

CRYPTFLOW2: Practical 2-Party Secure Inference

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ABSTRACT

We present CRYPTFLOW2, a cryptographic framework for secure inference over realistic Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) using secure 2-party computation. CRYPTFLOW2 protocols are both correct – i.e., their outputs are bitwise equivalent to the cleartext execution – and efficient – they outperform the state-of-the-art protocols in both latency and scale. At the core of CRYPTFLOW2, we have new 2PC protocols for secure comparison and division, designed carefully to balance round and communication complexity for secure inference tasks. Using CRYPTFLOW2, we present the first secure inference over ImageNet-scale DNNs like ResNet50 and DenseNet121. These DNNs are at least an order of magnitude larger than those considered in the prior work of 2-party DNN inference. Even on the benchmarks considered by prior work, CRYPTFLOW2 requires an order of magnitude less communication and 20×-30× less time than the state-of-the-art.

KEYWORDS

Privacy-preserving inference; deep neural networks; secure two-party computation

1 INTRODUCTION

The problem of privacy preserving machine learning has become increasingly important. Recently, there have been many works that have made rapid strides towards realizing *secure inference* [4, 6, 13, 17, 19, 22, 31, 43, 48, 49, 51, 55, 57]. Consider a server that holds the weights w of a publicly known deep neural network (DNN), F , that has been trained on private data. A client holds a private input x ; in a standard machine learning (ML) inference task, the goal is for the client to learn the prediction $F(x, w)$ of the server’s model on the input x . In secure inference, the inference is performed with the guarantee that the server learns *nothing* about x and the client learns nothing about the server’s model w beyond what can be deduced from $F(x, w)$ and x .

A solution for secure inference that scales to practical ML tasks would open a plethora of applications based on MLaaS (ML as a Service). Users can obtain value from ML services without worrying about the loss of their private data, while model owners can effectively monetize their services with no fear of breaches of client data (they never observe private client data in the clear). Perhaps the most important emerging applications for secure inference are in healthcare where prior work [4, 45, 55] has explored secure inference services for privacy preserving medical diagnosis of chest diseases, diabetic retinopathy, malaria, and so on.

Secure inference is an instance of secure 2-party computation (2PC) and cryptographically secure general protocols for 2PC have been known for decades [32, 63]. However, secure inference for practical ML tasks, e.g., ImageNet scale prediction [24], is challenging for two reasons: a) realistic DNNs use ReLU activations¹ that are expensive to compute securely; and b) preserving inference accuracy requires a faithful implementation of secure fixed-point arithmetic. All prior works [6, 31, 43, 48, 49, 51] fail to provide efficient implementation of ReLUs. Although ReLUs can be replaced with approximations that are more tractable for 2PC [22, 31, 49], this approach results in significant accuracy losses that can degrade user experience. The only known approaches to evaluate ReLUs efficiently require sacrificing security by making the untenable assumption that a non-colluding third party takes part in the protocol [7, 45, 50, 56, 61] or by leaking activations [12]. Moreover, some prior works [45, 49–51, 61] even sacrifice correctness of their fixed-point implementations and the result of their secure execution can sometimes diverge from the expected result, i.e. cleartext execution, in random and unpredictable ways. Thus, correct and efficient 2PC protocols for secure inference over realistic DNNs remain elusive.

1.1 Our Contributions

In this work, we address the above two challenges and build new semi-honest secure 2-party cryptographic protocols for secure computation of DNN inference. Our new efficient protocols enable the first secure implementations of ImageNet scale inference that complete in under a minute! We make three main contributions:

- First, we give new protocols for millionaires’ and DReLU² that enable us to securely and efficiently evaluate the non-linear layers of DNNs such as ReLU, Maxpool and Argmax.
- Second, we provide new protocols for division. Together with new theorems that we prove on fixed-point arithmetic over shares, we show how to evaluate linear layers, such as convolutions, average pool and fully connected layers, faithfully.
- Finally, by providing protocols that can work on a variety of input domains, we build a system³ CRYPTFLOW2 that supports two different types of Secure and Correct Inference (SCI) protocols where linear layers can be evaluated using either homomorphic encryption (SCI_{HE}) or through oblivious transfer (SCI_{OT}).

We now provide more details of our main contributions.

¹ReLU(x) is defined as $\max(x, 0)$.

²DReLU is the derivative of ReLU, i.e., $\text{DReLU}(x)$ is 1 if $x \geq 0$ and 0 otherwise.

³Implementation is available at <https://github.com/mpc-msri/EzPC>.

New millionaires’ and DReLU protocols. Our first main technical contribution is a novel protocol for the well-known *millionaires’* problem [63], where parties P_0 and P_1 hold ℓ -bit integers x and y , respectively, and want to securely compute $x < y$ (or, secret shares of $x < y$). The theoretical communication complexity of our protocol is $\approx 3\times$ better than the most communication efficient prior millionaires’ protocol [21, 29, 32, 62, 63]. In terms of round complexity, our protocol executes in $\log \ell$ rounds (e.g. 5 rounds for $\ell = 32$ bits); see Table 1 for a detailed comparison and [21] for a detailed overview of the costs of other comparison protocols.

Using our protocol for millionaires’ problem, we build new and efficient protocols for computing DReLU for both ℓ -bit integers (i.e., \mathbb{Z}_L , $L = 2^\ell$) and general rings \mathbb{Z}_n . Our protocol for DReLU serves as one of the main building blocks for non-linear activations such as ReLU and Maxpool, as well as division over both input domains. Providing support for ℓ -bit integers \mathbb{Z}_L as well as arbitrary rings \mathbb{Z}_n , allows us to securely evaluate the linear layers (such as matrix multiplication and convolutions) using the approaches of Oblivious Transfer (OT) [8, 51] as well as Homomorphic Encryption (HE) [30, 43, 49], respectively. This provides our protocols great flexibility when executing over different network configurations. Since all prior work [43, 48, 49, 51] for securely computing these activations rely on Yao’s garbled circuits [63], our protocols are much more efficient in both settings. Asymptotically, our ReLU protocol over \mathbb{Z}_L and \mathbb{Z}_n communicate $\approx 8\times$ and $\approx 12\times$ less bits than prior works [43, 48, 49, 51, 62, 63] (see Table 2 for a detailed comparison). Experimentally, our protocols are at least an order of magnitude more performant than prior protocols when computing ReLU activations at the scale of ML applications.

Fixed-point arithmetic. The ML models used by all prior works on secure inference are expressed using fixed-point arithmetic; such models can be obtained from [39, 42, 45, 52]. A faithful implementation of fixed-point arithmetic is quintessential to ensure that the secure computation is *correct*, i.e., it is *equivalent* to the cleartext computation for all possible inputs. Given a secure inference task $F(x, w)$, some prior works [45, 49–51, 61] give up on correctness when implementing division operations and instead compute an approximation $F'(x, w)$. In fixed-point arithmetic, each multiplication requires a division by a power-of-2 and multiplications are used pervasively in linear-layers of DNNs. Moreover, layers like average-pool require division for computing means. Loss in correctness is worrisome as the errors can accumulate and $F'(x, w)$ can be arbitrarily far from $F(x, w)$. Recent work [49] has shown that even in practice the approximations can lead to significant losses in classification accuracy.

As our next contribution, we provide novel protocols to compute division by power-of-2 as well as division by arbitrary integers that are both correct and efficient. The inputs to these protocols can be encoded over both ℓ -bit integers \mathbb{Z}_L as well as \mathbb{Z}_n , for arbitrary n . To the best of our knowledge, the only known approach to compute division correctly is via garbled circuits which we compare with in Table 3. While garbled circuits based protocols require communication which is quadratic in ℓ or $\log n$, our protocols are asymptotically better and incur only linear communication. Concretely, for average pool with 7×7 filters and 32-bit integers, our protocols have $\approx 54\times$ less communication.

Scaling to practical DNNs. These efficient protocols, help us securely evaluate practical DNNs like SqueezeNet on ImageNet scale classification tasks in under a minute. In sharp contrast, all prior works on secure 2-party inference ([4, 6, 13, 17, 19, 22, 31, 43, 48, 49, 51, 55, 57]) has been limited to small DNNs on tiny datasets like MNIST and CIFAR. While MNIST deals with the task of classifying black and white handwritten digits given as 28×28 images into the classes 0 to 9, ImageNet tasks are much more complex: typically 224×224 colored images need to be classified into thousand classes (e.g., agoric, gyromitra, ptarmigan, etc.) that even humans can find challenging. Additionally, our work is the first to securely evaluate practical *convolutional neural networks* (CNNs) like ResNet50 and DenseNet121; these DNNs are at least an order of magnitude larger than the DNNs considered in prior work, provide over 90% Top-5 accuracy on ImageNet, and have also been shown to predict lung diseases from chest X-ray images [45, 65]. Thus, our work provides the first implementations of practical ML inference tasks running securely. Even on the smaller CIFAR scale DNNs, our protocols require an order of magnitude less communication and $20\times$ - $30\times$ less time than the state-of-the-art [49] (see Section 7.2).

OT vs HE. Through our evaluation, we also resolve the OT vs HE conundrum: although the initial works on secure inference [48, 51] used OT-based protocols for evaluating convolutions, the state-of-the-art protocols [43, 49], which currently provide the best published inference latency, use HE-based convolutions. HE-based secure inference has much less communication than OT but HE requires more computation. Hence, at the onset of this work, it was not clear to us whether HE-based convolutions would provide us the best latency for ImageNet-scale benchmarks.

To resolve this empirical question, we implement two classes of protocols, SCI_{OT} and SCI_{HE} , in CRYPTFLOW2. In SCI_{OT} , inputs are in \mathbb{Z}_L ($L = 2^\ell$, for a suitable choice of ℓ). Linear layers such as matrix multiplication and convolution are performed using OT-based techniques [8, 51], while the activations such as ReLU, Maxpool and Avgpool are implemented using our new protocols over \mathbb{Z}_L . In SCI_{HE} , inputs are encoded in an appropriate prime field \mathbb{Z}_n (similar to [43, 49]). Here, we compute linear layers using homomorphic encryption and the activations using our protocols over \mathbb{Z}_n . In both SCI_{OT} and SCI_{HE} faithful divisions after linear layers are performed using our new protocols over corresponding rings. Next, we evaluate ImageNet-scale inference tasks with both SCI_{OT} and SCI_{HE} . We observe that in a WAN setting, where communication is a bottleneck, HE-based inference is always faster and in a LAN setting OT and HE are incomparable.

1.2 Our Techniques

Millionaires’. Our protocol for securely computing the millionaires’ problem (the bit $x < y$) is based on the following observation (first made in [29]). Let $x = x_1 || x_0$ and $y = y_1 || y_0$ (where $||$ denotes concatenation and x_1, y_1 are strings of the same length). Then,

⁴Here we state the communication numbers for GMW [32] for a depth-optimized circuit. The circuit that would give the best communication would still have a complexity of $> 2\lambda\ell$ and would additionally pay an inordinate cost in terms of rounds, namely ℓ .

⁵Couteau [21] presented multiple protocols; we pick the one that has the best communication complexity.

Layer	Protocol	Comm. (bits)	Rounds
Millionaires' on $\{0, 1\}^\ell$	GC [62, 63]	$4\lambda\ell$	2
	GMW ⁴ /GSV [29, 32]	$\approx 6\lambda\ell$	$\log \ell + 3$
	SC3 ³ [21]	$> 3\lambda\ell$	$\approx 4 \log^* \lambda$
	This work ($m = 4$)	$< \lambda\ell + 14\ell$	$\log \ell$
Millionaires' example $\ell = 32$	GC [62, 63]	16384	2
	GMW/GSV [29, 32]	23140	8
	SC3 [21]	13016	15
	This work ($m = 7$)	2930	5
	This work ($m = 4$)	3844	5

Table 1: Comparison of communication with prior work for millionaires' problem. For our protocol, m is a parameter. For concrete bits of communication we use $\lambda = 128$.

Layer	Protocol	Comm. (bits)	Rounds
ReLU for \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ}	GC [62, 63]	$8\lambda\ell - 4\lambda$	2
	This work	$< \lambda\ell + 18\ell$	$\log \ell + 2$
ReLU for general \mathbb{Z}_n	GC [62, 63]	$18\lambda\eta - 6\lambda$	2
	This work	$< \frac{3}{2}\lambda(\eta + 1) + 31\eta$	$\log \eta + 4$
ReLU for \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ} , $\ell = 32$	GC [62, 63]	32256	2
	This work	3298	7
ReLU for \mathbb{Z}_n , $\eta = 32$	GC [62, 63]	72960	2
	This work	5288	9

Table 2: Comparison of communication with garbled circuits for ReLU. We define $\eta = \lceil \log n \rceil$. For concrete bits of communication we use $\lambda = 128$.

Layer	Protocol	Comm. (bits)	Rounds
Avgpool _{d} \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ}	GC [62, 63]	$2\lambda(\ell^2 + 5\ell - 3)$	2
	This work	$< (\lambda + 21) \cdot (\ell + 3\delta)$	$\log(\ell\delta) + 4$
Avgpool _{d} \mathbb{Z}_n	GC [62, 63]	$2\lambda(\eta^2 + 9\eta - 3)$	2
	This work	$< (\frac{3}{2}\lambda + 34) \cdot (\eta + 2\delta)$	$\log(\eta\delta) + 6$
Avgpool ₄₉ \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ} , $\ell = 32$	GC [62, 63]	302336	2
	This work	5570	10
Avgpool ₄₉ \mathbb{Z}_n , $\eta = 32$	GC [62, 63]	335104	2
	This work	7796	14

Table 3: Comparison of communication with garbled circuits for Avgpool _{d} . We define $\eta = \lceil \log n \rceil$ and $\delta = \lceil \log(6 \cdot d) \rceil$. For concrete bits of communication we use $\lambda = 128$. Choice of $d = 49$ corresponds to average pool filter of size 7×7 .

$x < y$ is the same as checking if either $x_1 < y_1$ or $x_1 = y_1$ and $x_0 < y_0$. Now, the original problem is reduced to computing two millionaires' instances over smaller length strings ($x_1 < y_1$ and $x_0 < y_0$) and one equality test ($x_1 = y_1$). By continuing recursively, one could build a tree all the way where the leaves are individual bits, at which point one could use 1-out-of-2 OT-based protocols to perform the comparison/equality. However, the communication complexity of this protocol is still quite large. We make several important modifications to this approach. First, we modify the tree so that the recursion is done $\log(\ell/m)$ times to obtain leaves with strings of size m , for a parameter m . We then use 1-out-of- 2^m OT to compute the comparison/equality at the leaves, employing the lookup-table based approach of [25]. Second, we observe that by carefully setting up the receiver's and sender's messages in the

OT protocols for leaf comparisons and equality, multiple 1-out-of- 2^m OT instances can be combined to reduce communication. Next, recursing up from the leaves to the root, requires securely computing the AND functionality⁶ that uses Beaver bit triples [8]. We observe that the same secret value is used in 2 AND instances. Hence, we construct correlated pairs of bit triples using 1-out-of-8 OT protocols [44] to reduce this cost to $\lambda + 8$ bits (amortized) per triple, where λ is the security parameter and typically 128. Some more work is needed for the above technique to work efficiently for the general case when m does not divide ℓ or ℓ/m is not a power of 2. Finally, by picking m appropriately, we obtain a protocol for millionaires' whose concrete communication (in bits) is nearly 5 times better than prior work.

