]

We say that \( \mathcal{H} \) is \( R \)-correlation intractable with security \( \delta \) if it is \((\lambda^c, \delta)\)-correlation intractable for all \( c > 1 \). Finally, we say that \( \mathcal{H} \) is \( R \)-correlation intractable if it is \((\lambda^c, \frac{1}{\lambda^c})\)-correlation intractable for all \( c > 1 \).

A random oracle is correlation intractable for relations that are sparse, defined as follows:

Definition 2.3 (Sparsity). A relation ensemble \( R = \{ R_\lambda \subseteq (\{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)})^{t(\lambda)} \times (\{0,1\}^{\mu(\lambda)})^{t(\lambda)} \} \), is \( \rho(\lambda) \)-sparse if for every \( x \in (\{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)})^{t(\lambda)} \),

\[
\Pr_{y \leftarrow (\{0,1\}^{\mu(\lambda)})^{t(\lambda)}} ((x, y) \in R) \leq \rho(\lambda).
\]

We say that \( R \) is sparse if it is \( \text{neg}(\lambda) \)-sparse.
In this work, we focus on distinct input relations, i.e., relations $R$ such that for any $(x, y) \in R$, we have that $x_i \neq x_j$ for any pair $(i, j)$.

We now describe some special cases of the above definition. Two of them (CI for efficient functions and Output Intractability) have been discussed in prior works \cite{Zha16, HL18, CCH19, PS19}, while a third – which we call “CI for shifted relations” – we introduce in this work.

**Definition 2.4** (Correlation Intractability for Functions). For a given function ensemble $\mathcal{F} = \{f_\lambda : \{0, 1\}^{\kappa(\lambda)} \to \{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)}\}$, a hash family $\mathcal{H} = \{h_\lambda : \{0, 1\}^{\kappa(\lambda)} \times \{0, 1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \to \{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)}\}$ is said to be $f$-correlation intractable if it is $R$-correlation intractable for the single-input relation

$$R = \{(x, f(x)) : x \in \{0, 1\}^k\}.$$ 

Formally, the requirement is that for every poly-size $A = \{A_\lambda\}$,

$$\Pr_{k \leftarrow \mathcal{H}.Gen(1^\lambda)} \Pr_{x \leftarrow A(k)} [h(k, x) = f(x)] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

**Definition 2.5** (Output Intractability). For a given relation ensemble $R_{\text{out}} = \{R_{\text{out}, \lambda} \subseteq (\{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)})^t\}$, a hash family $\mathcal{H} = \{h_\lambda : \{0, 1\}^{\kappa(\lambda)} \times \{0, 1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \to \{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)}\}$ is said to be $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractable if it is $R$-correlation intractable for the relation

$$R = \{(x, y) : y \in R_{\text{out}} \text{ and } x_i \neq x_j \text{ for all } i \neq j\}.$$

Formally, the requirement is that for every poly-size $A = \{A_\lambda\}$,

$$\Pr_{k \leftarrow \mathcal{H}.Gen(1^\lambda)} \Pr_{x = (x_1, \ldots, x_t) \leftarrow A(k)} [x_i \neq x_j \text{ for all } i \neq j \text{ and } (y = (h(x_1), \ldots, h(x_t)) \in R_{\text{out}}] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

In this work, we also consider a strengthening of $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractability (as defined above) in which the inputs $x_1, \ldots, x_t$ are not required to be distinct; of course, this larger relation must still be sparse in order for correlation intractability to be feasible.

**Definition 2.6** (Not-All-Equal (NAE) Output Intractability). For a given relation ensemble $R_{\text{out}} = \{R_{\text{out}, \lambda} \subseteq (\{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)})^t\}$, a hash family $\mathcal{H} = \{h_\lambda : \{0, 1\}^{\kappa(\lambda)} \times \{0, 1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \to \{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)}\}$ is said to be not-all-equal $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractable if it is $R$-correlation intractable for the relation

$$R = \{(x, y) : y \in R_{\text{out}} \text{ and } x_1, \ldots, x_t \text{ are not all equal}\}.$$

When $t$ is a constant, not-all-equal output intractability for a $t$-output relation $R_{\text{out}}$ follows from standard output intractability for $\leq t^t$ different relations defined based on $R_{\text{out}}$ (there is one distinct-input relation for each partition of $[t]$). When $t$ is superconstant it becomes better to prove the security property directly (without incurring a $t^t$ security loss).

**Definition 2.7** ((Not-All-Equal) Multi-Input CI for $\mathbb{Z}_p$-Shifted Relations). Let $p = p(\lambda)$ be an efficiently computable function of $\lambda$.  

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For a given function ensemble \( F = \{ f_\lambda : \{0,1\}^{|\nu(\lambda)|} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\mu(\lambda)} \} \) and relation ensemble \( R_{\text{out}} = \{ R_{\text{out},\lambda} \subseteq (\mathbb{Z}_p^{\mu(\lambda)})^{t(\lambda)} \} \), a hash family \( \mathcal{H} = \{ h_\lambda : \{0,1\}^{\alpha(\lambda)} \times \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\mu(\lambda)} \} \) is said to be \((R_{\text{out}},f)\)-correlation intractable (respectively, not-all-equal \((R_{\text{out}},f)\)-correlation intractable) if it is correlation intractable for the shifted relation

\[
R = \left\{ (x, y) : x_i \neq x_j \text{ for all } i \neq j \text{ and } (y_1 - f(x_1), \ldots, y_t - f(x_t)) \in R_{\text{out}} \right\},
\]

respectively,

\[
R_{\text{NAE}} = \left\{ (x, y) : x_1, \ldots, x_t \text{ are not all equal } (y_1 - f(x_1), \ldots, y_t - f(x_t)) \in R_{\text{out}} \right\}.
\]

We note that Definition 2.7 generalizes both Definition 2.4 and Definition 2.5/Definition 2.6. In particular, when \( p(\lambda) \) is a power-of-two, Definitions 2.5 and 2.6 can be recovered (identifying \( \mathbb{Z}_p^\mu = \{0,1\}^{\mu \log p} \)) by setting \( f \) to be the all-zero function, while Definition 2.4 can be recovered by setting \( R_{\text{out}} = \{0^\mu \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\mu = \{0,1\}^{\mu \log p}\} \).

Finally, we describe an interesting special case of Definition 2.7 that we securely instantiate under LWE.

**Definition 2.8 (Weighted Sum Resistance mod \( p \)).** Let \( t = t(\lambda) \). A hash function family \( \mathcal{H} \) with output space \( \mathbb{Z}_p^\mu \) is weighted sum resistant mod \( p \) with weights \( w \in \{-1,0,1\}^t \) if it is output intractable for the \( t \)-output relation

\[
R_{\text{out}} = \left\{ y : \sum_{i=1}^t w_i y_i = 0^\mu \pmod{p} \right\}.
\]

Similarly, it is not-all-equal weighted sum resistant mod \( p \) with weights \( w \) if it is NAE output intractable for \( R_{\text{out}} \).

We say that \( \mathcal{H} \) is weighted sum resistant if it is sum resistant for all nonzero weight vectors \( w \), and NAE-weighted sum resistant if it is NAE-sum resistant for all weight vectors \( w \) such that \( \sum_i w_i \neq 0 \). As shown in Section 4, our LWE-based hash family satisfies (NAE) multi-input CI for (both variants of) shifted weighted sum resistance mod \( p \) with \( p \approx 2^\lambda \).

### 2.2 Shift-Hiding Shiftable Functions

We consider a weakening of the original definition of Peikert and Shiehian [PS18] that does not give the adversary oracle access to the SHSF. We also consider a modified definition with exact correctness rather than approximate correctness (this corresponds to the “rounded version” of the [PS18] construction).

