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Paper 2020/1230

Certificateless Public-key Authenticate Encryption with Keyword Search Revised: MCI and MTP

Leixiao Cheng and Fei Meng

Abstract

Boneh et al proposed the cryptographic primitive public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) to search on encrypted data without exposing the privacy of the keyword. Most standard PEKS schemes are vulnerable to inside keyword guessing attacks (KGA), i.e., a malicious server may generate a ciphertext by its own and then to guess the keyword of the trapdoor by testing. Huang et al. solved this problem by proposing the public-key authenticated encryption with keyword search (PAEKS) achieving single trapdoor privacy (TP). Qin et al. defined notion of multi-ciphertext indistinguishability (MCI) security and multi-trapdoor privacy (MTP) security, and proposed the first PAEKS scheme with MCI and TP. Certificateless public-key authenticated encryption with keyword search (CLPAEKS) is first formally proposed by He et al. as combination of the PAEKS and the certificateless public key cryptography (CLPKC). Lin et al. revised He's work and re-formalize the security requirements for CLPAEKS in terms of trapdoor privacy and ciphertext indistinguishability. However, how to achieve both MCI and MTP security in a CLPAEKS scheme is still unknown. In this paper, we initially propose a CLPAEKS scheme with both MCI security and MTP security simultaneously. We provide formal proof of our schemes in the random oracle model.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
Certificateless Public key encryptionKeyword searchKeyword guessing attacksMulti-ciphertext indistinguishabilityMulti-trapdoor privacy
Contact author(s)
mengfei_sdu @ 163 com
History
2021-07-10: withdrawn
2020-10-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1230
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY
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