DReLU. Let a be additively secret shared as a_0, a_1 over the appropriate ring. DReLU(a) is 1 if $a \geq 0$ and 0 otherwise; note that $a \geq 0$ is defined differently for ℓ -bit integers and general rings. Over \mathbb{Z}_L , where values are encoded using 2's complement notation, DReLU(a) = $1 \oplus \text{MSB}(a)$, where MSB(a) is the most significant bit of a . Moreover, $\text{MSB}(a) = \text{MSB}(a_0) \oplus \text{MSB}(a_1) \oplus \text{carry}$. Here, $\text{carry} = 1$ if $a'_0 + a'_1 \geq 2^{\ell-1}$, where a'_0, a'_1 denotes the integer represented by the lower $\ell - 1$ bits of a_0, a_1 . We compute this carry bit using a call to our millionaires' protocol. Over \mathbb{Z}_n , DReLU(a) = 1 if $a \in [0, \lfloor n/2 \rfloor]$. Given the secret shares a_0, a_1 , this is equivalent to $(a_0 + a_1) \in [0, \lfloor n/2 \rfloor] \cup [n, \lfloor 3n/2 \rfloor]$ over integers. While this can be naively computed by making 3 calls to the millionaires' protocol, we show that by carefully selecting the inputs to the millionaires' protocol, one can do this with only 2 calls. Finally, we set things up so that the two calls to millionaires' have correlated inputs that reduces the overall cost to ≈ 1.5 instances of millionaires' over \mathbb{Z}_n .

Division and Truncation. As a technical result, we provide a *correct* decomposition of division of a secret ring element in \mathbb{Z}_L or \mathbb{Z}_n by a public integer into division of secret shares by the same public integer and correction terms (Theorem 4.1). These correction terms consist of multiple inequalities on secret values. As a corollary, we also get a much simpler expression for the special case of *truncation*, i.e., dividing ℓ -bit integers by a power-of-2 (Corollary 4.2). We believe that the general theorem as well as the corollary can be of independent interest. Next, we give efficient protocols for both general division (used for Avgpool, Table 3) as well as division by a power-of-2 (used for multiplication in fixed-point arithmetic). The inequalities in the correction term are computed using our new protocol for millionaires' and the division of shares can be done locally by the respective parties. Our technical theorem is the key to obtaining secure implementation of DNN inference tasks that are bitwise equivalent to cleartext fixed-point execution.

1.3 Other Related Work

Perhaps the first work to consider the secure computation of machine learning inference algorithms was that of [14]. SecureML [51] was the first to consider secure neural network inference and training. Apart from the works mentioned earlier, other works include

⁶This functionality takes as input shares of bits x, y from the two parties and outputs shares of $x \text{ AND } y$ to both parties.

those that considered malicious adversaries [20, 36, 64] (for simpler ML models like linear models, regression, and polynomials) as well as specialized DNNs with 1 or 2 bit weights [4, 55, 57]. Recently, [26] gave protocols for faithful truncation (but not division) over ℓ -bit integers and prime fields in various adversarial settings. For 2-party semi-honest setting, our protocols have up to $20\times$ less communication for the truncations required in our evaluation.

1.4 Organisation

We begin with the details on security and cryptographic primitives used in Section 2 on preliminaries. In Section 3 we provide our protocols for millionaires’ (Section 3.1) and DReLU (Section 3.2, 3.3), over both \mathbb{Z}_L and general ring \mathbb{Z}_n . In Section 4, we present our protocols for division and truncation. We describe the various components of DNN inference in Section 5 and show how to construct secure protocols for all these components given our protocols from Sections 3 and 4. We present our implementation details in Section 6 and our experiments in Section 7. Finally, we conclude and discuss future work in Section 8.

2 PRELIMINARIES

Notation. For a set \mathcal{W} , $w \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{W}$ denotes sampling an element w , uniformly at random from \mathcal{W} . $[\ell]$ denotes the set of integers $\{0, \dots, \ell - 1\}$. Let $\mathbf{1}\{b\}$ denote the indicator function that is 1 when b is true and 0 when b is false.

2.1 Threat Model and Security

We provide security in the simulation paradigm [18, 32, 47] against a *static semi-honest* probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary \mathcal{A} . That is, a computationally bounded adversary \mathcal{A} corrupts either P_0 or P_1 at the beginning of the protocol and follows the protocol specification honestly. Security is modeled by defining two interactions: a real interaction where P_0 and P_1 execute the protocol in the presence of \mathcal{A} and the environment \mathcal{Z} and an ideal interaction where the parties send their inputs to a trusted functionality that performs the computation faithfully. Security requires that for every adversary \mathcal{A} in the real interaction, there is an adversary \mathcal{S} (called the simulator) in the ideal interaction, such that no environment \mathcal{Z} can distinguish between real and ideal interactions. Many of our protocols invoke multiple sub-protocols and we describe these using the *hybrid model*. This is similar to a real interaction, except that sub-protocols are replaced by the invocations of instances of corresponding functionalities. A protocol invoking a functionality \mathcal{F} is said to be in “ \mathcal{F} -hybrid model.”

2.2 Cryptographic Primitives

2.2.1 Secret Sharing Schemes. Throughout this work, we use 2-out-of-2 additive secret sharing schemes over different rings [11, 59]. The 3 specific rings that we consider are the field \mathbb{Z}_2 , the ring \mathbb{Z}_L , where $L = 2^\ell$ ($\ell = 32$, typically), and the ring \mathbb{Z}_n , for a positive integer n (this last ring includes the special case of prime fields used in the works of [43, 49]). We let $\text{Share}^L(x)$ denote the algorithm that takes as input an element x in \mathbb{Z}_L and outputs shares over \mathbb{Z}_L , denoted by $\langle x \rangle_0^L$ and $\langle x \rangle_1^L$. Shares are generated by sampling random ring elements $\langle x \rangle_0^L$ and $\langle x \rangle_1^L$, with the only constraint that $\langle x \rangle_0^L + \langle x \rangle_1^L = x$ (where $+$ denotes addition in \mathbb{Z}_L). Additive secret

sharing schemes are perfectly hiding, i.e., given a share $\langle x \rangle_0^L$ or $\langle x \rangle_1^L$, the value x is completely hidden. The reconstruction algorithm $\text{Reconst}^L(\langle x \rangle_0^L, \langle x \rangle_1^L)$ takes as input the two shares and outputs $x = \langle x \rangle_0^L + \langle x \rangle_1^L$. Shares (along with their corresponding $\text{Share}()$ and $\text{Reconst}()$ algorithms) are defined in a similar manner for \mathbb{Z}_2 and \mathbb{Z}_n with superscripts B and n , respectively. We sometimes refer to shares over \mathbb{Z}_L and \mathbb{Z}_n as arithmetic shares and shares over \mathbb{Z}_2 as boolean shares.

2.2.2 Oblivious Transfer. Let $\binom{k}{1}$ -OT $_\ell$ denote the 1-out-of- k Oblivious Transfer (OT) functionality [16] (which generalizes 1-out-of-2 OT [27, 54]). The sender’s inputs to the functionality are the k strings m_0, \dots, m_{k-1} , each of length ℓ and the receiver’s input is a value $i \in [k]$. The receiver obtains m_i from the functionality and the sender receives no output. We use the protocols from [44], which are an optimized and generalized version of the OT extension framework proposed in [9, 41]. This framework allows the sender and receiver, to “reduce” λ^c number of oblivious transfers to λ “base” OTs. We also use the notion of correlated 1-out-of-2 OT [5], denoted by $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_\ell$. In our context, this is a functionality where the sender’s input is a ring element x and the receiver’s input is a choice bit b . The sender receives a random ring element r as output and the receiver obtains either r or $x + r$ as output depending on b . The protocols for $\binom{k}{1}$ -OT $_\ell$ [44] and $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_\ell$ [5] execute in 2 rounds and have total communication⁷ of $2\lambda + k\ell$ and $\lambda + \ell$, respectively. Moreover, simpler $\binom{2}{1}$ -OT $_\ell$ has a communication of $\lambda + 2\ell$ bits [5, 41].

2.2.3 Multiplexer and B2A conversion. The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^n$ takes as input arithmetic shares of a over n and boolean shares of choice bit c from P_0, P_1 , and returns shares of a if $c = 1$, else returns shares of 0 over the same ring. A protocol for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^n$ can easily be implemented by 2 simultaneous calls to $\binom{2}{1}$ -OT $_\eta$ and communication complexity is $2(\lambda + 2\eta)$, where $\eta = \lceil \log n \rceil$.

The functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$ (for boolean to arithmetic conversion) takes boolean (i.e., over \mathbb{Z}_2) shares as input and gives out arithmetic (i.e., over \mathbb{Z}_n) shares of the same value as output. It can be realized via one call to $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_\eta$ and hence, its communication is $\lambda + \eta$. For completeness, we provide the protocols realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^n$ as well as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$ formally in Appendix A.3 and Appendix A.4, respectively.

2.2.4 Homomorphic Encryption. A homomorphic encryption of x allows computing encryption of $f(x)$ without the knowledge of the decryption key. In this work, we require an additively homomorphic encryption scheme that supports addition and scalar multiplication, i.e. multiplication of a ciphertext with a plaintext. We use the additively homomorphic scheme of BFV [15, 28] (the scheme used in the recent works of Gazelle [43] and Delphi [49]) and use the optimized algorithms of Gazelle for homomorphic matrix-vector products and homomorphic convolutions. The BFV scheme uses the batching optimization [46, 60] that enables operation on plaintext vectors over the field \mathbb{Z}_n , where n is a prime plaintext modulus of the form $2KN + 1$, K is some positive integer and N is scheme parameter that is a power-of-2.

⁷The protocol of $\binom{k}{1}$ -OT $_\ell$ [44] incurs a communication cost of $\lambda + k\ell$. However, to achieve the same level of security, their security parameter needs to be twice that of $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_\ell$. In concrete terms, therefore, we write the cost as $2\lambda + k\ell$.

3 MILLIONAIRES' AND DReLU PROTOCOLS

In this section, we provide our protocols for millionaires' problem and DReLU(a) when the inputs are ℓ bit signed integers as well as elements in general rings of the form \mathbb{Z}_n (including prime fields). Our protocol for millionaires' problem invokes instances of \mathcal{F}_{AND} that take as input boolean shares of values $x, y \in \{0, 1\}$ and returns boolean shares of $x \wedge y$. We discuss efficient protocols for \mathcal{F}_{AND} in [Appendix A.1](#) and [A.2](#).

3.1 Protocol for Millionaires'

In the Yao millionaires' problem, party P_0 holds x and party P_1 holds y and they wish to learn boolean shares of $1\{x < y\}$. Here, x and y are ℓ -bit unsigned integers. We denote this functionality by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^\ell$. Our protocol for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^\ell$ builds on the following observation that was also used in [29].

$$1\{x < y\} = 1\{x_1 < y_1\} \oplus (1\{x_1 = y_1\} \wedge 1\{x_0 < y_0\}), \quad (1)$$

where, $x = x_1 || x_0$ and $y = y_1 || y_0$.

Intuition. Let m be a parameter and $M = 2^m$. First, for ease of exposition, we consider the special case when m divides ℓ and $q = \ell/m$ is a power of 2. We describe our protocol for millionaires' problem in this setting formally in [Algorithm 1](#). We use Equation 1 above, recursively $\log q$ times to obtain q leaves of size m bits. That is, let $x = x_{q-1} || \dots || x_0$ and $y = y_{q-1} || \dots || y_0$ (where every $x_i, y_i \in \{0, 1\}^m$). Now, we compute the shares of the inequalities and equalities of strings at the leaf level using $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₁ (steps 9 and 10, resp.). Next, we compute the shares of the inequalities (steps 14 & 15) and equalities (step 16) at each internal node upwards from the leaf using Equation 1. Value of inequality at the root gives the final output.

Correctness and security. Correctness is shown by induction on the depth of the tree starting at the leaves. First, by correctness of $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₁ in step 9, $\langle \text{lt}_{0,j} \rangle_1^B = \langle \text{lt}_{0,j} \rangle_0^B \oplus 1\{x_j < y_j\}$. Similarly, $\langle \text{eq}_{0,j} \rangle_1^B = \langle \text{eq}_{0,j} \rangle_0^B \oplus 1\{x_j = y_j\}$. This proves the base case. Let $q_i = q/2^i$. Also, for level i of the tree, parse $x = x^{(i)} = x_{q_i-1}^{(i)} || \dots || x_0^{(i)}$ and $y = y^{(i)} = y_{q_i-1}^{(i)} || \dots || y_0^{(i)}$. Assume that for i it holds that $\text{lt}_{i,j} = \langle \text{lt}_{i,j} \rangle_0^B \oplus \langle \text{lt}_{i,j} \rangle_1^B = 1\{x_j^{(i)} < y_j^{(i)}\}$ and $\langle \text{eq}_{i,j} \rangle_0^B \oplus \langle \text{eq}_{i,j} \rangle_1^B = 1\{x_j^{(i)} = y_j^{(i)}\}$ for all $j \in \{0, \dots, q_i - 1\}$. Then, we prove the same for $i+1$ as follows: By correctness of \mathcal{F}_{AND} , for $j \in \{0, \dots, q_{i+1} - 1\}$, $\langle \text{lt}_{i+1,j} \rangle_0^B \oplus \langle \text{lt}_{i+1,j} \rangle_1^B = \text{lt}_{i,2j+1} \oplus (\text{lt}_{i,2j} \wedge \text{eq}_{i,2j+1}) = 1\{x_{2j+1}^{(i)} < y_{2j+1}^{(i)}\} \oplus (1\{x_{2j}^{(i)} < y_{2j}^{(i)}\} \wedge 1\{x_{2j+1}^{(i)} = y_{2j+1}^{(i)}\}) = 1\{x_j^{(i+1)} < y_j^{(i+1)}\}$ (using Equation 1). The induction step for $\text{eq}_{i+1,j}$ holds in a similar manner, thus proving correctness. Given uniformity of $\langle \text{lt}_{0,j} \rangle_0^B, \langle \text{eq}_{0,j} \rangle_0^B$ for all $j \in \{0, \dots, q-1\}$, security follows easily in the $(\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₁, \mathcal{F}_{AND})-hybrid.