**Definition 2.9 (Shift-Hiding Shiftable Functions [PS18]).** Let \( p = p(\lambda) \) be an efficiently computable function of \( \lambda \). We define a family of shift-hiding shiftable functions with input space \( \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \) and output space \( \mathbb{Z}_p^{\mu(\lambda)} = \{0,1\}^{\mu(\lambda) \log p(\lambda)} \) for arbitrary polynomial functions \( (\nu(\lambda), \mu(\lambda)) \).

For a given class \( C \) of function ensembles \( F = \{ f_\lambda : \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\mu(\lambda)} \} \), a shift-hiding shiftable function family \( \text{SHSF} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Shift}, \text{Eval}, \text{SEval}) \) consists of four PPT algorithms:
- \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ outputs a master secret key $\text{msk}$ and public parameters $\text{pp}$.
- \text{Shift}(\text{msk}, f)$ takes as input a secret key $\text{msk}$ and a function $f \in \mathcal{F}$. It outputs a shifted key $\text{sk}_f$.
- \text{Eval}(\text{pp}, \text{msk}, x)$, given a secret key $\text{msk}$ and input $x \in \{0,1\}^\nu(\lambda)$, outputs an evaluation $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\mu(\lambda)$.
- \text{SEval}(\text{pp}, \text{sk}_f, x)$, given a shifted key $\text{sk}_f$ and input $x \in \{0,1\}^\nu(\lambda)$, outputs an evaluation $y \in \mathbb{Z}_p^\mu(\lambda)$.

We will sometimes use the notation $F_{\text{sk}}(x)$ to mean either \text{Eval}(\text{sk}, x)$ or \text{SEval}(\text{sk}, x)$ when the context is clear.

We require that SHSF satisfies the following two properties:

- \textbf{Computational Correctness}: for any function $f \in \mathcal{C}$, given public parameters $\text{pp}$ and a shifted key $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow \text{Shift}(\text{msk}, f)$ (for $(\text{pp}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$), it is computationally hard to find an input $x \in \{0,1\}^\nu(\lambda)$ such that $\text{Eval}(\text{sk}_f, x) \neq \text{Eval}(\text{msk}, x) + f(x) \pmod{p}$. In other words, the equation
  
  \[ F_{\text{sk}_f}(x) = F_{\text{msk}}(x) + f(x) \]
  
  holds computationally (mod $p$).

- \textbf{Shift Hiding}: for any pair of functions $f, g \in \mathcal{C}$,
  
  $\text{sk}_f \approx_{\text{e}} \text{sk}_g$,
  
  where $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow \text{Shift}(\text{msk}, f)$, $\text{sk}_g \leftarrow \text{Shift}(\text{msk}, g)$, and $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$.

2.3 Learning with Errors and (One-Dimensional) Short Integer Solution

We begin with definitions of the learning with errors (LWE) and sort integer solution (SIS) problems, following Peikert’s survey [Pei16]. We refer the reader to [Pei16] for definitions of worst-case lattice problems such as SIVP and GapSVP.

\textbf{Definition 2.10 (Learning with Errors).} For integers $n, m, q, \chi \in \mathbb{N}$, the learning with errors problem \text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi} is defined to be the following average-case decision problem: distinguish between a uniformly random matrix-vector pair

\[
(A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}, u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m)
\]

and an approximate linear equation

\[
(A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}, sA + e)
\]

with $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $e \leftarrow \chi^m$.

\textbf{Definition 2.11 (Short Integer Solution).} For integers $n, m, q, B \in \mathbb{N}$, the short integer solution problem \text{SIS}_{n,m,q,B} is defined to be the following search problem: given a uniformly random matrix

\[
A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}
\]

find a vector $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ such that $||v||_\infty \leq B$ and $Av = 0^n$. 

2.3.1 One-Dimensional SIS Variants

We also explicitly consider two different “one-dimensional” variants of SIS that come up in our security proofs. One variant is the “1D-R-SIS problem” as defined by [BV15]; the other is a variant implicitly considered by [Ajt96] and explicitly considered by [Reg04,BV15] that we will call “(approximate) $Z_q$-SIS.”

These problems are no easier to solve than LWE, but for clarity, as was done in [BV15,PS18], it is convenient to define them separately.

**Definition 2.12 (Approximate $Z_q$-SIS).** For positive integers $q, m, B, E \in \mathbb{N}$, the approximate $Z_q$-SIS problem is defined as follows: given a uniformly random vector $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, find a nonzero vector $z \in \mathbb{Z}_m^m$ such that:

- $||z||_{\infty} \leq B$; and
- $\langle v, z \rangle \pmod{q} \in [-E, E]$.

In [Reg04,BV15], it is shown that $Z_q$-SIS is as hard as worst-case lattice problems in the following parameter regime (among others):

**Fact 2.13.** If $q = \prod_{i=1}^{m} p_i$ and each $p_i \geq B \cdot \omega(\sqrt{mn \log(n)})$, then $Z_q$-SIS is as hard as SIVP$_{B \tilde{O}(\sqrt{mn})}$ and GapSVP$_{B \tilde{O}(\sqrt{mn})}$ for $n$-dimensional lattices.

However, we will be interested in a variant of approximate $Z_q$-SIS where $E$ is very large compared to $B$; therefore, we appeal to a simple modulus switching [BV11] reduction.

**Claim 2.14.** The approximate $Z_q$-SIS problem with parameters $(q, m, \beta, \eta)$ reduces to the approximate $Z_Q$-SIS problem with parameters $(Q, m, B, E)$ if $\beta \geq B$ and

$$\frac{\eta}{q} \geq \frac{E}{Q} + \frac{mB}{Q} + \frac{mB}{q}$$

We will invoke this claim (see Section 4.5) in a setting where $Q \gg q$ (in fact, we will set $q \ll \frac{Q}{E}$ so that the first term in this sum is insignificant).

**Proof.** Given $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ (interpreted as an integer vector), define $V \in \mathbb{Z}_Q^m$ so that each coordinate satisfies $V_i = \left\lceil \frac{Q}{q} v_i + r_i \right\rceil$, where $r_i$ is a uniformly random real number in the range $[0, \frac{Q}{q}]$. We then have that

$$V = \frac{Q}{q} v + \epsilon$$

for a vector $\epsilon \in \mathbb{R}^m$ such that $||\epsilon||_{\infty} \leq 1 + \frac{Q}{q}$. Note that $V$ is a uniformly random element of $\mathbb{Z}_Q^m$, so the reduction is valid. Now, assuming that the $Z_Q$-SIS problem is solved correctly, we are given a vector $z$ such that

$$\langle V, z \rangle = Q \cdot \ell + \epsilon$$

---

9 The problem called “1D-SIS” in [BV15] is a special case of approximate $Z_q$-SIS; the two error parameters $(B, E)$ in Definition 2.12 below are set to be equal to each other in [BV15].
and $|e| \leq E$. Then,
\[
\langle v, z \rangle = q\ell + \frac{q}{Q}e - \frac{q}{Q} \langle \epsilon, z \rangle,
\]
which breaks approximate $\mathbb{Z}_q$-SIS with parameters $(q, m, B, \eta)$ as long as
\[
\eta \geq \frac{q}{Q}E + m\frac{q}{Q}(1 + \frac{Q}{q})B
\]
\[= \frac{q}{Q}E + \frac{q}{Q} \cdot mB + mB \]
In addition to approximate $\mathbb{Z}_q$-SIS, we consider a slight variant of 1D-R-SIS [BV15] due to [BKM17].

**Definition 2.15** (1D-R-SIS [BV15, BKM17]). Let $p \in \mathbb{N}$ and $p_1 < p_2 < \ldots < p_n$ be pairwise coprime and relatively prime to $p$. Let $q = p \cdot \prod_{i=1}^n p_i$. Then, for positive integers $m \in \mathbb{N}$ and $B$, the 1D-R-SIS$_{m,p,q,B}$ problem is as follows: given a uniformly random vector $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, find a nonzero vector $z \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ such that
- $||z||_\infty \leq B$; and
- $\langle v, z \rangle \pmod{q} \in \frac{q}{p} \cdot (Z + \frac{1}{2}) + [-B, B]$.

**Fact 2.16** ( [Ajt96, BV15, BKM17]) For sufficiently large $p_i \geq B \cdot \text{poly}(n, \log q)$, solving 1D-R-SIS is at least as hard as approximating SIVP and SVP on arbitrary $n$-dimensional lattices to within $B \cdot \text{poly}(n)$ factors.

## 3 Correlation Intractability from Shift-Hiding Shiftable Functions

In this section, we show that shift-hiding shiftable functions (Definition 2.9) that are output intractable (Definitions 2.5 and 2.6) can be used to construct correlation-intractable hash functions for shifted relations (Definition 2.7). As a special case, this shows that SHSFs that are hard to invert yield correlation-intractable hash functions for all circuits (Definition 2.4) supported by the SHSF function class $C$. In other words, SHSFs allow us to lift a form of output intractability to a more general form of correlation intractability.

Formally, let $\text{SHSF} = (\text{Gen, Shift, Eval})$ be a SHSF family that represents functions of the form $F_{sk} : \{0, 1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\mu(\lambda)}$ and supports shifts for functions $f \in C$, where $C$ is some class that contains the all zero function ensemble. We then consider two hash functions $H_{\text{plain}}, H_{\text{shift}}$:

- $H_{\text{plain}}$ uses $\text{msk}$ as a hash key, and computes the function $h(\text{msk}, x) = F_{\text{msk}}(x)$.
- $H_{\text{shift}}$ uses $\text{sk}_Z$ as a hash key, where $Z : \{0, 1\}^\nu \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\mu}$ is an identically zero function. It computes the function $h(\text{sk}_Z, x) = F_{\text{sk}_Z}(x)$.

**Theorem 3.1.** Let $R_{\text{out}}$ be an efficiently decidable output relation. If SHSF is a shift-hiding shiftable function family for $C$ and $H_{\text{plain}}$ is $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractable, then $H_{\text{shift}}$ is $(R, f)$-correlation intractable for any $f \in C$.

Moreover, if $H_{\text{plain}}$ is NAE-$R_{\text{out}}$-output intractable, then $H_{\text{shift}}$ is NAE-$(R, f)$-CI for any $f \in C$. 

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Proof. Suppose that a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ breaks the $(R, f)$-correlation intractability of $H_{\text{shift}}$, which means that $\mathcal{A}$ wins the following challenger-based security game with non-negligible probability:

1. The challenger samples $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$.
2. The challenger samples $\text{sk} = \text{sk}_Z \leftarrow \text{Shift}(\text{msk}, Z)$ and sends $\text{sk}$ to $\mathcal{A}$.
3. $\mathcal{A}(\text{sk})$ outputs $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_t)$.
4. $\mathcal{A}$ wins if (i) the inputs $x_i$ are distinct, and (ii) for $y_i = F_{\text{sk}}(x_i) - f(x_i)$, the relation $R_{\text{out}}(y)$ holds.

Then, $\mathcal{A}$ also wins each of the following modified security games with non-negligible probability.

- **Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_1$:** same as the honest security game, except that in step (2), we sample $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow \text{Shift}(\text{msk}, f)$

  This is indistinguishable from the original security game by the shift-hiding of SHSF.

- **Hybrid $\text{Hyb}_2$:** same as $\text{Hyb}_1$, except that in step (4), we change the win condition (ii) so that $\mathcal{A}$ wins if for $y_i = F_{\text{msk}}(x_i)$, the relation $R_{\text{out}}(y)$ holds.

  This is indistinguishable from $\text{Hyb}_1$ by the computational correctness of SHSF.

Finally, we show that $\mathcal{A}$’s success in $\text{Hyb}_2$ leads to an attack $\mathcal{A}'$ on the $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractability of $H_{\text{plain}}$. The attack works as follows:

1. The challenger samples $\text{msk} \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ and sends $\text{msk}$ to $\mathcal{A}'$.
2. $\mathcal{A}'(\text{msk})$ samples $\text{sk} = \text{sk}_f \leftarrow \text{Shift}(\text{msk}, f)$.
3. $\mathcal{A}'$ then calls $\mathcal{A}(\text{sk}_f)$ and outputs $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_t)$.
4. By definition, $\mathcal{A}'$ wins if (i) the $x_i$ are distinct, and (ii) for $y_i = F_{\text{msk}}(x_i)$, the relation $R_{\text{out}}(y)$ holds.

By construction, $\mathcal{A}'$ above wins with the same probability that $\mathcal{A}$ wins in $\text{Hyb}_2$, contradicting the $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractability of $H_{\text{plain}}$.

The same argument as above applies to NAE-CI, with the condition (i) replaced by “the inputs $x_i$ are not all equal.” This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1.

4 Construction of (Weighted) Sum-Resistant SHSF

We show the (weighted) sum-resistance of a variant of the Peikert-Shiehian construction of shift-hiding shift-hiding functions [PS18]. We start by describing the ingredients that we use in the construction; the construction itself is described in Section 4.2. We include proof sketches of computational correctness in Section 4.3 and shift-hiding in Section 4.4 for completeness, although these follow the original [PS18] result. Finally, the proof of sum-resistance (which is new to this work) is in Section 4.5. Appropriate parameter balancing must be done to ensure that the three security reductions are simultaneously valid for a single set of parameters.
4.1 The Ingredients

The Gadget Matrix. An important ingredient in many lattice-based constructions is the gadget matrix $G$ and the operator $G^{-1}$ associated to it. Let

$$g = [1, 2, 4, \ldots, 2^{\lceil \log q \rceil - 1}] \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{1 \times \lceil \log q \rceil}$$

The gadget matrix $G = I_n \otimes g$ is a block diagonal matrix with copies of $g$ on the diagonal. In fact, we will extend $G$ to $m$ columns for any $m \geq n \lceil \log q \rceil$ by appending zero columns.

An important property of $G \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}_{q}$ is that for every vector $v \in \mathbb{Z}^{n}_{q}$, there is a 0-1 vector $v' \in \{0, 1\}^{m}$ such that $Gv' = v \pmod{q}$. This leads us to define the operator $G^{-1} : \mathbb{Z}^{n}_{q} \to \{0, 1\}^{m}$ which has the property that

1. $G^{-1}(v) \in \{0, 1\}^{m}$ for every vector $v \in \mathbb{Z}^{n}_{q}$; and
2. $G \cdot G^{-1}(v) = v \pmod{q}$.

We will extend $G^{-1}$ to matrices $V$ by acting on each column of the matrix separately. We caution the reader that $G^{-1}$ refers to a (non-linear) operator, and has little to do with matrix inverses.

Gadget Homomorphisms. The key idea in the SHSF construction is the notion of gadget homomorphisms originating from [BGG+14]. For LWE matrices $A_1, A_2 \in \mathbb{Z}^{n \times m}_{q}$, define the sum and product matrices

$$A_+ = A_1 + A_2 \quad \text{and} \quad A_\times = -A_1 G^{-1}(A_2) \quad (1)$$

where $G$ is the gadget matrix and $G^{-1}$ is the bit decomposition operator defined above. The gadget homomorphisms allow us to start from LWE encodings $c_1 \approx s(A_1 + x_1 G)$ and $c_2 \approx s(A_2 + x_2 G)$ w.r.t. an LWE secret $s \in \mathbb{Z}^{n}_{q}$ (where we suppress the LWE errors for clarity) and compute

$$c_+ \approx s(A_+ + (x_1 + x_2)G) \quad \text{and} \quad c_\times \approx s(A_\times + x_1 x_2 G) \quad (2)$$

In particular, this is accomplished by setting

$$c_+ = c_1 + c_2 \approx s(A_1 + A_2 + (x_1 + x_2)G) = s(A_+ + (x_1 + x_2)G)$$

and

$$c_\times = -c_1 G^{-1}(A_2) + x_1 c_2$$

$$\approx -s(A_1 + x_1 G) \cdot G^{-1}(A_2) + s(A_2 + x_2 G) \cdot x_1$$

$$= s(-A_1 G^{-1}(A_2) + x_1 x_2 G)$$

$$= s(A_\times + x_1 x_2 G)$$

Crucially, this computation does not require the knowledge of either $x_1$ or $x_2$ to compute the sum. It does require the knowledge of $x_1$ (but not $x_2$) to compute the product. This asymmetry will prove invaluable to us down the line. We will ensure that the inputs $x_i$ as well as the intermediate values in the computation are bits, in order to control the error growth.