General case. When m does not divide ℓ and $q = \lceil \ell/m \rceil$ is not a power of 2, we make the following modifications to the protocol. Since m does not divide ℓ , $x_{q-1} \in \{0, 1\}^r$, where $r = \ell \bmod m$.⁸ When doing the compute for x_{q-1} and y_{q-1} , we perform a small

⁸Note that $r = m$ when m divides ℓ .

Algorithm 1 Millionaires', $\Pi_{\text{MILL}}^{\ell,m}$:

Input: P_0, P_1 hold $x \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and $y \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, respectively.

Output: P_0, P_1 learn $\langle 1\{x < y\} \rangle_0^B$ and $\langle 1\{x < y\} \rangle_1^B$, respectively.

- 1: P_0 parses its input as $x = x_{q-1} || \dots || x_0$ and P_1 parses its input as $y = y_{q-1} || \dots || y_0$, where $x_i, y_i \in \{0, 1\}^m$, $q = \ell/m$.
 - 2: Let $M = 2^m$.
 - 3: **for** $j = \{0, \dots, q-1\}$ **do**
 - 4: P_0 samples $\langle \text{lt}_{0,j} \rangle_0^B, \langle \text{eq}_{0,j} \rangle_0^B \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$.
 - 5: **for** $k = \{0, \dots, M-1\}$ **do**
 - 6: P_0 sets $s_{j,k} = \langle \text{lt}_{0,j} \rangle_0^B \oplus 1\{x_j < k\}$.
 - 7: P_0 sets $t_{j,k} = \langle \text{eq}_{0,j} \rangle_0^B \oplus 1\{x_j = k\}$.
 - 8: **end for**
 - 9: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₁ where P_0 is the sender with inputs $\{s_{j,k}\}_k$ and P_1 is the receiver with input y_j . P_1 sets its output as $\langle \text{lt}_{0,j} \rangle_1^B$.
 - 10: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₁ where P_0 is the sender with inputs $\{t_{j,k}\}_k$ and P_1 is the receiver with input y_j . P_1 sets its output as $\langle \text{eq}_{0,j} \rangle_1^B$.
 - 11: **end for**
 - 12: **for** $i = \{1, \dots, \log q\}$ **do**
 - 13: **for** $j = \{0, \dots, (q/2^i) - 1\}$ **do**
 - 14: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes \mathcal{F}_{AND} with inputs $\langle \text{lt}_{i-1,2j} \rangle_b^B$ and $\langle \text{eq}_{i-1,2j+1} \rangle_b^B$ to learn output $\langle \text{temp} \rangle_b^B$.
 - 15: P_b sets $\langle \text{lt}_{i,j} \rangle_b^B = \langle \text{lt}_{i-1,2j+1} \rangle_b^B \oplus \langle \text{temp} \rangle_b^B$.
 - 16: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes \mathcal{F}_{AND} with inputs $\langle \text{eq}_{i-1,2j} \rangle_b^B$ and $\langle \text{eq}_{i-1,2j+1} \rangle_b^B$ to learn output $\langle \text{eq}_{i,j} \rangle_b^B$.
 - 17: **end for**
 - 18: **end for**
 - 19: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b outputs $\langle \text{lt}_{\log q,0} \rangle_b^B$.
-

optimization and use $\binom{R}{1}$ -OT₁ in steps 9 and 10, where $R = 2^r$. Second, since q is not a power of 2, we do not have a perfect binary tree of recursion and we need to slightly change our recursion/tree traversal. In the general case, we construct maximal possible perfect binary trees and connect the roots of the same using the relation in Equation 1. Let α be such that $2^\alpha < q \leq 2^{\alpha+1}$. Now, our tree has a perfect binary sub-tree with 2^α leaves and we have remaining $q' = q - 2^\alpha$ leaves. We recurse on q' . In the last step, we obtain our tree with q leaves by combining the roots of perfect binary tree with 2^α leaves and tree with q' leaves using Equation 1. Note that value at the root is computed using $\lceil \log q \rceil$ sequential steps starting from the leaves.

3.1.1 Optimizations. We reduce the concrete communication complexity of our protocol using the following optimizations that are applicable to both the special and the general case.

- Combining two $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₁ calls into one $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₂: Since the input of P_1 (OT receiver) to $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₁ in steps 9 and 10 is same, i.e. y_j , we can collapse these steps into a single call to $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₂ where P_0 and P_1 input $\{(s_{j,k} || t_{j,k})\}_k$ and y_j , respectively. P_1 sets its output as $(\langle \text{lt}_{0,j} \rangle_1^B || \langle \text{eq}_{0,j} \rangle_1^B)$. This reduces the cost from $2(2\lambda + M)$ to $(2\lambda + 2M)$.

- Realizing \mathcal{F}_{AND} efficiently: It is well-known that \mathcal{F}_{AND} can be realized using Beaver bit triples [8]. For our protocol, we observe that the 2 calls to \mathcal{F}_{AND} in steps 14 and 16 have a common input, $\langle \text{eq}_{i-1,2i+1} \rangle_b^B$. Hence, we optimize communication of these steps by generating correlated bit triples $(\langle d \rangle_b^B, \langle e \rangle_b^B, \langle f \rangle_b^B)$ and $(\langle d' \rangle_b^B, \langle e' \rangle_b^B, \langle f' \rangle_b^B)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, such that $d \wedge e = f$ and $d' \wedge e' = f'$. Next, we use $\binom{8}{1}$ -OT₂ to generate one such correlated bit triple (Appendix A.2) with communication $2\lambda + 16$ bits, giving the amortized cost of $\lambda + 8$ bits per triple. Given correlated bit triples, we need 6 additional bits to compute both \mathcal{F}_{AND} calls.
- Removing unnecessary equality computations: As observed in [29], the equalities computed on lowest significant bits are never used. Concretely, we can skip computing the values $\text{eq}_{i,0}$ for $i \in \{0, \dots, \log q\}$. Once we do this optimization, we only need a single call to \mathcal{F}_{AND} instead of 2 correlated calls for the leftmost branch of the tree. We use the $\binom{16}{1}$ -OT₂ \rightarrow $2 \times \binom{4}{1}$ -OT₁ reduction to generate 2 regular bit triples from [25] (Appendix A.1) with communication of $2\lambda + 32$ bits. This gives us amortized communication of $\lambda + 16$ bits per triple and we need 4 additional bits to realize \mathcal{F}_{AND} . Overall, we get a reduction in total communication by M (for the leaf) plus $(\lambda + 2) \cdot \lceil \log q \rceil$ (for leftmost branch) bits.

3.1.2 Communication Complexity. In our protocol, we communicate in protocols for OT (steps 9&10) and \mathcal{F}_{AND} (steps 14&16). With above optimizations, we need 1 call to $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₁, $(q - 2)$ calls to $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₂ and 1 call to $\binom{R}{1}$ -OT₂ which cost $(2\lambda + M)$, $((q - 2) \cdot (2\lambda + 2M))$ and $(2\lambda + 2R)$ bits, respectively. In addition, we have $\lceil \log q \rceil$ invocations of \mathcal{F}_{AND} and $(q - 1 - \lceil \log q \rceil)$ invocations of correlated \mathcal{F}_{AND} . These require communication of $(\lambda + 20) \cdot \lceil \log q \rceil$ and $(2\lambda + 22) \cdot (q - 1 - \lceil \log q \rceil)$ bits. This gives us total communication of $\lambda(4q - \lceil \log q \rceil - 2) + M(2q - 3) + 2R + 22(q - 1) - 2\lceil \log q \rceil$ bits. Using this expression for $\ell = 32$ we get least communication for $m = 7$ (Table 1). We note that there is a trade-off between communication and computational cost of OTs used and we discuss our choice of m for our experiments in Section 6.

3.2 Protocol for DReLU for ℓ -bit integers

In Algorithm 2, we describe our protocol for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$ that takes as input arithmetic shares of a and returns boolean shares of $\text{DReLU}(a)$. Note that $\text{DReLU}(a) = (1 \oplus \text{MSB}(a))$, where $\text{MSB}(a)$ is the most significant bit of a . Let arithmetic shares of $a \in \mathbb{Z}_L$ be $\langle a \rangle_0^L = \text{msb}_0 || x_0$ and $\langle a \rangle_1^L = \text{msb}_1 || x_1$ such that $\text{msb}_0, \text{msb}_1 \in \{0, 1\}$. We compute the boolean shares of $\text{MSB}(a)$ as follows: Let $\text{carry} = 1\{(x_0 + x_1) > 2^{\ell-1} - 1\}$. Then, $\text{MSB}(a) = \text{msb}_0 \oplus \text{msb}_1 \oplus \text{carry}$. We compute boolean shares of carry by invoking an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\ell-1}$.

Correctness and security. By correctness of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\ell-1}$, $\text{Reconst}^B(\langle \text{carry} \rangle_0^B, \langle \text{carry} \rangle_1^B) = 1\{(2^{\ell-1} - 1 - x_0) < x_1\} = 1\{(x_0 + x_1) > 2^{\ell-1} - 1\}$. Also, $\text{Reconst}^B(\langle \text{DReLU} \rangle_0^B, \langle \text{DReLU} \rangle_1^B) = \text{msb}_0 \oplus \text{msb}_1 \oplus \text{carry} \oplus 1 = \text{MSB}(a) \oplus 1$. Security follows trivially in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\ell-1}$ hybrid.

Communication complexity In Algorithm 2, we communicate the same as in $\Pi_{\text{MILL}}^{\ell-1}$, that is $< (\lambda + 14)(\ell - 1)$ by using $m = 4$.

Algorithm 2 ℓ -bit integer DReLU, $\Pi_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$:

Input: P_0, P_1 hold $\langle a \rangle_0^L$ and $\langle a \rangle_1^L$, respectively.

Output: P_0, P_1 get $\langle \text{DReLU}(a) \rangle_0^B$ and $\langle \text{DReLU}(a) \rangle_1^B$.

- 1: P_0 parses its input as $\langle a \rangle_0^L = \text{msb}_0 || x_0$ and P_1 parses its input as $\langle a \rangle_1^L = \text{msb}_1 || x_1$, s.t. $b \in \{0, 1\}$, $\text{msb}_b \in \{0, 1\}$, $x_b \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell-1}$.
 - 2: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\ell-1}$, where P_0 's input is $2^{\ell-1} - 1 - x_0$ and P_1 's input is x_1 . For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle \text{carry} \rangle_b^B$.
 - 3: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b sets $\langle \text{DReLU} \rangle_b^B = \text{msb}_b \oplus \langle \text{carry} \rangle_b^B \oplus b$.
-

Algorithm 3 Simple Integer ring DReLU, $\Pi_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{ring}, n}$ simple:

Input: P_0, P_1 hold $\langle a \rangle_0^n$ and $\langle a \rangle_1^n$, respectively, where $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

Output: P_0, P_1 get $\langle \text{DReLU}(a) \rangle_0^B$ and $\langle \text{DReLU}(a) \rangle_1^B$.

- 1: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^\eta$ with $\eta = \lceil \log n \rceil$, where P_0 's input is $(n - 1 - \langle a \rangle_0^n)$ and P_1 's input is $\langle a \rangle_1^n$. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle \text{wrap} \rangle_b^B$ as output.
 - 2: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$, where P_0 's input is $(n - 1 - \langle a \rangle_0^n)$ and P_1 's input is $((n - 1)/2 + \langle a \rangle_1^n)$. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle \text{lt} \rangle_b^B$ as output.
 - 3: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$, where P_0 's input is $(n + (n - 1)/2 - \langle a \rangle_0^n)$ and P_1 's input is $\langle a \rangle_1^n$. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle \text{rt} \rangle_b^B$ as output.
 - 4: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^2$ with input $(\langle \text{lt} \rangle_b^B \oplus \langle \text{rt} \rangle_b^B)$ and choice $\langle \text{wrap} \rangle_b^B$ to learn $\langle z \rangle_b^B$.
 - 5: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b outputs $\langle z \rangle_b^B \oplus \langle \text{lt} \rangle_b^B \oplus b$.
-

3.3 Protocol for DReLU for general \mathbb{Z}_n

We describe a protocol for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{ring}, n}$ that takes arithmetic shares of a over \mathbb{Z}_n as input and returns boolean shares of $\text{DReLU}(a)$. For integer rings \mathbb{Z}_n , $\text{DReLU}(a) = 1$ if $a < \lceil n/2 \rceil$ and 0 otherwise. Note that this includes the case of prime fields considered in the works of [43, 49]. Below, we formally discuss the case of rings of odd number of elements and omit the analogous case of even rings. We first describe a (simplified) protocol for DReLU over \mathbb{Z}_n in Algorithm 3 with protocol logic as follows: Let arithmetic shares of $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ be $\langle a \rangle_0^n$ and $\langle a \rangle_1^n$. Define $\text{wrap} = 1\{\langle a \rangle_0^n + \langle a \rangle_1^n > n - 1\}$, $\text{lt} = 1\{\langle a \rangle_0^n + \langle a \rangle_1^n > (n - 1)/2\}$ and $\text{rt} = 1\{\langle a \rangle_0^n + \langle a \rangle_1^n > n + (n - 1)/2\}$. Then, $\text{DReLU}(a)$ is $(1 \oplus \text{lt})$ if $\text{wrap} = 0$, else it is $(1 \oplus \text{rt})$. In Algorithm 3, steps 1,2,3, compute these three comparisons using $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}$. Final output can be computed using an invocation of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^2$.

Optimizations. We describe an optimized protocol for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{ring}, n}$ in Algorithm 4 that reduces the number of calls to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}$ to 2. First, we observe that if the input of P_1 is identical in all three invocations, then the invocations of OT in Algorithm 1 (steps 9&10) can be done together for the three comparisons. This reduces the communication for each leaf OT invocation in steps 9&10 by an additive factor of 4λ . To enable this, P_0, P_1 add $(n - 1)/2$ to their inputs to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$ in steps 1,3 ($\eta = \lceil \log n \rceil$). Hence, P_1 's input to

Algorithm 4 Optimized Integer ring DReLU, $\Pi_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{ring},n}$:

Input: P_0, P_1 hold $\langle a \rangle_0^n$ and $\langle a \rangle_1^n$, respectively, where $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$. Let $\eta = \lceil \log n \rceil$.

Output: P_0, P_1 get $\langle \text{DReLU}(a) \rangle_0^B$ and $\langle \text{DReLU}(a) \rangle_1^B$.

- 1: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$, where P_0 's input is $(3(n-1)/2 - \langle a \rangle_0^n)$ and P_1 's input is $(n-1)/2 + \langle a \rangle_1^n$. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle \text{wrap} \rangle_b^B$ as output.
 - 2: P_0 sets $x = (2n-1 - \langle a \rangle_0^n)$ if $\langle a \rangle_0^n > (n-1)/2$, else $x = (n-1 - \langle a \rangle_0^n)$.
 - 3: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$, where P_0 's input is x and P_1 's input is $((n-1)/2 + \langle a \rangle_1^n)$. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle \text{xt} \rangle_b^B$ as output.
 - 4: P_0 samples $\langle z \rangle_0^B \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$.
 - 5: **for** $j = \{00, 01, 10, 11\}$ **do**
 - 6: P_0 parses j as $j_0 || j_1$ and sets $t_j = 1 \oplus \langle \text{xt} \rangle_0^B \oplus j_0$.
 - 7: **if** $\langle a \rangle_0^n > (n-1)/2$ **then**
 - 8: P_0 sets $s'_j = t_j \wedge (\langle \text{wrap} \rangle_0^B \oplus j_1)$.
 - 9: **else**
 - 10: P_0 sets $s'_j = t_j \oplus ((1 \oplus t_j) \wedge (\langle \text{wrap} \rangle_0^B \oplus j_1))$
 - 11: **end if**
 - 12: P_0 sets $s_j = s'_j \oplus \langle z \rangle_0^B$
 - 13: **end for**
 - 14: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\binom{4}{1}$ -OT₁ where P_0 is the sender with inputs $\{s_j\}_j$ and P_1 is the receiver with input $\langle \text{xt} \rangle_1^B || \langle \text{wrap} \rangle_1^B$. P_1 sets its output as $\langle z \rangle_1^B$.
 - 15: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b outputs $\langle z \rangle_b^B$.
-

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$ is $(n-1)/2 + \langle a \rangle_1^n$ in all invocations and P_0 's inputs are $(3(n-1)/2 - \langle a \rangle_0^n)$, $(n-1 - \langle a \rangle_0^n)$, $(2n-1 - \langle a \rangle_0^n)$ in steps 1,2,3, respectively.

Next, we observe that one of the comparisons in step 2 or step 3 is redundant. For instance, if $\langle a \rangle_0^n > (n-1)/2$, then the result of the comparison $\text{lt} = \langle a \rangle_0^n + \langle a \rangle_1^n > (n-1)/2$ done in step 2 is always 1. Similarly, if $\langle a \rangle_0^n \leq (n-1)/2$, then the result of the comparison $\text{rt} = 1\{\langle a \rangle_0^n + \langle a \rangle_1^n > n + (n-1)/2\}$ done in step 3 is always 0. Moreover, P_0 knows based on her input $\langle a \rangle_0^n$ which of the two comparisons is redundant. Hence, in the optimized protocol, P_0 and P_1 always run the comparison to compute shares of wrap and one of the other two comparisons. Note that the choice of which comparison is omitted by P_0 need not be communicated to P_1 , since P_1 's input is same in all invocations of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}$. Moreover, this omission does not reveal any additional information to P_1 by security of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}$. Finally, P_0 and P_1 can run a $\binom{4}{1}$ -OT₁ to learn the shares of DReLU(a). Here, P_1 is the receiver and her choice bits are the shares learnt in the two comparisons. P_0 is the sender who sets the 4 OT messages based on her input share, and two shares learnt from the comparison protocol. We elaborate on this in the correctness proof below.

Correctness and Security. First, by correctness of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$ (step 1), $\text{wrap} = \text{Reconst}^B(\langle \text{wrap} \rangle_0^B, \langle \text{wrap} \rangle_1^B) = 1\{\langle a \rangle_0^L + \langle a \rangle_1^L > n-1\}$. Let $j^* = \langle \text{xt} \rangle_1^B || \langle \text{wrap} \rangle_1^B$. Then, $t_{j^*} = 1 \oplus \text{xt}$. We will show that $s'_{j^*} = \text{DReLU}(a)$, and hence, by correctness of $\binom{4}{1}$ -OT₁, $z = \text{Reconst}^B(\langle z \rangle_0^B, \langle z \rangle_1^B) = \text{DReLU}(a)$. We have the following two cases.

When $\langle a \rangle_0^L > (n-1)/2$, $\text{lt} = 1$, and $\text{DReLU}(a) = \text{wrap} \wedge (1 \oplus \text{rt})$. Here, by correctness of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$ (step 3), $\text{xt} = \text{Reconst}^B(\langle \text{xt} \rangle_0^B, \langle \text{xt} \rangle_1^B) = \text{rt}$. Hence, $s'_{j^*} = t_{j^*} \wedge (\langle \text{wrap} \rangle_0^B \oplus j_1^*) = (1 \oplus \text{rt}) \wedge \text{wrap}$.

When $\langle a \rangle_0^L \leq (n-1)/2$, $\text{rt} = 0$, $\text{DReLU}(a)$ is $1 \oplus \text{lt}$ if $\text{wrap} = 0$, else 1. It can be written as $(1 \oplus \text{lt}) \oplus (\text{lt} \wedge \text{wrap})$. In this case, by correctness of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$ (step 3), $\text{xt} = \text{Reconst}^B(\langle \text{xt} \rangle_0^B, \langle \text{xt} \rangle_1^B) = \text{lt}$. Hence, $s'_{j^*} = t_{j^*} \oplus ((1 \oplus t_{j^*}) \wedge (\langle \text{wrap} \rangle_0^B \oplus j_1^*)) = (1 \oplus \text{lt}) \oplus (\text{lt} \wedge \text{wrap})$. Since $\langle z \rangle_0^B$ is uniform, security follows in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}, \binom{4}{1}$ -OT₁)-hybrid.

Communication complexity. With the above optimization, the overall communication complexity of our protocol for DReLU in \mathbb{Z}_n is equivalent to 2 calls to $\Pi_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$ where P_1 has same input plus $2\lambda + 4$ (for protocol for $\binom{4}{1}$ -OT₁). Two calls to $\Pi_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$ in this case (using $m = 4$) cost $< \frac{3}{2}\lambda(\eta+1) + 28(\eta+1)$ bits. Hence, total communication is $< \frac{3}{2}\lambda(\eta+1) + 28(\eta+1) + 2\lambda + 4$. We note that the communication complexity of simplified protocol in Algorithm 3 is approximately 3 independent calls to Π_{MILL}^η , which cost $3(\lambda\eta + 14\eta)$ bits, plus $2\lambda + 4$ bits for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^2$. Thus, our optimization gives almost $2\times$ improvement.

4 DIVISION AND TRUNCATION

We present our results on secure implementations of division in the ring by a positive integer and truncation (division by power-of-2) that are bitwise equivalent to the corresponding cleartext computation. We begin with closed form expressions for each of these followed by secure protocols that use them.

4.1 Expressing general division and truncation using arithmetic over secret shares

Let $\text{idiv} : \mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}$ denote signed integer division, where the quotient is rounded towards $-\infty$ and the sign of the remainder is the same as that of divisor. We denote division of a ring element by a positive integer using $\text{rdiv} : \mathbb{Z}_n \times \mathbb{Z} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_n$ defined as

$$\text{rdiv}(a, d) \triangleq \text{idiv}(a_u - 1\{a_u \geq \lceil n/2 \rceil\} \cdot n, d) \bmod n, \quad (2)$$

where the integer $a_u \in \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$ is the unsigned representation of $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ lifted to integers and $0 < d < n$. For brevity, we use $x =_n y$ to denote $x \bmod n = y \bmod n$.

THEOREM 4.1. (*Division of ring element by positive integer*). Let the shares of $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ be $\langle a \rangle_0^n, \langle a \rangle_1^n \in \mathbb{Z}_n$, for some $n = n^1 \cdot d + n^0 \in \mathbb{Z}$, where $n^0, n^1, d \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $0 \leq n^0 < d < n$.

Let the unsigned representation of $a, \langle a \rangle_0^n, \langle a \rangle_1^n$ in \mathbb{Z}_n lifted to integers be $a_u, a_0, a_1 \in \{0, 1, \dots, n-1\}$, respectively, such that $a_0 = a_0^1 \cdot d + a_0^0$ and $a_1 = a_1^1 \cdot d + a_1^0$, where $a_0^1, a_0^0, a_1^1, a_1^0 \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $0 \leq a_0^0, a_1^0 < d$. Let $n' = \lceil n/2 \rceil \in \mathbb{Z}$. Define $\text{corr}, A, B, C \in \mathbb{Z}$

as follows:

$$\text{corr} = \begin{cases} -1 & (a_u \geq n') \wedge (a_0 < n') \wedge (a_1 < n') \\ 1 & (a_u < n') \wedge (a_0 \geq n') \wedge (a_1 \geq n') \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},$$

$$A = a_0^0 + a_1^0 - (1\{a_0 \geq n'\} + 1\{a_1 \geq n'\} - \text{corr}) \cdot n^0.$$

$$B = \text{idiv}(a_0^0 - 1\{a_0 \geq n'\} \cdot n^0, d) + \text{idiv}(a_1^0 - 1\{a_1 \geq n'\} \cdot n^0, d)$$

$$C = 1\{A < d\} + 1\{A < 0\} + 1\{A < -d\}$$

Then, we have:

$$\text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_0^n, d) + \text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_1^n, d) + (\text{corr} \cdot n^1 + 1 - C - B) =_n \text{rdiv}(a, d).$$

The proof of the above theorem is presented in [Appendix C](#).

4.1.1 Special Case of truncation for ℓ bit integers. The expression above can be simplified for the special case of division by 2^s of ℓ -bit integers, i.e., arithmetic right shift with s ($\gg s$), as follows:

COROLLARY 4.2. (Truncation for ℓ -bit integers). Let the shares of $a \in \mathbb{Z}_L$ be $\langle a \rangle_0^L, \langle a \rangle_1^L \in \mathbb{Z}_L$. Let the unsigned representation of a , $\langle a \rangle_0^L, \langle a \rangle_1^L$ in \mathbb{Z}_L lifted to integers be $a_u, a_0, a_1 \in \{0, 1, \dots, 2^\ell - 1\}$, respectively, such that $a_0 = a_0^0 \cdot 2^s + a_0^1$ and $a_1 = a_1^0 \cdot 2^s + a_1^1$, where $a_0^0, a_0^1, a_1^0, a_1^1 \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $0 \leq a_0^0, a_0^1 < 2^s$. Let $\text{corr} \in \mathbb{Z}$ be defined as in [Theorem 4.1](#). Then, we have:

$$(a_0 \gg s) + (a_1 \gg s) + \text{corr} \cdot 2^{\ell-s} + 1\{a_0^0 + a_1^0 \geq 2^s\} =_L (a \gg s).$$

PROOF. The corollary follows directly from [Theorem 4.1](#) as follows: First, $(a \gg s) = \text{rdiv}(a, 2^s)$. Next, $n = 2^\ell$, $n^1 = 2^{\ell-s}$, and $n^0 = 0$. Using these, we get $A = a_0^0 + a_1^0$, $B = 0$ and $C = 1\{A < 2^s\} = 1\{a_0^0 + a_1^0 < 2^s\}$. \square

4.2 Protocols for division

In this section, we describe our protocols for division in different settings. We first describe a protocol for the simplest case of truncation for ℓ -bit integers followed by a protocol for general division in \mathbb{Z}_n by a positive integer ([Section 4.2.2](#)). Finally, we discuss another simpler case of truncation, which allows us to do better than general division for rings with a special structure ([Section 4.2.3](#)).

4.2.1 Protocol for truncation of ℓ -bit integer. Let $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{int}, \ell, s}$ be the functionality that takes arithmetic shares of a as input and returns arithmetic shares of $a \gg s$ as output. In this work, we give a protocol ([Algorithm 5](#)) that realizes the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{int}, \ell, s}$ correctly building on [Corollary 4.2](#).

Intuition. Parties P_0 & P_1 first invoke an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$ (where one party locally flips its share of $\text{DReLU}(a)$) to get boolean shares $\langle m \rangle_b^B$ of $\text{MSB}(a)$. Using these shares, they use a $\binom{4}{1}$ -OT $_\ell$ for calculating $\langle \text{corr} \rangle_b^L$, i.e., arithmetic shares of corr term in [Corollary 4.2](#). Next, they use an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^s$ to compute boolean shares of $c = 1\{a_0^0 + a_1^0 \geq 2^s\}$. Finally, they compute arithmetic shares of c using a call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^L$ ([Algorithm 7](#)).

Correctness and Security. For any $z \in \mathbb{Z}_L$, $\text{MSB}(z) = 1\{z_u \geq 2^{\ell-1}\}$, where z_u is unsigned representation of z lifted to integers. First, note that $\text{Reconst}^B(\langle m \rangle_0^B, \langle m \rangle_1^B) = 1 \oplus \text{Reconst}^B(\langle \alpha \rangle_0^B, \langle \alpha \rangle_1^B) = \text{MSB}(a)$ by correctness of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$. Next, we show that $\text{Reconst}^L(\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^L, \langle \text{corr} \rangle_1^L) = \text{corr}$, as defined in [Corollary 4.2](#). Let $x_b = \text{MSB}(\langle a \rangle_b^L)$

Algorithm 5 Truncation, $\Pi_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{int}, \ell, s}$

Input: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b holds $\langle a \rangle_b^L$, where $a \in \mathbb{Z}_L$.

Output: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle z \rangle_b^L$ s.t. $z = a \gg s$.

- 1: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, let $a_b, a_b^0, a_b^1 \in \mathbb{Z}$ be as defined in [Corollary 4.2](#).
- 2: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$ with input $\langle a \rangle_b^L$ to learn output $\langle \alpha \rangle_b^B$. Party P_b sets $\langle m \rangle_b^B = \langle \alpha \rangle_b^B \oplus b$.
- 3: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b sets $x_b = \text{MSB}(\langle a \rangle_b^L)$.
- 4: P_0 samples $\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^L \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$.
- 5: **for** $j = \{00, 01, 10, 11\}$ **do**
- 6: P_0 computes $t_j = (\langle m \rangle_0^B \oplus j_0 \oplus x_0) \wedge (\langle m \rangle_0^B \oplus j_0 \oplus j_1)$ s.t. $j = (j_0 || j_1)$.
- 7: **if** $t_j \wedge 1\{x_0 = 0\}$ **then**
- 8: P_0 sets $s_j =_L -\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^L - 1$.
- 9: **else if** $t_j \wedge 1\{x_0 = 1\}$ **then**
- 10: P_0 sets $s_j =_L -\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^L + 1$.
- 11: **else**
- 12: P_0 sets $s_j =_L -\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^L$.
- 13: **end if**
- 14: **end for**
- 15: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\binom{4}{1}$ -OT $_\ell$, where P_0 is the sender with inputs $\{s_j\}_j$ and P_1 is the receiver with input $\langle m \rangle_1^B || x_1$ and learns $\langle \text{corr} \rangle_1^L$.
- 16: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^s$ with P_0 's input as $2^s - 1 - a_0^0$ and P_1 's input as a_1^0 . For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle c \rangle_b^B$.
- 17: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^L$ ($L = 2^\ell$) with input $\langle c \rangle_b^B$ and learns $\langle d \rangle_b^L$.
- 18: P_b outputs $\langle z \rangle_b^L = (\langle a \rangle_b^L \gg s) + \langle \text{corr} \rangle_b^L \cdot 2^{\ell-s} + \langle d \rangle_b^L, b \in \{0, 1\}$.

for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and let $j^* = (\langle m \rangle_1^B || x_1)$. Then, $t_{j^*} = (\langle m \rangle_0^B \oplus \langle m \rangle_1^B \oplus x_0) \wedge (\langle m \rangle_0^B \oplus \langle m \rangle_1^B \oplus x_1) = (\text{MSB}(a) \oplus x_0) \wedge (\text{MSB}(a) \oplus x_1)$. Now, $t_{j^*} = 1$ implies that we are in one of the first two cases of expression for corr – which case we are in can be checked using x_0 (steps 7 & 9). Now it is easy to see that $s_{j^*} = -\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^L + \text{corr} = \langle \text{corr} \rangle_1^L$.