More generally, we define the following two algorithms.
- **Gadget.MEval** \( (g, A_1, \ldots, A_\ell) \), the matrix homomorphism, takes as input a function \( g : \{0, 1\}^\ell \to \{0, 1\} \) and \( \ell \) matrices \( A_1, \ldots, A_\ell \) and outputs the matrix \( A_g \) obtained by composing together the addition and multiplication operations in Equation 1.

- **Gadget.VEval** \( (g, x, c_1, \ldots, c_\ell) \), the vector homomorphism, takes as input a function \( g : \{0, 1\}^\ell \to \{0, 1\} \), an input \( x = x_1 x_2 \ldots x_\ell \) and LWE encodings
  \[
  c_1 = s(A_1 + x_1 G) + e_1, \ldots, c_\ell = s(A_\ell + x_\ell G) + e_\ell
  \]
of \( x \) w.r.t. \( A_1, \ldots, A_\ell \), and outputs a vector \( c_g \) obtained by composing together the addition and multiplication operations in Equation 2.

Correctness tells us that if \( c_1, \ldots, c_\ell \) have \( \text{poly}(n) \)-bounded error, then
\[
c_g \approx s(A_g + g(x) G)
\]
where the difference is an LWE error whose magnitude is \( O((n \log q)^{O(d_g)}) \) where \( \lambda \) is a security parameter and \( d_g \) is the depth of the circuit \( g \). Looking ahead, we make two important observations on these algorithms:

1. First, if the function \( g \) is of a special form, namely \( g(x_1, x_2) = \langle x_1, f(x_2) \rangle \) for some \( x = x_1 || x_2 \), then Gadget.VEval does not require the knowledge of \( x_1 \), rather only \( x_2 \). Furthermore, while we required all the numbers in a computation to be bits so far, a terminal inner product (i.e. an inner product at the end of a computation) can support \( x_1 \) being a vector consisting of large numbers. These observations are due to \([AFV11, GVW15]\) where they were used to construct a predicate encryption scheme.

2. Secondly, if the first coordinate of \( s \) is 1 (which we can set without loss of security) then we have
\[
c_g \approx s a_g + g(x)
\]
where \( c_g \) is the first coordinate of \( c_g \) and \( a_g \) is the first column of \( A_g \). This is because the first column of \( G \) is the unit vector with 1 in the first coordinate and 0 everywhere else.

**FHE with Almost Linear Decryption.** We require the existence of a (secret-key) FHE scheme where the secret key \( fsk \) is a vector \( s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \), ciphertexts \( \text{fct} \) of messages \( m \in \mathbb{Z}_p \) are vectors \( c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \) and decryption proceeds by first doing a linear operation which gives
\[
\langle fsk, \text{fct} \rangle = m \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{q}{p} \right\rfloor + e \pmod{q}
\]
where \( e \) is a small error. In particular, we will ask that if initial ciphertexts have polynomially bounded error, then \( ||e|| \) should be bounded by \( (\hat{n} \log q)^{O(d)} \), where \( d \) is the depth of the homomorphic computation. Prior LWE-based FHE schemes, as constructed in \([BV11, BGV12, GSW13, BV14, AP14]\), have this form (based on different variants of LWE). We will let FHE.Enc denote the encryption algorithm and FHE.Eval denote the evaluation algorithm.
4.2 The Shift-Hiding Shiftable Function

Let the class of functions $C$ consist of functions $f : \{0,1\}^\nu \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\mu$ computable by circuits of size at most $s = s(\lambda)$. We require that $p = p(\lambda)$ is a sufficiently large function of $\lambda$; for simplicity, we will choose $p$ so that $p = 2^{\Omega(\lambda)}$ (further specified later). Since we allow $\mu(\lambda), \nu(\lambda)$ to be arbitrary polynomial functions, every function family with polynomially related input and output length can be expressed in such a way.

- **Gen($1^\lambda$):** picks LWE parameters $n = n(\lambda)$, $m = m(\lambda)$ and $q = q(\lambda)$, where $q = 2^{(d\lambda)^{O(1/\epsilon)}}$ is a sufficiently large product of primes to be specified later. We pick the LWE error distribution to be polynomially bounded, and set $n \geq (d\lambda)^{O(1/\epsilon^2)}$ so that the LWE assumption follows from worst-case hardness of GapSVP with subexponential approximation factors. Generate the public parameters

$$pp = (A_1, \ldots, A_\ell, u) \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m})^\ell \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times m}$$

for a certain $\ell = \ell(s, \lambda)$ (also specified later).

Choose a uniformly random vector $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ whose first coordinate $s[1] = 1$. Let $msk = s$.

- **Eval($msk, x$):** Let $FHE$ be a (leveled) fully homomorphic encryption scheme with almost linear decryption (as defined above in Equation 5) with plaintext space $\mathbb{Z}_p$. Construct the functions $g_{x}^{(i)}$ that, on input a pair ($fsk$, $fct$), output$^{10}$

$$g_{x}^{(i)}(fsk, fct) = \left\langle fsk, FHE.Eval(fct, \mathcal{U}_x^{(i)}) \right\rangle \pmod{q}$$

where $\mathcal{U}_x^{(i)}$ is a universal circuit that takes as input the description of a circuit $f$ and outputs the $i^{th}$ $\mathbb{Z}_p$-block of $f(x)$. The parameter $\ell = \text{poly}(\nu, \mu, \lambda)$ is set to be large enough so that the functions $g_{x}^{(i)}$ have description length at most $\ell$.

Define

$$A_{x}^{(i)} = \text{Gadget.MEval}(g_{x}^{(i)}, A_1, \ldots, A_\ell) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m},$$

let $a_{x}^{(i)}$ denote the first column of $A_{x}^{(i)}$ and let

$$A_x := [a_x^{(1)} || a_x^{(2)} || \ldots || a_x^{(\mu)}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times \mu}$$

do the concatenation of $a_{x}^{(i)}$. The output is

$$[sA_x + uG^{-1}(A_x)]_p := \left\lfloor \frac{p}{q} \cdot (sA_x + uG^{-1}(A_x)) \right\rfloor \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{1 \times \mu}$$

- **Shift($msk, f$):** Choose an FHE secret key $fsk \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, encrypt the description of $f$ into an FHE ciphertext $fct$, let $\phi := fct||fsk$, and let

$$A_f := [A_1 + \phi_1 G] || \ldots || [A_\ell + \phi_\ell G]$$

$^{10}$The function $g_{x}^{(i)}$ does not actually have a binary output, but as was done in [BV15, GVW15], the [BGG+14] homomorphism can be extended to this function.
Output as the shift key
\[ \text{sk}_f := (\text{fct}, sA_f + e) \]

where \( e \) is drawn from the LWE noise distribution.

Note that \( \ell \) is the bit-length of \( fsk\|\text{fct} \) and is \( \text{poly}(s, \lambda) \).