Next, by correctness of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^s$, $c = \text{Reconst}^B(\langle c \rangle_0^B, \langle c \rangle_1^B) = \langle c \rangle_0^B \oplus \langle c \rangle_1^B = 1\{a_0^0 + a_1^0 \geq 2^s\}$. Given boolean shares of c , step 17, creates arithmetic shares of the same using an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^L$. Since $\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^L$ is uniformly random, security of our protocol is easy to see in $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}, \binom{4}{1}$ -OT $_\ell, \mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^s, \mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^L)$ -hybrid.

Communication complexity. $\Pi_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{int}, \ell, s}$ involves a single call each to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}, \binom{4}{1}$ -OT $_\ell, \mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^L$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^s$. Hence, communication required is $< \lambda\ell + 2\lambda + 19\ell +$ communication for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^s$ that depends on parameter s . For $\ell = 32$ and $s = 12$, our concrete communication is 4310 bits (using $m = 7$ for Π_{MILL}^{12} as well as Π_{MILL}^{31} inside $\Pi_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, 32}$) as opposed to 24064 bits for garbled circuits.

4.2.2 Protocol for division in ring. Let $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DIV}}^{\text{ring}, n, d}$ be the functionality for division that takes arithmetic shares of a as input and returns arithmetic shares of $\text{rdiv}(a, d)$ as output. Our protocol builds on our closed form expression from [Theorem 4.1](#). We note that ℓ -bit integers is a special case of \mathbb{Z}_n and we use the same protocol for

division of an element in \mathbb{Z}_L by a positive integer.

Intuition. This protocol is similar to the previous protocol for truncation and uses the same logic to compute shares of corr term. Most non-trivial term to compute is C that involves three signed comparisons over \mathbb{Z} . We emulate these comparisons using calls to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\delta}$ where δ is large enough to ensure that there are no overflows or underflows. It is not too hard to see that $-2d + 2 \leq A \leq 2d - 2$ and hence, $-3d + 2 \leq A - d, A, A + d \leq 3d - 2$. Hence, we set $\delta = \lceil \log 6d \rceil$. Now, with this value of δ , the term C can be re-written as $(\text{DReLU}(A - d) \oplus 1) + (\text{DReLU}(A) \oplus 1) + (\text{DReLU}(A + d) \oplus 1)$, which can be computed using three calls to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\delta}$ (Step 19) and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$ (Step 20) each. Finally, note that to compute C we need arithmetic shares of A over the ring \mathbb{Z}_Δ , $\Delta = 2^\delta$. And this requires shares of corr over the same ring. Hence, we compute shares of corr over both \mathbb{Z}_n and \mathbb{Z}_Δ (Step 15). Due to space constraints, we describe the protocol formally in Appendix D along with its communication complexity. Also, Table 3 provides theoretical and concrete communication numbers for division in both \mathbb{Z}_L and \mathbb{Z}_n , as well as a comparison with garbled circuits.

4.2.3 Truncation in rings with special structure. It is easy to see that truncation by s in general rings can be done by performing a division by $d = 2^s$. However, we can omit a call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\delta}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$ when the underlying ring and d satisfy a relation. Specifically, if we have $2 \cdot n^0 \leq d = 2^s$, then A is always greater than equal to $-d$, where $n^0, A \in \mathbb{Z}$ are as defined in Theorem 4.1. Thus, the third comparison ($A < -d$) in the expression of C from Theorem 4.1 can be omitted. Moreover, this reduces the value of δ needed and $\delta = \lceil \log 4d \rceil$ suffices since $-2d \leq A - d, A \leq 2d - 2$.

Our homomorphic encryption scheme requires n to be a prime of the form $2KN + 1$ (Section 2.2.4), where K is a positive integer and $N \geq 8192$ is a power-of-2. Thus, we have $n^0 = n \bmod 2^s = 1$ for $1 \leq s \leq 14$. For all our benchmarks, $s \leq 12$ and we use this optimization for truncation in SCI_{HE} .

5 SECURE INFERENCE

We give an overview of all the layers that must be computed securely to realize the task of secure neural network inference. Layers can be broken into two categories - *linear* and *non-linear*. An inference algorithm simply consists of a sequence of layers of appropriate dimension connected to each other. Examples of linear layers include matrix multiplication, convolutions, Avgpool and batch normalization, while non-linear layers include ReLU, Maxpool, and Argmax.

We are in the setting of secure inference where the model owner, say P_0 , holds the weights. When securely realizing each of these layers, we maintain the following invariant: Parties P_0 and P_1 begin with arithmetic shares of the input to the layer and after the protocol, end with arithmetic shares (over the same ring) of the output of the layer. This allows us to stitch protocols for arbitrary layers sequentially to obtain a secure computation protocol for any neural network comprising of these layers. Semi-honest security of the protocol will follow trivially from sequential compositibility of

individual sub-protocols [18, 32, 47]. For protocols in SCI_{OT} , this arithmetic secret sharing is over \mathbb{Z}_L ; in SCI_{HE} , the sharing is over \mathbb{Z}_n , prime n . The inputs to secure inference are floating-point numbers, encoded as fixed-point integers in the ring (\mathbb{Z}_L or \mathbb{Z}_n); for details see Appendix E.

5.1 Linear Layers

5.1.1 Fully connected layers and convolutions. A fully connected layer in a neural network is simply a product of two matrices - the matrix of weights and the matrix of activations of that layer - of appropriate dimension. At a very high level, a convolutional layer applies a filter (usually of dimension $f \times f$ for small integer f) to the input matrix by sliding across it and computing the sum of element-wise products of the filter with the input. Various parameters are associated with convolutions - e.g. stride (a stride of 1 denotes that the filter slides across the larger input matrix beginning at every row and every column) and zero-padding (which indicates whether the matrix is padded with 0s to increase its dimension before applying the filter). When performing matrix multiplication or convolutions over fixed-point values, the values of the final matrix must be scaled down appropriately so that it has the same scale as the inputs to the computation. Hence, to do faithful fixed-point arithmetic, we first compute the matrix multiplication or convolution over the ring (\mathbb{Z}_L or \mathbb{Z}_n) followed by truncation, i.e., division-by- 2^s of all the values. In SCI_{OT} , multiplication and convolutions over the ring \mathbb{Z}_L are done using oblivious transfer techniques and in SCI_{HE} these are done over \mathbb{Z}_n using homomorphic encryption techniques that we describe next followed by our truncation method.

OT based computation. The OT-based techniques for multiplication are well-known [8, 23, 51] and we describe them briefly for completeness. First consider the simple case of secure multiplication of a and b in \mathbb{Z}_L where P_0 knows a and P_0 and P_1 hold arithmetic shares of b . This can be done by invoking $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_i$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, \ell\}$ requiring communication equivalent to ℓ instances of $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_{\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$. Using this, multiplying two matrices $A \in \mathbb{Z}_L^{M,N}$ and $B \in \mathbb{Z}_L^{N,K}$ such that P_0 knows A and B is arithmetically secret shared requires $MNK\ell$ instances of $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_{\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$. This can be optimized with structured multiplications inside a matrix multiplication by combining all the COT sender messages when multiplying with the same element, reducing the complexity to that of $NK\ell$ instances of $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_{\frac{M(\ell+1)}{2}}$. Finally, we reduce the task of secure convolutions to secure matrix multiplication similar to [45, 50, 61].

HE based computation. SCI_{HE} uses techniques from Gazelle [43] and Delphi [49] to compute matrix multiplications and convolutions over a field \mathbb{Z}_n (prime n), of appropriate size. At a high level, first, P_1 sends an encryption of its arithmetic share to P_0 . Then, P_0 homomorphically computes on this ciphertext using weights of the model (known to P_0) to compute an encryption of the arithmetic share of the result and sends this back to P_1 . Hence, the communication only depends on the input and output size of the linear layer and is independent of the number of multiplications being performed. Homomorphic operations can have significantly high computational cost - to mitigate this, we build upon the *output rotations* method from [43] for performing convolutions, and reduce its

number of homomorphic rotations. At a very high level, after performing convolutions homomorphically, ciphertexts are grouped, rotated in order to be correctly aligned, and then packed using addition. In our work, we divide the groups further into subgroups that are misaligned by *the same offset*. Hence the ciphertexts within a subgroup can first be added and the resulting ciphertext can then be aligned using a single rotation as opposed to subgroup-size many rotations in [43]. We refer the reader to Appendix F for details.

Faithful truncation. To correctly emulate fixed-point arithmetic, the value encoded in the shares obtained from the above methods needs to be divided-by- 2^s , where s is the scale used. For this we invoke $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{int},\ell,s}$ in SCI_{OT} and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DIV}}^{\text{ring},n,2^s}$ in SCI_{HE} for each value of the resulting matrix. With this, result of secure implementation of fixed-point multiplication and convolutions is *bitwise equal* to the corresponding cleartext execution. In contrast, many prior works on 2PC [49, 51] and 3PC [45, 50, 61] used a *local truncation* method for approximate truncation based on a result from [51]. Here, the result can be arbitrarily wrong with a (small) probability p and with probability $1 - p$ the result can be wrong in the last bit. Since p grows with the number of truncations, these probabilistic errors are problematic for large DNNs. Moreover, even if p is small, 1-bit errors can accumulate and the results of cleartext execution and secure execution can diverge; this is undesirable as it breaks correctness of 2PC.

5.1.2 Avgpool_d. The function Avgpool_d(a_1, \dots, a_d) over a pool of d elements a_1, \dots, a_d is defined to be the arithmetic mean of these d values. The protocol to compute this function works as follows: P_0 and P_1 begin with arithmetic shares (e.g. over \mathbb{Z}_L in SCI_{OT}) of a_i , for all $i \in [d]$. They perform local addition to obtain shares of $w = \sum_{i=1}^d a_i$ (i.e., P_b computes $\langle w \rangle_b^L = \sum_{i=1}^d \langle a_i \rangle_b^L$). Then, parties invoke $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DIV}}^{\text{ring},L,d}$ on inputs $\langle w \rangle_b^L$ to obtain the desired output. Correctness and security follow in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DIV}}^{\text{ring},L,d}$ -hybrid model. Here too, unlike [49], our secure execution of average pool is bitwise equal to the cleartext version.

5.2 Nonlinear Layers

5.2.1 ReLU. Note that $\text{ReLU}(a) = a$ if $a \geq 0$, and 0 otherwise. Equivalently, $\text{ReLU}(a) = \text{DReLU}(a) \cdot a$. For \mathbb{Z}_L , first we compute the boolean shares of $\text{DReLU}(a)$ using a call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\ell}$ and then we compute shares of $\text{ReLU}(a)$ using a call to multiplexer $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^L$ (Section 2.2.3). We describe the protocol for $\text{ReLU}(a)$ over \mathbb{Z}_L formally in Algorithm 8, Appendix B (the case of \mathbb{Z}_n follows in a similar manner). For communication complexity, refer to Table 2 for comparison with garbled circuits and Appendix B for details.

5.2.2 Maxpool_d and Argmax_d. The function Maxpool_d(a_1, \dots, a_d) over d elements a_1, \dots, a_d is defined in the following way. Define $\text{gt}(x, y) = z$, where $w = x - y$ and $z = x$, if $w > 0$ and $z = y$, if $w \leq 0$. Define $z_1 = a_1$ and $z_i = \text{gt}(a_i, z_{i-1})$, recursively for all $2 \leq i \leq d$. Now, Maxpool_d(a_1, \dots, a_d) = z_d .

We now describe a protocol such that parties begin with arithmetic shares (over \mathbb{Z}_L) of a_i , for all $i \in [d]$ and end the protocol with arithmetic shares (over \mathbb{Z}_L) of Maxpool_d(a_1, \dots, a_d). For simplicity, we describe how P_0 and P_1 can compute shares of $z = \text{gt}(x, y)$ (beginning with the shares of x and y). It is easy to see then how

they can compute Maxpool_d. First, parties locally compute shares of $w = x - y$ (i.e., P_b computes $\langle w \rangle_b^L = \langle x \rangle_b^L - \langle y \rangle_b^L$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$). Next, they invoke $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\ell}$ with input $\langle w \rangle_b^L$ to learn output $\langle v \rangle_b^B$. Now, they invoke $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^L$ with input $\langle w \rangle_b^L$ and $\langle v \rangle_b^B$ to learn output $\langle t \rangle_b^L$. Finally, parties output $\langle z \rangle_b^L = \langle y \rangle_b^L + \langle t \rangle_b^L$. The correctness and security of the protocol follows in a straightforward manner. Computing Maxpool_d is done using $d - 1$ invocations of the above sub-protocol in $d - 1$ sequential steps.

Argmax_d(a_1, \dots, a_d) is defined similar to Maxpool_d(a_1, \dots, a_d), except that its output is an index i^* s.t. $a_{i^*} = \text{Maxpool}_d(a_1, \dots, a_d)$. Argmax_d can be computed securely similar to Maxpool_d(a_1, \dots, a_d).

6 IMPLEMENTATION

We implement our cryptographic protocols in a library and integrate them into the CrypTFlow framework [1, 45] as a new cryptographic backend. CrypTFlow compiles high-level TensorFlow [3] inference code to secure computation protocols using its frontend Athos, that are then executed by its cryptographic backends. We modify the truncation behavior of Athos in support of faithful fixed-point arithmetic. We start by describing the implementation of our cryptographic library, followed by the modifications that we made to Athos.

6.1 Cryptographic backend

To implement our protocols, we build upon the $\binom{2}{1}$ -OT_ℓ implementation from EMP [62] and extend it to $\binom{k}{1}$ -OT_ℓ using the protocol from [44]. Our linear-layer implementation in SCI_{HE} is based on SEAL/Delphi [2, 58] and in SCI_{OT} is based on EMP. All our protocol implementations are multi-threaded.

Oblivious Transfer. $\binom{k}{1}$ -OT_ℓ requires a correlation robust function to mask the sender’s messages in the OT extension protocol, and we use AES₂₅₆^{RK} (re-keyed AES with 256-bit key)⁹ to instantiate it as in [23, 25]. We incorporated the optimizations from [33, 34] for AES key expansion and pipelining these AES₂₅₆^{RK} calls. This leads to roughly 6× improvement in the performance of AES₂₅₆^{RK} calls, considerably improving the overall execution time of $\binom{k}{1}$ -OT_ℓ (e.g. 2.7× over LAN for $\binom{16}{1}$ -OT₈).

Millionaires’ protocol. Recall that m is a parameter in our protocol $\Pi_{\text{MILL}}^{\ell,m}$. While we discussed the dependence of communication complexity on m in Section 3.1.2, here we discuss its influence on the computational cost. Our protocol makes ℓ/m calls to $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₂ (after merging steps 9&10), where $M = 2^m$. Using OT extension techniques, generating an instance of $\binom{M}{1}$ -OT₂ requires 6 AES₂₅₆^{FK} and $(M+1)$ AES₂₅₆^{RK} evaluations. Thus, the computational cost grows super-polynomially with m . We note that for $\ell = 32$, even though communication is minimized for $m = 7$, empirically we observe that $m = 4$ gives us the best performance under both LAN and WAN settings (communication in this case is about 30% more than when $m = 7$ but computation is $\approx 3\times$ lower).

⁹There are two types of AES in MPC applications - fixed-key (FK) and re-keyed (RK) [10, 35]. While the former runs key schedule only once and is more efficient, the latter generates a new key schedule for every invocation and is required in this application.

Implementing linear layers in SCI_{HE} . To implement the linear layers in SCI_{HE} , we build upon the Delphi implementation [2, 49], that is in turn based on the SEAL library [58]. We use the code for fully connected layers as it is from [2]. For convolution layers, we parallelize the code, employ modulus-switching [58] to reduce the ciphertext modulus (and hence ciphertext size), and implement the strided convolutions proposed in Gazelle [43]. These optimizations resulted in significant performance improvement of convolution layers. E.g. for the first convolution layer¹⁰ of ResNet50, the runtime decreased from 306s to 18s in the LAN setting and communication decreased from 204 MiB to 76 MiB.

6.2 CrypTFlow integration

We integrate SCI_{OT} and SCI_{HE} as new cryptographic backends into the CrypTFlow framework [1, 45]. CrypTFlow’s TensorFlow frontend Athos outputs fixed-point DNNs that use 64-bit integers and sets an optimal scale using a validation set. CrypTFlow required a *bitwidth* of 64 to ensure that the probability of local truncation errors in its protocols is small (Section 5.1.1). Since our protocols are correct and have no such errors, we extend Athos to set both the bitwidth and the scale optimally by autotuning on the validation set. The bitwidth and scale leak information about the weights and this leakage is similar to the prior works on secure inference [43, 45, 48–51, 61].

Implementing faithful truncations using $\Pi_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{int},\ell,s}$ requires the parties to communicate. We implement the following peephole optimizations in Athos to reduce the cost of these truncation calls. Consider a DNN having a convolution layer followed by a ReLU layer. While truncation can be done immediately after the convolution, moving the truncation call to after the ReLU layer can reduce the cost of our protocol $\Pi_{\text{Trunc}}^{\text{int},\ell,s}$. Since the values after ReLU are guaranteed to be all positive, the call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\ell}$ within it (step 2 in Algorithm 5) now becomes redundant and can be omitted. Our optimization further accounts for operations that may occur between the convolutions and ReLU, say a matrix addition. Moving the truncation call from immediately after convolution to after ReLU means the activations flowing into the addition operation are now scaled by $2s$, instead of the usual s . For the addition operation to then work correctly, we scale the other argument of addition by s as well. These optimizations are fully automatic and need no manual intervention.

7 EXPERIMENTS

We empirically validate the following claims:

- In Section 7.1, we show that our protocols for computing ReLU activations are more efficient than state-of-the-art garbled circuits-based implementations (Table 4). Additionally, our division protocols outperforms garbled circuits when computing average pool layers.
- On the DNNs considered by prior work on secure inference, our protocols can evaluate the non-linear layers much more efficiently and decrease the total time (Table 5) as well as the online time (Table 6).

¹⁰Layer parameters: image size 230×230 , filter size 7×7 , input channels 3, output channels 64, and stride size 2×2




Figure 1: The left y-axis shows $\left(\frac{\text{GC Time}}{\text{Our Time}}\right)$. The right y-axis shows the total number of ReLU layers corresponding to each layer size in our benchmark set. The legend entries denote the input domain and the network setting.

- We show the first empirical evaluation of 2-party secure inference on ImageNet-scale benchmarks (Section 7.3). These results show the trade-offs between OT and HE-based secure DNN inference (Table 7).

We start with a description of our experimental setup and benchmarks, followed by the results.

Experimental Setup. We ran our benchmarks in two network settings, namely, a LAN setting with both machines situated in West Europe, and a transatlantic WAN setting with one of the machines in East US. The bandwidth between the machines is 377 MBps and 40 MBps in the LAN and the WAN setting respectively and the echo latency is 0.3ms and 80ms respectively. Each machine has commodity class hardware: 3.7 GHz Intel Xeon processor with 4 cores and 16 GBs of RAM.

Our Benchmarks. We evaluate on the ImageNet-scale benchmarks considered by [45]: SqueezeNet [40], ResNet50 [37], and DenseNet121 [38]. To match the reported accuracies, we need 37-bit fixed-point numbers for ResNet50, whereas 32 bits suffice for DenseNet121 and SqueezeNet (Appendix I). Recall that our division protocols lead to correct secure executions and there is no accuracy loss in going from cleartext inference to secure inference. Appendix G provides a brief summary of these benchmarks.

7.1 Comparison with Garbled Circuits

We compare with EMP-toolkit [62], the state-of-the-art library for Garbled Circuits (GC). Figure 1 shows the improvement of our ReLU protocols over GC in both LAN and WAN settings. On the x-axis, which is in log-scale, the number of ReLUs range from 2^0 to 2^{20} . The histogram shows, using the right y-axis, the cumulative number of layers in our benchmarks (SqueezeNet, ResNet50, DenseNet121) which require the number of ReLU activations given on the x-axis. We observe that these DNNs have layers that compute between 2^{13} and 2^{20} ReLUs. For such layers, we observe (on the left y-axis) that

Benchmark	Garbled Circuits			Our Protocols		
	LAN	WAN	Comm	LAN	WAN	Comm
SqueezeNet	26.4	265.6	7.63	3.5	33.3	1.15
ResNet50	136.5	1285.2	39.19	16.4	69.4	5.23
DenseNet121	199.6	1849.3	56.57	24.8	118.7	8.21

(a) over \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}

Benchmark	Garbled Circuits			Our Protocols		
	LAN	WAN	Comm	LAN	WAN	Comm
SqueezeNet	51.7	525.8	16.06	5.6	50.4	1.77
ResNet50	267.5	2589.7	84.02	28.0	124.0	8.55
DenseNet121	383.5	3686.2	118.98	41.9	256.0	12.64

(b) over \mathbb{Z}_n **Table 4: Performance comparison with Garbled Circuits for ReLU layers. Runtimes are in seconds and comm. in GiB.**

our protocols are $2\times$ – $25\times$ faster than GC – the larger the layers the higher the speedups, and gains are larger in the WAN settings. Specifically, for WAN and $> 2^{17}$ ReLUs, the speedups are much higher than the LAN setting. Here, the cost of rounds is amortized over large layers and the communication cost is a large fraction of the total runtime. Note that our implementations perform load-balancing to leverage full-duplex TCP.

Next, we compare the time taken by GC and our protocols in computing the ReLU activations of our benchmarks in Table 4. Our protocol over \mathbb{Z}_L is up to $8\times$ and $18\times$ faster than GC in the LAN and WAN settings respectively, while it is $\approx 7\times$ more communication efficient. As expected, our protocol over \mathbb{Z}_n has even better gains over GC. Specifically, it is up to $9\times$ and $21\times$ faster in the LAN and WAN settings respectively, and has $\approx 9\times$ less communication.

We also performed a similar comparison of our protocols with GC for the Avgpool layers of our benchmarks, and saw up to $51\times$ reduction in runtime and $41\times$ reduction in communication. We report the concrete performance numbers and discuss the results in more detail in Appendix H.

7.2 Comparison with Delphi

In this section, we compare with Delphi [49], which is the current state-of-the-art for 2-party secure DNN inference that outperforms [12, 13, 17, 19, 22, 31, 43, 48, 56] in total time as well as the time taken in online phase. It uses garbled circuits for non-linear layers, and we show that with our protocols, the time taken to evaluate the non-linear layers can be decreased significantly.

For a fair evaluation, we demonstrate these improvements on the benchmarks of Delphi [49], i.e., the MiniONN (CIFAR-10) [48] and ResNet32 (CIFAR-100) DNNs with ReLU activations (as opposed to the ImageNet-scale benchmarks for which Delphi has not been optimized). Similar to Delphi, we perform these computations with a bitwidth of 41 in the LAN setting.

In Table 5, we report the performance of Delphi for evaluating the linear and non-linear components of MiniONN and ResNet32 separately, along with the performance of our protocols for the same non-linear computation¹¹. The table shows that the time to evaluate non-linear layers is the bulk of the total time and our

¹¹Our non-linear time includes the cost of correct truncation.

Benchmark	Metric	Linear	Non-linear		
			Delphi	Ours	Improvement
MiniONN	Time	10.7	30.2	1.0	30.2×
	Comm.	0.02	3.15	0.28	12.3×
ResNet32	Time	15.9	52.9	2.4	22.0×
	Comm.	0.07	5.51	0.59	9.3×

Table 5: Performance comparison with Delphi [49] for non-linear layers. Runtimes are in seconds and comm. in GiB.

Benchmark	Linear	Non-linear		
		Delphi	Ours	Improvement
MiniONN	< 0.1	3.97	0.32	12.40×
ResNet32	< 0.1	6.99	0.63	11.09×

Table 6: Performance comparison with Delphi [49] for on-line runtime in seconds.

protocols are $20\times$ – $30\times$ faster in evaluating the non-linear layers. Also note that we reduce the communication by $12\times$ on MiniONN, and require $9\times$ less communication on ResNet32.

Next, we compare the online time of our protocols with the online time of Delphi in Table 6. In the online phase, linear layers take negligible time and all the time is spent in evaluating the non-linear layers. Here, our protocols are an order of magnitude more efficient than Delphi.

7.3 Evaluation on practical DNNs

With all our protocols and implementation optimizations in place, we demonstrate the scalability of CRYPTFLOW2 by efficiently running ImageNet-scale secure inference. Table 7 shows that both our backends, SCI_{OT} and SCI_{HE} , are efficient enough to evaluate SqueezeNet in under a minute and scale to ResNet50 and DenseNet121.

In the LAN setting, for both SqueezeNet and DenseNet121, SCI_{OT} performs better than SCI_{HE} by at least 20% owing to the higher compute in the latter. However, the quadratic growth of communication with bitlength in the linear-layers of SCI_{OT} can easily drown this difference if we go to higher bitlengths. Because ResNet50, requires 37-bits (compared to 32 in SqueezeNet and DenseNet121) to preserve accuracy, SCI_{HE} outperforms SCI_{OT} in both LAN and WAN settings. In general for WAN settings where communication becomes the major performance bottleneck, SCI_{HE} performs better than SCI_{OT} : $2\times$ for SqueezeNet and DenseNet121 and $4\times$ for ResNet50. Overall, with CRYPTFLOW2, we could evaluate all the 3 benchmarks within 10 minutes on LAN and 20 minutes on WAN. Since CRYPTFLOW2 supports both SCI_{OT} and SCI_{HE} , one can choose a specific backend depending on the network statistics [17, 53] to get the best secure inference latency. To the best of our knowledge, no prior system provides this support for OT and HE-based secure DNN inference.

8 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

We have presented secure, efficient, and correct implementations of practical 2-party DNN inference that outperform prior work [49] by an order of magnitude in both latency and scale. We evaluate the first secure implementations of ImageNet scale inference, a task that previously required 3PC protocols [7, 45] (which provide weaker security guarantees) or leaking intermediate computations [12]. In

Benchmark	Protocol	LAN	WAN	Comm
SqueezeNet	SCI _{OT}	44.3	293.6	26.07
	SCI _{HE}	59.2	156.6	5.27
ResNet50	SCI _{OT}	619.4	3611.6	370.84
	SCI _{HE}	545.8	936.0	32.43
DenseNet121	SCI _{OT}	371.4	2257.7	217.19
	SCI _{HE}	463.2	1124.7	35.56

Table 7: Performance of CRYPTFLOW2 on ImageNet-scale benchmarks. Runtimes are in seconds and comm. in GiB.

the future, we would like to consider ImageNet scale secure *training*. Even though we can run inference on commodity machines, for training we would need protocols that can leverage specialized compute and networking hardware. Like all prior work on 2PC for secure DNN inference, CRYPTFLOW2 only considers semi-honest adversaries. In the future, we would like to consider malicious adversaries. Another future direction is to help the server in hiding F from the client when computing a classifier $F(x, w)$. Like [43], SCI_{HE} can hide some aspects of F : the filter sizes, the strides, and whether a layer is convolutional or fully connected. Thus, SCI_{HE} hides more information than OT-based tools [48] but reveals more information than FHE-based tools [13, 31]. We are exploring approaches to hide more information about F while incurring minimal overhead.

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A SUPPORTING PROTOCOLS

Here, we describe supporting protocols that our main protocols rely on.

A.1 Protocol for regular \mathcal{F}_{AND}

Regular \mathcal{F}_{AND} can be realized using bit-triples [8], which are of the form $(\langle d \rangle_b^B, \langle e \rangle_b^B, \langle f \rangle_b^B)$, where $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $d \wedge e = f$. Using an instance of $(\binom{16}{1})\text{-OT}_2$, the parties can generate two bit-triples [25]. We describe this protocol for generating the first triple, and from there, it will be easy to see how to also get the second

Algorithm 6 Multiplexer, Π_{MUX}^n :

Input: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b holds $\langle a \rangle_b^n$ and $\langle c \rangle_b^B$.

Output: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle z \rangle_b^n$ s.t. $z = a$ if $c = 1$, else $z = 0$.