- \( \text{SEval}(\text{sk}_f, x) \): Let the circuits \( g_x^{(i)} \) be as in the definition of \( \text{Eval} \).

\[
c_x^{(i)} = \text{Gadget.VEval}(g_x^{(i)}, \text{fct}, c_1, \ldots, c_\ell) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n
\]

where \( c_i = s[A_i + \varphi_i G] \). Note that crucially, \( \text{Gadget.VEval} \) does not require \( fsk \) as input because, by observation (1) above, \( g_x^{(i)} \) only linearly depends on it. Let \( c_x^{(i)} \) denote the first element of \( c_x^{(i)} \) and let \( c_x \) be the concatenation of all \( c_x^{(i)} \).

Output
\[
\lfloor c_x + uG^{-1}(A_x) \rfloor_p
\]
as the shifted evaluation.

4.3 Proof of Computational Correctness

Computational correctness follows from a similar argument in [PS18], although with slightly different parameter choices. We sketch it here for completeness.

Basic Correctness. We first sketch correctness of \( \text{SEval} \) for any fixed \( x \). By the correctness of the gadget homomorphisms (equation 4), we know that

\[
c_x^{(i)} \approx sa_x^{(i)} + g_x^{(i)}(fsk, \text{fct})
= sa_x^{(i)} + \langle fsk, \text{FHE.Eval}(\text{fct}, U_x^{(i)}) \rangle
\approx sa_x^{(i)} + U_x^{(i)}(f) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{q}{p} \right\rfloor
= sa_x^{(i)} + f^{(i)}(x) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{q}{p} \right\rfloor
\]

where the second equation is by the definition of \( g_x^{(i)} \), the third (approximate) equation is by the correctness of FHE decryption (equation 5), and the fourth equation is by the definition of the universal circuit \( \mathcal{U} \). The approximation error is equal to the gadget homomorphic evaluation error plus the FHE decryption error, which is

\[
O((n \log q)^{O(d')}) + (\hat{n} \log q)^{O(d)} = \lambda^{O(\frac{1}{\lambda} d \log(d\lambda))}
\]

where \( d \) is the depth of the circuit \( U_x^{(i)} \) and \( d' = O(d \cdot \log(n \log q)) \) is the depth of the circuit \( g_x^{(i)} \) that homomorphically evaluates \( U_x^{(i)} \) and decrypts. Since we chose \( q = 2^{\Theta(1/\epsilon)} \), this error is very small relative to \( q \).
Now, as long as $c_x^{(i)}$ does not fall too close to the boundaries of multiples of $q/p$, we have

$$\text{SEval}(sk_f, x) = [c_x + uG^{-1}(A_x)]_p$$
$$= [sA_x + uG^{-1}(A_x)]_p + f(x) = \text{Eval}(msk, x) + f(x) \pmod{p} \quad (7)$$

It turns out that for any fixed $x$, the boundary event happens with a negligible probability. Moreover, adapting arguments from [BV15,PS18], we will now show that it is computationally hard to find an $x$ for which correctness (that is, equation 7) fails. (This is stronger than basic correctness in that it holds for any adaptively chosen $x$, and weaker because the guarantee is computational; adaptive statistical correctness does not hold for this construction.)

Computational Correctness. By the calculation in equation 6, we know that for each $i \in [\mu]$,

$$c_x^{(i)} = sa_x^{(i)} + f^{(i)}(x) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{q}{p} \right\rfloor + e_i$$

where $|e_i| \leq B := \lambda^{O(\frac{1}{\epsilon}d \log(d\lambda))}$.

Assume that there is an adversary that, given the shift key $sk_f \leftarrow \text{Shift}(msk, f)$ for some $f$ of his choice, produces an $x$ such that

$$\text{SEval}(sk_f, x) \neq \text{Eval}(msk, x)$$

meaning that they differ in some coordinate, say $i$.

Then, by the expressions for SEval and Eval, we have

$$\text{SEval}(sk_f, x) = \left\lfloor \frac{p}{q} \cdot c_x^{(i)} \right\rfloor = \left\lfloor \frac{p}{q} \cdot (sa_x^{(i)} + f^{(i)}(x) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{q}{p} \right\rfloor + e_i) \right\rfloor$$

$$= \left\lfloor \frac{p}{q} \cdot (sa_x^{(i)} + f^{(i)}(x) \cdot \frac{q}{p} + e'_i) \right\rfloor$$

$$\neq \left\lfloor \frac{p}{q} \cdot (sa_x^{(i)} + f^{(i)}(x) \cdot \frac{q}{p}) \right\rfloor$$

$$= \frac{p}{q} \cdot sa_x^{(i)} + f^{(i)}(x) = \text{Eval}(msk, x)|_i$$

where $e'_i = e_i + f^{(i)}(x) \left( \left\lfloor \frac{q}{p} \right\rfloor - \frac{q}{p} \right) \in \left[ -(B + p), (B + p) \right]$. This can only happen when

$$\frac{p}{q} c_x^{(i)} \in \mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2} + \frac{p}{q} \cdot \left[ -(B + p), B + p \right]$$

or, equivalently,

$$c_x^{(i)} \in \frac{q}{p} \left( \mathbb{Z} + \frac{1}{2} \right) + \left[ -(B + 1/2), B + 1/2 \right].$$

Now, observe that

$$c_x^{(i)} = [c_1| \ldots | c_\ell] \cdot h^{(i)}$$

for some vector $h^{(i)}$ of low norm $B = \lambda^{O(\frac{1}{\epsilon}d \log(d\lambda))}$. Since $c_i$ are pseudorandom, this gives us a solution to the 1D-SIS_{\epsilon,p,q,B} problem. For this choice of $B$, Fact 2.16 tells us that provided
\[ q = p \prod_{i=1}^{n'} p_i \text{ such that each } p_i \geq \text{poly}(B), \text{ this 1D-SIS variant is as hard as SIVP/GapSVP on }\]
\[ n'\text{-dimensional lattices with an approximation factor of poly}(B). \text{ Given all of the parameter constraints, we can set } n' \geq (d\lambda)^{O(1/\epsilon)} \text{ so that } 2^{(n')^c} \geq \text{poly}(B), \text{ allowing us to rely on the claimed hardness assumption.}\]

### 4.4 Proof of Shift-Hiding

We wish to show that for any two functions \( f_0, f_1 \in \mathcal{C} \),

\[ (\text{Shift}(\text{msk}, f_0), pp) \approx_c (\text{Shift}(\text{msk}, f_1), pp) \]

where \( (pp, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \). This also follows from [PS18] (up to minor definition/notation changes), but we sketch a proof for completeness. Shift-hiding follows by the following sequence of hybrids.

**Hybrid 0.** This is the distribution generated by picking \( (pp, msk) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \) and outputting \( pp \) together with

\[ sk_{f_0} \leftarrow \text{Shift}(msk, f_0) \]

That is,

\[ sk_{f_0} := (\text{fct}, sA_{f_0} + e) \]

where \( \text{fct} \) is an FHE encryption of \( f_0 \) under an FHE secret key \( \text{fsk} \), and

\[ A_{f_0} = [A_1 + \phi_1 G | \ldots | A_\ell + \phi_\ell G] \]

where \( \phi = \text{fsk} || \text{fct} \) and the matrices \( A_i \) live in the public parameters.

**Hybrid 1.** Generate \( \text{fct} = \text{FHE.Enc}(\text{fsk}, f_0) \) as above, and let \( \phi = \text{fsk} || \text{fct} \). Choose

\[ A_{f_0} = [A'_1 || \ldots || A'_\ell] \]

to be a truly random LWE matrix of the appropriate dimensions, and program \( A_i \) in the public parameters to be \( A'_i - \phi_i G \). Hybrid 1 is distributed identically to that in Hybrid 0.

**Hybrid 2.** Replace \( sA_{f_0} + e \) in Hybrid 1 with a uniformly random vector. This is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid 1 by an application of LWE with respect to the uniformly random matrix \( A_{f_0} \).

**Hybrid 3.** Replace the public parameters by uniformly random matrices \( A_i \). This hybrid is distributed identically to Hybrid 2. Note that the distribution in this hybrid is independent of the FHE secret key \( \text{fsk} \).