- 1: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b picks $r_b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_n$.
 - 2: P_0 sets s_0, s_1 as follows: If $\langle c \rangle_0^B = 0$, $(s_0, s_1) = (-r_0, -r_0 + \langle a \rangle_0^n)$. Else, $(s_0, s_1) = (-r_0 + \langle a \rangle_0^n, -r_0)$.
 - 3: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\binom{2}{1}$ -OT $_\eta$ where P_0 is the sender with inputs (s_0, s_1) and P_1 is the receiver with input $\langle c \rangle_1^B$. Let P_1 's output be x_1 .
 - 4: P_1 sets t_0, t_1 as follows: If $\langle c \rangle_1^B = 0$, $(t_0, t_1) = (-r_1, -r_1 + \langle a \rangle_1^n)$. Else, $(t_0, t_1) = (-r_1 + \langle a \rangle_1^n, -r_1)$.
 - 5: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\binom{2}{1}$ -OT $_\eta$ where P_1 is the sender with inputs (t_0, t_1) and P_0 is the receiver with input $\langle c \rangle_0^B$. Let P_0 's output be x_0 .
 - 6: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b outputs $\langle z \rangle_b^n = r_b + x_b$.
-

triple using the same OT instance. The parties start by sampling random shares $\langle d \rangle_b^B, \langle e \rangle_b^B \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$. P_1 sets the first two bits of its input to $\binom{16}{1}$ -OT $_2$ as $\langle d \rangle_1^B \| \langle e \rangle_1^B$, while the other two bits are used for the second triple. P_0 samples a random bit r and sets its input messages to $\binom{16}{1}$ -OT $_2$ as follows: for the i -th message, where $i \in \{0, 1\}^4$, P_0 uses the first two bits $i_1 \| i_2$ of i to compute $r \oplus ((i_1 \oplus \langle d \rangle_0^B) \wedge (i_2 \oplus \langle e \rangle_0^B))$, and sets it as the first bit of the message, while reserving the second bit for the other triple. Finally, P_0 sets $\langle f \rangle_0^B = r$, and P_1 sets the first bit of the output of $\binom{16}{1}$ -OT $_2$ as $\langle f \rangle_1^B$. It is easy to see correctness by noting that $\langle f \rangle_1^B = \langle f \rangle_0^B \oplus (d \wedge e)$, and since $\langle f \rangle_0^B$ is uniformly random, security follows directly in the $\binom{16}{1}$ -OT $_2$ -hybrid.

The communication of this protocol is the same as that of $\binom{16}{1}$ -OT $_2$, which is $2\lambda + 16 \cdot 2$ bits. Since we generate two bit-triples using this protocol, the amortized cost per triple is $\lambda + 16$ bits, which is 144 for $\lambda = 128$.

A.2 Protocol for correlated \mathcal{F}_{AND}

Correlated triples are two sets of bit triples $(\langle d \rangle_b^B, \langle e \rangle_b^B, \langle f \rangle_b^B)$ and $(\langle d' \rangle_b^B, \langle e' \rangle_b^B, \langle f' \rangle_b^B)$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, such that $e = e'$, $d \wedge e = f$, and $d' \wedge e' = f'$. The protocol from [Appendix A.1](#) required a $\binom{16}{1}$ -OT $_2$ invocation to generate two regular triples, where the 4 bits of P_1 's input were its shares of d, e, d' , and e' . However, when generating correlated triples, we can instead use an instance of $\binom{8}{1}$ -OT $_2$ because $e = e'$, and thus, 3 bits suffice to represent P_1 's input. Correctness and security follow in a similar way as in the case of regular \mathcal{F}_{AND} (see [Appendix A.1](#)).

The communication of this protocol is equal to that of $\binom{8}{1}$ -OT $_2$, which costs $2\lambda + 8 \cdot 2$ bits. Thus, we get an amortized communication of $\lambda + 8$ bits per correlated triple.

A.3 Protocol for Multiplexer

We describe our protocol for realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^n$ in [Algorithm 6](#).

First we argue correctness. Let $c = \text{Reconst}^B(\langle c \rangle_0^B, \langle c \rangle_1^B) = \langle c \rangle_0^B \oplus \langle c \rangle_1^B$. By correctness of $\binom{2}{1}$ -OT $_\eta$, $x_1 = -r_0 + c \cdot \langle a \rangle_0^n$. Similarly, $x_0 = -r_1 + c \cdot \langle a \rangle_1^n$. Hence, $\text{Reconst}^n(\langle z \rangle_0^n, \langle z \rangle_1^n) = z_0 + z_1 = c \cdot a$.

Algorithm 7 Boolean to Arithmetic, Π_{B2A}^n :

Input: P_0, P_1 hold $\langle c \rangle_0^B$ and $\langle c \rangle_1^B$, respectively, where $c \in \{0, 1\}$.

Output: P_0, P_1 learn $\langle d \rangle_0^n$ and $\langle d \rangle_1^n$, respectively, s.t. $d = c$.

- 1: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_\eta$ where P_0 is the sender with correlation function $f(x) = x + \langle c \rangle_0^B$ and P_1 is the receiver with input $\langle c \rangle_1^B$. Party P_0 learns x and sets $y_0 = n - x$ and P_1 learns y_1 .
 - 2: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b computes $\langle d \rangle_b^n = \langle c \rangle_b^B - 2 \cdot y_b$.
-

Algorithm 8 ℓ -bit integer ReLU, $\Pi_{\text{ReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$:

Input: P_0, P_1 hold $\langle a \rangle_0^L$ and $\langle a \rangle_1^L$, respectively.

Output: P_0, P_1 get $\langle \text{ReLU}(a) \rangle_0^L$ and $\langle \text{ReLU}(a) \rangle_1^L$.

- 1: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$ with input $\langle a \rangle_b^L$ to learn output $\langle y \rangle_b^B$.
 - 2: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^L$ with inputs $\langle a \rangle_b^L$ and $\langle y \rangle_b^B$ to learn $\langle z \rangle_b^L$ and sets $\langle \text{ReLU}(a) \rangle_b^L = \langle z \rangle_b^L$.
-

Security trivially follows in $\binom{2}{1}$ -OT $_\eta$ -hybrid. Communication complexity is $2(\lambda + 2\eta)$.

A.4 Protocol for B2A

We describe our protocol for realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$ formally in [Algorithm 7](#). For correctness, we need to show that $d = \text{Reconst}^L(\langle d \rangle_0^n, \langle d \rangle_1^n) = \langle c \rangle_0^B + \langle c \rangle_1^B - 2\langle c \rangle_0^B \langle c \rangle_1^B$. By correctness of $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_\eta$, $y_1 = x + \langle c \rangle_0^B \langle c \rangle_1^B$. Using this, $\langle d \rangle_0^n = \langle c \rangle_0^B + 2x$ and $\langle d \rangle_1^n = \langle c \rangle_1^B - 2x - 2\langle c \rangle_0^B \langle c \rangle_1^B$. Security follows from the security of $\binom{2}{1}$ -COT $_\eta$ and communication required is $\lambda + \eta$ bits.

B PROTOCOL FOR ReLU

We describe our ReLU protocol for the case where the input and output shares are over \mathbb{Z}_L in [Algorithm 8](#), and note that the case of \mathbb{Z}_n follows similarly. It is easy to see that the correctness and security of the protocol follow in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^L)$ -hybrid.

Communication complexity. We first look at the complexity of $\Pi_{\text{ReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$, which involves a call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^L$. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \ell}$ has the same communication as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\ell-1}$, which requires $\lambda(\ell-1) + 13\frac{1}{2}(\ell-1) - 2\lambda - 22$ bits if we assume $m = 4$ and $m \mid (\ell-1)$, and exclude optimization (3.1.1) in the general expression from [Section 3.1.2](#). $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^L$ incurs a cost of $2\lambda + 4\ell$ bits, bringing the total cost to $\lambda\ell + 17\frac{1}{2}\ell - \lambda - 35\frac{1}{2}$ bits, which can be rewritten as $< \lambda\ell + 18\ell$. We get our best communication for $\ell = 32$ (with all the optimizations) by taking $m = 7$ for the Π_{MILL}^{31} invocation inside $\Pi_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, 32}$, which gives us a total communication of 3298 bits.

Now, we look at the complexity of $\Pi_{\text{ReLU}}^{\text{ring}, n}$, which makes calls to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{ring}, n}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^n$. The cost of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{ring}, n}$ is $2\lambda + 4$ bits for $\binom{4}{1}$ -OT $_1$, plus $\frac{3}{2}\lambda(\eta+1) + 27(\eta+1) - 4\lambda - 44$ bits for 2 invocations of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\eta+1}$, where P_1 's input is the same in both invocations and the same assumptions are made as for the expression of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MILL}}^{\ell-1}$ above. The cost of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{MUX}}^n$ is $2\lambda + 4\eta$ bits, and thus, the total cost is $\frac{3}{2}\lambda(\eta+1) + 31\eta - 13$, which

#	$1\{a_0 \geq n'\}$	$1\{a_1 \geq n'\}$	$1\{a_u \geq n'\}$	w	c^1	c^0
1	0	0	0	0	0	A'_0
2	0	0	1	0	-1	A'_1
3	0	1	0	1	0	A'_1
4	0	1	1	0	0	A'_1
5	1	0	0	1	0	A'_1
6	1	0	1	0	0	A'_1
7	1	1	0	1	1	A'_1
8	1	1	1	1	0	A'_2

Table 8: Truth table for the correction terms c^0 and c^1 in the proof of division theorem (Appendix C).

can be rewritten as $< \frac{3}{2}\lambda(\eta + 1) + 31\eta$. Concretely, we get the best communication for $\eta = 32$ by taking $m = 7$ for the millionaire invocations, getting a total communication of 5288 bits.

C PROOF OF DIVISION THEOREM

Here, we prove [Theorem 4.1](#).

PROOF. From [Equation 2](#), we can write $\text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_i^n, d)$ as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_i^n, d) &= {}_n \text{idiv}(a_i - 1\{a_i \geq n'\} \cdot n, d) \\ &= {}_n \text{idiv}(a_i^1 \cdot d + a_i^0 - 1\{a_i \geq n'\} \cdot (n^1 \cdot d + n^0), d) \\ &= {}_n a_i^1 - 1\{a_i \geq n'\} \cdot n^1 + \text{idiv}(a_i^0 - 1\{a_i \geq n'\} \cdot n^0, d), \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

for $i \in \{0, 1\}$. a_u can be expressed as $a_u = a_0 + a_1 - w \cdot n$, where the wrap-bit $w = 1\{a_0 + a_1 \geq n\}$. We can rewrite this as:

$$\begin{aligned} a_u &= a_0 + a_1 - w \cdot n \\ &= (a_0^1 + a_1^1 - w \cdot n^1) \cdot d + (a_0^0 + a_1^0 - w \cdot n^0) \\ &= (a_0^1 + a_1^1 - w \cdot n^1 + k) \cdot d + (a_0^0 + a_1^0 - w \cdot n^0 - k \cdot d), \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

for some integer k such that $0 \leq a_0^0 + a_1^0 - w \cdot n^0 - k \cdot d < d$. Similar to [Equation 3](#) and from [Equation 4](#), we can write $\text{rdiv}(a, d)$ as:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{rdiv}(a, d) &= {}_n a_0^1 + a_1^1 - w \cdot n^1 + k - 1\{a \geq n'\} \cdot n^1 \\ &\quad + \text{idiv}(a_0^0 + a_1^0 - w \cdot n^0 - k \cdot d - 1\{a \geq n'\} \cdot n^0, d) \\ &= {}_n a_0^1 + a_1^1 - w \cdot n^1 - 1\{a \geq n'\} \cdot n^1 \\ &\quad + \text{idiv}(a_0^0 + a_1^0 - w \cdot n^0 - 1\{a \geq n'\} \cdot n^0, d). \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

From [Equations 3](#) and [5](#), we have the following correction term:

$$\begin{aligned} c &= {}_n \text{rdiv}(a, d) - \text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_0^n, d) - \text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_1^n, d) \\ &= {}_n (1\{a_0 \geq n'\} + 1\{a_1 \geq n'\} - w - 1\{a \geq n'\}) \cdot n^1 \\ &\quad + \text{idiv}(a_0^0 + a_1^0 - w \cdot n^0 - 1\{a \geq n'\} \cdot n^0, d) \\ &\quad - (\text{idiv}(a_0^0 - 1\{a_0 \geq n'\} \cdot n^0, d) + \text{idiv}(a_1^0 - 1\{a_1 \geq n'\} \cdot n^0, d)) \\ &= {}_n c^1 \cdot n^1 + c^0 - B \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$

Let $A'_i = \text{idiv}(a_0^0 + a_1^0 - i \cdot n^0, d)$. Then the values of the correction terms c^1 and c^0 are as summarized in [Table 8](#).

From the table, we have $c^1 = \text{corr}$ and can rewrite the correction term as $c = {}_n \text{corr} \cdot n^1 + c^0 - B$. Thus, adding $\text{corr} \cdot n^1 - B \bmod n$ to $\text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_0^n, d) + \text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_1^n, d)$ accounts for all the correction terms except $c_0 \bmod n$.

Now all that remains to be proven is that $c^0 = 1 - C$. Let $C_0 = 1\{A < d\}$, $C_1 = 1\{A < 0\}$, and $C_2 = 1\{A < -d\}$. Then, we have $C = C_0 + C_1 + C_2$. Note from the theorem statement that $A = a_0^0 + a_1^0$ and $A = a_0^0 + a_1^0 - 2 \cdot n^0$ for the cases corresponding to rows 1 and 8 respectively from the table, while $A = a_0^0 + a_1^0 - n^0$ for the rest of cases. Thus, it is easy to see that $c^0 = \text{idiv}(A, d)$. Also note that $-2 \cdot d + 2 \leq A \leq 2 \cdot d - 2$, implying that the range of c^0 is $\{-2, -1, 0, 1\}$. Now we look at each value assumed by c^0 separately as follows:

- $c^0 = -2$: In this case, we have $(A < -d)$, implying $C_0 = C_1 = C_2 = 1$, and $1 - C = -2$.
- $c^0 = -1$: In this case, we have $(-d \leq A < 0)$, implying $C_0 = C_1 = 1, C_2 = 0$ and $1 - C = -1$.
- $c^0 = 0$: In this case, we have $(0 \leq A < d)$, implying $C_0 = 1, C_1 = C_2 = 0$ and $1 - C = 0$.
- $c^0 = 1$: In this case, we have $(d \leq A)$, implying $C_0 = C_1 = C_2 = 0$ and $1 - C = 1$.

Thus, $c = {}_n \text{corr} \cdot n^1 + (1 - C) - B = {}_n \text{rdiv}(a, d) - \text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_0^n, d) - \text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_1^n, d)$. \square

D PROTOCOL FOR GENERAL DIVISION

We describe our protocol for general division formally in [Algorithm 9](#). As discussed in [Section 4.2.2](#), our protocol builds on [Theorem 4.1](#) and we compute the various sub-terms securely using our new protocols. Let $\delta = \lceil \log 6d \rceil$. We compute the shares of corr over both \mathbb{Z}_n and \mathbb{Z}_Δ ([Step 15](#)). We write the term C as $(\text{DReLU}(A - d) \oplus 1) + (\text{DReLU}(A) \oplus 1) + (\text{DReLU}(A + d) \oplus 1)$, which can be computed using three calls to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \delta}$ ([Step 19](#)) and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$ ([Step 20](#)) each.