**Hybrid 4.** Replace \( \text{fct} \) in Hybrid 3 with an encryption of \( f_1 \) instead of \( f_0 \). This is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid 3 by an application of FHE semantic security.

The remaining hybrids backtrack through hybrids 2 back to 0 using \( f_1 \) instead of \( f_0 \).

**Hybrid 5–7.** This is identical to Hybrid 2–0, except that \( \text{fct} \) is an encryption of \( f_1 \).
Putting the hybrid argument together, we have that given the public parameters \( pp \), the shift keys for \( f_0 \) and \( f_1 \) are computationally indistinguishable. Indistinguishability relies on LWE for matrices in \( \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m} \) as well as the semantic security of an FHE scheme (with almost linear decryption) over \( \mathbb{Z}_q \) with messages in \( \mathbb{Z}_p \), which can both be arranged to follow from the hardness of GapSVP with subexponential approximation factors.

4.5 Proof of Sum-Resistance

Assume that an adversary \( A \), given \( msk \) and \( pp \), comes up with weights \( w_1, \ldots, w_t \in \{-1, 0, 1\} \) and inputs \( x_1, \ldots, x_t \) such that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot \text{Eval}(msk, x_i) = 0 \pmod{p}
\]

and either the \( x_i \) are all distinct, or the \( x_i \) are not all equal and \( \sum_i w_i \neq 0 \). The equation above says that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot [sA_{x_i} + uG^{-1}(A_{x_i})]_p = 0 \pmod{p}
\]

Rewriting this, we have

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot [(sG + u)G^{-1}(A_{x_i})]_p = \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot \left[ \frac{p}{q} \cdot (sG + u)G^{-1}(A_{x_i}) \right] = 0 \pmod{p}
\]

Writing \( v \) for \( sG + u \), and isolating the rounding errors \( \epsilon_i \in \left( \frac{1}{q} \mathbb{Z} \right)^\mu \), we have

\[
\frac{p}{q} \cdot v \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot G^{-1}(A_{x_i}) = \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \epsilon_i \pmod{p}
\]

Note that \( \| \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \epsilon_i \|_\infty \leq t \) since \( \| \epsilon_i \|_\infty \leq 1 \) for all \( i \). Multiplying both sides by \( q/p \),

\[
v \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot G^{-1}(A_{x_i}) = \frac{q}{p} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \epsilon_i :\epsilon \pmod{q}
\]

where \( \epsilon \in \mathbb{Z}^\mu \) and \( \| \epsilon \|_\infty \leq qt/p \). Now, we have two possibilities:

Case 1. \( \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot G^{-1}(A_{x_i}) \neq 0 \pmod{q} \). In this case, the matrix \( Z = \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot G^{-1}(A_{x_i}) \) — or any nonzero column \( z \) of \( Z \) — constitutes an approximate \( \mathbb{Z}_q \)-SIS (Definition 2.12) solution on instance \( v \), with input norm bound \( \| z \|_\infty \leq t \) and output error bound \( E = \frac{qt}{p} \).

By Claim 2.14, this variant of \( \mathbb{Z}_q \)-SIS is as hard as approximate \( \mathbb{Z}_q \)-SIS with the following parameters:

- Modulus \( \tilde{q} = \tilde{\Theta}(\sqrt{p}) \)
- Input norm bound \( \beta = t \)
• Output error bound \( \eta = \frac{\tilde{q}}{p} + 2mt = \tilde{O}(\frac{1}{\sqrt{p}}) + 2mt \leq 2mt + O(1) \) (since \( p = 2^{\Theta(\lambda)} \)).

By Fact 2.13, setting \( \tilde{q} \) to be the product of the first \( \tilde{\lambda} \geq \lambda^{1/3} \) primes, this problem is at least as hard as SIVP/GapSVP over lattices of dimension \( \lambda^{1/3} \) with approximation ratio \( \text{poly}(\lambda, m, t) \).

Case 2. \( \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot G^{-1}(A_{x_i}) = 0 \pmod{q} \). In this case, we know that
\[
G \cdot \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i \cdot G^{-1}(A_{x_i}) = \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i A_{x_i} = 0 \pmod{q}
\]

We now show how to use this to break SIS.

Let \( h = h_1 \ldots h_\ell \) be the description of a random function chosen from a \( t \)-wise independent hash family with range \( \mathbb{Z}_q^\mu \). Moreover, let \( x_1, \ldots, x_i \) denote the inputs returned by any fixed execution of \( A \). Then, let
\[
y = \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i h(x_i) \pmod{q}.
\]

We note that with high probability over the choice of \( h \), we have \( y \neq 0 \). This follows directly from the \( t \)-wise independence of \( h \): if the \( x_i \) are distinct, then indeed \( \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i h(x_i) \) is uniformly random (since each \( h(x_i) \) is uniform and independent of the other \( h(x_j) \)). Similarly, if the \( x_i \) are not-all-equal and \( \sum_i w_i \neq 0 \), then there exists a term \( \sum_{i \in S} w_i h(x_i) \) corresponding to one “super-variable” where \( \sum_{i \in S} w_i \neq 0 \), again implying that the overall sum is uniformly random. Therefore, we conclude that with non-negligible probability over the randomness of \( A, \text{msk}, h \), \( A \) outputs \( x \) such that \( \sum_{i=1}^{t} w_i G^{-1}(A_{x_i}) = 0 \) and \( y \neq 0 \).

Now, imagine the experiment where \( A_j \) is picked as \( AR_j + h_j G \). Here,
\[
A = \begin{bmatrix}
    a \\
    A
\end{bmatrix}
\]

where \( A \) is an SIS challenge matrix and \( a \) is uniformly random. This is statistically indistinguishable from above, so the same claimed property holds. Now,
\[
A_x^{(i)} = \text{Gadget.MEval}(U_x^{(i)}, A_1, \ldots, A_\ell) = A_{R,x,i} + h(x)|_i G
\]

and
\[
a_x^{(i)} = A_{R,x,i} + h(x)|_i u_1
\]

where \( u_1 \) is the first unit vector. (Technically, \( A_x^{(i)} \) is computed by doing a homomorphic evaluation of \( h \) and then decrypting. However, this complication does not make a significant difference to our argument below.)

We know that for each \( i \in [\mu] \),
\[
\sum_{j=1}^{t} w_j a_x^{(i)} = 0 \pmod{q}.
\]
Defining $R_{x_j} = [r_{x_{j,1}} \ldots r_{x_{j,\mu}}]$, we conclude that

$$A \cdot \sum_{j=1}^{t} w_j R_{x_j} + \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{t} w_j h_1(x_j) u_1 \right] \ldots \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{t} w_j h_\mu(x_j) u_1 \right] = 0 \pmod{q}$$

Whenever $y \neq 0 \pmod{q}$, it follows that $R$ is not zero. Now, we have $AR = 0 \pmod{q}$ (since $u_1 = 0$) and $R \neq 0$ giving us a SIS solution w.r.t. $A$. This finishes the proof of weighted $t$-sum-resistance.

4.6 Putting it Together: Weighted Sum-Resistant SHSFs

Combining the results of Section 4.4, Section 4.3, and Section 4.5, we obtain the following theorem.

**Theorem 4.1.** Assume that there is some $\epsilon > 0$ for which it is hard to approximate short vector problems in worst case $n$-dimensional lattices to within $2^{n^\epsilon}$ factor. Let $\text{SHSF} = (\text{Gen, Shift, Eval})$ be the SHSF family constructed above. Then, the hash function family $H_{\text{plain}}$ that uses $(pp, msk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ as a hash key, and computes the function

$$h((pp, msk), x) = \text{Eval}(pp, msk, x)$$

is $t$-weighted-sum-resistant for every $t = \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Combining Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 3.1 (the CI lifting theorem), we get a hash family that is CI for shifted (weighted) sum relations.

**Theorem 4.2.** Under the same assumption as in Theorem 4.1, there is a hash function family $H$ that is $(R_{\text{out}}, f)$-correlation intractable (as in Definition 2.7), where $R_{\text{out}}$ is the weighted sum relation as in Definition 2.8 and $f$ is any efficiently computable function. That is, $H$ is correlation-intractable for shifted (weighted) sum relations.

5 Output-Intractable SHSFs from iO

In this section, we present constructions of Output-Intractable SHSFs from iO (Theorem 1.6 and Theorem 1.5). For simplicity, we set the shift modulus $p = 2$ for SHSFs in the remainder of this section.

5.1 IO-Related Preliminaries

5.1.1 Indistinguishability Obfuscation

An *obfuscator for all circuits* is a PPT algorithm $O$ such that for every circuit $C$, $O(C)$ is with probability 1 a circuit $\tilde{C}$ with the same functionality as $C$. 
**Definition 5.1** (Indistinguishability Obfuscation [BGI+01]). \(O\) is a \((s, \delta)\)-secure indistinguishability obfuscator \((iO)\) if for all pairs of functionally equivalent circuits \(C_0\) and \(C_1\) of size \(|C_0| = |C_1| = \lambda\), and all circuits \(A\) of size \(s(\lambda)\), it holds that
\[
\Pr[A(O(C_0))] = 1 - \Pr[A(O(C_1))] = 1 \leq O(\delta(\lambda)).
\]

**5.1.2 Puncturable PRFs**

**Definition 5.2** (Puncturable PRF [BW13,BGI14,KPTZ13,SW14]). A puncturable PRF family is a family of functions
\[
\mathcal{F} = \left\{ F_{\lambda,s} : \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\mu(\lambda)} \right\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, s \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}}
\]
with associated (deterministic) polynomial-time algorithms \((\mathcal{F}.\text{Eval}, \mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}, \mathcal{F}.\text{PuncEval})\) satisfying

- For all \(x \in \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)}\) and all \(s \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}\), \(\mathcal{F}.\text{Eval}(s,x) = F_{\lambda,s}(x)\).
- For all distinct \(x, x' \in \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)}\) and all \(s \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}\),
  \[
  \mathcal{F}.\text{PuncEval}(\mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(s,x), x') = \mathcal{F}.\text{Eval}(s,x')
  \]

For ease of notation, we write \(F_s(x)\) and \(\mathcal{F}.\text{Eval}(s,x)\) interchangeably, and we write \(s\{x\}\) to denote \(\mathcal{F}.\text{Puncture}(s,x)\).

\(\mathcal{F}\) is said to be \((s, \delta)\)-secure if for every \(\{x(\lambda) \in \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}\), the following two distribution ensembles (indexed by \(\lambda\)) are \(\delta(\lambda)\)-indistinguishable to circuits of size \(s(\lambda)\):
\[
(S\{x(\lambda)\}, F_s(x(\lambda))) \text{ where } S \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}
\]
and
\[
(S\{x(\lambda)\}, U) \text{ where } S \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}\text{, } U \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\mu(\lambda)}.
\]

**Theorem 5.3** ([GGM84,KPTZ13,BW13,BGI14,SW14]). If \{polynomially secure, subexponentially secure\} one-way functions exist, then for all functions \(\mu : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}\) (with \(1^{\mu(\nu)}\) polynomial-time computable from \(1^\nu\)), and all \(\delta : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0,1]\) with \(\delta(\nu) \geq 2^{-\text{poly}(\nu)}\), there are polynomials \(\ell(\lambda), \nu(\lambda)\) and a \{polynomially secure, \(\frac{1}{2^{\nu(\lambda)}}, \delta(\nu(\lambda))\)-secure\} puncturable PRF family
\[
\mathcal{F}_\mu = \left\{ F_{\lambda,s} : \{0,1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{\mu(\nu(\lambda))} \right\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, s \in \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}}.
\]

**5.1.3 Lossy Functions**

**Definition 5.4** (Lossy Functions [PW08]). A lossy function family \(LF = (\text{LF.Gen}, \text{LF.Eval})\) consists of two PPT algorithms:

- \(\text{LF.Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{injective/lossy})\) outputs an evaluation key \(ek\) either in “injective mode” or “lossy mode.”
• LF.Eval(ek, x) takes an evaluation key ek as well as an input x ∈ \{0, 1\}^{\nu(\lambda)}. It returns a deterministic output y ∈ \{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)}.

We require that LF satisfies three properties:

• **Injectivity**: With probability 1 − negl(\lambda) over the randomness of ek ← LF.Gen(1\^\lambda, injective), the function LF.Eval(ek, \cdot) is injective.

• **Lossiness** (with parameter \ell(\lambda)): With probability 1 − negl(\lambda) over the randomness of ek ← LF.Gen(1\^\lambda, lossy), the range of the function LF.Eval(ek, \cdot) has size at most 2^{\ell(\lambda)}.

• **Key Indistinguishability**: randomly sampled injective and lossy keys are computationally indistinguishable.

### 5.2 Output-Intractable SHSFs from iO + Output-Intractable Puncturable PRFs

In this section, we note that the natural construction of SHSFs from (subexponential) iO and puncturable PRFs (following the [BLW17] construction of private constrained PRFs from iO) also yields output-intractable SHSFs from iO along with output-intractable puncturable PRFs. This fact will be used in all of our iO-based constructions.

**Construction 5.5 (SHSF from IO).** Let PRF = \{F_s : \{0, 1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} → \{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)}\} denote a (puncturable) PRF family and let O denote an indistinguishability obfuscator. Then, PRF can be augmented with the algorithm Shift, defined as follows:

\[
\operatorname{Shift}(s, f) = O\left(x \mapsto PRF_s(x) + f(x)\right).
\]

Moreover, a shifted key sk_f ← Shift(s, f) can be evaluated on an input x simply by interpreting sk_f as a program and evaluating sk_f(x).

**Lemma 5.6.** Suppose that PRF is a 2^{-\nu(\lambda)} \cdot \negl(\lambda)-secure puncturable PRF (Definition 5.2), and O is a 2^{-\nu(\lambda)} \cdot \negl(\lambda) secure indistinguishability obfuscator (Definition 5.1).

Then, (PRF, Shift) is a SHSF for bounded-size shift functions. Moreover, if the hash family \mathcal{H}_{\text{plain}}(msk, x) = PRF_{msk}(x) is output-intractable (or NAE-output-intractable) for a relation R_{out}, then the same is true for SHSF.

**Proof.** For the first claim, it suffices to show that (PRF, Shift) satisfies correctness and shift-hiding. Correctness follows immediately from the correctness of O.

To see that (PRF, Shift) is shift-hiding – namely, that sk_f ≈ sk_g for any pair of (bounded-size) circuits (f, g), we closely follows the CHCPRF security proof in [BLW17]. Namely, we appeal to a hybrid argument with 2^{\nu} + 2 hybrid distributions on keys sk, defined as follows:

• Hyb_{−1}: sk = sk_f ← Shift(s, f) = O\left(x \mapsto PRF_s(x) + f(x)\right).

• For every 0 ≤ x^* ≤ 2^{\nu} − 1 (interpreting x^* as both an integer and a string \text{Hyb}_{x^*} = sk ← O\left(x \mapsto PRF_s(x) + g(x)\text{ if } x < x^*, x \mapsto PRF_s(x) + f(x)\text{ if } x ≥ x^*\right)
Lemma 5.8. Suppose that $H$ is a $2^{-\nu} \cdot \text{neg}(\lambda)$-secure puncturable PRF family that is injective with high probability, $H$ has a nearly uniform output distribution, meaning that
\[
\left\{ k \leftarrow H.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda), x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{N(\lambda)} : (k, h(x)) \right\} \approx_{c, 2^{-\nu}\cdot \text{neg}(\lambda)} \left\{ k \leftarrow H.\text{Gen}(1^\lambda), y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)} : (k, y) \right\}.
\]
Then, $H$ is a $2^{-\nu} \cdot \text{neg}(\lambda)$-secure puncturable PRF family that is also $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractable (or $\text{NAE}-R_{\text{out}}$-output intractable).