Correctness and Security. First, $m = \text{Reconst}^B(\langle m \rangle_0^B, \langle m \rangle_1^B) = \text{Reconst}^B(\langle a \rangle_0^B, \langle a \rangle_1^B) = 1\{a \geq n'\}$. Next, similar to [Algorithm 5](#), $\text{Reconst}^L(\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^L, \langle \text{corr} \rangle_1^L) = \text{corr} = \text{Reconst}^\Delta(\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^\Delta, \langle \text{corr} \rangle_1^\Delta)$, where corr is as defined in [Theorem 4.1](#). Given the bounds on value of A (as discussed above), it easy to see that [Steps 16&17](#) compute arithmetic shares of A , and $A_0 = (A - d), A_1 = A, A_2 = (A + d)$, respectively. Now, invocation of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \delta}$ on shares of A_j ([Step 19](#)) returns boolean shares of $\gamma = (1 \oplus \text{MSB}(A_j))$ over δ bit integers, which is same as $1 \oplus 1\{A_j < 0\}$ over \mathbb{Z} . Hence, $C'_j = \text{Reconst}^B(\langle C'_j \rangle_0^B, \langle C'_j \rangle_1^B) = 1\{A_j < 0\}$. By correctness of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$, [step 22](#) computes arithmetic shares of C as defined in [Theorem 4.1](#). In [step 23](#), $B_0 + B_1 = {}_n B$ as defined. Hence, correctness holds and $\langle z \rangle_b^n$ are shares of $\text{rdiv}(a, d)$.

Given that $\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^n$ and $\langle \text{corr} \rangle_1^\Delta$ are uniformly random, security of the protocol is easy to see in $(\binom{4}{1}\text{-OT}_{\eta+\delta}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \delta}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n)$ -hybrid.

Communication complexity. $\Pi_{\text{DIV}}^{\text{ring}, n, d}$ involves a single call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{ring}, n}$ and $(\binom{4}{1})\text{-OT}_{\eta+\delta}$, and three calls each to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \delta}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$. From [Appendix B](#), we have the cost of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{ring}, n}$ as $\frac{3}{2}\lambda\eta + 27\eta - \frac{\lambda}{2} - 13$ bits. $(\binom{4}{1})\text{-OT}_{\eta+\delta}$ and $3 \times \mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$ cost $2\lambda + 4 \cdot (\eta + \delta)$ and $3\lambda + 3\eta$ bits respectively. Since the cost of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \delta}$ is $\lambda\ell + 13\frac{1}{2}\ell - 3\lambda - 35\frac{1}{2}$ bits (see [Appendix B](#)), $3 \times \mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int}, \delta}$ requires $3\lambda\delta + 40\frac{1}{2}\delta - 9\lambda - 106\frac{1}{2}$ bits

Algorithm 9 Integer ring division, $\Pi_{\text{DIV}}^{\text{ring},n,d}$:

Input: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b holds $\langle a \rangle_b^n$, where $a \in \mathbb{Z}_n$.

Output: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b learns $\langle z \rangle_b^n$ s.t. $z = \text{rdiv}(a, d)$.

- 1: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, let $a_b, a_b^0, a_b^1 \in \mathbb{Z}$ and $n^0, n^1, n' \in \mathbb{Z}$ be as defined in [Theorem 4.1](#). Let $\eta = \lceil \log(n) \rceil$, $\delta = \lceil \log 6d \rceil$, and $\Delta = 2^\delta$.
 - 2: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{ring},n}$ with input $\langle a \rangle_b^n$ to learn output $\langle \alpha \rangle_b^B$. Party P_b sets $\langle m \rangle_b^B = \langle \alpha \rangle_b^B \oplus b$.
 - 3: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b sets $x_b = \mathbf{1}\{\langle \alpha \rangle_b^n \geq n'\}$.
 - 4: P_0 samples $\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^n \xleftarrow{s} \mathbb{Z}_n$ and $\langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^\Delta \xleftarrow{s} \mathbb{Z}_\Delta$.
 - 5: **for** $j = \{00, 01, 10, 11\}$ **do**
 - 6: P_0 computes $t_j = (\langle m \rangle_0^B \oplus j_0 \oplus x_0) \wedge (\langle m \rangle_0^B \oplus j_0 \oplus j_1)$ s.t. $j = (j_0 || j_1)$.
 - 7: **if** $t_j \wedge \mathbf{1}\{x_0 = 0\}$ **then**
 - 8: P_0 sets $s_j = n - \langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^n - 1$ and $r_j = \Delta - \langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^\Delta - 1$.
 - 9: **else if** $t_j \wedge \mathbf{1}\{x_0 = 1\}$ **then**
 - 10: P_0 sets $s_j = n - \langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^n + 1$ and $r_j = \Delta - \langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^\Delta + 1$.
 - 11: **else**
 - 12: P_0 sets $s_j = n - \langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^n$ and $r_j = \Delta - \langle \text{corr} \rangle_0^\Delta$.
 - 13: **end if**
 - 14: **end for**
 - 15: P_0 & P_1 invoke an instance of $\binom{4}{1}\text{-OT}_{\eta+\delta}$ where P_0 is the sender with inputs $\{s_j || r_j\}_j$ and P_1 is the receiver with input $\langle m \rangle_1^B || x_1$. P_1 sets its output as $\langle \text{corr} \rangle_1^n || \langle \text{corr} \rangle_1^\Delta$.
 - 16: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b sets $\langle A \rangle_b^\Delta = \Delta a_b^0 - (x_b - \langle \text{corr} \rangle_b^\Delta) \cdot n^0$.
 - 17: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b sets $\langle A_0 \rangle_b^\Delta = \Delta \langle A \rangle_b^\Delta - b \cdot d$, $\langle A_1 \rangle_b^\Delta = \langle A \rangle_b^\Delta$, and $\langle A_2 \rangle_b^\Delta = \Delta \langle A \rangle_b^\Delta + b \cdot d$.
 - 18: **for** $j = \{0, 1, 2\}$ **do**
 - 19: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\delta}$ with input $\langle A_j \rangle_b^\Delta$ to learn output $\langle Y_j \rangle_b^B$. Party P_b sets $\langle C'_j \rangle_b^B = \langle Y_j \rangle_b^B \oplus b$.
 - 20: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b invokes an instance of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^n$ with input $\langle C'_j \rangle_b^B$ and learns $\langle C_j \rangle_b^n$.
 - 21: **end for**
 - 22: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b sets $\langle C \rangle_b^n = \langle C_0 \rangle_b^n + \langle C_1 \rangle_b^n + \langle C_2 \rangle_b^n$.
 - 23: For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, P_b sets $B_b = \text{idiv}(a_b^0 - x_b \cdot n^0, d)$.
 - 24: P_b sets $\langle z \rangle_b^n = n \cdot \text{rdiv}(\langle a \rangle_b^n, d) + \langle \text{corr} \rangle_b^n \cdot n^1 + b - \langle C \rangle_b^n - B_b$, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
-

of communication. Thus, the overall communication of $\Pi_{\text{DIV}}^{\text{ring},n,d}$ is $\frac{3}{2}\lambda\eta + 34\eta + 3\lambda\delta + 44\frac{1}{2}\delta - 4\frac{1}{2}\lambda - 119\frac{1}{2}$, which can be rewritten as $< (\frac{3}{2}\lambda + 34) \cdot (\eta + 2\delta)$. Concretely, we get the best communication for $\Pi_{\text{DIV}}^{\text{ring},n,49}$ ($\eta = 32$) by setting $m = 7$ in all our millionaire invocations, which results in a total communication of 7796 bits.

Note that for the case of ℓ -bit integers, our division protocol would require a call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\ell}$ and $\binom{4}{1}\text{-OT}_{\ell+\delta}$, and three calls each to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\delta}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^L$. The cost of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\ell}$ and $3 \times \mathcal{F}_{\text{DReLU}}^{\text{int},\delta}$ are as mentioned in the previous paragraph, and the cost of $\binom{4}{1}\text{-OT}_{\ell+\delta}$ and $\mathcal{F}_{\text{B2A}}^L$ are $2\lambda + 4 \cdot (\ell + \delta)$ and $3\lambda + 3\ell$ bits respectively. Thus, the overall communication is $\lambda\ell + 3\lambda\delta + 20\frac{1}{2}\ell + 44\frac{1}{2}\delta - 7\lambda - 142$ bits, which can be rewritten as $< (\lambda + 21) \cdot (\ell + 3\delta)$. By setting $m = 8$ in

all our millionaire invocations, we get the best communication of 5570 bits for $\Pi_{\text{DIV}}^{\text{int},32,49}$.

E INPUT ENCODING

Neural network inference performs computations on floating-point numbers, whereas the secret-sharing techniques only work for integers in a ring \mathbb{Z}_n , for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$.¹²

To represent a floating-point number $x \in \mathbb{Q}$ in the ring \mathbb{Z}_n , we encode it as a fixed-point integer $a = \lfloor x \cdot 2^s \rfloor \bmod n$ with scale s . Fixed-point arithmetic is performed on the encoded input values (in the secure domain) and the same scale s is maintained for all the intermediate results. The ring size n and the scale s are chosen such that the absolute value of any intermediate result does not exceed the bound $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ and there is no loss in accuracy (refer [Appendix I](#)).

F IMPROVEMENT TO GAZELLE'S ALGORITHM

Gazelle [43] proposed two methods for computing convolutions, namely, the input rotations and the output rotations method. The only difference between the two methods is the number of (homomorphic) rotations required¹³. In this section, we describe an optimization to reduce the number of rotations required by the output rotations method.

Let c_i and c_o denote the number of input and output channels respectively, and c_n denote the number of channels that can fit in a single ciphertext. At a high level, the output rotations method works as follows: after performing all the convolutions homomorphically, we have $c_i \cdot c_o / c_n$ intermediate ciphertexts that are to be accumulated to form tightly packed output ciphertexts. Since most of these ciphertexts are misaligned after the convolution, they must be rotated in order to align and pack them. The intermediate ciphertexts can be grouped into c_o / c_n groups of c_i ciphertexts each, such that the ciphertexts within each group are added (after alignment) to form a single ciphertext. In [43], the ciphertexts within each group are rotated (aligned) individually, resulting in $\approx c_i \cdot \frac{c_o}{c_n}$ rotations. We observe that these groups can be further divided into c_n subgroups of c_i / c_n ciphertexts each, such that ciphertexts within a subgroup are misaligned by the same offset. Doing this has the advantage that the c_i / c_n ciphertexts within each subgroup can first be added and then the resulting ciphertext can be aligned using a single rotation. This brings down the number of rotations by a factor of c_i / c_n to $\approx c_n \cdot \frac{c_o}{c_n}$.

With our optimization, the output rotations method is better than the input rotations method when $f^2 \cdot c_i > c_o$, where f^2 is the filter size, which is usually the case.

G COMPLEXITY OF OUR BENCHMARKS

The complexity of the benchmarks we use in [Section 7](#) is summarized as follows:

- SqueezeNet: There are 26 convolution layers of maximum filter size 3×3 and up to 1000 output channels. The activations after linear layers are ReLUs with size of up to 200,704

¹²Note that this includes the case of ℓ -bit integers when $n = 2^\ell$.

¹³The number of homomorphic additions also differ, but they are relatively very cheap.

Benchmark	Bitwidth	Scale	TF Top 1	Fixed Top 1	TF Top 5	Fixed Top 5
SqueezeNet	32	9	55.86	55.90	79.18	79.22
ResNet50	37	12	76.47	76.45	93.21	93.23
DenseNet121	32	11	74.25	74.35	91.88	91.90

Table 10: Summary of the accuracy achieved by fixed-point code vs input TensorFlow (TF) code.

Benchmark	Garbled Circuits			Our Protocol		
	LAN	WAN	Comm	LAN	WAN	Comm
SqueezeNet	0.2	2.0	36.02	0.1	0.8	1.84
ResNet50	0.4	3.9	96.97	0.1	0.8	2.35
DenseNet121	17.2	179.4	6017.94	0.5	3.5	158.83

(a) over \mathbb{Z}_{2^t}

Benchmark	Garbled Circuits			Our Protocol		
	LAN	WAN	Comm	LAN	WAN	Comm
SqueezeNet	0.2	2.2	39.93	0.1	0.9	1.92
ResNet50	0.4	4.2	106.22	0.1	1.0	3.82
DenseNet121	19.2	198.2	6707.94	0.6	4.4	214.94

(b) over \mathbb{Z}_n

Table 9: Performance comparison of Garbled Circuits with our protocols for computing Avgpool layers. Runtimes are in seconds and communication numbers are in MiB.

elements per layer. All ReLU layers combined have a size of 2,033,480. Additionally, there are 3 Maxpool layers and an Avgpool₁₆₉ layer (Avgpool with pool size 169).

- ResNet50: There are 53 convolution layers of maximum filter size 7×7 and a peak output channel count of 2048. Convolution layers are followed by batch normalization and then ReLUs. There are 49 ReLU layers totaling 9,006,592 ReLUs, where the biggest one consists of 802,816 elements. Moreover, ResNet50 also has Maxpool layers and an Avgpool₄₉.

- DenseNet121: There are 121 convolution layers with maximum filter dimension of 7×7 and up to 1000 output channels. Similar to ResNet50, between 2 convolution layers, there is batch normalization followed by ReLU. The biggest ReLU layer in DenseNet121 has 802,816 elements and the combined size of all ReLU layers is 15,065,344. In addition, DenseNet121 consists of a Maxpool, an Avgpool₄₉ and 3 Avgpool₄ layers.

H GARBLED CIRCUITS VS OUR PROTOCOLS FOR Avgpool

In this section, we compare our protocols with garbled circuits for evaluating the Avgpool layers of our benchmarks, and the corresponding performance numbers are given in Table 9. On DenseNet121, where a total of 176,640 divisions are performed, we have improvements over GC of more than 32 \times and 45 \times in the LAN and the WAN setting, respectively, for both our protocols. However, on SqueezeNet and ResNet50, the improvements are smaller (2 \times to 7 \times) because these DNNs only require 1000 and 2048 divisions, respectively, which are not enough for the costs in our protocols to amortize well. On the other hand, the communication difference between our protocols and GC is huge for all three DNNs. Specifically, we have an improvement of more than 19 \times , 27 \times , and 31 \times on SqueezeNet, ResNet50, and DenseNet121 respectively, for both our protocols.

I FIXED-POINT ACCURACY OF OUR BENCHMARKS

In this section, we show that the accuracy achieved by the fixed-point code matches the accuracy of the input TensorFlow code. Table 10 summarizes the bitwidths, the scales, and the corresponding TensorFlow (TF) and fixed-point accuracy for each of our benchmarks. Since our truncation and division protocols lead to faithful implementation of fixed-point arithmetic, accuracy of secure inference is the same as the fixed-point accuracy.