Proof. We first show output intractability. If an adversary $A(k, \text{sk})$ finds distinct (respectively, not-all-equal) inputs $(x_1, \ldots, x_t)$ such that $(h_k(\text{PRF}_{\text{sk}}(x_1)), \ldots, h_k(\text{PRF}_{\text{sk}}(x_t))) \in R_{\text{out}}$ with non-negligible probability, then we claim that this violates the $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractability of $H$. This holds because with all but negligible probability, $\text{PRF}_{\text{sk}}$ is an injective function, in which case the inputs $\text{PRF}_{\text{sk}}(x_1), \ldots, \text{PRF}_{\text{sk}}(x_t)$ to $h_k$ are distinct (respectively, not-all-equal) as long as $x_1, \ldots, x_t$ are distinct (respectively, not-all-equal). This gives an attack on the $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractability

\[
\text{Hyb}_{2^\nu} : \text{sk} = sk_g \leftarrow \text{Shift}(s, g) = O(x \mapsto \text{PRF}_s(x) + g(x)).
\]
of $\mathcal{H}$: given a key $k$, an adversary $A'$ can sample $sk$, call $(x_1, \ldots, x_t) \leftarrow A(k, sk)$, and output $(\text{PRF}_{sk}(x_1), \ldots, \text{PRF}_{sk}(x_t))$.

Next, we show that $\text{PRF}_{\mathcal{H}}$ is a $2^{-\nu} \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$-secure puncturable PRF family. To do so, we define a puncturing algorithm:

$$\text{PRF}_{\mathcal{H}}.\text{Puncture}(k, sk, x^*) = (k, sk\{x^*\}).$$

One can then verify that for $x \neq x^*$

$$\text{PuncEval}((k, sk)\{x^*\}, x) = \text{PRF}_{\mathcal{H}}(k, sk, x).$$

Finally, $2^{-\nu} \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$-pseudorandomness at punctured points follows from the analogous property for PRF along with the fact that $\mathcal{H}$ has a nearly uniform output distribution.

\[
5.4 \text{ Construction 2: Precomposition with a Lossy Function}
\]

Construction 5.9. Let PRF denote a puncturable PRF family mapping $\{0, 1\}^{N(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\mu(\lambda)}$. Let $LF = (\text{LF.Gen}, \text{LF.Eval})$ denote a lossy function family mapping $\{0, 1\}^{\nu(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{N(\lambda)}$ and lossiness parameter $\ell(\lambda)$. Then, we define the PRF family $\text{PRF}_{LF} = \text{PRF} \circ LF$ as follows:

- A secret key for $\text{PRF}_{LF}$ is a pair $(sk, ek)$ with $ek \leftarrow \text{LF.Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{injective})$ and $sk \leftarrow \text{PRF.Gen}(1^\lambda)$.
- Evaluation is defined to be

$$\text{PRF}_{LF}(sk, ek, x) = \text{PRF}(sk, \text{LF.Eval}(ek, x)).$$

Lemma 5.10. Suppose that PRF is a $(2^{N(\lambda) + \ell(\lambda)} \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda))$-secure puncturable PRF family, and suppose that LF is a lossy function family with lossiness parameter $\tau(\lambda)$. Then, for any relation $R_{out}$ with sparsity at most $2^{-\ell(\lambda)} \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$, $\text{PRF}_{LF}$ is a $2^{-\nu} \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$-secure puncturable PRF family that is also $R_{out}$-output intractable.

Moreover, if $R_{out}$ is also sparse whenever the inputs $x_1, \ldots, x_t$ are not-all-equal, then the PRF family satisfies NAE-$R_{out}$-output intractability.

Proof. We first show puncturing-pseudorandomness. To do so, we define a puncturing algorithm

$$\text{PRF}_{\mathcal{H}}.\text{Puncture}(sk, ek, x^*) = (k, sk\{\text{LF.Eval}(x^*)\}).$$

Punctured evaluation correctness (with all but negligible probability over the sampling of $(sk, ek)$) follows from the fact that $ek$ is sampled in injective mode. Pseudorandomness follows directly from the pseudorandomness of PRF.

We next show output intractability. If an adversary $A(sk, ek)$ finds distinct (respectively, not-all-equal) inputs $(x_1, \ldots, x_t)$ such that

$$(\text{PRF}_{sk}(\text{LF.Eval}(ek, x_1)), \ldots, \text{PRF}_{sk}(\text{LF.Eval}(ek, x_t))) \in R_{out}$$

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with non-negligible probability $\epsilon$, then since $e_k$ is sampled in injective mode, the same claim holds where $(\text{LF.Eval}(e_k, x_1), \ldots, \text{LF.Eval}(e_k, x_t))$ are distinct (respectively, not-all-equal).

Then, by the security of LF, we also know that when $e_k \leftarrow \text{LF.Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$ is sampled from the lossy distribution, we have that

$$ (x_1, \ldots, x_t) \leftarrow A(s_k, e_k) : (\text{LF.Eval}(e_k, x_1), \ldots, \text{LF.Eval}(e_k, x_t)) \text{ are distinct}$$
$$\text{and} (\text{PRF}_{\text{LF}}(s_k, e_k, x_1), \ldots, \text{PRF}_{\text{LF}}(s_k, e_k, x_t)) \in R_{\text{out}} \geq \epsilon - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Finally, we claim that in reality, with high probability over $(s_k, e_k)$, there do not exist such input tuples. This follows from the pseudorandomness of PRF: for any fixed set $S$ of size $2^\ell(\lambda)$, the probability that a random function $F$ has an $t$-tuple of distinct (respectively, not-all-equal) inputs $z_1, \ldots, z_t$ from $S$ such that $(F(z_1), \ldots, F(z_t)) \in R_{\text{out}}$ is at most $|S|^t \cdot \beta$ if $R_{\text{out}}$ has sparsity $\beta$, which is negligible under our hypotheses. Picking $S = \text{Im}(\text{LF}(e_k, \cdot))$, we conclude that the same holds for the PRF family $\text{PRF}_{s_k}$, as this condition can be tested in time $2^{N(\lambda) + \ell(\lambda)t(\lambda)}$ by enumeration. Thus, we obtain a contradiction, completing the proof of Lemma 5.10.

\[ \square \]

5.5 Putting it Together

Combining Theorem 3.1 and Lemma 5.6 with Lemma 5.8 and Lemma 5.10, respectively, we obtain our final constructions of correlation intractable hash families based on obfuscation. We restate the results (Theorem 1.6 and Theorem 1.5) from the introduction for completeness.

**Theorem 5.11** (Theorem 1.6, restated). Assume the existence of

1. Subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation,

2. Subexponentially secure one-way functions, and

3. A hash family $H$ such that (i) $H$ is $R_{\text{out}}$-output intractable, and (ii) for a random input $X$, $h_k(X)$ is $2^{-\nu} \cdot \text{negl}(\lambda)$-indistinguishable from uniform (even given $k$).

Then, there exists a hash family that is CI for shifted $R_{\text{out}}$-relations.

This follows by combining Theorem 3.1, Lemma 5.6, and Lemma 5.8.

**Theorem 5.12** (Theorem 1.5, restated). Assume the existence of

1. Subexponential IO,

2. Subexponential OWFs, and

3. Lossy functions with input domain $\{0, 1\}^\nu$ with a range of size $\leq 2^\ell$ in lossy mode.

Then, there exists a hash family $H$ that is CI for all (efficiently decidable) shifted $t$-ary output relations with sparsity at most $2^{-t\ell}$.

This follows by combining Theorem 3.1, Lemma 5.6, and Lemma 5.10.
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References


